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NOTE.

The following selection of cases in the law of Damages has been

made primarily for use in connection with the lectures upon that

subject given in the Law Department of the University of Michigan.

The purpose has been partly to supply illustrations of the applica-

tion of principles referred to in the lectures, and partly to supplement

the lectures by rounding out the view of certain ﬁelds not otherwise

completely developed.

Arbitrary, but inexorable, considerations of size and price have

determined the scope of the selection; and, for reasons perhaps suf-

ﬁciently obvious, preference has been given, when possible, to cases

which have appeared in the National Reporter System. It is, how-

ever, due to the publishers to say that, with respect to both of the

considerations above mentioned, their attitude has been constantly

NOTE.

generous.

The cases, as a rule, are not annotated, and they have usually been

reproduced entire, although some parts of them may not be germane

to the subject of Damages. F. B. M.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,

Ann Arbor, November 1, 1898.
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The following selt>ction of cases in the law of Damages has been
made primarily for use in connection with the lectures upon that
aubject given in the Law Department of the University of Michigan.
The purpose has been partly to supply illustrations of the application of principles referred to in the lectures, and partly to supplement
the lectures by rounding out the view of certain flelde not otherwise
completely developed.
Arbitrary, but inexorable, considerations of size and price have
determined the scope of the selection; and, for reasons perhaps suficiently obvious, preference has been given, when pqssible, to cases
which have appeared in the National Reporter System. It is, how·
ner, due to the publishers to say that, with respect to both of the
considerations above mentioned, their attitude has been constantly
generous.
The cases, aa a rule, are not annotated, and they have usually been
reproduced entire, although some parts of them may not be germane
to the subject of Damages.
F. B. M.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
ADD .Arbor, November 1, 1898.
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3

followed by some perceptible damagC'. whlcll
can be established as a matter of !net; In
other words, that lnjurla sine damno ls not
U. S. Circuit Court, D. M&ine. M&T Term, actionable. See Mayor of Lynn, etc., v.
Mayor of London, 4 Term R. 130, 141, 143,
1838.
144; Com. Dig. "Action on the Case," B l,
In equity. On bill for lnjucctlon.
:.!. On the contrary, from my enrll<'st reading,
Bill In equity by Joshua Webb against .I have considered it laid up among the very
the Portland Manufacturing Company to elements ot the common Jaw that wherever
restrain the diversion ot water trow pla.ln- there Is a wrong there Is a remedy to redress
tifrs mill. On the stream on which the mill it; and that every Injury Imports damage In
was situated were two dame, the distance the nature of lt; and, If no other damage is
between which was about 40 or 50 rods, oc- established. the party Injured Is entitle<l to
cupied by the mill-pond of the lower dam. a verdict for nominal damages., A fortiori
Plaintiff owned certain mills and mill prlvl- this doctrine applies where there Is not only
leges on the lower dam. Defendants also a violation ot a right of the plalntlfl', but the
owned certain other mills and mill privlle1tes act of the defendant, if continued, may be-<>n the same dam. To supply water to one ! eome tbe foundation, by lapse ot time, of
<>t such mills, defendants made a canal from I an adverse right In the defendant; for then
the pond at a point Immediately below the it a!ISumes the character, not merely of a
upper dam. The water thus withdrawn by violation of a right tending to diminish its
them for that purpose was about one-fourth value, but goes to the absolute destruction
of the water to which defendants were en- and extinguishment ot It. Under such cirtitled as mlll-owners on the lower dam. and cumstnnces, unless the party Injured can prowas returned Into the stream Immediately tect bis right trom such a violation by an
below that dam. A preliminary question. action, It Is plnln that It may be lost ot· desuggested by the court,. was argued on the blll etroyed, without any pOS!llble remedial r<>and answer.
dress. In my judgment, the common Jaw
countenances no such lnconsif1tency, not to
C. S. Davels, for plaintiff. P. Mellen and call It by a stronger name. Actual, perceptl:'\Ir. Longfellow, tor defendants.
1 ble damage Is not Indispensable as the foundatlon of an action. The law tolerates no
STORY, J. The question which has been 1 further Inquiry than whether there has been
argued upon the suggestion of the court Is of the violation of a right. If so, the party tnvital Importance In the cause, and, It de- 1 jured Is entitled to maintain his action for
clded In favor of the plalntlfl', It supersedes nominal damages, In vindication of his right.
many of the Inquiries to which our attention It no other damages are flt and proper to
must otherwise be directed. It Is on this ac- remunerate him. So Jong ago as the great
count that we thought It proper to be argued case of Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Rnym. 938. 6
separately trom the general merits of the 1 Mod. 45, Holt, 524, the objection was put
cause.
forth by some of the judges, and was anThe argument tor the defendants, then, swered by Lord Holt. with his usunl ability
presents two distinct questions. The first Is and clear learning; and his judgment was
whether. to maintain the present suit, It Is es- supported by the house of lords, and that of
sentlal for the plaintiff to establish any actual his brethren overturned. By the favor of an
dama:;:'e. The second ts whether, In point of eminent judge, Lord Holfs opinion, apparentlaw, a m·lll-owner, having a right to a certain ly copied from his own manuscript. has
portion of the water of a stream tor the been recently printed. In this Inst printed
use ot his mill at a particular dam, bas a opinion (page 14} Lord Holt says: "It Is Imright to draw otr the same portion or any possible to Imagine any such thing as lnjurla
less quantity of the water, at a considerable sine damno. Every Injury Imports damage
distance above the dam, without the consent In the nature of It." S. P. 2 Ld. Raym. 933.
of the owners of other mills on the same dam. And he cites many cases In 1mpport of hi;o1
In connection with these questions, the point position. Among these Is Starling v. Turner.
will also Incidentally arise whether It makes 2 Lev. 50. 2 Vent. 25, where the plalntifl'
any dlfl'erence that such drawing ofl' of the was a candidate tor the office of brldge-mnswater above can be shown to be no sensible ter of London bridge, and the lord mayor reInjury to the other mill-owners on the lower fused hfs demand of a poll. and It was dedam.
termlned that the action was maintainable
As to the first question, I can very well tor the refusal of the poll. Although It might
understand that no action lies In a case where hc.ve been thn.t the plaintiff would not have
there Is damnum absque lnjurla; that Is, been elected, the action was neverthelesa
where there Is a damage done without any maintainable; for the refusal was n. violawrong or violation of any right of the plain- tlon of the plalntlfl''s right to be a candidate.
tiff. But I am not able to understand how So In the case cited, as trom 23 Edw. III. 18,
It can correctly be said, In a legal sense, that tit. "Defense," (It Is a mistake In the MS.,
an action will not lie, even In case of a and should be 29 Edw. III. 18b: Fitz. Abr.
wrong or violation of a right, unleSI! It ls tit "Defense," pl. 5,) and 11 Hen. IV. 47,
WEBB v. PORTLA?'l'D MANUF'G CO.
(Fed. Cu. No. 17,32'l: 3 Suma. 189.)

WEBB v. PORTLAND MANUF'G CO.

(Fed. Cas. No. 17,322: 3 Sumn. 189.)

U. 8. Circuit Court, D. Maine. May Term,

1838.

In equity. On bill for imuuctlon.

Bill in equity by Joshua Webb against

the Portland Manufacturing ‘Company to

restrain the diversion of water from plain-

tit'.[‘s mill. On the stream on which the mill

was situated were two dams, the distance

between which was about 40 or 50 rods, oc-

cupied by the mill-pond of the lower dam.

Plaintiff owned certain mills and mill privi-

leges on the lower dam. Defendants also

owned certain other mills and mill privileges

on the same dam. To supply water to one

of such mills, defendants made a canal from

the pond at a point immediately below the

upper dam. The water thus withdrawn by
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them for that purpose was about one-fourth

of the water to which defendants were en-

titled as mill-owners on the lower dam. and

was returned into the stream immediately

below that dam. A preliminary question,

suggested by the court,_ was argued on the bill

and answer.

C. S. Davels, for plaintiff. P. Mellen and

Mr. Longfellow, for defendants.

STORY. J. The question which has been

argued upon the suggestion of the court is of

vital importance in the cause, and, if de-

cided in favor of the plaintiff, it supersedes

many of the inquiries to which our attention

must otherwise be directed. It is on this ac-

count that we thought it proper to be argued

separately from the general merits of the

cause.

The argument for the defendants, then,

presents two distinct questions. The ﬁrst is

whether. to maintain the present suit, it is es-

sential for the plaintif f to establish any actual

d31n8§_'t3.v The second is whether, in point of

law, a mill-owner, having a right to a certain

portion of the water of a stream for the

use of his mill at a particular dam, has a

right to draw of! the same portion or any

less quantity of the water. at a considerable

distance above the dam. without the consent

of the owners of other mills on the same dam.

In connection with these questions, the point

will also incidentally arise whether it makes

any difference that such drawing of! of the

water above can be shown to be no sensible

injury to the other mill-owners on the lower

dam.

As to the ﬁrst question, I can very well

understand that no action lies in a case where

there is damnum absque injuria; that is,

where there is a damage done without any

wrong or violation of any right of the plain-

till. But I am not able to understand how

it can correctly be said, in a legal sense, that

an action will not lie, even in case of a

wrong or violation of a right, unless it is

I

followed by some perceptible damage. which

can be established as a matter of tact; in

other words, that injuria sine damno is not

I

NOMINAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES.
4 NOMINAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES.

where the owner of a market, entitled to toll

upon all cattle sold within the market,

brought an action against the defendant for

hindering a person from going to the market

with the intent to sell a horse, it was, on the

like ground, held maintainable; for though

the horse might not have been sold, and no

toll would have become due, yet the hindering

the plaintiff from the possibility of having

toll was such an injury as did import such

damage, for which the plaintiff ought to re-

cover. So in Hunt v. Dowman, Cro. Jae.

478, 2 Rollo, 21, where the lessor brought an

action against the lessee for disturbing him

from entering into the house leased. in order

to view it, and to see whether any waste

was committed; and it was held that the

action well lay, though no waste was com-

mitted and no actual damage done. for the

lessor had a right so to enter, and the hinder-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:09 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ing of him was an injury to that right, for

which he might maintain an action. So Her-

ring v. Finch, 2 Lev. 250. where it was held

that a person entitled to vote, who was re-

fused his vote at an election, might well

maintain an action therefor, although the can-

didate, for whom he might have voted, might

not have been chosen, and the voter could

not sustain any perceptible or actual damage

by such refusal of his vote. The law gives

the remedy in such case, for there is a clear

violation of the right. And this doctrine, as

to a violation of the right to vote, is now in-

controvertibly established; and yet it would

be impracticable to show any temporal or

actual damage thereby. See Harman v. Tap-

penden, 1 East, 555; Drewe v. Coulton, Id.

563, note; Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236;

Lincoin v. Hapgood. 11 Mass. 350; 2 Vin.

Abr. “Action, Case," note c, pl. 3. In the

case of Ashby v. White, as reported by Lord

Raymond, (2 Ld. Raym. 953,) Lord Holt

said: “If the plaintiff has a right, he must

of necessity have a means to vindicate and

maintain it, and a remedy, it he is injured

in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and. in-

deed, it is a vain thing to imagine a right

without a remedy; for want of right and

want of remedy are reciprocal." S. P. 6

Mod. 53.

The principles laid down by Lord Holt are

so strongly commended, not only by authori-

ty. but by the common sense and common

justice of mankind, that they seem absolutely,

in a judicial view, incontrovertible. And they

have been fully recognized in many other

cases. The note of Mr. Sergeant Williams to

Mellor v. Spateman. 1 Saund. 346a, note 2;

Weils v. Watling, 2 W. B1. 1233; and the case

of the Tunbridge Dippers, (Weller v. Baker.)

2 Wils. 414,—are direct to the purpose. I am

aware that some of the old cases inculcate a

different doctrine, and perhaps are not recon-

cllable with that of Lord Holt. There are

also some modern cases which at ﬁrst view

seem to the contrary. But they are dis-

tinguishable from that now in judgment; and,

it they were not, cgo assentior scaevoloc. The

case of Williams v. Morland, 2 Barn. & C. 9.

where the owner of a market, entitled to toll casa of Wllllam11 v. Morland, 2 Barn. & C. 9.
upon all cattle sold within the market, 10, seems to have proceeded upon the ground •
brought an action against the defendant for that there was neither any damage nor any
hlndertng a person from going to the market Injury to the right of the plalntl1f. Whether
with the Intent to sell a hone, It was, on the that case can be supported upon principle It
like ground, held maintainable; for though Is not now necessary to say. Some of the
the horse might not have been sold,' and no dicta in It have been subsequently Impugned,
toll would have become due, yet the hindering and the general reasoning of the judges seems
the plaintiff from the posalblllty of having to admit that, if any right of the plaintiff
toll was such an Injury as did import such bad been violated, the action would have
damage, for which the plalntUT ought to re- lain. Tbe case of Jackson v. Peaked, 1 Maule
cover. So In Hunt v. Dowman, Cro. Jae. & S. 235, turned upon the euppoeed defects
478, 2 Rolle, 21, where the lessor brought an of the declaration, as applicable to a mere
action against the lessee for disturbing him reverslonary Interest, It not stating any act
from entering Into the house leased, in order done to the prejudice of that reverslonary Into view It, and .to see whether any waste terest. I do not stop to Inquire whether
was committed; and It was held that the there was not an overnicety in the appllcaactlon well lay, though no waste was com- tlon of the technical principles of pleading
ml.t ted and no actual damage done, for the to that <:ase, although, notwithstanding the
lessor bad a right so to enter, and the hinder- elaborate opinion of Lord Ellenborough, one
Ing of him was an Injury to that right, for might be Inclined to pause upon it. The case
which be might maintain an action. So Her- of Young v. Spencer, 10 Barn. & C. 145, turnring v. Finch, 2 Lev. 250, where It was held ed. also upon the point whether any Injury
that a person entitled to vote, who was re- was done to a reverslonary Interest. I confused bis vote at an election, might well fess myself better pleased with the ruling of
maintain an action therefor, although the can- the learned judge (Mr. Justice Bayley) at
dldate, for whom he might have voted, might the trial than with the declRlon of the com·t
not have been chosen, and the voter could In gmntlng a new trial. But the court adnot sustain any perceptible or actual damage mltted that, if there was any Injury to the
by such refusal of his vote. The law gives reverslonary right, the action would lie; and,
the remedy In such case. tor there ls a clear although there might be no actual damage
violation of the right. And this doctrine, as pro"\'ed, yet, if anything done by the tenant
to a viola tlon of the right to vote, is now In- would destroy the evidence of title, the accontroYertlbly established; and yet It would tlon was maintainable. A fortiori, the action
b~ hnpractlcnble to show any temporal or
must have been held maintainable, It the
actual damage thereby. See Harman v. Tap- act done went to destroy the existing right,
penden, 1 East, 555; Drewe v. Coulton, Id. or to found an adverse right.
563, note; !{llbam v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236;
On the other hand, Marzettl v. Williams.
Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; 2 Vin. 1 Barn. & Adol. 415, goes the whole length
Abr. "Action, Case," note c, p}. 3. In the of Lord Holt's doctrin!l.; for there the plaincase of Ashby v. White, as reported by Lord tllT recovered, notwithstanding no actual
Raymond, (2 Ld. Raym. 953,) Lord Holt damage was proved at the trial; and Mr.
said: "If the plaintiff bas a right, he must Justice Taunton on that occasion cited
of necessity have a. means to vindicate and many authorities to show that where a
maintain It, and a remedy, if be ls Injured wrong ls done, by which the right of the
In the exercise or enjoyment of It; and, In- party may be Injured, it Is a good cause of
deed, it is a vain thing to Imagine a right action, although no actual damage be suswlthout a remedy; for want of right and talned. In Hobson v. Todd, 4 Term R. 71,
want of remedy are reciprocal." S. P. 6 73, the court decided the case upon the very
Mod. 53.
dlstinctlon,whlch ls most material to the
The principles laid down by Lord Holt are present case, thnt If a commoner might not
so strongly commended, not only by authori- maintain an action for an Injury, however
ty, but by the common sense and common small, to his right, a mere wrong-doer
justice of mankind, that they seem absolutely, might, by repeated torts, In the course of
In a judicial view, Incontrovertible. And they time establish evidence of a right of comhave been fully recognized in many other mon. The same principle was afterwards
cnses. The note of Mr. Sergeant Wllliams to recognized by Mr. Jm1tlce Grose, In Pindar
Mellor v. Spnteman. 1 Saund. 3'16a, note 2; v. Wadsworth, 2 East, 162. But the case
Wells v. Watling, 2 W. Bl. 1233; and the case of Bower v. Hlll, 1 Bing. N. C. M9, fully
of the Tunbridge Dippers, (Weller v. Baker,) sustains the doctrine for which I contend;
2 Wlls. 414.-are direct to the purpose. I am and, Indeed, a stronger case of Its appllcaa ware that some of the old cases Inculcate a tlon cannot well be imagined. There the
different doctrine, and perhaps are not recon- court held that a permanent obi;tructlon to
cilable with that of Lord Holt. There are a navigable drain of the plalntll'l''s, though
also some modern cases which at first view choked up with mud for 16 years, Wll8 aceeem to the contrary. But they are dls-1 tlonable, although the plalntlll' received no .
tlngulshable from thnt now In judgment; ancl, Immediate damage thereby; for, If acqui1! they were not, ci;o assentior screvolre. The esced In for 20 years, ft would become evl-
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dence of a renunciation and abandonment

of the right of way. The case of Blanchard

v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268, recognizes the

same doctrine in the most full and satisfac-

tory manner, and is directly in point; for

it was a case for diverting water from the

plaintiff's mill. 1 should be sorry to have

it supposed for a moment that Tyler v.

Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, Fed. Cas. No. 14,-

312, imported a different doctrine. On the

contrary, I have always considered it as

proceeding upon the same doctrine.

Upon the whole, without going further in-

to an examination of the authorities on this

subject, my judgment is that, whenever

there is a clear violation of a right, it is not

necessary in an action of this sort to show

actual damage; that every violation im-

ports damage; and, if no other he proved,

the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for nom-
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inal damages; and a fortiori that this doc-

trine applies whenever the act done is of

such a nature as that by its repetition or

continuance it may become the foundation

or evidence of an adverse right. See, also,

Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & Adol. 304, 5 Barn.

& Adol. 1. But if the doctrine were other-

wise, and no action were maintainable at

law, without proof of actual damage, that

, would furnish no ground why a court of

equity should not interfere, and protect such

a right from violation and invasion; for, in

a great variety of cases, the very ground of

the interposition of a court of equity is that

the injury done is irremediabie at law, and

that the right can only be permanently pre-

served or perpetuated by the powers of a

court of equity. And one of the most ordi-

nary processes to accomplish this end is by

a writ of injunction, the nature and eﬂicacy

of which for such purpose I need not state,

as the elementary treatises fully expound

them. See Eden, Inj.; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. c.

23, §§ 86-959; Bolivar Manuf'g Co. v. Nepon-

set Manuf'g Co., 16 Pick. 241. If, then, the

diversion of water complained of in the

present case is a violation of the right of

the plaintiff, and may permanently injure

that right, and become, by lapse of time,

the foundation of an adverse right in the

defendants, I know of no more ﬁt cae for

the interposition of a court of equity, by

way of injunction, to restrain the defend-

ants from such an injurious act. If there

ho a remedy for the plaintiff at law for dam-

ages, still that remedy is inadequate to pre-

vent and redress the mischief. If there be

no such remedy at law, then, a fortiori, a

court of equity ought to give its aid to vindi-

cate and perpetuate the right of the plain-

tiff. A court of equity will not, indeed, en-

tertain a bill for an injunction in case of a

mere trespass fully remediable at law. But,

if it might occasion irreparable mischief or

permanent injury, or destroy a right, that

is the appropriate case for such a bill. See

2.Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 926-928. and the cases

there cited; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch.

315; Van Bergen v. Van Bergen, 3 Johns.

dence ot a renunciation and abandonment
of the right of way. The case of Blanchard
v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 233, 268, recognizes the
same doctrine ln the most full and eatle!actory manner, and ls directly ln point; tor
It was a case for diverting water from the
plalntur'e mW. I should be sorry to have
It supposed for a moment that Tyler v.
Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, Fed. Oas. No. 14,312, Imported a ditrerent doctrine. On the
contrary, I have always considered It as
proceeding upon the same doctrine.
Upon the whole, without going further lnto an uamlnatlon of the authorities on tble
subject, my judgment le that, whenever
there Is a clear violation of a right, It le not
necessary ln an action of this sort to show
actual damage; that every violation Imports damage;- and, It no other be proved,
J the plalntltr ls entitled to a verdict for nominal damages; and a !ortlorl that this doctrine applies whenever the act done ls of
such a nnture as that by Its repetition or
continuance It may become the foundatlo'.l
or evidence of an ad\•erse right. See, aleo,
l\lason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & Adol. 304, 5 Barn.
& Adol. 1. But It the doctrine were othert wlBe, and no action were malntaJnable at
law, without proof of actual damage. that
would furnish no ground why a court of
equity should not interfere, and protect such
' a right from violation and Invasion; for, In
a great variety of caBeS, the very ground of
the Interposition of a court or equity ls that
the Injury done Is Irremediable at law, and
that the right can only be permanently preserved or perpetuated by the powers of a
court of equity. And one of the most ordl·
nary processes to accomplish this end le by
a writ of injunction, the nature and efficacy
of which tor such purpose I need not state,
as the elementary treatises fully expound
them. See Eden, lnj.; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. c.
23, f§ 86-9;')9; Bolivar Manut'g Co. v. Nep:>nset Manuf'g Co., 16 Pick. 241. It, then, the
diversion or water complained or in the
present case ls a violation of the rlg!lt of
the plalntitr, and may permanently Injure
that right, and become, by lapse of time,
the foundation of an adverse right In the
defendants, I know of no more fit case tor
the Interposition of 'a court of equity, by
way of Injunction, to restrain the defendants from such an Injurious act. It there
bo a remedy tor the plalntllT at law for damages, still that remedy ls Inadequate to pre\"ent and redress the mischief. If thC're be
no such remedy at law, then, a fortiori, a
court of equity ought to giYe Its aid to vindicate and perpetuate the right of the pialntUr. A court of equity will not, Indeed, entertain a bill for an Injunction in case of a
mere trespass fully remediable at law. But,
it It might occasion irreparable mischief or
permanent injury, or destroy a right, that
ls the appropriate case tor such a bill. See
2. Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 926-928, and the cases
there cited; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch.

~

311:>; Van !Jergen v. Van Bergen, 3 J'ohne.
Ch. 282; Turnpike Road v. Miller, 5 .Johns.
Ch. 101; Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2
Johns. Cb. 162.
Let us rome, then, to the only remaining
question lo the cause, and that la whether
any right of the plalntltr, as mill-owner on
the lower dam, le or wlll be violated by the
dlYerslon of the water by the canal of the
defendants. And here It does not seem to
me that, upon the present state of the law,
there Is any real ground for controYersy, although there were formerly many vexed
questions, and much contrariety of opinion.
The true doctrine le laid down In Wright v.
Howard, 1 Sim. & S. 190, by Sir John Leach,
in regard to riparian proprietors, and bis
opinion has since been deliberately adopt.~
by the king's bench. Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn.
& Adol. 30-1, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1. See, also,
Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 208. "Prima facle,"
says that learned judge, "the proprietor of
each bank of a stream le the proprietor of
half the land covered by the stream; but
there le no property in the wate~ Every
proprietor has an equal right to use the water which fiows In the stream; and consequently no proprietor can have the right to
use the water to the prejudice of any other
proprietor, without the consent of the other
proprletol'B who may be atrected by his operations. No proprietor can either diminish
the quantity of water which would otherwise
descend to the proprietors below, nor throw
the water back upon the proprietors above.
Every proprietor, who claims a right either
to throw the water back above or to dhnlnlsh
the quantity or water which ls to deacend
below, must, In order to maintain his claim,
either prove an actual grant or license from
the proprietors atrected by bis operations, or
must prove an uninterrupted enjoyment of
twenty years, which term of twenty years
ls now adopted upon a principle of general
convenience, as atrordlng conclusive presumption of a grant." The sa.me doctrine was
fully recognized and acted upon In the case
of Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, 400402; and also In the case of Blanchard v.
Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 260. In the latter case
the learned judge (Mr. Justice Weston) who
delivered the opinion of the court, used the
following emphatic language: "The right to
the use of a stream ls Incident or appurtenant
to the land through which It passes. It ls an
ancient and well-established principle that it
cannot be lawfully diverted, unleBS It "Is returned again to Its accustomed channel, before It paBBes the land of a proprietor below.
Running water ls not susceptible of an appropriation wblch will justify the diversion
or unreasonable detention of It. The proprietor of the water-course has a right to
avail himself of Its momentum as a power,
which may be turned to beneficial purposes."
The C1l.8e of Mason v. Hill, 5 Barn. & A.dol.
l, contains langunge ot an exactly similar
Import, used by Lord Denman In deliyerlng
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the opinion of the court. See, also, Gardner

v. Village of Newburgh. 2 Johns. Ch. 162.

Mr. Chancellor Kent has also summoned up

the same doctrine, with his usual accuracy,

in the brief, but pregnant, text of his Com-

mentaries, (3 Kent, Com. [3d Ed.] lect. 42,

p. 430;) and I scarcely know where else it

can be found reduced to so elegant and sat-

ist'at-tor_v a formulary. In the old books

the doctrine is quaintly, though clearly, stat-

ed; for it is said that a water-course begins

ex jure nitturee, and, having taken a certain

course naturally, it cannot be [lawfully] di-

verted. Aqua currit, et debet currcre, ut cur- 1

rero solcbat.

Poph. 166.

The same principle applies to the owners

of mills on a stream. They have an un-

Shury v. Piggot, 3 Bulst. 339,
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doubted right to the ﬂow of the water as it

has been accustomed of right and naturally

to ﬂow to their respective mills. The pro-

prietor above has no right to divert or un-

reasonably to retard this natural ﬂow to

the mills below; and no proprietor below has

a right to retard or turn it back upon the

mills above to the prejudice of the right

of the proprietors thereof. This is clearly

established by the authorities already cited;

the only distinction between them being that

the right of a riparian proprietor arises by

mere operation of law as an incident to his

owner as an incident to his mill. Bealey v.

Shaw, 6 East, 208; Saunders v. Newman, 1

Barn. & Ald. 258; Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & '

Adol. 304, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1; Blanchard v.

Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268; and Tyler v. Wil-

kinson, 4 Mason, 397, 400-i.05,—are fully in

point. Mr. Chancellor Kent in his Commen-

taries relies on the same principles and fully

supports them by a large survey of the au-

thorities. 3 Kent Comm. (3d Ed.) lect. 52,

pp. 441-445.

Now, it this be the law on this subject,

upon what ground can the defendants insist

upon a diversion of the natural stream from

the plaintiffs mills, as it has been of right

accustomed to ﬂow thereto? First, it is said

that there is no perceptible damage done to

the plaintiff. That suggestion has been al-

ready in part answered. If it were true, it

could not authorize a diversion, because it ‘

impairs the right of the plaintiff to the full,

natural ﬂow of the stream, and may become

the foundation of an adverse right in the de-

fendants. In such a case actual damage is

not necessary to be established in proof. The

law presumes it. The act imports damage

to the right, it damage be necessary. Such

a case is wholly distinguishable from a mere

fugitive, temporary trespass, by diverting or

withdrawing the water a short period with-

out damage, and without any pretense of

right. In such a case, the wrong, it there he

no sensible damage, and it be transient in its

nature and character. as it does not touch

the right, may possibly (for I give no opin-

ion upon such a case) be without redress at
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the opinion of the cou~. See, also, Gardner
. v. VUlage of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
Mr. Chancellor Kent ha.s also summoned up
the same doctrine, with his usual accuracy,
fn the brief, but pregnant, text of bis Commentarles, (3 Kent, Com. [3d Ed.] lect. 42,
p. 439;) and I scarcely know where else It
can be found reduced to so elegant and sati~fnctory a formulary.
In the old bool«•
the doctrine ls quaintly, though clearly, stated; for It ls said that a water-course begins
ex jure nil.turre, and, having taken a. certain
course naturally, It cannot be [lawfully] diverted. Aqua currit, et debet curl'ere, ut currere solebat. Shury v. Plggot, 3 Buist. 339,
Popb. 100.
The same principle applies to the owners
of mills on a. stream. They have an un· doubted right to the ti.ow of the water a.s It
has been accustomed of right and naturally
to ti.ow to their respective mills. The proprietor above bas no right to divert or unreasonably to retard this natural tlow to
the mills below; and no proprietor below has
a l'lght to retard or turn It back upon the
mills above to the prejudice of the right
of the proprietors thereof. This Is clearly
established by the authorities already cited;
the only distinction between them being that
the right of a riparian proprietor arises by
mere operation of law as an Incident to his
ownership of the bank, and that of a millowner as an Incident to his mill. Bealey v.
Shaw, 6 East, 208; Saunders v. Newman, 1
Barn. & Ald. 258; Mason v. Hill, S Barn. &
Adol. 304, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1; Blanchard v.
Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268; and Tyler v. Wllklnson, 4 Mason, 897, 4-00-405,-are fully In
.point. Mr. Chancellor Kent 1n his Commentarles relies on the same principles and fully
supports them by a large survey of the authorltles. 8 Kent Comm. (3d Ed.) lect. B2,
pp. 441-445.
·
Now, ff this be the law on this subject,
upon what ground can the defendants Insist
upon a diversion .of the natural stream from
the plalntifI's m11ls, as it has been of right
accust()med to tlow thereto? First, lt 1s said
that there la no perceptible damage done to
the plalntUJ. That suggestion has been already In part answered. It It were true, It
could not authorize a diversion, because it
Impairs the right of the plalntltr to the full,
natural ftow of the stream, and may become
the foundation of an adverse right in the defendants. In such a case actual damage ls
not necessary to be established 1n proof. The
law presumes It. The act Imports damage
to the right, If damage be necessary. Such
a case ls wholly distinguishable from a mere
fugitive, temporary trespass, by diverting or
withdraw1ng the water a short period without damage, and without any pretense of
right. In such a case, the wrong, if there be
no sensible damaite, and It be transient In Its
nature and character. as It does not touch
the right, may possibly (for I give no oplnlon upon such a case) be without redress at

law; and certainly It would found no groum:t
for the interposition of a court of equity by
way of Injunction.
But I confess myself wholly unable to comprehend how It can be assumed, In a case
like the present, that there Is not and cannot
be an actual damage to the right of the plaintUf. What ls that right? It Is the right of
' having the water tlow in its natural current
at all times of the year to the plaintiff's
i mllls. Now, the value of the mill prlvUeges
J must essentially depend, ·Dot merely upon the
· vel0city of the stream, but upon the head of
water which Is permanently maintained. The
necessary result of lowering the head of water permanently would seem, therefore, to
be a direct diminution of the value of the
privileges; and, If so, to that extent It must
! be an actual damage. ·
I Again, It Is said that the defendants are
mill-owners on the lower dam, and are en· titled, as such, to their proportion of the
water of the stream 1n Its natural 11.ow. Certalnly they are. But where are they so entitled to take and use It? At the lower dam~
for there is the place where their right attaches, and not at any place higher up the
stream. Suppose they are entitled to use
for their own m1lls on the lower dam halt
the water which descends to It, what ground
Is there to say that they have a right to draw
otr that half at the head of the mill-pond?
i Suppose the bead of water at the lower dam
j 1n ordinary times Is two feet high, Is it not
obvious that, by withdrawing at the head
of the pond one-halt of the water, the water at the dam must be proportionally lowIt makes no dltrerence tha.t the de1 ered?
i fendants Insist upon drawing off only onefourth of what they lnsht they are entitled
to; for, pro tanto, It will operate In the same
manner; and, If they have a right to draw
off to the extent of one-fourth of their prlvI llege, they have an equal right to draw otr
to the full extent of it. The privilege attached to the mills of the plaintiff is not the
I' privilege of using half, or any other proportion merely, of the water In the stream, but
of having the whole stream, undiminished
, In Its natural 11.ow, come to the lower dam
with Its full powei:, and there to use his
· full share of the water-power. The plaintiff
has a title, not to a half or other proportion
of the water In the pond, but Is, If one may
so say, entitled per my et per tout to bis
proportion of the whole bulk of the stream,
undivided and Indivisible, except at the lower
dam. This doctrine, In my judgment, lrreslstlbly follows from the general principles
already stated; and, what alone would be declslve, It has the express sanction of the supreme court of Maine In the case of Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 270. The court
there said, In reply to the suggestion that
the owners of the eastern shore had a right
to half the water, and a right to divert It to
that extent: "It has been seen that, If they
had been owners of both sides, they had n<>
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right to divert the water without again re-

turning it to its original channel, (before it

passed the lands of another proprietor.) Be-

sides, it was possible, in the nature of things,

that they could take it from their side only.

An equal portion from the plaintiff's side

must have been mingled with all that was

diverted."

A suggestion has also been made that the

defendants have fully indemniﬁed the plain-

tiff from any injury, and in truth have con-

ferred a beneﬁt on him, by securing the wa-

ter, by means of a raised dam, higher up

the stream, at Sebago pond, in a reservoir,

so as to be capable of affording a full supply

in the stream in the dryest seasons. To this

suggestion several answers may be given.

In the ﬁrst place, the plaintiff is no party to

the contract for raising the new dam, and has

no interest therein, and cannot, as a matter
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of right, insist upon its being kept up, or

upon any advantage to be derived therefrom.

In the next place, the plaintiff is not com-

pellable to exchange one right for another,

or to part with a present interest in favor of

the defendants at the mere election of the

latter. Even a supposed beneﬁt cannot be

forced upon him against his will; and, cer-

tainly, there is no pretense to say that, in

point of law, the defendants have any right

to substitute. for a present existing right of

the plaintifffs, any other which they may

deem to be an equivalent. The private prop-

erty of one man cannot be taken by another,

simply because he can substitute an equiva-

lent beneﬁt.

Having made these remarks ‘upon the points

raised in the argument, the subject, at least

so far as it is at present open for the con-

sideration of the court, appears to me to be

exhausted. Whether, consistently with this

opinion, it is practicable for the defendants

successfully to establish any substantial de-

fense to the bill, it is for the defendants, and

not for the court, to consider. I am author-

ized to say that the district judge concurs in

this opinion.

Decree accordingly.

right to divert the water without again returning It to Its original channel, (before It

passed the lands of another proprietor.) Be-sides, lt waa possible, l.n the nature of things,
that they could take lt from their side only.
An equal portion from the plalntllf's side
must have been mingled with all that was
diverted.''
A suggestion bas also been made that the
defendants have fully Indemnified the plaint.Ur from any Injury, and In truth have con·
ferred a benefit on him, by securing the water, by means of a raised dam, higher up
the stream, at Sebago pond, In a. reservoir,
so as to be capable of affording a. full supply
ln the stream In the dryest seasons. To this
suggestion several answers may be given.
In the first plare, the plaintiff ls no party to
the contra.ct for raising the new dam, and has
no Interest therein, and cannot, as a matter
of right, Insist upon Its being kept up, or
upon any advantage to be derived therefrom.
In the next place, the plaintiff ls not compellable to exchange one right for another,

7

or to part with a present Interest In favor of
the defendants at the mere election of the
latter. Even a supposed benefit cannot be
forced upon him against his will; and, certainly, there ls no pretense to say that, In
point of law, the defendants have any right
to substitute, for a present existing right of
the plalntltr's, any otier which they may
deem to be an equivalent. The private property of one man cannot be taken by another,
simply because he can substitute an equivalent benefit.
Having made these remarks upon the points
raised In the argument, the subject, at least
so far as It ls at present open for the conslderntlon of the court, appears to me to be
exhausted. Whether, consistently with this
opinion, It ls practicable for the defendants
successfully to· establlsh any substantial defense to the bill, 1t ls for the defendants, and
not for the court, to consider. I am authorized to say that the district judge concurs in
this opinion.
Decree accordingly.
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\/ PAUL v. SLASON et 91.

(22 Vt. 231.)

Supreme Court of Vermont. Rutland. Jan.

" Term, 1850.

Trespass for taking two cords of wood,

two baskets, two pitchforks, two horses.

one harness, and one wagon. Plea, the

general issue. with notice, that the defend-

ant Charles H. Slason attached the prop-

erty by virtue of a writ, which he was 16-

gally deputised to serve, in favor of one

Langdon against the plaintiff, and that the

other defendants aided him in so dofng, at

his request. Trial by jury, September

Term, 1848,—HALL, J., presiding. On trial

it appeared, that on the twenty sixth day

of September, 1844, the defendant Francis

Slason commenced a suit in the name of

Benjamin F. Langdon against the plaintiff,

and that the defendant Charles H. Sluson,
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who was legally deputized to serve the

writ. which was returnable to the county

court, attached the property in question,

except one pitchfork, and that the defend-

ant Pelkey assisted in removing the prop-

erty. It also appeared, that on the same

day Charles H. Slason and Pelkey made

use of the horse, wagon and harness, part

of the property attached, in removing grain

and other property, which was attached

at the same time, on the same writ, and

upon the same farm, and continued to use

them for this purpose through the day;

and that on the next day Charles H. Sla-

son was seen driving the same horse and

wagon, with the harness, in the highway

in the vicinity,—but upon what business

did not appear. It also appeared,that the

defendants took a pitchfork belonging to

the plaintiff, and used it during the day,on

which the attachment was made,in remov-

ing the grain &c. The defendants offered

in evidence the ﬁles and record of the su-

preme court, in the suit in favor of Lang-

don against the plaintiff, in which the prop-

erty in question was attached, for the pur-

pose of proving, that judgment was ren-

dered therein in favor of Langdon;—t0

which evidence the plaintiff objected; but

It was admitted by the court. The defend-

ants then offered in evidence an execution,

purporting to have been issued upon the

judgment in the supreme court above men-

tioned, dated February 21,1848 ;—to the ad-

mission of which the plaintiff objected, in-

sisting, that an exempliﬁed copy of the

judgment should be produced, before

the execution could be *given in evi. ‘233

dence, and that the execution, and the

issuing thereof, could be shown only by a

certiﬁed copy of the record of the judgment;

—bu€ the objection was overruled by the

COlll‘ .

The defendants then offered in evidence

the return of one Edgerton, as sheriff, upon

thesaid execution, to show that tbewagon

in question was sold thereon and the pro-

ceeds applied in payment of the debt. To

the admission of this evidence the plaintiff

(22 Vt. 231.)
Supreme Court of Vermont. Rutland. J'au.
· Term, 1850.

Trespass for ta.king two cords of wood,
two baskets, two pitchforks, two horses.
one harness, and ene wagon. Plea, the
general Issue, with notice, that the defendant Charles H. Slason attached the property by virtue of a writ, which he was legally deputised to serve, in favor of one
Langdon against the plaintiff, and that the
other defendants aided him In so doing, at
his request. Trial by Jury, September
Term, 1848,-HALL, J., presiding. On trial
It appeared, that on the twenty sixth day
of September, 1844, the defendunt Frallcis
Slaeon commenced a suit in the name of
Benjamin F. Langdon against the plaintiff,
and that the defendant Charles H. Slaeon,
who was legally deputized to serve the
writ, which was returnable to the county
court, attached the property in question,
except one pitchfork, and that the defendant Pelkey assisted in removing the property. It also appeared, that on the same
day Charles H. Sia.son and Pelkey made
use of the horse, wagon and harness, part
of the property attached, In removing grain
and other property, which was attached
at the same time, on the same writ, and
upon the same farm, and continued -t:n use
them for this purpose through the day;
and that on the next dny Charles H. Slaeon was seen driving the same horse and
wagon, with the harness, in the highway
In the vlcinity,-but upon what business
did not appear. It also appeared, that the
defendants took a pitchfork belonging to
the plaintiff, and used It during the day, on
which theattachmentwM made, In removing the grain &c. The defendants offered
In evidence the files and record of the supreme court, In the suit In favor of Langdon against the plaintiff, in which the prop.
erty in question was attached, for the purpose of proving, that Judgment was rendered therein in favor of Langdon;-to
which evidence the plaintiff objected; but
It was admitted by the court. 'l'he defendants then ottered In evidence an execution,
purporting to have been Issued upon the
Judgment in the supreme court above mentioned, dated February 21, 1848 ;-to the admission of which the plaintiff objected, insisting, that an exemplified copy of the
Judgment shoul<l be produced, before
the execution could be *given In evl- •233
dence, and that the execution, and the
Issuing thereof, could be shown only by a.
certified copy of the record of the judgment;
-but the objection was overruled by the
court.
The defendants then offered In evidence
the return of 0 ne Edgerton, as sheriff, upon
theflaid execution, to show that thewagon
In question was sold thereon and the proceeds applied in payment of the debt. To
the admission of this evidence the plaintiff
objected, upon the ground, that from the
return It appeared, that the property was
sold two days after the sheriff received the
execution for service, lis shown by hie indorsement upon it. The counsel forthedefendanta then suggested, that there was a

mistake In the return, in stating the day
of the sale, and moved the court, that the
sheriff have leave to amend his return In
that particular. To this the plaintiff obJected; but the court permitted the sheriff
to amend his return, eo as to state the day
of sale to have been one month later than
stated originally in the return. The defendants then offered in evidence the return, as a.mended; to which the plaintiff
objected,-but the objection was overruled
by the court. The defendants then offered
in e\"idence the .return of the sheriff upon the
original writ In favor of Langdon against
the plaintiff, showing an appraisal of the
horse and some other property attached,
and that the plaintiff had furnished security totheeberiff and received possession of
the property. It appeared, that the money
had not been paid on the security, and no
application of the property bad ever been
made upon the execution by the sheriff, or
b:v an:v other person. The defendants also
proved, thatoneMl'Cunfl had executed a receipt to the sheriff fora portion of the prop.
ert:v attached. and that the property, excep·t the wagon which was sold upon the
execution, went into the possession of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff requested the court
to charge the jury,-1. That the defendants could not justify the taking of the property In question under the writ In favor of
Langdon, If the property attached, or any
portion thereof, were put to use by the officer who had attaehro it. 2. That property attaehed must be considered as In the
custody of the law, and the attaching officer has no authority to put it tou111e; and
if, tn this case, they found, that, upon the
property being attached by Charles H. Slason, he put the horse, wagon and harneee,
to use, and contlnu+id W use them,
during the greater part •of the day, •234
in removing the other property attached, be rendered himself a trespasser ab
fnltio, and could not jufltlfy taking the
property, or any part thereof, under the
attachment. 3. Thatiftheomcercouldjustlfy the taking of the property under the
attachment, If he so used any part of It, he
could not justify the taking of the horse,
wagon and harness so used; but, as to the
property so used, the authority was rendered void by the a.buee. 4. That the use of
the horse, wagon and harness, on the next
day after the atta~hment, was unjustlfta~
ble, and rendered the officer a trespasser
a(l lnltlo. 5. Thn.t the application of the
plaintiff to havo the property appraised,
under the statute, In order to regain the
possession of It, and giving security to the
sheriff, was not a waiver of the right of
action against the defendant for the trespass; but that the plaintlttwas entitled to
recover the amount thus secured by him .
6. 'fhat if a portion of the property were
delivered to the receiptor, the plaintiff wae
entitled to recover Its value, unless it had
come to his possession. 7. That if theJury
found , that the defendants took the plaintiff's pitchfork and used it during the day,
without right, he was entitled to recover
its value, unless It were ret urned,-and
that, if returned, he was entitled to recover nominal damages. 8. That the sale
of the wagon and the application of its
proceeds upon the execution in favor 01
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Langdon could have no errect upon the
amount of damages In this snit. But the
court charged the Jury, that, from the testimony, the attachment and disposition
of the property attacbed was ajuetiflcatlon
for the defendants, unless they had been
gutlty of such an abuse of the property, as
to make them treep&88f're ab lnltlo;-that
whether the defendants were trespassers tl-b
Jnltlo depended upon the character of the
use or the property by them, after the attachment ;-that the uee of the horse,
wagon and hamees, in removing and securing other property of the plaintiff, attached
the eame day, on the eame writ and on the
eame farm with the horee, wagon and harnesa,-tbe use being for a part of the day
only,-would not nect!f4earily be euch an
abuse of the omcer'fl authority,ae to make
the defendants trespaesere ab lnitlo; but
that if they found, either that eucb use or
the property by the defendant was wanton, and with a design to Injure the plaintiff, or that the property was Injured by
It so as materially to diminish Its value,
the defendants would be trespasHere
•233 -in the original taking and be l11tble
In this action ;-thatwhetherthedrlvlng or the bol'fle nod wagon by the officer,
the next day after the attachment, was an
abuse or his authority depended upon the
purpose and business, for which they were
driven; that If the Jury found, that the officer was uelng the horse and wagon for
other purposes than that of removing l\nd
securing them In a convenient place for
keeping, under the attachment, the defendants would be Hable; but tr for such a purpose, they would not be liable. In regard\
to dt;y11ages, the court Instructed the jury,
that, the property having either boon sold
and applied on the execution, orrdeJh·ered
to the plaintiff on security furnished by
him, the plaintiff would not he entitled to
recover the full value of tt; but that the
measure of damages would be the amount,
which the property had been diminished In
value by the defendants' abuse of It. In
regard to the pitchfork the court charged
the jury, that if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendants took ancl carried
It away, they should give the plaintiff tte
,·a.Jue; that if It was used and left upon the
premises, eo thnt the defendant received tt
again, and it wae h1Jured by the use, th('I
pialntlff would be entl~ to recover the
amount or the injury; but that if they
found, that it WWI merely used for a portion of a day in removing the plalntlH"s
property, there attached, and wae left
where It was found, eo that the plaintiff
bad It again, and that It was not injured
by the use, they were not hound to give the
plaintiff damages for such mie. The jury
returned a verdict fur the defendants. Exceptions by plnintiff.
M. G. Ev;uts nnd T/Jrnll & Smith. for
J>laintlff, cited Lamb v. Dny 8 \"t. 407: 3
Stark. Ev. 1108; 1 Chit. Pl. lil; 5 Ilnc. Abr.
161; Strong v. Hobbs, 20 Vt. 18.J; Hart v.
Hyde, 5 Vt. 328; Orvis v. Isle La. Mott, 12
Vt. 195; Fletcher v. Pratt, 4 Vt. 182; and
Brainard v. Burton, 5 Vt. 97.
E. Edgerton, for defendants, rited 2
Greenl. Ev.§ 253; lb. 283, § 2iG, 11 . 5; 1 Stark.
Ev. 151, § 33; Mickles et al. v. Hnl!klo, 11
Wend. 125; Lamb v. Duy, 8 Vt. 4U7.
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Langdon could have no effect upon the

amount of damages in this suit. But the

court charged the jury, that, from the tes-

timony, the attachment and disposition

of the property attached was ajustiﬁcation

for the defendants, unless they had been

guilty of such an abuse of the property, as

to make them trespassers ab 1nit10;—that

whether the defendants were trespassers n b

initio depended upon the character of the

use of the property by them, after the at-

tachment;—that the use of the horse,

wagon and harness,in removing and secur-

ing otherproperty of the plaintiff, attached

the same day, on the same writ and on the

same farm with the horse, wagon and bar-

ness,—the use being for a part of the day

only,—would not necessarily be such an

abuse of the ofﬁcer's authority,as to make

the defendants trespassers ab inftio; but
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that if they found, either that such use of

the property by the defendant was wan-

ton, and with a design to injure the plain-

tiff, or that the property was injured by

it so as materially to diminish its value,

the defendants would be trespassers

‘235 ‘in the original taking and be liable

in this action ;—that whether the dri v-

ing of the horse and wagon by the oﬂicer,

the next day after the attachment, was an

abuse of his authority depended upon the

purpose and business, for which they were

driven; that if the jury found, that the of-

ﬁcer was using the horse and wagon for

other purposes than that of removing and

securing them in a convenient place for

keeping, under the attachment, the defend-

ants would be liable; but if for such a pur-

pose, they would not be liable. In regard

to damages, the court instructed the jury.

that, the property having either been sold

and applied on the execution, or’deiivered

to the plaintiff on security furnished by

him, the plaintiff would not be entitled to

recover the full value of it; but that the

measure of damages would be the amount,

which the property had been diminished in

value by the defendants‘ abuse of it. In

regard to the pitchfork the court charged

the jury. that if they believed,from the evi-

dence, that the defendants took and carried

it away, they should give the plaintiff its

value; that if it was used and left upon the

premises, so that the defendant received it

again, and it was injured by the use, the

plaintiff would be entitbed to recover the

amount of the injury; but that if they

found, that it was merely used for a por-

tion of a day in removing the plaintiffs

property, there attached, and was left

where it was found, so that the plaintiff

had it again, and that it was not injured

by the use, they were not bound to give the

plaintiff damages for such use. The jury

returned a verdict for the defendants. Ex-

ceptions by plaintiff.

M. G. Evarts and Thrall & Smith. for

plaintiff, cited Lamb v. Day 8 Vt. 407: 3

Stark. Ev. 1108; 1 Chit. Pl. 171; 5 Bac. Abr.

•

9

"The opinion of the court was de- "238
livered by

•

POLA ND, .J. ThP ftrst question, Rrhlin~
In this caae, te In relation to the charge of
the county court to the Jury as to the use
or the horse, wagon and harness by the defendants, In removing the other property
of the plaintiff, which was attached at th('I
eame time. The jury were charged, that
If they were only used in removing the
other property, and were not Injured or
lessenerl lo value thereby, such use would
not make the defendan te t1·espassers ab
lnltlo.
It was an early doctrine or the common

law, that when a party was guilty of an
abuae or authority given by the law, he became a trespasser ab lnftlo, and lost the
protection of the authority, :under which
he originally acted,-ae, If beasts, taken
dama}.re fensant, or dlstralned for rent,
were kllled, or put to work, by the party
taking them, he might be eued in trespass
as for an orlginR.l wrongful taking. This
doctrine has fully obtained In tllis country, and wae acted upon by tWs court In
the case of Lamb v. JJay et al., 8 Vt. 407,
where It was held, that the defendants,
who bad attached the plaintiff's mare (one
being creditor and the other officer) and
worked her for several w~ks In running
a line of stages, without the plu.lntlff's con11ent, bccam-e trel!passers ab lnltlo. The
doctrine bas, 1;o our knowledge, never been
extended to any case, except where there
hllB been a rlear, substantial vlolu.tlon of
the plaintiff's rights, and of such a character as to ehow a wanton disregard of
duty on the part of the defendants. Were
the acts of the derendants, in using the
horse, wagon and harness under the circumstances and for the purpoRe mentioned
lo this case, such an abuse of the property
and of the authority under whlcli it was
taken, as ought to deprive them of the benefit or its protection?
It was the duty or the omcer to remov~
the property, In order to make hie attaehmeut P.ffcctunl, and the expense of such removal must be borne by the debtor; an<l
instead of the plaintiff being injured by ti•··
use of the property, be was really benefited
by it. The doctrine, for whleh the plalntlH conten<le, goee the extent of saying,
that any use or the property makes the officer a trespasser ;-so that if an offlcer attach a horse and wagon, and uee the horse
for the purpose or drawing away the
wagon from the possession of the debtor,
he becomes a tort feal!or. We are wholly
unable to satisfy ourselves, that the Jaw
has ever gone to so unrPasonable an
•237 extent, or *has ever been applied to
any case, except those where the
property has been Injured, or lrns been ui;ed
by the officer for his own benefit, or for the
benefit of some one other than the debtor.
This was the rule laid down by the county
court, and we are fully satisfied of its correctneRs.
2. 'l'he next question arises upon the
charge to the Jury In relation to the driving of the horse and wagon by the officer
on the next clay after the uttnchment. The
cni;e states, that the officer wnR seen driving the horse and wagon in the highway,

10
10
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but upon what business did not appear.

The jury were charged, that if they found,

that the ofﬁcer was using the horse at!d

wagon for other purposes, than that of re-

moving and securing them in a place for

conveniently keeping them,while under the

attachment, the defendants would be lia-

ble.—otherwise not.

The ofﬁcer, no doubt, had the right to

drive the horse and wagon for the purpose

suggested in the charge; but the plaintiff

claims, that the legal presumption should

be, in the absence of express proof as to

the object and purpose of driving the horse

and wagon, that it was for an unlawful

purpose. But in our opinion this would be

contrary to the ordinary rule of legal pre-

sumption in relation to all persons, and

especially persons acting under legal au-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:09 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

thority. Omnia przesumnntur rite acta is

a maxim, which is always applied to the

conduct of persons acting under the a uthcr-

ity of law. Although there was no direct

evidence as to the object and purpose of

driving the horse and wagon, the jury

might well infer the object from the time,

circumstances and direction of the driving;

and we think it was properly left to them

to determine. We think, it was upon the

plaintiff to show the act of the ofﬁcer to

be unlawful; andif he had it left to the jury

to decide, even without any evidence to

prove it, we do not see, that he has any

ground of complaint.

3. Another question is also raised upon

the charge to the jury in relation to the

use of the pitchfork by the defendants.

Under the charge thejury must have found,

that the pitchfork was used by the defend-

ants only in moving the plaintiffs proper-

ty, that it was left where they found it,

that the plaintiff received it again, and

that it was in no way or manner injured.

They were told by the court, that if they

found all these facts proved, they were not

obliged to give the plaintiff any damages

for the fork.

It is true, that, by the theory of the

'238 law, whenever an invasion of "a right

is established,though no actual dam-

age be shown, the law infers a damage to

the owner of the property and gives nom-

inaldamages. This goes upon the ground,

either that some damage is the probable ,

result of the defendant's act,orthat his act ‘

would have effect to injure the other's

right, and would be evidence in future in

favor of the wrong doer. This last applies

more particularly to unlawful entries upon

real property, and to disturbance of incor-

_NO~IINAL
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out upon what business did not appear.
The jury were charged, that if they found,
that the officer was using the horse aitd
wagon for other purposes, than that of removing and securing them In a pla.ee for
conveniently keeping them, while under the
attachment, the defendants would be llable,-otherwise not.
The officer, no doubt, had the right to
drive the horse and wagon for the purpose
suggested in the charge; but the plaintiff
claims, that the legal presumption should
be, In the absence of express proof as to
the object and purpose of driving the horse
and wagon, that It was for an unlawful
purpose. But in our opinion this would be
contrary to the ordinary rule of legal p~
eumptlon In relation to all persons, and
especially persons acting under legal authority. Omnia pr.resun111ntur rite acta la
a maxim, which ls always applied to the
conduct of personsactlngundertheauthcrlty of law. Although there was no direct
evidence as to the object and purpose of
driving the horse and wagon, the Jury
might well infer the object from the time,
clreumetances and direction of thedrh·lng;
and we think It was properly left to them
to determine. We think, It was upon the
plaintitt to show the a.ct or the officer to
be unlawful; and If he had It left to the Jury
to decide, even without any evidence to
prove It, we do not see, that he bas any
ground of complaint.
3. Another question le also raised upon
the charge to the Jury in relation to the
use of the pitehfork by the defendants.
Under the charge the jury must haTe found,
that the pitchfork was used by the defendants only In moving the plaintiff's property, that It was left where they found It,
that the plaintiff received It again, and
that it was In no way or manner Injured.
They were told by the court, that If they
found all these facts proved, they were not
obliged to give the plaintiff any damages
for the fork.
It ls true, that, by the theory of the
*238 law, whenever an Invasion of •a right
ls established, though no actual dam~e be shown, the law infers a damage to
the owner of the property and gives nominal damages. This goes upon the ground,
either that some damage is the probable
result of the defendant's act, or that his act
wou1d have effect to Injure the other's
right, and would be evidence In future In
faYor of the wrong doer. This last applies
more particularly to unlawful entries upon
real property, and to disturbance of Incorporeal rights, when the unlawful act might
have an effect upon the right of the party
and be eYidence in favor of the wrong doer,
If bis right ever came In question. In these
cases an action may be supported, though
there be no actual damage done,-becau11e
otherwise the party might lose his right.
So, too, whenever any one wantonly Invades another's rlghts for the purpose of
Injury, au action will lie, though no actual
damage be done; the law presumes damage, on account of the unlawful intent.
But it Is believed, that no case can be found,
where damages have been given for a trespass to personal property, when no unlawful Intent, or dlsturuance of a right, or possession, is shown, and when not only all

probable, but all possible, damage is expressly disproved.
L The English courts have recently gone
far towards breaking up the whole system of giving verdicts, when no actual injury has been done, unless there be some
right in question, which1Nt a.a important
to the plaintiff to establish. In the case of
Wllliams v. Mostyn, 4
W. 145, where
·case was brought for the voluntary escape
of one Langford, taken on mesne process,
and it was admitted, that the plaintiff had
sustained no actual damage, or delay, the
defendant ha>ing returned to the custody
of the plaintiff, a verdict was found for the
plaintiff for nominal damages. But, on
motion, the court directed a nonsuit to be
entered, saying that there had been no
damage In fact or In Ia w. So in a suit
brought by the owner of a house against a
Jessee, for opening a door without leave.
the premises not being in any way weakened, or injured, by the opening, the court
refused to allow nominal damages, and remitted the case to the jury to say, whether
the plai11Uff's reversionary.lnterest had in
polut of fact been prejudiced. Younie v.
Spencer, 1ti B. & C. 145, [21 E. C. L. 70.] Mr.
Broome, In nls recent work on Legal Maxims, Jaye down the law In the following
language,-" Farther, there are some Injuries of so small and little consideration In
the law, that no action will lie for them;
for instance, in respect to the payment •of tithes, the principle which •23i.may be extra~ted from the cases appears to be, that for smll.ll quantities or
com, Involuntarily left In the process of
raking, tithe shall not be payable, unless
there be any particular fraud, or Intention
to deprive the parson of his full right."
If any farther authority Is deemed neceesary,in support of the ruling of the county
court on this point, we have only to refer
to that ancient and well established maxim,
....de min/mis non curat Jex,-whlch seems
J>~uliarly applicable In this case, and would
alone have been n.mple authority upon this
part of the case; for we fully agree with
Mr. Sedgwick, that the law should hold
out uo Inducement to useless or vindictlv&
litigation. Sedgwick on Dam. 62. This
disposes of all the questions raised upon
the charge.
4. The remaining questions in the case
arise upon the admlsRlon or the original
files and record of the case Langdon v.
Paul. The plaintiff objected to the Introduction of the original record, and claimed,
that the judgment could only be proved by
an exemplified copy of the record. But we
think the objection not well founded. If
the clerk or the supreme court were wllling
to bring the original record Into court, we
think It might well be used. He probably
could not be compelled to do so, and might
have required the party to procure a copy
of the same; but when the original record
Is brought into court, we think it would
be very difficult to give any substantial
reason, why it is not evidence of as high e.
character, as a copy of the same record
would be. The practice of receiving origI' inal
recordR as evidence has been universal,
· as we believe, In this state, and ls often
much more convenient than to procurecopies. l\'ye et al. v. Kellam, 18 Vt. 594.

poreal rights, when theunlawful act might

have an effect upon the right of the party

and be evidence in favor of thewrong doer,

if his right ever came in question. In these

cases an action may be supported, though

there be no actual damage done,.—becanse

otherwise the party might lose his right.

So, too, whenever any one wantonly in-

•
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In relation to the amendment of the exe-

cution by the ofﬁcer, it is very clear, that

the county court had no power to permit

any such amendment; but we cannot per-

ceive, that the case was in any way affected

by it. If the ofﬁcer. who held the execu-

tion, was guilty of any irregularity in his

proceedings in the sale of the wagon upon

the execution, it could not have the effect

to make these defendants trespassers, who

took the property rightfully, and were in

no way responsible for the act of the sher-

iff, who had the execution.

We ﬁnd no error in the proceedings of the

county court, and their judgment is af-

ﬁrmed.

NOTE. In Fullam v. Stearns, 30 Vt. 454. the

question was whether a trespasser should be

held liable for the value of certain thongs or

strings, which were used to fasten together the
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ends of a leather belt, and which the trespasser

had unnecessarily cut. The trial court had in-

structed the jury that if they found the thongs to

be old, worn out, and nearly worthless, the de-

fendant would not be liable unless he cut them

wantonly. As to this, the supreme court, by

BENNETT, J., said:

“We have more difficulty in relation to the

manner in which the court put the case to the

jury relative to the bands or belts. The case

is not put to them upon the ground that it was

necessary to cut the thongs with which the

bands were laced or fastened together. It could

not have so been, for the case says the evidence

went to show that the could have been easily

taken out without cuttmg.

“With reference to the value of the thongs,

the case should have been put to the jury upon

the ground that they found just what the de-

fendants‘ testimony tended to prove, and noth-

ing more, and that wa ‘that the thongs were

considerably worn, and of small value.' The

court were not warranted, upon such evidence.

to put the case to the jury upon the hypothesis

that they should ﬁnd the thongs to be old, worn

out, and nearly worthless. The court should

have charged the jury as to what the law would

have been had the jury found the thongs to

have been ‘considerably. worn, and of small

value.‘ “'ould the court, upon such a ﬁndin .

apply the maxim, ‘De minimis non curat lex ?

“‘hile, on the one hand, we should be unwill-

ing to hold out inducements to useless and vin-

dictive litigation, we should, on the other, be

slow to violate and set aside well-settled prin-

ciples. To give a right of action, it has often

been said there must be both an injury and a

damage, and it has been as often said that ev-

ery violation of a right imgorts some damage,

and, if none other be prove . the law allows a

nominal damage. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 1

Gallison, 429. The maxim, ‘De minhais non

curat lex,' I apprehend, whenever it is applied

correctly to take away a right of recovery, has

reference to the injury, and not to the resulting

damage.

“If a person has a right to vote at an election,

and he is refused this right, he may have his

action, even though the person for whom he

rn I"t'latlon to the amendment of the execution by the omccr, it is Yery clear, that
the coonty court bail no power to permit
any such amendment; but we cannot perceive, that the case was In any way affected
by it. If the officer. who held the exe<>ution, was gullty of any lrn>gularity In hie
proceedings In the sale of the wagon upon
the execution, It coulcl not haYe the erti-ct
to make theee defen<lantR trl'Rpru!Hers, who
took the property rightfully, and were In
no way responsible for the act of the sllerirf, who had the execution.
We find no error In the procE'e<linJtS of the
county court, and their judgmt:nt l8 o.f.
fl rm ed.
NOTE. In Fullam v. ·strnms, 30 Vt. 454, the

question was whether a tn-spasser should be
held liable for the value or certain thongs or
strings, which were used to fasten together the
ends of a leather belt, aud which the trei;pusser
bad unneces...irily cut. The triul court h11d instructed the jury that if they found the thong.i to
be old, worn out, and nenrly worthless, th1• <h'fendant would not be liable unless he cut tb1•m
wantonly. As to this, the supreme court, l.Jy
BE~~ETT, J., Bllid:
""'e ha>e more difficulty in relation to the
manner in which the court put the case to the
jury relati>e to the bunds or belts. The caAe
is uot put to them upon the ground that it wa:;
nl'<'t'>lsnry to cut the thongs with which thP
bands wer•! laced or fastened together. It could
not h8\·e so been, for the case says the evideuee
went to show that the1 could have been eui,;ily
taken out without cutting.
"With reference to the value of the thongs,
the cnlM' should have b<>en put to the jury upon
the ground that they found just what the defendants' testimony tendt•d to proYe, and nothing more. and that was 'thnt the thongs WPre
considerably worn, and of small value.' The
court were not warranted, npon such evidem·e.
to put the case to the jury upon the hypotht>,.is
that they should find the thouics to be old, worn
out, and nearly worthless. The conrt shonld
have charged the jury as to what the law would
have beeu had the jury found the thongs to
have been 'considerably. worn, and of small
value.' ".ould the court. upon such a find inf..
apply the muxim, 'De minimi.s non curnt lex ?
While, on the oue baud, we should be unwilling to hold out inducements to useless and vindictive litigation, we should, on the other, be
slow to violate and set aside well-settled principles. To gi>e a right of action, it has orten
been snid there must be both an injury and a
damalfe. and it has been as often said that every violation of a right imports some damage,
and, if none other be pro>ed, the law allows u
nominal damage. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 1
Gallhlon, 429. The maxim, 'De minimis uo11
carat lex,' I apprehend, whenever it is ap1>lied
correctly to take away a right of recovery, has
reference to the injury, and not to the resultiug
dan1age~

"If a person has a right to vote at an election,
and he is refused this right, he mny ha>e his
action, even though the pen<on for whom be
pro,,.->sed to vote ~hould chance to be electt'tl.
Ashb.\· v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 9:IB. So, if a
sheriff neglect to return an execution the creditor may have his action for nominal damages,
although no damal[f' appeared to have re~ultl•d
trom the neglect. Kidder v. Barker, 18 Vt. 4:i-l.
In the cn11e -of Clifton v. Hooper, (j Adol. & K
(N. S.) 468, in an action for not exeentiul{ u en.
sa., the jury found the defendant in defanlt,
but that the plaintiff had sustained no dnruuge,
and still judgment wne gi>en for the plaintiff
for nominal damages. lLord Denman. in that
case, said 'that l\·here a clear right of a party
waM in>aded, in consequence of another's brl'nc>h
or duty, lw must be entitled to an nc>tiou ai:ni11Nt
thnt 1mrty for some amount. and that there wus
no authority to the contrary.' J

11

"In Ashby v. 'White, 2 Ld. Raym.938,it is said
by Lord Holt 'that every Injury to a right importe a dama~e in the nature of it, though ther11
be no r-cumary loss.' See, also, Barker v.
Green, - Bini:. 317. The case of Williams v.
ll.oRtyn .. 4 llees. & W. 145, fa not in conflict
with Chftou v. Hooper. In that case the distinction hrtween mesne and final process is well
takPn. Ju the cuse of mesne process, no rh:ht
of the cn>ditor is violated by an escape, uni'""'
he is delayed in his suit tbereb>, or has sustained actual damage. The creditor, it is said
In that Cll8e, simply had the right to have the
sheriff keep the prisoner ready to l.Je removed at
any time the plaintiff might elect, by habeas
corpus, Into the superior court, there to be charged with a dl'claration, or to be declared ngninst
as in the custody of the sheriff. The right ot
the plaintiff was correlati>e to the dutv of the
sl.Jeriff: and, unless the plaintiff was delayed in
his suit by N'nson of the escape, no right of his
hnd }>e(>n violated; but, if delayed, though tor
ewr so 11hort a time, a right hnd heen violnh'd,•
and he ha11 his action. See, also, Cady v. Huntington, 1 N. H. 138. So. in Young v. Spencer,
10 Barn. & C . 145, the actiou was by the person who bad the reversionnry interest agniust a
and the court rerused to allow nominal
damnices for a wrongful act of the leM11ee, which
di1l not injure the estate in revel'lliou. Here,
also, no right of the ren•r><ioner was violnted.
A lrgal riKht must be violated. and a damuge
en1111C; but actunl. 1>erceptihl(' dumnges are not
lndi11{W'nsa hie, and they will be pre11umed to follow. Eml.Jrey v. Owen, G Exch. 353, 372; Willinms v . .Esling. 4 Barr, 486. The maxim. 'De
minimis non curnt lex,' has been applied to
cluims for tithe!<, where the quantity was smnll,
and involuntarily left upon the ground in the
proCP1<s of raking; yet, if there is a fraud, or an
intpntion to deprive the per!l<m of his ri,i:bt, the
maxim will not be apphed to cut oil hi11 right
ot recovery, though the qunntity be 11mall, and
In Olonvlll v. Stacey, 6 Harn. & C. 543, the
plnintiff had a judgment on his verdict for three
shillings, and in fleneca Road Co. v. Auhurn
Hnilrond C'o., 5 Hill. 175, it . is Mid the muxim,
'De minimi11,' etc., is never applied to a positive
and wroni.:fnl invasion of another's property;
nnd I apprehend it may at least be sate to sny
it should never in such cnl!<'!I be applied to cut
otf a recon•ry, where the positive and wrongful
act causes damages which can be fairly valued.
The damage done to the plaintiff's property by
cutting hiH thongs, which fastened the bands
together, though 'considernhly worn, and of
small \•nhw,' could he eMtimnted, and we cannot say that he shall not reeover them. In Pnul
v. Slason, 22 Vt. 2:\G, the Jury were charged
that, if they found that it (the pitchfork) was
nwrely used for a portion of a day in removing
the plaintiff's property, there attaehed, and was
left where it was found, so that the plaintiff had
it ngnin, and that It 11·as not injured by its use,
they were not hound to give the plnintiff dam·
ages tor 1mch nse. The supreme eourt, it is
true, ottirmed this ruling, ond applied the maxim, 'De minimis non curat lt>x,' to the case. It
may be remarked that in that case the pitchfork
was used in removing the pluintiff's hay, which
had been attached, and which was to be removed at his expense; and it mn3', in one sense,
be snid that the fork was used in the business
of the plaintiff, and for his henefit. aud the jury
must hue found that the pluiutiff had his fork
again. and thnt it had not been injured by the
otHcer in removing the hay. 'Ve apprehend that
case does not warrant the <'llRrJ!,'e or the court
in th1• case ut bar. Both the injury 111ul the
dnmnge were too insignificant to l.Je made the
.i:round of an action. lud<•l'd. the jury musl
hnvc found there was no actual dnruni:e, and
the court would not imply a damage from such
a taking, though perhaps it might technically
ha>e constituted a wrongful taking by the officer. though taken to be u11cd iu removing the
plaintiff's bay, nnd for the expense of which the
plaintiff was to be charged."

h·""''"·

NOMIXAL AXD St;BSTANTIAL D.A;\llGES.

W .ARTMAN v. SWIXDELL.
l2‘/

1\'OMIl\'AL AND SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES.

WARTMAN v. SWINDELL.

(% Atl. 356, 5-1 N. J. Law, 589.)

(25 Atl. 356, 54 N. J. Law, 589.)
-Oourt of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
Nov. 14, 1892.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 14, 1892.

Error to circuit court, Camden county; be-

fore Justice Garrison.

Action by John W. Wartman against Wil-

liam H. Swindell for damages. Judgment

for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Error to circuit court, Camden county; before Justice Garrison.
Action by John W. Wartman against William H. Swindell for damages. Judgm~nt
for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Reverse!).
John W. Wartman, pro se. Scovel & Harrlt1, for defenuant In e1·ror.

John W. Wartmau, pro se. Scovel & Har-

ris, for defendant in error.

VAN SYCKEL, J. In September, 1891, the

clerk of the plaintiff in error, who was plain-

tiff below, drove the horse and carriage of

, the plaintiff to the sheriff's oﬂice in Camden,

and there tied the horse to a post at the curb

line of the street.. While the clerk was in

the sheriff's ofﬁce, the lines, worth about

three dollars or four dollars, were taken from
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the horse by the defendant in error, and the

clerk was left without the means of driving

the horse. He therenpon demanded the lines

of the defendant, who refused to return them

to him. The clerk then went to the oﬂice of

the plaintiff, and informed him of the occur-

rence, and was instructed to return to the

courthouse, and again demand the lines of

the defendant. A second demand was made.

and the defendant refused to comply with it.

Therenpon the plaintiff brought suit against

the defendant for damages. On the trial of

the cause in the court below the plaintiﬂ,

after proving the facts above stated, rested

his case. On the cross-examination of the

plaintiff's clerk it appeared that the defend-

ant said to him that the plaintiff had taken

a small article from the defendant, and the

clerk, in reply to the question whether the

defendant did not take the lines by way of a

joke, said he “supposed perhaps he did it in

a joke, but he did not know what it was done

for when it was ﬁrst done." When the plain-

tif f had rested his case, the trial judge said:

“If the defendant will make a tender of these

lines now, I will dismiss this case upon the

ground de minimis non curat lex." The de-

fendant therenpon tendered the lines to the

plaintiff, and the court dismissed the jury

from the further consideration of it. This

disposition of the case is the error complained

of in this court. The trial judge acted upon

the idea that the conduct of the defendant

was intended as a joke, and that the matter

involved was too insigniﬁcant to claim the at-

tention of the court. . If the defendant relied

upon the fact that he removed the lines by

way of a joke. it was a question for the jury

to decide whether the parties had been per-

petrating practical jokesnpon each other in

such a way that the defendant had a right to

believe that the plainiif f would accept this

act as a joke. That question could not legal-

ly be taken from the jury, and settled by the

court; nor, in my judgment, was the maxim

de minimis non curat iex applicable to this

case. In Seneca Road Co. v. Auburn & R. R.

Co., 5 Hill, 175, Mr. Justice Cowen said this

maxim is never applied to the positive and

VAN SYCI<:EL, J. In September, 1891, the
-clerk of the plaintiff In error, who was plaintiff below, drove the horse and carriage of
• the plaintiff to the sherllr's oftice In Camden,
.anu there tleu the horse to a post at the curb
line of tht street. . While the clerk was In
the sheriff's oftice, the lines, worth about
three dollars or four dollars, were taken from
the horse by the defendant In error, and the
. clerk was left without the means of driving
the horse. He thereupon demanded the lines
or the defendant, who refused to return them
to him. The clerk then went to the office of
the plalntl!I, and Informed him of the occurrence, and was lnsti·ucted to return to the
-courthouse, and again demand the lines of
the defendant. A second demand was made,
anu the defendant refused to comply with It.
Thereupon the plaintiff brought suit against
the defendant for uamages. On the trial of
the cause In the court below the plaintiff,
after proving the facts above stated, rested
his case. On the cross-examination of the
plaintiff's clerk It appeared that the defendant snld to him that the plalntltT had taken
a small artlelE: from the defendant, and the
derk, In reply to the question whether the
defendant did not take the lines by way of a
joke, said he "supposed perhaps he did It In

a Joke, but be did not know what It Wal! done
for when It was first done." When the plaintiff had rested his case, the trial Judge said:
"It the defendant will make a tender of these
lines now, I will dismiss this case upon the
ground de mlnlmls non curat lex." The defendant thereupon tendered the lines to the
plalntl.lr, anu the court dismissed the jury
from the further consideration of It. This
disposition of the case Is the error complained
of In this court The trial judge acted upon
the Idea that the conuuct of the defendant
was Intended as a joke, and that the matter
invoh·ed was too insignificant to claim the attention of the court. , It the defendant relied
upon tbe fact that he removed the lines by
way of a joke. it was a question for the Jury
to decide whether the parties bad been perpetrating pn1ctlcal jokes . upon each other In
such a way that the defendant I.Jail a right to
believe that the plaintiff would accept tills
act as a joke. That question could not legally be taken from the jury, and settled by the
court; nor, In my Judgment, was the maxim
de mlnlmis non curat lex applicable to thl11o
case. In Seneca Uoad Co. v. Auburn & R. R.
Co., 5 Hill, 175, llr. Justice Cowen sald this
maxim Is never applied to the positive and
wrongful Invasion of another's property. The
right to maintain an action for the value of
property, however small, of which the owner
is wrongfully deprived, Is never denied. A
trespass upon lands Is actionable, although
the damage to the owner Is Inappreciable.
The celebrated Six Carpenters' Case, reported
In 8 Coke, 432, Involved a trltllng sum. But
as the case In hand stood at the close of the
plulntll'l'"s testimony, I am not prl.'pnred to
say that a verdict for substantial damages
would not have been justifiable. In my opinion, the trial court erred In dismissing this
case, and the judgment below should therefore be reverseu.

NOMINAL A:SD
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DAYTON v. PARKE et all

(37 N. E. 642, 142 N. Y. 391.)

Court of Appeals of New York. June 5. 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

second department.

Action by William B. Dayton against Wil-

liam A. Parke and others to recover freight

and demurrage charges. From a judgment

of the general term (22 N. Y. Supp. 613) mod-

ifying a judgment for plaintiff, defendants

appeal. Modiﬁed.

SUBSTA.~TUL

DAYTON "'· P.'-RKE et al.1
(37 N. l!l. 642, 142 N. Y. 391.)
Court ot Appeala of New York. June 15, 1894.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
BeCOnd department.
Action by Wllllam B. Dayton against Wllllam A. Parke a.nd others to recover freight
and demurrage cbargN. From a. judgment
of the general term (22 N. Y. Supp. 613) mod·
ltytog a judgment for plalntlff, defendants
appeal Modified.
Edward M:. Shepard, for appellanta. Thoe.
J. Ritch, Jr., for respondent.

Edward M. Shepard, for appellants. Thos.

J. Ritch, Jr., for respondent.

PECKHAM, J. The trial court directed

a verdict for the amount of the plaintiff's

claim for freight, together with six cents

damages, for demurrage, and the judgment

was thus duly entered, with costs. Both

parties appealed, and the general term, upon
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plaintiffs appeal, modiﬁed the judgment by

increasing the amount allowed plaintiff for

demnrrage from 6 cents to $312, and it af-

ﬁrmed the judgment upon defendants' ap-

peal. The defendants have appealed here

from the judgment as so modilied, and also

from several orders relating to costs, and to

the amendment of the judgment as to the

amount that should be directed upon the

plaintiff's claim for freight. [The court then

held defendants liable for freight, but not for

demurrage. as such, under the terms of the

bill of lading.]

We come, then, to the question of liability

of defendants, as consignees and presumed

owners of the ties, for the payment of dam-

ages in the nature of demurrnge for an im-

proper detention of the vessel. On this

branch the plaintiff has wholly failed to

prove any damage whatever. Because the

defendants might have been liable to pay

those damages which the plaintif f might

have proved it he had sustained them is no

reason for allowing the plaintiff to recover

even a nominal sum by way of damages,

when no amount of damages whatever has

been proved. The plaintiff chose to plant

himself upon his alleged right to recover "de-

PECKHAll, J. The trial court directed
a verdict for the amount of the plalntltr's
cla.lm for freight, together with six cents
damages, for demurrage, and the judgment
wns thus duly entered, with coats. Both
parties nppealed, and the general term, upon
plalntlt'f's appeal, modified the judgment by
Increasing the amount allowed plalntltr for
demurrage from 6 cents to $312, and It aftl.rmed the judgment upon defendants' appeal The defendants ha'l"e appealed here
from the judgment a11 so modltled, and also
from several orders relating to costs, and to
the amendment of the judgment as to the
amount that should be directed upon the
plalntitl's clalm for freight. [The court then
held defendants liable for freight, but not for
demurrnge. as such, under the terms of the
bill of lading.]
We come, then, to the question of llablllty
of defendants, as consignees and presumed
owners of the ties, for the payment of damages In the nature of demurrnge for an Improper detention of the vessel. On this
branch the plalntllf has wholly failed to
pro'l"e any damage whatever. Because the
defendants might have been liable to pay
those damages which the plnlntllr might
have proved If be had sustained them Is no
reason for allowing the plalntltr to reco'l"er
even a nominal sum by way of damages,
when no amount of damages whatever has
been pro'l"ed. The plalntltf chose to plant
himself upon bis alleged right to recover "demurrage," technically so called; and for that
purpose he refers to the bill of lading and
charter party as forming a contract on defendants' pnrt to pay a certain sum dally

murrage," technically so called; and for that

purpose he refers to the bill of lading and

charter party as forming a contract on de-

fendants' part to pay a certain sum daily

t Portion of opinion omitted.

for each day's detention proved beyond the

number allowed in the charter party. This

claim, as we have seen, he cannot make

good, and there is no reason why he should

be permitted to recover even a small sum

unproved, especially when the effect might

be to saddle costs of the litigation, otherwise

payable by plaintiff, upon the shoulders of

the defendants. The plaintiff says he was

entitled to a recovery of six cents, if for no

other reason than to establish a principle.

I see no principle that is established by such

a judgment. In an action of trespass upon

real estate, where title comes in question,

it is easily understood_ that a verdict of six

cents may be of the greatest value to

1

Portion of opinion omitted.

DAlLA.GES.

lS

for each day's detention proved beyond the
number allowed in the charter party. This.
claim, ae we have seen, be cannot make
good, and there •s no reason why he should
be permitted to recover even a small sum
unproved, especially when the etrect might
be to saddle costs of the litigation, otherwise
payable by pla.lntltr, upon the shoulder& of
the defendants. The pla.lntltr says he was
entitled to a recovery of six cents, ff for no
other reason than to establish a principle.
I ilee no principle that ls established by such
a judgment. In a.n action of trespass upon
real estate, where title comes ln question,
1t Is easily understood_ that a verdict of six
cents may be of the greatest value to
plalntitr as establlahlng his title to the land,
so far at leaat as the defendant la concerned.
No such principle obtalns or can obtaln in
such an action as this. The cause of action
of plalntltr In heh a case consists of two
brancbes,~ne to establish an unjust or unreasonable detention by defendant, and the
other to show the damages whlcb plaintiff
sustains by reason of such detention. A
failure to prove either fact-unlawful detention or damage ensuing-ls a failure to prove
a cause of action; and a plalntllr, In falling to prove any damage whatever, Is not
entitled to a. judgment for nominal damages.
It Is not a case where the law will presume
damage. It Is a fact to be proved.
We think the best that can be done In this
<'&se Is to reverse the judgment, and grant a
new trial, costs to abide the e'l"&ut, unless the
plaintiff shall consent to reduce the judgment by striking out any recovery whatever
for demurraire. In case such consent shall
be given, then judgment shall stand for the
reduced amount, subject to any further reduction, It any shall be allowed by the decision of the court upon defendants' application for costs by reason of the offer made by
them. No costs on this appeal are allowed
to either party In case the jml~ment Is affirmed by consent of plalutltr as reduced, and
In that case the order denying motion to
modify verdict ls affirmed. The· order denying defendants' application for taxation of
costs must, In event of atllrmance of the
juclgrueut by consent, be reversed, with leave
to defendants to renew such motion upon the
facts as now existing. Judgment will accordlnirly be entered In accordance with this
opinion. All concur. Judgment accordingly.

14:
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JONES v. KING.

(33 Wis. 422.)

June Term, 1873.

E. L.

NOMINAL AND SuBS'.l'ANTIAL DAMAGES.

;JONES v. KING.
(33 Wis. 422.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. June Term, 1873.
J. F. .Mc.Mullen, for appellant. E. L.
Browne, for respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

J. F. .\Ic\Iullen, for appellant.

Browne, for respondent.

LYON, J. This is an action for slander.

The complaint charges the speaking by the

defendant, to and concerning the plaintiff, of

certain slanderous words, imputing to the

latter the committing of divers criminal of-

fenses. The defendant, by his answer, denies

the speaking of some of the slanderous words

set out in the complaint, andadmits the

speaking of others of them, and alleges, by

way of mitigation, that the plaintif f provoked

him, by charging him with crime, and by ap-

plying to him grossly insulting epithets, to

utter the language complained of. The evi-
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dence shows that the parties casually met,

and engaged in a conversation, which at ﬁrst

was reasonably good-natured, but soon be-

came an angry verbal altercation. in which

vile epithets and charges of crime were freely

hurled by each at the other. It will serve

no useful purpose to state the testimony in

detail, or to inquire which of the parties was

most to blame. It is better for them both

that we forbear to spread upon this record the

particulars of their foolish and disgraceful

encounter. Some objections on behalf of the

plaintiff were made to the admission of tes-

timony, and overruled; but they relate main-

ly to unimportant matters, and are not men-

tioned in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff.

Considering that they are abandoned, no fur-

ther notice will be taken of them. No valid

exception was taken to the charge of the

court. and no objection is made in the argu-

ment to its correctness. It should also be

stated that considerable testimony was given

tending to impeach the character of the plain-

tiff. The jury returned a verdict for the de-

fendant, upon which, after a motion for a

new trial had been overruled, judgment was

rendered dismissing the complaint, with costs.

The plaintiff appeals, and his counsel claims

that there should have been a verdict for

nominal damages, at least, which, while it

would have only carried nominal costs for

the plaintiff, would have defeated the defend-

ant's rights to recover costs. The claim of the

learned counsel is doubtless correct. The

speaking of words by the defendant, to and

concerning the plaintiff, imputing to him a

criminal offense, as charged in the complaint,

is admitted by the answer. The plaintiff was

therefore entitled to a verdict for at Jeast

nominal damages, without introducing any

testimony, and without regard to the testi-

mony which was introduced on the trial; and

such verdict would have defeated the recov-

ery of costs by the defendant. It should be

observed that the circuit judge was not asked

to charge, and did not directly charge, the

jury' that the plaintif f was entitled to a ver-

dict for some damages. He did not say to

the jury (as he well might) that the answer

LYON, J. This Is an action for slander.
The complaint charges the speaking by the
defendant, to and concerning the plalntUf, of
certain slanderous words, Imputing to the
latter the committing of divers criminal offenses. The defendant, by his answer, denies
the speaking of some ot the slanderous words
set out In the complaint, and · admits the
speaking of others of them, a.nd a.lieges, by
way of mitigation, that the plalntl.!f provoked
him, by charging him with crime, and by applying to him grossly Insulting epithets, to
utter the language complained of. The evidence shows tha.t the parties casually met,
and engaged In a conversation, which at first
was reasonably good-natured, but soon became an angry verbal altercation, In which
vile epithets and charges of crime were freely
hurled by each at the other. It will serve
no useful purpose to state the testimony In
detail, or to Inquire which of the parties was
most to blame. It Is better for them both
that we forbear to spread upon this record the
particulars of their toollsh and disgraceful
encounter. Some objections on behalf of the
plaintiff were made to the admission of testimony, and overruled; but they relate mainly to unimportant matters, and are not mentioned In the brief ot counsel for the plaintiff.
Considering that they are abandoned, no turther notice will be taken of them. No valld
exception was taken to the charge ot the
court. and no objection 1B made In the argumi>nt to Its correctness. It should also be
statl'd that considerable testimony was given
tending to Impeach the character of the pialntilT. The jury returned a verdict !or the defendant, upon which, after a motion for a
new trial had been overruled, judgment was
rendered dismissing the complaint, with costs.
The plelntlff appeals, and his counsel claims
that there should have been a verdict for
nominal damages, at least, which, while It
would ha'\"e only carried nominal costs for
the plalntllf, would have d~feated the defendant's rights to recover costs. The claim of the
learned counsel ls doubtll'ss correct. The
speaking of words by the defendant, to and
concerning the plaintiff, Imputing to him a
criminal offense, as charged In the complaint,
Is admitted by the answer. The plaintiff was
therefore entitled to a verdict for at Jens!
nominal damages, without Introducing any
testimony. and without regard to the testimony which was introduced on the trial; and
such verdict would have defeated the recovery of costs by the defendant. It should be
observed that the circuit judge was not asked
to charge, and did not directly charge, the
jury' that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict for some damages. He did not say to

the jury (as be well might) that the answer
of the defendant admits, and also that the undisputed testimony proved, that actionable
words were spoken by the defendant to and
concerning the plaintiff, as alleged In the
complaint. But the judge, In his charge,
more than once refers to the speakJng of
such words, hypothetically. His language Is.
"If the words were spoken," and the like.
Hence the verdict l.s not in disregard of the
instructions of the court. It must also be
observed that evidence of express malice on
the part of the defendant seems to be entirely
wanting in the case. In view of this tact,
and of the uncontradlcted testimony on certain other points (which it is unnecessary to
specify), we are perfectly well satisfied that
the plaintiff should have recovered no more
than nominal damages. Indeed, we do not
understand hie counsel to claim that he Is entitled to anything beyond that. We have before us, tpen, an action for ·slander, in which
the verdict was for the defendant, but should
have been for the plalntltT for nominal damages only, and In which it Is not claimed that
any rule of law has been violated by the
court, In admitting or rejecting testimony, or
in the Instructions to the jury, or that the
jury have disregarded the Instructions of the
court, or ha'\"e behaved Improperly. From
these data we are to determine whether the
plaintiff is entitled to a new trial of his action.
In Laubenhelmer v. Mann, 19 Wis. 519, ft
was held that a judgment of nonsuit, although erroneous, will not be reversed, If It
appear that the plaintiff is only entitled to
nominal damages, If the case be one in which
the defendant would recover costs, notwithstanding there ls a judgment for nominal damages rendered against him. That was an action for a penalty, and was within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. Hence, had
the plaintiff recovered nominal damages, the
defendant would have been entitled to costs,
the sa.me as upon a nonsuit. · In Mecklem v.
Blake, 22 Wis. 495, which was an action to
recover damages for alleged breaches of the
covenants of seisin and against incumbrances
in a deed of land, the court followed the decision In Laubenhelmer v. Mann, and refused
to reverse a judgment dismissing the complaint, although it appeared that the plalntll'f
was entitled to recover, but only to recover
nominal damages. The fact was entirely
overlooked that such damages, In that action,
would have entitled the plaintiff to costs.
Hence, In Eaton v. Lyman, 30 Wis. 42 (which
was also an action on the covenants contained In a conveyance of real estate), Meck·
lem v. Blake was overruled as to the point
we are considering; and, It appearing that the
plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages, we
reversed a judgment of nonsuit against them.
We are entirely satisfied with this decision,
and belleve that It establishes the correct rule
In all actions sounding in contract to which
it Is applicable. But there Is a class of ac-
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tions denominated in the books “hard ac-

tions," to which a different rule has been

applied in numerous oases. Of these actions,

and of the rules relating to new trials which

are applicable to them, a learned author says:

“Hard actions strictly include only civil pro-

ceedings, involving in their nature some pe-

culiar hardship, arising from the odium at-

tached to the alleged offense, or the severity

of the punishment which the law inﬂicts on

the offender in the shape of damages. To

this belong most actions arising ex delicto.

Trespass, slander, libel, seduction, malicious

prosecution, criminal conversation, deceit,

gross negligence, actions upon the statute, or

qui tam actions, prosecuted by informers, and

penal actions, prosecuted by special public

bodies or the public at large, are ranged

under this head. But as they partake, less

or more, in their nature and effect, of prose-
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cutions for criminal offenses. the rules that

govern in granting or refusing new trials, and

the reason of those rules, are drawn from

criminal cases, rather than civil." 1 Grab. &

W. New Tr. p. 503, c. 14. it is scarcely nec-

essary to say that in criminal prosecutions,

after trial and verdict for the defendant, a

new trial is never granted. But the rule is

not as broad in the class of civil actions men-

tioned above; yet in those actions it is much

broader in favor of defendants than in other

civil actions. In the volume last above cited,

we ﬁnd the following statement: \“It is a

general rule, with but few exceptions, that in

penal, and what are denominated ‘hard ac-

tions,' the court wlll not set aside the verdict,

if for the defendant, although there may have

been a departure from strict law in the ﬁnd-

ing of the jury." Page 353. And, again, on

page 5%: “In hard actions, a new trial will

not be granted, especially if the verdict be for

the defendant, although against evidence, not

unless some rule of law be violated." The

author proves the correctness of the princi-

ples and rules thus laid down by him, by

references to large numbers of cases, both

English and American; and he satisfactorily

demonstrates that, in a case like the present

one, a new trial cannot be granted without

a violation of well-settled rules of law. Per-

haps as satisfactory a statement of the law

on this subject as can be found is contained

in Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns. 180. Judge

Spencer there says: “In penal actions, in ac-

tions for a libel and for defamation, and other

actions vindictive in their nature, unless some

rule of law be violated in the admission or

rejection of evidence, or in the exposition of

the law to the jury, or there has been tam-

pering with the jury, the court will not give

a second chance of success." Add to these

other conditions which exist in this case, to

wit, that, at the most, the piaintif! is only en-

titled to recover nominal damages, and that

the jury have not disregarded the instructions

of the court, and there can be no doubt what-

ever that the motion for a new trial was prop-

erly denied by the court below. Our conclu-

sion is that the judgment of the circuit court

tlons denominated in the books "hard actions," to which a dltrerent rule has been
applied in numerous 088etl. Of these actions,
and of the rules relating to new trials which
are applicable to them, a learned author says:
"Hard actions strictly lnclude only civil proceedings, involving In their nature some peeullar hardship. arising from the o<llum attached to the alleged otrense, or the se;erlty
of the punishment which the law Inflicts on
the otrender in the shape of damages. To
this belong most actions arising ex dellcto.
Trespass, slander, libel, seduction, malicious
prosecution, criminal con;ersatlon, deceit,
gross negligence, actions upon the statute, or
qui tam actions, prosecuted by Informers. and
penal actions, prosecuted by special publlc
bodies or the public at large, are ranged
under this head. But as they partake, less
or more, In their nature an<l etrect, of prosecutions for criminal otrenses. the rules that
govern In granting or refusing new trials. and
the reason of those rules, are drawn from
criminal cruses, rather than cl;ll." 1 Grab. &
W. New Tr. p. 503, c. 14. lt Is scarcely necessary to say that In criminal prosecutions,
after trial and verdict tor the defendant, a
new trial Is never granted. But the rule la
not as broad In the class of civil actions mentioned above; yet In those nctlons It Is much
broader In favor of defendants than In other
clvfi actions. In the volume last abo;e clte<l,
we find the following statement: \"It ls a
general rule, with but few exceptions, that In
penal, and what are denominated 'hard ac-
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tlons,' the court will not set aside the verdict,
if for the defendant, although there may have
been a departure from strict law In the finding of the jury." Page 353. And, again, on
page 523: "In hard actions, a new trial will
not be granted, especially If the verdict be for
the defendant, although against evidence, nor
unless some rule of law be violated." The
author proves the correctness of the principles and rules thus laid down by him, by
references to large numbers of cases, both
English and American; and he satisfactorily
demonstrates that, In a case like the present
one, a new trial cannot be granted without
a violation or well-settled rules of law. Perhaps as satisfactory a statement of the law
on this subject as can be found le contained
In Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns. 180. Judge
Spencer there says: "In penal actions, In actions for a libel and for defamation, and other
actions vindictive In their nature, unless some
rule of law be violated In the admission or
rejection of evidence, or In the exposition of
the law to the jury, or there has been tampering with the Jury, the court will not give
a second chance of success." A<ld to these
other conditions which exist In this case, to
wit, that, at the most, the plalntllr ls only entitled to recover nominal damages, and that
the jury have not disregarded the Instructions
of the court, and there can be no doubt whatever that the motion for a new trial was prop·
erly denied by the court below. Our conclusion ls that the judgment of the circuit court
must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.
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SPOKANE TRUCK & DRAY CO. v. HOE-

FER et ux.

(25 Pac. 1072, 2 VVash. 45.)

Supreme Court of Washington. Feb. 5, 1891.

Appeal from superior court, Spokane coun-

ty.

Turner & Graves, for appellant.

thur, for appellees.

Jesse Ar-

DUNBAR, J. The plaintif f Mina Hoefer

had her arm broken, and was otherwise in-

jured, by the falling of a safe, which was

being hoisted by the defendant into a ﬁve-sto-

ry brick building, known as the “Eagle

Block," in the city of Spokane Fails. Plain-

tiff had been to the oﬂlce of her physician, in

the second story of said building, where she

was accustomed to go for treatment daily,

and while returning from such a visit on the

7th day of February, 1890, she passed down
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the stairway, and into the court or opening

under the hoisted safe just as it fell. The

said stairway started from the entrance of

said court or well on Stevens street, and land-

ed on the north end of the covered way on

the second ﬂoor of the rear building. Dr.

'll‘hiel‘s ofﬁce, where Mina Hoefer had been

just before she was injured, was in a room

on the second ﬂoor of the Stevens-Street

building, and was the ﬁrst room north of the

Stevens-Street entrance. There was one oth-

er and perhaps main entrance to the building

from Riverside avenue, and it is claimed by

the defendant that the court or well on that

side of the block was used for hoisting heavy

articles to the upper stories of the building,

and was not generally employed by the pub-

lie as an entrance to the upper stories of the

block; yet we think it fairly appears that

the stairway leading from Stevens street was

in common use, and that the plaintif f had a

right to use it in going to and from the oﬂice

of her physician. Suit was brought against

the defendant, alleging damages in the sum

of $5,000. The case was tried by a jury, and

a verdict rendered for plaintiffs for $2,500,

and a judgment rendered for the same, from

which judgment an appeal was taken to this

court.

The defendant assigns as error the follow-

ing instructions to the jury, given by the

court upon its own motion: “Furthermore,

gentlemen, the plaintiffs claim in this action

t , the defendant was not only guilty of neg-

l‘ ence. by reason of which the plaintiff was

damaged, but was guilty of gross negligence,

and, in case you ﬁnd they were guilty of gross

negligence, a different rule of damages ap-

plies to the case." “ ‘Gross negligence' means

a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights

of other persons taken into consideration with

th(‘ facts in the case; and, in case you ﬁnd

that it was, then, in addition to the actual

damages which you may ﬁnd for plaintiff,

you ‘may assess a sum which the law calls

‘exemplary damages.' That means a damage

to deter others from being wanton and reck-

less of the rights of others." Also the fol-

lowing instructions asked by plaintiffs: "If

V-COMPENSATORY .AND E~E:MPLARY DAMAGES.

SPOKANE TRUCK & DRAY CO. v. HOEFIDR et UL
(26 Pac. 1072, 2 Wash. 45.)

lees of the rights of others." Also the following Instructions asked by plalnturs: "It
the jury believe from all- the evidence that the
agent and employ~ of defendant, the SpoSupreme Court of Washington. Feb. 5, 1891. kane Truck & Dray Company, In placing the
Appeal from superior court, Spokane coun- beams and planks across tbe well-hole, in
ty.
plaint111'.s' petition mentioned as being In the
Turner & Graves, for appellant. Jesse /u- Ea,gle block, in the city of Spokane Falls, and
in any other way, in the construction and
thur, for appellees.
preparation of the appliances, tor hoisting the
DUNBAR, J. The plaint!II Mina Hoefer sate up and through said well-hole, and, In
had her arm broken, and was otherwise In- the hoisting of the same, failed to use such
jured, by the falling of a safe, which was care as the nature of the employment, and
being hoisted by the defendant Into a ftve-sto- the situation -and circumstances surrounding
ry brick building, known as the "Eagle the same, required of a prudent person; havBlock," In the city of Spokane Falls. Plaln- ing had experience, and skilled In such or
tltr had been to the otllce of her physician, In similar work, and that, by reason thereof,
the second story of said building, where she said beam and planks, and other appliances,
was accustomed to go for treatment dally, In the attempt to hoist said safe, gave way or
and while returning from such a visit on the were broken, and tell down through 'sald '\Vell7th day of February, 1890, she passed down hole, striking plalntitr Mina Hoefer, breaking
the· stairway, and Into the court or opening her arm, and otherwise Injuring her, they
under the hoisted safe just as It fell. The should llnd tor plalntltr, assessing the dam11ald stairway started from the entrance of age, It any-, at such sum as they ftnd she has
said court or well on Stevens street, and land- sustained, not exceeding $5,000, the aniount
ed on the north end of the covered way on claimed In the complaint." "The jury Is Inthe second 11.oor of the rear building. Dr. structed that, It they ftnd tor plalntllI under
Thlel's otllce, where Mina Hoefer had been the preceding Instruction, In assessing the
just before she was Injured, was in a room damage they have a right to consider and alon the second 11.oor of the Stevens-Street low for the loss of the personal serv.lces of
building, and was the first room north of the plalntllI Mina Hoefer to her family; her menSteYC'ns-Street entrance. There was one oth- tal sulierlng and bodily pain; the extent-of
er and perhaps main entrance to the building probable duration of the Injury; and the profrom Riverside avenue, and It Is claimed by · spective loss of service occasioned theceby;· althe defendant that the court or well on that so the exi>euse Incurred for medicine, nun1side of the block was used for hoisting heavy lng, etc., and such reasonable doctor bill as
articles to the upper stories of the building, plalntitrs were obligated to pay." "Should
nnd was not geqerally employed by the pub- the jury find for plalntltl's under Instruction
llc as an entrnnce to the upper stories of the No. 1, and also ftnd that defendant's agents
block; y-et we think It fairly appears that and empl.oyes, In constructing the appli3llces
the stairway leading from Stevens street was for hoisting said safe, and In hoisting the
In common use, and that the plalnt!II had a same, were guilty of gross negligence, that Is,
right to use It In going to and from the office exercised so little care as to evince a reckless
of her physician. Suit was brought against and willful lndlll'.erence to the safety of plalnthe defendant, alleging damages lu the sum tllI ~Ilna Hoefer, and all others using said enof $5,000. The case was tried by a jury, and trance nnd stairway, then they may find for
a verdict rendered for plalntll'l's for $2,500, plnintltl's exemplary damages; that ls, damand a judgment rendered for the same, from ages in money by way of punishment, in adwhich judgment an appeal was taken to this dition to the damages they may find under
instruction No. 2, in no case exceeding In
court.
'!'he defendant assigns as error the follow- all the amount of $5,000 claimed In the coming lnstrm:tlons to the jury, given by the plaint." The court refused to give the folcourt upon Its own motion: "l•'urthermore, lowing instruction asked by the defendant,
gentlemen, the plaintiffs claim in this action which refusal defendant also assigns as ertilt tile defendant was not only guilty of ueg- ror: "If you find by the evidence tllllt the
uieuce, by renson of which the plaintll'I' was Injury occurred by defects in the wall, caused
damaged, but was guilty of gross negligence, by the elements, and such defects were not
and, In case you find they were guilty of gross discoYerl'd by or1llnury care, In the absence of
further negligen<·e on tlle part of the dl'~egllgence, a different rule of damages applies to tile cnse." .. 'Gross negligence' means fendan t, the plalntllf cnnnot recover." So
a wanton arnl reckless disre~ard of the rights far as the instruct ion Is concerned that was
of other persons taken into consideration with asked for by defendant and refused by the
the fads in the ense ; and, in case you find court, we think it had already been substanthat It was, then, In addition to the actual tially given by the court; and It was not necdamages which you may find for plnlntll'I', essary to repeat It In another form of words.
you ·may assC'sS a sum which the law calls The court had already instnirted the jury
•exemplary damages.' That means a damage that "if It did n ot appear by a preponderance
to deter others trow being wanton and reek- of testimony that this Injury was occasioned
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- an actual insurer of the safety of the public,

. was “that the defendant was bound to usedl

by the negligence of the defendant, that it

was their duty to ﬁnd for the defendant."

Courts should not be called upon to particu-

iarize by referring to certain portions of the

testimony. It is a far safer rule to state the

law governing the case in general terms.

It is claimed by the defendant that the lan-

guage used by the court in the ﬁrst instruc-

tion asked by plaintiffs makes the defendant

and is therefore erroneous. The statement

such care as the nature of the employment

and the situation and circumstances surround-

ing the same required of a prudent person

having had experience, and skilled in such o1;)

similar work." “'e are unable to see how

this instruction could be materially modiﬁed.

Undoubtedly the “nature of the employment"
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must be taken into consideration. If it is

an employment which is likely to endanger

life or property, certainly a greater degree of

care would be required than an employment,

the careless performance of which would not

ordinarily result in injury to person or prop-

erty. It is plain that “the situation and cir-

cumstances surrounding the employment"

must be considered; for, applying the rule

to a case of this character, a person in hoist-

ing a heavy weight in an unfrequented place,

in no way connected with any thoroughfare

or passage-way, would not be held to the

same degree of care as he would be if the

work were being done in a public thorough-

fare, where people had a right to pass, and

were actually constantly passing. It certain-

ly cannot be gainsaid that "prudence" should

be one of the requisite qualiﬁcations of a

person engaged in such employment. Nor

must his qualiﬁcations stop here. when en-

gaged in a business which is liable to inju-

riously affect the public; for he might be an

ordinarily prudent man, and yet, if he had

no experience or skill in the particular work

in which he is engaged, disastrous results

would be liable to follow. Language which

is not technical must be construed by its or-

dinarily accepted meaning, and we do not

think that the language employed by the

court could be so construed as to make the

defendant an insurer; and we concur with

the counsel for the plaintiffs that it states

substantially the same doctrine as the quota-

tion from Shear. & R. .\'eg. it 47, by defend-

ant, where they deﬁne ordinary care to be

“the care usually bestowed upon the matter

in hand by persons accustomed to deal with

such matters, and having the prudence of

the general class of society to which the per-

son whose conduct is in question belongs_.j

We next pass to the instruction of the court

both upon its own motion and upon the mo-

tion of ‘the plaintiffs in relation to punitive

damages. This is a question which has en-

gaged the earnest attention of courts and au-

thors. A careful investigation of the discus-

sion of this subject by such noted authors as

Greenleaf, Sedgwick, and Parsons, and also

l1

by the negligence of the defendant, that It other eminent text-writers, and by numerous
was their duty to find for the defendant." courts, shows a wonderful diversity of opluConrts should not be called upon to partlcu- ion on tbls Interesting subject. The weight
larlze by referring to certain portions of the of authority, especially considering the older
testimony. It Is a tar safer rule to state the cases, seems to be In fu,·or of the doctrine
law go,·ernlng the C'ase In genernl terms.
of punitive d111nnges, but the opposite 11oetrine
It Is claimed by the defendant that the Ian- has received the support and advocacy of
guage used by the court In the first lm1trnc- many modern writers, and the judicial sanction asked by plalntitl's makes the 1lt•fP111lant tion of many modern courts; while other
. an actual insurl:'r of the \'afety of the pulJlic, courts hnn~ frankly stated tlwlr repugnance
and Is thert>fore erronPons. The statt>ment to the doctrine, yet considered the1nselves
was "tbnt the 1lefl'l1<l11nt wus hound to use? ' hound, by former dPdsious In their respedi\·e
such care as the nature of the employment state;;, to st ill maintain it, appealing to the
and the situation and drenm,..tanet•s surround- legislatm·e to relieYe them from what tb;y
lug the same 1"1:'1111lred of 11 prmlPut l•t•rson believe to be a P•'rnlc!ous practice. In this
ha vlng had experll'nf·e. aml skilll•d in 1<11eh otJ state It Is a nl'w quPstlon, and the court ap-·
similar work." 'Ye are unable to st>e how pronches Its h1n•stig11tlon untrammeled hy
this lnstrul"tlon coul1l he ma teriully moditted. former dcdsious, free to accept the rea:;ouiug
Cndoubtedly the "nnhll'<' of th<' emvloynwnt" whleh most strong!~· HJll•<':ll!'t to its jnclgmPnt,.
must be taken Into t·on;:llh•ratiun. If it Is and to adopt the rule whleh. ln its opinion.
an employment whkh is likely to endanger will simplify judicial proceedings, and lead to
life or property, certainly a greater rl1'g1·1~ of the h•ast embarrassing complkatlons in the
care would be required thnn an emplo~·mPnt, mlmlnistratlon of the law, unrl the determinathe carPless perfonnanee of whil'h would not tion of rights thereunde1·. Aud this desire1l
ordinarily result In lnjnr~· to pPrson or prop- ultimatum, we think, will hest hP attainl:'<l hy
erty. It Is plain that "the situation and cir· adopting the mle laid down by ~Ir. GrC('nleaf
<:umstancPS surrounding the employment'' (\"olume 2, § 21">3! that ··1111ma~··~ 11re gln•n nS\
must be conshlt>rPd; for, applying the rnle a comJJell!mtion or satlsful'tlon to the pl:1into a case of this character, a person in hoist- tit!' for an Injury actually sustained by him
Ing a heavy weight In an unfrequentPd pince, from the detPJHlant. They shoultl he predsely
ln no way connected with any thoroughfare comn11'nsurate with the Injury, neither more
or pn~sage-way, would not be held to the nor less; and this whethPr It be to his Pr.!:-:'
same degree of cnr<> us he would he It the son or his estate,"-nlthough It Is stoutly
work were being done In a public thorough- maintained by so emlm•nt an author ns.
tare, where people had a right to pass, nnd Mr. Sedgwick that this dettnitlon Is toll limit- :
were actually constantly passing. It certain- ed, and that, "wherever the elements or•
ly cannot be galnsaltl that "prudence" should fraud , malice, gross negllgt>nce, or oppresbP. one or the requisite quallficatlons of a skm mingle In the controversy, the law, Inperson engaged In sueh employment. Nor stead of adhering to the system or even the
must his quallfieatlons stop here, when ('n- language of compensation, adopts a wholly
gaged In a buslnes;; which Is liable to lnju- difft>rent rule. It J!ermits the jury to give
rlously affect the public; for he might be an what It tenns 'punitive,' '.11·lmlktlve,' or 'exordinarUy prudent man, and yet, If he had emplary' damnges; In other word:>, blends tono e.~periPnc1' or skill In the particular work gether the Interests of society 11111! of the agin which he Is engaged, disastrous rPsnlts grieved individual, and gives damngt>s not
would be liable to follow. Language which only to recompense the sul'ferer, but to punish
Is not technlcnl must be construed by Its or- the offender." 1 SPdg. Dam. p. :J8; Id. (itb
dlnarlly ac"<·eptt>d meaning, and we do not F..d.) p. 5.1. It seems to us that there are
think that the language employed by the many vnlltl objeetlons to lnterjeetlng Into a.
court could he so construed as to make the purely civil adion the elements of a criminal
defendant an Insurer; and we concur with tr!nl. Intermingling Into a sort of a me<lll'y or
the counsel for the plaintiffs that It states legal jumble two distinct systems of judicial
substantially the same doctrine us the quota- procedure. While the defendant Is tried for
tion from i;:h<'a r. & R Xeg. § 47, by defenrt- a crime, and damages awardi>d on the thPory
ant, where they dPftne ordinary care to b~ that he hns b een proven guilty of a crimr.
''the 1·nre usually bl•stowt>d 111Jon the mnttt•t·i many of the time-honored rules governln"in hand by JlerMns acl'nstoml:'tl to tlt>nl with the trial of' criminal a ctions. nrnl or the rightlJ
such mutters. and haying the prndence of 'that haYe bePn secured to dPfe11rt11nts In <"rimthe gPnPral C'la~s of sof'iety to whlrh thP per- Inn! actions "from the time wh r n•of the memson whose conduct Is in question belon~s.:.:;
ory of man runueth not to the contrary,'' nre
\Ve next pass to the lnstrurtion or the court ahsolutely Ignored. Umler this 1n·ocetlure th~
both upon Its own motion and upon the mo- doctrine of pi·esumptlon of lnnocl'nce, until
tlon of .the plalntltl's In relation to punitive proven guilty IJeyoml a reasonnble doubt,
damages. This is a question which has en- finds no 101lgment in the charge of the court,
gagt>d the earnest attention of courts and au- but Is supplanted by the rule In civil actho111. A careful Investigation of the discus- tlons of a prepo111lPl'ance of testimony. The
slon of this subject by such note1l author!! ns fnlla<'y and unfairness of the position Is made
Greenleaf, Sedgwick, and Parsons, aDd also manifest when It is noted that a person can.
LAW D.lll.2d Ed.-2
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be convicted of a crime, the penalty for

which is unlimited, save in the uncertain

judgment of the jury, and ﬁned to this unlim-

ited extent for the beneﬁt of an individual

who has already been fully compensated in

damages, on a smaller weight of testimony

than he can be in a criminal action proper,

brought for the beneﬁt or protection of the

state, where the amount of the ﬁne is ﬁxed

and limited by law; and, in addition to this,

he may be compelled to testify against him-

.self, and is denied the right to meet the wit-

nesses against him face to face under the

practice in civil actions of admitting deposi-

tions in evidence. Exclusive of punitive dam-

ages, the measure of damages as uniformly

adopted by the courts and recognized by the

law is exceedingly liberal towards the injured

party. There is nothing stinted in the rule
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of compensation. The party is fully compen-

sated for all the injury done his person or

his property, and for all losses which he may

sustain by reason of the injury, in addition to

recompen for physical pain, if any has been

inﬂicted. But it does not stop here; it en-

ters the domain of feeling, tenderly inqui'res

into his mental sufferings, and pays him for

any anguish of mind that he may have expe-

rienced. Indignities received, insults borne,

sense of shame or humiliation endured, lacer-

ation of feelings, disﬁguration, loss of reputa-

tion or social position, loss of honor, impair-

ment of credit, and every actual loss, and

some which frequently border on the imag-

inary, are paid f under the rule of compen-

satory damages. The plaintiff is made en-

tirely whole. T e bond has been paid in

full. Surely the public can have no interest

in exacting the pound of ﬂesh. Ordinarily

the administration of the laws is divided into

two distinct jurisdictions, the civil and the

criminal, each governed by rules of procedure,

and by rules governing the admission and

weight of testimony different and distinct

from the other. The province of the civil

court is, as its name indicates, to investigate

civil rights; there its jurisdiction ends, or

ought to end; while the province of the crim-

inal court is, as its name imports, to investi-

gate and punish crime and restrain its com-

mission. And it is to the criminal, and not

the civil, jurisdiction that society looks for its

protection against criminals. Yfhe object of\

punishment is not to deter the criminal from

again perpetrating the crime on the particu-

lar individual injured, but for the protection J

of society at large; and as the state is at the

expense of restraining and controlling its

-criminals, and as lines are imposed for the

double purpose of restraining the offender-,

and of reimbursing the state for its outlay in

protecting its citizens from criminals, we are

at a loss to know by \\"h2IL process of reason-

ing, either legal or ethical, the conclusion is

reached that a plaintiff in a civil action, un-

der a complaint which only asks for compen-

sation for injuries received, is allowed to ap-

propriate money which is supposed to be paid

COlIPEN'SA.TORY .AND EXEMPLARY DA.MAGES.

be convicted of a crime, the penalty tor
which is unlimited, save In the uncertain
judgment of the jury, and fined to thi8 unl!m1teil extent for the benefit of an Individual
who has already been fully compensated In
damages, on a smaller weight of testimony
than he can be In a criminal action proper,
brought for the benefit or protection of the
state, where the amount of the fine Is fixed
and limited by law; and, la addition to this,
he may be compelled to testify against him.self, and ls denied the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face under the
practice In civil actions of admitting depositions In evidence. Exclusive of punitive damages, the measure of damages as uniformly
adopted by the com·ts and recognized by the
law is exceedingly liberal towards the Injured
party. There Is nothing stinted In the rule
of compensa tlon. The party ls fully compensated for all the Injury done bis person or
bis property, and for all losses which he may
sustain by reason of the Injury, In addlllon to
recompenn for physical pain, If any has l>een
Inflicted. But It does not stop here; It en•
ters the omain of feeling, tenderly inquires
Into bis mental sufferings, and pays him for
any anguish of mind that he may have experienced. Incllgnltles received, Insults borne,
sense of shnme or humiliation endured, laceration of feelings, dlsfiguration, loss of reputation or social position, loss of honor, lmpafrment of credit, and every actual loss, and
some which frequently border on the imaginary, are paid fr under the rule of compensatory dnmnges. The plaintiff Is made entirely whole. T e bond has been paid In
full. Surely the public can have no Interest
In exacting the pound of flesh. Ordinarily
the admiuistrntlon of the laws Is divided into
two distinct jurisdictions, the civil and the
criminal, each gov.erned by rules of procedure,
and by rules governlag the admission and
w<'ight of testimony different and distinct
fl'om the other. '.rhe province of the civil
court Is, as Its name Indicates, to Investigate
civll rights; there Its jurisdiction ends, or
-0ught to end; while the province of the criminal conrt Is, as Its name Imports, to Investigate and punish crime and restrain Its commission. And It Is to the criminal. and not
the civil, jurisdietlon tbat society looks for Its
protection against criminals. \:he object ot\
punishment Is not to deter the criminal from
n~nln perpetrating the crime on the particular Individual Injured, but for the protectlon4
·-Of society at large; and as the state Is at the
expense of restraining and controlling Its
.criminals, and as fines are Imposed for the
double purpose of restraining the offender·,
aml of relmbm·i<inir the state for Its outlay In
protecting Its citizens from cril'ninals, we are
at a loss to know by whaL process of reasoning, either legal or ethical, the conclusion Is
r<'ached that a plalntit'f In a civil action, under a complaint which only asks for compenHtlon for Injuries received, Is allowed to appropriate money which is supposed to be paid

for the'bene1lt of the state. It Is to be presumed that the state bas fully protected Its
own interests, or as fully at lea.st as they
could be protected by laws, when It provides
for the punishment of crime In Its criminal
statutes, and fixes the fine at a sum which It
deems commensurate with the crime designated; hence, punitive damages cannot be
allowed on the theory that It Is for the benefit of society at large, but must logically be:
allowed on the theory that they are for the
sole benefit of the plalnti.11'. who has alreadi.
been fully compensated, a theory which 1si
repugnant to every sense of justice.
Again, while jurors should be the judges
ot the character and weight of testimony,
that juclgment should be exercised under
some rule, and be amenable to some law, so
that an abuse of discretion could be ascertained and corrected; but, under the doctrine of punitive damages, where the whole
question ls left to the tinguided judgment of
the jury, and where, under the very nature
of the doch·lne, no measure of damages can
be stated, and hence no limits compelled,
where there are no special findings provided
tor, It would not be often that n. court would
be warranted In Interfering with a verdict,
Ir Indeed It could do so at all, If the verdict
fell within the amount asked as compensatory damR.ges. '.rake the case at bar for
Instance, and the court has no way of ascertaining whether the jury found that the
plaintiff had actnally been damaged to the
full runount of $2,500, or whether they found
her actual dnmages to be $il00, and assrs>1ed
the other $2,000 by way of punishment. It
seems to us that a practice which leads to so
much confusion and uncertainty In the admlnlstru tlon of the law, and that Is always liable to lead to Injustice, the rorrection of
which ls Impracticable, cannot be too l!lll'edlly e1·adlcated from our system of jurl:iprndence. In this connection, we quote approvingly the language of the supreme court ot
Indiana In Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51.
Says the court: "The doctrine of exemplary1
or punitive damages rests llllOn a very uncertain and unstable basis. It Is almost equivalent to giving the jury fhe power to make
the law of damages In each case; and in a
case where the defendant ls a commanding,
popular, influential person, and the plaintiff
of an opposite character. and the local and
temporary excitement of the time happens
to be In favor of the defendant, the jury Is
apt to be reluctant in giving even pectmlary
compensation, without adding Anything by
way of exemplary or punitive damages; while,
In a case tn which the character of the parties and the circumstances are reversed, the
jury will be liable to push their powers to
an unwarranted and unconscionable extent,
dangerous to justice and the security of settled rights." Says the <'ourt In Murphy v.
Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 Pac. 119: "The reflecting lawyer is naturally curious to account
for this 'her('sy' or 'deformity,' as It bas been
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termed. Able and searching investigations

made by both jurists and writers disclose the

following facts concerning it, viz.: That it

was entirely unknown to the civil law; that

it never obtained a foothold in Scotland; that

it ﬁnds no real sanction in the writings of

Blackstone, Hammond, Comyns, or Ruther-

forth; that it was not recognized in the earlier

English cases; that the supreme courts of

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Indiana.

Iowa, Nebraska, .\Iit-higan, and Georgia have

rejected it in whole or in part; that of late

other states have faiteringly retained it be-

cause committed so to do: that a few years

ago it was correctly said, ‘At last accounts

the court of queen's bench was still sitting

hopelessly involved in the meshes of what

Mr. Chief Justice Quain declared to be “ut-

terly inconsistent propositions;" ' and that the

rule is comparatively modern, resulting in all
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probability from a misconception of impas-

sioned language and inaccurate expressions

used by judges in some of the earlier English

cases." And in support of this theory the

Colorado court quotes Mr. Justice Foster in

-Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, who concludes

a discussion of the expression “smart mon-

ey" as used by Grotins and jurists contempo-

rary with that author, in the following

language: “It is interesting, as well as in-

structive, to observe that one hundred and

twenty years ago the term ‘smart money‘ was

employed in a manner entirely different from

the modern signiﬁcation which it has obtain-

ed, being then used as indicating compensa-

tion for smarts of the injured person, and not,

as now, money required by way of punish-

ment, and to make the wrong-doer smart."

Some courts have held that it was in viola-

tion of the constitutional guaranty “that no

person should be twice put in jeopardy for

the same offense,“ where the criminal code

provided a punishment for the same otfense,

and some have restricted or limited its abro-

gation to cases where the act charged to

have been committed was made punishable

by law; but, without expressing any opinion

on the constitutional question, ‘we believe that‘

the doctrine of punitive damages is unsound

in principle, and unfair and dangerous in

practice, and that the instruction of the court

on the subject of punitive damages was erroj

neous. With this view of the law it is not

necessary to examine the further objection

urged by defendant, “that this was not a

proper case for the application of the doc-

trine of punitive dmnages." The judgment

is reversed, and the case remanded for a new

trial.

ANDERS, C. J., and HOYT, SCOTT, and

STILES, JJ., concur.

termed. Able and searching Investigations
made by both jurists and writers disclose the
following facts concerning It, viz.: Thot It
was entirely unknown to the civil Jaw; that
it never obtained a foothold In Scotland; that
It finds no real sanction In the writings of
Blackstone, Hammond, Coruyns, or Ruther·
forth; that It was not recognized In the earlier
English cases; that the supreme courts of
New Hampshire, :Massachusetts, Indiana.
Iowa, Nebraska, :\lic·hlgan, and Georgia have
rejected it In whole or In part; that of late
<>ther states have falteringly retained It because committed so to do; that a few years
ago It was correctly said, 'At last llccounts
the court of queen's bench was still sitting
hopelessly involved In the meshes of what
Yr. Chief Justice Quain declared to be "lit·
terly lncon11lstent propositions;"• and that the
rule Is comparatively modern, resulting In all
probability from a mlsconcpptlon of Impassioned language and Inaccurate exprrs~ions
used by judges In some of Lile earlier E,ngllsh
cases." And In support of this theory the
Colorado court quotes Mr. Justice Foster In
. Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, who concludes
a discussion of the expression "smart mon·
f'Y" as used by Grotius nml jurists contemporary with that author, In the following
Ian~'lu1~e: "It Is inlt'l'l'lltiug, as Wl'll ns ln:Structlve, to observe that one hundred and
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twenty years ago the term 'smart money' was
employed In a manner entirely dlt'!erent from
the modern signification which It hns obtained, being then used as Indicating compensation for smarts of the injured person, and not,
as now, money required by way of punishment, and to make the wrong-doer smart."
Some courts haYe held that It was In violation of the constitutional guaranty "that no
person should be twice put in jeopnrdy for
the same offense," where the criminal code
provided a punishment for the same otl'ense,
and some have restricted or limited Its abrogation to eases where the act charged to
have been committed was made punishable
by law; but, without expressing any opinion
on the constitutional question, lwe believe thnt1
the doctrine of punitive damages Is unsonud
In principle, and unfalr and dangerous In
practice, and that the Instruction of the court
on the subj<'et of punltlve damages was erro;.1
neous. With this view of the law it Is not
necessary to examine the further objection
urgecl by defendant, "that this was not a
proper case for the applicntlon of the doctrine of punitive damages." The judgment
Is reYersed, and the case remanded for a new
trial.
ANl>EHS, C. J., and HOYT, SCOTT, and
STILES, JJ., concur.
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/ CO:\IPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

LUCAS v. MbIGAN CENT. R. CO.
(56 N. w. 1039 98 Mich. l.)
,
Supreme Court of Michigan. Dee. 4, 1893.

LUCAS v. MPCHIGAN CENT. R. CO.

(56 N. W. 1039, 98 Mich. 1.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 4, 1893.

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Cor-

nelins J. Reilly, Judge. Y

Action by Calvin Lucas against the Mich-

igan Central Railroad Company for damages

for wrongful ejection from defendant's train.

Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings

error. Reversed.

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Cornellus J. Reilly, Judge.
·
Action by Calvin Lucas against the Michlgan Central Railroad Company for damages
for wrongful ejection from defendant's train.
Jnd~ment for plaintilr, and defendant brings

error.

Reversed.

Henry Russel, (Ashley Pond, of counsel,)
for appellant. Dickinson, Thurber & Stevenson,· for appellee.

Henry Russel, (Ashley Pond, of counsel.)

for appellant. Dickinson, Thurber & Stev-

enson,-for appellee.

l\lcGR.A'I'H, J. Plaintiff purchased an ex-

cursion ticket at Dexter, good to Detroit

and return, and rode to Detroit thereon. At

about 8 o'clock on the evening of the same

day he took the train at Detroit for Dexter,
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taking a seat in the smoking car. When a

few miles out of Detroit, the conductor took

up his ticket. When the train arrived at

Ypsilanti, plaintiff left the smoker, and took

a seat in a regular passenger car. After the

train left Ypsilanti, the conductor came to

plaintiff, and demanded his fare. Plaintiff

informed him that he had given him his

ticket in the other car. The conductor then

asked him for his check. Plaintiff replied

that he had not been given a check. The

conductor threatened to put him off, but did

not at that time, but told him that he would

have to pay his fare, or get off at Ann Ar-

bor. Plaintiff responded that he had sur-

rendered his ticket, and would not pay his

fare. After the train left Ann Arbor, the

conductor returned, and, plaintiff refusing

to‘pay his fare, the conductor called the

brakeman, and they together pulled plaintif

f

from his seat, took him through the car, and

put him oﬂ, about one mile west of Ann

Arbor and eight miles east of Dexter. Plain-

tiff testiﬁed that when his ticket was taken

up no check was given him; that when the

conductor came to him the second time, and

again just before he was put off, he told the

conductor that if he would go back with him

into the smoking car he would prove his as-

sertions by the man who sat with him, but

that the conductor told him that he had no

time to bother with him; that the conduc-

tor insisted that he (plaintiff) had gotten on

at Ypsilanti; that he was ejected from the

car by force at about 10 o'clock at night;

that the night was very dark; that he could

not even see the fences on either side of the

track, and that he was compelled to walk

home. It was not claimed on the trial that

plaintiff had not surrendered a ticket, but

the conductor insisted that he had given him

and all of the excursionists checks; that he

told plaintiff that if he would bring one

man that knew him, that said he came from

Detroit, it would be all right, but he would

not do that; that he used no force in eject-

ing him; and denied that plaintlff had re-

quested him to go into the smoking car for

McGRATH, J. Plalntltr purchased an excurelon ticket at Dexter, gootl to Detroit
and return, and rode to Detroit thereon. At
about 8 o'clock on the evening of the . same
day he took the train at Detroit for Dexter,
taking a seat iu the smoking car. When a
few miles out of Detroit, the conductor took
up his ticket. When the train arrived at
.Y psilanti, plnlntil't left the smoker, and took
a seat in o. regular pnssenger car. After the
trnln left Y1>silant1, the conductor came to
plalntltr, and demanded his fare. Plaintiff
Informed him that he had given him his
ticket In the other car. The conductor then
asked him for his check. Plaintiff replied
that he bad not been given a check. The
conductor threatened to put him ol'f, but did
not at that time, but told him that he would
have to pay his fare, or get otr at Ann Arbor. Plaintiff responded that he had surrendered his tlc}tet, and would not pay bis
tare. After the train left Ann Arbor, the
conductor returned, and, plaintiff refusing
to · pay his fare, the conductor cnlled the
brakeman, and they together pulled plaintiff
from his seat, took him through the car, and
put him otf, about one mile west of Ann
Arbor and eight miles east of Dexter. Plaintll'f testified that when bis ticket was taken
up no check was given him; that when the
conductor came to him the second time, and
again just before he was put off, he told the
conductor that It he would go back with him
Into the smoking car he would prove his ns~1·t1ons by the man who sat with him, but
that the conductor told him that he had no
time to bother with !Jim; that the conductor lnsisteu that he (plaintllI) had gotten on
at Ypsilnntl; that he was ejected from the
rnr lly force ot about 10 o'clock nt night;
that the night was very dark; that he could
not even see the fences on either side of the
track, and that be wns compelled to walk
home. It was not claimed on the trial that
plalntil'f bad not sur1·N11Iered a ticket, but
the conductor insisted that he had given him
and aJI of the excursionists checks; that he
told plaintiff that lf he would bring one
man that knew him, that said he came from
Detroit, It would be all right, but he would
not do that; that he used no force In eject·
Ing lliw; and denied tllat plalntllr had re-

quested him to go into the smoking car for
the purpose ot ldentlfl.catlon. One of plaint11f's witnesses, who was In the smoker,
testlfl.ed that the conductor gave plaintiff D<>
check when the ticket was taken up. Another witness, who was in the car from
which plaintiff was ejected, testified that she
was an excursionist, as were others who.
were with her; that no checks were given
to her or the other excursionist with her,
and that she heard plaintiff say to the conductor that lf he would go into the smoking
car with him (plaintiff) he could prove that
he got on at Detroit, and had given up his
ticket, and the conductor refused to go.
Plalntil't had a verdict for $1,200, and defendant appeals.
The alleged erl'Ors relate to the refusal ot
requests to charge, and to the Instructions
given on the question of durnages. Tbe defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed as to the law applicable to Its version of the case. After tlle sw·render of
his ticket, plaintiff bad left his seat In the
smoking car, and taken a sent in another
car. It plnintil'f received a check from the
conductor, and, when bis fare was demanded, did not produce the clleck, and, when requested, refused to go Into the other car for
identification, he could not recover. The
check, If given, was given him for the very
purpose or identification. It was notice tohim that the conductor would rely upon Its
production, and not upon recollection. The
defendant was entitled to the Instruction
that there was- no evidence of malicious Intention on the part of the conductor; but,
under the circumstances of this case, If the
jury believed the testimony Introduced on
behalf of plalntllr, the plalntltr was entitled to recover, not only those damages~
which are ordinarily termed "actual damages," but for whatever lujnry to bis feelings or of indignity, pain, anti disgrace such
conduct would tend to produce In view of
the time, pince, and circumstances. Conduct may be so hasty and Ill-timed, and S<>
far disregard proper precaution and the
rights of others, as to be reckless and oppressive, and the law regards recklessnes.:1
and opp1·<>sslon as aggravating the Injury.
Post Co. v. McArthur, 1G Mich. 4.>3; Josselyn v. McAlllster, 22 Mich. 310; Kreiter v..
Nlcllols, 28 Mich. 499; Elliott v. Herz, 29·
Mich. 2ro; Kehrig v. Peters, 41 Mich. 4i::i,
2 N. W. 801; Ross v. LPg'gett, Gl !lllcb. 445,
28 N. W. 695. If plaintil'l'.'s lPgnl rights 'Were
violated by the expulsion from the train, It
was for the jury to consider the Injury to hl<J
feelings that such conduct would be likely to
produce, In view of his couseiousness thnt
he was without fault. and had a right to remnln upon the trnln to his destination. Rnllron!I Co. •· Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; Carsten v.
Railroad Co., 4-! Minn. 45-!, 47 N. W. 49;
Hallroa<l Co. v. IUce, 64 Md. C.3, 21 Atl. 97;
Railroad Co. v. Holdridge, 118 Ind. 281, 20
N. E. 837. It was expressly held in Hall-
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road Co. v. Winter's Adm'r, 1&3 U. S. 60,

12 Sup. Ct. 356, that if plaintiff was right-

fully on the train as a passenger, he had the

right to refuse to be ejected from it, and

to make a suﬂicient resistance to being put

oﬂ.' to denote that he was being removed by

compulsion, and against his will; and the

fact that under such circumstances he was

put off the train was of itself a good cause

of action against the company. Defendant's

belief cannot be held to justify unreasonable

or reckless conduct. Welch v. Ware, 32

Mich. 77; Raynor v. Nims, 37 Mich. 34.

The court was in error, however, in in-

structing the jury that plaintiff was enti-

tled to exemplary damages in the absence

of any explanation as to what was meant

by that term. Post Co. v. McArthur, supra.

The court had already instructed the jury
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that plaintiff was entitled to recover as ac-

tual damages “for such pain and mortitica-

tion and disgrace as the act entailed," and

then informed the jury that if plaintiff made

a proposition to the conductor to step back

into the other car, and allow him to prove

that he got on at Detroit, and surrendered

his ticket, then he was entitled to recov-

er, in addition to his actual damages,

what the law calls “exemplary damages."

The jury were left free to add to the amount

which they found that plaintif f had suffered

from mortiﬁcation, pain, and disgrace a fur-

ther sum as a punishment. The aim of

law which gives redress for private wrongs

is compensation to the injured, rather than

the prevention of a recurrence of the wrong.

The law recognizes the fact that an injury

may be intensiﬁed by the malice or will-

fuiness or oppresslveness or recklessness of

the act, and simply allows damages com-

mensurate with the injury when these ele-

ments are present. The added injury in

consequence of their presence is not always

susceptible of proof, hence the matter is left

to the sound discretion of the jury. Courts,

however, should call attention to the ele-

ments that should be considered by juries in

this class of cases, and caution them from

acting upon improper theories. Jossclyn v.

McAllister, 22 Mich. 310; Scripps v. Reilly, 38

Mich. 10; Stiison v. Gibbs, 53 Mich. 280, 18

N. W. 815; Wilson v. Bowen, 64 Mich. 133,

31 N. W. 81. It is urged that the defendant

is not liable in exemplary damages for the

oppressive or reckless conduct of the con-

ductor, and Railroad Co. v. Prentice, 147

U. S. 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 261, is relied upon. In

that case the act was wholly without the

line or scope of the conductor's authority,

’and the court expressly recognize the rule

that, if any wantonness or mischief on the

part of an agent acting within the scope of

his employment causes additional injury to

the plaintiff in body or mind, the principal

is liable to make compensation for the whole

injury suffered, and a number of cases are

cited in support of the doctrine. Forlthe

errors mentioned, the judgment is reversed,
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l'OOd Oo. T. Winter's Adm'r, HS u. 8. 60, the prevention ot a recurrence ot the wrong.
12 Sup. Ct. 356, that If plalntur wae rtght- The law recognizes the tact that an Injury
tully on the train aa a passenger, he hnd the may be lntenalfl.ed by the malice or wmright to retuse to be eJected from It, and tulnesa or oppressiveness or recklessness of
to make a suftlclent resistance to being put the act, and simply allows damages com·
-otr to denote that be was being removed by mensurate with the Injury when these ele-compulslon, and against hLs will; and the ments are present. The added Injury In
consequence of their presence Is not always
~act that under such clrcumstnncea he was
put otr the train was ot Itself a good cnni.e susceptible of proof, hence the matter Is left
()f action agatnat the company. Defendant's to the sound discretion of the jury. Courts,
belief cannot be held to jusUty unreasonable however, should call attention to the eleor reckless conduct. Welch v. Ware, 32 ments that should be considered by juries In
this class of cases, and caution them from
l\Ilch. TI; Raynor v. Nims, 37 Mich. 34.
The court was In error, however, In ln- acting upon Improper theories. Josselyn v.
structlng the jury that plnlntltr was enti- McAllister, 22 Mich. 310; Scripps v. Reilly, 39
tled to exemplary damages In the absence Mich. 10; Stilson "'· Gibbs, ;:;3 Mich. 280, 18
of any explanation aa to what was meant N. W. 815; Wilson v. Bowen, 64 Mich. 133,
by that term. Post Co. v. Mc.Arthur, supr11.. 31 N. W. 81. It Is urged that the defendant
The court had already Instructed the Jury Is not liable In exemplary damages for the
that plalntUr was entitled to recover as ac- oppressive or reckless conduct of the contual damages ''tor such pain and mortifica- ductor, and Rallrond Co. v. Prentice, 1-17
tion and disgrace as the act entnlled," and U. S. 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 261, la relied upon. In
then Informed the jury thnt If plalntltr made that case the act was wholly without the
a proposition to the conductor to step back , llue or scope of the conductor's authority,
Into the other car, and allow him to prove and the court expressly recognize the rule
that he got on at Detroit, and surrendered that, If any wnntonness or mischief on the
bis ticket, then be was entitled to recov· part of an agent acting within the scope of
er, in addition to his actual damages, hla employment ca.uses additional Injury to
what the law calla "exemplary damages." the plalntltr In body or mind, the principal
The Jury were left tree to add to the amount Is liable to make compensation for the whole
' which they found tbnt plaintiff had 8Utrered injury sutrered, and a number of cases are
from mortlfl.catlon, pain, and disgrace a fur. cited In support of the doctrine. For. the
ther sum as a punishment. The aim of errors mentioned, the judgment-la reversed,
law which gives redress for private wrongs and a new trial ordered. 'nle other Justices
18 compensation to the Injured, rather than concurred.
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CHELLIS v. CHAPMAN.t

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

CHELLIS~. CHAPl\IAN.1

(26 N. E. 308, 125 N. Y. 214.)

(26 N. E. 308. 125 N. Y. 214.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 13, 1891.
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 13, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general

term, fourth department.

Watson M. Rogers, for appellant. Han-

nibal Smith, for respondent.

GRAY, J. This plaintiff has recovered a

verdict for $8,000, as damages for the

breach by defendant of his promise to

marry her. The proofs abundantly justi-

ﬁed the jury in ﬁnding as they did. but the

defendant insists that the trial judge erred

in his rulings upon the evidence, and in

his charge. He does not raise any ques-

tion about the fact of his agreement to

marry the plaintiff. and, indeed, he could

not well do so, as it was established out

of his own mouth; but he thinks his case

was prejudiced by theadmission ofcertain
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evidence. and by the way in which the trial

judge submitted the question of the dam-

ages to the consideration of the jury, and

that he should. therefore, have a new trial.

The general term, in afﬂrming the ju'dg-

ment, have passed upon various points

raised by the appellant, and we might well

remit the case without further expression

of opinion; but some of the questions still

insisted upon seem to deserve further con-

sideration from us. Evidence ofthe defend-

ant‘s general reputation as to wealth, at

the time of the agreement ofmarriage, was

admitted against theobjection to its cor‘-

petency upon the subject of damages in

such an action. The exception to its ad-

mission presents an interesting question,

and one which may be deemed not alto-

gether free from difficulty. Such evidence,

on ﬁrst consideration, seems to conﬂict

with the general rule that in actions for

a breach of contract evidence as to the de-

iendant's wealth is inadmissible. The

plaintiff. in such actions. is entitled to re-

cover only those damages which she may

prove that she has suffered in consequence

of the defendant's failure to perform on

his part. The defendan t's solvency, or in-

solvency, has nothing to do with the is-

sue, and furnishes no measure for the com-

putation of damages. And this rule of ex-

Clusion as to such evidence has been also

applied to cases where damages are sought

to be recovered for seduction, or for crint-

inal conversation. James v. Biddington,

6 Car. & P. 589; Dain v. Wycoff,7 N. Y.

191. Boron Ar.nsnso.v, in James v. Bid-

dington, an action by a husband for crim-

inal conversation with his wife, assigned

as the reason for holding such evidence to

Appeal from ellpreme court, general
terru, fourth department.
Wat.w m M. Rogers, for appellant. Han1Jilu1J Swit/J, for re!!pondent.
GRAY, J. Thi11 plaintiff has recovered a
venlict for $8,UOU, as damages for the
lm~nch by defenclant of hie promise to
murry her. '.fhe proofs abundantly jm1tltkll the jury In finding as they dill, but the
ddendunt insi11ts that the trial judge erred
In hie rulings uoon the evidence, and In
bis charge. He does not raise any queRtion about the fact of his agreement to
warry the plaintiff. and, lndeecl, he could
not well 11.o so, as it wa11 established out
or his own mouth; hut he tllinks bl!! case
was prejudiced by the11dmleRion of certain
evidence. encl hy the way in which the trial
Judge eul>mltted the question of tbe damages to the consldern tion of the jury, and
that he Rhould, therefore, have a new t1•ial.
The general term, In affirming the jntlgment, have pasHetl upon various points
raised by the appellant, and we might well
remit the case without further expression
or opinion; but some of the qllestione still
fnsl!!ted upon seem to deserve fui:ther con11icleration froru us. Evldenceoftbedefendant's gencrai reputation aR to wealth, at
the timP of thengreementofmarrlnge, was
edmitted against thl'objectlon to its col"petency upon tile subject of clamages in
such an action. The exception to ft11 admission presents an Interesting question,
and one which may be deemed not altogether free from dlfticalty. Such evidence,
on first considerntlon, seems to conflict
with the general rule thut In actions for
a breach of contract evidence as to the d~
fendant's wealth Is lnadmlRslble. The
pluln tiff. in such actions, le en ti tie cl to recover only those damages which she may
prove that 11he has suffered In comwquence
or the defendant's failure to perform on
bis part. The defendant's solveney, or lneoh·ency, has nothing to do with the issue, and furnishes no measure for the computation of damages. And this rllle of excluHiou us to snch evidence has been also
applied to caseswheredamage~areeought
to he recovered for seduction, or for criminal conversution. James v. Blddlngton,
6 Car. & P. 589; Dain v. Wycoff, 7 N. Y.
191. Buron ALDERSON, Jn James v. Illddington, an action by a husliaud for criminal conversation with hie wife, assigned
as the remmn for ho1'11ng such evidence to
be Improper that "the plaintiff is entitled
to as much damages as a jury think is a
compensation for thP. Injury he has sustai:ll'd, and the amount or .the defendant's
property le not a question In the caeP.."
Judp;e G.um1:"'1rn, In Dain v. Wycoff, an
action hy n father for the seduction of hie
daughter, reasoned, upon the exclusion of
proof of what dt•fendant was worth, that
the jury should not be allowecl "to i;co
beyond the issue between the parties litigating, and, after Indemnifying the plt1.in-

be improper that “the plaintiff is entitled

to as much damages as a jury think is a

compensation for the injury he has sus-

tained, and the amount ofthe deiendant‘s

property is not a question in the case."

Judge GARDINER, in Dnin v. Wyeofi, an

action by a father for the seduction of his

daughter, reasoned, upon the exclusion of

proof of what defendant was worth. that

lAffirwing 7 N. Y. Supp. 78.

tiff for the tnjury sustained by Mm, proceed as conservators of the public morals
topunleh thedefendant In a private action
for an offense against society." 'l'be principle umlerlying tHe exclusion of this kincl
of evidence, In the lotter clnss of rases, le
that vlndictlveorpunitlvedumages would
be Improper, as the recovery In them
should be confined to what the jury may
deem to be n sufficient compens1ttion for
the injury l!Ustnlned hy the pluintiff. But
the pre;;ent action Is quite other in Its nature, and co11stltute1:1 an exception to that
general rule upon the Ruhject of damages
for violation ofcontract obllga ti one which
has been al!sented to by the Judges of the
courts in this country and In Englund. It
is apparent that, In such an action as this,
thero can be no hard and fltst rule or damages, and that they must be left to the
discretion orthe jury. or course, that discretion le not so absolute us to be Inclependent of a conslclerutlon of the evidence.
It le oue whtch le to be exercised wltli regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, and, as It haR frequently been
salc1, where the \'Pl'clict has not been
Influenced hy 1we)udice, pnBBion, or corruption, tile Yerdict wlll not he disturbed
hy the court. \'l'hD,t the nmonnt of the
suitor's pecunla ry means iR a factor of some
Importance in the caae of a demand of
marriage cannot fairly be dentecl. It is a
circumstance which ve1·y frequently must
lta\•e Its particular influence upon the mind
of the woman in determining the question
of consent or refusal; and, as I think, lo
u. proper case, very naturally and properly
so. ThP. ability or the man to support her
In r.omfort, ancl the station In life which
marriage with him holds forth, are matters which may be weighed In connection
1 with an agreement to m1l1'ry.
'-- Ju the cnse at bar the plalnttn was 41
years of ege, and the defendant 74. Six.
yenre previously he baa !!ought her acquaintance, um1nllclted by her, ancl wltb
matrimoniul views on hie part. He bad
visited her more or less f~uently, and
had twice propm1ed marrluge befor-e thl'ir
engagement In 1886. She was ~nd had
been supporting herself l.lB a teacher and
superintendent In city schools. He bad
never heen married, and hac1 lived in the
country as a farmer. He was possessed of
pecuniary means, considerable In amount
In the general estimation of his neighbors,
and not incom!lderable If we take hie own
estlmatP. Though pretending to Aome
cultivation of mind, which, umong other
wayR, If we may judge from this record,.
he seem eel to dellgb t in displaying by 11
versification of the homely though not Vl'ry
Inspiring or romantic toplcR and events of
his farm life and Rurroundings, be yet was
seemingly lacking in thoeeoutwarcl g1·aces
of the perHon which arc not Infrequently
deemed u sub!!titute for more eolM poesesllions. Nor does he seem to have hud recourse to the 11d vent! tlouH aids of the wardrobe to adorn hie exterior person, ancl
thereby to compensate for pereonnl Rhortcomlnge. I think that the jury should b~
made awt1.re or all theclrcumstanceswhlch
In this caRe, and In every such ca11e, might
be ellpposed to have presented themselves
to the mind of the plaintiff when a11ked tQo
clrnnge her position by marriage. Of
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these circumstances. the home offered,

which for its comforts and case would de-

pend upon the more or less ample pecuni-

ary means of the defendant, the freedom

from the personal exertions for daily sup-

port, the social position accompanying

the marriage, all these are facts which

have their proper bearing upon the ques-

tion of marriage. The wealth and the rep-

utation for wealth of a man are matters

which, as this world is constituted. often

aid in determining his social positiou.not-

withstandinghe may haveother and more

intelligible rights to it. and despite objec-

tionable characteristies or traits. Where,

therefore, the defendant has demanded an

engagement of marriage. it seems proper

enough that the jury should know what

possible reinforcement his suit may have

had, and what were the inducements
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offered by his social standing and sur-

roundings. In the case of James v. Bid-

dington, supra, Baron ALDERsON, while

holding it improper to give evidence of the

amount of defendant's property in an ac-

tion fur criminal conversation, said: " In

acase of breach of promise of marriage.

the amount of the defendant's property is

very material, as showing what would

have been the station of the plaintiff in

society if the defendant had not broken his

promise. " And see Berry v. Du Costa, L. R.

1 C. P. 331; Wood v. Hurd. 2 Bing. N. (7.

166. It has been so held in this court. and

in the courts of other states, to some of

whose decisions the respondent's brief has

directed our attention. Knlffen v. Mc-

Connell. 30 N. Y. 285: Lawrence v. Cooke,

56 Me. 187; Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 3~16,

4 N. W. Rep. 8: Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91.

In Mayne, Damages. (Wood's Ed. § 677,)

upon the strength of the English authori-

ties I have cited, the same rule is given.

I apprehend, however, that the difﬂculty,

in the question before us, of theevidence.is

not so much in adducing proof as to de-

fendant's pecuniary means. as inthe mode

of their proof. But assuming, as I think

we are bound to do under the authorities,

that the amount of defendant's property

is material in such an action.then evidence

of the reputation which he enjoys for

wealth is unobjectionable. Reputation is

the common knowledge of the community,

a_nd. if it is exaggerated or incorrect. the

defendant has the opportunity to correct

it, and of giving the exact facts upon the

trial. The admission of the evidence is

not to establish an ability to pay, but to

show the ocial standing which defend-

ant's means did, or might. command. In

Kniffen v. McConnell, 30 N. Y. 289, which

was an action for a breach of promise

of marriage. Judge lsonsumu, deliver-

ing the opinion of the court, held that “it

may be objectionable to particuiarize the

deiendaut's property. and such evidence

should be conﬁned to general reputation

as to the circumstances of the defendant.

these clreumRtanreR. the home offered,
which for its comforts and ease would depend upon thP more or Jess ample pecuniary means of tile defendant, tbe freedom
from the personal exertions for dally support, the social position accompanylni;
the marriage, tdl these are fnctH which
have their proper bem·ing upc..u the question of marriage. The wealth amt tbe'reputatlon for weulth of a mun ore muttt•r8
which, as this worl<l is com1Ututecl, oftrn
aid In determining his social position. notwithstanding he may ha veother am] mo1·e
Intelligible ri11:hts to It, and despite objectionablti characteristics or traits. Where,
therefore, the defendant has demande<l an
engagement of marrluu;e, It sremH proper
enough tbnt the jury shouhl know what
passible relnforcemf'nt hla suit mny have
had, and what wne the inducements
offered by his social standln~ um! 1rnrrou11dings. Jn the cttse of Jumea v. Blddln:;!,tnn, supra, Baron A1.n~:RSO:"', while
holding it Improper to give evldt.-nce of the
amount of defendant'8 property in an action fur criminal con vert-1ation, suid: "In
a c11Re of breuch of promise of ma rringe.
the amount of the dl'fenl1ant's propPrty 111
'"ery mnterial, as showing what would
buve been the station of the plaintiff In
society If the defcmla11 t had not broken h111
proml11e." And Rell Berry v. Du CoRta, L. It.
1 C'. P. 331; WooJ v. Html. 2 Bing. N. C.
1G6. It has been so hl'ld In this court. und
in the courts of other states, to some of
whose decisions the respondt•nt'R brief hlls
directl'cl our attention. Kniffen v. McConnell. :W N. Y. 2>i5: Lnwrence , .. Cook!',
56 Me. 187; Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. a-16,
4 N. W. Rep. 8; Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91.
Io Mayne, Damages, {Wood's Ed. § 677,)
upon the strengtb of the English authorities I have cite<!, the same rnle lR p;l\•eo.
I apprehend, however, th11t the difficulty,
in thtt question before us, of the evlllence, Is
not so much in adducing proof as to defendant's pecuniary meuns. ae In the mode
of their proof. But assuming, aR I think
we are bound to do under the authorities,
that the amount of defendant's property
le ma terlal In 1mch an action, then evidence
of the reputation which he enJoye for
wealth Is unobjectionable. Reputation is
the common knowledge of the community,
apd, If lt Is exaggerated or ln('orrect, the
defendant has the opportunity lo correct
It, and of giving the exact facts upon the
trial. The admission of the evlden<'e Is
not to establish an ablllty to pay, lmt to
show the social stanrllug which defendant's means did, or might. command. In
Kniffen v. McConnell, 30 N. Y. 289, which
wa11 an action for a breach of promise
of marringe, Judge lsGRAHAM, dellfer·
ing the opinion of the court, held that "It
may be objectlonuble to partlcnlarlze the
defendant's property, and such evidence
should be conttned to general reputation
es to the drcuuu1ta11ceK of the defendant.
To that extent I think it admiilslble."
The learned judge does not reuson npon
the role, but I am not aware that thlH 1leclslon has ever been questioned, and I do
not tbluk It well can he. lo Kerfoot v.
Marsden, 2 Fost. & F. 160, an action for
breach of promise or marriage, In 1860,
WILDE, B., rnled: .. Yoo muy ask In a general wuy as to the llefendunt's property,
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but you cannot go Into particular Items
as to bis property." I think we must conch1de upon authority, as well ns upon tho
reafio11 of the thlnK. that evidence of the
reputu ti on of the defendunt as to wcaH.,
ls nclmlsslble lo these cases. The belief
of the plaintiff must have been lufiuenced by the opinions or beliefs of the
memberil of the community In which the
<1efendant rrsided. She could not he pn•sumed to have personal cogniznnce or
a matter. which ls so pecnliarly one
within the lndivhluars exl'iusive knowledge, and what cre<lence she ga\·e to genernl report wall not without justiHcntion.
She had some right to rely upon it. The
action is lntendecl as an in<lemnity for the
temporal loRs which the plain tiff has RUKtnlned, and thnt embraces the mortification to t11e feellngR. the wounded pride,
and all the disappointments from the fail·
ure of the ma rriuge, UH well in the losseR
it butJ occa8ione<l us In the blow to the
affections.
'l'he nppellnnt lni:lstM upon the error of
the trlnl judge in Hulunittlng to the jury
the queRtlon of exemplary damages. But
we think, In such a case, that lt Is the
pro'l'ince of the jury to determine upon
the pl'oof of the facts and of the surround·
Ing clrcllmstancee what dnmagee should
be awarded. If the conduct or the defen11ant In. vlolntlng his promise ls characterized by a dlRrel(ard of the plalntlff'R fcoellngs or reputation; lf he has placed her,
or Induced her to pluce herHeU, In a falHe
poHition, or to forego temporul advantage>;: If the breach of his promise Is unju11tlftahle; lf he spreadR upon the record
matters In defense of the action which arc
scundulous, and tend to reflect discredit
npon the plaintiff, or stain her reput11tlon.-then these are all circumstances
which may be considered by the jury, und
may be avafled of by them to enhanc.!!..
the damages. Here the trial judge did·
not sny In his charge that this waR a ca~
for the Infliction of punitive damRgcs. He
lnstructc<l the jury, In substance, that in
the plaintiff was entitled to damages
they should certainly give compensatory
dama~es. and that, in the exercil~e of thetr
discretion based on theproofs and circumstances or the case. they might awa1'!!J
exemplary or punitive damngee. Upon
this subject, of when such damages might
be awarded, bo read at length from the
oplnlonR or thlR court In Thorn v. Km1pp.
42 ~. Y. 47.J, and Jnhnsoo v. Jenkins, 24
N. Y. 252, for the purpose of showing the
rllle to be applied. It ls clear that he
IPft It to them to anive at f\ decision •1pon the proprlet.r of giving exemplary
damagcR from a conshll'rntion of the defendant's motives and conduct. Now,
there was e\·l<lcnce In the cose upon which
n verlllct mi~ht well Include exemplar~·
damugeH. 'l'he weddlug <lay was ~reed
upon, th'! mmal prPpnratlons were made
by the plaintiff, and relatives and guests
were llld<len to the ceremony. But the defendant did not appear. He alleged physical ailments in excuRe of not fulfilling bis
marital engagement, but there was evidence that he was evading lt, and shamming tllness. He admits that he had no
ra ult to find with her. She b!ld resigned
her r;oHition to marry him. He denies re-
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questing her to do so; but his attempt at

denial is weakened by his subsequent ad-

mission that he expected her to do it.

'l‘hen,in his pleading, he charges the plain-

tiff with having no affection for him. but

with entertaining a purpose to procure

money from him. on the pretense of his

promise to marry her, and his breach

thereof. These were elements in the case

which might properly enter into the de-

cision of the jury as to the amount of

damages.

The appellant alleges another error in

the charge. when the trial judge in-

structed theiury: “in ﬁxing the amount

(of damages] the plaintiff is entitled at

least to such damages as would place her

in as good pecuniary ‘condition as she

would have been if the contract had been

fulﬁlled." This was, of course, a careless
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use of language, but itcould not have prej-

udiced the defendant's case. It was very

plain from all the char;ze,in whatpreceded

as in what immediately followed the sen-

tence picked out for objection, that the

/trial judge intended to and did instruct his

jury that they should compensate the

plaintiff for what she had lost and was

deprived of by the failure of the marriage.

They might afﬁx to the marriage with

the deiendant that pecuniary value which,

in their judgment, upon all the circum-

stances of the case, it would have to the

plaintljﬂ The jury-could not reasonably

have understood thejudge otherwise. It

may often occur in a charge to the jury

that particular words or expressions used,

when taken by themselves, will be objec-

tionable or seem to be erroneous: but they

should not be considered independently of

contextual phrases. If, when read in con-

nection with the rest of the charge, the sense

of language used is made clear, and its

meaning explained, and the instruction is

not uncertain as to the subject-matter, the

result of the trial should not be disturbed

for mere inaccuracies or carelessness in

speech. There is no occasion for a further

discussion of any questions, and the judg-

ment and order appealed from should be

afﬁrmed, with costs. All concur, except

EARL and PECKHAM, JJ., who dissent, on

the ground that it was error to receive

proof of the defendant's wealth by repu-

tation.

J udgment aﬂirmed.

OOllPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

questing her to do so; but bis attempt at deprived of by the failure of tho marrla~.
denial ls weakened by his subsequent ad- They might affix to the marriage with
mission that he expected her to do It. the dl'fendant that pecunlnryvalue which,
Then, in hie pleading, be charges t.he 11h1ln- In their Judgment, upon all the cfrcumetanct'B of the ca1:111, It would have to tho
tlff with having no arrectlon for him, but
with ente1·tainlng a purpose to procure plalntULI The Jury could not reasonably
money from him, on the pretense of hie have understood the Jmlge otherwise. It
promise to marry her, and bis breach may often occur In a charge to the Jory
thert!of. These were elements in the case that particular words or expressions used,
which might properly enter Into the de- when tnken by themselves, will be objeccision of the jury as to the amount of tionable or seem to be erroneous: hut they
.c:Jama11;ee.
should not be conellicred lnrlep~ndentl.r or
The appellant alleges another error In contextual phrases. Ir, when reu1l in r.onthe charge, when the t1ial judge ln- nectlon with the rest or the charge, the sense
fltructed the Jury: "In fixing the an.ount of la.ngnat?;e used Is made clent', anrl Its
(of damngee] the plaintiff le entitled ut meaning; explained, and the Instruction Is
least to such damages as would pince her not uncertain as to the subJPct-ma tter, the
in as good pecuniary ·condition as she result of the trial should nut Lie disturbed
would have been If the contract bad been . for mere Inaccuracies or carelessness In
fulfilled." This was, or course, a careless speech. There Is no occa1!1on for a further
use of language, but ftcould not have prej- dlHcm1elo11 of any questlonR, ttnr1 the judQ:·
udiced the defendant's case. It was very ment and order appealed from should be
plalnfrom all thecbargt!,ln wbntpreceded affirmed, with costs. All concur, except
as In what immediately followed the sen- .t<:ARL and PECKHAM, JJ., who dissent, on
'tence picked out for objection, that the the ground thnt it was error to receive
ftrinl Judice intt•ndc!l to and dl•J Instruct his proof of the defendant"& wealth by repu·
tury that they should compensate the tatlon.
plain Un for what she had lost and was
Judgment affirmed.
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McINTYRE,· Adm'r, ·v
"· SHOLTY, Adm'r.

{13 N. E. 239, 121 Ill. 660.)

\/

MeINTYRE,' Adm'r,/v. SHOLTY, sum..

(13 N. E. 239, 121 m. 660.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. Sept. 27, 1887.

Error to appellate court, Third district; O.

T. Reeves, Judge.

Blades & Neville, for plaintiff in error.

Kerrick, Lucas & Spencer and Tipton & Bea-

8upre1Di! Court of lllinoi1. Sept. 27, 1887.
Error to appellate court, Third district; O.
T. Reeves, Judge. •
Blades & Nevllle, for plaintllr ln error.
Kerrick, Lucas & Spencer and Tipton & Beaver, for defendant in error.

ver, for defendant in error.

•

I

MAGRUDER, J. This is an action of tres-

pass, brought by defendant in error against

piaintif f in error, in the circuit court of Mc-

Lean county, under the “Act requiring com-

pensation for causing death by wrongful act,

neglect, or default;'' being chapter 70 of the

Revised Statutes, entitled “lnjuries." Hurd,

Rev. St. 1885, p. 695. Jury was waived by

agreement, and the case was tried without a

jury before the judge oi.‘ the circuit court,
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who gave judgment for the plaintiff for

$2,500. This judgment has been aiiirmed by

the appellate court, and is brought before us

for review by writ of error to the latter court.

Hannah Sholty was the wife of Levi Sholty,

a farmer living in McLean county, near

Bloomington. About February 17, 1886, a

working-man upon Levi Sholty‘s farm dis-

covered a man in the barn, who, to all up-

pearances, had been concealing himself there

for some time. The person so concealed is

proven to have been defendant's intestate,

Benjamin D. Sholty, a brother of Levi Sholty.

Some eiiorts seem to have been made on

February 17th or 18th to get the otiicers of

the law in Bloomington to go out to the farm

and arrest Benjamin D. Sholty, called by the

witness David Sholty. This effort, however,

failed. Accordingly, Levi Sholty and his

hired man, and a number of his neighbors,

gathered at his house on the afternoon of

February 18, 1886, for the purpose of watch-

ing for the intruder, and getting: him out of

his hiding-place. The barn was 40 or 50-feet

wide, and from 80 to .100 feet long. It was

situated about 150 or 200 feet north-west

from the house. The granary was in the

western end of the barn, and, hence. in the

end that was furthest from the house. About

6 o'clock in the evening, David Sholty was

discovered in the granary by his brother Levi

and one McCoy, who were on watch just out-

side of the granary door. He shot at them

twice with a pistol, while they were trying to

prevent his escape, and to capture him. Oth-

ers who were waiting in the house came to

their assistance. A wpe was obtained, with

the intention ot tying him, if captured. Pres-

ently there was a cry of ﬁre, and the ﬂames

were seen to be breaking out at the eastern

end of the barn, being the end nearest to-

wards the house. At this time Mrs. Hannah

Sholty, plaintiffs intestate, went from the

- house towards the barn, and had advanced

about half of the distance between the two,

when David Sholty appeared in the door at

the eastern end of the barn, with a shotgun.

He was plainly visible in the light made by

the ﬁre that had broken out. He called upon

MAGRUDER, J. This ls an action of trespass, brought by defendant lo error against
plalntur lo error, In the circuit court or McLean county, under the "Act requiring compensation tor causing droth by wrongful act,
neglect, or default;" being chapter 70 of the
Revised Statutes, entitled " Injuries." Burd,
Rev. St. 1885, p. 695. Jury was waived by
agireement, and the ('9.Se was tried without a
jury before the judge of the circuit court,
who gave judgment tor the plalntllr for
$2,500. This judgment has been affirmed by
the appellate court, and Is brought before us
for review by writ of error to the latter court.
Hannah Sholty was the wife of Levi l:lholty,
a farmer llvlng In McLean county, near
Bloomington. About February 17, 1886, a
working-man upon Levi Sholty's farm discovered a man in the barn, who, to all appearances, had been concealing himself there
tor some time. The person so concealed Is
proven to have been defendant's Intestate,
.Benjamin D. Sholty, a brother of Levi Sholty.
Some efforts seem to have been made on
February 17th or 18th to get the officers ot
the law In Bloomington w go out to the farm
and arrest Benjamin D. Sholty, culled by the
witness David Sholty. This effort, however,
failed. Ac<.-ordlngly, Levi Sholty and his
hired man, and a number of his neighbors,
gathered at his house on the afternoon of
February 18, 11386, tor the purpose of watching for the intruder, and gettlngi him out ot
his biding-place. The barn was 40 or 50·fect
wide, and from 80 to .100 feet long. It was
situated about 150 or 200 feet north-west
from the house. The granary was ln the
western end of the barn, and, hence, In the
end that was furthest from the house. About
6 o'clock in the evening, David Sholty was
discovered In the granary by hie brother Levi
and one McCoy, who were on watch just outside of the granary door. He shot at them
twice with a pistol, while they were trying to
iirevent bis escape, and to capture him. Others who were waiting In the house came to
thi?lr a11slstance. A rope was obtained, with
the intention ot tying him, If captured. Presently there was a cry or fire, and the flames
were seen to be breaking out at the eastern
end of the barn, l>elng the end nearest towards the house. At this time Mrs. Hannah
Sholty, plalntltr's Intestate, went from the
house towards the barn, and had advanced
about bait of the distance between the two,
when David Sholty appeared In the door at
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the eastern end of the barn, with a shot-gun.
He was plainly visible In the light made by
the fire that had broken out. Be called upon
Mrs. Sholty and her daughter Mary, who wus
with her, to stop. They stopped, turned, and
had advanced a few feet on their way back
towards the house, when David Sholty fired
at them with the gun In bis hand. Both
were shot. The daughter was wounded In
the wrist, and the mother was killed. This
action ls brought by her husband, as admln·
lstrator of her estate, to recover damages for
her death, agalust the administrator of the
estate of Ds.vld Shdlty, who is said to have
~rlshed In the flames of the burning barn.
The defendant introduced no testimony, except that the examination of one witness was
begun, and abandoned, after a few preliminary questions, on account of the ruling of
the court as hereafter stated. The defense
propos<.><l to show lJy the witness on the stand,
and by others there present in court, that defendnnt's intestate, Benjamin D. Sholty, was
Insane nt the time Mrs. Sholty was kllled.
The court refused to reccl'l'e evidence of his
Insanity, and exception was taken to the ruling. The question prcsentell relates to the
llablllty of an insane person for injuries commltte1l by him.
It 18 well settled that, though a lunatic Is
not punishable criminally, he ls liable in a
civil action for any tort he may commit.
However Justly this doctrine may have been
originally subject to criticism, on the grounds
of reason and principle, lt ls now too firmly
supported by the weight of authority to be
disturbed. It Is the outcome of the principle
that In trespass the intent Is not conclusive.
Mr. Sedgwick, In bis work on Damages,
(marg. page 456,) says that, on principle, a
lunatic should not be held liable for his to11:l·
ous acts. Opposed to bis view, however, la
a majority of the decisions and text writers.
There certainly can be nothing wrong or unjust In a verdict which merely gives compensation for the actual loss resulting from an
injury Inflicted by a lunatic. Be has properly no will. His acts lack the element of intent, or Intention. Hence it would seem to
follow that the only proper measure of damages In an action against blm for a wrong,
ls the mere compensation of the party Injured. Punishment ls not the object of the
~w when persons unsound in mind are the
wrong-doers. There ls, to be sure, an appearance of hardship in compelllng one to respond
for that which he ls unable to avoid, for
want of the control of reason. But the question of liablllty In these cases Is one of public policy. If an Insane person Is not held
liable for his torts, those Interested In his
estate, as relatives, or otherwise, might not
have a sufficient motive to so take care of
him as to deprl'l'e him ot opportunities for in·
filctlng Injuries upon others. There ls more
injustice in denying to the injured party the
recovery of damages for the wrong suffered
by him, than there Is in calling upon the reln-
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tlves or friends of the lunatic to pay the ex-

pense of his conﬁnement, it he has an estate

ample enough for that purpose. The liability

of lunaties for their torts tends to secure a

more eﬂicient custody and guardianship of

their persons. Again, it parties can escape

the consequences of their injurious acts upon

the plea of lunacy, there will be a strong

temptation to simulate insanity, with a view

of masking the malice and revenge of an evil

heart. The views here expressed are sus-

tained by the following authorities: Cooley,

Torts, 99-103; 2 Sannd. Pl. & Ev. 318; Shear.

& R. Neg. § 57; Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134;

Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Behrens v.

McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333; Krom v. Schoon-

maker, 3 Barb. 647; also cases in note to said

case, in Ewell, Lead. Cas. 642. In the light

of the principles thus announced we ﬁnd no

error in the ruling of the circuit court upon
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this subject.

Plaintiff in error also contends that there

COMPENSATORY AND EXE:\IPLARY DAUAGES.

tlves or friends of the lunatic to pay the ex- and that be -was :n·med, when she started tc>
pense of his confinement, If he has an estate go from the house towards the stable; and
ample enough for that purpose. The liability that by doing so, under the circumstances,
of lunatics for their to1·ts tends to secure a she was guilty of a want of proper ca.re and
more etliclent custody and guardianship of prudence, We forbear to express any opintheir persons. Again•. it parties can escape ion as to whether or not there could be any
the consequences of their Injurious acts upon such thing as contributory negligence In a
the plea of lunacy, there will be a strong case of this kind, and under such circumtemptation to simulate insanity, with a view stances as are herein disclosed. It Is sumof masking the malice and revenge of an evll clent to SliY that there ls a considerable
heart. The views here expressed are sus- amount of evidence In the case bearing upon
tained by the following authorities: Cooley, this question. It lt could be properly mised,
Torts, 99-103; 2 Saund. Pl. & Ev. 318; Shear. the facts necessary to do so were fully de& R. Neg. § 67; Weo.ver ·v. Ward, Hob. 13!; veloped in the testimony presented to the
Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Behrens '\', court by the plalntll'l below. Therefore,
McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333; Krom v. Schoon- plaintitr In el'l'or should have submitted to the
maker, 3 Barb. 647; also cases In note to said trial court a proposition to be held ns law
case, ln Ewell, Lead. Cas. 642. In the light embodying his tlleory of contributory negliof the principles thus announced we find no gence as applicable to the facts of the case,
error In the ruling of the circuit court upQn In accordance with section 41 of the practice
this subject.
act. Hurd, Rev. St. 1885, p. 001. He did
Plalntltr In error also contends that there not do so, and hence the question Is not propshould have been no recovery In this case be- erly before us for · our consideration.
cause of alleged contributory negligence on
The judgment of the appellate court ls afthe part of Mrs. Sholty. It ls claimed that firmed.
she knew of her brother-In-law's madness,
Judgment amrmed.

should have been no recovery in this case be-

cause of alleged contributory negligence on

the part of Mrs. Sholty. It is claimed that

she knew of her brother-in-law's madness,

and that he was armed, when she started to

go from the house towards the stable; and

that by doing so, under the circumstances,

she was guilty of a want of proper care and

prudence. We forbear to express any opin-

ion as to whether or not there could be any

such thing as contributory negligence in a

case of this kind, and under such circum-

stances as are herein disclosed. It is suﬂi-

cient to say that there is a considerable

amount of evidence in the case bearing upon

this question. If it could be properly raised,

the facts necessary to do so were fully de-

veloped in the testimony presented to the

court by the plaintiff below. '.[‘hercfore,

plaintiff in error should have submitted to the

trial court a proposition to be held as law

embodying his theory of contributory negli-

gence as applicable to the facts of the case,

in accordance with section 41 of the practice

act. Hurd, Rev. St. 1885, p. 904. He did

not do so, and hence the question is not prop-

erly before us for our consideration.

The judgment of the appellate court is af-

ﬁrmed.

Judgment aﬂirmed.
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SHEIK v. HdBSON, Adm'r.

(19 N. W. 875, 64 Iowa. 146.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. June 11, 1884.

Appeal from circuit court, Clayton county.

Action for damages on account of slander-

ous words spoken of plaintif f by defendant's

intestate. There was a verdict and judg-

ment for plaintiff for $1,000. Plaintiii ap-

neals.

J. W. Rogers & Son, for appellant. Mur-

dork & Larkin, Ainsworth & Hobson, Noble &

Updegraff, and Cyrus Wellington, for appel-

SHEIK "· HdBSON, Adm'r.
(19 N. W. 875, 6! Iowa, 146.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. June 11, 1884..
Appeal from circuit court, Clayton county.
Action for damages on account of slanderous words spoken of plalntllf by defendant's
Intestate. There was a verdict and judgment tor plaintur tor $1,000. Plaintlcr apoeals.
J. W. Rogers & Son, for appellant. ~Iur
dork & Larkin, Ainsworth & Hobson, .l\oble &
Updegratr, and Cyrus Wellington, tor appcl·
lee.

lee.

REED, J. The action was originally

brought against Henry Rush, but during its

pendency he died. and defendanL Hobson,

administrator of his estate, was substituted

as defendant. The alleged slanderous words

imputed to plaintiff a want of chastity. They

are alleged to have been spoken in the pres-
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ence of plaintiff's husband, and were to the

effect that Rush had had sexual intercourse

with plaintiff. ‘

At the trial plaintiff asked the court to give

the following instructions:

"(1) If you ﬁnd that the defendant, Henry

Rush, did publish in substance the words al-

leged in petition as the grounds of the action,

and that said publication was made mali-

ciously and wantonly, you are instructed that

you may give exemplary damages. (2) You

are instructed that if you ﬁnd from the evi-

dence that the slanderous words were pub-

lished, and that the same were dictated or

accompanied by malice, oppression, or gross

negligence, you can give exemplary damages

in your verdict." The court refused to give

these instructions, but told the jury that

“damages on account of maliciously speak-

ing the words, or, in other words, exemplary

dauaages,'are not to be given." Error is as-

signed by plaintiff on the giving of this in-

struction, and the refusal to give those asked.

The question raised by the assignment is

whether exemplary or punitory damages may

be awarded against the personal representa-

tive of a deceased wrong-doer. There is no

doubt but, at common law, the remedy for

injury such as plaintiff complains of deter-

mines upon the death of the wrong-doer. 1

Chit. Pl. 89. But under our statute (Code, §

2525) all causes of action survive, "and may

be brought, notwith:-"tanding the death of the

person entitled or liable to the same." Plain-

tiff's position is that, under this section, the

right is preserved to her to have damages of

this character assessed on account of the

wrongful and malicious act by which she has

suffered, notwithstanding the death of the

one who committed the act. But we think

the position is not sound. It cannot be said,

in any ease,—uniess the right is created by

statute,—that the person who suffers from

the wrongful or malicious acts of another,

has the right to have vindictive damages as-

sessed against the wrong-doer. Such dam-

ages are awarded as a punishment of the man-

who has wickedly or wantonly violated the

rights of another, rather than for the com-

REED, J. The action was orlglnnlly
brought against Henry Rush, but during its
pendency he died, and defendant, Hobson,
administrator of his estate, was substituted
as defendant. The alleged slanderous words
Imputed to plalntUf a want or chastity. 'l'hcy
are alleged to have been spoken In the presence of plalntltr's husband, and were to the
etrect that Rush had had sexual intercourse
with plalntlll'.
At the trial plalntilf asked the court to give
the following Instructions:
"(1) It you find that the defendant, Henry
Rush, dld publish In substance the words alleged In petition as the grounds of the action,
and that said publlcatlon was made maliciously and wantonly, you are Instructed that
you may give exemplary damages. (2) You
are Instructed that tr you find trom the evidence that the slanderous words were pubUs~. and that the same were dictated or
accompa.nled by malice, oppression, or gross
negligence, you can give exemplary damages
In your verdict." The court refused to give
these Instructions, but told the jury that
"damages on account of maliciously speaking the words, or, In other words, exemplary
damages,· are not to be given." Error Is assigned by plnlntltr on the giving of this lnBtructlon, and the refusal to give those asked.
The question raised by the assignment ls
whether exemplary or punltory damages may
be awarded against the personal representative of a deceased wrong-doer. There Is no
doubt but, at common law, the remedy tor
Injury such as plalntllf complains of determines upon the death of the wrong-doer. 1
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Chit. Pl. 89. But under our stll.tute (Code, §
2525) all causes of action survive, "and may
be brought, notwithstanding the death ot the
person entitled or liable to the same." Plain·
tiff"s position ls that, under this section, thP.rlght Is preserved to her to have damages of
this character assessed on account of the
wrongful and malicious act by which she has
suffered, notwithstanding the <leuth of the
one who committed the act. But we think
the position Is not sound. It cannot be said,
In any case,-unless the right Is created by
statute,-that the person who sutTers from
the wrongful or malicious nets of another,
has the right to have vindictive damages assessed against the wrong-doer. Such damages are awarded as a punishment of the runn
who has wickedly or wantonly violated the
right.<i or another, rather than !01· the compensa tlon of the one who su!Ters from his
wrongful act. It is true, they are awarded
to the one who has been made to :omlfer, hut
not as a matter of right; for, while he ls entitled, under the law, to such sum as will
fully compensate him for the injury sustained, the question whether punltory damages
shall be assessed, and the amount of the assessment, Is left to the dit!Cretion of the jury.
Plaintiff had a right of action, on account or
the slanderous words spoken by Rush, for
such euru as would compensate her for the
Injury. This was her cause of action, and
this Is what was preserved to her by the statute at his death. But she had no personal Interest In the question of his punishment. So
tar as be was concerned, the punltory power
of the law ceased when he died. To allow exemplary damages now, would be to punh!h
his legal and personal representatives for his
wrongful acts; but the civil law never infilcts vicarious punishment. Our holding as
to the object of assessing exemplary damages
In any case ls abundantly sustained by the
authorities, both In this state and elsewhere.
We content ourselves, however, with citing
the following cases In this state: Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa, 3i9; Garland v.
Wholeham, 26 Iowa, 185; Ward v. Ward, 41
Iowa, 686.
We think, therefore, that the holding of the
circuit court ls correct, and the judgment Is
affirmed.

~
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LA.KE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO. v. PRENTICE.
.

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

(13 Sup. Ct. 261, 147 U. S. 101.]

\i

LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO. v. PREN-

TICE. '

(13 Sup. Ct. 261, 147 U. S. 101.]

.Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 3,
1893.

No. 58.

Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 8,

1893.

No. 58.

in error to the circuit court of the United

‘States for the northern district of Illinois.

Action by Chalmer M. C. Prentice against

the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Rail-

way Company to recover damages for unlaw-

ful arrest of plaintiff, while a passenger, by

the conductor of one of the company's trains.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defend-

ant brings error. Reversed.

Statement by Mr. Justice GRAY:

This was an action of trespass on the case,

brought October 19, 1886, in the circuit court
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of the United States for the northern district

of illinois, by Prentice, a citizen of Ohio,

against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern

Railway Company, a corporation of Illinois,

to recover damages for the wrongful acts of

the defendant's servants.

The declaration alleged, and the evidence

introduced at the trial tended to prove, the

following facts: The plaintiff was a physi-

cian. The defendant was engaged in operat-

ing a railroad, and conducting the business

of a common carrier of passengers and

freight, through Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and

other states. On October 12, 1886, the plain-

tiff, his wife, and a number of other persons

were passengers, holding excursion tickets,

on a regular passenger train of the defend-

ant's railroad. from Norwalk, in Ohio, to

Chicago, in Illinois. During the journey the

plaintiff purchased of several passengers

their return tickets, which had nothing on

them to show that they were not transfera-

ble. The conductor of the train, learning

this, and knowing that the plaintiff had been

guilty of no offense for which he was liable

to arrest, telegraphed for a police oﬂicer, an

employe of the defendant, who boarded the

train as it approached Chicago. The con-,

ductor therenpon, in a loud and angry voice,

pointed out the plaintiff to the ofﬁcer, and

ordered his arrest; and the oﬂicer, by direc-

tion of the conductor, and without any war-

rant or authority of law, seized the plaintiff,

and rudely searched him for weapons, in the

presence of the other passengers, hurried him

into another car, and there sat down by him

as a watch, and refused to tell him the cause

of his arrest, or to let him speak to his wife.

While 1.he plaintiff was being removed into

the other car, the conductor, for the purpose

of disgracing and humiliating him with his fel-

low passengers, openly declared that he was

under arrest, and sneeringly said to the plain-

tiff's wife, “Where's your doctor now?" On

arrival at Chicago, the conductor refused to

let the plaintiff assist his wife with her par-

cels in leaving the train, or to give her the

check for their trunk; and, in the presence

i

Jn error to the circuit court of the United
·states for 1.he northern district of Illinois.
Action by Chalmer l\I. C. Prentice agninst
the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company to recover damages for unlawful an·e.'lt of plalntlft', while a passenger, by
the conductor of one of the company's tmlns.
Verdict and judgment for plainUJr. Defendm1t brings error. Reversed.
Statement by Mr. Justice GRAY:
'.rhis was au action of trespass on the case,
brought October 19, 1886, in the circuit court
of the United States for the northern distl'lct
of. 11.linois, by Prentice, n citizen of Ohio,
~gnlnst the Lnke Shore & Michigan Southern
Hallway Company, a corporation of Illinois,
to recover damages for the wrongruJ. acts of
the defendant's servants.
The declaration allei,,-ed, and the evidence
introduced at the trial tended to prove, the
:following facts: The plalnutr was a physl<Jlnn. The defendant wllB engaged in operating a railroad, and conducting the business
of a common carrier of pas.~engers and
freight, through Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and
<>ther states. On October 12, 188G, the plainti1f, his wife, and a number of other persons
were passengers, holding excursion tickets,
on a regular passenger train of the defendant's railroad, from Norwalk, · In Ohio, to
Cbicugo, in Illinois. During the journey the
plalntltr purchased o:f several passengers
their return tickets, which had nothing on
them to show that they were not transferable. The conductor of the train, learning
tJ1ls, nml knowing that tlie plalntift' bad been
guilty of no offense for which he was liable
to arre8t. telegraphed for a police omcer, an
employe of the defendant, who boarded the
train as it npproarhcd Chicago. The conductor tllereupon, ln a loud and angry voice,'
JJOinted out th~ plnlnutr to the officer, and
ordered his arrest; and the omcer, by dlrer.tton ot tile conductor, and without any warmnt o;- authority of law, seized the plnlntUT,
and rudely searched him for weapons, in the
prrsmce of the other passengers, hurried him
into another car, and there sat down by him
:is a watch, and refused to tell him the cause
cf bis arrest, or to let him speak to his wife.
While the plaintlft' was being remo"cd into
the other cnr, the conductor, for the purpose
of dlsgmciug and humiliating him with bis fellow passengers, openly declared that he was
under arrest, and sneeringly said to the plainti1f's wife, "Where's your doctor now?" On
arrival at Chicago, the conductor refused to
let the plaintlt'l assist his wife with ber parcels in leanng the train, or to give ber the
check :for their trunk; and, in the presence

of th.A pnseengers and others, ordered him to
be taken to the station house, an-1 Ile. wus
forcibly · taken tl1ere, and detained until the
conductor arrived; and, kn•JWlng that the
plnlntltr had been guilty of no ·offense, entm-ed a false charge against blm of disorderly conduct. upon wWcb he gave ball and was
released, allll of wWcb, on appearing before
o. justlee or the peace for trial on the next
clay, and n:> one appearing to prosecute him,
he was tinally discharged.
The ueclaration alleged that all these nets .
were done by the defendant's agents in the
line of their employment, and that the defendant was legally responsible therefor; and
that the plalntilt had been thereby put to
Pxpen.se, and greatly injured 1n mind, body,
nncl reputation.
At the trial, and before the Introduction of
nny evidence, the defendant, by its counsel,
admitted "that the arrest of the plnlntl1f was
wrongful, and that be was entitled to recover
actual damages therefor;" but afterwards
excepted to each of the following Instructions
given by the circuit judge to the jury:
1 "If you believe the statements which have
been made by the plaintiff and the witnesses
who testified in bis behalf, (and they are not
dt'ltled,\ then he is entitled to a "erillct which
will fully compensate him tor the injuries
wWch he sustained, and In compensating him
you are authorized to go beyond the amount
that be bas accually expended 1n employing
counsel; you may go beyond the actual outlay in money which he has made. He was
arrestoo publicly, without a warrnnt, and
without cause; and 1f such conduct as has
been dPtaiied before you occurred, such IL8
the remark that was addressed by the conductor to the wife in the plaintltf's presence,
In comptmsatlng him you have a right to con"lder the hmnlllatlon of feeling to which he
was thus publicly subjected. It the company, without rens<>n, by its unlawful and oppressive act, subjected him to this public humiliation, and thereby outraged his feelings,
he ts entitled to compensation for that injury and mental anguish."
"I am not able to give you any rule by
which you can determine that; but, bear 1n
mind, It Is strictly on the line of compens.'ltion. '!'he plaintiff Is entitled to compensation In money tor bumlllatloo. of feeling and
spirit, as well as the actual outlay wblcb be
bsul made In and about this suit."
"And. further, after agreeing upon the
amount wlllch will fairly compensate the
plaintiff tor his outlay and injured fe cltngs,
you u1ay add sowething by way- of punitive
llmnag('s a1."llin.<1t the defendant, which ill
_sometimes called 'smart money,' if you are
sath.iicd that the conductor's conduct was illegal, (and it was illegal,) wanton, and oppressive. How much that shall be the court cannot tell you. You must act as reasonable
111en, and not indulge vindictive feelings
toward.~ the defendant."
"It a public corr1orntlon, like an individual,

COllPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
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acts oppressively, wantonly, abuses power,

and a citizen in that way is injured, the citi-

zen, in addition to strict compensation, may

have. the law says, something in the way of

smart money; something as punishment for

the oppressive use of power."

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff

in the sum of $10,000. The defendant moved

for a new trial. for error in law, and for ex-

cessive damages. The plaintiff therenpon, by

leave of court, remitted the sum of $4,000,

and asked that judgment be entered for $0,-

000. The court then denied the'motion for

a new trial. and gave judgment for the plain-

til1' for $6,000. The defendant sued out this

writ of error.

‘Geo. C. Greene, for plaintiff in error. W.

A. Foster, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating thecase
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as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The only exceptions taken to the instruc-

tions at the trial, which have been argued in

ihisoourt, are to those on the subject of ptmi-

tive damages.

The single question presented for our de-

cision, therefore, is whether a railroad cor-

poration can be charged with punitive or ex-

emplary damages for the illegal, wanton, and

oppressive conduct of a conductor of one of

its trains towards a passenger.

\\ This question, like others affecting the lia-

bility of a railroad corporation as a common

carrier of goods or passengers,—such as its

right to contract for exemption from respon-

ibility for its own negligence, or its liability

beyond its own line, or its liability to one of

! its servants for the act of another person in

its employment,—is a question, not of local

but of general jurisprudence,

law, upon

A which this court, in_th_e absence of express

statute regulating the subject, will exercise‘

it? own judgment, lmcontrolled by the de-

cisions of the courts of the several states.

Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368;

Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenlx Ins.

Co., 129 U. S. 397, 443, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460;

Myrick v. Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102, 109, 1

Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Hough v. Railway Co., 100

U. S. 213, 226. '

- The most distinct suggestion of the doc-

trine of exemplary or punitive damages in

England before the American Revolution is

to be found in the remarks of Chief Justice

Pratt (afterwards Lord Camden) in one of

the actions against the king's messengers for

trespass and imprisonment, under general

wlu-rants of the secretary of state, in which,

the plaintiff's counsel having asserted. and

the defendant's counsel having denied. the

right to recover “exemplary damages," the

chief justice instructed the jury as follows:

“I have formerly delivered it as my opinion

on another occasion, and I still continue of

the same mind. that a jury have it in their

power to give damages for more than the

injury received. Damages are designed, not

only as a satisfwtion to the injured person,

acts opprf'flSlvely, wantonly, abusee power,
aml a citizen ln thnt way le injured, the citizen, ln adtllUon to strict compensation, may
h..-tve, Ila: lnw snys, something ln the way of
smart money; something as punlshlllent for
the oppressive use of power."
The jury returned a verdict for th~ plaintiff
In tl1e sum of $10,000. The defendant move<l
for n new trlnl. for error ln law, and for ext•essive 1lamai;es. The plaintllr thereupon, by
lca\·e ot court, remitted the sum of $4,000,
and asked that Judgment be entered for $G,OOO. The court then denied the ·motion for
a new trial. and gave judgmeqt for the plalntill' tor $6,000. 'Ihe defendant sued out thls
writ ot error.

only as a eatlsfi.r.tlon to the injured person,
l>ut lil.:cwlsc as a puuislnnent to the guilty,
to deter from any such proceeding for the t11t ure, 1111d as a proof of the detestation of thejnry to the action ltsc>lt." Wilkes v. Wood,
Lotl't, l, 18, 19, 19 Howell, St. T. 1153, 1167,
See, also, Huckle v. Money, 2 Wlls. 205, 207;.
Snyer, Da.m. 218. 221. The recovery ot damages, beyond compensation for the injury receivc>d, by wny of plmlshlng the guilty, nncl
as an examole to deter others from o!l'.c>mUug
in like manner, ls here clearly recognizerl.
Iu this co11rt the doctrine ls well settled
thnt in actions of tort the jury, in ndclition to
the sum awarded by way of compc>nsation
for the plnintl!l'.'s injury, may award cxem}llary, puniti\"e, or vindictive damnges, S-OmeC. Greene, for plaintiff In error. W. times cnllcd "smnrt money,'' It the dP.fendA. 1"ostc1·, for defemlant ln error.
nnt has actl.><1 wantouly, or oppressively, or
with such nmlice as lrupllcs a spirit of mlsMr. Justice GRAY, attc>r stating the ·case clliet Ol' c:rimiunl lndi!Tcn•ncc to civil obllgn:tions; hut sueh i:uilty intention on the part
ru; above, delivered the oplniQn of the court
The only exceptions t.'lken to the lnstruc- of the 1left>nclnnt is required In order totl<>us at the trial, which have been argued In chnrge him with exemplary or punitive damages. The Amlnl1le Nancy, 3 Whcnt. 54G,
this court, are to those on the subject ot punir,;;s, 559; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 3<11,
tive da111nges.
The single question ]>l'E'Sented tor our de- !!11; ll:iilro11d Co. v. Quigl'!y, 21 How. 202,
cision, therefore, ls whether a railroad cor- 213, :!H; TI:1ilwny Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 4~;!J,
poration can be charged with punitive or ex- 4::.13, 4U:-•; Hallway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S.
emplary damages for the lllrgal, wanton, and :il2, !:i:.!l, G 811p. ct. Hep. 110; Barry v. l~oppressive conduct of a conductor of one of 1uumls, llU U. B. G:iO, GG2, U63, 6 Sup. Ct..
Rep. r.ot; Railway Co. v. HaT1is, 122 U. S.
Its tt·ains towards a passenger.
Thie question, like others affecting the lla- f'ill7, 60!1. 610, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1286; Hnllwny
Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 36, 9 Sup. Ct.
.
illty of a ra.ilrond corporation ns a common
) earlier of goods or passengers,-f!uch as Its Rep. 21)7.
l!:xen111lary or punitive dnmnges, beln~ ght to coutrnct for exemption from responbility for its O\\-U negligence, or its liability awm'dt!<.l, not by wny of compensntlon to the·
beyond Its <>wn line, or Its liability to one of sufferer, but by way of punishment of the·
/ Its servnnts for the net of another person In o!l'.cncllo'r. nml as a warning to others, cnn
! its eru11l.:>yml•nt,-ls a questbn, not of local only be nwurded against one who has partici, law, hut of genet1ll jurisprudence, upon pated ln the offense. A principal, the1·efore,
· hich this court, In. th~ n bscmce of exp r~1<11_ _ though of course llnble to make compentuto regulating the suuj('ct, will exe1"Cise sntlon for Injuries done by his agent within
own judgment, lmcontrolled by the de- tile sco11e of his employment, cannot be held
cisions of the courts of the Revernl states. linble tor exemplary or punitive dnmngefl,
---unuroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368; merely by rensou of wanton, oppressivi>, or
Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. malielous intent on the part of the agent.
Co., 129 U. B. 397, 443, 0 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460; This ls clearly shown by the judgment of this
Myrick v. Rallrond Co., 107 U. B. 102, 109, 1 C•)Urt in the cn.se of The Amiable Nnncy, 3
Sup. Ct. Rep. 42G; Hough v. Unllwny Co., 100 Whc>nt. !i40.
u. s. 213, 226.
Iu that cnse, upon a libel ln admiralty by
'rhe most distinct suggrstlon of tlle dor- the o.wner, master, supercargo, ancl crew of
trine of exemplnry or punitive dnmnges lu a neutral vessel ngninst the owners of nn
Englaml bl.'fore the American Revolution ls American privateer, for illrg:illy nnd wantontu be found In the remnrks ot Chil'f Justice ly sl'iziug nnd plunderini:; the neutml vessel
l'ratt (afterwards Lord Camden) in one of aml mnltrC'atlng ht·r officers nncl crew, :\Ir.
the actions against the king's messengpn; for J111<tice Story, speaking for the court, in 1S1~.
treepa~ nud lmprleonment, under genernl
laid down the genernl rule as to the llaullity
warrnut~ of the secretary of state, In which,
for exl'mplary or vlndlcth·e d:unngl'S by w:1y
the plaintlf'l'e oounsel having ns1<<'l't<'d. anrt of punishment, ns follows: "Upon the fnets
the defendant's counsel hnvlng denlr<l. the dlo;;closoo In the e'<;dence, this must be proright to recover "exemplary dam:tg('<," thf> nonncrd n cnse of gross nnd wanton outraJ.!'e,
<.'llief justice Instructed the jury as follows : without any just provocation or excuse. en"I hal·e formerly dellvere<l it ns my 011inion der such circunuitances, the honol• of the
on another occasion, nnd I still continue of country nn<l the duty of the court equnlly
the enmo lllllllJ, thnt n jury have It In their require that a just compensntlon shoultl he
power to give dama~es for mo1·e than the made to the unoffendtng neutrals ·for all the
IDJtu')' receh·ed. Dawnges are dcsib"lle<l, not injuries and losses actuully sustulnell by

peo.
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them; and, if this were a suit against the

original wrongdoers, it might be proper to

go yet farther, and visit upon them, in the

shape of exemplary damages, the proper pun-

ishment which belongs to such lawless mis-

-conduct. But it is to be considered that this

is a suit against the owners of the privateer,

upon whom the law has, from motives of pol-

icy, devolved a responsibility for the conduct

of the oﬂicers and crew employed by them,

and yet, from the nature of the service, they

can scarcely ever be able to secure to them-

selves an adequate indemnity in cases of loss.

They are innocent of the demerit of this

transaction, having neither directed it, nor

countenanced it, nor participated in it in the

slightest degree. Under such circumstances,

we are of the opinion that they are bound

-to repair all the real injuries and personal

wrongs sustained by the libelants, but they
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are not bound to the extent of vindictive

damages." 3 Wheat. 558, 559.

The rule thus laid down is not peculiar to

courts of admiralty; for, as stated by the

same eminent judge two years later, those

courts proceed, in cases of tort, upon the

same principles as courts of common law, in

allowing exemplary damages, as well as dam-

ages by way of compensation or remunera-

tion for expenses incurred, or injuries or loss-

es sustained, by the misconduct of the other

party. Manufacturing Co. v. Fiske, 2 Mason,

119, 121.t In Keene v. Lizardi, S La. 20, 33,

Judge Martin said: “It is true, juries some-

times very properly give what is called ‘smart

money.‘ They are often warranted in giving

vindictive damages as a punishment inﬂicted

for outrageous conduct; but this is only jus-

tiﬁable in an action against the wrongdoer,

and not against persons who, on account of

their relation to the offender, are only conse-

quentiaily liable for his acts, as the princi-

pal is responsible for the acts of his factor or

agent." To the same effect are The State

llights, Crabbe, 42. 47, 48; The Golden Gate,

McAll. 104; Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal.

118; Boulard v. Calhoun. 13 La. Ann. 445;

Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich.

447; Grund v. "an Vleck, 69 11l. 478, 481; Beck-

er v. Dupree, 75 Ill. 167; Rosenkrans v. Bar-

ker, 115 111. 331, 3 N. E. Rep. 93; Kirksey v.

Jones, 7 Ala. 622, 629; Pollock v. Gantt, 09

Ala. 373, 379; Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis.

570, 15 N. W. Rep. 760; Haines v. Schultz,

50 N. J. Law, 481, 14 Atl. Rep. 488; McCarthy

v. De .~\rmit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 72; Clark v. New-

sam, 1 Exch. 131, 140; Clissold v. Machell,

26 L'. C. Q. B. 422.

The rule has the same application to cor-

porations as to individuals. This court has

often, in cases of this class, as well as in

other cases, aﬂirmed the doctrine that for

acts done by the agents of a corporation, in

the course of its business and of their em-

ployment, the corporation is responsible in

the same manner and to the same extent as

1 Fed Cas. No. 1,681.

-scope of his employment;

an individual is responsible under similar
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an lndlvidrutl ls responsible under etmllar
them; and, It this were a suit against the
011glnal wrongdoe1"B, it might be proper to circumstances. lta.U.1·oad Co. v. Quigley, 21
.go yet fartber, and visit upon them, in the How. 202, 210; Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S .
.shape of ex.?mplary damages, the proper pun- 699, 702; Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U .
ishment which belongs to such lawless mls- S. 256, :,Wl, 6 Sup. Ct. Itep. 1055; Railw!ly
·conduct. But it is t.o be considered that this Co. v. Hanis, L'>2 U. S. 597, 608, 7 Sup. Ct.
ts a sutt ngalnst the owners of the privateer, Rep. 12S6.
A corporation ls doubtless liable, like an
upon whom the law has, from motives of pol.ky, devoh·ed a responsibility for the conduct individual, t.o make compensation for any
tort committed by nn agent in the course ot
of the officers and crew employed by them,
and yet, from the nature of the service, they his employment, although the net ls done
can scarcely ever be able to secure to them- wautouly 11.nd recklessly, or against the ex11ehes an adequate indemnity in cases ofloss. press orders of the principal. Railroad Co.
'!'hey are innocent of the demerit of this v. Derby, 14 How. 468; Steamboat Co. v.
ctrnnsnction, having neither directed It, nor Brockett, 121 U. S. 637, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1039;
countenanced it; nor participated in It in the Howe v. Newmnrch, 12 .Allen, 49; Ramsden
v. Itnllrond Co., 104 MnBS. 117. A corporaslightest degree. t..:nder such circumstances,
we are of the opinion that they are bound tion wny even be held linble for a. libel, oa a.
to repair all the real injuries and personal mnllclous prosecution, by its agent within the
wrongs sustained by the libelants, but they · scope of his employlllent; and the malice
are not bound to the extent of vindictive necessa1·.v to support either action, It proved
in the agent, may be imputed t.o the corpora-damages." 3 Wheat. 558, 5;;9.
The rule thus lnld down is not peculiar to tion. Uatko:ut Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202,
courts of admiralty; for, as stated by the 211; i:,lnlt L'lkc City .v. Hollister, 118 U. S.
s:tme emln('nt jud~e two years later, those 2:iG, 2G2, 6 Sup. Ct. Hep. 1055; Reed v. Bank,
t:ro Mn~. 448, 44-G, and cases cited; Krulecourts proceed, in cases of tort, upon the
vitz v. Rnllro1td Co., 14-0 Mnss. 573, 5 N. E.
&'llllP. principles as courts of common law, in
allowin;; exemplary damages, as well as dam- Hep. 500; McDermott v. Journal, 43 N. J.
uges by way of compensation or remunera- Law, 4~. and 44 N. J. Law, 430; Bank v.
tion fo1· expenses incurred, or lnjmiee or loes- Owston, 4 App. Cns. 270. But, as well ob.,s sustained, by the misconduct of the other serwd by Mr. Justice Field, now chief justice of Massachusetts: "The logical difficulty
party. Manufacturing Co. v. Fiske, 2 Mason,
llU, 12 i.l Iu Keene v. l.lznrdi, 8 La. 2U, 33, of Imputing the actual malice or fraud of an
Judge l\fartln said: "It ls true, juries some- agent to his principal is perhaps less when
times very properly give what Is called 'smart the principal is a person than when it ls a.
moncy.' Tbey are often warranteil in giving C'Orpor!ltion; still the foundation of the Imputation Is not tllat It ls Inferred that the prin\·i.mli<'tive damages as a punl.-;hment Inflicted
tor outrageous conduct; but this is on1y jus- cipal actually participated in the malice or
fraud, but, the net baying been done for bis
tifiable in an action against the wrongdoer,
aml not agnlnst persons who, on account of benelit by his agent acting within the scope
1heh- i'dntlon to the otTender, are only conse- cif his employment in his business, it le just
t}Ul:'ntinlly liable for his acts, as the princi- that he should be held responsible for It in
pal ls responsible for the nets of his factor or damages." Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 4il,
480, 481.
.
u~ent." '.ro the ~ame etTect are The State
Though the principal ls liable to make com!tights, Cmbbe, 42, 47, 48; The Golden Gate,
pensation for a. libel published or a malicious
McAll. 104; Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal.
prosecution instituted by his agent, he ls not
118; Boulard v. C11lhoun, 13 La. Ann. 445;
Detroit Dally Post Co. v. l\lcArthur, 1G Mich. liable to be punished by exemplary damages
447; Grund v. Van Vleck, 69 lll. 478, 481; Beck- for an intent in which he did not pnrtlclpnte.
-er v. Dupree, 75 Ill. 167; Rosenkrans v. Bar- In Detroit Dally Post Co. v. McArthur, in
Eviston v. Cramer, and In Haines v. Schultz.
ker, 115 Ill. 331, 3 N. E. Rep. 93; Kirksey v.
Jones, 7 Ala. 622, 629; l'ollock v. Gantt, 69 above cited, It was held that the publisher of
Ala. 373, 379; Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis. a newspaper, when sued for a libel published
570, 15 N. W. Rep. 700; Haines v. Sclmltz, therein by one of his reporters without his
50 N. J. Law, 481, 14 Atl. Rep. 488; McCarthy knowledge, was liable for compensatory damv. De A.rmlt, 99 Pa. St. 63, 72; Clark v. New- ages on1y, and not for punitive damages, un1mm. 1 Exch. 131, 140; Cllssold v. Machen, less he approved or ratified the publication;
and in Haines v. Schultz the supreme court of
~G L'. C. Q . B. 4:!2.
Tlw rnle has the same application to cor- New Jt-rsey sn.ld of punitive damages: "The
pomtions as to Individuals. This court bas right to award t11em rests primartly upon the
often, in c.1ses of tills class, as well as 1n single ground,-wrongful motive." "It is the
other casl's, affir111ed the doctrine that tor wrongful personal Intention to injure that
nets done l>y the agents of a corporation, in cnlls forth the penalty. To this wrongful inthe course. of Its buslncss and of their em- tent knowledge Is an essential prerequisite."
"Absence of nll proof bearing on the essenploym~nt, thE> eorporatlon le responsible in
the same manncr and to the same extent as tial question, to wit, defendant's motive, cannot be permlttt>d to take the place of evi1 Fed Cns. No. 1,681.
dence, without lending t.o a most dangero\111

00.MPE.SSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

COMPE.\'SATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. 31

extension of the doctrine respondent supe-

rior." 50 N. J. Law, 484, 485, 14 Ail. Rep.

488 Whether a principal can be criminally

,prosecuted for a libel published by his agent

without his participation is a question on

which the authorities are not agreed; and,

where it has been held that he can, it is ad-

mitted to be an anomaly in the criminal law.

Com. v. Morgan. 10? Mass. 199, 203; Reg. v.

liolbrook, 3 Q. B. Div. 60, 68, 64, 70, 4 Q. B.

Div. 42, 51, 60.

No doubt, a corporation, like a natural per-

son, may be held liable in exemplary or puni-

tive damages for the act of an agent within

the scope of his employment, provided the

criminal intent, necessary to warrant the im-

position of such damages, is brought home to

the corporation. Railroad Co. v. Quigley,

Railway Co. v. Arms, and Railway Co. v.

Harris, above cited; Caldwell v. Steamboat
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Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Bell v. Railway Co., 10 C.

B. (N. S.) 287, 4 Law~'l‘. (N. S.) 203.

Independently of this. in the case of a cor-

poration. as of an individual, if any wanton-

ness or mischief on the part of the agent,

acting within the scope of his employment,

causes additional injury to the plaintift in

body or mind, the principal is, of course, lia-

ble to make compensation for the whole in-

jury suffered. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S.

22, ‘J Sup. Ct. Rep. 696; Meagher v. Driscoll,

99 Mass. 281, 283; Smith v. Holcomb, 1d. 532;

Iiawes v. I(no\\‘lt-s, 114 Mass. 518; Campbell

v. Car Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 484.

’In the case at bar, the defendant's counsel

having admitted in open court “that the ar-

rest of the plaintiff was wrongful, and that

he was entitled to recover actual damages

therefor." the jury were rightly instructed

that he was entitled to a verdict which would

fully compensate him for the injuries sus-

tained, and that in compensating him the

jury were authorized to go beyond his out-

lay in and about 1his suit, and to consider

the humiliation and outrage to which he had

been subjected by arresting him publicly

without warrant and without cause, and by

the conduct of the conductor, such as his rc-

mark to the plaintiff's wife.

But the court, going beyond this, distinctly

instructed the jury that, "after agreeing upon

the amount which will fully compensate the

plaintilf for his outlay and injured feelings,"

they might “add something by way of puni-

tive damages against the defendant, which is

sometimes called ‘smart money,”' if they

were “satisﬁed that the conductor's conduct

was illegal, wanton, and oppressive."

The jury were thus told, in the plainest

terms. that the corporation was responsible in

punitive damages for wantonness and oppres-

sion on the part of the conductor, although

not actually participated in by the corpora-

tion. This ruling appears to us to be incon-

sistent with the principles above stated, un-

supported by any decision of this court, and

opposed to the preponderance of wcli-consid-

ﬁred precedents.

In Railroad Co. v. Derby, which was an ac-

extenalon of the doctrine ~espondeat superior." 00 N. 1. Lnw, 484. 485, 14 .A.tl. Rep.
"58. Whether a principal can be erlmlnally
11rosecuted for a libel publl.shed by bis agent
without b18 parUclpatlon la a question on
which the nuthoritles are not agreed; ud,
where it h:is been held thnt he can, It Is admitted to be an anomaly In the criminal law.
Com. v. Morgan, 107 Mnss. 199, 203; Ueg. v.
Holbrook, 3 Q. B. Div. GO, 63, G!, 70, 4 Q. B.
Div. 4:?, 51, 60.
No doubt, a corporation, like a natural perMn, may be held liable In exemplary or punitive damages for the act of nn agent within
the scope of bis employment, provided the
~rlmlnal Intent, necessary to warrant the imposition of such dnmnges, ls brought home to
the corporation. Railroad Co. v. Quigley,
Rnllwny Co. v. Arms, and Railway Co. v.
Harris, above cited; Caldwell v. Steamboat
Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Bell v. Railway Co., 10 C.
B. (~. S.) 287, 4 Lnw T. (N. S.) 200.
Independently of this. tu the case of a corporation, as of an Individual, if nny wantonness or ml.schief on the part of the agent,
:icting within the scope of his employment,
<·~1use:1 additional Injury to the plnlntltr In
body or mind, the principal Is, of course, lla·
hle to make compensation for the whole injury sulfered. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S.
!!2, ~) Sup. Ct. Uep. 696; Meagher v. Driscoll.
-00 l\lass. 281, !!Ki; Smith v. Holcomb, Id. {;'.j2;
Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518; Campbell
T. Car Co., ~ Fed. Rep. 484.
·"1n the case at bar, the defendant's counsel
having admitted In open court "that the arrest of the plnlntilr was wrongful, and that
lie wns entitled to recover actual damages
thf:>rt•for." the jury were rightly instructed
that he was entitled to a verdict which would
fully compensate him for the lnjm1es &us·
tnlned, nnd that In compensnting him the
jury were nutbo1iz<'d to go beyond his outlay In nnd about 1hls suit, nnd to consider
the humiliation and outrage to wWch ht• hnd
b<>en subjected by arresting him puulfdy
without warrant and without cause, aml by
the conduct of the conductor, such as Ws re·
mark to the plnintUf's wife.
Rut the court, going beyon(l this, distinctly
Instructed the jury that, "after agreeing upon
the amount which will fully compensate the
plnlntilr for hl8 outlay and Injured feelings,"
they might "add something by way of punitive damages against the defendant, which ls
sometimes called 'smart money,' " if they
were "satisfied thnt the conductor's conduct
was illegal, wanton, and oppressive."
The jury were tltus t•)id, In the plainest
·tem1s, that the corporation was responslule In
punlth·o damages for wantonness and oppression on the part of the conductor, although
not actually pnrtlclpnted In by the corporation. Thl8 ruling appears to us to be Inconsistent with the principles above stated, unsupported by any decision of this court, and
opposed to the preponderance of well-coui>ld·
\!red precedents.

Sl

In Rnllrond Co. v. Derby, which wns un action by a passenger agn.lnst n railroad corporation for a personal Injury suffered
through the negligence of Its servants, the
Jury were Instructed that "the damages, If
any were recoverable, nre to be confined to
the dlrL>et and lmmedlnte consequences of the
injury sustnlned;" and no exception wns
taken to tltls Instruction. 14 How. 470, 471.
In Railroad Co. v. Quigley, which was an
action agnlust a railroad corporation !or a
llhel puulishcd by Its agents, the jury returned 11 verdict for the pl11lntllr under an lni>tructlon thnt "they nre not restricted In giv·
Ing daurnges to the actual positive Injury
sustained by the plnlntllr, but may give such
uxemplary dnmnges, i! any, ns In their opinion 1ue called for ond justllied, In view of all
the circumst.mces ln this case, to render
rupu1·nt1on to the plalntllr, and act as an adequate pUllfshment to the defendant." This
c•mrt set nshle the verdict, because the In·
structlon glven to the jury did not nccurutely
define the measure of the defendant's liability; and, sp"?aklng by Mr. Justice Campbell,
1>tatcd the rules applicable to the case In these
wo1'1ls: "For acts done by the agl•nts of the
corpomtion, either In contrnctu 01· In dellcto,
In the L'Ourse of Its business and of their emJllo;vment, the corporation ls responsible, as
un lndiylcJual ls responsible under el.mllar clrctm1sta11cee." "\Vhenever the Injury complained of bas been Inflicted maliciously or
wantonly, ond with circumstances of contumely or indlbrtlfty, the jury are not limited
to the n.scertnlnment of a simple compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved person. But the malice spoken o! In
this rule ls not merely the doing of nn unlawful or Injurious net. 'l'he word lmplles
tbnt the net complained of was concrlved
In the sph-lt of mischief, or criminal lndltrert·n<'.e to cl•ll obllimtions. Nothing o! this
kind can be Imputed to these defendants."
21 How. 210, 213, 214.
Jn ltnllwny Co. v. Arms, which was an action against a railroad corporation, by a passenger lnjure<1 In a collision caused by the
negligence ot the servants of the corporation,
the jury were iustmcted thus: "lf you find
that th<~ accident was cnmied by the gross
negligence of the defendant's servants connollin~ the tmln, you mny give to the plnlntltr
pnnltlvo 01· exemplary damages." This court,
sprnking by Mr. Justice Dnvi'I, and approYlng
and applying the rule of exemplary damages,
as stnt•~tl In Quigley'& Case, held that this
wa.'I a mlstllrectlon, arnl that the failure of
the rmployN• to use the cnre that was required to avohl tlte accldPnt, "whether cnlled
'!-'Toss· or 'or!linnry' negligence, did not autho1iz<' the jury to visit tl1e company with
dnn1nges beyond the limit of compensation
for the Injury actually inflicted. To do thls,
there mnst have been some willful misconduct, 01· thnt entire want of care which would
1·alsf! the presumption of a. conscious lndlffert!Dce to consequences. Nothing of this kin!\
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can be imputed to the persons in charge of

the train; and the court, therefore, misdi-

rooted the jury." 91 U. S. 495.

In Railway Co. v. Harris, the railroad com-

pany, as the record showed, by an armed

force of several hundred men, acting as its

agents and employes, and organized and com-

manded by its vice president and assistant

general manager, attacked with deadly weap-

ons the agents and employes of anothercom-

pany in possession of a railroad, and forcibly

drove them out, and in so doing ﬁred upon

and injured one of them, who therenpon

brought an action against the corporation,

and recovered a verdict and judgment under

an instruction that the jury “were not lim-

ited to compensatory damages. but could give

punitive or exemplary damages, if it was

found that the defendant acted with bad in-

tent, and in pursuance of an unlawful pur-
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pose to forcibly take possession of the rail-

way occupied by the other company, and in

so doing shot the plaintiff." This court,

speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, quoted and

approved the rules laid down in Quigley's

Jase, and aﬂirmed the judgment, not because

any evil intent on the part of the agents of

the defendant corporation could of itself

make the corporation responsible for exem-

plary or punitive damages, but upon the sin-

gle ground that the evidence clearly showed

that the corporation, by its governing oﬂicers,

participated in and directed all that was

planned and done. m U. S. 610, 7 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 1286.

The president and general manager, or, in

his absence, the vice president in his place,

actually wielding the whole executive power

of the corporation, may well be treated as so

far representing the -corporation and identi-

ﬁed with it that any'wanton, malicious, or

oppressive intent of his, in doing wrongful

acts in behalf of the corporation to the in-

jury of others. may be treated as the intent

of the corporation itself; but the conductor

of a train, or other subordinate agent or serv-

ant of a railroad corporation, occupies a very

different position, and is no more identiﬁed

with his principal, so as to affect the latter

with his own unlawful and criminal intent,

than any agent or servant standing in a cor-

responding relation to natural persons carry-

ing on a manufactory, a mine, or a house of

trade or commerce.

The law applicable to this case has been

found nowhere better stated than by Mr.

Justice Brayton, afterwards chief justice of

Rhode Island, in the earliest reported case

of the kind, in which a passenger sued a rail-

road corporation for his wrongful expulsion

from a train by the conductor, and recovered

a verdict, but excepted to an instruction to

the jury that “punitive or vindictive dam-

ages, or smart money, were not to be allowed

as against the principal, unless the principal

participated in the wrongful act of the agent,

expressly or impliedly, by his conduct an-

thorizing it or approving it, either before or

after it was committed." This instruction

<'an be Imputed to the persons in chnrge ot
the trnin; nnd the court, therefore, mlsdirected the jury." 91 U. S. 495.
In Hailwny Co. v. Harris, the railroad company, as the reco1·d showed, by an armed
forcc or several hundred men, acting ns Its
agC'nts and employes, and organized and comnrnndecl l>y its vice president and assistant
gl•neral manager, attacketl \lith deadly weapous the agents and employes ot another·comp:my ill possession of a rnllroad, and forcibly
llrove them out, and in so doing fired upon
and injured one of them, who thereupon
hrought nn action against the corporation,
null recovered a verdict nrnl judgment under
:111 \nstmction that the jury "were not Umlted to compensntory tJamnges. but could give
1111nitlvc or exemplary damages, It It wn.s
found thnt the defendant acted with bad intent, nw:l in pm'l!uance ot :m unlawful pur·
pose to forcil.Jly t:ik~ possession of the rail·
way occupied by the other C'ompany, nnd in
so doing shot tl1e plnintlt'l'." This court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, quoted and
upproverl the rules laid down In Quigley's
tJase, uml affirmed the judgment, not t>ecaUl5~
:my evil fntt~nt on the part of the agents of
the defendant corporation .could of Itself
mnl.:e the corporation respouslble for exemplary or punitive damages, but upon the single ground that the evidence clearly showed
that the corporation, by its governing officers,
p:u·ticipated in and dlrecrod nll that was
plnnnetl and done. 122 U. S. 610, 7 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 128\J.
'l'he president and genP~l manager, or, in
his absence, the vice president In his place,
actually wielding the whole executive power
of the corporation, may well be treated as so
tar representing the corporation and ldenttfled with it that any· wanton, malicious, or
oppressive intent of his, in doing wrongful
nets In behalf of the corporation to the injury ot others, may be treated as the intent
ot the corporation Itself; but the conductor
of a train, or other subordinate agent or servnnt of a railroad corporation, occupies a very
dlft'erent position, and Is no more Identified
with his principal, so as to nfl'ect the latter
with his own unlawful and criminal intent,
than any ng•mt or servant stnndlng In n corresponding relation to natural persons carryIng on a manufactory, a mine, or a house of
trade or commerce.
The law applicable to this case has been
found nowhere better stated than by Mr.
Jrn;tice Brnyton, ntterwards chlet justice of
Rhode Island, in the earliest reported oose
of the kind, In which a. passenger sued a milI
road corporation for his wrongful expulsion
/ t1·om a. train by the conductor, and recovered
s verdict, but excepted to an Instruction to
the jury that "punitive or vindictive damages, or smart money, were not to be allowed
ns ngnin~t the principal, \mless the principal
partici1mtecl In the wrongful act ot the agent,
exprcS:illy or impliedly, by his conduct nuthorizing It or approving It, either before or

I

nfter It was committed." This instruction
was held to be right, tor the tollo'\\ing reasous: "In cases where punitive or exemplary
damages have been assessed, it has been
done, upon evidence of such willfulness, recklessness, or wickedness, on the part of theparty at fault, as amounted to criminality,
which for the good of society and warning
to the individual, ought to be punished. l.f
In such ooses, or in any case ot a civil nature,
It ls the policy of the law to visit upon the
ot'l'ender such exemplary damnges as will
operate as punishment, and teach the lesson
of caution to pre,·ent a repetition of criminal·
ity, yet we do not see how such damages can
be allowed, where the principal is prosecuted
for the tortious net of his servant, unless
there is pl'Oof in the cause to Implicate the
principal and make him partlceps c1iminls of
hli; agent's act. No man should be punished
for that of which he is riot guilty." "Where
c:he proof does not Implicate the principal,
and, however wicked the servant may have
been, the principal neither expressly nor lmpliedly authorizes or ratifies the net, and the
criminality of It ls as much against him as
ngalnst auy other member of society, we
think it Is quite enough that be shall be liable
in compensatory damages for the injury sustained in consequence of the wrongful act of
n. person dctlng as his servant." Hagan v_
ltailroud Co., 3 R. I. 88, 91.
'l'he like view was expressed by the court
11! appeals of New York, in an action brought
ngulnst a railroad corporation by a passenger
for inJurtcs sut'l'ered by the neglect of a
switchm:m, who was Intoxicated at the time
of the accident. It was held that evldencethat tht> swltC'hman was a man of intempernte habits, which was known to the agent
of the company hnvlng the power to employ
nnd discharge him and other subordinates,
was competent to support n dnlm tor exem1>lary damages, but that a direction to the
jury In general terms that in awarding damnges they might add to full compensation for
the injury "such sum for exemplary damages
n.s the case c:ills for, depending in a great
measure, of course, upon the conduct of the
defendant," el'titlcd the defendnnt to a new
trial; and Chief Justice Church, dell\·eringthe unanimous judgment ot the court, stated
the rule as follows: "For injuries by thenegligence of a servant whlle engaged in th~
business of t.he master, within the scope of his
employment, the latter Is liable for compensatory damages; but for such n<>gllgence,
however gross or culpable, be Is not liable t<>
be punished in p\mltive damages unless he
Is also chargeable with grnss mlscomluct. ~.
Such misconduct may be est:lblished by showl.ng that tl1e net of the servant was authorool or rnttfied, or that the master employed
or retained the ser'l"ant, knowing that he wasincompetent, or, from bad habits. unfi.t for
the position he occupied. Something more
than ordinary negligence is requisite; it must
be reckless. and ot a criminal nature, and

.,
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eieariy established. Corporations may incur

this liability as well as private persons. If a

railroad company, for instance, knowingly

and wantonly employs a drunken engineer

or switchman, or retains one after knowledge

at his habits is clearly brought home to the

t-ompany, or to a superintending agent au-

thorized to employ and discharge him, and in-

jury occurs by reason of such habits, the

company may and ought to be amenable

to the severest rule of damages; but I am not

aware of any principle which permits a jury

to award exemplary damages in a case which

does not come up to this standard, or to

graduate the amount of such damages by

their views of the propriety of the conduct of

the defendant, unless such conduct is of the

character before speciﬁed." Cieghorn v.

Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 47, 48.

Similar decisions, denying upon like grounds
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the liability of railroad companies and other

mrporntions, sought to be charged with puni-

tive damages for the wanton or oppressive

acts of their agents or servants, not partic

ipatcd in or ratiﬁed by the corporation,

have been made by the courts of New Jersey,

l‘ennsylvanim Delaware, Michigan, Wiscon-

sin. California, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas,

and West Virginia.

It must be admitted that there is a wide

divergence in the decisions of the state courts

upon this question, and that corporations

have been held liable for such damages un-

der similar circumstances in New Hamp-

shire, in Maine, and in many of the western

and southern states. But of the three lead-

ing cases on that side of the question. Hop-

kins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9, can hardly

be reconciled with the later decisions in Fay

v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, and Bixby v. Dunlap,

56 N. H. 456; and in Goddard v. Railway Co.,

57 Maine, 212, 228, and Railway Co. v. Dunn,

LAVV DA\[.2d Ed.—3

19 Ohio St. 162, 590, there were strong dis-

senting opinions. in many, if not most, of the

other cases, either corporations were put

upon different grounds in this respect from

other principals, or else the distinction be-

tween imputing to the corporation such

wrongful act and intent as would render it

liable to make compensation to the person

injured, and imputing to the corporation the

intent necessary to be established in order

to subject it to exemplary damages by way of

punishment, was overlooked or disregarded.

Most of the cases on both sides of the ques-

tion, not peciﬂcally cited above, are collected

in 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 880.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff does not ap-

pear to have contended at the trial, or to

have introduced any evidence tending to

show, that the conductor was known to the

defendant to be an unsuitable person in any

respect. or that the defendant in any way

participated in, approved, or ratiﬁed his treat-

ment of the plaintiff ; nor did the instructions

given to the jury require them to be satisﬁed

of any such fact before awarding punitive

damages; but the only fact which they were

f'lcnrly l'StnbHshed. Corpor.lrlona may lncm·
this liability as well as private persons. It a
mllroad company, for Instance, knowingly
11nd wantonly employs a drnnken engineer
or switchman. or retalns one after knowledge
.. r Jilli habits ls clearly brought home to the
('ompan~·. or to a superintending agent authorized to employ and discharge him, and lnJury occul'8 by reason of such habits, the
com1J1my may and ought to be amenable
to the severest rule of dnmagee; but I am not
nwnre of any principle whk\l permits a jury
to award exemplary dnmnges ln a cnee which
1loes not come up to thlB standard, or to
grndunte the amount of such damngl'S by
their views of the propriety of the concluct of
the defendant, unll's.~ such conduct Is ot the
charnctcr before sp<..-clfied." Cleghorn v.
Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 47, 48.
Slmllar decisions, denylug upon llkc grounds
the liability of rnllrond compnnles and other
corpomtlons, sought to be charged with punitive damnges for the wanton or oppressive
acts at. their 8"ents or servants, not pnrtlclpated ln or ratified by the corpo1·atton,
have been mnde by the courts of New Jersey,
Penn.<1ylvnnh. Delaware, Michigan, Wisc-0nsin, C:1li!ornln, Loul.Blana, .Alabama, Texas,
:md West Virginia.
It must be admitted that there is a wide
divergence ln the decisions of the state courts
upou. this question, and that corpomtlons
have lx>t.>n held liable for such drunnges un1ll'r sln1!111.r clrcumstuncea ln New Hnmpi'lblre, in Maine, and ln mnny of the western
Md southern states. But of the thrw leading cruJes on that elde of the question, HopkiM v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9, cnn hardly
be ~onctlcd with the later dedslons In l<~ay
v. !'ark.er, 5a N. H. 342, and Bixby v. Dunlap,
r.6 N. H . 456; and ln Goddard v. Railway Co.,
iJ7 ~lalne, 202, 228, and ltallway Co. v. Dunn,
f,A W DA '.\1.2111-M.-3

19 Ohl~ St. 1G2, 590, there were strong dissenting opinions. In many, If not most, of the
other l'nses, either corporations were put
upon dit'terent grounds ln this respect from
Clthl'r principals, or else the distinction betwet-n imputing to the corporation such
wrong(ul net nnd Intent as would render it
llllble to make compl'nsntlon to the person
injured, nnd imputing to the corporation the
Intent necessary to be established 1n order
to 11Ubject lt to exemplary dnmnges by way of
punlBhment, wus overlooked or disregarded.
l\Iost of the cases on both sides of the question, not specifically cited above, are collected
in 1 8P1lg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 380.
In the case at bar, the pla1nti11' does not appear to havl~ contl'nded at the trial, or to
have introduced any evidence tending to
111how, that tlle conductor was known to the
df'fentlant to be an unsuitable person ln any
rl'Spl'ct. or tbat the cle!endant In any way
vnrticlpntNl ln, approved, 01· ratified his treatmC"nt or the plnlntitT; nor cllcl the iustructlonR
glV<·n to the jury re11uh·e them to be safulied
cf nny such fnct bl'fo1·e nwn'l'dlng pllnltive
dn111ni;l'1<; but the only fac:t which they were
requirt~LJo.. tlud, in order to 1mppo1't n chf1m
for punitive damngl'8 against U1e corpomtion, wns that tl1e conductor's illegal conduct
wns wnnton and opp1·esslve. For this error.
118 we cannot know how mu'.!11 of the Vl'rdict
was lull-nded by tile jury as a compensation
tor tl1e plnlntUf's injury, and how much by
way or punL~ltlng the corporation for an ln·
t~nt ln which it had no part, the judgment
must be reversed, and the case remanded to
lhe circuit court, with directions to set nslde
the Yerdlct, and to order a new trtal

Mr. JllStlce FIELD, Mr. Justice HARLAN,
nnd ::\fr. Justice J,A~IAR took no part ln this
1\('('islon.

COMPENSATORY AND
3-i=

COMPENSATORY AND EXEM PLARY DAMAGES.

GODDARD v. GRAND TRFNK RY. OF

CANADA.

(57 Me. 202.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1869.

Action against the Grand Trunk Railway of

Canada to recover damages for an assault

made on a passenger by a brakeman in defend-

ant's employment. There was a verdict for

plaintiff, to which defendant excepted.

G. F. Shepley, for plaintiff. P. Barnes, for

defendant.

WALTON, J. Two questions are presented

for our consideration: First, is the common‘

carrier of passengers responsible for the will-t'

fui misconduct of his servant? or, in other I

words, if a passenger who has done nothing,

to forfeit his right to civil treatment, is as-1

-saulted and grossly insulted by one of the

-carrier's servants, can he look to the carrier
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for redress? and, secondly, if he can, what is

the measure of relief which the law secures

to him‘); These are questions that deeply.

concern,'not only the numerous railroad and

steamboat companies engaged in the trans-

portation of passengers, but also the whole

traveling public; and we have endeavored to

give them that consideration which their

great importance has seemed to us to de-

mand.

1. Of the carrier's liability. It appears in

evidence, that the plaintiff was a passenger

in the defendants' railway ear; that, on re-

quest, he surrendered his ticket to a brake-

man employed on the train, who, in the ab-

sence of the conductor. was authorized to

demand and receive it; that the brakeman

afterwards approached the plaintiff, and, in

language course, profane. and grossly insult-

ing, denied that he had either surrendered or

shown him his ticket; that the brakeman

called the plaintiff a liar, charged him with

attempting to avoid the payment of his fare,

and with having done the same thing before,

and threatened to split his head open and

spill his brains right there on the spot; that

the brakeman stepped forward and placed

his foot upon the seat on which the plaintiff

was sitting, and, leaning over the plaintiff.

brought his ﬁst close down to his face, and

shaking it violently, told him not to yip, if

he did he would spot him, that he was a

damned liar, that he never handed him his

ticket, that he did not believe he paid his

fare either way; that this asault was con-

tinued some ﬁfteen or twenty minutes, and

until the whistle sounded for the next sta-

tion; that there were several passengers

present in the car, some of whom were

ladies, and that they were all strangers to

the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was at the

time in feeble health, and had been for

some time under the care of a physician, and

at the time of the assault was reclining lan-

guldly in his seat; that he had neither said

nor done anything to provoke the assault;

that, in fact, he had paid his fare, had receiv-

ed a ticket, and had surrendered it to this

very brakeman who delivered it to the con-

EXE~IPJ..\RY

DAMAGES.

that, In fact, be had paid bis fare, had received a ticket, and had surrendered It to tl1ls
very brakeman who dellvered it to the con(57 Me. 202.)
ductor only a few minutes before, by whom
It was afterwards produced and Identified;
Supreme .Tudicial Court of l'rlaine. 1869.
that the defendants were immediately notiAction against the Gmnd Trunk Railway of fied of tl!~ misconduct of the brakeman, but,
Canada to recover damages for an assault Instead of discharging him, retained him In
made on a passenger by a brakeman ln defend- his place; that the brakeman was still In
ant's employment. There was a verdict for the defendantJJ' employ ·when the case was
plalntur, to which defendant excepted.
tried and was present In court during the
G. F. Shepley, tor plalntltr. P. Barnes, for trial, but was not called as a witness, and no
attempt was made to justify or excuse bis
defendant.
conduct.
Upon this evidence the defendants conteu,1
WALTON, J. Two questions are presented
fo1· our conslcleratlon: Fii'llr,·I8Tue-·coinmon"'I that they are not liable, because, as they say,
carrier of passengers responsible for the will· ~ the brakeman's assault upon the plaintiff
ful misconduct of his servant? or, ln other f was willful and mallclous, and was not diwords, lf a passenger who has done nothing rectly nor Impliedly authorized by them.
-.to forfeit hie right to clvll treatment, is as- They say the substance of the whole case Is
-saulted and grossly Insulted by one of the · this, that "the master Is not responsible as a
·Carrie1·'s servants, can he look to the carrier 1 trespasser, unless by direct or Implied aufor redress? and, secondly, If he can, what ls thority to the servant, be consents to the uuthe measure of relief which the law SC<:'ttres la wful act."
The fallacy of this argument, when applied
to him? , These are questions · that deeply
concern, ·not only the numerous mllroad and to the common carrier of passengers, consists
steamboat companies engaged In the trans- In not discriminating between the obligation
portntion of passengers, but also the whole which he Is Wider to bis passenger, and the
traveling public; and we have endeavo1·ed to duty which he owes a stranger. It may be
true that If the carrier's servant wlllfully
gin~ them that consideration which their
great importance bas seemed to us to de- and maliciously assaults a stranger, the ma-ster wm not be liable; but the law Is othermand.
I. Of the carrier's liability. It nppeo.rs In wise when he assaults one of his master's
evlrlcnce, that the plaintlff was a passenger passengers. The carrier's obligation is to
In the defendants' railway car; that, on re- cnrry his passenger sately and properly, and
11uest, he sunendered bis ticket to a brakl'- to treat him respectfully, and If he intrusts
man employed on the train, who, In the ab- the performance of this duty to his servants.
sence of the conductor, was authorized to the law holds him responsible for the mandemand and receive It; that the brakeman ner In which they execute the trust. The
afterwards approached the plaintiff, and, In law seems to be now well settled that the
languagn coarse, profane. and grossly Insult- carrier Is obliged to protect his passenger
ing, denied that he had either surrendered or from violence and insult, from whatever
11hown him his ticket; that the brakeman source arising. He Is not regarded as an inrnlled the plalntitf a liar, charged him with surer of his passenger's safety against every
attempting to avoid the payment of bis fare, possible source of danger; but he Is bound to
and with having done the 1mrne thing befor~, use nil such reasonable precautions as humau
and thrnntened to split his bead open and judgment aud foresight are capable of, to
splll his brains right there on the spot; that make his pass:mger's journey aafe and comthe brakeman stepped forward and placed fortable. He must not only protect bis pashis foot upon the seat on which the plalntur senger a~'1llnst the violence and Insults of
was sitting, and, leaning over the plalntltf, strangers and co-passengers, but a fortiori,
brought his fist close down to his face, and against the violence and Insults of his own
shaking It violently, told him not to yip, tf servants. If this duty to the passenger ts
he did he would spot him, that he was 11 r.ot performed, If this protection Is not furdamnecl liar, that he never handed him Ills nished, but on the contrary, tl1e passenger Is
ticket, that be did not believe he paid his assaulted and Insulted, through the neglifare either way; that this assault was con- gence or the wUlful misconduct ot the cartinued some fifteen or twenty minutes, and rier's servant, the carrier Is necessarily r&until the whistle sounded for the next sta- sponslble.
tion; tlmt there were several pal!llengers
And It seems to us It would be cause of
present In the car, some of whom were profound regret If the law were otherwise.
ladles, and that they were all strangers to The car1ier selects his own servants and can
the plalntltr; that the plalntltr was at the discharge them when he pleases, and It •s
time In feeble bee.Ith, and had been for but reasonable that he should be responsible
some time under the care of a physician, and for the manner In which they execute their
at the time of the assault was recllnlng lan- trust. To their ca.re and fidelity are Intrustguidly In his is._'flt; that he bad neither said ed the lives and limbs and comfort and connor done anything to provoke the a888.ult; venience of the whole traveling publlc, and It
GODDAHD v. GHAXD THUXK RY. OF
CANADA.
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is certainly as important that these servants

should be trustworthy as it is that they

should be competent. It is not suﬂicient that

they are capable of doing well, if in fact

they choose to do ill; that they can be as

polite as a Chesterﬁeld, if, in their inter-

course with the passengers, they choose to

he coarse, brutal, and profane. The best se-

curity the traveler can have that these serv- .

ants will be selected with care, is to hold ,

those by whom the selection is made respon-

sible for their conduct.

This liability of the master is very clearly

expressed in a recent case in Massachusetts.

The court say, that wherever there is a con-

tract between the master and another per-

son, the master is responsible for the acts of

his servant in executing that contract, al-

though the act is fraudulent and done with-
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out his consent. Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Al-

len, 55 (paragraph nearest the bottom of the

page). And Messrs. Angeli and Ames, in

their work on Corporations (l8th Ed.] p. 40-l,

§ 38%), say: “A distinction exists as to the

liability of a corporation for the willful tort

of its servant toward one to whom the corpo-

ration owes no duty except such as each citi-

zen owes to every other; and that toward

one who has entered into some peculiar con-

tract with the corporation by which this duty

is increased; thus it has been held that a

railroad corporation is liable for the willful

tort of its servants whereby a passenger on

the train is injured."

In Brand v. Railroad Co., 8 Barb. 368, the

court say, a passenger on board a stagecoach

or railroad-car, and a person on foot in the

street, do not stand in the some relation to

the carrier. Toward the one the liability of

the carrier springs from a contract, ex-

press or implied, and upheld by an adequate ‘

consideration. Toward the other he is under

no obligation but that of justice and humani-

ty. Hence a passenger, who is injured by a

servant of the carrier, may have a right of

action against him when one not a passen-

ger, for a similar injury, would not.

In Moore v. Railroad Co., 4 Gray, 465, the

plaintiff was forcibly put out of a car for not

giving up his ticket or paying his fare, when

in fact he had already surrendered his ticket

to some one employed on the train. The de-

fendants insisted that they were not respon-

sible for the misconduct of the conductor;

and further, that an action for an assault

would not lie against a corporation. But the

court held otherwise, and the plaintif f recov-

ered.

In Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 Iiurl. & N.

354, the plaintif f was assaulted and taken

out of the defendant's omnibus by one -)f

his servants.

he was not liable, because it did not appear

that be authorized or sanctioned the act of

the servant. But it was held in the ex-

'chequer chamber, afﬁrming the judgment of

the exchequer court. that the jury did right

in returning a verdict for the plaintiff.

Is certainly as Important that these senants
In Railrood Co. v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388, the
should be trustworthy as lt ls that they plaintltr was unlawfully put out of a car ty
ahould be competent. It ls not sufficient that the conductor. After stating that lt was in·
they are capable of doing well, if 1n fact slated, by the counsel for the railroad, that
they choose to do 111; that they can be as 1n no case could a cause of action arise
pollte as a Chesterfield, If, In their lnter- against the principal for the willful misconeourse with the passengers, they choose to duct of the agent, the court went on to suy,
be coarse, brutal, and profane. The best se- that after a ca1-eful examination of the posl·
eurity the traveler can have that these serv- tlon, they we1"P. satisfied it was not correct;
ants wlll be selected with care, Is to hold that where the misconduct of the agent
those by whom the selection ls made respon- causes a breach of the princlpal'e cont1-ad,
sible fw their conduct.
be will be liable whether such mlscouduct
Thls liability of the master Is very clearly be wlllful 01· merely negligent.
In Rallroad Co. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa.. St. aro,
expressed in a. recent case in Massa.chusetts.
The court say, that wherever there ls a con- a passenger received injuries, of which he
tract between the master and another per- died, by being thrown from the platform of
son, the master ls responsible rw the acts or a rallrood car because he refused to pay hlR
bis sen-ant 1n executing that contract. a.l- fare or show hie ticket, he averring he bad
thougb the act ls fraudulent and done with· bought one but could not find it. The evi-0ut his consent. Howe v. Newmarcb, 12 Al- dence showed he was partially intoxicat~.
len. "5 (paragraph nearest the bottom of the It was urged In defense that if the passenpage). And :Messrs. Angell and Ames, In ger's deoth was the result of force aud Yiotheir work on Corporations ([8th Ed.] p. 404, lence, and not the result of negligence, then
f 388), say: "A distinction e.iclsts as to the (such force and violence being the act of the
llablllty of a. corporation for the willful tort ngents alone without any command or order
-Of Its servant toward one to whom the corpo- ' of the <-ompany) the company was not i·eration owes no duty except such as each cit!- R)lonsible therefor. But the court held oth7.en owes to every other; and that towa1·d : erw1se. "A railway company," said the
-0ne who has entered Into some peculiar con- com·t, "!!elects Its own agents at its own
tract with the corporation by which this duty )lleasure, and it is bound to employ none
is lncreesed; thus it has been held that a except capable, prudent. and hulllilne men.
railroad corporation ls liable for the wllllnl ! In the present case the company and Its
tort of its servants whereby a passenger on agents were nil liable for the Injury dune to
the train ls injured."
the deceased."
In Brand v. Rallroo.d Co., 8 Barb. 368, the
In Wee<! v. Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 3112. the
court say, a passenger on board a stage-coach jcry found specially that the act of the sei'Yor railroad-car, and a person on foot In the ant by which the plaintiff was Injured, wa11
street. do not stand 1n the enme relation to willful. The court held the willfulness of
the carrier. T;>ward the one the liability of the act did not defeat the plalntllI's right to
the carrier springs from a contract, ex- look to the railroad compnny tor i·eclre811.
press or implied, and upheld by an adeqw1te
In Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 4flS,
-eonslderotlon. Toward the other he ls undl!r where the servant or a t-allrood company
no obligntlon but that of justice and humani- took an engine and run lt oyer the rood for
ty. Hence a passenger, who ls injured by a bis own gratlticlition, not only wltlwut conservant of the carrier, may have a right of sent, but contrary to express orders, the su.action against him when one not a pa88en- preme ceurt of the United States held that
ger, for a similar Injury, would not.
the rallrCJad company was responsible.
In ~loore v. ltallroe.d Co., 4 Gray, 405, the
In Railway Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512, n
plaintiff was forcibly put out of a car for not passenge1·'s arm was broken in a fight begiving up hie ticket or paying his fare, when tween some drunken persons that forced
In fact he bad already surrendered bis ticket
their way into the car at a station nenr •111
to some one employed on the train. The de- agricultural fair, and the company was hel1l
fendants Insisted that they were not reepon- responsible, because the conductor went on
11ible for the misconduct of the conductor; collectlni.: fares, and did not stop the train
and further, that an action for an assault and expel the rioters, or demonstrate, by an
would not lie against a corporation. But the earnest etrort, that it was Impossible to do
·court held otherwise, and the plaintiff recov- so.
ered.
In Flint v. Transportation Co., 34 Conn.
In Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 Hurl. & N. 554, where the plalntlf! was Injured by the
.3i>4, the plaintiff was assaulted and taken discharge of a gun dropped by some soldiers
-0ut of the defendant's omnibus by one .if engaged in a scuttle, the court held that pashis servants. The defendant Insisted that senger carriers are bound to exercise the uthe was not Hable, because it did not appear most vigilance and care to guard those they
that he authorized . or sanctioned the act of transport from Ylolence from whateYer
the eervant. But It WM held In the ex- source arising; and the plaintiff recovered a
-<:bequer chamber, aflirmlug the judgment of verdict for $10,000.
the exchequer court, that the jury did right
In I..nndrooux v. Bell, 5 La. 0. S. 275, tb4!
court eny, that carriers are responsible for
lD returning a verdict for the plalntltr.
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the misconduct of their servants toward pas-

sengers to the same extent as for their mis-

conduct in regard to merchandise committed

to their care; that no satisfactory distinction

can be drawn between the two cases.

In Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242,

Judge Story declared in language strong and

emphatic, that a passenger's contract enti-

tles him to respectful treatment; and be ex-

pressed the hope that every violation of this

right would be visited, in the shape of dam-

ages, with its appropriate punishment.

In Nieto v. Clark, 1 Cliff. 145, where the

steward of the ship assaulted and grossly in-

suited a female passenger, Judge Clifford de-

clares, in language equally emphatic, that

the contract of all passengers entitles them

to respectful treatment and protection

against rudeness and every wanton interfer-
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ence with their persons from all those in

charge of the ship; that the conduct of the

steward disqualiﬁed him for his situation,

and justiﬁed the master in immediately dis-

charging him, although the vessel was then

in a foreign port. And we have his authori-

ty for saying that he has recently examined

the question with care, in a case pending

in the lthode Island district, where the clerk

of a steamboat unjustiiiably assaulted and

maltreated a passenger, and that he enter-

tains no doubt of the carrier's liability to

compensate the passenger for the injury thus

received, whether the carrier previously au-

thorized or subsequently ratiﬁed the assault

or not. A report of the case will soon be

published. See 3 Cliff.

And a recent and well-considered case in

Maryland (published since this case has been

‘pending before the law court, and very much

like it in all respects), fully sustains this

view of the law. Railroad Co. v. Blocher,

27 Md. 277.

The grounds of the carrler's liability may

be brieﬂy stated thus:

The law requires the common carrier of

passengers to exercise the highest degree of

care that human judgment and foresight are

capable of, to make his passenger's journey

safe. Whoever engages in the business im-

pliedly promises that his passenger shall

have this degree of care. In other words.

the carrier is conclusively presumed to have

promised to do what, under the circumstan-

ces, the law requires him to do. We say

conclusively presumed, for the law will not

allow the carrier by notice or special con-

tract even to deprive his passenger of this

degree of care. If the passenger does not

have such care, but on the contrary is un-

lawfully assaulted and insulted by one of the

very persons to whom his conveyance is in-

trusted, the carrier's implied promise is bro-

ken, and his legal duty is left unperformed,

and he is necessarily responsible to the pas-

senger for the damages he thereby sustains.

The passenger's remedy may be either in

assumpsit or tort. at his election. In the

one case, ne relies upon a breach of the
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the misconduct of their servants toward passengers to the same extent as for their misconduct In regard to merchandise committed
to their care; that no satlsfactory distlnctlon
can be drawn between the two cases.
In Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242,
Judge Story declared in language strong and
empbntlc, that a passenger's contract entltles him to respectful treatment; and he ex}lressed the hope that every vlolatlon of this
right would be visited, In the shape of damages, with Its appropriate punishment.
In Nieto v. Clark, 1 Clllf. 145, where the
steward <>f the ship assaulted and grossly insulted a female passenger, Judge Clifford '1ecla1-es, In language equally emphatic, that
the contract of all passengers entitles them
to respectful treatment and protection
ngalnst rudeness and every wanton Interference with their persons from all those In
charge of the ship; that the conduct of the
steward disqualified him for his situation,
and justified the master in Immediately discharging him, although the vessel was th1m
in a foreign port. And we have his authotity for saying that he has recently examined
the question with care, in a case pending
In the Rhode Island district, where the clerk
of a steamboat unjustifiably asSdulted and
maltreated a passenger, and that he entertains no doubt of the carrier's llablllty to
<·ompensate the passenger for the injmy thus
i-ecel;ed, whether the carrier previously authorized or subsequently ratified the assault
or not. A report of the case wm soon be
lJUbllsbed. See 3 Cliff.
And a recent and well-considered case In
Maryland (published since this case has been
'pending before the law court, and very much
like it In all respects), fully sustains this
view of the law. Railroad Co. v. Blocher,

1

27 l\ld. 2i7.

'.fhe grounds ot the carrier's liability may
be brlelly stated thus:
The law requires the common carrier ot
passengers to exercise the highest degree or
care thllt human judgment and foresight are
eapnble of, to make his passenger's journey
safe. Whoever engages In the business Impliedly promises that his passenger shall
have this degree ot care. In other words,
the enrrler ls conclusively presumed to have
promised to do what, under the clrcumstnnees, the law requires him to do. We say
coudnslvely presumed, for the law wlll not
allow the carrier by notice or l!peClal contract e\·en to deprive his passenger of this
clegree at care. It the passenger does not
have sucb care, but on the contrary ls unlawfully assaulted and Insulted by one or the
,·m·y persons to whom his con;eyance ls lntnll!ted, the carrier's Implied promise ls broken, and his legal duty ls left unperformed,
and be ls necessarily responsible to the pas11enger tor the damages he thereby sustains.
The passenger's remedy may be either In
assumpslt or tort, at his election. In the
QBe case, ile relles upon a breach ot the

I

carrier's common-law duty In support of bl11
action; ln the other, upon a brencb of hls
Implied promise. Tbe form of the action ls
Important only upon the question of damages. In actions of aBBumpslt, the damages
are ge~rally limited to compensation. ln
actions of tort, the jury are allowed greater
latitude, and, in proper cases, may give exemplary damages.
II. \Ve now come to the second branch ..if
the case. What ls the measure of relief
which the law secures to the Injured party~
or, In other words, can he recover exemplary
damages? We bold that be can. The right
ot the jury to give exemplary damages for
inju1·ies wantonly, recklessly, or mallclousl.V'
lntllcted, ls as old as the right of ti·lal by
jury Itself; and ls not, as many seem to supi;ose, an Innovation upon the rules of the
common law. It was settled in Englan<l
more than a century ago.
In 1763, Lord Chief Justice Pratt (afterwards Earl of Camden), with whom the other judges concurred, declared that the jury
bad done tight In giving exemplary damages_
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wiie. 20:1.
In another case the enme learned judgcdeclared with emphasis, that damages ar1~
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment
to the guilty. 5 Camp. Lives Chan. (AUL
Ed.) p. 214.
·In 1814, the doctrine of punitive damag'!s·
was stringently applied In a case where tl1e
defendant, in a state of intoxication, forct!d
himself Into the plaintiff's company, and In·
solently 11erRlsted In hunting upon bis
grounds. The plalntltr recovered a verdict
tor five hundroo pounds, the full amount of" •
his ad damnum, and the court refusea to.
et It aside. Mr. Justice Heath remarked
In this cuse that be remembet·ed a caae wberctbe jury gave five hundred pounds for merely knocking a man's hat olT, and the court
etused a new trial. It goes, said be, to prevent the practice of dueling, If juries are·
permitted to punish Insult by exemplary
damages. 'Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442.
See, also, to the same etrect. Sears v. Lyon ..
2 Starkie, 317 (decided in 1818).
In 1844, Lord Chief Baron Pollock said, that
ln actions for malicious Injuries, juries had
alway!'! been nllowed to give what are called
vlndktlve dnmnges. Doc v. Fllllter, 13 Mees.
&

w.

50.

In 1858, In an action of trespass for tak-·
log personal property on a fraudulent bill
of sale, the derendnnt's counsel contended
that lt was not a case for the application
of the· doctrine of exemplary damages; but
the court held otherwise. No doubt, said"
Pollock, C. B., It w~s a case lo which vindictive clnm11i:es might be given. Thomas v.
Harris. 3 Hurl. & N. 961.
In 1800, In an nctlon tor willful negligence,
the defendant contended that the plaintiff's
declaration was too defeetlve to entitle him
to exemplary damages-; but the court held
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otherwise; and the judge who tried the case

remarked that he was glad the court had

come to the conclusion that it was competent

for the jury to give exemplary damages, for

he thought the defendant had acted with a

high hand. Emblen v. Myers, 6 Hurl. & N.

54.

"Damages exemplary," is now a familiar

title in the best English law reports. See

6 Hurl. & N. 969.

It was the ﬁrmness with which Lord Cam-

den (then Chief Justice Pratt) maintained and

enforced the right of the jury to punish with

exemplary damages the agents of Lord Hal-

ifax (then secretary of state) for the illegal

arrest of the publishers of the North Briton,

tint made him so immensely popular in Eng-

land. Nearly or quite twenty of those cases

appear to have been tried before him, in all
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of which enormous damages were given, and

in not one of them was the verdict set aside.

In one of the cases a verdict for a thousand

pounds was returned for a mere nominal im-

prisonment at the house of the oiﬁcer mak-

ing the arrest, and the court refused to set it

aside. Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils.

244. >

“After this," says Lord Campbell, in his

Lives of the Chancellors, "he became the

idol of the nation. Grim representations of

him laid down the law from sign-posts, many

busts and prints of him were sold not only

in the streets of the metropolis, but in the

provincial towns; a ﬁne portrait of him, by

Sir Joshua Reynolds, with the ﬂattering in-

scription, ‘in honor of the zealous asserter

of English liberty by law,' was placed in

the gulldhali of the city of London; ad-

dresses of thanks to him poured in from all

quarters; and one of the sights of London,

which foreigners went to see, was the great

Lord Chief Justice Pratt."

In this country, perhaps Lord Camden is

better known as one of the able English

statesmen who so eloquently defended the

American colonies against the unjust claim

of the mother country to tax them. Lord Camp-

bell says some portions of his speeches upon

that subject are still in the mouths of school-

boys. But in England his immense popularity

originated in his ﬁrm and vigorous enforce-

ment of the doctrine of exemplary damages.

And we cannot discover that the legality of

his rulings in this particular was ever seri-

ously called in question. On the contrary,

we ﬁnd it admitted by his political opponents

that he was a profound jurist and an able and

upright judge. His stringent enforcement of

the right of the jury to punish ﬂagrant

wrongs with exemplary damages, arrested

not only great abuses then existing, but it

has had a salutary inﬂuence ever since. It

won for him the title'of the “asserter of

English liberty by law."

In this country the right of the jury to

give exemplary damages has been much dis-

cussed. It seems to have been ﬁrst opposed

by Mr. Theron Metculf (afterwards reporter

otherwile; and the judge who tried the case
remarked that he was glad the court had
<X>me to thl" conclusion that It was competent
for the jury to give exemplary damages, for
he thought the defendant had acted with a
high hand. Emblen v. Myers, 6 Hurl. & N.
M.

.. Damages exemplary," la now a familiar
title In the best English law reports. See
() Hurl. la; N. 969.
It waa the ftrmness with which Lord Cam<l~n (then Chief Justice Pratt) maintained and
enforced the right of the jury to punish with
.exemplary damages the agents of Lord Halifax (then secretary of Btate) tor the 11legal
arrest of the publlshel'll of the North Briton,
that made him so Immensely popular In England. Nearly or quite twenty of those cases
appear to ban been tried before him, lo all
of which enormous damages were given, and
In not one of them was the verdict set ulde.
In one of the caeeti a Vet"dlct for a thousand
JJOUDds was returned for a mere nominal Imprisonment at th!! house of the otftcer making the arrest, and the court refm1ed to set It
aside. Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wll.s.
:!44.

"After this," says Lord Campbell, In llls
Lives of the Chancellors, "be became the
Idol ot the nation. Grim representations of
him laid down the law from sign-posts, many
busts and prlnt8 of him were sold not only
in the streets of the metropolls, but in the
JlrO\"lnclal towns; a tine portmlt of him, by
81r Joshua Reynolds, with the ftattf'rlng Inscription, 'ln honor of the zealorn1 asserter
of English liberty by law,' was placed ln
the guildhall of the city of London; addresses of thanks to him poured ln from all
quarters; antl one of the eights of London,
which foreigners went to see, was the great
I..ord Chief Justice Pra.tt."
In this country, perhaps Lord Camden ls
better known as one of the able English
statesm.en who so eloquently defended the
American colonies against the unjust claim
of the mother country to tax them. Lord Campbell says some portions of his speeches upon
that subject are still In the mouths of AChoolboys. But ln England his Immense popularity
oclglnated In hie firm and vigorous enforcement of the doctrine of exemplary damages.
And we cannot dieco\"er that the legality of
hie rulings In this particular was ever seriously called ln question. On the contrary,
we find It admitted by hie political opponents
that be was a profound jurist and au able and
upright judge. His stringent enforcement of
the right of the jury to punish ftagrant
wrongs with exemplary damages, atTested
not only great abuses then existing, but It
has bad a salutary lnftuence ever since. It
won for him the title · of the "asserter of
English liberty by law."
In this country the right of tile jury to
gl\"e exemplary damages has been much discussed. It seems to have been first opposed
by :Ur. Theron :Uetcal! (afterwards reporter
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aJ¥1 judge of the supreme com1 of Massachusetts), m an article published in 3 Am. Jnr.
387, in 1830. The substance of this article
was afterwards Inserted In a note to Mr.
Greenleaf'a work on Evidence. Mr. Sedgwick, In his work on Damages, took the opposite view, and sustained his position by
the citation of numerous autllorlties. Professor Greenleaf replled In an article In 9
Bost. La.w Rep. 629. Mr. Sedgwick rejoined
In the same perlodlatl (volume 10, p. 49).
Essays on different sides of the question
were al8o publlshed Jn 3 Am. Law Mag. N.
S. 537, and 4 Am. Law Mag. N. S. 61. But
notwithstanding this formidable opposition,
the doctrine triumphed, and must be regarded as now too firmly established to be shaken
by anything short of legislative enactments.
In tact the decisions of the courts are nearly
unanimous lo 118 favor.
In a ai.ae In the supreme court of the
United States, Mr. Justice Grier, In dellverlng
the opinion of the court, says, It Is a wellestabllehed principle of the common law, tha.t
In all actions for torts the jury may lnftlct
what are called punitive or exemplary damages, having In view the enormity of the
offense rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff. "We are aware,'' the
judge continues, "that the propriety of this
doctrine has been questioned by Rome writers;
but If repeated judicial decisions for more
than a century are to be received as the
best e.xpo11ltlon of wbat the law Is, the question will not admit of argument." Day v.
Woodworth, 13 How. 363.
In a case in North Carollna., the court refer
to the note In Professor Greenleaf'& work on
Evidence, ana say that It Is very clearly wrong
with respect to the authorities; and In their
judgment wrong on principle; that It ls fortunate that wblle juries endeavor to give ample
compensation for the Injury actually received,
they are also allowed Rueb full discretion as
to make verdicts to deter others from ftagmnt violations of social duty. And the
same court bold that the wealth of the defendant ls a proper circumstance to be weighed by the jury, because a thousand dollars
may be a less punishment to one man than
a hundred dollars to another. In one caFe
the same court sustained a verdict which In
terms assessed the actual damages at $100,
and the exemplary damages at $1,000. 'l'he
court held It was a good verdict for $1,100.
Pendleton v. Dnvls, 1 Jones (N'. C.) US; MeAulay v. Blrkbead, 13 Ired. 28; Gllreatb v.
Allen, 10 Ired. 137.
In fact, Professor Greenlenf le blmselt nn\
authority for the doctrine of exemplary dam- ;
ages. Speaking of the action for assault and
battery, be says the jury are not confined to
the mere corporal lnjmy, but may consider the
malice of the defentlant, the Insulting character of his conduct, the rank In life of the
several parties, and all the circumstances of
the outrni::e. and thereupon nward sm:h extmplary damages as the clrcumstnnct'S may
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in their judgment require. 2 Greenl. Ev. §.89.

But if the great weight of Professor Green-

ieaf's authority were to be regarded as op-

posed to the doctrine, we have, on the other

hand. the great weight of Chancellor Kent's

opinion in favor of it. He says, surely this

is the true and salutary doctrine. And after

reviewing the English cases, he continues by

-saying it cannot be necessary to multiply in-

stances of its application; that it is too well

settled in practice, and too valuable in prin-

ciple to be called in question. Tillotson v.

Chcetham, 3 Johns. 56, 6~i.

This brief review of the doctrine of ex-

emplary damages is not so much for the pur-

pose of establishing its existence, as to cor-

rect the erroneous impression which some
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member of the legal profession still seem to

entertain. that it is a modern invention, not

sanctioned by the rules of the common law.

We think every candid-minded person must

admit that it is no new doctrine; that its ex-

istence as a fundamental rule of the common

law has been recognized in England for more

than a century; that it has been there strin-

gently enforced under circumstances which

would not have allowed it to pass unchal-

lenged, if any pretext could have been found

for doubting its validity; and that in this

country, notwithstanding an early and vig-

orous opposition, it has steadily progressed,

and that the decisions of the courts are now

nearly unanimous in its favor. It was sanc-

tioned in this state, after a careful and full

review of the authorities, in Pike v. Dilling,

48 Me. 539, and cannot now be regarded as

an open question.

But it is said that if the doctrine of ex-

emplary damages must be regarded as es-

tablished in suits against it3t}_ural_’pe_r§p_n§

for their own willful and malicious torts, it

ought ngt_;,to be applied to coi_"p_o_t;at_igps for

the torts of their servants, especially where

the tort is committed by a servant of so low

a grade as a brakeman on a railway train,

and the tortious act was not directly nor im-

pliedly authorized nor ratiﬁed by the corpora-

tion; and several cases are cited by the defend-

ants' counsel, in which the courts seem to

have taken this view of the law; but we

have carefully examined these cases, and in

none of them was there any evidence that the

servant acted wantonly or maliciously; they

were simply cases of mistaken duty; and

what these same courts would have done if

a case of such gross and outrageous insult had

been before them, as is now before us, it is

impossible to say; and long experience has

shown that nothing is more dangerous than

to rely upon the abstract reasoning of courts,

when the cases before them did not call for

the application of the doctrines which their

reasoning is intended to establish.

We have given to this objection much con-

sideration, as lt was our duty to do, for the

presiding judge declined to instruct the jury
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In their judgment require. 2 Greenl. Ev. t $9.
But If' the great weight or Professor Green!eaf's authority were to be regarded as opposed to the doctrine, we have, on the other
hand, the great weight of Chancellor Kent's
opinion in favor of It. He says, surely this
is the true and salutary doctrine. And after
reviewing the English cases, be continues by
,saying it cannot be necessary to multiply Instances of Its application; that It is too well
settled In practice, and too valuable In principle to be called in question. Tlllotson v.
Clleetham, 3 Johns. 56, 64.
This brief review of the doctrine of ex.emplary damages Is not so much for the purpose of establishing Its existence, as to correct the erroneous Impression which some
members of the legal profession still seem to
entertain, that it ls a modern Invention, not
sanctioned by the rules of the common law.
We tblnk every candid-minded person must
admit µiat 1t is no new doctrine; that Its existence as a fundamental rule of the common
law has been recognized In England for more
than a century; that It hlls been there stringently enforced under cll'cumstances which
would not have allowed lt to pass uncballenited, It any pretext could have been found
for doubting Its validity; and that In this
country, notwithstanding an early and vigorous opposition, It has steadily progressed,
and that the decisions of the courts are now
nearly unanimous in Its favor. It was 811.nctioned In this state, after a careful and full
review of the authorities, In Pike v. Dilling,
48 Me. 539, and cannot now be regarded as
an open. question.
But It ls said that tr the doctrine or exemplary damages must be regarded as established In suits &galnst ~Yttl!ral ~rsons
for their own willful and ma lclous torts, it
ought ..!!Qi.- to be applied to CO!J>OrAtlQ!IS for
the torts of their se1·vants, especially where
the tort ls committed by a. servant ot so low
a grade as a brakeman on a rallw&.T traln,
and the tortious act was not directly nor Impliedly authorized nor ratified by the corporation; and several cases are·clted by· the defendants' counsel, lo which the courts seem to
have taken this view ot the law; but we
have carefully examined these cases, and in
none of them was there any evidence that the
servant acted wantonly or maliciously; they
were simply cases or mistaken duty; and
what these same courts would have done if
a case of such gross and outrageous Insult had
been before them, as ts now before us, It is
lmpos1>lble to say; and long experience bas
shown that nothing Is more dangerous than
to rely upon the abstract reasoning of courts,
when the cases before them did not call tor
the appllcatlon of the doctrines which their
reasonlng Is intended to establish.
We have given to this objection much consideration, as lt was our duty to do, fOI' the
presiding judge declined to Instruct the jury
that tr the acts and words of the defendants'
servant were not directly nor Impliedly au-

thorlzed nor ratified by the defendant, the
plalntltl' could not recover exemplary damages. We confe98 that It seems to us that
there ls no class of Clllles where the doctrine
ot exemplary damages can be more benedclally applied than to railroad corporations
In their capacity of common carriers of passengers; and It might as well not be applied
to them at all as to limit Its application to
cases where the servant ls directly or impliedly commanded by the corporation to
maltreat and Insult a passenger, or to cases
where such an act is directly or Impliedly ratified; for no such cases will ever occur. A corporation Is an Imaginary being.
It has no mind but the mind of Its servants;
It has no voice but the voice of Its servants;
and lt bas no hands with which to act but
the bands of Its servants. All Its Rchemes of
mischief, as well as its schemes of public enterprise, are conceived by human minds and
executed by human hands; and these minds
and hands are Its servants' minds and bands.
All attempts, therefore, to distinguish between the guilt of the servant and the gullt
of the corporation; or the malice ot the servant and the malice of the corporation; or the
punishment ()f the servant and the punishment or the corporation, ls sheer nonsense;
and only tends to confuse the mind and contound the judgment. Neither gullt, malice,
nor sutl'ering is predicable or this Ideal existence, called a corpomtlon. And yet under
cover of Its name and authority, there ls ln
tact as much wickedness, and a.s much that
ls deserving or punishment, as can be found
anywhere else. And since these ideal existences can neither be hung, Imprisoned, whipped, or put In the stocks,---411nce in ta.ct no
corrective lnduence can be brought to bear
upon them except that of pecuniary loss,-lt
does seem to us that the doctrine or exemplary damages Is more beneficial In its application to them, than In Its application to
natural persons. It those who are in the
habit or thinking tha.t lt ls a terrible hardship to punish an Innocent corporation for
the wickedness of Its agents and servants,
will for a moment reflect upon the absurdity
ot their own thoughts, their anxiety wm be
cured. Careful engineers can be selected
who will not run their trains Into open draws;
and careful baggage men can be secured,
who will not handle and smash trunks and
band-boxes as ls now the universal custom;
and conductors and brakemen can be had
who will not assault and Insult passengers;
and lt the courts wlll only let the verdicts
ot upright and Intelligent juries alone, and
let the doctrine or exemplary damages have
lts legitimate ln11uence, we prP.dl.ct these
great and growing evlls wlll be very much
lessened, It not entirely cured. There is but
one vulnerable point about these ldool existences, called corporations; and that ls, the
pocket ot the monled power that Is concealed
behln,d them; and It that Is reached they will
wince. When It ls thoroughly understood
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carelessness,

that it is not proﬁtable to employ careless

and indifferent agents, or reckless and inso-

lent servants, better men will take their pla-

ces, and not before.

It is our judgment, therefore, that actions

against corporations, for the willful and ma-

licious acts of their agents and servants in

executing the business of the corporation,

should not form exceptions to the rule allow-

ing exemplary damages. On the cont1ary,

we think this is the very class of cases, of

-all others, where it will do the most good,

and where it is most needed. And in this

conclusion we are sustained by several of the

ablest courts in the country.

In a case in Mississippi, the plaintiff was

carried four hundred yards beyond the sta-

tion where he had told the conductor he

wished to stop; and he requested the con-
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ductor to run the train back, but the conduct-

or refused, and told the plaintiff to get off

the train or he would carry him to the next

station. The plaintiff got ofi. and walked

back, carrying his valise in his hand. The

plaintiff testiﬁed that the conductors manner

toward him was insolent, and the defendants

having refused to discharge him, the jury re-

turned a verdict t'or four thousand ﬁve hun-

dred dollars, and the court refused to set it

aside. They said the right of the jury to

protect the public by punitive oamages. and

thus prevent these great public blessings

from being converted into the most danger-

ous nuisances, was conclusively settled; and

they hoped the verdict would have a salu-

tary inﬂuence upon their future management.

Railroad Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660.

In New Hampshire, in an action against

this identical road, where, through gross

there was a collision of the

passenger train with a freight train, and the

plaintiff was thereby injured, the judge at

nisi prins instructed the jury that it was a

proper case for exemplary damages; and the

full court sustained the ruling, saying it

was a subject in which all the traveling pub-

iic were deeply interested; that railroads had

practically monopolized the transportation

of passengers on all the principal lines of

travel, and there ought to be no lax adminis-

tration of the law in such cases; and that it

would be diﬁﬁcuit to suggest a case more loud-

ly calling for an exemplary verdict. (If mere

carelessness, however gross, calls loudly for

an exemplary verdict, what shall be said of

an injury that is willful and grossly insult-

ing?) Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9.

Judge Rediield, in his very able and useful

work on Railways, expresses the opinion

that there is quite as much necessity ‘for

holding these companies liable to exemplary

damages as their agents. He says it is dlﬂl-

cult to perceive why a passenger, who suffers

indignity and insult from the conductor of

a train, should be compelled to show an ac-

tual ratiﬁcation of the act, in order to sub-

ject the company to exemplary damages. 2

Redf. R. R. 231, note. But if such a ratiﬁ-

that It ls not profitable to employ careless
and lndUrerent agents. or reckless and lnso. lent servants, better men will take their places, and not before.
It Is our judgment, therefore, that actions
against corporations, for tbe willful and malicious acts of their agents and servants In
executing the business of the corporation,
abou1d not form exceptions to the rule allowing exemplary damages. On the contrary,
we think this le the very class of cases, of
. all others, where It will do the most good,
and where It ls most needed. And In this
conclusion we are sostalned by several of the
ablest courts In the country.
In a case in llleslsslppi, the plalntltr was
carried four hundred yards beyond the station where he had told the conductor he
wished to stop; and he requested the conductor to run the train back, but the conductor refused, and told the plalntltr to get off
the train or be would carry him to the next
station. The plalntltr got olf and walked
back, carrying bis valise In bis band. The
plalntltr testified that the conductor's manner
toward blm was Insolent, and the defendants
having refused to discharge him, the jury returnecJ a verdict for four thousand five hundred dollars, and the court refuse<l to set It
aside. They said the right of the jury to
protect the public by punitive oamages, and
thna prevent these great public blessings
from being converted Into the most dangerous nuisances, was conclusively settled; and
they hoped the verdict would have a salutary Influence upon their future management.
Railroad Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 600.
In New Hampshire, In an action against
thla identical road, where, through groes
·carele88ne88, there was a collision of the
passenger train with a freight train, and the
plalntllf was thereby Injured, the Judge at
nlsl prlus Instructed the jury that It was a
proper case for exemplary damages; and the
full court sustained the ruling, saying It
was a subject In which all the traveling public were deeply Interested; that rallroa$)s had
practically monopolized the transportation
·of passengers on all the principal lines of
travel, and there ought to be no lax administration of the law lo such cases; and that It
would be difficult to sugirest a case more loudly calling for an exemplary verdict. (If mere
carelessness, however groBS, calls loudly for
an exemplary verdict, what shall be said of
an Injury that Is willful nnd grossly Insulting?) Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. II. 9.
Judge Redfield, In bis very able and useful
work on Railways, expresses the opinion
that there Is quite aa much necessity "tor
holding these companies liable to exemplary
damages as their agents. He says It t.s dlffi·
cult to perceive why a. passenger, who suft'ers
indignity and Insult from the conductor of
a train, should be com}lelled to show an actual ratlftrotlon of the act, In order to subject the rompany to exemplary damng~. 2
Redf. R. R. 231, note. But If such a rntlll-

cation ls necessary, be thinks the corporation, which ls a mere legal entity, Inappreciable to sense, should be regarded as always
pl'\!Sent In the person of Its servant, and as
directing and ratifying the servant's acts
within the scope of his employment, nnd thus
be made responsible for bis willful misconduct. 1 Redf. R. R. 515 et se<1.
And In a recent case In llaryllllld (published since this case bas been pending before
the law court), a c:ase In all respects very
similar to the one we are now considering.
the presiding judge was requested to Instruct
the jury that the plalntllf Wll8 not entitled
to recover vindictive or punitive damages
from the defendants, unless they expressly
or Impliedly participated In the tortious act,
authorizing It before or approving It after It
was committed; but the presiding justi<'e
refused so to Instruct the jury, and the fnll
court held that the request was properly rejected; that It was sl'ttll•d that where the
Injury for which com}X'nmtlon lo damn;.res
ls sought, is accompanied by force or malice,
the Injured party Is entitled to recover cxem·
pl11ry damages. Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27
Md. 277.
But the defendants sny that the damni:ee
awarded by the jury are excessive, and they
move to have the verdict set aside and a
new trial granted for that reason. That the
verdict In this case ls highly punitive, and
was so designed by the jury, cannot be doubted; but by whose judgment ls it to be measured to determine whether or not It Is exceeslve? What standard shall be used? It
ls a. case of want.on Insult and Injury to
the plaintiff's character, and feelings of 11elfrespect, and the damages can be measured
by no property standard. It ts a. case where
the judgment will be verY- · much tntluencecJ
by the estlmntlon In which character, selfrespect, and freedom from Insult are held.
To those who set a. very low value on character, and think that pride and self-respect
exist ooly to become objects ot ridicule and
sport, the damages wlll undoubtedly be considered excessive. It would not be strange
If some such persons, measuring the sensibilities of others by their own low sta.udard,
should view this verdict with envy, and regret that somebody will not assault and Insult them, If such Is to be the standard or
compensation. While others, who feel that
character and self-respect are above all price,
more valuable than life Itself even, will regard the verdict as none too large. We repeat, therefore, that It 16 a case where men's
judgments will be likely to dill'er. And suppose the court Is of opinion that the damages In this case nre greater, much greater
even, than they would have awarded, does
1t therefore follow that the Judgment of the
court Is to be substituted for that ot the
jury? By no means. It Is the wisdom of the
law to suppose that the judgment of the jury
Is more likely to be right than the judgmeut
of the court, for It Is to the fonner anLl not
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to the latter that the duty of estimating dam-

ages is conﬁded. Unless the damages are so

large as to satisfy the court that the verdict

was not the result of an honest exercise of

judgment. they have no right to set it aside.

A careful examination of the case fails to

satisfy us that the jury acted dishonestly, or

that they made any mistake in their appli-

cation of the doctrine of exemplary dama-

ges. We have no doubt that the highly puni

tive cha1acter of their verdict is owing

the fact that, after J ackson‘s misconduct wa

known to the defendants, they still retain

him in their service. The jury undoubtedly

felt that it was due to the plaintiff, and due

to every other traveller upon that road, to

have him instantly discharged; and that to-

retain him in his place, and thus shield and

protect him against the protestation of the ,
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plaintiff, made to the servant himself at the

time of the assault, that he would lose his t

place, was a r tical ratitica/th)_'n and ap-

proval of the ::!r;lv€a_n.m()'mﬁct, and would ‘

be so understood by him and by every other -

servant on the road.

And when we consider the violent. long-

continued, and grossly insulting character of

the assault; that it was made upon a per-

son in feeble health, and was accompanied

by language so coarse, profane, and brutal;

that so far as appears it was wholly unpro-

voked; we confess we are amazed at the con-

duct of the defendants in not instantly dis-

charging Jackson. Thus to shield and pro-

tect him in his insoience, deeply implicated

them in his guilt. It was such indifference

to the treatment the plaintiff had received,

such indifference to the treatment that other

travelers might receive, such indifference to

the evil inﬂuence which such an example

would have upon the servants of this and

other lines of public travel, that we are not

prepared to say the jury acted unwisely in

making their verdict highly punitive. We

cannot help feeling that if we should inter-

fere and set it aside, our action would be

most unfortunate and detrimental to the pub-

lic interests. On the contrary, if we allow it

to stand, we cannot doubt that its inﬂuence

will be salutary. It will be an impressive

lesson to these defendants, and to the man-

agers of other lines of public travel, of the

risk they incur when they retain in their

service servants known to be reckless, ill-

mannered, and unlit for their places. And it

will encourage those who may suffer insult

and violence at the hands of such servants,

not to retaliate or attempt to become their

own avengers, as is too often done, but to

trust to the law and to the courts of jus-

tice, for the redress of their grievances. It

will say to them, be patient and law-abid-

ing, and your redress shall surely come, and

in such measure as will not add insult to

your previous injury.

On the whole, we cannot doubt that it is

best for all concerned that this verdict be

allowed to stand.

to the latter that the duty of estimating damages is confided. Unless the damages are so\
large ~ to satisfy the court tba.t the verdict
was not the result of an honest exercise of
judgment, they have no right to set It aside. I
A careful examination ot the case tall& to
satisfy us that the jury acted dishonestly, or
that they ma.de any mlstake in their application of the doctrine ot exemplary damages. We have no doubt tha.t the highly pun3
tlve character ot their verdict is owin.r
the !act that, a!ter Jackson's misconduct w
known to the defendants, they still retain
him In their service. The jury undoubtedly
!elt that It wes due to the plalntitT, and due
to every other traveller upon that road, to
have him Instantly discharged; and that toretain him In his place, and thus shield and
protect him against the protestation of the
plaintltT, made to the servant himself at the
time ot the assault, that he would lose his
place, waa a N&etlcal_ratlgcatlon and approval of the servant's con uct,and would
be so understood by him and by every other
servant on the roa.d.
.And when we consider the violent, longcontlnued, and grossly Insulting character of
the lll181lult; that It waa made upon a pereon In feeble health, and WBB accompanied
by langunge so C06.rse, profane, and brutal;
that so tar as appears it was wholly unprovoked; we confess we are amazed at the conduct o! the defendants in not instantly discharging Jack.son. Thus to shield and protect him In his Insolence, deeply Implicated
them lo his guilt. It was such lndUference
to the treatment the 11Iaintltr bad received,
such lndllierence to the treatment that other
travelers might receive, such lndilTerence to
the evil Influence which such an example
would have upon the sen·ants of this and
other lines of public travel, that we are not
prepared to say the jury acted unwisely In
making their verdict highly punitive. We
cannot help feeling that If we should Interfere and set It aside, our action wquld be
most unfortunate and detrimental to the public interests. On the contrary, it we allow lt
to stand, we cannot doubt that Its Influence
will be salutary. It will be an Impressive
lesson to these defendants, and to the managers of other lines of public travel, of the
risk tlley Incur when they retain In their
service servants known to be reckless, Illmannered, and unfit tor their places. And it
will encourage those who may suffer Insult
and violence at the hands of such servants,
not to retaliate or attempt to become their
own a venget'S, as Is too often done, but to
trust to the Jaw and to the courts of justice, !or the redress of their grievances. It
will say to them, be pa.tient and law-abiding, and your redress shall surely come, and
In such measure as will not add Insult to
your previous Injury.
On the whole, we cannot doubt that lt ls
best for 11.ll concemed that this verdict be
allow<'d to stand.

We see nothing In the rulings or charge ot
the presiding Judge, of which the defendants
can justly compla.lu. And there la nothing
to eatlsty us that the jury were prejudiced
or unduly blaaed; or that they made any
mistake either as to the tacts or the law.
Our conclusion, therefore, ls, that the exceptions and motion must be overruled.
Motion and exceptions over:ruled.
APPLETON, 0. J., and DIOKERSON,
BARROWS, and DANFORTH,JJ.,concurred.

TAPLEY, J., did not concur upon the question of damages, and gave his oplnlon a.a follows:
In so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice
WALTON as determines the question ot the
liability of the defendants to answer In damages tor the acts of the brakeman Jackson I
concur; but I do not concur·ln sustaining the
rulings of the court at the trial of the cause
fixing the rule of damage foc the jury; and I
regard It so clearly wrong In principle, Inequitable and unjust in practice, and so entirely wanting In precedent, that my duty requires something more than a silent dissent.
So much of the opinion as discusses the
right ot a jury to give In civil actions punitive damages, I do not propose now to ~
view or express any opinion of or concerning,
but It ls to the application of the rule ma.de
In this case by the justice presiding at the
trial o! the cause. The rulings upon this
matter are happily so clearly expressed and
positive In tei·ms, that no reasonable doubt
concerning the proposition Involved In them
can be entertained. It by .possibility any
doubt could have arisen concerning them, the
opinion he baa drawn in the case sets them
at rest.
The case shows that "on the subject ot
damages the presiding justice Instructed the
jury as follows: It the plalntitT has proved
his case so that he is entitled to recover
some damages, the question arlsc.s howmuch.
That Is a question which you must determine, 'being guided by the rules ot law as I
shall state them to you. In the first place,
the plaintiff Is entitled to such damages as
he haa actually suffered, and In estimating
the amount, you will not be limited to whnt
he bas lost In dollars and cents. In fact,
there Is no evidence that he has sutrcred pecunlarlly to any extent. You are to conslde1·
the injury to his feelings, his wounded pride,
his wounded self-respect, his mental pain
and sutTerlng, occasioned by the assault, and
the feeling of degradation that necessarily
resulted from It. There are few men probably that would not rather sutTer a severe
pecuniary loss than a personal and insulting
assault. Hence If one man should spit In
another's face In public, the jury would not
be limited to ten cents damages on the
ground that that sum would pay him tor
washing his t'nce. A man's feelings, self-respect, and pridt• of charaeter are as much un-
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der the protection of the law in such case as

his property. And in estimating the dam-

ages for a personal assault attended with

opprobrious and insulting language, the jury

have a right to consider the character and

standing of the person assaulted, and the in-

jury to his feelings, as well as the injury to

his person, and then to give him such dam-

ages as. in view of all the circumstances,

will be a just compensation for the injury

actually suffered. This amount must be left,

in every case, to the sound judgment and

discretion of the jury."

Pausing at this point of the ii1sinicli0ns,

we shall notice that they embrace all the el-

ements of compensatory damages recognized

by courts of the most liberal views in thme

matters; and embrace elements which many

courts denominatc exemplary; and they are

stated in so clear and concise a manner, and
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accompanied by so forcible an illustration,

that had they stopped at this point the plain-

tiff might well have expected his verdict to

cover the utmost his injuries would war-

rant. With the rule thus far I am content,

although carrying it to the very verge and

utmost limit of precedent. 1 call attention

to it at this point to show that the jury had,

at this time, instructions which covered all

the tangible and intangible elements of as-

sessment in such cases. Instructions which

if adhered to and followed by the jury re-

store him to the condition in which the as-

saulting party found him, so far as money

can do it. Under these instructions he is to

be made whole in the eyes of the law, just

as if the injury had not been done; in every

particular compensated so far as money can

do it; what is done beyond is not to com-

pensate, it is not to meet mere speculative or

intangible injuries, is not to give him any-

thing due him. for he has his full desert.

These elements reach everything he, as an

individual, can claim by reason of any in-

fringement of his rights.

These instructions having been given, so

full, clear, and liberal, the presiding judge

proceeds to give the next element of damage,

which has not for its basis any injury, inva-

sion of right or privilege, discomfort, incon-

venience, or indeed anything relating to the

plaintiff, or anything in which he has any in-

terest above that possessed by every other

member of the community. It is not act or

deed, word or menace,—these have all been

adjusted; but it is mere motive, thought, in-

terest, and secret desire. Being evil, mor-

ally wrong, somebody must be punished for

their existence, and the judge says:

“There is also another important rule of

law bearing upon the question of damages.

if the injury was wanton, malicious, com-

mitted in reckless and willful disregard of

the rights of the injured party, the law al-

lows the jury to give what is called punitory

or exemplary damages. It blends the inter-

ests of the injured party with those of the

public, and permits the jury not only to give

damages suﬂicient to compensate the plain-

EXl·~~IPLARY

dt•r the prote<:tlou or the law ln such case as
his property. Ami ln estimating the damages for a personal assault _attended with
opprobrious and Insulting language, the jury
have a right to consider the character and
~tandlng of the person aasaulted, and the Injury to his feelings, as well as the Injury to
his 11erson, and then to give him such damages as. In view of all the clrcumatan<.-es,
will be a just compensation for the Injury
actually sutrered. This amount must be left,
in every case, to the sound judgment and
discretion of the jury."
Pausing at this point of the instructions,
we llball notice that they embrace all the elements of compensatory damages recognized
by courts of the most liberal views ln thtWe
matters; and embrace elements which many
CQUrt.8 denominate exemplary; and they are
stated In so clear and concise a manner, and
aCCQlllpanled by l!IO forcible an lllwrtratlon,
that bad they stop{led at this point the plalntitr might well have expected his verdict to
cover the utmost bis Injuries would warrant. With the rule thus far I am content,
although ctllT)'ing lt to the very verge and
utmost limit of precedent. l call attention
to it at this point to show that the jury had,
at this time, Instructions which covered all
the tangible and Intangible elements of usesament In such cl18e& Instructions which
if adhered to and followed by the jury restore him to the condition In which the assaulting party found him, so far as money
can do lt. Under these Instructions he ls to
be made whole In the eyes of the law, just
88 if the Injury bad not been done; ln every
1iartlcular compensated BO far as money can
do It; what la done bevond ls not to compensate, lt is not to meet mere speculative or
Intangible Injuries, ls not to give him anything due him, for be bas lils full desert.
These elements reach everything he, as an
Individual, can clnlm by reason of Hny Infringement of his rights.
These instructions having been given, so
full, clear, and liberal, the presiding judge
11roceeds to give the next element of damage,
which hns not for Its basis any Injury, invasion ot right or privilege, discomfort, inconvenience, or Indeed anything relating to the
plalntltr, or anything In which he has any In·
terest above that possessed by every other
member of the community. It Is not act or
deed, word or ruenace,-these btlve all been
adjusted; but lt ls mere motive, thought, Interest, and eeeret desire. Being evil, morally wrong, somebody must be punished for
their existence, and the judge says:
''There ls also another Important rule ot
law beo1ing upon the question or damages.
If the injury was wanton, niallclous, committed in reckless and willful disregard of
the rights or the Injured party, the law allows the jury to give what ls called punltory
or exemplary damages. It blends the lnter(:tlts of the Injured party with those or the
public, and permits the jury not only to give
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damages sufficient to compensate the plalntl!r, but also to punish the defendants. I
feel lt my duty, however, to say, that you
ought to be very cautious ln the application
of this rule. The law does not re'qulre you
to give exemplary damages In any case, and
where the damages which the plalntltr la entitled to recover lo order to compensate him
for the Injury he has actually suffered ls
sutttclent to punish the defendants, and serve
as a warning and example to others, the jury
ought not to give roorP. But lf they think
It ls not enough, then the law allows them
to add such further sum as will make it
enough for that purpORe. But they should
be careful In fl.xlng the amount not to allow
more than ls just and ree.sonable, and not
to allow their judgment to be swerved by
their passions. Defendants' counsel reqm~t
ed the presiding judge to Instruct the jury,
that the plalntltr is not entitled to recover
against the defendant company, any greater
<lamages than he might against Jackson
himself, for the same cause of action upon
similar evidence. Upon which request the
presiding judge stated to the jury: I decline to gl ve you such Instruction. I ha ,-e
endeavored to give you the correct rnles by
which the damages, lf any, are to be assessed ln this case; and I think you cannot
rightfully be required to enter Into a consideration of the damagetl which a party not
now before the court, and has not therefore
hnd an opportunity to be heard, ought to
pay, and then measure the damages In this
case which has been boord, by those which
you think ought to be just ln another which
has not been heard; we wlll endeavor to decide this case right now, and when Jackson·s
cue comes before us, If lt ever <toes, we will
endeavor to decide that right.
"Defendants' counsel further requested the
presiding judge to Instruct the jury, that lt
the jury find that the acts nnd words of
Jackson were not directly nor Impliedly authorized, nor ratified by the defendants, then
the plnlntlfr Is not ln any event entitled to
recover vindictive damages against the defendants, nor damages In the nature of
smart-money, which request was not complied with, the presiding judge having already Instructed the jury upon what state
of facts the plnlntltr would be entitled to
such damages."
I have copied all the Instructions "on the
subject of damages." It will be seen toot
these latter Instructions are substantially
that the jury having given full compensatory damag<'I~, may give others ln their dis·
cretlon to punish these defendants for the
wanton, willful, and malicious act of their
brakeman ln assaulting a passenger, although they neither directly nor impliedly authorized or ratified the act.
This proposition must be sustained, lf at
all, upon one of two grounds; either that It
ls competent to punish one man for the crhnlnal Intent of another, or that the malice of
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the brakcman in this case was that of the de-

fendant corporation.

A brief notice of some of the authorities

touching the liability of the master for the

acts of his servant will, I think, show the

ground of liability, the reason for the rule,

and exhibit a marked distinction between the

ordinary case of master and servant and the

case at bar.

In 2 Dane, Abr. c. 59, art. 2, it is said:

“The master is not liable for the willful,

voluntary, or furious act of his servant."

“If my servant distrain a horse lawfully by

my order, and then use him, this conversion

is his act, and trover lies against him; for

my order extends only to distraining the

horse, and not to using him; this is his own

act." - >

“Nor is the master bound for the volun-
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tary acts of his servants; for if he be bound,

servants may ruin their masters by willful

acts; nor are willful acts, wrongs author-

ized by their masters."

“If I order my servant to do what is law-

ful, and he does more, he only is liable; it

is his own act, otherwise he might ruin me,

and in such case there can be no express or

implied command from me for what he does

beyond his orders; and whenever the ques-

tion is how far-the master is liable for his

servant's acts, the material inquiry must be,

how far he expressly or impliedly author-

ized it."

“The master is liable for the negligent act

of his servant, but not for his willful wrong;

is liable in trover; for which rule several

reasons may be given: (1) A willful wrong

is the servant's own act. (2) To allow him

by his willful tortious act to bind his master

and subject him to damages, would be to al- '

low servants a, power to ruin their masters.

(3) In such cases there is no command from

the master expressed or implied to do a will-

ful wrong."

In 4 Bac. Abr. tit. “Master and Servant,"

it is said: “The master must also answer

for torts, and injuries done by his servant

in the execution of his authority. But

though a master is answerable for damages

occasioned by the negligence or unskillful-

ness of his servant acting in the execution of

his orders, yet he is not answerable in tres-

pass for the willful act of his servant done

in his absence, and without his direction or

assent."

Chancellor Kent says: “The master is on-

ly answerable for the fraud of his servant

while he is acting in his business, and not

for fraudulent or tortious acts, or misconduct ‘

in those things which do not concern his duty

to his master, and which when he commits,

he steps out of the course of his service.

But it was considered in l\IcManus v.

Cricket, 1 East, 106, to be a question of great

concern and of much doubt and uncertainty,

whether the master was answerable in dam-

ages for an injury willfully committed by

his servant while in the performance of his
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the brakeman ln this case was that of the de- master's business, without the direction or
assent of the master. The court of K. B.
fendant corporation.
A brief notice of some of the authorltles went Into an ex.amlnation of all the authoritouching the liability of the master for the ties, and after much discussion and great
acts of his servant will, I think, show the consideration, with a view to put the quesground of liability, the reason for the rule, tion at rest, it was decided that the master
and a..xhlhlt a marked distinction between the was not liable in trespass for the wlllful act
orrlinary cnse of master and servant and the ot his servant in driving his master's carriage against another, without his master·s
case at bnr.
In 2 Dane, Abr. c. 59, art_ 2, It ls satd: direction or assent. 'fhe court considered
"The nmster ls not liable tor the willful, that when the servant quitted sight of tbe
voluntary, or furious act of his servant." object for which he was employed, and with"It my servant dlstraln a horse lawfully. by out having In view his master·s orders, pm·my 01·der, and then use him, this conversion eued the object which hie own malice sugls his act, and trover lies against him; for gested, he- no longer acted In pursuance or
my order extends only to dlstralnlng the the authority given him, and lt wns deemed
horse, and not to using him; this ls his own so far a wlllful abandonment of his master's.
business. This case has received the sane"
act."
"Nor Is the master bound for the volun• tlon of the supreme court of l\lnsl!llchueetts
tary acts of bis servants; for If he be bound, and New York, on the ground that there was
servants mny min their masters by willful no authority from the master expre11s or Imacts; nor are wlllful nets, wrongs author- plied, and the servant in that act was not In ·
the employment of bis master."
'
ized by their masters."
In Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343, Cowen,
"It I order my servant to do what ls lawful, and he does more, be only ls liable; It J., who gave the opinion of the court, says:
ls his own act, otherwise be might ruin me, "It the act was willful, the master le no more
ancl In such case there can be no express or liable than It his servant had committed any
hnplled command from me for what he does other assault and bnttery. All the cases
beyond his orders; and wheneve1· the ques- agree that a man ls not liable to1· the willful
tion Is how far · the maste1· ls liable for hie . mischief of his servant, though be be at the
servant's acts, the material Inquiry must be, i time In other respects engaged In the se1·vlce
how far he exprei,;iely or Impliedly author- ' ot the former." After citing several cases
he ad<ls: "Why ls a. master chargeable tor
ized lt."
'"Ibe wa.s ter ls liable for the negligent act the act of his servant? Because what a man
ot his servant, but not for his willful wrong; does by another he does by himself. The act
ls liable In trover; for which rule several ls not within the scope of his agency." He
reasons may be given: · (1) A willful wrong says: "The authorities deny that when the
ls the servant's own act.- (2) To allow him servant willfully drives over the man, he It<
by his willful tortlous act to bind his master In his master's business. They held It a de,nd subject him to damages, would be to al- parture, and going Into the servant's own Inlow servants a. power to ruin their masters. dependent business."
(3) In such cases the1·e ls no command from
In Turnpike Co. v. Yanderbllt, 1 Hill, 4811,
the master expressed or Implied to do a will- case of a collision of steamboats, the suful wroug."
preme court held that if the collision was
In 4 Bae. Abr. tit. "Master aud Servant," willful on the part of the defendant's servIt ls said: "The master must also answer ant, the defendant was not liable, referrin~
for torts, and injul"les done by his servant to 'V1·ight v. Wilcox. The case afterwar<I
ln the execution of his autho11ty. But went to the court of appeals (2 Com. 479)
though a master ls answerable for damages where the doctrine applied In the supreme
occasioned by the negUgence or unskillful- court was sanctioned; and It was further
ness of hie servant acting In the execution ot held that the corporation was not liable, alhis orders, yet he le not answerable In tres- though the wlllful act producing · the injury
pass for the willful act of his servant done wa.s authorized and sanctioned by the presiIn hie absence, and without his direction or dent and general agent thereof; because a
assent."
general or special agent, when be commits o-r
Chancello1· Kent says: "The master Is on- orders a willful trespass to be committed,
ly answerable tor the tmud of his servant acts without the scope of his authority.
while he ls acting In his business, nnd not
In Hibbard v. Rallrnad Co., 15 N. Y. 455,
for fraudulent or tortlous acts, or misconduct which was "an action against the corporaIn those things which do not concern his duty tion for ejecting a pai;iseuger from the cars,
to his master, and which when he commits, who, having once exhibited bis ticket, rebe steps out ot the course of his service. fused so to do when again requested by the
But It was considered In McMnnus v. conductor," Brown, J., In giving his opinion
Cricket, 1 East, 106, to be a question of great says, speaking of a requested Instruction
concern and of much doubt and uncertainty, concerning damages, "the object of the rewhether the master was answerable In dam- quest was, that the court should discriminate
ages for an injury wlllfully committed by between those acts of the company's agent
his serrnut while In the performance of his done In the execution of its directions, amf
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those done in the excess of its instructions

and without authority or approbation. This

I think should have been done. The plaintiff

may have been injured by the use of unnec-

essary force to effect what the company had

a right to do. The conductor and those who

aided him are not the company. They are

its agents and servants, and, whatever tor-

tious acts they commit by its direction, it is

responsible for and no other. This is upon

the principle that what one does by another

he does by himself. For injuries resulting

from the carelessness of the servant in the

performance of his master's business the lat-

ter is liable. But for the willful acts of the

servant the master is not responsible, be-

cause such willful acts are a departure from

the master's business ;" and cites the case of

Wright v. Wilcox, and cases there cited.
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In the same case Comstock, J., says: “If

the conductor had no right to eject the plain-

tiff from the train after he had complied with

the request and produced the ticket, then I

do not see upon what principle the defendants

can be made liable for the wrong. The reg-

ulation and instructions to the conductor, as

we have said, were lawful, and they did not

in their terms or construction profess to jus-

tify the trespass and eviction. The result is,

the wrong was done without any authority,

and, therefore, that those who actually did it

are alone -gdanswerable." “If he mistook the

authority conferred upon him both when he

committed the trespass and when he was ex-

amined as a witness, it cannot alter the law

or change the rights of the parties. His own

mistake as to the extent of his powers cannot

make the railroad company liable for acts not

in fact authorized." These cases are all cited

in a subsequent case. Weed v. Raih-oad Co.,

17 N. Y. 362.

The rule is thus stated in Story, Ag. § 456:

“But although the principal is liable for the

torts and negligence of his agents, yet we are

to understand the doctrine with its just limi-

tations, that the tort or negligence occurs in

the course of the agency For the principal

is not liable for the torts or negligences of

his agent in matters beyond the scope of the

agency unless he has subsequently adopted

them for his use or beneﬁt. Hence it is that

the principal is never liable for the unauthor-

ized, the willful, or the malicious act or tres-

pass of his agent."

lilr. Hilliard, in his work on Torts, says:

“In general, a master is liable for the fault

or negligence of his servant; but not for his

willful wrong or trespass. The injury must

arise in the course of the execution of some

service lawful in itself, but negligently or un-

skilifully performed, and not be a wanton vio-

latlon of law by the servant, although occu-

pied about the business of his employer." Hil.

Torts, c. 40.

In Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592, Met-

calf, J., says: “But the act of a servant is

not the act of a master even in legal intend-

ment or effect unless the master personally di-

AND

th08e done In the excess of Its Instructions
and without authority or approbation. This
I think should have been done. The plalntUr

may hnve been Injured by the use of unnec·
essary force to effect what the company bad
a right to do. The conductor and those who
aided him are not the company. 'They are
Its agents and sen-nnts, and, wlmtevc1· tor·
tious acts they commit by Its direction, lt Is
responsible for and no other. This Is upon
the principle that what one does by another
he does by himself. !<'or Injuries resulting
from the carelessness or the servant In the
performance of his master's business the latter Is Hable. But !or the willful acts of the
Rervant the master le not respom1ible, be·
cam;e such willful acts are a departure from
the master's business;" and cites the case or
Wright v. Wilcox, and cases there cited.
In the same case Comstock, J., says: "If
the conductor bad no right to eject the plalntitr from the train after he bad complied with
the request and produced the ticket, then I
do not see upon whnt principle the defemL'lnts
can be made liable for the wrong. The reg·
ulation and Instructions to the conductor, ns
we have said, were lawful, and they did not
in their terms or construction profess to justlfy the trespass and eviction. The result le,
the wrong was done without any authority,
nnd, therefore, that those who actually did It
are alone .,_,answerable." "It he mistook tbe
authority conferred upon him both when he
committed the trespass and when he was examined as a witness, It cannot alter the law
or change the rights of the parties. Hie own
mistake as to the extent or his powers cannot
make the railroad company liable tor acts not
In !act authorized." These cases are all cited
In a subsequent case. Weed v. Railroad Co.,
17 N. Y. 362.
The rule le thus stated In Story, Ag. I 456:
"But although the principal ls liable for the
torts and negllgence or his agents, yet we are
to understand the doctrine with Its just llml·
tatlons, that the tort or negligence occurs In
the course of the agency / For the principal
le not liable tor the torts or negligences of
his agent In matters beyond the scope of the
agency unless he has subsequently adopted
them for his use or benefit. Hence It Is that
the principal Is never liable ror the unauthorized, the willl'nl, or the mnlicious act or tres11ass of bis agent."
llr. Hilliard, In bis work on Torts, says:
"In general, a master ls llnble for the fault
or negligence of his servnnt; but not tor hie
wlllful "Tong or trespnss. The Injury must
arise In the course or the execution or some
service lawful In Itself, but negligently or un·
skillfully performed, and not be a wanton violation or law by the servant, although occupied about the business of hie employer." HU.
Torts, c. 40.
In Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592, Met·
calf, J., says: "But the act ot a servant Is
not the act of a master even In legal lntendment or effect unless the master personally di-
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rects or subsequently adopts It. In other cases, he ls liable for the acts of bis servant
when liable nt all, not as If the act were done
by himself, but because the law makes him
answerable therefor. He ls liable, says Lord
Kenyon, 'to make compensation for the dam·
age consequential for his employing or an unsklllful or negligent servant.' " 1 East, 108.
Of this latte1· class or cases, Story says:
"In every such case the principal holds out
his agent as competent and fit to be trusted;
and thereby, In etrect, he warrants bis ftdellty
and good conduct In all the matters of the
agency." Story, Ag. § 452.
In Southwick v. Estes, 7 Cush. 385, Dewey,
J., Instructed the jury "that If the act of the
servant were not done negligently but willfully with the intention of disregarding the directions of the master, he would not be responsible therefor." This Instruction was held
correct, and the case of McManus v. Crlckett
was cited by the court.
In Railroad Co. v. Langley, 21 How. 202,
l\lr. Justice Campbell In delivering the opinion of the court snys, "the result of the cruies
is that tor acts done by the agents of a corporation either In contractu or In dellcto In .the
course or Its bus!ness and of their employment, the corporation ls respotJslble as an lndlvldual ls responsible unde1· similar circumstances."
In Weed v. Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 362, this
rule was lnYoked to relieve the defendants
from the consequences or the willful act or the
conductor In the detention or a train whereby a
pa88enger was made sick and sutrered permanent injury In her health. Strong, J., In delivering the opinion or the court sa.ys: "The defendants Insist that they are not liable for the
willful act of the conductor followed by such
a result; and they Invoke, In support of their
position, the rule, well sustained by principle
and authority, that a master ls not liable for
a willful trespass or bis servant." He then
proceeds to say: "It ls Important, therefore,
to Inquire whether that rule extends to a case
like the present, and for that purpose to con·
elder the basis on which it ls founded. 'l'be
reason or the rule clearly appears by the cases In which It bas been declared and applied."
He then examines many of the cases where
the rule has been stated and applied, and cite'!
also Story, Ag. 5 456, and then says: "All
tbc cases on the subject, so far as I have observed, agree In i·cgard to the principle of the
rule, and also In limiting the rule to that prln·
clple. For acts of an agent within bis authority, the principal is liable, but not for
willful acts without his authority." Uallroad
Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 4G8. lie then proeeetls.
In reference to the case then under consideration, to say: "In the light of this examlna·
tion of the class of cases which bas been considered, It cannot fail to be seen that there
ls an Important dllference between those cases and the one before the court. The former
are cases or willful, unauthorl7.ed, wrong'ful
acts by agents, unapproved by their princl·

COMPENSATORY AND EXE:\IPLAUY DAM.\GES.

44 GOMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DA.\IAGES.

t_,

pals, occasioning damage, but which do not

involve nor work any omission or violation

of duty by their principals to the persons in-

jured; wrongs by the agents only with which

the principals are not legally connected. In

the present case, by means of the wrongful,

willful detention by the conductor, the obli-

gation assumed by the defendants, to carry

the wife with proper speed to her destination,

was broken. The real wrong to the wife in

this case, and from which the damage pro-

ceeded, was the not carrying her in a reason-

able time to Aspinwall as the defendants had

undertaken to do, and this was a wrong of

the defendants unless the law excused them

for their delay on account of the misconduct

of their agent." In the conclusion of his dis-

cussion he says, the rule of law, relied on by

the defendants to sustain their position, is in-
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applicable to the case, and that it makes no

difference whether the act was willful or neg-

ligent as to the liability of the defendants for

a nonfulﬂliment of their contract. From an

examination of these authorities, I think it

will be found that the principal is liable for

the act of his agent in three classes of cases:

I. Where the act is done by the previous

command of the principal, or is subsequently

ratiﬁed or adopted by him.

This command may appear from proof of

speciﬁc directions, or implied from the circum-

stances of the case.

II. Where the agent negligently, nnskillful-

ly or otherwise improperly performs the du-

ties pertaining to his employment.

IIII Where the act of the agent has caused

the breach of a contract, or prevented the pe1-

formance of an obligation due from, and ex-

isting between, the principal and a third per-

son.

The liability, in the ﬁrst class of cases, rests

solely upon the maxim, "Qui facit per alinm

facit per se;" and in no other cases is he liable

as an actor, but in those cases where he has

commanded the act or subsequently ratiﬁed it,

which is regarded in law as a previous com-

mand.

The authorities, ancient and modern, are be-

lieved to be uniform upon this proposition, and

wherever a liability attaches for an unauthor-

ized act, it is founded upon some other rea-

son.

In the second class the agent is held out as

competent and ﬁt to be trusted (by the prin-

cipal), and he, in effect, warrants his ﬁdelity

and good‘ conduct in all the matters of the

agency; by reason of this, as Lord Kenyon

says, he becomes liable “to make compensa-

tion for the damage consequential for his em-

ploying of an unskiiiful or negligent servant."

As to whether this warranty covers the willful

tortious acts of the agent while engaged in and

about the master's business, the authorities do

not all agree. Some hold that as soon as the

act becomes a willful trespass, the master is

no longer liable; others hold that for acts done

in the course of his employment the master

is responsible whatever may be the animus of

pals, occasioning damage, but which do not the actor. A review of the authorities, touchinvolve nor wprk any omission or violation ing this question, will be found in the case ot.
of duty by their principals to the persons in- Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind.
jured; wrongs by the agents only with which
The liability, In the third claBB of casee,
the principals are not legally connected. In rests not upon the lawfulness or unlawfulthe present case, by means of the wrongful, ness of the act done by the agent, but as
willful detention by the conductor, the obli- grounded upon the failure of the principal
gation assumed by the defendants, to can-y to perform a contract or fulfill an obllgatlon
the wife with proper speed to her destination, with the party Injured. In this class of
was broken. The real wrong to the wife ln cases it matters not whether the act be a
thi8 case, and from which the damage pro- "wlllful treepaBS" or not: whether It wu
ceeded, was the not carrying her ln a reason- done In the course of the employment of the
n ble time to Aspinwall as the defendants bad servant is Immaterial; lf the act produces
undertaken to do, and this was a wrong of the breach of the contract, or causes a fallthe defendants unless the law excused them ure to fulfill the existing obligation, the llafor their delay on account ot the misconduct blllty to answer attaches. The gravamen of
ot their agent." In the conclusion of his dls- the charge le not that the agent has done
cuealon be says, the rule of law, relied on by this or that act, but that the principal bas
the defendants to sustain their position, ls ln· not fulfilled his agreement.
appllcable to the case, and that It makes no
That the case at bar comes within this
dltrerenre whether the act was willful or neg- class of cases I think there can be no doubt,
ligent as to the liability of the defendants tor and the liability of the defendants ls well
a nonfuUl.llment of their contract. From an placed upon those grounds, by Mr. Justice
examination of these authorities, I think. lt WALTON, and could be sustained upon no
will be found that the principal 11 liable tor other.
the act of bis agent In three cla88e8 ot cases:
In the light of these authorities and deI. Where the act Is done by the prevloUI cisions, ancient and modem, emanating from
command of the principal, or ls 8llbsequently courts of the highest jurisdiction, character,
, mtlfied or adopted by him.
and ability, what ls the true rule of dami
This command may appear from proof of ages In the case at bar? Or, putting the
! specific directions, or implied from the circum- question ln a more pertinent form, were the
defendants liable to punltory damages, eueh
stances of the case.
II. Where the agent negligently, tlD8kllltul- as "ls sumclent to punish the defendants
ly or otherwise improperly performs the du- and serve aa a warning and example to
ties pertaining to hie employment.
others."
IIL Where the act of the agent bas caused
U the a.cl ..of .J.a.ckrmn was a willful, wanthe breach of a contract, or prevented the per~ ton.. an.a __jU/lllcloue --trespass upon his part.
formance of an obligutlon due from, and ex- llD.t:J_ was_ J;lelther directly DUI' tmp1ledly auisting between, the principal and a third per- thorized or ratlfted by the defendants, -the
son.
act WllB neither In fact nor legal lntendment
The llabillty. lo the first class of cases, rests the net of the defendantR. This ls quite
&Jlely upon the maxim, "Qui tacit per alium clear from reason and authority. Although
tacit per se;" and In no other ca.~ Is he llnble It may be one which devolved upon them n
as au actor, but In those ca!Jes wht>re be has llablllty, It Is In no sense their act; so that.
commanded the act or subsequently ratified It, if ordinarily the malice of the acting agent
which ls regarded ln law as a previous com- was so Inseparably connected with the act
that It would attach to the principal, nolens
mand.
The authorities, ancient and modern, are be- volens, in those cases where, by legal lnlieved to be uniform upon this proposition, and tendment, lt was his, the prlnclpal's act, In
wherever a Jlablllty attaches tor an unauthor- this case 1t would not, It being neither In
ized act, lt is founded upon some other rea- act or legal lntendment the act of the defendants.
son.
'J'l1e requested Instruction clearly presentIn the second class the agent ls held out ns
competent and fit to be trusted (by the prin- ed the proposition that unless the act was
cipal), and he, ln etrect, wnrro.nts his fidelity authorized directly or impliedly, or subsea nil good conduct In all the matters of the quently ratified by the defendants, they
ugcney; by reason of this, as Lord Kenyon could not be chargeable with the motive and
says, he becomes liable "to mnke compensa- intent of the actor. This was refused and
tion for the damage consequential for his em· the rule left, that, regardless of authorizaploying of an unskillful or negligent servant." tion or ratification, they might be punished
As to whether this warranty covers the willful for the willful, wanton, and malicious acts
tortlous acts of the agent while engaged In and of Jackson.
The ruling, It Is apparent, extends to caeee
about the master's business, the authorities do
not nil agree. Some hold that as soon as the not within the ftrst class, and the result of
act becomes a willful trespass, the master ls placing It In either ot the other classes ls to
no longer llable; others hold that tor acts done punish one tor the mallce ot another. To
in the course of his employment the master relieve the case from this difficulty an efIs responsible whaten~r may be the anlmua of fort ls made to make corporations an excep-
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tion to the rule, although all the authorities,

whether found in elementary treatises or

judicial decisions, place them upon the same

footing. The idea put forward seems to be,

that the servant is the corporation. In order,

however, that the position may certainly

stand as it is made, and the argument pro-

ceed upon no erroneous deductions of mine,

I quote: “A corporation is an imaginary be-

ing. It has no mind but the mind of its

servants; it has no voice but the voice of

its servants, and it has no hands with which

to act but the hands of its servants. All its

schemes of mischief, as well as its schemes

of public enterprise, are conceived by hu-

man minds and executed by human hands,

and those minds and hands are its minds

and hands. All attempts, therefore, to dis-

tinguish between the guilt of the servant

and the guilt of the corporation; or the
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malice of the servant and the malice of the

corporation; or the punishment of the serv-

ant and the punishment of the corporation is

‘sheer nonsense,' and only tends to confuse

the mind and confound the judgment."

In relation to this proposition one inquiry

may be made, viz.: Have these servants no

“minds," no “hands," and no "schemes" ex-

cept those of the corporation? Are all their

schemes, all their acts, and all the emana-

tions of their minds those of the corporation?

If they have any other, shall the corpora-

tion be punished for them?

Does not the argument attach a respon-

sibility to the corporation for all the acts of

a person in its employ? If it does not,

where is the dividing line? It is all, or part.

What part? This is the question which law-

writers and judges have been answering for

many years, and whether, in the estimation

of any, it be or not “sheer nonsense," they

have distinguished between those acts of

the agent for which the corporation is, and

those for which it is not liable.

What its “volce" commands, what its

“bands" do, and the “schemes" which it ex-

ecutes, it should be and is held responsible

for, whether done by direct or implied au-

thority or subsequently ratiﬁed by them;

and when they do this in wanton and will-

ful disregard of the rights of others, they

may, under the law as now administered,

be punished by punitive damages.

But when the ‘‘voice'' which speaks, and

the "hand" which executes, is not that of

the principal, however wanton, willful, and

malicious it may be, the “stones," even, “cry

out" against inﬂicting upon him a punish-

ment therefor, and the more wanton and

malicious the act, the more horrible is the

doctrine.

Corporations are but aggregated individ-

uals acting through the agency of man.

They may consist of a single individual, or

more, and they are no more ideal beings

when thus acting than the individual thus

acting. For certain acts the individual,

though not manually engaged in it, is held

responsible. For the same acts the body of

tlon to the rule, although all the authorltlee,
whether found in elementary tre&tlses or
Judicial decisions, place them upon the same
footing. The Idea put forward seems to be,
that the servant ls the corporation. In order,
however, that the position may certainly
stand aa 1t ls made, and the argument proceed upon no erroneous deductions of mine,
I quote: "A corporation ls an Imaginary being. It has no mind but the mind of Its
servants; It has no voice but the voice of
its servants, and It has no hands with which
to act but the hands of Its servants. All Its
schemes of mischief, as well as Its schemes
of public enterprise, are conceived by human minds and executed by human hands,
and thoee minds and hands are Its minds
and hands. All attempts, therefore, to distinguish between the guilt of the servant
and the guilt of the corporation; or the
malice of the servant and the malice of the
corporation; or the punishment of the serv·
ant and the punishment of the corporation Is
'sheer nonsense,' and only tends to confuse
the mind and confound the judgment."
In relation to this proposition one Inquiry
may be made, viz.: Have these servants no
"minds," no "hands," and no "schemes" except those of the corporation? Are all their
schemes, all their acts, and all thP- emana·
tions of their minds those of the corporation?
It they have any other, shall the corporation be punished for them?
Does not the argument attach a responslbillty to the corporatton for all the acts of
a person in Its employ? If It does not,
where ls the dividing line? It ls all, or part.
What part? This ls the question which lawwriters and judges have been answering for
many years, and whether, In the estlmatlon
of any, It be or not "sheer nonsense," they
have distinguished between those acts of
the agent for which the corporation ls, and
those for which It ls not liable.
\\'hat Its "voice" commands, what Its
''hands" do, and the "ll<'herues" which It executes, It should be and ls held responsible
tor, whether done by direct or Implied authority or subsequently ratified by them;
and when they do this lo wanton and wlllCnl disregard of the rights of others, they
may, under the law as now administered,
be punished by punitive damages.
But wllen the "voice" which speaks, and
the "hand" wl1lcli executes, ls not that of
the principal, however wanton, wlllful, and
malidous It may be, the "stones," even, "cry
out" against inflicting upon him a punishment therefor, and the more wanton nod
mnllclous the act, the more horrible ls the
doctrine.
Corporations are but aggregated lndlvld·
nals acting through the agen<'y of man.
They may consist of a single lndlvldnal, or
mor.-, and they are no more Ideal beings
when thu.s acting than the Individual thus
acting. For certain acts the lndh·ldual,
tltough not manually engnged in It, ls held
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reeponslble. For the Mme acts the body or
Individuals, denominated a corporation, are
held responsible. The principal and agent,
In both cases, are separate and Independent
beings. Agents presuppoee a principal,somebody to act for. somebody whose or·
ders they are to execute, and somebody for
whom they are to perform service; somebody who ls answerable to them, and wbo
may be answerable for the acts done under
their direction. Mr. Justice Brown, In Hibbard v. Railroad Co., before cited, says, "The
conductor and those who aided him are not
the company;. they are Its agents and servants." It the employee and set"Vaot ls the
corporation, In fact or legal lntendment, it
does not act through agents. Its acts arc
all the direct acts of principals without the
Intervention of any other power, and It carries us back to a responslblllty for all the
acts of a person employed by a corporation,
whether those acts have any relation to his
particular employment or not, a proposition
too absurd and monstrous In Its results to be
entertained at all. Mr. Justice Cnmpbell, In
gl vlng the opinion of the supreme court of
the United States, In the case before cited
(21 How. 202), says, the result of the cases Is
that for acts done In the course of Its business and of their employment "the corporation ls responsible, as an Individual ls responsible, under shnllar circumstances."
I, therefore, come to the conclusion that if
liable at all to be punished for the malice
of Jackson, It must be upon some oth•!L'
ground tluin their legal identity with hhu,
and that In no sense can bis mnllce be said
to be their malice; and there seems to be
strong Indications in the charge of the presiding judge, that be, at that time, placed It
upon no such grounds. The defemlllnts, in
view of this assumption by the plalntltf, "requested the presiding judge to Instruct the
jury that the plalntttr ls not entitled to recover against the defendant company any
greater damages than he might recover
against Jackson himself, for the snrue cause
of action upon similar evidence." This instruction the court decllncd to give, and rl'mark"ed to the jury, "I think you cannot
rlg}\tfully be required to enter into a consh1·
emtlon of the damages which a party, not
now before the court, and has not, therefore,
had an opportunity to be heard, ought to pay,
and then measure the damages fn this case
which has been heard by those which you
think might be just In another case which
l•as not been heard. We will endeavor to
decide this case right now, and when Jackson's case comes before us, lf It ever does,
we wlll endeavor to decide that right."
I think the argument ls very strong from
this remark, that It was not the malice arnl
ill-will of Jackson that was designed to be
punished, for he says his case has not been
heard. The court say, sul>stnntlnlly, we
know not what excuses or justllkatlon he
may olTer when hfard, if eve1·, "and when
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his case comes before us, lf ever it does, we

will endeavor to decide that right." One

would suppose that it was some “wanton.

malicious act, committed in reckless and will-

ful disregard of the rights of the injured par-

ty," by these defendants that was to receive

such punishment as should “serve a warning

and example to others," and not such an act

done by Jackson. The argument would seem

to proceed and say Jackson, for his act, may

deserve one punishment, and those defend-

ants, for their acts, may deserve another;

and I cannot well forbear the inquiry here,

if there is not here some evidence of an “at-

tempt to distinguish between the guilt of

the servant and the guilt of the corporation;

or the malice of the servant, and the malice

of the corporation; or the punishment of the

, servant, and the punishment of the corpora-

tion?" Was it here that “sheer nonsense"
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was enacted, and “the mind confused," and

the “judgment confounded"?

If it was the maiiclous act of the defend-

ants that was to be punished, the enormity

of Jackson's wrong had indeed nothing to do

with it. If it was the malicious wrong of

Jackson that was to be punished, why should

a party, innocent of all wrong in the matter,

be punished more than the wrong-doer him-

self. If he was the corporation, why would

not all the acts of extenuation and jl.tstiﬁ('il-

tion surrounding him be also the acts of the

corporation, and be proper elements to be

considered in graduating or ﬁxing the pen-

alty? How could his case come before us, if

he was the corporation? Would it be to be

punished for the act of the corporation?

D.‘ we hold both guilty and both liable, it

must be founded upon the idea of two actors,

and that the employee is not only the corpo

ration but somebody else, and the nonentity

of agent becomes itself a nonentity, and in-

stead of a mere imaginary thing which swal-

lows up and extinguishes all the relations of

principal and agent, and renders any attempt

to distinguish between them “sheer non-

sense," we do have two distinct, independent,

accountable subjects, susceptible of being

brought before the courts to answer and be

punished, and we are not left to the ideal ac-

-tion of punishing an ideal existence. Again;

if the actor is brought before the court and

punished, would he be punished for the act

of the corporation or his own act? for the

malice of the corporation, or his own malice?

If imprisoned, should we say the corporation

was imprisoned?

If not, and he is (as undoubtedly he may

be) called to answer for an assault, and pun-

ished for an assault, when we come to ﬁx the

punishment, do we not distinguish between

his guilt and the guilt of the corporation, his

malice and the malice of the corporation?

And when the rule is required that we pun-

ish him in the same manner and to the same

extent as the corporation, should we not reply

very much as did the presiding judge at the

trial? I think there can be no two opinions

‘ cases say, no.

will endeavor to decide that right.'' One
would suppose that it was some "wanton,

malicious act, committed ln reckless and willful disregard of the rights of the Injured party," by these defendants that was to receive
sueh i>unlshment as should "serve a warning
nnd example to others," and not such an net
done by Jnckson. '.fhe argument would seem
to proc~ and say Jackson, for his net, may
deserve one punishment, and those defendants, for their nets, may deserve another;
and I cannot well forbear the Inquiry here,
if there ls not here some evidence of an "attempt to distinguish between the guilt of
the servant and the guilt·of the corporation;
or the malice of the servant, and the malice
of- the co1·poratlon; or the punishment of the
servant, and the punishment of the corpora·
tion?" Was lt here that "sheer nonsense"
was enacted, and "the mind confused," and
the '"judgment confounded"?
It lt was the malicious act of the defendants that was to be punished, the enormity
of Jackson's wrong bad Indeed nothing to do
with it. If It was the mnllcious wrong of
Jackson that was to be punished, why should
a party, innocent of all wrong In the matter,
be punished more than the wrong-doer himself. If he was the corpo1'1ltlon, why would
not nil the nets of extenuation and justification surrounding him be also the nets of the
co11>0ra tlon, and be proper elements to be
considered In graduating or fixing the penalty? How could his case come before us, if
he was the corporation? Would it be to be
punished for the act of the corporation?
It we hold both guilty and both liable, ft
must be founded upon the Idea of two actors,
and that the employee ls not only the corporation but somebody else, and the nonentity
of agent becomes itself a nonentity, and In·
stead of a mere Imaginary thing which swallows up and extinguishes all the relations of
principal and agent, and renders any attempt
to distinguish between them "sheer non·
sense," we do have two distinct, Independent,
accountable subjects, susceptible of being
brought before the courts to answer and be
punished, and we are not left to the ideal ac·tlon of punishing an Ideal existence. Again;
If the actor Is brought before the court and
punished, would be be punished for the :ict
of the corporation or his own net? for the
malice of the corporation, or his own malice'!
If imprisoned, sllould we say the corporation
was imprisoned?
If not, n.nd he Is (as undoubtedly he may
be) called to answer for an assnult, and punished for an assault, when we come to fix the
punishment, do we not distinguish between
his guilt and the guilt of the corporation, his
malice and the malice of the corporation?
And when the rule Is required that we punish him In the same manner and to the same
extent as the corporation, should we not reply
very much as did the presiding judge at th~
trial? l think there can be no two Ol'lnions

about the matter, and that there ls manifestly
a distinction between the two, and that there
are two to distinguish between, and that
when the act Is authorized by any previous
command or subsequent adoption, It Is not,
and cannot In the nature of things be made
the act of another than the actor. Laws may
be made making others responsible therefor,
but it Is the net of him who does it, and not
of him who neither does nor authorizes it;
and no amount of judicial legislation or refinement can make It so; as before remarked,
It Is not possible In the nature of things.
Again, if this servant ls the corporation,
what becomes of the law regulating the liability of the principal for an Injury received
by an employee while In the business of the
co1·poratlon. It Is held, that If the lnjmy
was produced by the cnrelessneBB or negligence of the master or corporation, they must
respond in damages; but If produced by the
act of a fellow-servant, they are not liable.
Is not here a distinction recognized between
the guilt of the servant and the guilt of the
corporation? Is not here a manifest distinction noted and acted upon between the servant and corporation? lf the servant ls the
corporation, It is the act of the corporation
when done by the fellow-servant. But these
cases say, no. You assume the risks arising
from the acts of your fellow-servants, but
not the nets of your principal, the corporation; when the corporation ls negligent you
may recover, but when It Is the servant, you
cannot. Again, I ask, how can this be, If the
servant Is the corporation? This new Idea,
It appears to me, has In It more of Ingenuity
than logic or substance; it Is altogether Ideal,
and If It finds place In the law, It will be
among Its fictions.
The learned judge then adds, "And It might
as well not be applled to them at all, as to
limit Its application to cases where the servant Is directly and specially directed by the
corporation to maltreat and Insult a passenger, or to cases where such an act is directly
and specifically ratified; for no such cases
wlll ever occur." The instruction requested
and refused, used the te1·w directly or "impliedly," and with this sentence so amended,
I have simply to say, that if no such case
ever does occur, there Is no occasion, right,
or propriety In Inflicting the punishment. If
the act Is neither directly nor Impliedly authorized or rntllled, there is hf it no wantonnl>s8.
no malice, and no ill-will towal'd the person
Injured, and no public wrong by them dolll!
to be redressed or atoned for. Repentance
with them ls absolutely Impossible. The m··
_g_~pient Is sl01_ply .thl.a: If . we-do not punlall
you- when you do not directly .JlL.ltµplle..9,tt,
jl.llthor1ze or adop~ a wro,ng, we llhall neve..have an opportunity, tor you never will~
authorize or adopt one. 'l'he argument is
clearly stated by the learned judge, and I
leave It as he left it, remarking, that If the
end to be attained ls the punishment of railroad corporations whether &'UlltY or Innocent,
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the rule requiring them ﬁrst to be guilty of

wrong had better be abolished.

That the learned judge meant to state his

argument thus, is, I think, apparent from the

remark which immediately follows: “that if

those who are in the habit of thinking that

it is a terrible hardship to punish an inno-

cent corporation for the wickedness of its

agents and servants, will for a moment reﬂect

upon the absurdity of their own thoughts,

their anxiety will be cured."

In Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70, the

court say: “Nor will sound policy maintain

the application of a rule to railways or cor-

porations on this subject, which shall not be

alike applied to others, as has been intimated

in some quarters. The suggestion is not lit

to be made, much less sanctioned, in any tri-

bunal pretending to adminis(er justice impar-

tiaily."
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in another case it is said: "The law lays

down the same rule for all, and we cannot

make a different rule in the case of a serv-

ant of a railway company and an ordinary

tradesman;" “and, therefore, treating Phil-

lips as the servant, the company are not lia-

ble for his tortious act any more than other

individuals would be." Roe v. Railroad Co.,

7 Eng. Law & Eq. 5-i7.

With the criticism (if it be entitled to that

appellation) of the opinion upon railroads and

their management I have,_in the position I

now occupy, no occasion to deal. My duty

I consider performed, and best performed,

when I have endeavored to ascertain the law

as it is, and apply it to causes as they are

presented, rather than in making rules for

any real or supposed grievances. The law-

making power is ample to afford the neces-

sary means of redress where none now ex-

ists; and did these great and growing evils

really exist, we might reasonably expect to

ﬁnd the law-makers, the people, those who

must suffer by their existence, exercising

their corrective powers.

If the evil is not suﬂicient to induce the

sufferers to proﬁde a remedy, it will hardly

justify the judiciary in leaving the clear path

of the duty of exponnding the law, and as-

suming the powers and responsibilities of

law-makers. Perhaps there has been no one

thing that has introduced into the law so

much confusion and embarrassment as me

engrafting policy of courts; adding here a lit-

tle and there a little, till the original is cover-

ed with these judicial excrescences; and not

unfrequently the jewel is lost in its surround-

ings of dross.

The plaintiff, in the printed brief of his ar-

gu'ment presented in this case, says: "It,

therefore, an individual master, perhaps per-

sonally innocent of positive evil intent is

liable to punishment by exemplary damages

for the malice o1! his servant, for a much

stronger reason ought a soulless corporation

to be rmponsible for the wicked and wanton

acts of its sole reprwentative."

In my judgment, if the premise were right

in this proposition, there is no reason why

the rule requiring them ftrst to be guilty of
wrong bad better be abolished.
That the learned judge meant to state bis
.argument thus, ls, I think, apparent from the
remark which immediately follows: "that If
those who are In the habit of thinking that
it ls a terrible hardship to punish an Innocent corporation for the wickedness ot Its
agents and servants, will tor a moment reflect
upon the absurdity of their own thoughts,
their anxiety wlll be cured."
In Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70, the
court say: "Nor will sound policy maintain
the application of a rule to rnllways or corporations on this subject, which shall not be
alike applied to others, as bas been Intimated
In some quarters. The suggestion Is not fit
to be made, much lees sanctioned, In any tribunal pretending to admlnitAer justice lm{'artlnlly."
Ju another case It le eald: "'l'be law lays
down the same rule tor all, and we cannot
make a dUferent rule In the case of a servant of a railway company and an ordinary
tradesman;" "and, therefore, treating Phillipe as the servant, the company are not liable tor his torttous act &Dy more than other
Individuals would be." Roe v. Railroad Co.,
7 Eng. Law & Eq. 547.
With the criticism (If It be entitled to that
appellation) of the opinion upon railroads and
their management I hal'e,. In the position I
now occupy, no occasion to deal. My duty
I consider performed, and b('St performed,
when I have endeavored to ascertain the law
as it ls, and apply It to causes as they are
presented, rather than In making rules for
any real or supposed grievances. The law·
making power ls ample to afl'ord the necessary means of redress where none now exists; and did these great and growing evils
really exist, we might reasonably expect to
find the law-makers, the people, those who
must suffer by their existence, exerclslng
their corrective powel'!'·
It the evil ls not sufllclent to Induce the
sufferers to provide a remedy, It will hnrdly
justify the judiciary In leaving the clear path
of the duty of expounding the law, and assuming the powers and responsibilities ot
Jaw-makers. Perhaps there bas been no one
thing that bas Introduced Into the law
much contusion and embarrassment aa tne
engraftiug policy ot courts; adding here a little and there a little, Ull the original ls covered with these judicial excrescences; and not
unfrequently the jewel Is lost In Its surroundings of dross.
The plaintur, in the printed brief ot his nrgtiment presented In this case, says: ''If,
therefore, an individual master, perhaps personally innocent of positive evil Intent Is
liable to punishment by exemplary damages
tor the malice of his servant, for a much
stronger reason ought a soulless corporation
to be l'E8poDBible for the wicked and wanton
acta of its 11<>le representative."
In my judgment, if the premise were right

"o
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in this proposition, there Is no reason why
the conclusion ls not right. But I know
ot no case where the master, Innocent of nll
wrong upon his own part, bas been held to be
liable to punishment for tl.te mallce of bis
servant. It ls only where he has been a pa1·tlclpator In some manner In the wanwuness
and malice displayed in tl.te act, and it Is
his own wanton and malicious act that ls
then punished. The plalntltr eays further~
''Besides, If corporations cannot be reached
In exemplary damages for the malice of
their servants, they escape entirely, and thus
stand Infinitely better than citizens wno are
liable In punltory damages, not only for their
own personal acts, which latter It ls obvious
a corporation can never be guilty of In the
strict sense." If citizens were liable In punl·
tory damages for the mallce of their servants,
In nowise participated In by themselves, the
conclusion that corporations would stand better than citizens, If they escaped a punishment for the malice of their servants, is Irresistible; but again I say, I know of no law,
authority, or reason tor holding an innocent
citizen to punishment for the malice of his
servant or agent. It ls quite as much as
one can reconcile with just accountability to
hold him to compensate for Injuries mallclously lnftlcted in the course of his employment, without adding puulshruent.
The theory of punitive damages ls the lnftlctlon of a punishment for an olTense committed. It presupposes the existence of a
moral wrong, an Infraction of the moral code;
a wrong In which the community has some
interest In the redress, and In securing Immunity from In the future. It presupposes
also an offender, and designs to punish that
offender. To punish one not an offender is
against the whole theory, policy, and practice
of the law and Its administrators. "It Is
better that ten gullty men should escape than
one Innocent man should sutrer." Before the
smallest fine can be lnfilcted, evidence, lenvlng no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
party to be thus punished, must be adducer!.
Evidence thnt he possessed tbe evil Intent,
wicked and depraved spirit; that it was he
that was regardless ot social duty. The Iden
ot punishing one who Is not partlcepa crlruinls
In the wrong done Is so entirely devoid ot
the first principles and fundamental elements
of law, that It can never find pince among the
rules of action In an lntelllKent and virtuous
community. There ls no parallel, tor It IR
In the administration of the law, and courts
ot the highest repute have, whenever the
question has arisen, declared It unsound In
principle and Inequitable In practice.
In Hagan v. Railroad Co., 3 R. I. 188,
Bronghton, J., In delivering the opinion ot
the court says: "In cases where punitive
or exemplary damages have been assessed,
It has been done upon evidence of such wllltulness, recklessness, or wickedness on the
part of the party at fault as amounted to
criminality, which tor the good of society and
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security to the individual ought to he pun-

ished. If, in such cases, or in any case of

a civil nature, it is the policy of the law to

visit upon the offender such exemplary dam-

ages as will operate as a punishment, and

teach the lesson of caution to prevent repeti-

tion of such criminality, yet we do not see

how such damages can be allowed, when a

principal is prosecuted for the tortious act

of a servant, unless there is proof in the case

to implicate the principal, and make him

particeps criminis of his agent's act. No

man shall be punished for that of which he

is not guilty. Cases may arise in which

the principal is deeply implicated in the serv-

ant's guilt or fault,—cases in which the con-

duct of the principal is such as to amount

to a ratiiication. In all such cases. the prin-

cipal is particeps criminis, if not the princi-
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pal offender; and whatever damages might

properly be visited upon him who commits

the act, might be very properly inﬂicted upon

him who thus criminally participates in it.

But where the proof does not implicate the

principal, and however wicked the servant

may have been, the principal neither express-

ly nor impliedly authorizes or ratiﬁes the act,

and the criminality of it is as much against

him as against any other member of society,

we think it is quite enough that he shall be

liable in compensatory damages for the injury

sustained in consequence of the wrong of a

person acting as his servant."

In Railroad v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388, which

was a case for putting a passenger of f the

cars before reaching the end of the route to

which his ticket entitled him, the court be-

iow instructed the jury that “in this case,

if you ﬁnd the complaint sustained by evi-

dence, you may give such damages as shall

compensate the plaintiff for his loss by the

act of the defendant, and also such exempla-

ry damages as you may ﬁnd proper under

the circumstances." The defendants request-

ed an instruction “that they should give the

plaintiff such damages only as would com-

pensate him for his loss by reason of putting

off the cars; that they could not give vindictive

or punitory damages, called smart-money." This

instruction was refused. The -court, in giv-

ing their opinion, say: “The judge improp-

erly refused to instruct the jury as requested

by defendants' counsel, that the plaintiff was

only entitled to recover such sum as would

compensate him for his actual loss by being

put off the cars, and that he was not entitled

to vindictive damages or smart-money. If

it be admitted that the action of the’ con-

ductor in expelling the plaintiff from the cars

was willful and malicious, or so grossly neg-

ligent, oppresive, or insulting as to bring the

case within the rule authorizing exemplary

damages, if the suit had been brought against

him; yet there was not one word of testi-

mony offered showing, or tending to show,

that such conduct on his part was either pre-

viously directed, or subsequently rntitied or

adopted by the company; although they may
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security to the individual ought to be pun- be liable In this action to Indemnify the
lshed. It, In such cases, or ln any case ot plaintilf tor the actual loes or aamage wblcb
a. civil nature, lt ls the policy ot the law to he sustained by reason ot the misconduct ot
visit upon the ollender sucb exemplary dam· the conductor, because It oceasloned a breach
ages as wlll operate as a punishment, and ot their duty or obligation to carry him from
tench the lesson of caution to prevent repetl- Madison to Edgerton. Still It does not toltlon or such criminality, yet we do not see low that they may be visited with damages
how such damages can be allowed, when a by way ot punishment, without proof that
principal ls prosecuted for the tortlous net they directed the act, or subsequently conot a servant, unless there ls proof In the case firmed It. Defendants are not to be visited
to Implicate the principal, and make him with damages by way ot punishment, wlthparticeps crlminls ot his agent's act. No o1!t proof that they directed the act to be
man shall be punished for that ot which be done, or subsequently confirmed it. Such
ls not guilty. Cases may arise In which damages are given by way of punishing the
the principal is deeply Implicated In the serv- malice or oppression, and are graduated by
ant's guilt or fault,--casea In which the con- the Intent of the party committing the wrong.
duct of the principal ls such as to amount But how can such damages be assessed
to a ratification. In all such cases. the prin- against a principal with such Intent? Sureclpal Is partlceps criminis, if not the p1·1ncl- ly they cannot be. But In an action against
pal otrender; and whatever damages might the principal tor the act of the agent, bow
properly be visited upon him who commits can the question ot their assessment be propthe act, might be very properly infllcted upon erly submitted to the jury when there ls no
him who thus criminally pa1'tlclpates In lt. evidence conneding the principal ,with such
But where the proof does not implicate the Intent on tbe part of the agent? Clearly It
principal, and however wicked the servant cannot." The damages in this case were
may have been, the principal neither express- $175, and tbe judgment ot the court below
ly nor Impliedly authorizes or mtlftes the act, was reversed.
and the c1·lmlnallty of It ls as much against
Turner v. Ralh'oad Co., 34 Gal. 594, wni;
him as against any other member of society, an action for unlawfully ejecting the plalntllf
we think It ls quite enough that be shall be from a car by the conductor. The court bellable In compensatory damages for the Injury low ruled "tbat the Injury, If committed, and
sustained In consequence of the wrung of a If a willful one on tae part of the defendants
person acting as his servant"
In their servant the conductor, and accomIn Railroad v. Finney, 10 Wis. :m, which pnnle<l by malice or such acts as In their
was a ense tor putting a passenger otr tbe nature tended to show a purpose ot resent·
cars before reaching the end of the route to went or ill-will, or a disposition to degrade
which bis ticket entitled blm, the court be- the plaintiff, entitled her to what ls called
iow instructed the jury that "in thls case, exemplary damages." After some comment,
If you tlnu the complaint sustained by eYl- and citing Story, Ag. § 456, 19 Wend. 343.
,tence, you may give sucb damages as shall and 14 How. 486, before referred to, th:?
compensate the plaintiff for his loss by the court s11y: "Tested by these prlnciple>s, It h;
act of the defendant, and also such exempla- obvious that In this case the defendant was
ry damages as you may ftnd proper under not liable for any mullcious and wanton coothe circumstances." The defendants request-1 duct ·of tho conductor. It liable at all, its
ed an Instruction "that they should give the liability must be confined to the actual damplalntll:Y such damages only as would com- ages which the plaintiff suffered. To render
peu1mte him for his loss by reason ot putting the defendant llnble to punitive damages, It
ol:Y the cars; that they could not give vindictive was Incumbent on the plalntlt'l to show that
or puultory damages, calletl snull't-money." This the act complained of was done wltll the
instruction was refused. 'l'he ·court, In glv- authority elthet' express or Implied ot the
Ing their opinion, say: "'l'he judge lmprop- defendant, or wns subsequently adopted by
erly refused to Instruct the jury as requested I the company." "If hei' expulsion resulted
by defendants' counsel, that the plaintiff was · from the malice of the conductor, or was acouly entitled to recover such sum as would companied by violence or personal indignity,
compensate him for bis actwtl loss by being the conductor alone Is responsible for such
put otr the cars, and that be was not entitled damages as she may be entitled to tor this
to vlndlcth·e damages 01· smart-moue)·. It cause beyond the actual damages resulting
it be admitted that the action ot the con- from her exclusion from the car, unle11s as
ductor In expelllng the plalntUr from the ears before stated the company expressly or tncltwas willful and malicious, or so grossly neg- ly pm·Uclpated In the malice and Yiolent conllgcut, oppreslve, or lnsultln1; as to bring the duct of the couducto1·. In othei· words, If
e:tse within the rule authorizing exemplary the act of the conductor was wholly u11audamage1t, if the suit had been brought ngalnst tborlzecl, the company ls liable for the nctual
him; yet the1·e was not one word of testl- damage, and the conductor alone tor the punlmony offered showing, or tending to show, tlve damages, It any."
that sueb conduct on his part was either preThere ls another case ln the same volume
viously directed, or subsequently rntltled or (34 Cal. 586,-PIPllsants v. Railroad Co.), anu
adopted by the com111111y; although they way decided upon the same g1·ounds.
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In Clark v. Newson, 1 Exch. 131, and 1

VVelsb. H. & G. (a case of joint trespass by

two), Pollock, C. B., said: “I think it would

be very wrong to make the malignant motive

of one party a ground of aggravation of dam-

ages against the other party who were al-

together free from any improper motive. In

such case the plaintiff ought to select the

party against whom he means to get ag-

gravated damages."

In relation to the views thus expressed, it

is said by Mr. Justice WALTON, in his opin-

ion, that: “In none of them was there any

evidence that the ser'vant acted wantonly or

maliciously; they were simply cases of mis-

taken duty. And what these same courts

would have done if a case of such gross and

outrageous insult had been before them, as

is now before us, it is impossible to say; and
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long experience has shown that nothing is

more dangerous than to rely upon the ab-

stract reasoning of courts, when the cases be-

fore them did not call for the application of

the doctrines which their reasoning is intend-

ed to establish." Walving, for the present,

the question of fact as to whether they were

or not simply cases of mistaken duty, we

ﬁnd in each of them the question of puni-

tive damages legitimately and clearly raised

and discussed. and the reasoning, such as it

is, is before the profession. The cases are

not cited as mere authority by reason of

their being decided cases by courts of com-

petent jurisdiction, but because the reason-

ing is believed to support the decision. If the

reasoning is bad, fallacious, inconclusive,

some would adopt the plan of exhibiting

these facts by a course of reasoning of their

own, rather than by promuigating a general

proposition that it is unsafe to rely upon

their reasoning. if the reasoning is sound

and applicable to case at bar, it does not

matter that it was, or was not necessarily

called out in the case into which it has been

introduced, and it requires some other an-

swer than mere criticism upon course of pro-

ceeding by the judges in those cases.

That the gentlemen, composing the several

courts alluded to, supposed the cases called

for the decisions and reasonings they made,

cannot well be doubted, and an examination

of the cases as reported in the printed vol-

umes of the reports referred to, will, I think,

leave the reader in no doubt concerning that

question.

There are some other cases to be found in

the books not referred to on the defendant's

brief to which I will advert as indicating the

views of some of the courts in other states.

Ackerson v. Railway Co., 32 N. J. Law,

254, was an action to recover damages for

injuries sustained while traveling in their

cars by reason of the carelessness and diso-

bedience of the employees of the road. The

court say: “It appeared on trial that the de-

fendants had adopted all needful rules and

regulations for the running of their trains,

and had employed competent persons as ten-

In Clark v. Newson, 1 Exch. 131, and 1
\Velsb. H. & O. (a case ot joint trespass by
two), Pollock, C. B., said: "I think it would
be very v.-rong' to make the malignant motive
ot one party a ground ot aggravation ot damages against the other party who were altogether free from any Improper motive. In
such ease the plaintiff ought to select the
party against whom be means to get aggravated damages."
In relation to the views Urns expressed, It
ls said by Mr. Justice WALTO.N, in his opinion, that: "In none of them was there nny
evidence that the ser\·nnt acted wantonly or
maliciously; they we1·c simply cases of mistaken duty. And what these same courts
would ha~e done If a ease of such gross and
outrageous Insult had been before them, as
is now before us, It ls lmpof:sible to sny; and
lung experience bas shown that notl1lng ls
more dangerous than to rely upon the abstract reasoning of courts, when the cases before them did not call for the application of
the doctrines wbleh their reasoning is Intended to e!'ltal>lisll." Waiving, for the present,
the question of tact as to whether they were
or not simply cases of mistaken duty, we
lh1d in eucb of them the question of punitive damages legitimately and clearly raised
and discussed, anti the reasoning, such as It
ls, ls before the profession. The cases are
not cited as mere authority by reason of
their being decided cases by courts of competent jurisdiction, but because the reasoning Is believed to support the decision. It the
reasoning Is bad, fallacious, Inconclusive,
some would adopt the plan of exhibiting
these tacts by a course of reasoning or their
own, rather than by promulgating a general
propoaltlon that it Is unsafe to rely upon
their reasonlng. It the reasoning Is sound
and applicable to case at bar, it does not
matter that it was, or was not necessarily
called out In the case into which It bas been
Introduced, and lt requires some other answer than mere criticism upon course of pt"().
ceedlng by the judges in those cases.
'.rba t the gentlemen, composing the several
courts alluded to, supposed the cases called
for the decisions and reasonings they made,
cannot well be doubted, and 11.ll examination
of the cases as reported in the printed volumes of the reports referred to, will, I think,
lea'l"e the reader In no doubt concerning that
question.
There are some other cases to be found In
the books not referred to on the defendant's
brief to which I will ad,·ert as Indicating the
views of some of the courts In other states.
Ackerson v. Railway Co., 32 N. J. Law,
25-l, was an action to recover damages for
injuries sustained while trn Ye ling In their
cani by reason of the careles~nN1s and di1mbedlence of the employees of the road. The
court say: "It appeared on trial that the defendants had adopted all needful rules and
regulations for the running of their trains,
and had employed competeut persons as tenLAW DAM.2d Ed.-4

ders of tl1e switch at which the accident occurred. No care or caution, required tor the
safety or the passengers, bad been omitted
by the. company. Through the carelessnes&
and disobedience of their agents the accident happened." "In fact, the only fault or
negligence complained of was that of the·
employees or the company. "'here a rail·
roo1I company adopts ull rules and regulations needful tor the safety of passengers.
nm! employ1 competent agents, whose duty it
Is to see that these rules and regulations are
obse1Ted, I do not think that the company,
lo case of Injury to the passengers happening by reason of the fallure of the agent tc>
perform his duty, can be held liable tor pun1·
tl'l"e damages. If, however, the company, as·
such, ls In fault, a ditrcrcnt rule applies.
The company, for Its own cnrcles~ness, may
be justly held lial>le for smart-money. This
rule does not prevail where the carelessness
Is only that or a subordinate agent. There ls
no justice ln punishing the company after lt
bas done all ln Its powe1· to prevent an injury. The agent, If guilty of negligence, may,
In certain cases, be proceeded ago.Inst by In-·
dlctment. I cannot yield to the argument eo·
earnestly urged by the counsel of the plaintiff, that by construction of law the compa:.ny Is guilty of gross negllgence whenever its
agent Is, aud ls, therefore, to be treated the
same as If tbl"Ough Its own negligence the injury happened. I think the verdict was
against the charge of the court In that lt la,
to some extent at least, tor punitive damages.. Full compensation to the plaintiff tor
all real loss, present and prospective, was the
measure or damages."
l'orter v. Railway U ... , 32 N. J. Law, 261,
argued at the sume time, was determined upon the rules announced In this case.
These cnses well Indicate the views of the
court ln New Jersey. McKeon v. Railway
Co., 42 )lo. 79, was an action for an injury
done to a passenger. The court, In giving:
their opinion, say: "If the conduct of this
driver was willful and malicious with Intent
to injure the plaintiff, he might be liable to
indictment for aseo.ult with intent to klll, or
some other criminal otrense; but his employe1· was not responsible for his crimes,
nor llal>le for his acts of willful and malicious trespass. The company was answerable only for his negllgence, or bis incapacity,
or unsklllfuluess In the performance of the
duties assigned to him. In such cases we
have no hesitation in saying, that puuitory
damages, or any damages beyond a full compensn tlon for the Injury sustained, cannot i>e
allowed."
Hnllroad Co. v. Smith, 2 Du'\". (Ky.) 5jG,
was a cnse where the evidence tended to
show that the ca1· of the plalutiffs was upset
by the carelessness of their driver, and defendant injured thereby. The Instruction
was, "That If the car was thrown trom the
track by the fast and careless driving or the
defeudnnts' (now plaintiffs') agent, th<'J
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should ﬁnd for plaintiff (now defendant), and

that the jury are not necessarily restricted to

actual damages, but may, in their discre-

tion, award such exemplary damages as they

deem just and proper in view of all the facts

in the case." The court say, the facts did

not authorize a punishment of the defend-

ants, and the court below should have re-

stricted them to compensatory damages, and

for this reason the judgment was reversed.

In the case of Hill v. Railroad Co., 11 La.

Ann. 292, the court used the following lan-

guage: “In actions of this kind, it is not

within the province of the jury, although

negligence is clearly proven, to give vindic-

tive damages, as is sometimes allowed in

case of willful and malicious injuries. The

company, in such cases, is not to be pun-'

ished for the negligence of its agents as a

crime."
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Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 27, was an action

brought to recover damages of defendants,

ship-owners, for injuries to plaintiff's wife,

at the hands of a master of a vessel on which

she was a passenger. The evidence showed

gross neglect and wanton outrage on the part

of the master against the lady. In deliver-

ing the opinion of the court, the judge said:

“It is true, juries sometimes give what is

called smart-money. They are often war-

ranted in giving vindictive damages as a

punishment inﬂicted for outrageous conduct.

But this is only justiﬁable in an action

against the wrong-doer, and not against per-

sons who, on account of their relation to the

offender, are only coaasequentially liable for

his acts, as the principal is liable for the

acts of his factor or agent."

In Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 1, it is

said: “Whatever rule of damages would ap-

ply in a suit against a natural person, ought

to apply in a suit against a corporation. Any

discrimination in that regard would shock

the public sense of impartial justice, and

would be an unjust innovation. The instruc-

tions, governing subordinate employees and

agents, may be devised in such utter disre-

gard of the rights of others, that obedience

to them will result in palpable wrong to in-

dividuals; whether it was so here was a

question for the jury,"—thtYs putting the

question whether the acts are done in obedi-

ence to instructions that the execution of

would result in palpable wrong.

Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447, was an

action by l\1('AI'thur for publishing an al-

leged libel. The court say: “The employ-

ment of competent editors, the supervision,

by proper persons, of all that is to be insert-

ed, and the establishment and habitual en-

forcement of such rules as would probably

exclude improper items. would reduce the

blame-worthiness of a publisher to a mini-

mum for any libel inserted without his priv-

ity or approval, and should conﬁne his lia-

bility to such damages as include no redress

for wounded feeling, beyond what is inevita-

ble from the nature of the libel. And no

amount of express malice in his employees
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should find for plalntlff (now defendant), and
that the jury are not necessarily restricted to
nctual damages, but may, ln their discretion, award such exemplary damages as they
deem just and proper in view of all the facts
in the case." The court say, the facts did
not authorize a punishment of the defendants, and the court below should have restricted them to compensatory damages, and
for this reason the judgment was reversed.
In the case of Hill v. Railroad Co., 11 La.
Aun. 292, the court used the following language: "In actions of this kind, it Is not
within the province of the jury, although
negligence Is clearly proven, to give vindictive damages, as is sometimes allowed in
case of willful and malicious injuries. The
company, in such cases, is not to be pun-·
ished for the negll~nce of its agents as n
crime."
Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 27, was an action
brought to recover damages of defendants,
ship-owners, for injuries to plaintifl''s wife,
at the hands of a master of a vessel on which
she was a passenger. The evidence showed
g1·oss neglect and wanton outrage on the part
of the master against the lady. In delivering the opinion of the court, the judge said:
"It ls true, juries sometimes give what ls
called smart-money. They are often warranted in giving vindictive damages as a
punishment inflicted for outrageous conduct.
But this Is only justifiable in an action
against the wrong-doer, and not against persons who, on account of their relation to the
offender, are only consequentially Uable for
his acts, as the principal Is liable for the
acts of his factor or agent"
In Hailroad Co. v. Hogers, 28 Ind. l, It Is
said: '"Whatever rule of damages would apply In a suit against a natural person, ought
to apply in a suit against a corporation. Any
discrimination In that regard would shock
the public sense of Impartial justice, nnd
would be an unjust innovation. The Instructions, governing subordinate employees and
agents, may be devised in such utter disregard of the rights of othe1·s, that obedience
to them will result In palpable wrong to lndh·i1l11nls; whether It was so here was a
question for the jury,"-tht'ftl putting the
question whether the acts are done in obedience to instrnctlons that the execution of
would result In palpable wrong.
Post Co. v. McArthur, 1G Mich. 447, was an
.action by l\kArthur for publlsblng an 11.ll<'l!'Nl libel. '.rhe court say: "The employment of competent editors, the supervision,
by proper persons, of all that is to be inserted. and the establishment and habitual enforcement of such rules as would probably
exelude improper items, would reduce the
blame-worthiness of a publisher to a minimum for any libel Inserted without his privlty or approval, and should confine his liability to such damages as Include no redress
for wounded feeling, beyond what is Inevitable from the nature of the libel. And no

amount of express malice in his employees
should aggravate damages against him, when
he has thus purged himself from blame."
"While, therefore, In the present case the reporters were guilty of carelessness In receiving hearsay talk of legal charges, which
could only be lawfully published In accordance with the documentary facts, and while
there could be no justification for publishing
outside scandal against an Individual from
any source whatever, yet the defendants
were only responsible beyond the damages
recoverable under any circumstances, for
such a libel to tbe extent ot their own conduct In the case, or want of care used In
guarding their columns against the insertion
of such articles."
In the case of Railroad Co. v. Baum, before
cited, the court sav: "But when the act ls
, unnecessary to the performance of the master's service, and not really Intended for that
purpose, but Is done by the servant to gratify his own malice, though, under pretense
of executing his employment, It Is not done
to serve the master, and Is not, in fact, within the scope of the employment, and the master ls not. therefore, liable." "Under these
circumstauccs, last enumerated, lt 1s not easy
to perceive, In the nature of things, any just
reason for holding the master responsible.
It will not do to say he shall answer In damages, because by employing the servant he
gives him opportunity to maltreat those with
wbom he comes In contact In discharging his
duties, that reason would hold the shop-keeper for any outrage committed by his clerk upon a customer; the merchant for the like
conduct of his journeyman; and, Indeed,. 1t
would be equally applicable to nlmOf!t every
department of business in the conduct of
which it Is neces.'ltlry or convenient to employ assistants to deal with the public. Even
the Inn-keeper, whose cook feloniously mingles poison with the ·food of a guest, must
then respond in damages."
In Kleen v. Railroad Co., 37 Cal. 400, the
court say: "As to the general rule upon that
subject there can be no doubt. If the act
of the conductor, in pulling the plaintltr oft'.
the cars was a wanton and mallclous act,
committed out of the course of his agency,
the defendant cannot be held responsible for
the manner in which be did It, unless, however, the defendant expressly authorized the
act."
In the case of The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat.
546, which was a suit for a marine trespass,
Mr. Justice Story, In delivering the opinion
of the court, among other things says: "UPon the facts disclosed In the evidence, this
must be pronounced a case of gross and
wanton outrage without any just provocation or excuse; under such clrcumstauces, tile
honor of the country and the duty of the
court equally require that a just compensation should be made to the unotrendlng neutrals for nil the injuries and losses actually
sustained by them. And If tllis were a suit

COMP.lllNSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DA.MAGES.
COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. 51

against the original wrong-doers, it might be

proper to go yet further and visit upon them,

in the shape of exemplary damages the prop-

er punishment which belongs to such lawless

misconduct. But it is to be considered that

this is a suit against the owners of a priva-

teer upon whom the law has, from motives of

policy, devolved a responsibility for the con-

duct of the oiiicers and crew employed by

them, and yet from the nature of the service

they can scarcely ever be able to secure to

themselves an adequate indemnity in cases

of loss. They are innocent of the demerit of

this transaction, having neither directed it,

nor countenanced, nor participated in it in

the slightest degree. Under such circum-

stances. we are of opinion that they are

bound to repair all real injuries and personal

wrongs sustained by the libelinnts, but they

are not bound to the extent of vindictive
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damages."

In Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118, the

jury found for actual and exemplary dam-

ages in the sum of $2,500. The chief jus-

tice, in delivering the opinion of the court,

quoted with approval the opinion of Judge

Story in The Amlabie Nancy, and said:

“When it appears that the coach at the time

of the accident was driven by a servant or

agent of the owner, the rule in such case is,

that the principal is liable only for simple

negligence, and that exemplary damages can-

not be enforced against him."

In the case of Moody v. McDonald, 4 Cal.

297, the facts were similar to the above, and

in the action brought against the principal

for tortlous acts of his servant, where the

jury gave $2,500 damages, and $2,500 smart-

money, the court disallowed the verdict for

the smart-money, holding the principal liable

only for compensatory damages.

In McLellan v. Bank, 24 Me. 566, the court

say: "The ﬁrst question obviously presented

by the case is, can a corporation aggregate

be chargeable with malice? Such corpora-

tions have been held answerable in trover;

and might, perhaps. in other actions sounding

in tort for all acts done by their oﬂiccrs un-

der circumstances implying authority to do

them. But it may well be doubted if such

corporations can be implicated by the acts of

their servants in transactions in which mal-

ice would be necessary to be found in order

to the sustaining an action against them

therefor."

Two cases are cited by Mr. Justice WAL-

TON as sustaining the rulings of the presid-

ing judge; one in New Hampshire, and one

in Mississippi.

In the (iise in New Hampshire (Hopkins v.

Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 1) the ruling com-

plained of was, “That if the jury should ﬁnd

the defendants guilty of gross negligence at

the time of the collision, and the plaintiff's

injury was occasioned by such negligence,

they might in their discretion give exemplary

-damages."

“To this

made:

against the original wrong-doers, it might be
proper to go yet further and visit upon them,
1n the shape of exemplary damages the proper punishment which belongs to such lawless
misconduct. But it ls to be considered that
this is a suit against the owners of a privateer upon whom the law has, from motives of
]>Ollcy, devolved a responsibility for the conduct of the officers and crew employed by
them, and yet trom the nature of the service
they can scarcely ever be able to secure to
themselves an adequate Indemnity In cases
-of loss. They are innocent of the demerit of
this transaction, having neither directed It,
nor countenanced, nor particlP!l-ted in It In
the slightest degree. Under such circumstances, we are of opinion tlmt they are
bound to repair all real injurll'!! and personal
wrongs sustained by the llbt-lhmts, but they
are not bound to the extent of vindictive
damages.''
In Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118, the
jury found for actual and exemplary damages ln the sum of $2,500. The chief justice, ln delivering the opinion ot tile court,
quoted with approval the opinion of Juoi:e
Story In The Amiable Nancy, and said:
"When It appears that the coneh at the time
of the accident was driven by a sernrnt or
agent ot the owner, the rule In such case is,
that the principal is liable only for simple
negligence, and that exemplary damages cannot be enforced against him."
In the c11se of Moody v. McDonald, 4 Cal.
297, the tacts were slmllar to the above, and
in the action brought against the principal
for tortlous acts of his servant, where the
jury gave ,2,500 damages, and $2,500 smartmoney, the court disallowed the verdict for
the smart-money, holding the principal liable
only for compensatory damages.
In McLellnn v. Bank, 24 Me. aOO, the court
my: "The first question obvlou>ily presented
by the cll8e ls, can a corporation aggregate
be chargeable with malice? 8uch corporatiom; have been held answerable in trover;
and might, perhaps. In other lll"tions sounding
in tort tor all acts done by thi>ir officers under circumstances Implying authority to do
them. But It mny well be doubted If such
corporations can be lm1,lien te1l by the acts of
their servants In transadlons iu which malice would be necessary to be found In order
to the sustaining an action ngalnst them
therefor."
Two cases are cited b1• :!\Ir. Justice WALTON as sustaining the rulini:s of the presiding judge; one In New Hampshire, and one
in Mississippi.
In the case In New Hampshire (Hopkins v.
Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 1) the ruling complained of was, "That if the jury should find
the defendants guilty of gross negligence nt
the time of the collision, and the plaintiff's
Injury was occasioned by such negligence,
they might In their discretion give exemplary
-damages."

"To this Instruction two objPctlons are
made:
(1) That it Is not a case tor exemplary
damages, because the negligence, which ls
the foundation of the suit, was the negligence
of the defendant's servants;
(2) Because the facts of the case disclose
no fraud, malice, violence, cri1elty, or the like,
nor any turpitude or moral wrong."
Upon the last point, the court hold tilat
"gross carelessness in such case Implies a
heedless disregard for iluman life, nnd for
the snfety of passengers wilo intrust themselves to the care of the road, which brings
the case very strongly within the rule that
the wrong complained of, to warrant exemplary damages, must have something of a
criminal character."
In rein tlon to the ftrst objection the court
say: "Tlle defendants a1·e a corporation, and
can act in no way but by their officers,
agents, and servants; and when their officers, agents, or serYnnts net within the scope
of their authority and employment, 1t Is the
act of the corporation, and their negligence
Is the D<'gligeucn of the cor11orntlon;" 11nc1
they cite Ang. & A. Priv. Corp, 386, and
Clw:stnut Hill Turnpike v. llutter, 4 :::ierg. &
R. U.
It will be noticed that the learned chief

justice, who drew this opinion. makes only
sucli acts or the agent, as are authorized by
the cor1Xlrntlon, their acts. It Is sucil a~ are
within the scope ot theh- authority rts well
as employment. He does not say that unauthorlwd acts by the agent become the acts
of the principal. His proposition conforms
to the rules which we have bP.fore deduced
from the authorities. A recurrence to tile authorities, cited by him, will show this. Section 3SU, A.ng. &A. Prlv. Corp., which is cited.
reaus as follows: "Yet it ls somewhat remarkablethat the question wilether an action
of trespass would be against a corpomtion
should not. until within a very late period,
have been the subject of express judicial decision. In tile case of Maud v. Canal Co. it
was expressly decided by the English court
of common pleas, in 184:!, that trespass wlll
lie against a corporation. '!'he aetlon was
brought for breaking and entering locks on
a canal, and seizing and carrying a way bar- ges and coal. The trespasses, It was proved,
had been committed by an agent of the company, which was incorporated by an act of
parliament, and the barges and coal, it appeared, had been seized for tolls claimed to
be due them. The only question being
whether trei;1pass would lie againRt a corporation agg-rega te for an act done by their
agent witbin the scope of their authority.
The court lwld, that when It is established
that trover will lie against a corporation,
there could be no reason why trespass should
not also lie against them; that it was impossible to see a ny distinction be tween the two
actions."
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This section which is cited relates alone to

the question whether or not trespass can be

maintained when the act done was within

the scope of their authority; that is the au-

thority conferred by the corporation, and it

is held, when the act is done by the author-

ity of the corporation, it is the act of the cor-

poration, and trespass will lie.

The next section. save one, which follows

(388) says: “It is of importance, however, to

be observed, that an action of trespass can-

not be sustained against a private corpora-

tion for an act done by one of its agents un-

less done communicate consilio, or, in other

words, unless the act has been directed, suf-

fered, or ratiﬁed by the corporation. A cor-

poration is liable for an injury done by one

of its servants in the same manner and to

the same extent only as a natural individual

would be liable under like circumstances.
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The well-known rule of law is, that if the

cause of an injury to a person be immediate,

though it happens accidentally, the author of

it is answerable in trespass as well as in

case; but a master, whether a natural indi-

vidual or an artiﬁcial one, is not liable for a

willful act of trespass of his servant."

With these authorities before him we can-

not wcll suppose he meant to include any

unauthorized act of the agent. He was too

good a lawyer to say that an act done

against the master's orders and directions

was the act of the master. Did these, how-

ever, leave us in doubt, what follows upon

the same page of his opinion would seem to

put the matter at rest, for he proceeds to

say: “Corporations may be sued in trespass

for the authorized acts of their servants;

and if- the trespass is committed by their au-

thority, with circumstances of violence and

outrage such as would authorize exemplary

damages against an individual defendant, it

is not easy to discover any ground for a dif-

ferent rule of damages against the corpora-

tion which the law charges with the conse-

quences of the act as the responsible party.

If a corporation like this is guilty of an act

or default such as, in case of an individual,

would subject him to exemplary damages,

we think the same rule must be applied to

the corporation."

This we understand to be in harmony with

all the authorities, and comes within the

ﬁrst class of cases to which I have referred.

The act is theirs, because done by their au-

thority. Being theirs, they are held as would

be an individual defendant. If unauthor-

ized, it is not their act, although they may,

upon other principles. be liable to compen-

sate for the injury done.

The ground upon which exemplary dam-

ages is allowed is, that the trespass is com-

mitted by their authority with such circum-

stances of violence and outrage as would an-

thorize exemplary damages against an indi-

vidual defendant. I regard the law, as stat-

ed by the chief justice, as directly sustain-

ing the views that I present, viz.: that to be

chargeable with the animus of the transac-
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This section which ls cited relates alone to
the 11uestlon whether or not trespnss can be
maintained when the act done was within
tlle scope of their authority; that ls the authority conferred by the corporation, and It
ls held, when the act ls done by the authority of the corporation, it Is the act of the corporation, and trespass will lie.
The next section, save one, which follows
(388) says: "It Is of importance, however, to
be observed, that an action of trespass cannot be sustained against a private corporation for an act done by one of its agents unless done communicate consilio, or, in other
words, unless the act has been directed, suffered, or ratified. by the corporation. A corporation ls liable for an Injury done by one
of Its servants In the same manner and to
the same extent only as a natural Individual
would be liable under like circumstances.
The well-known rule of law ls, that lf the
cause of an Injury to a person be Immediate,
though It happens accidentally, the author or
it ls answerable In trespass as well as In
case; but a master, whether a natural Individual or an artificial one, is not liable for a
willful act of trespass. of bis servant."
With these authorities before him we cannot well suppose he meant to Include any
unauthorized act of the agent. He was too
good a lawyer to say that an act done·
against the master's orders and directions
was the act of the master. Diel these, however, leave us In doubt, what follows upon
the same page of his opinion would seem to
put the matter at rest, for he proceeds to
imy: "Corporations may be sued ln trespass
fo1· the authorized acts of their servants;
and If· the trespass Is committed by their authority, with circumstances of violence and
outrage such as would authorize exemplary
damages agnlnst an Individual defendant, lt
is not easy to discover any ground for a different rule of damnges against the corporation which the law charges with the consequences of the act as the responsible party.
If a corporation like this Is guilty of an net
or clefnnlt such as, In case of an individual,
woulll subject him to exemplary damages,
we think the snme rule ruust be applied to
the ('Ol'JlOl'fl tiou."
This we understand to be In harmony with
all the au1 horities, and comes within the
first cluss of cases to which I have referred.
The act Is theirs, b<>Cause done by their authority. Being theirs, they are held as would
be nu indivi(lnal defendant. If unauthorized. it ls not their act, although they may,
upon other prlncipl0s, be liable to compensate for the injury done.
The ground upon which exemplary damages is allowed is, that the trespass is committed by their authority with such circumstanc:es of violence and outrage as would authorize exemplary damages against an Individual defendant. I i·egarcl the law, as stated by the chief justice, as directly sustain-

Ing the views that I present, vlz.: that to be
chargeable with the animus of the transac·
tion, it must be theirs by previous authority,
direct or implied, or subsequently adopted or
ratified by them. The Instruction In the
court below required the defendants to be
guilty of gross negligence to subject them to
exemplary damages; and the sum total of
the decision was that this was right, and
that If the act was done by the authority of
the defendants. it was the act of the principal. What evidence there was, lf any, that
the defendants participated ln the act which
produced the injury, does not appear; nor
does lt appear tl1at the jury found the defendants were guilty of gross carelessness_
All the remarks of the chief justice are made
upon the hypothetical case of an injury happening through the g1·oss carelessness of the
defendant corporation.
The case ln Mississivpl came before the
court on a motion to set aside the verdict.
The discussion In the opinion Is upon the prop1·iety and autho1·lty of the court to set aside
verdicts on account of the amount of damages In those cases whe1·e there Is no fixed
rule of computation. and the authorities cited are almost all of them upon this point.
There was no ruling excepted to, and n<>
question of law presented. Upon the matter
of punitive damages, referred to by Judge
Walton in his opinion, they say: "The case
ls much stronger for the defendant in error,
than were the facts In the case of Helrn v.
Mccaughan, 32 Miss. 18. '!'he declson in that
cl\se was conclusive in this, as t<> the form of
action as well as the right of the jury, in sucb
cases, to protect the publlc, by punitive damages, against the negligence, folly, or wickedness which might otherwise convert thesegreat public blessings Into the most dangerous nuisances."
It will be perceiYed that this case, so far
as any consideration of punitive damages
was concerned, wns regar<led as settled by
the case in 32 Miss.
Looking at that case I find .It was an action
brought for an act dotle by a partner. Heirn
with others were owners of a vessel. Grant,
one of the owners, was the captain. The
court say, by Hand, J.: "There was testimony tending to show that the captain in
charge of the boat, which was published t0o
stop at Pascagoula at the time specified, willfully and capriciously disregarded the obligation Incurred by the publication, and that
the failure occasl<>ncd great bodily exposure,
and mental sufie1·ing and disappointment t0o
the plaintiffs (now defendants); these circumstauces were properly submittell to the jury,
to be considered by them, with the circumstances of excuse or extenuation relied upon
by the defendants; and it wus their province
to determine whether there was such fraud
or willful neglect of duty causing oppression
to tile plaintiffs, and under such clrcumstan·
ces of aggmvution as to warrant exemplary
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damages. ‘This was the substance of the rul-

ings of the court upon this point, and we per-

ceive no error in them."

This is the case which decided all that was

said in 36 Miss. about punitive damages, and

was an action brought against several part-

ners for the act of one of them. The value

of this case, in support of the principle that

a railroad corporation may be punished for

the malice of an employee, cannot, I think,

be considered great, especially when, in the

case in the 36th, we ﬁnd this remark: “It

is not enough that, in the opinion of the

court, the damages are too high. It may not,

rightfully, substitute its own sense of what

would be a reasonable compensation for the

injury, for that of the jury." Since the opin-

ion in this case was drawn, and since writ-

ing this opinion, my attention has been di-

rected bv Mr. Justice WALTON to the case
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of Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277, as

a case sustaining the ruling of the court in

the case at bar.

Upon an examination of that case, it will be

found that a diﬂlcuity arose between the con-

ductor of train upon the appellant's road and

appellee about his ticket; the one contend-

ing it had been surrendered to the conductor,

and the other averring it had not, and to

prevent being put off the train, the appellee

paid his fare; it subsequently appeared that '

he was right, and properly surrendered his

ticket when called upon so to do. He alleged

that the conduct of the conductor was vio-

lent and insulting.

At the trial of the case, the appellants re-

quested the court to instruct the jury as

follows:

“(7) If the jury believe the conductor

caught the appellee violently, etc., by the

collar and dragged him from his seat, while

a passenger in the train, the appellee is not

entitled to recover for the same in this action

against the appellants, unless they believe

the appellants authorized the act, and adopt-

ed and justiﬁed it since its committal.

“(8) That if the jury believe the conductor

wrongfully extorted from the appeiiee the

fare from Martinsburg to Baltimore, after

the appeilee had surrendered his-ticket, etc.,

the appeilee was not entitled to recover vin-

dictive or punitive damages from the appel-

lants, unless they expressly or impliedly par-

ticipated in the tortious act authorizing it be-

fore, or approving it after, it was com-

mitted."

Concerning these two requests, the court

say: “The conductors and employees of the

corporation represent them in the discharge

of these functions, and being in the line of

their duty in collecting the fare or taking up

tickets, the corporation is liable for any

abuse of their authority, whether of omission

or commission. Vide Redf. R. R. 381, note

6, and authorities there cited. The court

was, therefore, right in rejecting so much of

the defendants‘ prayers, as limited their lia-

bility to such tortious acts of their agents as

they had either personally authorized or sub-

damages. ,This was the substance of the rulings of the court upon this point, and we pereel ve no error In them."
This ls the case which decided all that was
said In 36 Miss. about punltlve damages, and
was an action brought against several partners tor the act of one of them. The value
of this case, In support of the principle that
a railroad corporation may be punished for
the malice of an employee, cannot, I think,
be considered great, especially when, In the
ease in the 36tb, we find this remark: "It
ls not enough that, In the opinion or the
eourt, the damages are too high. It may not,
rightfully, substitute Its own sense or what
would be a reasonable compensation for the
injury, for that of the jury." Since the opinion in this case was drawn, and since writing this opinion, my attention hos been directed bv Mr. Justice WALTON to the cnsP.
or Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27 :\Id. 277, as
a case sustaining the ruling of the court In
the case at bnr.
Upon an exrunlnatlon of that cnse, It will be
found thnt a dlfllculty arose between the con•luctor of train upon the appellant's road and
~ppellee about his ticket; t11e one contending lt had been surrendered to the conductor,
.and the other averring It had not, and to
prevent being put off the train, the appellee
paid his fare; It subsequently nppenred thnt ·
he was rlgbt, and properly surrendered his
ticket when called upon so to do. He alleged
that the conduct of the conductor was violent and Insulting.
At the trln! of the case, the appellants re<iuested the court to Instruct the jury as
follows:
"(7) If the jury believe tile conductor
eaught tlre appellee violently, etc., by the
eollnr and dragged him from his sent, while
.a pa$enger In the train, the 1tppellee Is not
eQtitled t.o recoTer tor the same In this action
against the appellants, unless they believe
the appellants authorized the net, and adopted a.nd justified It since Its committal.
"(8) That If the jury believe the conductor
wrongfully extorted from the appellee the
fare from Martinsburg to Bnlthnore, after
the appellee had surrendered bis · ticket, etc.,
the appellee wus not entitled to recover vindictive or punitive damages from the nppellantB, unless they expressly or Impliedly participated In the t.ortlous act authorizing It before, M approving It after, It was committed."
Concerning these two requests, the conrt
say: "The conductors and employee!l of the
corporation represent them In the dl!ldmrge
of these functions, and being In the line of
their duty In collecting the fare or taking up
tickets, the corporation Is liable for any
abuse of their authority, whether of omission
or commls!llon. Vlde Redf. R. R. 381, note
ti, and authorities there cited. 'l'he court
was, therefore, right In rejecting so much of
the defendants' prayers, as limited their Ila-
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blllty to such tortlous acts <>f their agents as
they had either personally authorized or subsequently approved."
The seventh and eighth prayers, requiring
the plaintiff to prove either previous authority or subsequent approval of the acts of the
conductor to render the defendant liable,
were rejected for reasons before assigned
(those above copied). "The prayer of the appellee claims compensation-for Injury to his
feelings and degradation of character. The
appellant's eighth prayer afll1·ms he ls not
entitled to recover vindictive or punltory
damages ngnlnst the company, unless they
expressly or Impliedly participated In the
tort, by authorizing It before, or approving It
after. 'Ye have nlrl'ndy declared our oplnion
on the lntter branch of this proposition.
This court, In the case of Gaither v. Blowem,
11 Md. iJ;-,2_ said, that where the Injury wns
accompanle<I with force or malice, the Injured party might recover exemplary damages. The action being vi et armls, or In
that chnn1cter, the jury were authorize<\ to
give whatever damages the evidence showed
the Immediate conse'quence or the wrong
warranted, and which necessarily resulted
from the net complained of. 2 Green!. Ev.
§§ 89, 25-l; McNamara v. King, 2 Gilman,
436; McTn \'lsh v. Carroll, 13 Md. 439."
This ls all that ls said upon this question.
I have quoted the requested Instructions, and
the remarks of the court upon them. The
conclusion of the court~ and the law of that
case, is found In these words: "The action
being vi et armls, or In that choracter, the
jury were authorized to give whatever dnm·
ages tl1e evidence showed the lmmedia te
consequences of the wrong wnITanted, and
which necessnrlly resulted from the net complained of."
A careful examination of that case will disclose the ta.ct that the question of damage
raised und decided, was whether the plalntltr had n right In such case to recovet· "for
Injury to his feelings, and degradation of
chnrnctet·." This was the prayer of the nppellee, and he asked no more, and no other
instruction was given. These were treated
as exemplary dnmnges by the appellants, nml
they sought, by their request, to limit the
damages to the actual physical and pecunin·
ry Injuries. An examination of the authorities cited by the court In their opinion will
lend to the conclusion that they regarded
thnt as the question, and considered such
damages exemplary damages. They cite Mr.
Grcenleuf fo1· the mle they lny down, and I
hnza1·d the opinion that Mr. Grecnlenf Ue\·er
expected to be quoted ns an authority fo1•
punitive damages In civil actlous. (Hee his
note to section '.!.J3. volume 2, on Evidence.)
The case of Gaither v. Blowers, referrell to,
goes no further than l\Ir. Greenleaf, and his
language, totldem verbls, is used as the authority for the doctrine advanced.
Mr. Greenleaf, In the note refel'l'ed to,

54

54

CO\IPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

speaking of the term “exemplary damages,"

as used by the courts in a case he is review-

ing, says: “From this and other expressions

it may well be inferred, that by actual dam-

ages the court meant those which were sus-

ceptible of computation, and that by exem-

plary damages or smart-money they intended

those damages which were given to the plain-

tiff for the circumstances of aggravation at-

tending the injury he had received, and go-

ing to enhance its amount. but which were

left to the discretion of the jury, not being

susceptible of any other rule."

The rulings, in the case at bar, covered all

these intangible matters before reaching the

point of punishing the defendant corporation.

They had been told “to consider the injury to

his feelings, his wounded pride, his wounded

self-respect, his mental pain and suffering oc-
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casioned by the assault, and the feeling of

degradation that necessarily resulted fromit."

This was going as far as the court in Mary-

land went or was asked to go, and does not

reach the ground of complaint in the case at

bar. I ﬁnd no evidence in it of a design togo

beyond this; the rule was declared in plain

terms to be such damages as “the evidence

showed the immediate consequence of the

wrong warranted, and which necessarily re-

sulted from the act complained of." This

certainly does not include damages by way

of punishing the defendants. Such damages

would not be the immediate consequence of

the wrong, and necessarily resulting from it.

Some comment is made concerning the re-

tention of Jackson in the defendant's em-

ploy. All that I ﬁnd, in the report of the

case concerning the matter, is a statement,

made by the plaintif f in his testimony, that

he had seen him several times since, in per-

formance of duties upon the train.

So far as any question arises upon the rule

of damages laid down in the instruction, it is

quite apparent this is perfectly immaterial,

and could be regarded, in any event, only as

remote evidence of ratiﬁcation. If he was

retained in their employ, we do not know un-

der what circumstances; possibly they were

such as would have furnished to the mind of

any reasonable man a perfect justitication;

sitting here. we must take the report as we

ﬁnd it. The opinion states that the jury un-

doubtedly regarded it as “a practical ratiﬁ-

cation and approval of his conduct." Could

they have done so if they had been correctly

instructed in the theory now advanced?

What was there to ratify? Yea, more, who

was there to ratify? If the servant is the

corporation, and the act of commission was

the act of the corporation, was there any-

thing to ratify? Was it not an original act

of the corporation? Did they ratify their

own act? If the act of commission was orig-

inally theirs, the act of retention was a sub-

sequent act, having no relation to the ﬁrst.

Did that infringe any right of his? If it

did, it was a new and substantive cause of

compnint not embraced in this declaration.
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speaking of the term "exemplary damages,"
as used by the courts in a case he is review·
ing, says: "From this and other expressions
it may well be Inferred, that by actual damages the court meant those which were susceptible of computation, and that by exemplary damages or smart-money they intended
thoi;e damages which were given to the plaiutil't'. for the circumstances of aggravation attending the Injury he had received, and going to enhance its amount, but which were
left to the discretion of the jury, not being
susceptible of any other rule."
Tl!e l'Ulings, In the case at bar, covered all
tllesc intangible matters before reaching tile
point of punishing the defendant corporation.
'l'hey had been told "to consider the Injury to
his feelings, his wounded pride, hls wounded
self-respect, his mental pain and suffering occasioned by the assault, and the feeling of
degradation that necessarily resulted from It."
This was going as far as the court In Maryland went or was asked to go, and does not
r·ench the ground of complaint In the case at
bar. I find no evidence in it of a design to go
beyond this; the rule was declared In plain
terms to be such damages as "the evidence
showed the immediate consequence of the
wrong warranted, and which necessarily resulte<l from the act complained of." This
certainly does not include damages by way
of punishing the defendants. Such damages
would not be the immediate consequence of
the wrong, and necessarily resulting from It.
Some comment ls made concerning the reten tlon of Jackson in the defendant's employ. All that I find, In the report of the
case concerning the matter, is a statement,
made by the plaintiff in his testimony, that
he had seen him several times since, in performance of duties upon the train.
So far as any question arises upon the mle
of damages lald down In the instruction, it ls
quite apparent this ls perfectly immaterial,
and could be regarded, in any event, only as
remote evidence of ratification. If he was
retained In their employ, we do not know under what circumstances; possibly they were
· such as would have furnished to the mind of
uuy reasonable man a perfect justification;
sitting here, we must take the report as we
find it. The opinion states that the jury undoubtedly regarded lt as "a practical ratification and approval of bis conduct." Could
they have done so if they had been correctly
instructed In the theory now a<lvanced?
What wus there to ratify? Yea., more, who
was there to ratify? If the servant is the
corporation, and the act ot commission was
the act of the corporation, was thern anything to ratify? Was It not an original act
of the corporation? Did they ratify their
own act? If the act of commission was originally theirs, the act of 1·etentlon was a subsequent act, having no relation to the first.
Did that infringe any rl~ht of his? If it
did, it was a new and substanti're cause of

compalnt not embraced in this declaration.
If, however, the theory which is now advanced ls not only novel but unsound, and
that previous command or subsequent approval was necessary to warrant the Infliction of punlsllment, the matter was of vital
lmpo11ance, and the defendants should have
had the advantage of the instruction. It is
not quite right, I think, to now assume that
the jury regarded it as a ratificntlon. Possibly the gentlemen composing that jury were
not quite prepared to find that the gentlemen composing the admlnlstratlve and executive departments of that corporation were
so lost to all tllat Is decent and honorable
among men, and so blind to their own lnter-ests that they would justify an act condemned · by everybody_ Giving full force to
the encomiums bestowed In the opinion upon
juries, might we not • conclude that they
would be more likely to infer, from the circumstances, that such amends had been made
as honorable gentlemen would require, rather
than convict them of an act that any prison
convict would cry out against?
Will it do to shield the verdict with that
which the jury were substantially told was
immaterial?
I have not considered this case upon the
motion, or upon any facts supposed to be
proved by the evidence reported, nor have I
considered the question whethel", under the
plnlntltr's declaration, he cnn recover upon
the grounds set forth in the opinion. I have
only considered the rule advanced by the Instructions. Under tl1is rule a railroad corporation may exerclse all possible care in the
selection of servants, and strictly enjoin them
from day to day against any irregularity of
conduct; yet if one of them, unmindful of
his duty, regardless of his master's interest,
and bent on exercising some private mo.lice
against a person who happened to be a traveler, assaults him, the corporation must not
only make full compensation for all the Injury, under the most liberal rules, but may
be punished for an act they have used every
endeavor within the reach of human power
to prevent. One committed by another,
ago.Inst their wishes, interest, and positive
commands: and it is to be such a punishment as wlll "serve as a warning and example to others."
If we were punishing the actor himself, we
should consider the probable efrect of a given
punishment upon him; but when, for his offense, we punish another, how can we form
any idea of the Influence of a punishment he
cannot feel. The master may discharge him
from his employment, and he thus feel the
punishment another suft.'ers Indirectly, and to
that extent. It will be perceived, however,
that this is the extent for all classes, kinds,
and deg1·ees of offense. It is the only channel through which he can be made to feel it.
But auppose It were otherwise, Is the punishment which is Inflicted upon the Innocent
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party any the less keen, unjust, and onerous?

Is that in any degree affected by the man-

ner in which the offender receives the intelli-

gence of its inﬂiction upon another? Again;

how shall the corporation avoid the constant

recurrence of penalties for the offenses of

others? Can they, when they select another

servant, exercise any more care or be more

watchful over him? Can they change the

passions of men? What is their fault if they

have exercised all the care, wisdom, and pru-

dence with which men are invested? Must

they be punished for not being omnipotent?

If the idea and design of punishment is to

restrain the offender and make the punish-

ment serve as a warning to others, how can

it better be done than by making it personal;

inﬂicting it upon the offender? How can its

inﬂuence upon others be made more restrain-

ing than by the reﬂection that they must per-
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sonally suffer the same punishment it they

offend? Is the reﬂection that others will suf-

fer it, more potent with that class of individ-

uals? Has the observation of men led to

this conclusion? And if it has, have all the

principles of reason, right, and justice yield-

ed to it and made it right?

If the punishment, thus inﬂicted, is to serve

as a warning to others, who must take warn-

ing? Evidently the innocent as well as guilty.

The innocent are to be the greatest suffer-

ers by reason of the offense, and punished

alone directly. It is to serve as a warning

to all innocent persons, that they may be pun-

ished for the offenses of others. after having

fully compensated the injury done.

One other consideration I barely suggest.

The liability in this case is based upon a con-

tract; purely so. No liability could, under

the proof, arise by the rules of law applica-

ble to master and servant. Had the plaintiff

been a stranger to the defendants, and had no

claims upon them, except such as each citizen

owes to the other, no liability of any kind

would have attached to these defendants for

the willful trespass of their servant. Not

only would they be saved punishment, but

compensation even. Now it being a case

where no liability would attach, but for the

contract, and the liability which does attach

being for breach of contract. the rule in this

case is not only punishing one for the act of

another, but it is doing this in an action ex

contractu, for this declaration must be con-

strued to be such to meet the law of the opin-

ion.

All consideration of the matter tends to

show the fundamental error in holding an in-

nocent party liable to punishment. In all

these acts, done by the command of the

principal (whether the authority appears by

direct command or by fair implication from

the proceedings of the party charged), there

is propriety in punishing if the act be wrong

and an infraction of the moral code; but

in those cases Where the act is unauthor-

ized, and the principal is in nowise con-

nected with the animus of the actor, and

becomes liable to compensate upon grounds

party any the less keen, unjust, and onerous?
Is that in an.r degree affected by the manner in which the otrender receives the lntelllgence of Its lntllctlon upon another? .Again;
J,low shall the corporation avoid the con~tant
recurrence of penalties for the offenses of
others? Can they, when they select nnotber
servant, exercise any more care or be more
watchful over him? Can they change the
oossions ot men? What Is their fault If they
have exercised all the care, wisdom, and prudence with which men are Invested? Must
they be punished tor not being omnipotent?
It the idea and design of punishment Is to
restrain the offender and make tbe punishment sen·e as a warning to otht>rs, how can
It better be done than hy making It per!lonal;
lntlictlng It upon the offender? How can Its
intluence upon others be made more restraining than by the rettection tbat they must personally sulfer the same punishment If they
otfend? Is the reflection that otbers will 1mf·
ter It. more potent with that class of lnillvlduals? Has the observation of men led to
this conclusion? And If It has, have all the
principles ot reason, right, and justice yielded to it and made it right?
If the punishment, thus Inflicted, is to serve
as a warulng to others, who must take warning? Evidently the Innocent as well as guilty.
The innocent are to be the greatest sufferers by reason of the offense, and punished
alone directly. It is to serve as a warning
to all innocent persons, that they may be punished tor the offenses ot otLers, after having
tully compensated the injury done.
One other consideration I llarely suggest.
The liablllty in this case is based upon n contract; purely so. No liability could, under
the proof, arise by the rules of law applicable to master and servant Hod the plaintiff
been a stranger to the defendants, and had no
claims upon them, except such as each citizen
owes to the other, no liability of any kind
would have attached to these defendants tor
the willful trespass of their servant Not
only would they be saved punishment, but
compensation even. Now It being a case
where no llabjlity would attach, but for the
contract, and the liability which does attach
being tor breach or contract, the rule In this

case Is not only punishing one tor the act ot
another, but It Is doing this in au action ex
contructu, tor this declaration must be construed to be such to meet the law ot the opinion.
All consideration of the matter tends to
show the tundmnental error in holding an innocent party liable to punishment. In all
these acts, done by the command ot the
principal (whether the authority appears liy
direct command or by fair implication froIU
the proceedings of the party charged), there
Is propriety in punishing if the act be wrong
and an infl·actlon of the moral code; but
in tho1:1e cases 'there the act is unautho1·ized, and the principal is In nowise connectl'<l with the animus of the actor, and
becomes liable to compensate upon grounds
other than that the act was done by his
command, It appears to me that all punishment inflicted, or rather all sutrerlng lmpo11ed under the name ot punishment, is tlagrant injustice; it ls not punishment, tor It
has not its necessary antecedent, wrong: both
reason and authority are opposed to It, and
no case can be found, where the question has
been l>resented and discussed, In which such
doetrll\es are not denounced ns unsound and
unjm1t In addition to the cases which I
have cited, there ls the pregnant tact that
no case can be found in llassachusetts or
New York where it has ever bad any sanction. even In the inferior courts; and no ens&
can be found, t}lat I nm aware of, where any
party has sought to establlsh any such rule
by an appeal to the superior courts or courts
of last resort ln those states. Yet these
states are a net-work of rallroods, ooo questions of liability are constantly arising and
being settled by the courts ot those states.
It appears to me the tact has some significance.
The rule established in this case ls 80 important, and fraught with such results under
the ordinary modes of administering law,
that I have felt impelled to enter my dissent
at length, and regret that the pressure of
other duties has prevented me from giving
a more extended examination ot the authorities, and the compression of them and my
own views Into a narrower compa&EI.
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/my examination, hearing, or trial.

WHEELER & WILSON MANUF'G CO. et

al. v. BOYCE.

(13 Pac. 609, 36 Kan. 350.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. April 8, 1887.

Supreme Court of Kansas. April 8, 1887.
Error from Shawnee county.
Waters & Ensminger, for plalntlt'fe In err-or. G. N. Elliott, for defendant In error.

Error from Shawnee county.

Waters & Ensminger, for plaintiffs in er-

ror. G. N. Elliott, for defendant in error.

JOHNSTON, J. This is a proceeding to

reverse a judgment rendered in an action

for glie_in_tEi,s_oAr_nent, brought by Jacob F.

Boyce against the Wheeler & Wilson Manu-

facturing Company, C. S. Baker, and J. W.

Hughes. Hughes was dismissed from the

action. and the judgment went only against

the plaintiff in error. The facts upon which

the case was disposed of are substantially

these: The Wheeler & Wilson Manufactur-

ing Company, a corporation organized for
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the manufacture and sale of sewing-ma-

chines, was engaged in business at Topeka,

Kansas, and C. S. Baker was its general

agent at that place. The company had sold

a sewing-machine to Mary Hatﬁeld, who

subsequently married Jacob F. Boyce, the

defendant in error. She paid a part of the

purchase money, and signed a contract, in

substance that the title to the machine

should remain in the company until the bal-

ance of the purchase money was paid. In

November, 1881, the company directed its

general agent to bring an action of repievin

against Mary Boyce to recover the machine,

claiming that there was a balance due there-

on, a claim which she denied. An action

-of replevin was begun before a justice of

-the peace, and a writ was issued and placed

.in the hands of Constable Hughes, who re-

ported that he had made search for the ma-

chine, and was unable to obtain possession

of it. C. S. Baker, the agent of the com-

pany, then directed Hughes to make and ﬁle

an afﬁdavit before the justice of the peace,

alleging that Mary Boyce and her husband,

Jacob F. Boyce, were in possession of the

-machine, and had refused to deliver it to

him, and thus obtain a warrant for their ar-

rest. This was done, and the justice issued

a warrant to the constable commanding him

to arrest Boyce and his wife, and commit

them to the Shawnee county jail, there to

remain until they should deliver the ma-

fchine. Under this warrant. Jacob F. Boyce

was arrested and placed in jail without be-

ing taken before the justice, and without

The con-

stable informed the general agent of the

company that he had arrested Boyce, and

placed him in the county jail as requested,

and Baker replied: "Now, I guess he will

give up the machine." The repievin action

resulted in a judgment in favor of Mary

Boyce. Jacob F. Boyce was held in the

county jail for 10 days, and was never

taken before any court or oﬂicer for exam-

ination or trial, and was ﬁnally discharged

at the instance of the plaintiffs in error, and

he became sick in consequence of his con-

JOHNSTON, J. Thie ls a proceeding to
f."e\·erse a judgment rendered In an action
for false Imprisonment, brought by Jacob F.
.llO.}°Ce against the Wheeler & Wilson ManutactUl"ing Company, C. S. Baker, and J. W.
Hughes. Hughes was dismissed from the
action, and the judgment went only against
the plaintiffs In error. The facts upon which
the case was disposed of arc substantially
these: The Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Company, a corporation 01·g:rnlzed for
the manufacture and sale of sewing-machines, was engaged In business at Topeka,
Kansas, and C. S. Baker was its general
agent at that place. The company had sold
a sewing-machine to Mary Hatfield, who
flubsequently married .Jacob l•'. Boyce, the
defendant in error. She paid a pal"t. of the
purchase money, and signed n contmct, In
substance that the title to the machine
.should remain in the company until the balance of the purchase money was paid. In
November, 1881, the company directed 1ts
general agent to bring an action of replevln
.against Mary Boyce to recover the machine,
claiming that there was a balance due there-00, a claim which she denied.
An action
.of replevln was begun before a justice of
.the peace, and a writ wns Issued and placed
.In the hands of Constable Hughes, who reported that he had made search for the machine, and was unable to obtain possession
ot It. C. S. Baker, the agent of the company, then directed Hughes to make and file
an affidavit before the justice ot the peace,
alleging that :uary Boyce and her husband,
Jacob F. Boyce, were In possession or the
-machine, and had refused to deliver It to
him, and thus obtain a warrnnt for tbek ar.
rest. This was done, and the justice Issued
a warrant to the constable comni:111<llng him
to arrest Boyce and bis wife, and commit
them to the Shawnee county jail, there to
remain until they should deliver the mafchlne. Under this warrant..Tacob Ii'. Bovee
·was arreste(} and placed In jail without ·being taken before the justice, and without
,.A.!IY exnminntion, hearing, or trial. The constable Informed the general agent ot the
company thn t he had arrested Boyce, and
placed him In the county jall as requested,
and Baker replied: ".:\ow, I gu<'ss he will
give up the machine." The replevin action
resulted In a judgment In favor of l\lnry
Boyce. Jacob F. Boyce was held in the
eounty jnll for 10 days, and was never
taken before any court or oftker for examination or trial, and wns finally discharged

at the Instance of the plaintiffs In error, and
he became sick in consequence of his confinement. He at once Institute~ this action,
and the jury awarded him damages In the
sum ot $1,000, and the verdict was appr<:>ved
by the trial court.
The plainti!Is in error eomplain chiefly of the
rulings of the court In the matter of charging
the jury. The jury were Instructed that, If the~
evidence justified It, they coulcl find exemplary.
damages or sma1't-money against the defend·\
nuts. After the jury had been out some
time, and had practically agreed upon their
verdict, the court recalled them, and advised them that he was in err•)!' in glring the
Instruction that they mli:-ht In their discretion assess exemplary damages, and withdrew It-from the jury, telling them that In
their dellberntlous they should .-.consider
the Instruction withdrawn. Objection was
made to the wlthdra wal or the instruction,
and au application of plalntlft's In eL·rar tor
leave to address the jury after the =-t1oliification had been made was denied, and this
ruling is assigned as et"L'Or. '.l'hls decision'
aO'orcl!! the plnlntilfs In error no ground fo~
complnlnt. The action of the com·t was favorable rather than prejudicial to theil' Interests. The Instruction given was predicated upon sufficient facts, was warranted
under the law, and the defendant In error
alone had reason to complain of Its with·
drawal. It ls a well-established principle of
jurisprudence that corporations may be held
Hable for torts involving a wrong Intention, such ns false lmp1·lsoument; and exemplary damages may be recovered against
them for the wrongful acts of their ser\·ants and agents done In the course of their
employment, In all <'ll9CS and to the same extent that natural persons committing llke
wrongs would be held liable. In such cases · ~
·
the malice and fraud of the auth<>rlzed ' ·
agents are Imputable to the corpoL-atlons for\
which they acted. '.l'his principle ls too well
settled to require argument, and the authorities sustaining It are numerous and wellnigh unanimous. Hallroad Co. v. Slusser,
19 Ohio St. 157; Ralit"oad Co. v. Dunn, 19
Ohio St. 1G2; Goddard v. Railway, 57 Me.
202; IU!ilrond Co. Y. Quigley, 21 How. 213;
Rallrood Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; Rallniad Co. v. Balley, 40 lllss. 3D:J; Rallroad
Co. v. Bloeher. 27 l\Id. 277; Hopkins v. Railroad Co., RG N. H. 9; Railroad Co. v. Ham·
mer, 72 Ill. 3:13; Reed v. Bank, 130 MllBS.
443; Fenton v. :\Inchlne Co., 9 Pblla. 189;
Goodspeed v. Rnnk, 22 Conn. 530; Boogher
v. Association, ir.> ~lo. 319; Wheless '"· Bank,
1 Baxt. 469; Jordan v. Railroad Co., 74
Aln. 8:1; Williams v. Insurance Co., 57 Miss.
759; Vance v. Railway Co., 32 N. J. Law,
334; Cooley, Torts, 119; 3 Suth. Dam. 270,
and cases cited; 2 Walt, Act. & Def. 447,
and cases cited. The same doctrine has
been fully recognized on several occasions by
tbls court. Hailroad Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan.
437; Hallway Co. v. \\"ea\'er, 1ll Kan. 4:JU;
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Railway Co. v. Kessler, 18 Kan. 523; Ball-

way Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 269; News Co. v.

Wiimarth, 33 Kan. 510, 6 Pac. 786. The

withdrawal of the instruction, although er-

roneous, was beneﬁcial to the piaintiffs in er-

ror, and there can be no reversal unless the

erroneous ruling is injurious to the party

complaining.

It is next contended that the company can-

not be held liable for the wrongful acts of

Baker and the constable, and an instruction

is challenged which holds that, if the agent

of the company caused and procured the lllei-

gal arrest and detention of the defendant in

error as charged, the company and its agent

were both liable. Baker was the mana'gin

agent of the company; his authority was

general, and the constable act§I wholly un-

de‘r’ his direction and sanction. He had not,
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only authority to sell machines, and collect

the money due for the same, but it is con-

ceded that he had authority to institute le-

gal proceedings to recover possession of the

machines conditionally sold, and for which

payment had not been made in accordance

with the terms of sale. . The arrest and de-

tention of Boyce was incidental to the re-

plevin action, and was made, as alleged, to

compel the delivery of the machine under a

provision of the Justices' Code relating to

replevin, which provides that where the de-

fendants, or any other persons, knowingly

conceal the property replevied, or, having the

control thereof, refuse to deliver the same

to the oﬂicer, they may be committed until

they disclose where the property is, or de-'

liver the same to the oﬂlcer. Comp. Laws

1879, c. 81, § 69. He had full authority to

represent the company, and whatever was

done by him was done for the beneﬁt of the

company, and for the accomplishment of its

purpose. His act, although wrongful, was in

the line of his employment. was done in the

execution of the authority conferred upon

him, and must be regarded as the act of the

company. To make the corporation respon-

sible, it is not necessary, as plaintiffs in er-

ror contend, that the principal should have

directly authorized the particular wrongful

act of the agent, or should have subsequently

ratiﬁed it. Judge Story, in treating of the

liability of principals for the acts of their

agents, says that “the principal is held liable

to third persons in a civil suit for tile frauds,

deceits, concealments, misrepresentations,

torts, negligences, and other malfeasances or

misfeasances and omissions of duty of his

agent in the course of his employment, al-

though the principal did not authorize or jus-

tify or participate in, or, indeed, know of

such misconduct, or even if he forbade or

disapproved of them," and to sustain this he

cites numerous authorities. “In all such

cases," he says, “the rule applies, respondeat

superior, and it is founded upon public policy

and convenience, for in no other way could

there be any safety to third persons in their

dealings, either directly with the principal,

Railway Co. v. Kessler, 18 Kan. 523; Railway Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 269; News Co. v.
Wllmarth, 33 Iian. 510, 6 Pac. 786. The
withdrawal of the instruction, although erroneous, was beneficial to tbe plalntifrs in error, ai1d there can be no reversal unless the
erroneous ruling 1s Injurious to the party
<:omplalnlng.
It ls next contended that the company cannot be held liable for the wrongful nets ot
Baker and the constable, and an lustruction
Is challenged which holds that, If the agent
of the company caused and procured the lll~
gal arrest and detention of the defendant h~
error as charged, the company and Its agenu\
\Vere both Hable. Baker was the mana'gingl.
agent of the company; his authority was
general, and the constable nctea wholly under'his direction 11nd sanction. He had not,
only authority to sell machines, and collect'
the money due for the same, but It Is con<:eded that he had authority to Institute legal proceedings to re<:over possession of the
machines conditionally sold, and for which
payment had not been made In ncco1-Uance
with the terms of sale. '.fbe arrest and det~ntlon of Boyce was Incidental to the replevin actlon, and was made, as alleged, to
rompel the delivery of the machine under a
provision of the Justices' Code relating to
replevin, which provides that where the defendants, or any other persons, knowingly
ronceal the property replevled, or, having the
(!(lntrol thereof, refuse to deliver the same
to the oft1cer, they may be committed until
they disclose where the property ls, or de- '
liver the same to the omcer. Comp. Laws
1879, c. 81, I 69. He had full authority to
represent the company, and wbateYel' was
<lone by him was done for the benefit of tile
eompany, and for the accomplishment of Its
purpose. His act, although wrongful, was in
the line of his employment, was done In the
exe<:utlon of the authol'ity conferred upon
him, and must be regarded as the act of the
eompany. To make the corporation responsible, It ls not ne<:essary, ns plaintiffs In error contend, that the principal should have
dire<:tly authorized the particular wrongful
act of the ttgent, or should have subsequently
ratified It. Judge Story, In treating of the
liability of principals tor the acts of their
agents, says that "the principal ls held liable
to third persons In a civil suit tor
frauds,
deceits, concealments, misrepresentations,
torts, negligences, nnd other malfeasances or
misfeasances and omissions of duty of his
agent In the course of bis employment, although the prlncl1lal did not authorize or justify or participate In, or, Indeed, know of
such misconduct, or even If he forbade .or
dlsappro>ed of them," and to sustain this he
cites numerou!!l authorities. "In nil such
cases," he says, "the rule applies, respondeat
superior, and it Is founded upon public policy
and convenience, for In no other way could
there be any safety to thircl persons in their
dealings, either directly with the principal,
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or lndlre<:tly with him through the Instrumentality of agents." Story, Ag. I 452.
They complain, further, of an Instruction
In which the court stated that the w111T1LI1t
under which Boyce was taken and held In
custody was lllegal and void, and lnsumclent
' In law to justify his arrest and. Imprisonment. 'l'be warrant, as we have seen, was
Issued upon au affidavit charging Boyce with
having control of the property replevled, anJ.
of refusing to deliver It to the officer who
had the writ. There was no process Issued
except the warrant, and It commanded that
he be committed at once to the county jail
until he should deliver the prooperty to the
otHcer. No notice was given to him that the
charge stated In the aftl<lavlt bod been made
against him, nor was an opportunity glyen
him to refute It The order ot commitment
was not based upon any examination, hearing, or trial, but was arbitrarily made, in
the absence of Boyce, upon ex parte statement. The plaintltrs In error attempt to justify this action, though not seriously, we
think, under section 139 of the Justices' Code,
already referred to, which rends as follows:
"Whenever It shall be made to appear, to the
satisfaction of the justice, by the amdavlt
of the plalntlfr or otl1erwlse, that the defendant, or any <Yther person, knowingly conceals
the propel'ty sought to be recovered, or, having control thereof, refuses to dellver the
same to the omcer, the justice may commit
such d1?fendant or other person until he or
they disclose where such property Is, or deliver the same to the omcer." '.fbe proceeding authorized by this statute ls vh'tually one
for the punishment of contempt. Whether
a party is to be brought before the justice
of the peace upon a notice or by attachment,
or what the Initial proceeding shall be, ls not
expressly provided. The se<:tlon quoted does
provide what punishment shall finally be visited upon a party; but this punishment Is
not to be administered until the guilt of the
party Is "mnde to appear to the satisfaction
of the justice." This language Implies that
there is to be a hearing and an adjudication
of the charge upon Its merits. When a contempt Is committed in facle curl~. the punlE:hment Is generally summary, and no lnl·
tlal proceeding ls required; but, when It Is
not committed In the view of the court, the
lnltln.I proceedings are necessary, and the
party must have notice and opportunity to
defend. The most common Initial process
Is a rule or order to show cause why 1111 attachment or warrant for contempt should not
Issue, of which service should be made; and,
In a procee<llng to punish for criminal contempt, perso11al notice ot the accusation Is
lndh1pernmble. Whnte>er procedure may be
adopted, It Is certain tbnt a party cannot be
condemned without notice: and a final judgment rendered, as was done In this case,
without a hearing or an opportunity to defend, Is void. Rap. Contempt, § OG. While '
the language of the statute Is not very ex-
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pliclt, it does not require the interpretation

contended for, and, it‘ it did, it would neces-

sarily be held void.

The ﬁnal error assigned is that the dam-

ages awarded are excessive. This assign-

ment is as groundless as those already con-

sidered. The case is an aggravated one, and

the conduct of the plaintiffs in error exhibit-

ed a wanton and reckless disregard of the

rights of the defendant in error. He was

not a party to the replevin action, and the

testimony is that the machine in controversy

was purchased long before he was married

to the plaintiff in that action, and that he

had no interest in or control over it. He was

thrust into jail, without warning or trial,

when there was no civil or criminal suit

pending against him, and kept there for 10-

days with 17 or 18 prisoners who were ei- “
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ther charged with or convicted of crimes.

The sewing-machine sought to be recovered

from his wife had been paid for, and belong-

ed absolutely to her; and plaintiffs in error,

with knowledge oif this fact, undertook to

compel the payment of money not due, or

the recovery of property which they did not

own, by the arrest and incarceration of the

defendant in error, without cause, and in a

manner that was clearly illegal. Apart from

the loss of time and interruption to his busi-

ness, as well as the humiliation and indigni-

ty suffered by him by being thrust into jail

upon a false charge, it appears that the con-

ﬁnement resulted in his sickness; and when

we consider the malicious and oppressive

conduct of the plaintiffs in error, and that

the case‘ is one which calls for the inﬂiction

of exemplary or punitive damages, we can

only conclude that the verdict of $1,000 in

favor of the defendant was fully justiﬁed,

if not too small. We can say without hesita-

tion that an award of a larger amount would

not have been disturbed on the ground that

it was excessive.

It follows that the assignments of error

must be overruled, and the judgment of the

district court afﬁrmed.

All the justices concurring.
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pllclt, It does not require the Interpretation compel the payment of money not due, or
contended for, and, if lt did, lt would neces- the recovery of property which they did not
own, by the arrest and Incarceration of the
sarily be held void.
The final error assigned Is that the dam- defendant In error, without cause, and in a
ag<lS awarded are excessive. Thls assign· manner that was clearly Illegal. Apart from
me;;;.t Is as groundless aa those already con- the Joss of time nnd Interruption to his busisidered. The case ls an aggravated one, and ness, as well as the humiliation and indigni·
the conduct of the plaintiffs In error exhibit· ty suffered by him by being thrust Into jail
ed a wanton nnd reckless disregard of the upon a false chnrge, lt appears that the conl'ights of the defendant in error. He was finement resulted in his sickness; and when
not a party to the replevin action, and the we consider the malicious and oppressive
testimony is that the machine In contt·oversy conduct of the plalntltrs ln error, and that
was purchased long before he was married the case is one which calls !or the lnflictlou
to the plaintitr In that action, and that he of exemplary or punitlve damages, we cau
had no Interest ln or control over lt. He was only conclude that the verdict of $1,000 ln
thrust into jail, without warning or trial, favor of the defendant was fully justified,
when there was no civil or criminal sult If not too small. We can say without hesitapending against him, and kept there for 10 tion that an award of a larger amount would
days with 17 or 18 prisoners who were el- · not have been disturbed on the ground that
ther charged with or convicted of crimes. It was excessive.
The sewing-machine sought to be recovered
It follows that the assignments or error
from his wife had been paid for, and belong· must be overruled, and the judgment of the
ed absolutely to her; and plalntltrs in error, district court affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
with knowledge of thls fact, undertook to
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proper Instructions. They were tolll: "If
the jury believe from the evidence that the
defendant's agents or employes, or any of
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. March 5, 1887. them, lo charge of defendant's train, carried
the plnintll'f beyond the station for which
Appeal from clrcult court, Marlon county. she had purchased a ticket, and refused to
Wm. Lindsay and Hountree & Lisle, for put her ol'f at her station, and were Indecorous
appellant. Hill & Rlves, !or appellee.
or Insulting, either in words, tone,Orliianner, they should find f01· the plaintll'f, and
HOLT, J. The appellee, Lou. E. Ballard, a ward her. damages In their discretion, not
after purchasing a proper ticket, took pas- exceeding tlve thousand dollars, the amount
sage fr<>m one Intermediate .station to an- claimed in the petition."
other, upon a passenger train of the Loulsvlll!!
A corporation can act only through natr
& Nashville Railroad. It failed to stop at ural persons. It of necessity commits Its
the platform at her place or destination, wblch business absolutely to their charge. They
was a flag station. It was a down grade at are, however, selected by It. In the case of
that point, and there Is some evidence tend- a railroad, the safety and comfort of pasing to show that the car brakes did not op- sengers ls necessarily committed to them.
erate well, In consequence ot which the train They act tor It. Its entire power, pro hac
ran some 50 or 60 yards beyond the platform, vice, ls vested In them. and as to passengers
where It was stopped, and the station then In trnnsltu they should be cunsidered as th~
announced by the proper person, but the corporation Itself. It Is therefore ns rl.'t!pon!
appellee did not get off the train. Upon the sible for their acts in the conduct of the train•
other hand, there ls testimony tending to show and the treatment of the passengers, as the
that this stop was not made, and that no otHcers of the train would be for themselves,1
etrort was made to stop the train, until It If they were tl\,e owners of It. \Public lnterJ
was done at the request of the appellee, at ests require this rule.' They atso demand
a point between her destination and the next that the corporation should be and lt Is liastation. The weight of the evidence shows ble for exemplary damages In case of an
that the conductor then Informed her that Injury to a passenger resulting from a violashe could either go on to the next station, or tion of duty by one of Its employes In the
he would stop the train and she could get otr conduct of the train, If lt be ac.oeompanled by'.
there; and that, upon bis so telllng her the oppression, fraud, malice, Insult, or other will- ;
aecon4 time, be did stop It, and she got off ful misconduct. evincing a reckless dlsreganl ·
at that point, which was a lonely place, and of consequences. Dawson v. Louisville & N.
R. Co., 6 Ky.
Rep. 608.
about a mile beyond ber station.
She Mys that the conductor "seemed very
As to female passengers the rwe goes
Impatient, and his ton& was rather rough still farther. Their contract of passage emfor a gentleman;" that he did not assist ner braces an Implied stipulation that the cory
in getting otr with her baggage, which con- poratlon wlll protect them against general
Blsted of a valise and bunllle; and that, as obscenity, Immodest conduct. or wnnton apshe jumped from the lowel.' step of the plat- proach. Com. v. Pow~. 7 Mete. (Mass.) 596.
form to the ground, be stood upon tbe plat- Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657; Nieto
form, wblle a brakeman or the train, who v. Clark, 1 Clll'f. 145, Fed. Cas. N<>. 10,262;
was standing by, looked at her and "grinned." Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242, I<'ed.
Upon the other hand, there ls evidence to Cas. N<>. 2,a75.
the e«ect that the conductor did assist her
It was Improper, however, to Instruct the
out of the car, and wn.s altogether klnd and jury, as was In effect done In this instance,
polite lo bis manner. There was no requ
that "indecorous" conduct alone Is suftlcient
upon her part that the train should be back to authorize exemplary damages. The term
ed to her station, but this should have been 18 too broad. It mny embrace conduct which
done, under the circumstances. The appel- would not authorize their lnfliction. It ls
lee was compelled to walk back to her sta- true that the peculiar element which, entertion, and from thence, three-quarters of a ing Into the commission of wrongful acts,
mile, to her home, In consequence of which justifies the lmposltlon of such damnges, canshe was confined to her bed the most of the not be so definitely defl.ned, perhaps, as to
time for three or four days, and unn ble to meet every
that may arise. It has been
teach her school for a week. 'l'he jury ln said that they are allowable where the wrongthis action by her for damages returned a ful act bas been accompanied with "circumverdict for $3,000.
stances of aggravation," (Chiles v. Drake, 2
Manifestly It cannot be sustained upon the Mete. [Ky.] 146;) or If a trespass be "commitground that It dld not Include exemplary ted In a high-banded and threatening mandamages, and was compensatory only, for a ner," (Jennings v. Maddox, 8 B. Mon. 430;)
breach of the contract for transportation. If or where the tort ls "accompanied by oppresupheld, lt must be upon the ground that she sion, fraud, malice, or negligence so great as
was entitled to exemplary damages, and that to raise a presumption of malice,'' (Parker v.
thll question was submitted to the jury by Jenkins, 3 Bush, 587;) or, as was said in
LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. BALLARD.

COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

(3 S. W. 530, 85 Ky. 307.)
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LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. BALLARD.

(3 S. W. 530, 85 Ky. 307.)

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. March 5, 1887.

Appeal f1om circuit court, Marion county.

Wm. Lindsay and Rountree & Lisle, for

appellant. Hill & Rives, for appellee.

HOLT, J. The appeilee. Lou. E. Ballard,

after purchasing a proper ticket, took pas-

sage from one intermediate station to an-

other, upon a passenger train of the Louisville

& Nashville Railroad. It failed to stop at

the platform at her place of destination, which

was a ﬂag station. It was a down grade at

that point, and there is some evidence tend-

ing to show that the car brakes did not op-

erate well, in consequence of which the train

ran some 50 or 60 yards beyond the platform,

where it was stopped, and the station then

announced by the proper person, but the
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appellee did not get off the train. Upon the

other hand. there is testimony tending to show

that this stop was not made, and that no

effort was made to stop the train. until it

was done at the request of the appeiiee, at

a point between her destination and the next

station. The weight of the evidence shows

that the conductor then informed her that

she could either go on to the next station, or

he would stop the train and she could get of

f

there; and that, upon his so telling her the

second time, he did stop it, and she got off

at that point, which was a lonely place, and

about a mile beyond her station.

She says that the conductor "seemed very

impatient, and his tone was rather rough

for a gentleman;" that he did not assist her

in getting off with her baggage, which con-

sisted of a valise and bundle; and that, as

she jumped from the lower step of the plat-

form to the ground, he stood upon the plat-

form, while a brakeman of the train, who

was standing by, looked at her and “grinned."

Upon the other hand. there is evidence to

the effect that the conductor did assist her

out of the car, and was altogether kind and

polite in his manner. There was no reques

upon her part that the train should be back

ed to her station, but this should have been

done, under the circumstances. The appel-

lee was compelled to walk back to her sta-

tion, and from thence, three-quarters of a

mile, to her home, in consequence of which

she was conﬁned to her bed the most of the

time for three or four days, and unable to

teach her school for a week. The jury in

this action by her for damages returned a

verdict for $3,000.

Manifestly it cannot be sustained upon the

ground that it did not include exemplary

damages, and was compensatory only, for a

breach of the contract for transportation. if

upheld, it must be upon the ground that she

was entitled to exemplary damages, and that

this question was submitted to the jury by\

proper instructions. They were told: “If

the jury believe from the evidence that the

defendant's agents or employes, or any of
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Dawson v. Railroad Co., supra, where the

wrongful act is accompanied by “insult, indig-

nity, oppression, or inhumanity."

It would, however, be extending the rule

unwarrantably to hold that they could be

imposed provided the conduct was merely

“indecorous." This, as deﬁned by Webster,

and as commonly understood, means impolite,

or a violation of good manners or proper

breeding. It is broad enough to cover the

slightest departure from the most polished

politeness to conduct which is vuigar and

insulting. It does not necessarily, or, indeed,

generally, involve an insult. The latter as-

sumes superiority, and offends the self-re-

spect of the person to whom it is offered,

while the former excites pity or contempt for

the one guilty of it. A word or act may be

both indecorous and insulting, but yet it

often lacks the essential elements of an in-
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suit.

In the ease now under consideration the

jury may have believed it was indecorous in

the conductor not to stop the train at the

platform, or not to carry her valise for her

when she was leaving the train, or to let

her get off between stations, although she

chose to do so rather than suffer inconveni-

ence by being carried to the next one, or in

merely telling her that she could walk back

to her station; yet none of these things

amounted to “insult, indignity, oppression, or

inhumanity."

The lower court properly refused the re-

quest as made for special ﬁndings. The in-

terrogatories offered merely required the jury

to say what amount they found as compensato-

ry, and what sum as exemplary damages. They

involved mixed questions of law and of fact.

Upon a retrial the question of limiting the

ﬁnding to compensatory damages should be

presented to the jury under proper instruc-

tions. and the difference between them and

those which are exemplary deiined.

The evidence as to the conduct of the brake-

man was competent. It is true that it was

not speciﬁcally complained of in the petition,

but only that of the conductor. The brake-

man was, however, one of the agents of the

railroad company in the management of the

train upon which the appellee was a passen-

ger. It is riot necessary that a petition should

enumerate speciﬁcally that this or that per-

son connected with the management of the

train was guilty of improper conduct in order

to authorize the admission of evidence as to

this or that particular party. It is suﬂicient/I

\

to aver the breach of duty upon the part of

those in control of the train. Besides, in this

instance, the conduct of the brakeman com-

plained of was in the immediate presence of

the conductor, and occurred at the time of

the other alleged acts of which the appellee

complains. We do not mean to say whetner

he was guilty of improper conduct or not,

but it was a part of the rm%az, and there-

fore admissible. Any circumsta ces attending

the commission of a trespass or a wrong, al-
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Dawson v. Railroad Co., supra, where the
wrongful act Is accompanied by "insult, indignity, oppression, or Inhumanity."
It would, however, be extending the rule
unwarrantably to hold that they could be
imposed provided the conduct was merely
"Indecorous." This, as defined by Webster,
and as commonly understood, means impollte,
or a violation of good manners or proper
brec!ling. It ls broad enough to cover the
slightest departure from the most polished
politeness to conduct which ls vulgar and
insulting. It does not necessarily, or, Indeed,
generally, involve an Insult. The latter assumes superiority, and otrends the self-respect of the person to whom it le otrered,
while the former excites pity or contempt for
the one ~rullty of It. A word or act may be
both Indecorous and Insulting, but yet It
often lacks the essential elements of an insult.
In the case now under consideration the
jury may have believed It was indecorous in
the conductor n<>t to stop the train at the
platform, or not to carry her vallse for her
when she was leaving the train, or to let
her get off between stations, although she
chose to do so rather than sutrer Inconvenience by being carried to the next one, or in
merely telling her that she could walk back
to her station; yet none of these things
amounted to "insult, indignity, oppression, or
Inhumanity."
The lower court properly refused the request as made tor special findings. The interrogatories offered mereiy required the jury
to say what amount they found as compensatory, and what sum as exemplary damages. They
Involved mixed questloos of law and of tact.

Upon a retrial the question of limiting the
finding to compensatory damages should be
presented to the jury under proper Instructions. and the dltrerence between them and
those which are exemplary defined.
The evidence as to the conduct of the brakeman was competent. It ls true that It WU
not specifically cowpralned of in the petition,
but only that or the conductor. The brakeman wa:i, however, one of the agents of the
railroad company in the management of the
train upon wiJJch the appellee was a passenger. It ls not necessary that a petition should
enumerate specifically that this or that person connected with the management of the
train was guilty of improper conduct in order
to authorize the admission of evidence as to
this or that particular party. It ls sufficlen-r1
to aver the breach of duty upon the part o~ \
those In control of the train. Besides, In this
Instance, the conduct of the brakeman complained of was In the Immediate presence of
the conductor, and occurred at the time of
the other alleged acts <>f which the appellee
complains. We do not mean to say whetner
be was guilty or Improper conduct or not,
but it was a part of the r~tre. and therefore admissible. Any clrcmnstaftces attending
the commission of a trespass or a wrong, although not set forth in the declaration, may
be given In evidence, with a view of a11'ect·
Ing the question of damages, save where
they within themselves constitute an independent cause of action. Sedg. Dam. side p.
·
538, note 3.
For the reason Indicated, the judgment below Is reversed, and cause remanded for a
new trial and further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

CO:MPE~S.ATORY .A.~D

CO.\IPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

EXEMPLARY D.UIAGES.

SOUTHERN KANSAS R. CO. v. RICE.
(16 Pac. 817, 38 Kan. 398.)
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SOUTHERN KANSAS R. CO. v. RICE.

(16 Pac. 817, 38 Kan. 398.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. Feb. 11, 1888.

Error to district court, Johnson county; J.

P. Hindman, Judge.

Action brought by Benjamin Rice against

the Southern Kansas Railroad Company on

October 31, 1885, to recover as damages the

sum of $1,000 for being unlawfully assaulted

and ejected from a passenger car by the con-

ductor thereof while returning from Kansas

City, Missouri, to Olathe, in this state; the

plaintiff at the time having a ticket to ride as

a passenger in the car. Subsequently therail-

road company ﬂied an answer containing a

general denial. Trial had at the \Iarch term,

1886. The jury returned a verdict for the

plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $117.-

46, and also made the following special ﬁnd-
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ings of facts: “(l) Did the conductor act

willfully, and in a grossly negligent manner,

in putting the defendant off the train? An-

swer. He willfully put him off the train.

(2) Did the conductor act with a reckless dis-

regard of the plaintiff's rights? A. Yes. (3)

Did the plaintiff state to the conductor thathe

had purchased his ticket the day before, and

could the conductor have easily ascertained

that fact from the passengers who were ac-

quainted with plaintiff? A. In this case he

could. (4) How much do you allow plaintiff

as exemplary damages? A. $71.75." “First.

How much do you allow plaintiff for pe-

cuniary loss? A. $.71. Second. Was plain-

tiff injured in person by the conductor? A.

No. Third. How much do you allow plain-

tif f for injury to his person? A. Nothing.

Fourth. Did plaintiff lose any time by reason'

of defendant's conductor refusing to honor

his ticket, and, if so, how much? A. No.

Fifth. How much do you allow plaintiff for

loss of time? A. Nothing. Sixth. How much

do you allow plaintiff for inconvenience in

going from his seat to the platform and back

again? A. Nothing. Seventh. Was plaintiﬂ'

treated in an insulting or brutal manner by

the conductor? And, if so, state fully how.

A. An insulting manner. Eighth. How much,

if anything, do you allow plaintiff for injury

to his feelings? A. $10.00. Ninth. How

much, if anything, do you allow plaintiff for

expenses, attorney's fees, or time in prosecut-

ing this case? A. $35.00." The defendant

ﬁled a motion to set aside the verdict of the

jury, and for a new trial, which was over-

ruled. Subsequently, judgment was entered

Supreme Court of KanSllll. Feb. 11, 1888.
Error to district court, Johnson county; J.
P. Hindman, Judge.
Action brought by Benjamin Rice agnlnst
the Southern Kansas Railroad Company on
October 31, 1885, to recover as damages the
sum of $1,000 tor being unlawfully assaulted
and ejected from a passenger car by the conductor thereof while returning from I\:ansas
City, Missouri, to Olathe, In this state; the
plaintiff at the time having a ticket to ride as
a passenger In the car. Subsequently the rallroad company tiled an answer containing a
genernl denial. Trial had at the ~rarch term,
1880. The jury returned a verdict tor the
plaintlrr, nnd assessed his damages at $117.46, and also made the following special findings of tacts: "(1) Did the conductor net
willfully, and In a grossly negligent manner,
in putting the defendant olT the train? Answer. He willfully put him otr the train.
(2) Did the conductor act with a reckless di!!·
regard of the plnlptltf's rights? A. Yes. (3)
Did the plalntll'l' !!late to the conductortbatbe
had purchased bis ticket the day before, and
could the conductor have easily ascertained
that tact from the passengers who were acquainted with plaintiff? A. In this case be
could. (4) How much do you allow plaintiff
as exemplary damages? A. $71.75." "First.
How much do you allow plnlntUr tor pecuniary loss? A. $.71. Second. Was plaintiff Injured In person by the conductor? A.
No. Tbh'd. How much do you allow plalntltr tor Injury to bis person? A. Nothing.
Fourth. Did plalntltr lose any time by reason'
ot defendant's conductor refusing to honor
bis ticket, and, If so, how much? A. No.
Fifth. How much do you allow plalntltf for
loss of time? A. Nothing. Sixth. How much
do you allow plaintiff tor Inconvenience In
going from his sent to the platform and back
again? A. Nothing. Seventh. Wns plalntlft"
treated In an Insulting or brutal manner by
the conductor? Aud, If so, state fully bow.
A. An Insulting manner. Eighth. now much,
It anything, do you allow plalntllT for Injury
to his feelings? A. $10.00. Ninth. How
much, If anything, do you allow plalntllf tor
expenses, attorney's fees, or time In prosecuting this ca,.e? A. $35.00." The defendant
filed n motion to set aside the verdict of the
jury, and tor a new h'lal, which was O'\"erruled. Subsequently, Judgment was <'ntered
upon the '\"erdlet. The mllroncl company ex·
cepted, and brings the case hel'e.
Geo. R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robert Dunlap, for plnintlt:r In erro1'. John T. Little
and Samuel T. Seaton, for defendant in error.

upon the verdict. The railroad company ex-

cepted, and brings the case here.

Geo. R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robert Dun-

lap, for plaintiff in error. John 'l‘. Little

and Samuel T. Seaton, for defendant in error.

HORTON, C. J. (after stating the facts as

above). On October 29, 15553, Benjamin Rice,

a colored man, purchased of the ticket agent

of the Southern Kansas Railroad (.‘ompany

at Olathe, in this state, for 50 cents, a lim-

ited railroad ticket to Kansas City, Missouri,

and return, good for three days; the date of

HORTON, C. J . (after i;tatlng- the facts as
above). On October 29, 18S:i, Benjamin Hire,
a colored mnn, purchased of the ticket ai;:"ent
of the Southern Kansas Haill'uad Cumpany

1
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at Olathe, In this state, for 50 cents, a limited rallroad ticket to Kansas City, Missouri,
and return, good tor three days; the date of
Issue being stamped on the back. On that
day he was carried as a passenger by the
railroad ~mpany upon one ot Its passenger
trains from Olathe to Kansas City. The
''going coupon" of the ticket wns torn oil'
and taken up by the conductor ot the trnin'.
On the next day, October 30th, Rice, desh'lng
to retul'll to Olathe, boarded one of the passenger tmlns of the company, which left
Kansas City about 10 o'clock p. m., and,
when the conductor called upon him tor his
tare, presented the "return coupon" ot the
ticket, which be bad purchased the day before. 'l'he ·conductor took It to the light,
and, after examining· It, handed It bnck to
Rice, saying It was not good, and Informed
him that he could not honor It. Rice Insisted
that the ticket was good, and said to the conductor that be bad pm·chased the ticket the
day before, and that be (the conductor) bad
carried him upon the tlcltet to Kansas City
on that day. Another passenger also stated
to the conductor, at the time, that be bad
seen Rice purchase the ticket on the 2!Jth.
The conductor replied that he could not honor
the ticket, and subsequently took bold of
Rice's coat-collar, and led him out of the car.
Rice bad no money to pay any extra fare;
nnd when he was otr the car, or about to get
ofl',a friend gave him 75 cents, which be gave
to the conductor, who returned him 5 cents,
punched a receipt for his fnre, and permlttt•d
him to rtde to Olathe.
On the part of Rice, It Is contended that the
ticket be presented showed plainly on Its
back that It was stamped at Olathe on the
29th of October; that he told the conductor
that be did not have any money to pay any
more tare; that he was quietly ln his sent
as a passenger when ordered by the conductor to leave the train; that be did not make
any forcible resistance to the orders of the
conductor; but that the conductor took him
out ot the car, and otT upon the steps of the
platform. Ou the part of the railroad company, It is claimed tbnt the ticket bad been
folded up and creased at the date; that the
conductor took It to the light, and examined
It carefully; that the date was oblltemted·
that the ticket looked so old and worn that
the conductor believed It bad expired; that
he iutormetl Rice that the ticket was not
goocl, and that he could not ride upon It, but
woulsl have to pay fare; that, when the t rain
r<>nched Holliday, the conductor Inquired of
Hice what he was going to do; that Rice
then refused to pay fare or get otr the trniu;
that the conductor then took bold of Rice's
coat-collar, and led him to the platform ot
the station, or. to the last step of the car;
that then a friend told Rice to come back
and he would give him money to pay bl~
fare; and the conductor permitted Hice to
take his sent and ride to his destination·
that, when Rice was informed that he would
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have to pay his fare or leave the car, it was

his duty to do one or the other; that he

should have paid his fare, and relied upon

his remedy to recover it back; that. if he

could not do this, he should have quietly

left the train, and not provoked or made nec-

essary an assault; that therefore he should

have recovered only 71 cents, that amount be-

ing the sum assessed by the jury for his pe-

cuniary loss.

The railroad company asked instructions

which tended to limit the amount of dam-

ages that Rice was entitled to recover to the

exact fare paid by him, with interest thereon.

The court refused to give these instructions,

but directed the jury, among other things, as

follows: “I instruct you that if you ﬁnd the

plaintiff presented to the conductor for his

passage a limited ticket, good only for three

days from the date of its sale; and that the
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conductor, from the mutilated and worn con-

dition of the ticket, was unable to read the

date on the ticket, and honestly believed that

' the ticket was an old one. and not good;

and for this reason, and without any unnec-

essary force or indignity to the plaintiff, re-

quired him to pay his fare or get off, and

did, upon refusal and failure to pay fare. re-

move said plaintiff without any unnecessary

force, and without injury to his person, to

the platform of the car, or to the platform or

ground at a regular station; and then plain-

tiff paid his fare, and continued his journey

on the same train, and without delay,—then,

if you ﬁnd as a fact that the ticket presented

by plaintiff was a good and valid ticket, and

that the conductor had no right to collect

this fare from the plaintiff, you must ﬁnd a

verdict for the plaintiff, and the measure of

his damages would be the amount of fare .

paid by him, with interest at seven per cent.

per annum from October 30th, 1885, and ac-

tual compensation for the injury and outrage, ‘

if any, suffered by plaintiff from the alleged '

assault." We perceive no error in this in-

struction. Inactions for the recovery of dam-

, ages for the wrongful expulsion of a passen-

ger from a train, the passenger may recover

for his time, inconvenience, the rm-essary ex-

penses to which he is subjected, and if treat-

ed with violence, or in an insulting manner,

for the injuries to his person and feelings.

If the expulsion be malicious, or through ‘

negligence which is gross and wanton, then

exemplary damages

“There is a special duty on the carrier to

protect its passengers, not only against the

violence and insults of strangers and co-pas-

sengers, but, a fortiori, against the vio-

lence and insults of its own servants; and

that for a breach of that duty he ought to

be compelled to make the amplest reparation.

The law wisely and justly holds him to a

strict and rigorous accountability. We would

not relax in the slightest degree this strict

accountability. VVe know that upon it, in no

small degree, depends the safety and com-

fort of passengers." Railway Co. v. Weaver,

16 Kan. 456; Railway Co. v. Kessler, 18

COMPENSATORY AND EXE)IPLATIY DAMAGES.

have to pay his fare or leave the car, lt was
bis duty to do oue or the other; that be
should have paid bis tare, and relied upon
his remedy to recover It back; that, it be
could not do this, he should have quietly
left the train, and not provoked or viade necessary an assault; that therefore be should
have recovered only 71 cents, that amount being the sum assessed by the jury for his pecuulary loss.
The rallroad company asked Instructions
which tended to limit the amount of damages that Rice was entitled to recover to the
exact fare paid by him, with Interest thereon.
The court refused to g)ve these lnst:ructlons,
but directP.d the jury, among other things, as
follows: "I instruct you that If you find the
plaintiff presented to the conductor for his
passai:e a limited ticket, good only for thr.ee
days from the elate of Its sale; and that the
conductor, from the mutilated and worn condition of the ticket, was unable to read the
date on the ticket, and honestly believed that
the ticket was an old one. and not good;
aud for this reason, and without any unnecessni·y force or Indignity to the plaintiff. required him to pay his fare 01· get off, and
did, upon refusal and failure to pay fare. r""
move said plaintiff without any unnecest1Ury
force, nnd without Injury to his person, to
th~ platform of the car, or to the platform or
ground at a regular station; and then plaintiff paid his fare, and continued his journey
on tlle same train, and without clelay,-then,
If you find as a fact that the ticket presented
by plaintiff was a good and yalid ticket, and
that the conductor had no right to collect
tbls fare from the plalntl!Y, you must find a
verdict for the plaintiff, and the measure of
his damages would be the amount of fare
paid by him, with interest at seven per cent.
per annum from October 30th, 1883, and actual compensation for the Injury and outrnge,
If any, sull'ered by plaiutll'f from the alit>A'ed
assault." \Ve perceive no error In this instruction. Inactions for the recovery of damages for the wronj.!fUl expulsion of a passenger from a train, the passenj.!er mny recover
for his time, Inconvenience, the neccl>imry expem<1es to which be Is subjected, and If treated with violence, or In au insulting manner,
for the Injuries to bis person and feelings.
If the expulsion be malicious, or through
negligence which Is gross and wanton, then
exemplary damages may be awarded.
"There is a special duty on the carrier to
protect Its pnssenj.!ars, not only against the
violence aud iusult11 of strangers and co-passengers, but, a fortiori, against the viC)lence and insults of Its own servants; and
that for a breach of that duty he ougllt to
be compelled to make the amplest reparation.
The law wisely and jmitly holds him to a
strict 11.lld rigorous accountability. We would
not relax In the slightest degree this strict
accountability. We know that upon It, in no
small degree, depends the safety and comfort of passengers." Railway Co. v. Weaver,

16 Kan. 456; Railway Co. v. Kessler, 18
Kan.. 523. We-fully concede that no one has
a right to resort to force to compel the performance of a contract made with him by
another; and a passenger about to be wrongfully expelled from a railroad train need not
require force to be exerted to secure his
rights, or increase his damages. l!'or any
brooch of contract or gross negligence on the
part of the conductor. or the other employ~s
of a railroad company, redress must be
sought in the courts, rather than by the
strong arm of the person who thinks himself
about to be deprived of his rigbts. A passenger should not be permitted to invite a
w1·ong, and then complain of it. Hall v.
Railroad Co., 15 Fed. 57; Townsend v. Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 301; Bral1sbaw v. Railroad
Co., 135 Mass. 409; Railroad Co. v. Connell,
112 Ill. 296; Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125; 3
Wood, Ry. Law, § 364. Of course, a. party
upon a train may resist when, under the cll'cumstances, resistance Is necessary for the
p1·otectlon of his life, or to prevent probable
serious injury; nor can a party be lawfully
ejected from a train whlle In motion, so that
his being put off would subject him to great
peril. In this case Rice made no unreasonable resistance. He did not resort to force
or violence. Having a good ticket, and being entitled to ride, be refused to pay fare
or get oft' the train. '.rhe conductor had no
difficulty in leading him off, and about all
that Rice did was merely to assert his lawful
right to rlde upon the train. Where a pas-}
senger with a cleal' right and a clean ticket ·
is entitled to ride on that trip and train,
and Is wrongfully ejected without forcible
resistance upon bis part, the jury are, and
ought to be, allowed great latitude in assessing damages. 'They should a ward liberal
damages In full compensation for the injuries
received. The quiet and peaceable behavior
of a passenger is to his advantage, rather
than to his detriment.
Complaint Is also made of other instruct1011s ot the court regarding the measure of
damages. Among otli<'r things, the court
said tci the jury that if "the assault was
malicious, and without cause or provocation,
or was accompanied by acts of gross insult,
outrage, or oppression, you may a.ward the
plaintltr exemplary or vindictive damages."
Also, "that In estimating damages they might
take Into consideration the l11dignity, insult,
and injury to plaintiff's feelings by being
publicly expelled." Further, that, if they
found "there was on the part of the conductor either malice, gross negligence, or oppression, they would not be confined in fixing
damages to the actual damages received, but
were justified In giving exemplary damages.•r
It is said that these instructions were misleading and erroneous, because there was no
evidence whatever to show that the conductor acted with malice or gross negligence.
Upon the evidence of Hice, corroborated by
McCulloch, another passenger, who said that
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he saw Rice purchase the ticket on October

29th, there was evidence before the jury up-

on which to found these instructions. Huf-

ford v. Railroad Co. (Mich.) 31 N. W. 544.

The forcible expulsion of Rice from the car

where he was rightfully seated was such a

wrong as is inevitably accompanied with

more or less outrage and insult. There was

‘no excuse for the act of expulsion, except the

honest mistake or the gross negligence of

the conductor. If that mistake was due to

such reckless indifference to the rights of a

passenger on the part of the conductor as

established gross negligence, amounting to

wantonuess, and the jury so found, they

might ﬁnd exemplary damages. Railroad Co.

v. Kessler, supra; Railroad Co. v. Rice, 10

Kan. 426. Whether the conductor was gross-

ly negligent, amounting to wantonness, or

actuated by malice, were matters before the
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jury, for their determination upon the evi-

dence. Under the authority of Titus v. Cor-

kins, 21 Kan. 722, Rice was entitled to re-

cover the expenses incurred by him in the

litigation, iif entitled to exemplary damages.

Hall v. Railroad Co., 15 Fed. 95—97. The

amount of the verdict in this case was only

$117.46; therefore the damages are not so ex-

cessive as to indicate passion or prejudice on

the part of the jury. The other matters sub-

mitted are immaterial.

The judgment of the district court will be

aﬂirmed.

All the justices concurring.

~ eaw Rice purchase the ttcket on October
29th, there was evidence before the jury upon which to found these Instructions. Huf·
ford v. Railroad Co. (Mich.) 31 N. W. 544.
The forcible expulsion of Rice from the car
·where he was rightfully seated was such a
wrong as ls lnevltnl>ly accompanied with
\more or less outrage and Insult. There was
,no excuse tor the act of expulsion, except the
honest mistake or the gross negligence of
the conductor. It that mistake was due to
sueh reckless Indifference to the rights of a
passenger on the part of the conductor as
established gross negligence, amounting to
wantonness, and the jury so found, they
might find exemplary damages. Railroad Co.
v. Kessler, supra; Railroad Co. v. Rice, 10
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Kan. 426. Whether the conductor was grossly negligent, amounting to wantonness, or
actuated by malice, were matters before the
jury, for their determination upon the evl·
dence. Under the authority of 'l'itus v. Corkins, 21 Kan. 722, Rice was entitled to recover the expenses Incurred by him in the
litigation, If entitled to exemplary damages..
Hall v. Railroad Co., 15 I!'ed. 0:>-97. The
amount of the verdict in this case was only
$117.46; therefore the damages are not so excessive as to Indicate passion or prejudice on
the part of the jury. The other matters submitted are Immaterial.
The judgment of the district court wlll be
am rm ed.
All the justices conctJrrlng.
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glnes, and they were old, worn, and In bad
condition. That plalntUf is entitled to com.
(23 S. "E. 443, 117 N. O. 565.)
pensatory damages there enn be no doubt.
but as to whether he ls entitled to exemSupreme Court of North Carolina. Oct 22,
plary damages 18 the question. It ls sal<f
1895.
that railroads are quasi public servants; thn•
they are crented by the public (the leglslatur<''
On petition for rebenrlug. Denied.
and owe duties to the public In return for their
right of fran<·hlse. And, while this ls true, It
Chns. F. Wnrren and L. T. Beckwith, fol
petitioner. Jobu H. Smnll, llal'Rne & Day, cnn only be considered by us as a reason for establishing the law as we shau find It, and not
and w. B. Rodw~ for defeuda11t.
as a reason for us to establish the law. Nor
can we consider the question as to whether deFURCHES, J. This Is n petition to rehear fendant's road ls a poor corporation, strugthis case, decided at Septembe1· term, 1804, gling for existence, and expending all Its
of this court, and pullllshed In 115 N. C. 602, ' earnings, and more, on Its road; or whether
20 S. E. 528. The defendant Is a corpom- It Is a rich corporation. These are questions
tlon under the laws of this stnte running and we ha"Ve no right to consider In pn!lslng upon
operatl&g its road between the towns of the question of law as to whether plalntur
\VasWngton and Jamesville, transporting is entitled to recover damages against delloth freight and passengers as a common car· fendant or not. Taylor v. Railroad Co., 4~
rier for pay. '.rhe plaintiff, & citl1A.'n of N. H. 317.
\Vashlngton, wanting to go to the town of i The legal question involved in this caRe Is
Edenton and back, on the 7th of September, , conceded to be an important one, and Is
18112, purchased a ticket of defendant to James· entitled to our best consideration. It ls one
ville, and from Jamesvllle back to Washing· that has b<>en so much discussed by law
ton on the 9th. The defendant carried plain- 1 writers and by the courts In judicial opln·
titr to .Tnruesville on the 7th, and be went Ions, In which dll'ferent phases or facts ap..
on to Edenton, and was In that town on the 1 pear, that It ls somewhat dlfllcult to estab8th of September. (It Is not stated In this lish om·selves on what we consider solid
ca11e that plalntllf went to Edenton, and was g1·01md. Often 11 very sllght difference In the
there on the 8th, but this was stated and facts changes the reason upon which a case
agreed to by counsel on the argument.) On ls decided. We find that decided cases, unless
the 8th of September, soon after leaving clcsely attended to, are often misleading_·
Jnmesvllle for 'Vashlngton, the axle of de· Also often 11 misunderstanding of some ot
:tend11nt'e engine broke, and when the plaln- the factt1, or an Inadvertence to some fact; In
tllf returned from Edenton to Jamesville on the case, leads to error. This, we think, was
the 0th the defendant was unable to carry the case with the learned justice who wrote
him on Its road from Jamesville back to the opinion we are now reviewing. In stat'Vashlngton, as lt had contracted to do. ' Ing the facts In Purcell's Case, 108 N. C. 414,
Thereupon plalntlO' brings this action for 12 S. E. 954, 956, he stated that when the
damages, which he lays nt $:-.00, and allege11 defendant's train passed the depot It "waa
tha. defendant's roadlJetf was In a ba<l. 11hack- overloaded," when there was e'\"idl.'nce tendly, and ruinous eondltlon; that dert•ndant ing to show that there was room for a numhad but two engines. both of which werl'
ber of other passengers; and this was the
worn and In bad condition, one of them at
hypotheRis upon which the court wns asked
that time being In the shops for repail", and
to cha r;:t• the jury. and which was refused
not In a condition to be used; that the ha<I
by the t•ourt. This lnndvertencf'. as we think,
condition of di>fPndnnt's roadbed had rattled
led the court to overrule Pnrt·cll's Case, •mthe other one so as to cause th1: axle , to
pra. After as full lnvestlgntion as we ha\·e
brrok; that all this showed such wlllful negbeen able to glrn to this case, we are or the
ligence on the pm't or defendant towards the opinion that the true ground for nllowing
public and towa1·ds the plnlntltr as to entitle
exemplary llamages is 1wn;onal Injury to
him, not only to compeusatory damages,
plalntifl', caused by the ne:,:ligence of dehut to exem1;lary dnmages. The defendant
fendant (and we do not undertake here 10
a11Rw1•n"<I. tiPn.\·ini: the allegation of n egllenumerate all the cnuses for exemplnry dnmgcn<·1>, admits that the road wa!l not In good
ages where there is pPrsonnl il1j1<ry). And
co111lition, says it was poor and struggling
where there Is no 1wrsonal injury, there muf't
for exlstencf. and that It was expending the be lusult, lmllgonlty. coutt•mpt, or something
whole earnings of the road, and more, In
ot tlie kind, to which the law Imputes bad
trying to keep 1t II: good repair, and was
motive towards a plnintltr; and when they
not able to do so. Therefore defendant de:i.r<> allowed they are in addition to compennies that it Is liable to plaintiff for anything,
!lll tory damages. 1 Sedg. Dam. 520; 5 Am.
nnd certainly not for punitive damages.
& Eng. Enc. Law, p. 43, note, and cases
And, without reviewing the evidence, It ls cited. This principle we tlntl ls recognized
such ns to wa1Tnnt us In saying that the roadand enforced In the following cases: A
bed was In a bad, <lllapldated, nnd ruloous
railroad conductor kissed a Indy passenger
condition; that defendant had but two en- on his tra.ln, and she was allowed to re-
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‘ rier for pay.

HANSLEY v. JAMESVILLE & W. R. CO.

(23 S. E. 443, 117 N. C. 565.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina. Oct 22,

1895.

On petition for rehearing. Denied.

Chas. F. Warren and L. T. Beckwith, for

petitioner. John H. Small, \Iat-Rae & Day,

and W. B. Rodman, for defendant

.

FURCHES, J. This is a petition to rehear

this case, decided at September term, 1894.

of this court, and published in 115 N. C. 602,

20 S. E. 528. The defendant is a corpora-

tion under the laws of this state running and

operating its road between the towns of

Washington and Jamesville, transporting

gines, and they were old, worri, and in bad

condition. That plaintif f is entitled to com-
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pensatory damages there can be no doubt,

but as to whether he is entitled to exem-

plary damages is the question. It is said

that railroads are quasi public servants; tha(

they are created by the public (the legislature‘

and owe duties to the public in return for their

right of franchise. And, while this is true, it

can only be considered by us as a reason for es-

tablishing the law as we shall ﬁnd it, and not

1 as a reason for us to establish the law. Nor

can we consider the question as to whether de-

fendant's road is a poor corporation, strug-

- gling for existence, and expending all its

both freight and passengers as a common car- '

The plaintiff, a citizen of

Washington, wanting to go to the town of

Edenton and back, on the 7th of September,

1892, purchased a ticket of defendant to James-

ville, and from Jamesville back to Washing-

ton on the 9th. The defendant carried plain-

tiff to Jamesville on the 7th, and he went

on to Edenton, and was in that town on the

8th of September. (It is not stated in this

case that plaintiff went to Edenton, and was

there on the 8th, but this was stated and

agreed to by counsel on the argument.) On

the 8th of September, soon after leaving

Jamesville for Washington, the axle of de-

fendant's engine broke, and when the plain-

tiff returned from Edenton to Jamesville on

the 9th the defendant was unable to carry

him on its road from Jamesville back to

Washington, as it had contracted to do.

Therenpon plaintiff brings this action for

damages, which he lays at $500, and alleges

tha. del'endant's rondbed was in a bad. shack-

ly, and ruinous condition; that defendant

had but two engines. both of which were

worn and in bad condition, one of them at

that time being in the shops for repair. and

not in a condition to be used; that the bad

condition of defendant's roadbed had rattled

the other one so as to cause the axle, to .

break; that all this showed such willful neg- '

ligence on the part of defendant towards the

public and towards the plaintiff as to entitle

him, not only to compensatory damages,

but to exeniplury damages. The defendant

answered. denying the allegation of negli-

1
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cover punitive damages, upon the ground that

it was a personal indignity. 5 Am. & Eng.

Enc. Law, p. 43. Where a railroad con- ;

ductor refused to carry a passenger after he

had paid his fare, the road is liable to ex-

emplary damages. 3 Suth. Dam. §§ 935, 937.

This is upon the same ground. Plaintiff is

not entitled to exemplary damages unless

there is a willful or intentional violation of

plaintiffs personal rights. Railroad Co. v.

Arms, 91 U. S. 489. Where a railroad car-

ried a lady passenger a few handred yards

beyond the station, and upon application of

the passenger refused to hack the train to the

station. but put the passenger out ins driving

rain, with her infant child and baggage, the

defendant was held to be liable to punitive

damages. But this was put upon the ground

of personal indignity and insult, as all the
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cases we have cited are; and the fact that

the passenger could not use her umbrella,

got wet, and was sick from the effects. wa

only allowed in evidence upon the measure

of damages. But the grammes of the ac-

tion was the personal indignity with which

the plaintiff had been treated by the defend-

ant. Railroad Co. v. Sellers. 93 Ala. 13, 9

South. 37 5. We might cite many other cases

to sustain the principle we have laid down,

but do not deem it necessary.

We make no question, under our system of

liberal pleading, that plaintiﬂf may recover ei-

ther in contract or tort, if he has made out

his case. But he can no more recover in tort

without making out his case than he could

recover in contract without making out his

case. The fact that the defendant's road was

in bad condition was no insult or indignity

to plaintiff, and as there was no personal in-

jury on account of its bad condition, this at-

fords him no cause of action. The fact that

defendant's engine broke down on the 8th

when plaintiff was in Edenton, was no per-

sonal insult, indignity, or intentional wrong

to plaintiff. No doubt the defendant regret-

ted the brcaking down of the engine as much

as plaintiff. The fact that plaintiff had a

right of action for breach of the contract gives

him no right of action for tort against the de-

fendant. And unless he had the right to

maintain an action of tort, he had no right

to punitive damages.

ages recovered when there is no right of ac-

tion. Damages are not the cause of action,

but the result of the action. Taking all the

evidence in the case offered by the plaintiﬂf,

or that may be considered in his favor, we

do ' faction

‘the defen and that the defend-

ant was entitled to have its second prayer

for instruction submitted to the jury, to

wit, “Taking the entire evidence in view. the

plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages."

This was refused by the court, and we think

there was error. We have arrived at our

conclusion by a different treatment of the

case, to some extent, from that adopted by

time court in the opinion published in 115 N.

EXEMPI,ARY DA)L\GES.
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coyer punitlve damages, upon the ground that C. 602, 20 S. E. 528; but our judgwent le the
It was a personal Indignity. 5 Am. & Eng. same. And In this opinion we do not think
Enc. Law, p. 43. Where a railroad con- It De<'eRAAry to disturb the judgment as an·
ductor refused to carry a J)8BRenger after he nounced In Purcell's Case, supm. Bnt the
had paid his fare, the road Is lin!Jle to ex- 1 judgment In that case shoultl be put upon the
grouncl that the defendant trl't1h'<l the plnlni>mplary damages. 3 Suth. Dam. §§ {)3ii, !l.'l7.
This is upon the same ground. Plnlntilf Is tltr, Purcell, with Indignity and co11tl'lll)lt
not entitled to exemplary dnmagl'S unles~ In rui;hlng by the station at faster speed,
there Is a willful or Intentional vlolntlon ot when th<'re wns room tor oth<'r 1msl'.'engPrs,
plaintiff's personal rights. Hallroad Co. '" or at least when there was evidence ternll11g
Arms, 91 U. S. 489. Where a ralh"oa<t ror- , to show this, a111l the court retuse!l the prnyl'r
ried a lady pai<.-<t•nger a few h11111lre1l ,·11rd11 for l11111t·ul'tio11 1111hmlttlng this fJUi>Stion to the
beyond the station, and upon n11pl11•ntl~n of jury. 'The petition is dismissed.
the pa~«enger refulled to hack the train to the 1
CLAHK, J. (!·011<·111·1·lng In part). Concm·station. hut put the Jllll'li!Pnger out In a driving
min. with her lnfnnt child and baggage, the 1 ring In the opi11io11 In so tar as It relust11tes
<IPfmrumt was held to be liable to punitive the nuthority or Pnrl'!'ll v. Rnllrond Co., 108
<lamages. But this wa11 put upon the i:round 1 N. C. 414, 12 R K !l:-..t, 956, the \'ast and
ot pen!onal lndbmlty nnd Insult, us all the g1·owhu: lmIJ<>rtunce ot the prlndplcs lnYolvl:'fl 111 this cnse to f>\'(•ry one who shall trnvt>I
r~ we nave cited are; and the fact that
the 1i:111.-enger rould not URP lwr umhr<'lla, OYPr or shtp frt>h:ht by these great public
got wet, and was llick from thP elTt>d,;. was ng1•nele11 forbids my n<·qulcscencc In some of
only allowed 1n evidence u1HJn the me11!!11re the r1~11<onlni.:" relied on In the pres<>nt C'ase.
In the rl'<'l'llt case or Hullrond Co. v. Prenof damages. But the grn,·amen or the nction was the personal Indignity with whl1·h ' tl<-e, Hi l 1. 8. 1011. 13 Hup. Ct. 261, l\fr. Justhe plaintiff had been trt'nte<I hy the defend- tlcf' 01'11.\' <'Ollllllf'lllh• the hlstot'i<-nl Instruction
ant. Hallroad Co. "· St>llt>rR, !}3 Ala. 13, 9 , of Chlt'f .J1111til'e l'l'att (11ftt>t'w11rds I..01·11 Cmnclen) that: "A jury h:tve It In their power to
~uth. :r.:;. We might cite many other cast's
to 1mstnln the principle we have laid down. gh·c dnmngt'R for more than the Injury l'N'<'iVed. Damages are designed not only as a Rotbut do not deem It necessary.
We make no questlol!, under our system ot b1factlon to the lnjnr1'<l person, but llk{'wlse
liberal pleading, that plaintiff may rero;er ei- as a punishment to the J."nllty to deter from
ther In contract or tort, If he has made out nuy such proceeding fo1· the future, und ns a
his case. But he can no more reco;er In tort proof ot the detestntlon of the Jury of the acwithout making out hie case than he conlll tion ltst>lf." And ~fr. Jui,1tke <:rn~·. tor th<!
reco;er In contmct without making out his court, :ul!ls: "The llm·trtne ls well settled"
rnse. The fact that the de!endant's road was tluit the jury, In 111lllitlo11 to compenllutory
In bad condition was no Insult or lndli:ulty damngl'R, "may uwnrd exemplary, punlth·e,
to plalntltr, and as there was no personal In- or vlrnlldive dnm111tt•11, sometimes called
jury on aerount ot Its bed cornlitlon, this af- 'smart money,' Ir the 1lefend1mt hnR 1l<'lf'1l
fords him no cause of action. The tact that wuntonly • • • or with criminal indilfi>rdefendant's engine broke down on the :'Ith ence to civil oblhmtlous." In the prt"Rl'Ut t'llHC
when plnlutltr wa11 In Edenton, was no per- bis honor below dutl'l!Pd thl' jury that: "If
sonal lm;uJt, Indignity, or Intentional wrong defendant railed to 1>rv1de Jlrope1· nll'ans tor
to plalntill. No doubt the defendant rl'i.:"ret- transportation of p ·sengers,-as, Co1· inted the breaking down or the engine as much l!hmce, the plalnt!II i thi11 1·11se.-as they hml
as plaintiff. The tart that plnlntltr had a undPrtnken to do, wa tonly and willfully, the
right or action for bren<'h ot the contract i:h·es jury may give punltivl' or punishing daruages;
him no right of action tor tort ai:ainst the de- and the amount of such is lnri.:ely n mattPr
fendant. And unlc11s he hail the rii.:"ht to for the jury to det!'nnlne, lmt the court will
maintain an action or tort, he hail no rl;:ht 1111111•rvlst•, so ns to see that no \\Toni.: h1 done."
to 11tmlti;e damages. There can he no 1la 111- ThiR sums up In a few words the whole conn;:es recovered when there Is no rli:ht of nc·
trovPrs~· In this ! ' HSI', nml It Is thlil l'linrge
tlon. DanmgPs nre not the enuse or a1·tion,
whl•·h "is thiR rl11y hrouirht Into qne11t ion ..,
hut the result of the a<"tlon. 'faking all the ' In l'1tl'<"Pll's Case. supi·q, this court. In a mmucvidPm·e In tile case ofT<•rPd by the plalutirr,
lmons opinion, laid down the wholesomt\ and
or 11w t moy be considert><I in his favor, we
It would sN•m the nece111"11uy, principle that
, , , . thkt& lt mak811 o.c1uwc Qf m·tion i1gninl!t
tor the w!llful and wanton violation by a rnilroacl corp,Jrntlon of the re~"111:1tlons prescrihe!l
.~and that. the dPfc>ud:mt was entitled to have Its i<econd riruyer for Its control and conduct l>y thl' lawmnklng
for instruction llUhmitted to the jury, to power ICode, 5 l!H>:l) such corporation IM liawit, "Taking the entire evillen<'t• In Yiew, the' ble to punitory damai:cR. 'l'he!le word!'!, "willplnintllf le not entltlt•tl to punith·e dnmngf's."
ful and wanton," have a wPII-deHne1l nw:111i11g
This was refused by the court, and W<' think
In om· courts, nml have \)('Pll 1"011,;trut'<l in
there was error. 'Ve have arrived at our
State v. Brigman, !)4 N. C. SS~. and State v.
conclusion by a different treatment of the
l\Iorgan, 98 N . C. 641, 3 S. E. 9:!7, to mean
•·u!<e, to some extent, from that adopt1>d by
"pur110R<'ly, lntentionnlly, 111111 with re•·kless
the court 1n the opinion pnbllshed In 115 N. , disregnnl of the rights of otht>rs." Our courts
LAW D.All.:.!d Ed.-0
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have upheld the authority to grant punitory

damages in all proper cases, and if they could

ever be granted against a corporation in any

case it would seem certainly they should lie

whenever the conduct of its oﬂlcials has

shown a “willful. intentional, violation" of

the statutes enacted by the legislature for

the control of these corporations, and a "reck-

less disregard of the rights of the traveling

public" or shippers of freight. The sover-

eignty which, through its agents, created and

gave existence to this corporation, has recog-

nized this rule as wholesome and just, for in

the act creating the railroad commission (Act

1891, c. 320, § 11) it is provided in almost

identically the same words (indeed, leaving

out the word “wantonly") that for a “willful

violation of the rules and regulations made

by the commissioners railroad companies are

liable for exemplary damages." It would be
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the strangest of anomalies if a railroad cor-

poration is liable to exemplary damages for

the willful violation of the regulations of the

railroad commission, but is not thus liable

for the willful and wanton violation of the

regulations prescribed by the legislative pow-

er which created them both. And we should

have this further anomaly in the law: A tele-

graphic dispatch announcing the critical ill-

ness of a near relative is sent. If not deliv-

ered promptly, the sendee, as is properly held

by numerous decisions of this court, is enti-

tled to exemplary damages, though he has

suffered no personal injury, nor has any in-

dignity been inﬂicted upon him. Young v.

Telegraph Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E. 1044;

Thompson v. Telegraph Co.. 107 N. C. 449.

12 S. E. 427; Sherrill v. Telegraph Co., 11!;

N. C. (355, 21 S. E. 429. The reason is that.

being put upon notice by the tenor of the dis-

patch. it is a wanton and willful violation of

the duties for which it was incorporated for

the company to fail to deliver the message

promptly. and the highest reasons of public

policy require that exemplary damages should

be imposed. Now, suppose the dispatch is

delivered, and the sendee starts for his home,

but the railroad corporation, ﬁnding that it

can send a larger number of passengers to

another point, stops its car,—as in the present

a1se they stopped it. because it was cheaper

to send a broken piece of machinery to Nor-

folk to repair than to keep necessary repair

shops or another engine,—and by this willful

and wanton violation of its statutory duties to

furnish suﬁicient transportation the recipient

of the telegram does not reach the bedside of _

his dying wife, would it not be an anomaly

that for a willful and wanton violation of its

duty to deliver the telegram promptly the tele-

graph company is liable to exemplary dam-

ages, but for an equally willful and wanton

violation by the railroad corporation to trans-

port the passenger according to schedule that

company is only liable to pay the passenger's

board bill during his detention. In a case

where the corporation failed to bring the pas-

senger home on his round-trip ticket, as the

0

CO~Il'EXSA'l'ORY

AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

have upheld the authority to grant punltory
dnmngt>s In nil proper cases, and If they could
ev<'r be gl'1mted against a corporation In any
case it would seem certainly they 11bould lie
whenever the conduct of its ofHdnle has
shown a "willful. Intentional, violation" of
the statutes enacted by the legislature for
the control of these corporations, and a "reckle88 dlerei."Urd of the rights of the traveling
public" or shippers of freight. The sovereignty which, through lte agents, Cl'eated and
gave existence to this corporation, has recognized this rule as wholeBOme and just, for In
the act creating the railroad commission (Act
1891, c. 320, § 11) It Is provided in almost
Identically the same words (Indeed, leaving
out the word "wantonly") that for a "willful
violation of the rules and regulations made
by the commissioners railroad companies are
liable for exemplary damages." It would be
the strangest of anomalies If a railroad corporation ls liable to exemplary damages for
the willful violation of the regulations of the
railroad commlsslon, but is not thus liable
for the willful and wanton violation of the
regulations prescribed by the legislative pow·
er which created them both. And we should
have this further anomaly In the law: A teleJtl"Rphlc dispatch announcing the critical illnl'Ss of a near relative le sent. It not delivered promptly, the sendee, as ls properly held
by numerous decisions of this court, Is entitled to exemplary damages, though he has
suftered no personal Injury, nor has any In, dignity been lnftletf'<l upon him. Young v.
Telegraph Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 8 . E. lOH;
Thompson v. Telegraph Co.. 107 N. 0. 441.1,
12 S. E. 427; Sherrill v. Telegl'nph Co., llH
N. C. 6:i:l, 21 S. E. 429. The re.aeon Is that.
being put upon notice by the tenor ot the dispatch, It le a wanton and willful violation of
the duties for whkh It was lncorpomted fo1·
the c-ompany to fall to deliver the message
promptly, and the hlgbt>st reasons of public
poli<'y require that exemplary damages 11hould
be Imposed. Now, suppose the dls11Utch Is
dt>livered, and the eendee starts for his home,
but the railroad corporation, finding that It
can !ilend a larger number ot passengers to
another point, stops Its car,-as In the present
case they stopped it. because It was cheaper
to send a broken ple<'e of muchlnt>ry to Nol'folk to repair than to keep neeeKM11ry rt>Jmlr
shops Qr another e~lne,-flnd by thlK willful
and wanton violation of lt11 11tntutory 1l11tlt>11 to
furnish suftldent transportntlon the redplent
of the telegram does not reach the bedside of
his dying wife, would It not be an anomaly
that for a wllltul and wanton vlolatlou of its
1l11ty to deliver the teleimim promptly the telegraph company ls liable to exemplary damage11, but for an equally willful and wanton
violation by the railroad corporation to transport the passenger ac·co1·dlng to schedule that
company ls only liable to pay the passenger's
hoe.rd blll during bis detention. In a case
where the corporation tailed to bring the pas..enger home on bis round-trip ticket, as the

defendant In this case failed to do, punitive
damages were sustained In Head v. Railroad
Co., 79 Ga. 358, 7 S. E . 217.
But It was contended on the argument that
though the rau~oad corporation ls liable for
the wlllful and wanton violation of its statutory duty In running Its trains by a station
without stopping, and thus falling to take on
a passenger when there happens to be a
vacant seat, it ls not so liable If with full
notice of more passengers waiting at a station than the mrs can carry, and In time to
add more cars, It falls to do so. It ls difficult to recognize the authority to hold that
this act of wlllful violation· of Its statutory
duties and wanton disregard of the rights of
the public does not subject the corporation to
punitive damages, while the same wlllfulness
and wantonness In running by a station without stopping does so subject the corporation
If then, happens to be a vacant S'eat. It ls
the same wlllfulnees and wantonness to fall
to have sutHdent seats when the corporation
has notice in time and cars In Its control ns
not to stop to fill the empty sent. The statute authorlze11 no such <llscrlmlnatlon. It pro·
vldes (Code, f 1003): "Every railroad corporation • • • shall furnish sufllcient nc·
commodatlon t'or thf. transportation of nil such
passengers and property as shall within u
reasonable time previous thereto be olferl'll
for transport.ation at the place of stopping
and at the usual stopping places estnblh1t.ed
for receh·lng and discharging passengers and
freight for that train, • • • and shall be
liable to the party aggrieved In damages for
any neglect or refusal." The 11tatute nowhere
Intimates any distinction when•by one willful and wanton violation of the statute Is
cause for exemplary damages, und that another equally willful and wuntou violation ot
the same statute in<.'Ul'8 no such llablllty.
The reasonable and Impartial rule laid down
by a uwrnlmous court In run•ell's CW!e Is that,
It the breach of the statute ·•was mere inadvertence or negligence, or was caused by
an unforeseen number of passengel's presenting themselves, which rendered It unsafe to
take a greater number abonrd, and the company could not by reasonable diligence h8\ e
ln<'r<'alled the number ot cars, then the plalntur could only recover compensatory damages. It, however, • • • the defendant,
hy r1•a!'01mbll• olllgence, could have asct>rtalm-d tlUlt the numher of cars was insuftlcleut, nnd made 110 etrort to sup11Iy the delll'iency. but, regardless of its duties and or
the rights of those whom It had Invited to
preRent themselves at Its regular station for
JlllsAAge, or tf, having room for additional
perKons, It Pl188ed without stopping, this tURI>layed a gross and willful db1rt>gard of' the
rights of the plalntllf, which entitled him to
l"l'l"over punitive damages." This Is sustained
by numerous authorities In other states.
Helrn v. lkCau1tlum. 32 MIRS. 1; Railroad
Co. v. Hurst. 3Q }fies. 060; Silver v. Kent,
60 lllss. 124; Wllsou v. Railroad Co., 63
0
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Miss. 352; Railroad Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9,

9 South. 375; 3 Suth. Dam. § 937. It was

urged on the argument that it would be dith-

cult often to decide what state of facts would '

or would not constitute a willful and wanton

disregard of statutory duties. But that does

not authorize a judicial repeal of the statute,

either in whole or in part. It must, in each

use. be determined whether the facts proved

show a “willful and wanton disregard of

statutory regulations," and, if they do, the

jury is empowered to impose exemplary dam-

ages, subject to the protective supervision of

the court to prevent abuse by setting aside

the verdict.

But it was further argued before us that,

while a railroad corporation is by. statute

liable for “a willful violation" of the regula-

tions of the railroad commission, it is not lla-
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ble for “a willful and wanton violation of

statutory regulations"; and hence, when a

train with several vacant seats passes its reg-

ular station without taking on a passenger

waiting there, the liability is only because of

the indignity offered the intending passenger.

But it will be noted that this is a mere sub-

stitution of words. The sole indignity oi!-

fered him is the willful and wanton disregard ‘

of his rights as guarantied by the statute

(Code. § 1963). that “suﬂicient accommodation

for transportation shall be afforded at the

usual stopping places"; and the same indig-

nity is equally offered him by the violation

of the same statute if the company knows in

reasonable time that the number of cars are

insuﬂicient, and can supply them, and fails

to do so, running by without stopping, though

with crowded cars, because it chose not to

supply enough. The duty to furnish suiii- ‘

clent cars is clearly stated in Branch v. Rail-

road Co., 77 N. C. 347, independently of the

express requirement of the statute (Code, i

1963) above quoted. In the present case the

learned judge charged the jury, in accord-

ance with the ruling of this court, that, if the

defendant was guilty of willful and gross

negligence, the plaintiff could recover, other-

wise not; and further, that if the accident

occurred, which they could not have, in the

ordinary course of their business, foreseen

and provided for, this would not be willful

negligence, but, “if the character of the neg-

ligence was such as to satisfy the jury that

the defendant did not care or was indifferent

as to whether they had the train there (to

bring the passengers home), it would be will-

ful negligence." It was in evidence that

when the plaintiff, who held a return ticket,

applied for transportation, the ofﬁcial in

charge gave himself no concern whatever.

I made no effort to have the plaintiff brought

i home, and refused the use of the hand car.

t His honor, after stating correctly and more

fully what facts would constitute willful

negligence and what would not, instructed

the jury that only in the event they found

willful negligence could the plaintiff recover.

There was ample evidence to submit to the

I
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Miss. 352; Railroad Co. v. Sellers, 93 .A.la. 9, made no effort to have the plaintiff brought
9 South. 3i5; 3 Suth. Dam. f 937. It wa11 home, and refused the use of the hand car.
urged on the argument that It would be dlm- His honor, after stating correctly and more
cult often to decide what state of facts would 1 fully wbat facts would constitute wllltul
or would not constitute a willful and wanton negligence &11d what weuld not, Instructed
disregard of statutory duties. But that does tbe jury that only In the event they found
not authorize a judicial repeal of the statute, wlllful negligence could the plaintiff recover.
either In whole or In port. It must, In each There was ample evidence to submit to the
ease, be determined whether the facts proved jury the Inquiry whether or not there was
show a "wlllful and wanton disregard of willful negligence. Both authority and realltntutory regulations," and, If thry do, the son sustain the proposition that ..the liability
jury ls empowered to Impose exemplary dam- of a rallroed company for exemplary damng<'N
ages, subject to tbe protecth·e supervision of cannot be made to depend on the ability of
tbe court to prevent abuse by setting aside the corporation to earn enough money to keep
Its road In such condition as to be operated
the verdict.
But It was further argued before us that, with safety." Railroad Co. T. Johnson, 75
while a railroad corporation ls by. statute Tex. tri8, 162, 12 S. W. 482; Taylor v. Hallliable for "a wlllful violation" of the regula- rond Co., 48 N. H. 304, 317. It the company
tions of the railroad commission, It ls not lia- ls unwllllng or unable to furnish money to
ble for "a wlllful and wanton violation of run Its trains according to the statutory restatutory regulations"; and hence, when a quirement, It should cease to bold Itself out
train with several vacant seats pnSBes Its reg- to the public as K common carrier.
ular station without taking on a passenger
The Jury having found that there was a
waiting there, the llablllty Is only because of willful violation by the defendant of Its statthe lndlgnlty offered the Intending passenger. utory duty to transport the plalntltr, and a
But it will be note.I that this Is a mere sub- wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights In
stitution of words. The sole Indignity of- that rt>spect, 1t Is not the province of t.1is apfered him ls tbe willful and wanton disregard J>('llate court to review tbe facts and dlstmb
of his rights as gwirantled by the statute the verllkt.
(Code. I 100.11. that "sumclent a<'<'Ommodatlon · The principle Involved ls one of universal Infor transportation shall be afforded at the terest. It Is nothing less, when reduced to
usual stopping places"; and tbe same Indig- Its last analysis, than whether these corporanity ls equally offered him by the violation tions, primarily created for the convenlenc~e
of the same statute It the company knows In and advantage of the public, with the Inreasonable time that the number of cars are cidental benefit of profit to their owners, ue
lmmtllclent, and can supply them, and falls subject to exemplary damages when they wlllto do so, nmnlng by without stopping, though fully and wantonly violate the statutes passwith crowded cars, because It chose not to ed for their regulation by the power wil:<'h
supply enough. The duty to furnish sutll- created them. It they are not, then <'learly
clent cars ls dearly stated In Branch v. Rail- and unmistakably the public are In the 11owl!r
road Co., 77 N. C. 347, Independently of the and at the mercy of the arhltrary will of <'Orexpress requirement of tbe statute (Code, I poratlons, which, dally aggregating into larKer
~) above quoted. In the present case the
and larger maBl!eB, are pow<>rful beyond any
learned judge charged the jury, In accord- control other than the law. And lf they po3seas
ance with the rnllng of this court, that, lt the the power ot violating wlllfully and wantondefendant was guilty of willful aud groBs ly the statutory regulations prescribed tor the
negligence, the plalntll'f could recover, other- protection ot the public, without fear of punwise not; and further, that If the accident ishment by the Imposition of exemplary damoccurred, whk·h they could not have, In the ages at the hands of a jury. then tbe lawordinary coun:e of t)ielr business, fore11een making power, In creating them, Is, like the
and pro"Vlded for, this would not be willful ' magician In the Eastern story, evoking a
11egllge11ce, but, "If the <'hnracter of the neg· spirit which mastered and destro~·etl him.
llgen<-e was such as to llllth1fy the jury that The rlghtE of the people are too mueh at
the defendant did not care or wa11 lndltrerent stake In maintaining the principle thnt railas to whether they had the train there (to road corporations are liable to exemplary
bring the passengers home), It would be will· damages for the "willful violation" of stattu1 negligence." It WIUI In evidence that utes passed for their regulation, equally with
when the plaintiff, who held a return tkket, similar Ylolatlons of the rl'KUlntlons of the
applied for tri.nsportatlon, the otlklnl In railroad commission, for any denial or Lmltacharge gave himself no concern whatever, tlon of such principles to pau unnoticed.
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CO.UPEN'SA1'0RY AND

STACY v. PORTLMJD PUB. CO.1

(68 Me. 279.)

Supreme Judicial Court of .\Iaine. June 7, 1898.

Case for libel. Defendant published in its

paper, under the head of “Personal," the fol-

lowing: "A responsible gentleman of Hal-

lowell informs us that Secretary of State

Stacy was recently arrested in that city for

drunkenness and disturbance. A ten-dollar

note quieted the affair." The plea was the

general issue and justiﬁcation. On the trial,

plaintiff requested an instruction that, if the

jury found that the article was published

with express malice, they might give ex-

emplary damages. This the presiding judge

refused. The verdict was for plaintiff; dam-

ages, one dollar. Plaintiff alleges exceptions,

and moves to set aside verdict for inade-

quacy.

O. D. Baker, for plaintiff. T. B. Reed,
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for defendants.

PETERS, J. ' ' ' ' '

The plaintiff's counsel earnestly insists that

it was error on the part of the court to omit

(after request) to direct the jury that puni-

tive damages might be recovered in such a

case as this. Taking the case as it resulted,

we are satisﬁed that the plaintiff has sus-

tained no injury in this respect. Without

overruling former decisions, this court can-

not deny that punitive damages may be re-

covered against a corporation for the mall-

cious conduct of its servants and agents, by

a person injured by it. To the facts and

ﬁndings, however, presented in the case at

bar, our judgment is that the doctrine con-

tended for has no reasonable application.

The charge against the plaintiff was of\a

[serious nature, calculated to wound his sensi-

'biiities, and,to degrade him in his personal

t-haracter.

complete, justiﬁcation of the charge, was

pleaded by the defendants. The plaintiff

was allowed to recover damages for the in-

jury “to his character as a man,a citizen; for

mental pain and suffering, anguish, morti-

tication; and for loss of the beneﬁts of pub-_

lie conﬁdence and social intercourse,"—result- '

ing from the publication. The jury were

permitted to add, as actual damages, for any ;

road Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9. 9 South. 377,

aggravation of these elements of injury oc-

easioned by the express malice of the person

who published the article complained of. The

jury assessed nominal damages only, the ver-

dict being for one dollar. The legal signiﬁ-

cation of the verdict is, either that there was

no actual and express malice entertained to-

wards the plaintiff by the defendants‘ agent,

or that, if there was, it did the plaintif

f

no injury. There is no room for punitive

damages here. There is no foundation for

them to attach to or rest upon. It is said,

in vindication of the them-y_of punitive dam-

A substantial, but not a full and ‘

ages, that the interests of the individual in-\

jured and of society are blended. Here the

interests of society have virtually nothing to

DAllAGES.

co.1

ages, that the Interests of the Individual In-\
jured and of society are blended. Here the
(68 Me. 2i9.)
Interests of society have virtually nothing to
Hupreme Judicial Court ot :llalne. June 7, 1898. blend with. If the Individual has but a
Case for libel. Defendant published In !ta ncmilnal interest, society can have none. Such
paper, under the bead of "Personal," the fol- damages are to be awarded against a defemlant for punishment. But, If all the Individlowing: "A responsible gentleman of Hallowell Informs us that Secretary of State ual Injury Is merely technical and theoretical,
what Is the pun1shment to be lnftlcted for?
Stacy was recently arrested In that city for
If a plalntUr, upon all such elements of Indrunkenness and disturbance. A ten-dollar
jury as were open to him, la entitled to renote quieted the atralr." The plea was the
cover but nominal damages, shall he be the
general Issue and justification. On the trial,
recipient of penalties awarded on account or
plalntur requested an Instruction that, It the
an Injury or a supposed Injury to others bejury found that the article was published
\ with express malice, they might give ex- side himself? It there was enough In the
defense to mitigate the dnm11.ges to the Indiemplary damages. Thia th~ presiding judge
vidual, so did It mitigate the damages to the
refused. The verdict was for plaintiff; dampublic as well. Punitive damages are the
ages, one dollar. Plaintiff alleges exceptlons,
last to be assessed, In the elements of Injury
and moves to set aside verdict tor Inadeto be considered by a jury, and should be the
quacy.
first to be rejected by facts In mitigation.
O. D. Baker, for plalntlft'. T. B. Reed, We think the Irresistible inference Is that, 1r
for defendants.
the Instruction had been given as It was requested, the verdict would not have been Increased thereby to the extent of a cent.
PETERS, J. • • • • •
The plalntllI's counsel earnestly Insists that There may be cases, no doubt, where the acIt was error on the part of the court to omit tual damages would be but small, and the
(after request) to direct the jury that punl- punltl¥e damages 18l'ge; but this case Is not
th·e damages might be recovered In such a ot such a kind. It would have been proper
t•ase as this. Taking the case as It resulted, In this case for the presiding justice to ban~
we are satisfied that the plaintiff has sus- informed the jury that If the actual d11mage~
) tnined no Injury In this respect. Without were nominal, and no more, they need not
o¥Prrullng former decisions, this court can- award punlth·e damages. Any erl'or in the
not deny that punitive damages may be re- ruling was cured by the verdict. Gilmore v.
<.'overed against a corporation for the mall- Mathews, 67 Me. 517.
l'lous conduct of Its servants and agents, by
Some other points appear to ha¥e been
n person Injured by It. To the facts and raised at the trial, whll'h are not discussed
tlndings, however, presented in the case at In the \"ery full and a hie brief of the plaluliar, our judgment Is that the doctrine con- tlft''s counsel, and we may very well i·egarll
tended for has no reasonable appllcntlon. them as .now wal¥ed. A motion Is made
The charite against the plalntlft' was of 1 a I against the verdict as too sm:tll. The court
I serious nature, <'alculated to wound his sens!- 1 rarely inte1·fel'es with a verdi<:t in n. case of
' blllties, and to degrade him In his personal I this kind, whether lllOVed against as too largt•
l'haracter. A substantial, but not a full and [' or too small. We !lo not allow the motion.
C'Omplete, justification of the charge, was Motion and exct>11tlons overruled.
pll'aded by the defendants. The plnlnti1T ,
APPLETON, C. J., and WALTON, BAH\ was allowed to recover damages for the In- ' ROW8, VIRGIN, and LIBBEY, J.J., ('OllCUl'jury "to his character as a man, a citizen; for
red.
1 mental pain and suft'erlng, anguish, mortl·
· ti<•atlon; and for loss of the benefits of pub-. !
NOTE. To the 1111me eTfoct i;t>e Kubu ""· Uuil11(• t·oufttlt•nce and social l11tercom·se,"-re1mltway Co., 74 Iowo.137, 37 ~. \v. llfi; nml Schi11lng from the publication. The jury wl're pel v. Norton, !{8 Knn. 507. lG Pot>. HO!. Contrn.
lWrmith><l to add, as actunl damagel'l, for nny see \\·il,;on , .. Yuughn. :!X I•\'<1. :?'.!!I. nnd Ruilagg1·11 \ ' Ill Ion of these t>lements of Injury oc- rond Co. v. St>llers, U3 Alu. 9. H South. :Ji7,
where the court sars: ''(U) Tberr nre resix•ct(':t:;ionP1l hy the express malice of the pt'rson nlJII'
nuthoritiPs which up1~or to hold that l'X\\'ho 1111hllslwd the artlde complalnecl of. Thr
e11111l11r~- dnmoi:Ps cannot Ill' uwnr11r<l when tht•
jury asse,;~ed nomlnnl damages only, the vn- :lt'tnul injury is 1111r1•ly nominal. tlw tlwnry beiuir
•lkt being for one dollnr. The legal slg11lft- thut as ex1•111plury 1!1111111ges ure luid in 1·on~1·rv11tion ot the iuter1•;;1s <•f so<'iety. whic-h for this
1·ation of the verdict Is, either thnt there was purpose nre coni;idPre<l 'ns hll'11tlrd with 1lw inno actual and express mnllce ente1·tnlne<1 to- te1'Pl<ts of the iu<lh·itlnnl,' whert• the ilulivitlunl is
w11nh1 the plalntlft' by the <IPfendnuts' nitent, injun>d only nominnlly or not nt nil in fuc·t.
though hi11 ril(hlt-1 are •iolatl'tl. 'thl• inlt·rt·st>; of
or that, If there was, It did the plnlntlft' sodety
haye virtnnll~· nothinl{ to blt>1al with,' awl
no injury. There Is no room tor punitive hrnC"e, 'the imli\·idunl hnvin~ but n nominnl inclamagt•s here. There Is no fonntlatlon for terPst. soci!'ty t•an ha¥P non<'.' et<'. Hiney ,._
Publishing Co.. 118 ~le. :..'87. This vir•w ii< l<(J('them to attach to or rest 111mn. It Is said, C'ions,
but, Wl' 111111r1•lu•lJll, 11111 sonn1l. 11w triw
In vindication ot the tlwor~·.of pnnltl¥e dnm- tht>ory o! <'X•'lllJ • lnr~· dnm11111•s i,.; thn t of 111111ishSTACY v. PORTLA!ND PUB.
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Port ion of 011inio11 omitted.

mPnt, invo!Yini:- thP iil1•11s nf rNrihntion for willful mis1:ou<lut:1, uu<l au ex11m11l11 to drier from its
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repetition. 'I1te position of the supreme court of

Maine can be sustained in principle, it seems to

us, only by assuming that which is manifestly

untrue, namely, that no act is criminal which

does not inﬂict individual injury capable of be-

ing measured and compensated for in money.

Many acts denounced as crime by our statutes,

or by the common law, involve no pecuniary in-

jury to the individual against whom they are

directed, and which, while the party aggrieved

could not recover damages as compensation be-

yond a merely nominal sum, are yet punished in

the criminal courts, and may also be punished in

civil actions by the imposition of ‘smart money‘;

and, on the same principle, acts readily conceiv-

able which involve malice, willtuiness, or wanton

and reckless disregard of the rights of others,

though not within the calendar of crime, and in-

ﬂicting no pecuniary loss or detriment. measur--

able by a money standard, on the individual, yet
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merit such punishment as the civil courts may

inﬂict by the imposition of exemplary damages.

And upon these considerations the law is, and

has long been, settled in this state that the in-

ﬂiction of actual damage is not an essential pred-

icate to the imposition of exemplary damages.

Parker v. Misc, 27 Ala. 480; l‘ -le;:raph Co. v.

Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 South. 419' Railroad

Co. v. 1-lcddleston, s2 Ala. 218. 3 South. 53.

See, also, 1 Suth. Dam. 748. The charges re-

quested by the defendant to the effect that ac-

tual damage must be shown before punitive dam-

agtes ecgul be recovered were therefore properly

re us .'

rl'petitioo. The position of the supreme court of
)[sine e110 be sustained in principle, it seems to
us. only by assuming that which is manifestly
uutrue, namely, that no act is criminal which
<loes not inOict individual injury capable ot being men~ured and compensated for in money.
llnny acts denounced as crime by our statutes,
or by the common law, involve no pecuniary injury to the individual against whom they are
directed, and whieh, while the party aggrieved
could not recover damages as compenS11.tion beyond a merely nominal sum, are yet punished in
the criminal courts, and may also be punished in
civil actions by the imposition of 'smart money';
and, on the same principle, acts re1iatty-·conceiv·
able which involve malice, willfulness, or wanton
and recklesa diarecard of the rights of others,

though not within the calendar of crime, and inflicting no pecuniary loss or detriment. mensurable by a money standard, on the individual, yet
merit such punishment as the civil courts mny
Inflict by the Imposition of exemplary damages.
And upon these considerations the law ls. and
has long been, settled in this state thnt the infliction of actual damage is not an essential predicate to the imposition of exemplary damages.
Parker v. Mise, Z1 Ala. 480; Teleicraph Co. v.
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 South. 419;.. Hailroad
Co. v. Heddleston, 82 Ala. 218, 3 Muth. 53.
See, also, 1 Suth. Dam. 748. The charges requested by the defendant to the eft'ect that ac·
tual damage must be shown before punitive damages could be recovered were therefore properly
refused."
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STEVENSON v. SMITH et al.

(28 Cal. 103.)

Supreme Court of California. April, 1865.

Appeal from district court, Second judicial

district, Tehama county.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the

court.

George Cadwalader, for appellant.

Long, for respondents.

W. S.

SAWYER, J. This is an action to recover '

a mare and colt seized by the defendant

(sheriff of Tehama county) under an attach-

ment, and damages for their detention.

Plaintiff recovered the ,property. Plaintiff

moved for a new trial on the ground that cer-

tain special damages, claimed to have been

proved, were not found for him. The mo-

tion was denied, and the plaintiff appeals

from the order denying a new trial.
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The appellant claims that the evidence

shows that the animals were placed by'de-

fendants in ﬁelds where the pasturage was

poor, and that in consequence of this act

they lost ﬂesh and depreciated in value to the

extent of ﬁve hundred dollars. Also that the

mare was a valuable brood mare, taken to

Tehama county for the purpose of being bred

to a particular horse, and that by reason of

the taking and detention by defendants the

breeding season was lost, whereby a t'urther

damage was shown to have been sustained

to the amount of ﬁve hundred dollars, and

that the court should upon the evidence have

found these items of damage for plaintiff.

On examination of the pleadings, we iind

no averments in the complaint that would an-

thorize the recovery of the items claimed.

These damages are special, and the facts out

of which they arise must be averred, or they

cannot be recovered.

Mr. Chitty says: “Damages are either gen-

shown with particularity. ' ' ' And

whenever the damages sustained have not

necessarily accrued from the act complained

of, and consequently are not implied by law,

then, in order to prevent surprise on the de-

fendant, which might otherwise ensue at the

trial, the plaintiff must in general state the

particular damage which he has sustained, or

he will not be permitted to give evidence of

it. Thus in an action of trespass and false

imprisonment, where the plaintiff offered to

give in evidence that during the imprison-

ment he was stinted in his allowance of food,

he was not permitted to do so, because the

fact was not, as it should have been, stated

, in the declaration; and in a similar action it

was held that the plaintiff could not give ev-

idence of his health being injured, unless spe-

cially stated. So in trespass ‘for taking a

horse,' nothing can be given in evidence

which is not expressed in the declaration,

and if money was paid over in order to re-

gain possession, such payment should be al-

leged as special damages." Id. 396.

The complaint in this case only alleges the

ownership of the animals, the value, the

wrongful taking and detention, the demand,
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STEVENSON v. SMITH et al.
(28 Cal. 103.)
Supreme Court of California. April, 1866.
Appeal from district court, Second judlclal
district, 'l'ehama county.
The facts are stated In the opinion of the
court.
George Cadwalade1-, for a1>pellnnt. W. S.
Long, for respondents.
SAWYER, J. This ls an action to recover
a mare and colt seized by the defendant
(sheriff of Tehama county) under an attachwt:nt, and damages for their detention.
Plaintiff recovered the . property. Plaintiff'
moved for a new trial on the ground that certain special damages, claimed to have been
proved, were not found for him. The motion was denied, and the plaintiff appeals
from the order denying a new trial.
'l.'he appellant claims that the evidence
shows that the animals were placed by'defendants In fields where the pasturage was
poor, and that in consequence of this act
they lost fiesh and depreciated In value to the
extent of five hundred dollars. Also tllat the
mare was a valuable brood mare, taken to
Tehama county for the purpose of being bred
to a particular horse, and that by reallon of
the taking a.nd detention by defendants the
breeding season was lost, whereby a further
damage was shown to have been sustained
to the amount of five hundred dollars, and
that the court should upon the evidence have
found these Items of damage tor plaintiff.
On examination of the pleadings, we tind
no averments In the complaint that would authorize the recovery of the Items claimed.
These damages are special, and the facts out
of which they arise must be averred, or they
cannot be recovered.
Mr. Chitty says: "Damages are either general or special. General damages are such a
the law Implies, or presumes to have accrued
from the wrong complained of. Special damages are such as really took place, and are
not Implied by law. and are either superadded to general damages arising from an
act Injurious In ltself,-as when some particular damage arises from the uttering of
slanderous words actionable In themselves.or are such as arise from an act lndltTerent,
and not actionable In Itself, but only Injurious In Its consequences," etc. 1 Chit. Pl. 395.
Again: "It does not appear necessary to
state the former description of the damages
In the declaration, because presumptions of
law are not In general to be pleaded or averred as facts, etc. • • • But when the law
does not neceesnrlly Imply that the plalntl.tr
11ustnlned the damages by the net complained
of, It Is essential to the validity of the declarnUcn that the resulting damage should be

1

shown with particularity. • • • Antl
whenever the damages sustained have not
necessarily accrued from the act complained
of, and consequently are not lmplled by law.
then, In order to prevent surprise on the defendant, which might otherwise ensue at thl.'I
trial, the plalutltr must in general state the
pnrtlculnr damage which he has sustained, or
he wlll not be permitted to give evidence of
It. Thus In an action of trespass and false
Imprisonment, where the plaintltr offered to
give In evidence that during the Imprisonment he was stinted In his allowance of food,
he was not permitted to do so, because the
fact was not, as It should have been, stated
In the declaration; and in a similar action It
was held that the plaintiff could not give evldence of his health being Injured, unless specially stated. So In ti·espass 'for taking a
horse,' nothing can be given In evidence
which le not exvreesed In the declaration,
and It money was paid over In order to regain possession, such payment should be alleged as special damages." Id. 396.
The complaint In tllls case only alleges the
ownership of the animals, the value, the
wrongful taking and detention, the demand,
and that plaintiff "has sustained damages by
reason of such wrongful taking and detention
of said chattels and property In the sum or
one thousand dollars."
From these fact.s alone the law does not
Imply either of the Items of damages claimed
to have been proved. The first item ls not
even consequential upon any of the facts alleged, but results from other acts of defendants while the animals were In his possession. And the second item of damages
would not necessarlly r,sult from a mere taking and detention. These damages depend
upon an extra.ordinary value of the animal
for a particular purpose, and upon the special use to which she was capable of being
applied. The facts out of which these Items
of special damages arise must be alleged in
the complaint, or they cannot be recovered.
They are not alleged, and are, therefore, not
embraced within the Issues to be tried. For
this reason, if for no other, the plalntift.' is
not entliled to judgment for such Items or
damages. There was, then, no ,error in 21ot
finding for plalntlft.' on these points.
The only other point made by appellant ls,
that the court erred In not giving plalntllf
costs. There ls no doubt In our minds that
the plaintiff was entitled to costs. But this
error In no way atTects the finding, and ls not
a ground for new trial. The error cannot.
therefore, be corrected on appeal from an order denying a new trial. The proper mode
of reviewing and correcting this error Is on
appeal from the judgment, but no such appeal has been taken In this case.
Judgment affirmed.
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WABASH WESTERN RY. CO. v. FRIEDMAN• .

WABASH WESTERN RY..CO. v. FRIED-

MAN.

(30 N. E. 353, 34 N. E. 1111, and 146 Ill. 583.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. March 24, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by Oscar J. Friedman against the

Wabash Western Railway Company to recov-

er damages for personal injuries. Plaintil!

obtained judgment, which was aﬂlrmed by

the appellate court. Defendant appeals. Re-

versed.

George B. Burnett (Black & Fitzgerald, of

counsel), for appellant. Page, Eliel & Rosen-

thal (J. W. Duncan, of counsel), for appellee.

CRAIG, J. This was an action brought by

Oscar J. Friedman against the Wabash West-

ern Railway Company to recover damages

for a personal injury received on the 1st day

of May. 1888, while plaintiff was a passenger

on the defendant's line of road, running from
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Moberly, Mo., to Ottumwa, Iowa. The fol-

lowing map shows the line of defendant's

road. The accident which resulted in the in-

jury complained of occurred in the state of

Missouri. between Kirksviile and Gienwood

(80 N. Ill. 853, 84 N. E. 1111, and 146 Ill. 583.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. March 24, 1892.
Appeal from appellate court, First district.
AcUon by Oscar J. Friedman against the
Wabash Westem Railway Company to recover damages for personal Injuries. Plalntilr
obtained judgment, wblcb was atnrmed by
the appellate court. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

George B. Burnett (Black & Fitzgerald, of
Page, Ellel & Rosenthal (J. W. Duncan, of counsel), for appellee.

eoun.se.l), for appellant.

CRAIG, J. This was an action brought by
Oscar J. Friedman against the Wabash Western Railway Company to recover damages
for a personal Injury received on the let day
of May, 1888, while plaintiff was a passenger
on the defendant's line of rood, running from
Moberly, Mo., to Ottumwa, Iowa. The following map shows the line of defendant's
road. The accident which resulted In the Injury complained of occurred In the state of
Missouri. between Klrksvllle nnd Uleuwood
Junction, two stations lndlcate<l on the map.

Junction, two stations indicated on the map.

J offuuwg

'1 8LOOM’‘E|_°

Distance from Kirksvilie to G1onwood Junction

25 miles.

The declaration contained ﬁve counts, but

they are all substantially alike. In the second

count, it is averred that defendant was on

May 1, 1888, operating a railroad from Klrks-

operating trains for the conveyance of pas-

sengers for reward; “and the said piaintiff,

at said Kirksviile, then became and was a

passenger in a certain train of the said de-

fendant on the said railroad, to be carried,

and was accordingly then being carried, in

the said train, from Kirksville to said Glen-

wood Junction," for reward, etc.; that it

became and was the duty of the said defend-

ant to properly and safely construct and

maintain the track and road-bed of said rail-

way, but the defendant so negligently con-

structed and maintained the same that the

same were not then safe for the use of pas-

sengers on defendant's trains, "and the rails

of said track of said railroad were then and

•s

Dl•tance from Ceotralla to Moberly, 24 milc11.
Distance from Moberly to Ottumwa, 181 miles.
Di11taoce from Klrkaville to Glenwood Junct.ioo
93 milee.

there in bad repair and condition, and a cer-

tain rail in the said track had become broken

by reason of the said negligence of the said

defendant, and thereby a certain car then be-

ing in the said train, and of a sort commonly

called ‘sleeping-cars,' was then and thcre

thrown with great force and violence from

andoff thesaid track;"and plaintiff, beingthen

and there asleep and in the exercise of due

care, was thrown from the berth in said car,

in which he was sleeping, with great force

and violence, across the car, and into the op-

posite berth, “by means whereof, then and

there. the spine and spinal column. including

the spinal cord, of the said plaintiff, became

and were greatly bruised. hurt, and injured,

and the said plaintiff suffered and incurred

an injury of the kind known as ‘concussion

and was accordingly then being carried, In
the said train, from Klrksvllle to said Glenwood Junction," for reward, etc.; tbnt It
became and was the duty of the said defendant to properly and safely construct and
maintain the track and rond-bed of said railway, but the defendant so negligently constn1cted and maintained the same thut the
same were not then safe for the use of pa!!sengers on defendant's trains, "and the l'llils
of said track of said railroad were then and
there In bad repair and condltlon, and a cc1·tnln rail In the said track had become broken
by reason of the said negligence of the Bdld
defendant, and thereby a certain car then being In the said train, and of a sort commonly
called 'sleeping-cars,' was then and thl•re
thrown with great force and violence from
nncl off the said track;" and plaintiff, being then
and there asleep and In the exercise of due
care, was thrown from the berth In said car,
In which he was sleeping, with great force
and violence, acrOSB the car, and Into the opposite berth, "by means whereof, then and
there, the spine and spinal column. including
the spinal cord, of the snld plaintiff, became
antl were greatly bruised, hurt, and Injured,
and the said plalntltr suffered and Incurred
an Injury of the kind known as 'concussion
of the spine,' " whereby he incurred expeucllturee, in endeavoring to be hcaloo, amounting
to $5,000, and becam·e sick. lame, etc., "from
thence hitherto," sufl'ering great pain and being prevented from attending to his business,
and thereby losing profits, ett. In the con·
cluslon of the declaration the plnlntllT claimed
damages amounting to ,50,000. Tbe defendant pleaded the general Issue, and on a trial
before a jury the plalntltr recovered $30,000,
and the judgment, on appeal to the appellate
urt, was affirmed.
It wlll be observed that In each count of
the declaration the plaintiff, In stating where
the relation of passenger and common carrier
commenced, and whe1-e such relation existed
between the plalntltr and the defendant.
averred as follows: "And the said plaintiff,
at Mid Kirksville, then became and was a
passenger on 11 certain train of the said de·
fendant on the said rnllrood, to be carried,
and was accordingly then being carried, In
the said train, from Klrksvllle to said Glenwood Junction," for reward, etc. No evidence
was Introduced on the trial that the plalutlff became a passenger at Klrksvllle for
Glenwood Junction; but the plnlntll'f testified
that be took the sleeper at l\loberly to go to
Ottumwa, and that he had a ticket which
rend, from ~foberly to Ottumwa, which be
had purchased at Moberly In the fall of 18Gi.
The testimony offered for the purpose of
proving the averment of the declaration w11s
objected to on the ground of a "\""nriance between the evidence and the declaration; but
the court overruled the objection, and allowed the evidence to be Introduced. Upon the
question of variance the defendant asked
the court to Instruct the jury as follows:

r

ville, Mo., to Glenwood Junction, Mo., and

The declaration contained five counts, but
they are all substantially alike. In the second

count, it ls averred that defendant was on
May l, 1888, operating a railroad from Kirksville, Mo., to Glenwood Junction, Mo., and
operating trains for the conveyance of passengers for reward; "and the said l>lalntUf,
at said Kirksville, then became and was a
passenger In a certain train of the said defendant on the said rnllronrl, to be carried,
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“The averment in plaintiffs declal-ation that

he became a passenger in the train of defend-

ant at Kirksville, Mo., to be carried from

said Kirksville to Glenwood Junction, is

material, and must be proved as alleged;

and if the jury believe from the evidence

that said plaintiff did not at the time in ques-

tion hecome a passenger in said train of de-

fendant at said Kirksville, to be carried to ;

said Glenwood Junction, then the jury will

ﬂnd for defendant, regardlem of all other

questions in the case." But the court refused

to give the instruction as prayed, but quali-

lied it by adding as follows, to-wit: “But if

it appear from the evidence that plaintiff was

a passenger on the train of the defendant

between the points mentioned, traveling from

a point south of said Kirksville to a point

beyond Glenwood Junction, then the aver-

ment in the plaintiffs declaration is suﬂl-
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ciently made out." It may be said that the

question involved is a technical one, and

hence not entitled to that consideration which‘

a court should give to a question which‘

goes to the merits of an action. The plaintiff

had the right, when the question was raised,

to amend his declaration, and thus obviate

the diiiiculty; but he saw proper to take

another course, and he occupies no position

now to complain, should the rules of law

fhat control in such cases be strictly en-

forced against him. But, while the ques-

tion involved may be regarded somewhat

technical, still it will be remembered that

the plaintiff is seeking to recover a large

sum of money, and the defendant has the

right to demand and insist that the grounds

upon which the plaintiff claims a right of

recovery should be clearly and concisely

stated, and that the case made on the decla1a-

tion should be proven as laid. If a plaintiff

mayallege in his declaration one ground of

recovery, and on the trial prove another, a

defendant never could be prepared for trial.

One great object of a declaration is to notify

the defendant of the nature and character

of the plaintiff's demand, so that he may be

able to prepare for a defense; but if one

ground of action may be alleged, and another

proven, a declaration would be a delusion,

and, instead of affording a defendant notice

of what he was called upon to meet, it would

be a deception. Here the plaintiff claimed

that the relation of passenger and common

carrier existed between him and the defend-

ant. nnd that the defendant owed him a duty

growing out of that relation. In speaking of

a declaration in such a case. Chitty on

Pleading says: “When the plaintiff's right

consists in an obligation on the defendant to

observe some particular duty, the declaration

must state the nature of such duty, which

we have seen may be founded either upon a

contract between the parties or on the obli-

gation of law arising out of the defendant's

particular character or situation, and the de-

fendant must prove such duty as laid; and

a variance will, as in actions on contract, be

fatal." Chit. Pl. 382. The same author also
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"The nt"erment In plnlntltrs declatntlon thnt
Ile became a pns.seuger In the train ot dctendunt at Kirksville, Mo., to be carried from
said Kirksville to Glenwood Junction, ls
material, and must be proved as alleged;
nnd If the jury believe from the evidence
that said plalntltr did not at the time In question become a passenger In said train ot detendant at said Kirksville, to be carried to
said Glenwood Junction, then the jury will
find for defendant, regardless ot all other
queii'tlons In the case." But the court refused
to give the Instruction as prayed, but qunllfied It by adding as follows, to-wit: "But If
It appear from the evidence that plalntU't wns
a passenger on the train of the defendant
between the points mentioned, traveling from
a point south of said Klrksvllle to a point
beyond Glenwood Junction, then the averment In the plaintlrl'e declaration Is sumclently made out." It may be said that the
question Involved ls a technical one, and
hence not entitled to that consideration whlcli
a court should give to a question which
goes to the merits ot an action. The pla.lntitr
had the right, when the question was raised,
to amend his declaration, and thus obviate
the ditliculty; but he saw proper to take
another course, and he occupies no position
now to complain, should the rules of law
t'i.lat control In such cuses be strictly enforced against him. But, while the question Involved may be regarded somewhnt
technlral, still It will be remembered thnt
the plaintiff ls seeking to recover a large
sum of money, and the defendant has the
l'ight to demand and ln.slst that the grounds
upon which the plaintiff claims a right of
recovery should be clearly and concisely
stated, and that the case mnde on the declaration should be proven as laid. If a plalntUf
may allege In his declaration one ground of
recovery, and on the trial prove another, a
defendant never could be prepared tor trial.
One great object of a declaration Is to notify
the defendant of the nature and chnracter
of the plalntllf's demand, so that he may be
able to prepare tor a defense; but If one
ground of nctlon may be alleged, and another
proven, a declaration would be a delusion,
:md, Instead ot affording a defendant notice
of what he wns called upon to meet, It would
be a deception. Here the plaintiff claimed
that the relation of passenger and common
carrier existed between him and the defendant. nnd that the defendant owed him a duty
growing out of that relation. In speaking ot
a declaration In sucb a case, Chitty on
Pleading says: "When the plalntll't's right
consists In an obligation on the defendant to
observe some particular duty, the declaration
must state the nature of such duty, which
we baYe seen may be founded either upon a
contract between the parties or on the obligation of law arising out of the defendant's
particular cha1·acter or situation, and the defendant must prove such duty as laid; and
a t"arlanre will, as in actions on contract, be

fatal.'' Chit. Pl. 382. The same author also
says: "In an action on the case tound-00. on
an express or Implied contract, as against an
attorney, agent, carrier, Innkeeper, or other
bailee, tor negligence, etc., the declaration
must correctly state the contract or the particular duty or consideration from which the
I llablllty results, and on which It Is founded;
: and a variance In the description of a coni tract, though In an action ex dellcto, may be
fatal, as In an action ex contractu. The declaration In such case usually begins with a
statement of the particular profession or
situation of the defendant and his retainer,
and consequent duty or llablllty. The declaration wlll be defective It' lt does not show
that by express contract or by implication
of law, 1n respect to tbe defendant's particular character or llltuation, etc., stated by the
plalntlt'l', the defendant was bound to do or
omit the act In reference to which he 18
charged." Chit. Pl. p. 384.
It may, however, be said that the statement In the declaration of the point from
which and to which the plaintiff was being carried was mere Inducement, and neetl
not be proved as laid. Upon a question of
this charncter, Chitty on Pleading (page 2921
says: "In general, however, every allegation ln an inducement which ls material, and
not Impertinent and foreign to the cause,
and which, consequently, cannot be rejecteci
as surplusage, must be proved as alleged,
and a variance would be fatal; and consequently great attention to the facts ls necessary ln framing the Inducement, and care
must be taken not to Insert any unnecessary
allegation." If, therefore, the allegation Is
to be regarded as Inducement, It was necessary to prove It as alleged. And at pnge 38.j
the author further says: "It Is also a rule
that it' a necessary Inducement of the plaintiff's right, etc., even ln actions for tortB, relate to and describe Wld be founded on a
matter ot contract. It ls necessary to be
strictly correct In stating such contract; It
being matter of description. Thus, even In
case against a carrier, it' the termini ot' the
journey which was to be undertnken be misstated, the variance will be t'atai Here the
allegation In the lntlucement relates to matter of description." Harris v. Rayner, 8
Pick. 541, ls a case In point. The action was
brought to recover for an Injury sustained
by the oversettlng ot' a stage-coach. The
plalntltr alleged In his declaration that he
paid defendants, for his paBSage In their
stage t'rom Albany to Boston, $10, the usual
fee for said passage, and defendants, In consideration thereQt, undertook and promised
carefully to .transport plaintiff In said passage from Albany to Boston. In support of
the declaration, pla.lntlfr proved tha.t he was
In a. stage-coach from Worcester to Boston,
and that just as he arrived at Boston the
coach was overset by the carelessneu of the
driver, and he was thereby Injured. It was
held tllat the evidence did not prove the

G.BN.El:AL A:\ D :;J>ECU.L DA'.\U.GES.
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' leged remains without proof."

contract set out in the declaration, and in

passing upon this point the court said: "We

think there was no suﬁicient proof at the

trial of the contract as alleged in the declara-

tion. The declaration alleges a contract on

the part of the defendants to transport the

plaintiﬂ from Albany to Boston. The proof

was that the plaintif f rode in defendants'

stage from Worcester to Boston; and. al-

though this is part of the route from Albany

to Boston, yet it is part, also, of many other

lines of travel. So that the contract as al-

In Tucker

v. Crackiin, 2 Starkie, 385, and in Railroad

&. Banking Co. v. Tucker, 79 Ga. 128, 4 S. E.

5, actions were brought against carriers for

the loss of goods; and in each case it was

held that a variance between the proof and
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allegation as to the termini of the carriage

was fatal. In Phillips, Ev. (volume 3, p.

268,) the author says: “The plaintif f will be

nonsuited if the termini of the journey are

not correctly set forth." In Railroad Co. v.

Sutton, 53 Ill. 398, the point was made that

an averment in the declaration of defend-

ant's undertaking to convey the plaintiff

from West Urbana to Tolono is not sustained

by proof of an undertaking to convey from

(.lhampaign City to Tolono. In disposing of

the question of variance, it is said: “It

would appear from the testimony that West

Urbana and Champaign City are one and the

same place; consequently, there was no vari-

ance." The averment in plaintiff's declara_-I

tion that he became and was a passenger at

Kirksville, to be carried to Glenwood Junc-

tion, for reward, was, in effect, a statement

that he took the defendant's train at Kirks.

ville for Glenwood Junction, and that he had

paid or was ready to pay his fare from one

point to the other when called upon, where-

upon there was an implied contract on

the part of the railway company to safely

carry him from one point to the other. We

think it plain that the averment in plaintiff's

declaration was not sustained by proof that

he became a passenger at Moberly for Ob-

tumwa. It may be true that plaintiff stat-

ed more in his declaration than he might

have stated; that he might have relied upon

an allegation that he was a passenger upon

defendant's cars, being carried for reward,

without stating deﬁnitely the termini of his

journey on defendant's line of road. But,

having gone into detail in his allegation, the

law requires him to prove them as laid.

What is said in Bell v. Senneff, 83 Ill. 125,»

is in point here: “As a general rule a party

is required to prove the averments of his

pleadings as he makes them. He may aver

more than is required; but, as a general

rule, he must prove them, although unneces-

sarily made." In Derragon v. Rutland, 58

Vt. 128, 3 Atl. 332, it was held that every

averment which the pleadings make material

as a descriptive part of the cause of action

must be proved as alleged; and any vari-

..-·ontr:i.ct set out In the declnmtlon, a111.l in
passing upon th1s point the court said: hWe
think there was no suftlclcnt proof at the
trial of the contract as alleged In the declaration. The declaration alleges a contract on
the part of the defendants to transport the
plalntifr from Albany to Boston. The proof
was that the plalntllf rode in defendants'
stage from Worcester to Boston; and. although this ls part of the route from Albany
to Boston, yet It ls part, also, of many other
lines of travel. So that the contract as alleged remains without proof." In Tucker
v. Cracklin, 2 Starkie, 3&J, and in llailrood
& Banking Co. v. Tucker, 79 Ga. 128, 4 S. E •
.'i, acUons were brought against caITlers for
the loss of goods; and in each case it was
held that a variance between the proof and
~llegatlon as to the termini of the carrini:-e
was fatal. In Phillips, Ev. {volume 3, p.
2~,) the author says:
"The plalntitr will l>e
nonsulted If the termini of the jouruey are
not correctly set forth." In Railroad Co. v.
Sutton, 53 Ill. 398, the point was made that
fill aV'erment In the declaration ot defendant's undertaking to convey the plalntitr
!rom West Urbana to Tolono ls not sustnJned
by proof ot an undertaking tb convey from
Champaign City to Tolono. In disposing of
the question ot variance, It Is said: "It
would appear from the testimony that West
Urbana and Champaign City are one and the
same place; consequently, there was no yarlance." The averment In plalntltr's declara-=J
tlon that he became and wa.s a passenger at
Klrkirrllle, to· be carried to Glenwood Junction, for reward, was, In etrect, a statement
that he took the defendant's train at Kirksville for Glenwood Junction, and that he had
paid or was ready to pay his fare from one
point to the other when called upon, whereupon there was an Implied contract on
the part of the railway company to safely
carry him trom one point to the other. We
think it plain that the averment In plalntltI's
declaration was not suetaJned by proof that
ht- became a passenger at Moberly tor Ottumwa. It may be true that plalntitr stated more In his declaration than he might
have stated; that he might have relied upon
fill allegation that he was a passenger upon
defendant's cars, being carried for reward.
without stating definitely the termini of bis
journey on defendant's line of road. But,
having gone into detail In his allegation, the
law requires him to prove them as laid.
What Is said In Bell v. Sennetr, 83 Ill. 125,
Is ln point here: "As a general rule a pa.rt;y
i8 required to prove the averments of his
pleMllngs as he makes them. He may aver
mOl'e than ls required; but, as a general
rule, he must prove them, although unnecessarll;y made." In Derragon v. Rutland, 58
Vt. 128, 3 Atl. 332, It was held that every
averment which the pleadings make material
as a descriptive part of the cause of action
must be proved as alleged; and any variance whlrh destroys the legal Identity of
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the matter or thing averred with the matter
or thing proYed Is fatal In State v. Copp,
15 N. H. 212, It Is said: "It Is a most geueral rule that no allegation which Is descriptive of the Identity ot that which Is legally
essential to the cJalm or charge can be rejected." See, also, 1 Philllps, Ev. pp. 709,
710; Steph. Pl p. 124, appendix. Here the
plaintlft'. was bound to allege that he was a
passenger on defeudnnt's train of cars for
reward. This was material, and the further
averwent that he became a passenger at
Kirksville for Glenwood Junction was descriptive of the Identity of thnt which was legally
essential. It could not be rejected or disregarded. In conclusion, we think It plain,
under the authorities, that there was a Yariance between the proof and the declnratlon;
and the court erred ln the admission of tile
cnce, and In the modlllcatlon of defenda t's Instruction.
' On the trial the plalntltI was permitted,
against the objection of the defendant, to
Introduce evidence tending to prove that
the plnintllf at the time of the injury was
receiving a compensation for his services
as a trarellng salesman of $3,000 pei· annum.
The declaration contained no allegation of
any special contract or engagement of the
plaintlft'. with an;y person under which he
might earn money for his services. In Hallway Co. v. Klnuber, 9 Ill. App. 613, In discussing a question ot this character it Is
said: "::-ieither of these allegations points
to any damages growing out of or depeudlug
upon the peculiar circumstances or business
of the defendant In Tomlinson v. Derby,
43 Conn. 562, the plalntllT was injured by
means of a detective highway, and his allegation was that he was thereby 'prevented from
transacting his ordinary buslne88;' and It
was held that, under such allegation, he
could not show that he was earning $100 a
month In atrtlng and sawing timber. So,
In Taylor v. Munroe, 43 Conn. 36, under a
similar allegation, It was held that the plain·
tiff could not show that she was a button·
maker, and what wages she earned in that
business. In City ot Chicago v. O'Bt·ennan,
65 Ill. IGO, the plalntltr brought suit for an
Injury caused by the falling of a. portion of
the brick and plastering in the common council chamber In the city. The allegation In
the declaration was that 'the plaintllr, who
was pursuing his occupation as journalist,'
was Injured, etc., 'and thereby the plalntltr,
as la.wyer, lecturer, and journalist, became
and was sick, sore, and Incapacitated from
attending to his business, and so continued
for a long time, to-wit, for two months; and,
as regards plalntltr's profession as a lecturer,
he has been almost wholly, ever since, disabled from pursuing It.' It was held that
under these allegations the plalntl1f could
not give In evidence the fact of a particular
engagement to lecture In Virginia, and the
probable gains thereor. The court say: 'In
order to subserve the ends of good pleading,

~
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which are to apprise the opposite party of

the nature of the claim, and prevent surprise,

it was necessary that these special damages,

and the facts on which they were based,

should have been set out in the declaration.' "

Baldwin v. Railroad Corp. 4 Gray, 333. City

of Bloomington v. Chamberlain, 104 Ill. 272,

is also a case in point. There the admitted

evidence was held not to be erroneous, but

the ruling was placed on the express ground

that the evidence was not as to the loss of

proﬁts of a particular engagement. Had the

evidence gone to that extent, as is the case

here, it is plainly laid down that the evidence

would have been erroneous, as held in City

of Chicago v. O'Brennan, 65 ill. 160. This

is apparent from what is said in the opinion

of the court on page 27 . We think the rule

established in the cases cited is the correct

one, and the court erred in the admission of
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the evidence. It cannot be said that the

error was a harmless one, as the evidence

was of a character calculated to produce on

the minds of the jury an impression that the

plaintiff, on account of his capacity to earn

a large salary before the injury, which he

had lost by the accident, and hence should

recover large damages.

It may, however, be said that the error

was cured by an instruction given by the

court as follows: “The court permitted the

testimony of what plaintiff was earning at

the time of the injury charged. This testi-

mony was admitted for no other purpose

than to show plaintiffs capacity to earn

/money. and must not be considered in any

respect as a measure of damages." It is not

entirely clear what the instruction means.

While the court directed the jury that the

evidence was not to be considered as a meas-

ure of damage the court failed to point out

what use they should make of the evidence.

The court ruled, when the evidence was

offered, that it was competent for the con-

sideration of the jury. That ruling was

never changed. The evidence was allowed

to remain with the jury for their considera-

tion, and it could have no other effect than

to swell the damages. Had the court, when

it was ascertained that an error had been

committed in admitting it, excluded the evi-

dence entirely from the consideration of the

jury, the error would in a great measure

have been removed; but that course was not

pursued. The instruction did not, in our

judgment, cure the error. For the errors

indicated the judgment of the appellate and

circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause

remanded.

(Oct. 23, 1893.)

MAGRUDER, J ., (dissenting.) It seems to

me that the petition for rehearing in this

case has demonstrated beyond question the

right of the appellee to a rehearing. First,

the declaration is suﬂicient as a declaration

upon the common-law liability of the carrier;

second, the declaration alleges that the plain-

tiff “was hindered and prevented from trans-

acting and attending to his business and

GENERAL AND SPECIAL DAMAGES.

which are to apprise the opposite party of
the nature of the claim, and prevent surprise,
It was necessary that these special damages,
and the facts on which they were based,
should bave been set out ln the declaration.'"
!!:tld,vln '"· Railroad Corp. 4 Gray, 333. City
of Bloomington v. Cbamberlaln, 104 Ill. Zi2,
ls also a case In point. Tbere the admitted
evidence was held not to be erroneous, but
the ruling was placed on the exp1·ess ground
that the evidence was not as to the loss of
profits of a particular engagement. Had the
evidence gone to that extent, IU! ls the case
here, It is plainly laid down that the evidence
would have been erroneous, as held in City
of Chkago v. O'Brennan, 65 Ill. 100. This
ls apparent from wbat Is said In the opinion
of the court on page 274. We think the rule
established ln the cases cited Is the correct
one, and the court erred ln the admission of
the evidence. It cannot be said that the
error was a harmless one, as the evidence
was of a character calculated to produce on
the minds of the jury an Impression that the
plalutlfl', on account of bis capacity to eam
a large salary befo1·e the Injury, whlclJ he
had lost by the accident, and hence should
recover large damages.
It may, however, be said that the error
was cured by an Instruction given by the
court as follows: "'l'he court permitted the
testimony of what plalntUr was earning at
the time of the injury charged. '!'his testimony was admitted for no other purpose
than to sbow plalntltr's capacity to eal"Il
~-money. and must not be considered lo any
respeet as a measure of damages." It Is not
entirely clear what the instruction means.
While the court directed the jury that the
evidence was not to be considered as a measure ot damage the court failed to point out
what use they should make of the evidence.
The court ruled, when the evidence was
olTercd, that It was competent for the consideration of the jury. Tbat ruling was
never changed. The evidence was allowed
to remain with the jury for their consideration, and It could have no other effect thnn
to swell the damages. Had the court, when
lt wns nseertnined that an error bad been

committed In admitting It, excluded the evidence entirely from the consideration of the
jury, the error would In a great measure
have been removed; but that course was not
pursued. Tbe Instruction did not, in our
judgment, cure the error. For the errors
indicated tbe judgment of the appellate and
circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause
remanded.
(Oct. 23, 1&13.)
MAGRUDER, J., (dissenting.) It seems to
me that the petition for rehearing In this
CIU!e has demonstrated beyond question the
right of the appellee to a rehearing. First,
the declaration Is sufficient as a declaration
upon the common-law liability of the carr1e1·~
second, the deciamtion alleges that the plnintllr "was hindered and prevented from transacting and attending to his business and
a1falrs, and lost and WIU! deprived of divers
great gains, profits, and compensntions,
which be might and otherwise would han~
made and aequired." This was a sufficient
allegation of special damage to justify t!Je
admission of evidence that plaintiff at the
time of tlle Injury was 1·ecelvlug a compenmtlon for bis sel'vlces as a traveling salesman
of $3,000 per annum, under the decision wude
in City of Bloomington v. Chamberlain, HH
Ill. 268. In the latter case the allegation In
the first count of the declaration was that
"plalntitr was hindered from transacting hel'
business and atralrs and deprived of large
gains and profits, which she otherwise would
have earned," and, In the second count, '"that
she had been rendered unable to earn or make
for l1erself a living, and had been deprived of large gains and profits which she otherwise would have earned." Under these allegations the plalntltr was there permitted
to testify that she bad taught school a.t
$50 per month. It the law ls a science of
precedents, no instance can be found where
a precedent so exactly fits a subsequent state
ot facts as the Chamberlain Case fits the
facts disclosed by the record in the case at
bar upon the second point here designated.
BAILEY, C. J., and BAKER, J., concur.
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HEISTER v. LOOMIS.

(10 N. W. 60, 47 Mich. 16.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Oct. 12, 1881.

Error to circuit court, Eaton county.

Crane & Dodge and Michael Kenny, for

plaintiff in error. Henry A. Shaw, for de-

fendant in error.

COOLEY, J. Loomis sued Heister in tres-

pass for an assault and battery. The evi-

dence tended to show that on the 3d day of

August, 1877, Heister, with some other per-

sons, suddenly came upon the plaintiff, and

with words such as, “I have got you where

I want you now," “We'll give you what you

deserve," proceeded to strike and kick him

until he was seriously injured. On the cross-

examination of the plaintiff, defendant sought

to show that, on the previous Sunday even-

ing, in passing,his house, the plaintiff had

stopped in front of it, and used vile and
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abusive language to his wife. Repeated

questions put for this purpose were objected

to by the plaintiff, and ruled out. This rul-

ing was correct. The language attributed to

the plaintiff was exceedingly provoking. and,

if a battery had followed immediately. a

jury might possibly have excused it. or dealt

with it leniently. But the law does not and

cannot, consistently with the safety of society,

admit the provocation of words as an excuse

for blows given after the blood has had time

and opportunity to cool. To do so would be

to encourage parties injured, or thinking

themselves injured, by the misconduct of

others, to take into their own hands the pun-

ishment of the offender; and violence would

beget violence, as each party measured out

according to the vehemence of his passion

the punishment which he thought or imagin-

ed his enemy deserved. The safer view for

society and the violated law is to consider

the fact that a battery has been committed

in revenge for a previous wrong as an aggra-A

vation of the fault, instead of an excuse for

it.

The most important question in the case is

whether the court correctly admitted certain

evidence of special damages. The declara-

tion averred that the plaintiff, because of

the wounds, bruises, and injuries inﬂicted

upon him by the defendant, “was greatly

hindered and prevented from doing and per-

forming his work and business, and looking

after and attending his necessary affairs and

avocations. for a long space of time," etc.

The plaintiff testiﬁed that his business was

that of a farmer; and, under objection. he

was permitted to state that his farm was a

grass farm: that, when assaulted, he was

about half through cutting his hay; that he

was bothered some about help; and that the

cutting was delayed because of his injury;

and that his crop of hay was damaged in

consequence at least $50. The defendant con-

tends that this evidence of injury to his

hay was inadmissible, because the declara-

tion contained no special averments which

would fairly apprise the defendant of the

purpose to offer it.

HEISTER 1'. woms.
(10 N. W. 00, 47 Mich. 16.)
Supreme Court of :Mic·higan. Oct. 12, 1881.
Error to circuit court, Eaton county.
Crane & Dodge and Michael Kenny, for
plaintUI' In error. Henry A. Shaw, for defendant In error.
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tlon contained no special averments whkh
would faJrly apprise the defendant of the
purpose to otter lt.
We have been very liberal In this state In
receiving evidence of special Injuries when
the declaration averred them; much more so
than the courts ot some other states. 'l'bc
cases ot Chandler v. Allison, 10 Mich. 400,
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, Gilbert v.
COOLEY, J. Loomis sued Heister In tres- Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, and Welch v. Ware,
pass for an assault and battery. The evl· 32 Mich. 77, will sumclently attest the tact.
dence tended to show that on the 3d day of The dltrerence Jn the rules applicable In cases
August, 1877, Heister, with some other per- of contract and tort has also been carefully
sons, suddenly came upon the plalntlrr, and marked and emphasized. Where only a
with words such as, "I have got you where breach of contract ls Involved, the defendant
I want you now," "We'll give you what you Is not to be made liable for damages beyond
deserve," proceeded to strike and kick him what may fairly be presumed to have been
until be was seriously Injured. On the cross- contemplated by the parties at the time the
examlnation of the plalntUI', defendant sought contract was entered Into. The damage alto show that, on the previous Sunday even- lowed ln such eases must be something which
ing, In passing. hls house, the plalntilr bad could haYe been foreseen and re88onably exstopped In front ot It, and used vile and pel'tecl, and to which the deft•ndant can be
abusive language to his wife. Repeated deemed to baYe assented, expressly or Imquestions put for this purpose were objected pliedly, by entering Into the contract. Borille,
to by the plalntltr, and rulerl out. This rul- 0. J., In Rnwmlll Co. v. Nettleshlp, L. R. 3
ing was correct. The langnngc nttrihut!'d to 0. P. 49H; Hndley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.
the plaintiff was excl'edlngly provoking. nod, 344; Hopkins v . Sanford. 38 Mich. 611. But
If a battery had followed lm11H•1llntely. a In cases of tort the plalntUf does not assist
jury might possibly have excus1>tl It. 01· <h•alt In making the case; It Is made for him
with it leniently. But the law does not and against bis will by a party who chooses his
cannot, consistently with tbe safety of society, own time, place, and manner of committing
admit the provocation of words as an excuse the wrong; and If the nature of the case
for blows given atter the blood has had time which he thus makes up le such that the
and opportunity to cool. To do so would be elements of Injury are uncertain, anti thrre
to encourage parties Injured, or thinking ls dUHculty In arriving at the just measure
themselves Injured, by the mls<'onduct of of redress, the consequences should fall upon
others, to take Into their own bands the pun- the wrongdoer. "To deny the Injured purtY\
ishment of the offender; and vlolen<'e would the right to recover any actual damages iu
bl>get violence, as each party measured out such cases, because thry are of a nature
according to the vehemence of his passion which cannot be certainly measured, would
the punishment which he thought or Imagin- be to enahle parties to profit by and spe<'ued his enemy deserved. The safer view tor late upon their own wronwi, encourage viosociety and the violated law Is to consider lence, and Invite depredntlon." Gilbert !:I
the fact that a battery bas been committed Kennedr, 22 Mich. 117. 130.
In revenge for a previous wrong as an aggraBut where the damages are such as do not)
Yation ot the fault, Instead of an excuse for· follow the Injury, ns a necessary cons!'quence, they shoultl be specially alleged l.aJ
it.
The most Important question In the case Is the declaration. 'fhls ls a rule of fairness,
whether the court correctly admitted cert11ln that the defendant may know what case It
evidence of special damages. The declara- Is Intended to make against him, and be pretion averred that the plalntltr, because of pared to meet It, if It ls false or falsely colorthe wounds, bruises, and Injuries lnftlcted ed. In the cases above cited from our own
upon him by the defendant, "was greatly Reports, the allegations of speelal damni.c<~
hindered and prevented from doing and per- were very full and speclftc. But in thlR
forming bis work and business, and looking case there Is only a general allegation that
after and attending his necessary alTalrs and the plalntlfl' was prevented from doing aml
avocations, for a lonir space of time," etc. performing his necessary business, and lookThe plalntlfl' testified that his business was ing after and attending his necessary atl'nlrs
that of a fnrmer; and, under objection, be and avocations. 'fhls llablllty may well be
was permitted to state that his fnrm was a said to ftow as a neeessary consequence from
grm;;; farm: that, when assaulted, he was any severe Injury; and it was therefore held
nhout half through cutting his hay; that he ln Tomlinson v. Town of Derby, 43 Conn.
was bothered some about help; and that the 562, that suc•h an averment could only be
cuttlug was delayed because of his Injury; construed as characterizing the Injury anti
and that hie crop of hay was damnged In lndlcatln&' Its extent In a general way, and
oonsE:'quence at least $.'iO. The defendant con- that It did not lay the foundntlon for proof
tends tbnt thhi evidence ot Injury to his of special damages In a pnrtl<·ulnr employhay was lnaclmisslble, because the declara- ment. E>ldence that plaintiff was engag<.>d
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in a particular business, at which he was

earning $100 a month, was therefore exclud-

ed in that case, though the declaration was

similar to the one here. Taylor v. Town of

Monroe, 43 Conn. 36, is to the same effect.

Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34, must be re-

garded as opposed to these.

in Baldwin v. Railroad Corp., 4 Gray, 333,

similar evidence was held inadmissible, un-

der the general allegation of injury. 'l‘he

action was for a physical injury, and the

plaintif f had been permitted to show that

she was by occupation a school teacher, and

possessed the necessary education and learn-

ing. The court said the evidence “could have

had no relevancy or application to the ones-

tions at issue between the parties except as

forming the basis on which special damages

were to be assessed for the injury of which

she complained. It did not tend to show

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:10 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

an injury falling within the class of general

damages. That class includes only such

damages as any other person as well as the

plaintiff, under the same circumstances,

might have sustained from the facts set

out in the declaration. Without determining

the more difﬁcult question whether the evi-

dence would be admissible under any form

of declaration, it is clear that this part of

the plaintiff's claim could be founded only

upon a peculiar loss sustained by her by

reason of the interruption to her occupation,

resulting from the tortious act of the de-

fendant. They were therefore, in their na-

ture, damages not necessarily ﬂowing from

the acts set out in the declaration, and of

which the defendants could not be supposed

to have notice unless they were properly

averred." Evidence of this nature was re-

ceived in Railroad Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. St.

396, but the report does not give the plead-

ings. See, also, Express Co. v. Nichols, 33

N. J . Law, 434.

The general spirit of our decisions would

perhaps lead to a more liberal rule than

that applied in Connecticut. as above shown,

but would not, I think, support the

ruling complained of here. What was the

special injury complained of in the declara-

tion? Only that the plaintiff, by reason

of the battery, was greatly hindered and

prevented from doing and performing his

work and business, and looking after and at-

tending to his necessary affairs and avocations.

Did this fairly apprise the defendant that

the plaintif f would seek to show, not merely

that he was disabled from pursuing a par-

ticular employment not mentioned, but also

that, by reason of the inability to obtain

laborers, his property went to ruin? If there

is a natural and inseparable connection be-

tween the alleged injury and the damage,

then the defendant should have been pre-

pared to meet such a showing; otherwise, he

was entitled to more speciﬁc allegations. But

there is no such natural and inseparable con-

nection. The circumstances must be alto-

gether exceptional which would cause a farm-

er to lose his crops because he could not
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in a pa1ticular business, at which he wns
earning $100 a month, was therefore excludeu in thnt cuse, though the declarntion was
similar to the one here. Taylor v. Town of
Momoe, 43 Conn. 36, Is to the SIUDe effect.
Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34, must be regarded as opposed to these.
In Baldwin v. Ralh'oad Corp., 4 Gray, 333,
similar evidence was held inndmlstdhle, under the general allegation of injury. The
action wns for a physical Injury, nnd the
plaintiff bnd been permitted to show that
she was hy occupation a school teacher, and
possl'ssed the necessary education and learning. 'l'he court said the evidence "could have
had no relevancy or application to the ouestions at Issue between the parties exc!'pt as
forming the basis on which special damages
were to be assessed for the Injury of which
she complained. It did not tend to show
an Injury falling within the class of general
darunges. That class Includes only such
damages as nny other person as well as the
plaintllT, under the same circumstances,
might have sustained from the facts set
out In the declaration. Without determining
the more difficult question whether the evltlence would be admissible under any form
of de<'lamtlon, It Is clear that tills part of
the plaiut!IT's claim could be founded only
upon a peculiar loss sustained by her by
r<'nson of the Interruption to her occupation,
resulting from the tortlous act of the defendant. They were therefore, In their nature, damages not necessarily tlowlng from
the acts set out In the declaration, and ot
which the defendants conld not be supposed
to have notlrr unless they were proprrly
averred." Evidence of this nature was received In Railroad Co. v. Coyle. 5.'> Pa. St.
300, but the report does not give the 1.>leadlngs. See, also, Express Co. v. Nichols, 33
N. J. Law, 434.
The general spirit of our dedslons would
perhatlB lead to n more liberal rule than
that applied In Connecticut. as above shown,
but would not, I think, support the
ruling complained of here. What wns the
special Injury complained of In the declaration? Only that the plalntll'r, by reason
ot the battery, was greatly hindered and
prevented from doing and performing his
work and business, and looking after and attending to bis necessary alialrs and avocations.
Did this fairly apprise the defendant that
the plalntltr would seek to show, not merely
that be was disabled from pursuing a particular employment not mentioned, but also
that, by reason of the Inability to obtain

laborers, his property went to ruin? It there
ls a natural and Inseparable connection between the alleged injury and the damage,
then the defendant should barn been pre.
part>d to meet such a showing; otherwise, be
was Pntitled to more specific allegations. But
there Is no such natural and Inseparable COD·
nectlon. The circumstances must be altogether exceptional which would cause a farm·
er to lose bis crops because be could not
personally gathe1· them. Indeed, according
to the plalntltr's showing, the clrcumst1tnce11
were exceptional here; for the Injury to thll
hay Is attributed to the difficulty or obtaining help to save it. But the defendant, had
be l>een apprised of the purpose to claim for
such a damage, might perhaps have shown
that the diflculty was wholly Imaginary, or
that the plaintilT willfully sultered his hay to
be Injured, when be might have a\·oided It.
It was his right to make such a showing, It
the facts would warrant It. But he could
not be aware of the necessity until he was
notified that damage to the hay by reason
or the battery was claimed.
In another particular I think the ckcult
judge erred In bis rulings on C\' ldence. Th<>
defendant not only offered to show abusive
and provoking conduct by the pl'lintitr on
the pre\'lous Sunday, but also that the plain- .
t!II threatened him on that occasion. Had
any tacts been In evidence which tended to
show that defendant, when be committed the
assault, bad reason to believe he was defending himself ngalnst an ass:mlt b;v tbl'
plalntllT, the proposed evidence of threats
should have been received. But there were
no such !nets, nnd the judge properly overruled the offer. But. having done this, he
permitted the plaintiff to prove the negative,
-that be made no such threats. This evidence was foreign to the Issue being tried.
and, under ordinary circumstances, could
have had no lnftuence, but, comln~ Immediately after the attempt by the defendant to
show thnt be was threatened, was very well
calculated to p1·ejudlce the jury against him.
The evidence, If believed, must have convinced them tliat not only bad the d<'fentlnnt
committed a serious assault. but that he bnd
done so under a wholly grounflles!l pretense
of fenr, and bad offered to give falt<e evldenee of threats In order to deceive and mlslen1l the jury. It seems to me Impossible
that the negative evidence could have been
harmless under such circumstances. 'Thr
judgment, I think, should be reversed, and
a new trial ordered. The other justices concurred.
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svE.\'nss.\' v. srara BANK or D norn.

(65 X. W. 1086. 64 Minn. 40.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Jan. 29. lttini. ,

Appeal from district court. St. Louis coun- ‘

ty: 8. H. Moer. Judge. .

Action by Becker Svendsen against the '

State Bank of Duluth. Verdict for plaintiff

for nominal damages. From an order deny-

ing a new trial he appeals. Reversed. .

John Rustgard, for appellant. Smith, Mc- I

\Iahon & Mitchell, for respondent. E

I

CANTY, J. During the time covered by

the transactions hereinafter mentioned plain-

tiff was carrying on a mercantile business in

Duluth. and the defendant was carrying on

a banking business in that city. Plaintiff

was a customer of the defendant. and kept
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a deposit in its bank. which he was in the

habit of d1awing out by means of checks,

and which was held by the bank for the

purpose of paying such checks. He had ,

drawn on the bank a check for $42.15 in fa-

vor of one ﬁrm. and another for $54.60 in fa-

vor of another ﬁrm. These checks came |

through the clearing house, and were on the

20th day of October, 1893. presented for pay-

ment to the bank, and payment refused. for '

want of funds. though the plaintiff then had

on deposit in the bank, subject to his check,

the sum of $235.22. The check were return-

ed through the clearing house to the holders i

thereof. The reason why the bank refused *

to honor the checks was that it had by mis-

take charged up to piaintif!‘s account a note 1

for $300. made by him, and held by it, which

was not yet due, but which the bank by mis-

take supposed was due This action was

brought to recover damages l'or'the refusal ‘

to pay the checks. Plaintiff did not allege ‘

or prove any special damages, but claimed

to be entitled to recover substantial general

damages. The court below on the trial ruled

against him on this point, and ordered a ver-

dict in his favor for nominal damages, to '

which he excepted, and from an order deny-

ing a new trial he appeals.

It is held by the authorities that in such

a case the plaintiff's recovery is not limited

to nominal damages, but he is entitled to re-

cover gencral compensatory damages. Ro- '

iin v. Steward, 14 C. B. 595; Schaffner v.

Ehrman (Ill. Sup.) 28 N. E. 91,7; Bank v. 1

Goos (Neb.) 58 N. W. 84; Patterson v. Bank.

130 Pa. St. 419, 18 Atl. 632; 3 Am. & Eng.

Enc. Law, 225; 1 Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.) § 77.

The case of Patterson v. Bank, supra, seems

to place the right to recover more than nomi- ;

nal damages in such a case on the ground 1

‘ of siandering the trader in his business. We

I (-an Ed.) i 191; Odger, smm. & L. (20 Ed.) '

, 80. Respondent's position that an action of /

I fully dishonor

.7.

of public policy. but the other cases place

it rather on the ground that the wrongful act

of the banker in refusing to honor the check

DA.~q,ES.

l4 ,!Cr:-v,
t

~'

of puulic policy, but the other cases plll<'!' •
It rn ther on tbe ground that tbe wronitful nl'l
(65 '.\'. W . 1086. 64 Mino. 40.)
of the bnnker In refusing to honor the <'hf'di
Imputes Insolvency, dlshonl•sty, or bad fnltl.t
~nrn •mf' C'ourt of llinne!!Ota. Jam. :..>fl. l~i. 1 to tbe drawer of tbe che<'k, nn!I has the elTl·C't
of sl:tnderlng the tmder In hh:1 uusiness. We
Appeal from dlstrl<'t court, St. Louis <'<'UD· I are of the opinion that the reco¥ery of morr p
ty; S. H. Moer, Judge.
than nominal dnmng-t>S c·nn. on Mund prln<·t- · ·
Action by Re<"ker Svendsen against the ' pl-:!, be sustaiue.I on the latter gi·ound, where · /
State &nk of Duluth. Verdict for plalntltr the di·u,,·er of the chPek ls a merc·h:mt or : \
for nominal damages. Froru no order deny- trnller. To rt>fui;e to honor hlR chec'k ts 11 .
Ing a new ta·lnl be ap1icals. Reverst•d.
• mmit effectual way of slnudt>rlng bim In blis ~ j
John Rnstgnrd, for appt>llant. Smith, Mc- t1111ll', und It ls well settled that to lrupuk
llahon & llltC'hell. for respondent.
lnsoh·pncy to a mer<"hnnt Is nctionuhle 1w1· '
se, and general damngl'S may be recovered
CANTY, J. During the time covered by for such a slander. Townsn. Stand. & J,. •
the tranAactlons hereinafter mentioned plnln- (4th Etl.) 1191; Odger, ~land. & L. (2d Et!.).,
tlff was carrying on a mercantlle buslne11s In 80. Res11ondent's position that an action of ·
Duluth. and the defendant was carrying on 1 tort cannot be rr.nintalned In Rtl<'h a case 011 •
a bankJng buelneBB In that elty. PlnlntltT this, and that plal,tilf's only rern<'dy ! s i n
wa11 a custoruer of tbe dt>fPudant, and kept B<"tlon on contrnl't, In wbkh ouly uomlu
a de!Xlslt In Its bank. which be was In the danmgPS cnn be 1·e<~o,· pred, is not 1m11tai11
habit of drawing out by means or checks, hy the authorities. The mseof :U111'Zettl v.' ·
and wblcb was held by the bank for tbe 111111111, 1 Barn. & Ado!. 415, cited by him, wns
purpose of paying such checks. He bad nn aetlon in tort. The amount or the verdk~
drawn on the hank a check for $4::!.15 In fa- Is not n-1>orted, but It Is \"er~· e\"ltlent that •
vor of one firm. and another for $r>4.60 In fa- It was only for a nominnl amount, amt the •
vor of another firm. These chec~ks cnme only CJlll'Rtion before the t'OUrt wal:! wheth1•r ~
throuli('h tbe elParlng house, and were on the or not the defendant wns entitlPtl to a uou20th clay of October, 1893. presented for JJll.Y· 11uit heffiuse the nction 11houlll have be<'n
ment to the bank, snd pnyment refused. for brought on contract, not In tort. The c·ourt
want of funds. though th•' plalntll'I' thl'n had bPld uguh111t the dPf<'nllnnt on that point, anjl
on deposit In the bank, ... ubject to his check. what Is said beyon•I thl11 Is m1•1·p)y ohh..r.
the sum of $235.22. The checks were return- and was so regnrdt•cl In the 1mb11Pq11ent e1H1e
ed through the clearlug hvuse to the holders of Rollo v. Steward. In Prehn ,•. H~.
tht>reof. The reason why the hank ref1111ed R. ii Ext·h. !12, the only question waf'.I whetlwr
to honor tbe cbeckb wai; 1bat It bad by mis- plalntilTR were t>ntitl<'d tc; r<'ro,·<'r of the bank
take <'hnrged up to plaintiff's a<"count a note ePrtaln 1n1m11 whkh tht>y hatl paid to saye
for $300. mucle by him, and reld by it, which tbPir C'rt•dlt by proeurlng monPy elsewht>l1'
was not yet due, but v. hleh the hunk hy mis· to pay bills 1Jmwn hy thPm on the hank, and
take suppol'led was due. 'fhls action wns to prl'Y!'nt thl• hills from going to protPl!t
brought to recover dnmt1ge11 tor 'the r<'fusal aftPr th<' hank had notiftetl them tlmt It
to pay the checks. Plalntltr did not allege would not pay th<'Se bil although It had
or proYe any special damages, but claimed funds In lt11 bonds to
hat purpose.
It
to be entitled to recover substantial gpnernl was ht>ld that th1·y c
re<·o\"er the full
danu1ges. The court below on the trial ruled sum so 1micl hy tllC'm to prPR<'r're their crt>tlaimlnst him on this point, and ordered a Ter- lt, and the nuthorlty of Rolin v. Steward
dlct in bis favor for nominal damages, to was expressly rPc11guizP11. · The case of
which be exePpted, and from an order d£>ny- Brooke v. B1mkli,
f' Hun, 202, 23 N. Y. Supp.
lng a new trial be appeals.
802, was an n
by the refi"ive1· of nu
It Is held l>y the authorities that In such lnsoh·Pnt who
che<'k had bt><'n wronga case the plaintiff's recovery is not limited fully dishonor
y t:1e bank. '!'be plnintltT
to nominal dnmagf'A, but he Is entitl<'d to re- was forced to conced<' that he could not mal11cover gi>nernl comprm111tory damages. Ro- taln an action of tort, or recover nny damlin v. Steward, 14 C. B. 595; Schn!Tner v. ages but such special dnmnge11 as be nllt>g1-.1
Ehrman (Ill. Sup.) 28 N. E. 91J; Bank v. and could prove In an aetlon for breach of a
Goos (Xeb.) 58 N. w. 84; Pnttl'l"SOll Y. Hnnk. contmct. Tlwse are nil the eas<'s C'lted whi<·b
130 Pa. St. 419, 18 At!. li3::!; 3 Am. & En;.{.
have any bearing Oll the t.:Rse. Tlwse l\rt! th<'
Enc. Law, 225; 1 Suth. Dam. (~ll Ed.) § 77. only que11tlons raised worthy of consilleraTh<' (':ll'I' or l'11i!Prson v. Bank, 1111µra , l:!l'Nns tlon. It necessarily follows from the foregoto pl:1<-e lbt! right to l"Cl'OV{'r IDOl't' tlmn llOWI· ing conclusions that the order appealed from
nnl rlam:i1tes In snch a en11e on the ground
must be reversed. So ordered.
'f.
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NATIONAL COPPER CO. v. MINNESOTA

MIN. CO.

(23 N. W. 781, 57 Mich. 83.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. June 3, 1885.

Error to Ontonagon.

T. L. Chadbourne, for appellant. Chandler,

Grant & Gray and G. V. N. Lothrop, for ap-

pellee.

COOLEY, C. J. This is an action of tres-

pass. The following is a statement of the

mse, as made'for the plaintiff, for the argu-

ment in this court:

“The plaintiff and defendant are corpora-

tions, which for 25 years and more have been

engaged in copper mining in Ontonagon coun-

ty. Their mines adjoin each other. Each

owns the land in fee on which its mine is situ-

ated. The plaintiff, in carrying on its mining

operations, left a wall of rock, from 15 to 18

feet thick, next to the boundary line of de-
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fendant's mine. This was left as a barrier

and protection to its mine against water or

other encroachments from the Minnesota. The

Minnesota left no such barrier; it not only

worked up to the boundary line, but broke

through into defendant's mine. About the

year 1866 the plaintiff, at about 40 feet above

its fourth level, and from 20 to 25 feet from the

boundary line, drilled a hole, of the ordinary

size, about one and one-half inches in diameter,

and when the blast was ﬁred it blew through

into the opening which had been previously

made by the defendant into the plaintiff's ter-

ritory. The drill-hole was left through from

two to two and one-half feet of solid rock.

Capt. Chynoweth, then the agent of plaintiff,

examined this hole and the surroundings, and

immediately gave orders to cease work there.

This was done as a further protection against

the defendant. No work was done at this

point after that until the winter of 1883—i.

The plaintiff had no knowledge of any fur-

ther trespass at thlsr1point until February, 1884,

under the circumstahces related hereafter. The '

pump of the defendant was stopped in 1870,

and that of the plaintiff in 1871 or 1872. Plain-

tiff's mine ﬁlled up to the adit level in about

ﬁve years. Since 1870 the defendant has

worked its mine more or less upon tribute, and

so did the plaintiff, until May, 1880, when it

resumed work. In order to avoid liability for

the trespass committed by it at the plaiptil‘f's

fourth level, (being the defendant's ﬁfth level,)

the defendant sought to show, and did show,

another hole at the ﬁrst level, between the two

mines. A continuation of the inquiry showed

that this hole also was about 20 feet from the

boundary line, on the plaintiff's side, and that

defendant had here trespassed 20 feet upon

plaintlft"s land. We do not think that the his-

tory of mining upon Lake Superior will dis-

close another instance of such reckless disre-

gard of the rights of an adjoining mine-owner.

This encroachment and trespass by the de-

fendant at the defendant's ﬁfth level occurred

about the year 1859.

“In May, 1880, the plaintiff resumed mining

operations and commenced to pump the water

from its mine. The six-inch pump, formerly

NATIONAL COPPER CO. v. MINNESOTA
MIN. CO.

tendant at the defendant's fifth level occurred
about the year 1859.
"In May, 1880, the plalntlfl' resumed mining
(23 N. W. 781, 57 Mich. 83.)
operations and commenced to pump the water
from Its mine. The six-Inch pump, tormeriy
Supreme Court of Michigan. June a, 1886.
used by the mine, and which had always been
adequate to keep the mine unwatered, proved
Error to Ontonagon.
wholly Inadequate, and It was compelled to get
T. L. Chadbourne, tor appellant. Chandler, a 12-lnch pump, and even this was not sutllclent
Grant & Gray and G. V. N. Lothrop, for ap- In the spring; and In 1882 the water galned 1
pellee..
on them 120 feet, and In 1883, 222 feet, with \
the pump working night and day. Capt. ParCOOLEY, O. J. This Is an action of tres- nell, the agent of the plalntltr's mine, was
pass. The followlng Is a statement of the thoroughly acquainted with It, having worked
case, as made· for the plalntlfl', for the argu- in the mine years before; he soon became conment In this court:
vinced that the bulk of the water came from
"The plalntltf and defendant are corpora- the defendant's mine. He found that the wations, which for 25 years and more have been ter came from the fourth level. He cleaned
engaged la copper mining In Ontonagon coun- out the level, and, on reaching the point where
ty. Their mines adjoin each other. Each the drill-hole had been made years before, he
owns the land In fee on which Its mine Is situ- found that the rock had been all blasted away
ated. The plalntlfl', In carrying on Its mining from the Minnesota side, and that the water
operations, left a wall of roclc, from 15 to 18 was rushing through an opening from 20 to 25
feet thick, next to the boundary line of de- feet high and 12 feet wide. When discovered
fendant's mine. This was left as a barrier there was a volume of water seven feet wide
and protection to Its mjne against water or flowing from the Minnesota Into the National.
other encroachments from the Minnesota. The When the defendant made Its second encroachMinnesota left no such barrier; It not only ment at this point does not clearly appear; {
worked up to the boundary line, but broke according to the defendant's witness Spargo it
through Into defendant's mine. About the was in 1871 or 1872. This witness was an
yea1· 1866 the plaintifl', at about 40 feet above employ6 of the defendant, and one of Its trlbuIts fourth level, and from 20 to 25 feet from the ters. He says he saw the hole trom the Minboundary llne, drilled a hole, of the ordinary nesota side, and It was then six to eight feet
size, about one and one-half Inches In diameter, high, and from four to five feet wide. Wlland when the blast was fired It blew through . llam George, a witness for defendant, last saw
Into the opening which had been prevlous!y the hole In 1870 or 1871. It was then about a
made by the defendant into the plalntlfl''s ter- toot In diameter. The witness was then workritory. The drill-hole was left through from ing for the defendant as trlbuter and captain.
two to two and one-half feet of solid rock. Thomas James was In charge of the mine.
Capt. Chynoweth, then the agent of plalntltr, He admits that the defendant's trlbuters were
examined this hole and the surroundings, and then mining there. This same Capt. James
Immediately gave orders to cease work there. has been In charge of the defendant's mine as
This was done as a further protection against agent ever since.
the defendant. No work was done at this
"It was not denied In the court below, and
point after that until the winter of 1883-4. we presume will not be In this court, that the
The plalntUf had no knowledge of any fur- defendant committed these several acts of tresther trespass at thl;Elnt until February, 1884, pnBB. But, In proof of the fact, we refer to
under the clrcumst ces related hereafter. The · the admission of the agent Harris, the evidence
pump of the deten nt was stopped In 1870, that the track of a tram-road, sollars, and a
and that of the plaintiff In 1871 orl872. Plnln- system of timbering were found constructed
tlft''s mine filled up Ito the adlt level In about from the fifth level of defendant's mine Into
five years. Since 1870 the defendant has this opening, and the testimony ot plalntllf's
worked Its mine more or less upon tribute, and witnesses already referred to. Furthermore,
so did the plaintlfl', until May, 1880, when It It Is beyond dispute that the defendant knowresumed work. In order to avoid llablllty for ingly and wllltully committed these acts of
the trespass committed by It at the plaintiff's trespass, and broke down the barl'ier which
fourth level, (being the defendant's fifth ievel,) the plnlntllf had so carefully left to protect Its
the defendant sought to show, and did show, mine tor nil future time, and against all possianother hole at the first level, between the two ble dangers.
mines. A continuation of the Inquiry showed
"About 1870 the defendant concluded to
that this hole also was about 20 feet from the abandon regular mining, stopped its pumps,
boundary line, on the plalntltr's side, and that and commenced what ls known among miners
defendant had here trespassed 20 feet upon as robbing the. mine. It placed Its tributera
plalntl1f's land. We do not think that the his- at work at the bottom of the mine, took out
tory of mining upon Lake Superlo1· will dis- all the copper ground that could be found, took
close another Instance of such reckless disre- out the supports of the roof of the mine, and
gard of the rights of an adjoining mine-owner. allowed It to settle or cave In. This was all
Thia encroachment and ti·espass by the de- done untler the direction of the defendant's
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agent, James. The defendant's mine is situ-

ated upon a hill or mountain side. The result

was that the surface of the ground became de-

pressed, and openings were made in it. De-

fendant's agent, James, testiﬁed to openings of

this character on the surface of the Minnesota,

amounting in all to over 500 feet in length;

some were 3 or 4 feet wide. Into these open-

ings the water from rains and melting snow

ran into the defendant's mine, and from thence

ﬂowed into the plaintiff's mine, through the

opening at its fourth level. But for these open-

ings the water would have run down the hill-

side. As one of defendant's own witnesses ex-

pressed it, ‘There has been a general falling

away of the bluff.' There were no such open-

ings on the surface of the National. In fact,

we everywhere ﬂnd the plaintiff conductmg its

mining operations with due regard to the

rights of adjoining owners; while we ﬁnd
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the defendant conducting its operations in

the most reckless disregard of such rights."

The above is a sufﬁcient statement of the

facts for a discussion of the principal question

in the case, viz: Is the plaintiff's right of ac-

tion barred by the statute of limitations? I

The count in the declaration on which the

parties went to trial alleged that the defend-

ant, on March 15, 1882, and on divers days

and times between that day and the com-

mencement of suit, with force and arms broke

down the partition wall between the mine of

the plaintiff and the mine of t.he defendant,

and let the water from its said mine into the

mine of the plaintiff, and then and there ﬁlled

the mine of the plaintiff with water, greatly

damaging its timbering, workings, walls, and

machinery, hindered and prevented the plain-

tiff from carrying on and transacting its law-

ful and necessary affairs and business, caused

the plaintiff great damage and expense in re-

moving water from its mine, etc.

The defendant pleaded the general issue,

with notice that the statute of limitations

would be relied upon. The plaintiff recovered

a large judgment.

1. The time limited for the commencement

of suit for trespass upon lands in this state is

two years from the time the right of action

accrues. How. St. § 8714. This action was

commenced in May, 1884, and it is not claimed

that damages for the original trespass can be

recovered in it. The contention of the plain-

tiff may be succinctly stated as follows: (1)

Had the plaintiﬂ! instituted suit within two

ymrs from the original trespass, the recovery

would have been limited to such damages as

‘ were the direct and immediate result of the

trespass. The subsequent ﬂowage of water

through the opening was not the direct, imme-

diate, or necessary result of breaking down the

barriers; therefore no damages could have

been recovered therefor in an action so brought.

(2) Two trespasses may be the result of one

act. In other words, one trespass may cause

another. and he who commits the wrongful

act in such a case will be responsible for both

trespasses. (3) In this case no action accrued

for the ﬂowage of water into the plaintiff's

agent, James. The defendant's mine Is situated upon a hill or mountain side. The result
was that the surtAce of the ground became depressed, and openings were made In It. Defendant's agent, James, testified to openings of
this character on the surface of the Minnesota,
amounting in all to over 500 feet in length;
some were 3 or 4 feet wide. Into theKe openings the water from rains and melting snow
ran Into the defendant's mine, and trom thence
flowed Into the plaintiff's mine, throu~h the
opening at Its fourth level. But for these openings the water would have run down the hlllslde. As one of defendant's own witnesses expressed It, 'There bas been a general fulllng
away of the hlatf.' There were no such openings on the surface of the National. In fact,
we everywhere find the plalntltr conoucuug tts
mining operations with due regard to the
rights of adjoining owners; while we find
the defendant conducting its operations ln
the most reckless disregard of such rights."
The above ls a sufficient statement of the
facts for a discussion of the principal question
l in the case, viz: Is the plaintiff's right of ac-,
1l tlon barred by the statute of limitations?
The count In the declaration on which t.h"
parties went to trial alleged that the defe;:i1ant, on March 15, 1882, and on divers days
and times between that day and the commencement of suit, with force and arms broke
down the partition wall between the mine of
the plaintiff and the mine of the dcfc>ndant,
and let the water trom Its said mine Into the
mine of the plaintiff, and then and there filled
the mine of the plaintltr with water, greatly
damaging Its timbering, workings, walls, and
machinery, hindered and prevented the plalntitf from can-ylng on and tranimctlng Its lawful and necessary al!'alrs and business, caused
the plalntltf great damage and expense In removing water from Its mine, etc.
The defendant pleaded the general Issue,
with notice that the statute of llwltntlons
would be relied upon. The plaintiff recovered
a large judgment
1. The time limited for the commencement
of suit for tresi:ass upon lands In this Rtate le
two years from the time the right of action
accrues. How. St t 8714. This action was
commenced In May, 1884, and It ls not claimed
that damages for the original tre111J11ss can be
recovered in It. The contention of tile plnlntltf may be succinctly stated as follows: (1)
Had the plaintiff instituted suit within two
years trom the original trespass, the recovery
would have been limited to such damages as
were the direct and Immediate result of the
trespass. The subsequent fiowage of water
through the opening was not the direct, immediate, or necessary result of breaking down the
barriers; therefore no damages could hnve
been recovered therefor in an action so brought.
(2) Two trespasses may be the result of one
a.ct. In other words, one trespass may cause
another, and be who commits the wrongful
act in such a case wlll be responsible for both
tretipasses. (3) In this rnse no action accrued
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for the tl.owage of water Into the plaintiff's
mine until the tl.owage actually took place, but
when the tl.owage occurred as a result of defendant's wrongful act It was a trespass, and
It It continued from day to 1.lny there was a .
continuous trespass for which repeated actions I
mlgnt be maintained.
Upon these positions the plalntltr plants Its
cnse, and unless they are sound in law the recovery cannot be supported. All right of recovery to1· the original trespass. which consisted In breaking through into the plaintiff's mine,
was long since barred, and It ls not claimed
that there was, from the time of the first
wrong, a continuous trespass which can give a
right of action now. The merely leaving an
opening between the two mines ls not the
wrong for which suit ls brought, but It Is the
flowing of water through the opening which Is
complah1ed of as a new trespass; the original
wrongful act of the defendant In breaking
through being the cause, and the Injurious consequence when it happened, connecting itself
with the cause to complete the right of action.
lo support of its contention that the case
before us way be regarded ns one of continuous trespass from the first, several authorities are cited for the plnintur. which
may be bliefly noticed. Among them Is
Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503. It appeared In that case that a turnpike company
had built buttresses on the plaintiff's land for
the support of its road. The net was a t1·es·
pass, and the plnlntilr recovered damages
therefor; but this, it was held, did not preclude Its malnta.ining a subsequent action for
the continuance of the buttresses where they
bad been wrongfully placed. 'fhe ground of
the dedsl_oo wns that in the first suit damages could be recovered only fo1· the con·
tlnu:rnce of the trespass to the time of its
ln~tltntlon. '!'here could be no legal presumption that the turnpike company would
persist in Its wrongful conduct, and consequently, prospective damages, which would
only be recoverable on the ground of such
persistent wrong-doing, would not have been
within the compass of the first recovery.
The cases or Bowyer v. Cook, 4 C. B. 23G;
Thompson v. Gibson, 7 Mees. & W. 4~>0;
Russell v. Brown, G3 Me. 203; and Powers
v. Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa, 052, are all decided upon the same principle. Cumberland,
etc., Co. v. Hitchings, 65 Me. 140, was one of
the wrongful filling up of a canal by a trespasser. It was held that the trespasser was
under legal obligation to remove what he
had unlawfully placed on the plaintlff"s prcmlses, and that, so long as he suffered the
obstruction to remain, he was guilty of a
continuous trespass from day to day.
In Adams v. Railroad Co.. 18 ~llnn. 260
(Gil. 236,) and Troy v. Railroad Co., 23 N.
H. 83, railroad companies which, by trespass, bad entered upon the lands of lndl·
vlduals and constructe~ and 1>eg·,10 the oper·
atlon of rallroalls, were held ll{>ble as trespassers from day to day so long as the oper-
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ation of the road was continued. The prin-

ciple of decision in all these cases is clear

and not open to question. In each of them

there was an original wrong, but there was

also a persistency in the wrong from day to

day; the plaintiff's possession was continu-

ally invaded, and his right to the exclusive

occupation and enjoyment of his freehold

continually encroached upon and limited.

Each day, therefore, the piaintiff suffered a

new wrong, but no single suit could be made

to embrace prospective damages, for the rea-

son that future persistency in the wrong

could not legally be assumed.

To make these cases applicable, it is nec-

essary that it should appear that the action

of the defendant has been continuously

wrongful from the ﬁrst. Whether it can be

so regarded will be considered further on.
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The plaintiff, however, does not, as we have

seen, rely exclusively upon this view. Its

case is likened by counsel to that of a farmer,

whose fences are thrown down by a tres-

passer; the cattle of the trespasser on a

subsequent day entering through the open-

ing. In such a case it is said there are two

trespasses: the one consisting in throwing

down the fences, and the other in the entry

of the cattle; and the right of action for the

latter would accrue at the time the entry was

actually made. The plaintiff also cites and

relies upon a number of cases in which the

act of the party which furnishes the ground

of complaint antedates the injurious conse-

quence, as the original trespass in this case

antedated the ﬂowing from which the plain-

tit1' has suffered damage.

One of these cases is Bank of Hartford Co.

v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 324. In that case

action was brought against a sherif f for,a

false return to a writ of attachment. The

falsity consisted in a misdescription of the -

land attached. When suit was brought, the

period of limitation, if it was to be com-

puted from the time the return was made,

had already run; but under the statute the

plaintiff was entitled to bring suit only aft-

er he had taken out execution and had a re-

turn made upon it, which would show a

necessity for a resort to the attached lands.

It was only after such a return of execution

that the plaintif f would suffer even nominal

damage from the oﬂicial misfeasance; and

it was therefore a necessary consequence

that the time of limitation must be comput-

ed from that time, and not from the time of

the false return.

Another case is that of McGuire v. Grant,

23 N. J . Law, 356, which is to be referred to

the same principle. The defendant removed

the lateral support to the plaintiff's land by

an excavation. made within his own bound-

aries. Injury subsequently resulted to the

plaintiff in consequence. The statute of lim-

itations was held to run from the time the

damage occurred; the excavation not being

of itself a tort until damage resulted. The

case of Bonomi v. Backhousc, l'll. Bl. J‘; El.
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ntlon of the road wns continued. The principle of decision In all these cases ls clear
and not open to question. In each of them
there was an original wrong, but there was
also a perslstency in the wrong from day to
day; the plalntUl''s possession WliB continually Invaded, and his right to the exclusive
occupation and enjoyment of his freehold
continually encroached upon am1 limited.
Each day, therefore, the plalntur sutrered a
new wrong, but no single sult could be made
to P.mbmce prospective damages, for the reason that future perslstency In the wrong
could not legally be assumed.
To make these cases applicable, It Is necessary that It should appear that the action
of the defendllllt has been continuously
wrongful from the tlrst. Whether It can be
so regarded wlll be considered further on.
The plalntltr, however, does not, as we have
seen, rely exclusively upon this Tlew. Its
~nse ls likened by counsel to that of a farmer,
whose fences are thrown down by a trespasser; the cattle of the trespasser on a
subsequent day entering through the opening. In ~uch a Cll8e It ls said there are two
trespasses: the one consisting In throwing
down the fences, lllld the other In the entry
of the cattle; and the rlKht of action for the
latter would accrue at the time the entry was
actunlly made. The plalntltr also cites and
relies upon a number of cases In which the
act ot the party which furnishes the ground
of complaint antedates the Injurious consequence, as the original trespass In this case
antedated the 1lowlng from which the plo.lntlfr has sutrered damage.
One of these cases ls Bank of Hartford Co.
v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 324. In that case
nctlon was brought against a sherltr for. a
false return to a writ of attachment. The
falsity consisted In a mlsdescrl1>tlon of the
land attached. When suit was brought, the
period of llmltatlon, If It was to be computed from the time the return was made,
had already run; but under the statute the
plalntlfr wns entitled to bring suit only after he had taken out execution nnd had a retu111 mo.de upon It, which would show a
necessity for a resort to the attached lands.
It was only after such a return of execution
that t'he plalntltr would suffer even nominal
damn~e from the official misfeasance; and
It was therefore a neccssul'y conset1uence
that the time of llmltr.).tlon must be computed from that tlme, and not from the time of
the false l'Ctum.
Another cn.se ls that of l\fcGuke v. Grant,
2:1 N'. J. Law, 3;j6, which Is to be referred to
I he i-mme principle. The defe11<lnnt removed
the lateral support to the plnlntiff's land by
an excavation, made within his own boundnrlcs. Injury subsequl'ntly resulted to the
plaintiff In consequence. The statute of limitations wns held to run from the time the
dnmni:re occurred; the exrn,·ntlon not being
ot lt~elt a tort until damal{e resultecl. Tlw
c:asi> of Bonomi v. Bn<'khonsl', El. Bl. & El.

622, was like the last In prluclple, and was
decided In the same way.
The plalntltr also, In this connection, likens
Its cli8e to that of one who, In consequence
of a ditch dug upon his neighbor's land, has
water collected and thrown upon his premises to his Injury. It ls not the act of digging the ditch that sets the time of limitation to running In such a case, bnt It ls the
happening of the Injurious consequence.
The case supposed, however, ls not a case of
trespass. The act of digging the ditch was .
not In Itself a wrongful act. The owner of
land ls at liberty to dig as many ditches as
he pleases on his own land, and he becomes
a wrong-doer only when, by means of them,
he causes Injury to another. If he 1loods his
neighbor's land the case ls one of nuisance,
and every successive lnstAnce of tloodlng ls
a new Injury. But here, as In the case of a
continuous trespass, prospective damages
cannot be taken Into account, because It
must be presumed that wrongful condu~t
wlll be abandoned rather than persisted In,
and that the party wlll elthe1· till up his
ditches or In some proper way gua1·d against
the recurrence of Injury. Battlshlll v. Heed,
18 C. B. 696. Cases of tloodlng lands by
dams or other obstructions to running water
are cases of this description_ Baldwin v.
Calkins, 10 Wend. 1G9; Mersereau v. Pearsall, 19 N. Y. 108; Plate v. Railroad Co., 37
N. Y. 472. So a1·e cases of diverting water, to
the tlow of which upon his premises the plalntUf ls entitled. Langford v. Owsley, 2 Bibb,
215. So are cases of the wrongful occupation
of a. public street, whereby the access of
the plalntltr to his premises ls obstructed.
Carl v. Railroad Co., 46 Wis. 625; S. C. 1 N.
W. 295. Other cases cited for the plalntllr,
and resting on the same principle, are Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio, 480; Blunt v. McCormick, 3 Denio, 28.~; Winchester v. Stevens
Point, 58 Wis. 3;:-i0, 17 N. W. 3, 547; Union
Trust Co. v_ Cuppy, 26 Kan. 754; Spilman v.
Navigation Co., 74 N. C. 675; Loweth VSmlth, 12 Mees. & W. 582.
The case of Whitehouse v. Fellowcs, 10 C.
B. .(N. S.) 7G5, was one of nuisance. A turnpike company made a covered drain with
gratings at intervals and catchplts. In consequence of the lnsutficlency of the catchplts, 01· of their not being kept In proper condition, the plnlntlfr's collle1-y was floodetl
every time there was a heavy shower. In
an action for this flooding It was held that
every damage was a new Injury and gave n
new right of .action. The rulin~ sustninccl
the position taken for the plnlntitl' In the
case, which wns thus succinctly state<l by
counsel arA"ue11uo: "The distiudion which
pervades the cases ls this: " ' here the plaintiff complains of a trespass, the statute runs
from the time when the act of trespass was·
committed, except In the case of a continuing
trN•pnss. But whc1·c the cause of act.Ion Is
not In ltselt a trespass, llB an act done upon
a 11!n11· 8 own land, and the cause ot nc>tiou Is
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the consequential injury to the plaintiff.

there the period of limitation runs from the

time the damage is sustained."

The case before us was one of admitted

trespass, from which immediate damage re-

sulted. Had suit been brought at that time.

all the natural and probable damage to re-

suit from the wrongful act would have been

taken into account, and the plaintiff would

have recovered for it. But there was no

continuous trespass from that time on. The

defendant had built no structure on the

plaintiffs premises, was occupying no part

of them with anything it had placed there,

and was in no way interrupting the plain-

tiff's occupation or enjoyment. All it had

left there was a hole in the wall. But there

is no analogy between leaving a hole in a

wall on another's premises and leaving
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houses or other obstructions there to in-

cumber or hinder his occupation; the phys-

ical hindrances are a continuance of the

original wrongful force, but the hole is only

the consequence of a wrongful force which

ceased to operate the moment it was made.

If. therefore, the plaintiff had brought suit

more than two years after the original tres-

is_ by no means necessarily conclusive. The

plaintiff must ﬁt: some distinct wrong upon

limitation, or the action must fail; and there

is no such wrong in this case unless the fail-

ure to prevent the ﬂowing constitutes one.

The original act of wrong is no more in ques-

tion now, after having been barred by the

~

nor do we see that it can be important in a

case like the present, where the wrong must

be found in the injurious ﬂowing, whether

there was or was not a wrong originally. If

there was, it stands altogether apart from the

wrong now sued for, with an interval he-

been complained of.. The mere fact that an

opening was nmde by the defendant between

the two mines, would not of itself have been

' a trespass unless the defendant invaded the

plaintiff's premises in making it. Each party

had a right to mine on its own side to the

' boundary, (Wilson v. Weddell, L. R. 2 App.

Cas. 95;) and if the plaintiff had ﬁrst done so,

the defendant might have done the same at

the same point, and in that way have made.

pass, and before the ﬂooding of its mine by (an opening rightfully. The difference be‘-

water ﬂowing through the opening had be-

gun, and if the statute of limitations had

been pleaded, there could have been no re-

covery. The action for the original wrong

would then have been barred, and there had

been no repetition of the injury in the mean

time to give a new cause of action. The

mere continuance of the opening in the wall

could not be a continuous damage. Lloyd

v. Wigney, 6 Bing. 489. /

The right of action, if any, for which the

plaintiff can complain, must therefore arise

from the ﬂowing itself as a wrongful act;

there being no longer any action for the orig-

inal breaking, and no continuous acts of

wrong from that time until the ﬂowing be-

the consequt!ntlal Injury to the plalntltr,
there the period of limitation runs trow tbe
time the damage Is sustained."
~e case before us was one of admitted
trespass, from which Immediate damage resuited. Had suit been brought at that time.
all the natural and probable damage to result from the wrongful act would have been
taken into account, and the plalntitr would
have recovered for It. But tilere was no
continuous trespass from that time on. The
defendant bad built no structure on the
plaintitl''s premises, wns occupying no part
ot them with anything It had placed there,
and was In no way lnterrnptlng the plaintitl''s occupation or enjoyment. Ail 1t ilad
left there was a bole In the wall. But there
is no analogy l>ctween lea vlng a hole In a
wall on another's premises nnd !roving
hous~ or otilcr obstructions there to Incumber or binder bis occupation; the physlea! hlndmnces are a coutinuance of the
original wrongful force, but the hole ts only
the consequence of a wrongful force which
ceased to operate the moment it was made.
It, therefore, the plaintitr bad brought suit
more than two years after the original trespass, and before the fi()()(}lng of Its mine by
water fiowing through the opening had begun, and if the statute of limitations had
been pleaded, there could have been no recovery. The action for the original wrong
would then have been barred, and there ha.d
been no repetition of the Injury In the mean
time to give a new cause of action. The
mere continuance of the opening in the wall
could not be a continuous damage. Llo,<l
v. Wlgney, 6 Bing. 489.
/
The right of action, It any, for which the
plaintiff can complain, must therefore arise
from the fiowlng Itself as a wrongful act;
there being no longer any action for the orig·
lnal breaking, and no continuous acts of
wrong from that time until the flowing began. The fiowage caused a damage to the
plaintiff; but damage alone does not give a
right of action; there must be a concul'rence
of wrong and damage. The wrong, then,
must be found in leaving the opening unclos.ed and permitting the water to flow through.
It must therefore rest upon no obligation on
the part ot the defendant either to close the
opening, because persons for whose acts It
was responsible had made It, or to rest1·ain
water whi<'h bud collected on Its own premj ises from f101ving upon the premises of the
, plaintiff to Its Injury. The latter seems to be
the ground upon which the plaintiff chiefly relies for a reeovery.
In the argument made for the plalntilT In
this court stress ls laid upon the fact that the
damage which has actually resulted from the
ftoodlng could not have been anticipated at
the time of the orl~inal trespass, and thet·efore could not then have been recovered for.
Thls consideration. It Is urged, ought to be
decisive. But, while we agree that It Is to bo
considered in the case for what It ls worth, It
L.\. \\' D.Ul.2d Etl.-0
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Is by no means necessarily conclusive. The
pialntltl' must lb: some distinct wrong upon.
the defendant within the period of statutory·
limitation, or the action must rail; and there
Is no such wrong In this case unless the fall·
ure to prevent the flowing constitutes one.
The original act or wrong Is no more In questlon now, after having bet:n barred by the
statute, than it would have been If damages
ilad been recovered or settled for amicably;
nor do we i>ee that it can be Important in a
case like the present, where the wrong must
be found In the injurious flowing, whether
there was or wns not a wrong originally. If
there was, It stands altogether apa1-t from tile
wroug now sued for, with an interval be·
tween them, when no legal wrong could ilave·
been complained of.. The mere fact tilat an
opening was n-.itle by the defendant between
the two mlues, woultl not of Itself hnve been
a trespass unless the defendant invaded the
plalntllT's premises In making it. Each party
bad a right to mine on its own side to the
boundary, (Wilson v. Waddell, L. R. 2 App.
Cas. 95;) and It the plalntlll' had first done so,
/ the defendant might have done the same at
I tile same point, and In thnt way have wade
4--'a n opening rightfully. Tlle difference be'tween the case supposed and this, Is that bere
\ the defendant was found to ham gone beyond
the boundary and committed a trespass. But
suppose the defendant had then made comi pensation for the trespass, so far as it was
, then damaging; how would the case have
· differed from the present? The opening would
remain, made by the defendant, through
which, It the water was allowed to collect in
hie mine, It must eventually pass; and If he
was under obligation to keep It within the
bounds of his own premises, be would be llahie tor allowing It to pass; otherwise not.
Tbe tact tllat compensation was not actually
made tor the breaking away or the plalntll!'s
barrier ls Immaterial when the statute bas
run, as bas been already explained.
The case or Clegg v. Dearden, 12 Q. B. 5i6"~
ls not unlike In Its facts the case before us.
In that case, also, there had been a wrongful
breaking through from one mine to another•
and an Injurious fiowage of water through
the opening. The facts were fouud by special
verdict, and Lor& Denman, in pronouncing
judgment, said: "'l'he gist of the action, as
stated In the declaration, Is the keeping open
and unfilled up of an aperture and excavatlon made by the defendant Into the plaintiffs' mine. By the custom the defendant wus
cntltletl to excamte . up to tl!e boundary or
his wine without leaving any barrier; and
the cause of action, thcrt•fore, Is the not flll·
ing up of the cxearntlon made by him on the
plainti!Is' side of the boundary antl withi11
their mine. It Is not, as In the cuse of Holm~s
v . Wih;mn, 10 Allol. & E . 503, a continuing of
something wrongfully plaC'cd by the dcfentlant upon the premises of the plaintiff. :\or
Is It a continuing of something placed upon
the land of a third person to the nuisance of
J
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the plaintiff, as in the case of Thompson v.

Gibson, 7 Mees. & W. 456.\There is a legal

obligation to discontinue a trespass or remove

a nuisance; but no such obligation upon a

trespasser to replace what he has pulled

down or destroyed upon the land of another,

though he is liable in an action of trespass to

compensate in damages for the loss sustained.

The defendant having made an excavation

and aperture in the plaintiffs' land was liable

to an action of trespass; but no cause of ac-

tion arises from his omitting to re-enter th

plaintiffs' land and ﬁll up the excavatiqiI

Such an omission is neither the continuation

of a trespass nor of a nuisance; nor- is it the

breach of any legal duty. It was, however,

contended on the part of .the plaintiffs, that,
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admitting this to be so, there nevertheless

was a legal obligation or duty upon the de-

fendant to take means to prevent the water

from ﬂowing from his mine into that of the

plaintiffs through the aperture he had made?'

but "the plaintiffs have not alleged any such

duty or obligation in their declaration, nor is

their action founded upon the breach of any

such duty, if it exists, but upon the omission

to ﬁll up the aperture made by them in the

plaintiffs‘ mine.) It appears to us that the

defendant, upon the facts found by the jury,

is entitled to have the verdict entered for

him upon the plea of not guilty."

If this case was rightly decided, it should

rule the one before us. It has been followed

by the supreme court of Ohio in Williams v.

Coal Co., 37 Ohio St . 583, in a case which also

closely resembles this upon its facts, and is

not distinguishable in principle. It seems to

us that these c ses are sound in law as well

as conclusive. The only wrongful act with

which the defendant is chargeable, was com-

mitted so long before the bringing of suit that

action for it was barred. iHad suit been

brought in due time, recovery might have

been had for all damages which could then

have been anticipated as the natural and

probable result of the wrongful act. If the

particular damages which have been suffered

could not then have been anticipated, it is be-

cause it could not then be known that the de-

fendant would cease mining operations and

the plaintiff would not. There could be no

ﬂowing from one mine into the other while

both were worked; and had the plaintiff

ceased operations and the defendant contin-

ued to work, the defendant would have suf-

fered the damage instead of the piaintlff.

But neither party was under obligation to

keep its mine pumped out for the beneﬁt of

its neighbor. Either was at liberty to discon-

tinue its operations and abandon its mine

whenever its interest should seem to require

it. And had the plaintiff brought an action

within two years from the time of trespass,

its recovery would necessarily have been had

with is undoubted right of abandonment in

view. But a jury could not have awarded
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the plaintlft', as in the cast of Thompson v.
Gibson, 7 Mees. & W. 456. '-.There ls a legal
obligation to discontinue a trespass or remove
11 nuisance; but no such obligation upon a
trespasser to replace what he has pulled
down or destroyed upon the land of another,
though he le Hable In an action of trespass to
compensate in damages for the loss sustained.
'l'he defendant having made an excavation
and aperture In the plaintiffs' land was liable
to an action of trespass; but no cause of action arises from his omitting to re-enter th!i
plalntll1's' land and fill up the excavatio!].)
Such an omission ls neither the continuation
of a trespass nor of a nuisance; nor- Is It the
breach of any legal duty. ·. It was, however,
contended on the part of.the plaintJlrs, that,
admitting this to be so, there nevertheless
was a legal obligation or duty upon the defendant to take means to prevent the water
'from flowing from his mini. into that of the
( plalntl11's through the aperture he had made;"
but "the plaintiff's have not alleged any such
duty or obligation In their declaration, nor Is
their action founded upon the breach of any
such duty, if it exists, but upon the omission
to fill up the a~rture made by them in the
plaintiff's' mine. J It appears to us that the
defendant, upon the facts found by the jury,
is entitled to have the verdict entered for
him upon the plea of not guilty."
If this case was rightly decided, it should
rule the one before us. It has been followed
by the supreme court of Ohio in Williams v.
Coal Co., 37 Ohio St 583, ln a case which also
closely resembles this upon Its facts, and Is
not distinguishable in principle. It seems to
us tbat these cp.ses are sound in law as well
as conclusive. \The only wrongful act with
which the defendant Is chargeable, was committed so long before the br~ging of suit t.hat
action for it was barred. ) Had suit been
brought in due time, recovery might have
been had for all damages which could then
have been anticipated as the natural and
probable result of the wrongful act. If the
particular damages which have been suffered
could ne>t then have been anticipated, It ts because It could ne>t then be known that the defendant would cease mining operatlona and
the plaintiff' would not. There could be no
ftowing from one mine Into the other whlle
both were worked; and had the platntur
c-<iased operations and the defendant contin-

.

ued to work, the defendant would have auffered the damage Instead of the plalnutr.
But neither party was under obligation to
keep Its mine pumped out for the benefit ot
Its neighbor. Either was at liberty to discontinue its operations and abandon its mine
whenever lts Interest should seem to require
It. And had the plaintill' brought an action
within two years from the time of trespass,
its recovery would necessarily have been had
with tji1s undoubted tight of abandonment lo
Ylew. IBut a jury could not have awarded
damages for any exercise e>f a right, and
they could not, therefore, have given damages for a possiWe injury to fie>w from such
an abandonment• This is on the plain principle that the meJe exercise of a right cannot
be a legal wrong to another, and if damage
,,hall happen, it ls damnum absque lnjuria. (
This view of the case is conclusive; bu
there is another that ls equally so. The
wrong to the plalntltr consisted in breaking
down the wall which had been left by It in Its
operations. If any damage might possibly
result from this which was not then so far
probable that a jury could have taken it Into
account In awarding damages, the plalntltf
was not without redress. It would have been
entitled In a suit then brought to recover the
cost of restoring the barrier which had been
taken away; and lf It had done so, and made
the restoration, the damage now complained
of could not have happened. It thus appears
that complete redress could have been had in
a suit brought at that time; and, that being
the case, the plalntllf is not entitled to recover now for an Injury far which an award of
means of prevention was within the right of
action which was suffered to become barred.
The right which then existed, being a right to
recover for all the injury which had then been
suffered, including the loss of the dividing
barrier, it we>uld not have been competent tor
the plaintUf, had suit then been brought, to
leave the loss of the barrier out of account,
a waiting possible special damages to ft.ow
therefrom as a ground for a new suit. The
wrong which had then been committed was
Indivisible; and the bar of the statute must
be as broad as the remedy was which It extinguishes.
The judgment must be set aside and a new
trial ordered.
·
The other justices concurred.

'
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DARLEY llAIX COLLIERY 00. v. MITCHELL.

DARLEY MAIN COLLIERY CO. v. MITCH-

ELL.

(11 ADD. Cas. 127.)

(11 App. Cns. 127.)

House of Lords, Feb. 8, 1886.

House of Lords, Feb. 8, 1886.

Appeal from a decision of the court of ap-

peal. 14 Q. B. Div. 125.

The respondent having brought an action

against the appellants for damages for in-

juries done to his cottage by subsidence in

the ground on which they stood, caused by the

improper working of the defendants' coiliery,

among other defenses they set up the statute

of limitations. At the trial, before Hawkins,

J., at the Leeds summer assizes, 1883, the fol-

lowing facts were proved or admitted: The

plaintiff was the freeholder of six perches of

land and three cottages thereon, in the parish

of Darﬁeld, Yorkshire. The defendants were

lessees of a seam of coal under the plain-

tiff's land, and worked the coal up to 1868.
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In consequence of that working, a subsidence

of the land took place in 1868, causing injury

to the plaintiff's cottages, in‘ respect of which

the defendants wererequired to and did then

execute repairs. The defendants never work-

ed the coal after 1868, but in 1882 a further

subsidence of the land took place. causing

further injury to the cottages. For this in-

jury this action was brought, in December,

1882.

The special jury having been discharged by

consent, Hawkins, J., on further consider-

ation, entered judgment for the defendants

upon the defense of the statute of limitations.

the plaintiff's counsel admitting that he could

not distinguish the case from Lamb v. Walker,

3 Q. B. Div. 3&). The court of appeal (Brett,

)1. R., Bowen and Fry, L. JJ.) reversed this

decision, and entered judgment for the plain-

tiff for damages to be assessed by an arbi-

trator. 14 Q. B. Div. 125. From this decision,

the defendants appealed.

During the argument of the respondent's

counsel before the house, a discussion took

place as to the cause of the subsidence in

1&2, and in the result the following state-

ment was agreed to, in writing, between the

appellants‘ and respondent‘ counsel: That

after the partial subsidence, in 1868, the

strata remained practically quiescent until the

working of the coal in the next adjoining land,

in 1881, which working caused a “creep" and

a further subsidence; that. if the owner of

the adjoining land (one Cooper) had not work-

ed his coal, there would have been no further

subsidence; but the appellants admit that if

the coal under the respondent's land had not

been taken out, or if the appellants had left

sufﬁcient support under the respondent's land,

then the working of the adjoining owner

would have done no harm.

S. B. Somerville, for appellants Baxter & Co.

Rldsdale & Son. for respondent Saunders,

Xicholson & Reeder.

LORD HALSBURY. My lords, in this case

the plaintiff, the owner of land upon the sur-

face, has sued the lessees of certain seams of

coal below and adjacent to the plaintiffs land

for having disturbed the plaintiff in the enjoy-

Ap11e:tl from a del'it<lon of the court of appt'al. H Q. B. DI¥. 125.
The respondent having brought an action
against the appellants for damages for Injuries done to his cottage by subsidence In
the ground on which they stood, l1l11Sed by the
Improper working of the defendants" colllery,
among other defenses they set up the statute
<>f limitations. At the trial, before Hawkins,
.J., at the Leeds summer assizes, 1883, the following facts were proved or admitted: The
plalntll:l' was the freeholder of six perches of
land and three cotuges thereon, In the parish
-0f Darfleld, Yorkshire. 1'he defendants were
lessees of a seam of coal under the plalntilf"s land, and worked the coal up to 1&18.
In conl!E'quence of that working, a suhsldence
-0f the land took place In 1868, causing Injury
to the plalntltr's cott1ges, Irr respect of which
the defendants were· required to and did then
execut~ repairs.
The defendants never ~ork
ed the coal after 1868, hut In 1882 a further
subsidence of the land took plnC'e. causing
further Injury to the cottages. Fo1· this Injury this action was brought, In Deeember
1882.
'
The special Jury having been discharged by
<'onsent, Hawkins, J., on further consideration, entered judgment for the defendants
upon the defense of the statute of limitations.
the plalntilf's counsel admitting that he could
not distinguish the case from L.·unb v. Walker,
3 Q. B. Div. 389. The court of appeal (Brett,
ll. R., Bowen and Fry, L. JJ.) reversed this
decision, and entered Judgment for the plalntllf for damaites to be assessed by an arbitrator. 14 Q. B. Div. 12.1. From this decision,
the defendants appealed.
During the argument of the respondent's
<'Olmsel before the house, a discussion took
place as to the cause of the subsidence In
1882, and In the result the following state~ent was agreed to, In writing, between the
appellants' and respondent's counsel: That
1lfter the partial subsidence, In 1868, the
strata remained practically quiescent until the
working of' the coal In the nl:!xt adjoining land,
In 1881, which working caused a "creep"' and
a further subsidence; that. If the owner of
the adjoining land (one Cooper) bad not work.W hie coal, there would hav11 been no turtber
subsidence; but the appellants admit that If
the coal under the respondent's land had not
been taken out, or If the appeHants had left
sufficient support under the respondent's land,
then the working of the adjoining owner
would have done no harm.
S. B. Somerville, tor appellants Baxter & Co.
Rld8dale & Son. for respondent Saunders,
.Nicholson & Reeder.

8S

LORD HALSBURY. !l!y lortls, In this case
the plnlntltr, the owner of land upon the surface, bas sued the lessees of certain seams ot
coal below and adjacent to the plalntltr's land
for haYlng disturbed the plaintiff In the enjoyment of bis property, by causing It to subside.
The defendants, before and up to the yt'ar
181i8, have worked-that Is to say, excavatl'tl-the seams of' coal of "'.hlch they were lesst>Ps.
Their exeavatlon caused a subsidence of the
ground, for which they acknowletlgecl their
liability, and made Ratlstactlon. '.l'b.ere were
other subshlences after this, and, as the case
originally came before your lordships, It was
m.1tter of inference only whether these subsidences were or were not In some way connected with, If not forming part of, the original
subsillence. '.J,'he parties have now, by an
actmlsslon at your lordshl11s' bar, placed tuc
matter beyond doubt.
It b:ts been agreed that the owner of the adjoining land worked out his coal subsequently ,
to 18G8: that, If be bad not clone so, tnere
would have been no further subsidence; and
It the defendants' coal had not been luK1•11
out, or If sufficient support had lK'eD left, the
working of the adjoining ownPr would have
none no harm. Under thPse <>lr1·11111stanct>!I,
the question Is whether the 1111ti;;fnetlon for
the past suhslllence must he tnk•m to have
been equlYalent to a satl1<fa1·tlo11 for all sut'ceedlng subsidenC'es. ~o om• will tltlnk of
disputing the Pl'OI>ositltm that for one cam1e of
action rou must recover all d~mages Incident
to It by law on<'e and for eyer A house that
has received a shock may not a once shew all
the damage done to It, but It Is d:tmaged none
the less then to the extent that It ls damaged:
and the fact that the damage only manifests
Itself later on, by stagf's, does not alter the
fact that the damage Is there. And so of the
morecomplPX mccbanlsmof thPhnman frame·
the dama"gp Is done In a rnllwny accident;
the whole maeblnery Is Injured, though It may
escape the eye or even the consciousness ot
the su!Terer at the time; the later st:tgC's of
sntrl•l'ing are but the manifestations of the
original damage done, and consequent upon
the Injury originally sustained.
But the words "cause of action" are somewhat ambiguously used In reasoning upon this
suhje<"I. What the plalntltr has a right to
complain of In a court of law In tbls case Is
the damage to Ills land, and by the da!Ilage I
mean th<> damage which had In fact occurred;
and, If this Is all that a plalntllf can complain
of, I do not see why he may not recover totles
quotles fresh damage Is Inflicted.
!:!Ince the decision of this house In Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. i:i03, It Is clear
that no action would lie for the excavation.
It ls not therefore a cause of action. That
case established that It Is the damage, and not
the excavation, which Is the cause of action.
I cannot understand why every new suhsldence, although proceeding from the s.1me
original act or omission of the defendants, ls
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not a new cause of action. for which damages

may be recovered. I cannot concur in ti1e

view that there is a breach of duty in the

original excavation.

In Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 El. & Bl. 123,

157, Cresswell, J., said that the owner of the

mines might have removed every atom of the

minerals without being liable to an action.

if the soil above had not fallen; and what

is true of the ﬁrst subsidence seems to me

to be necessarily true of every subsequent

subsidence. The defendant has originally

created a state of things which renders him

responsible if damage accrues. If, by the

hypothesis, the cause of action is the damage

resulting from the defendant's act, or an

omission to alter the state of things he has

created, why may not a fresh action be

brought? A man keeps a ferocious dog,

which bites his neighbour. Can it be con‘-
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tended that, when the bitten man brings his

action, he must assess damages for all pos-

sibility of future bites? A man stores wa-

ter artiﬁcially, as in ltylands v. Fletcher, L.

R. 3 H. L. 330. The water escapes. and

sweeps away the plaintiffs house. He re

lmilds it, and the artiﬁcial reservoir con-

tinues to leak, and sweeps it away again.

Cannot the plaintiff recover for the second

house, or must he have assessed in his ﬁrst

damages the possibility of any future inva-

sion of water ﬂowing from the same reser-

voir? With respect to the authorities, the

case of Nicklin v. Williams, 10 Exch. 259, was

urged by the attorney general as an author-

ity upon the question now before your lord-

ships, by reason of some words attributed to

Lord Westhury in Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9

H. L. Cas. 503, 512. If Lord Westbury real-

ly did use the words attributed to him, it is,

I think, open to doubt in what sense they

are to be understood. Baron Parke, in that

case, delivered the judgment against the

plaintiffs, recovering any subsequently ac-

cruing damage. because, he said. the cause

of action was the original injury to the right

by withdrawing support. That principle is

admittedly wrong, and was expressly held

to be wrong in Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L.

Cas. 503. 512, since, if that had been law.

there could have, been no answer to the plea

of the statute of iimitations in that case. It

is difﬁcult to follow the master of the rolls

when he says it was not necessary to overrule

.\'it-kiin v. “'illinms. l0 Exch. 259. by that

decision. It seems to me to have been the

whole point decided in Nicklin v. Williams.

10 Exch. 259: and how that case so decided

can be an authority for anything I am at a

loss to understand.

I think the decision of this case must de-

pend, as matter of logic. upon the decision

of your lordships‘ house in Baclchouse v.

Bonomi, 0 H. L. Cas. 503. 512; and I do not

know that it is a very legitimate inquiry,

when a principle has been laid down by a

tribunal from which there is no appeal. and

which is bound by its own decisions, wheth-

er that principle is upon the whole advan-
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not a new cnuse of nctlon, for whkh d:i.mages er that prlnrlple ls upon the whole advanmay be recovered. I cannot coneur in the tageous or convenient; but, If such conslrler11•lew that there is a breach of duty In the tions were pPrmlssible, I think Cockburn, C.
J., in bis judgment In Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q.
original ex ca vat!on.
In Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 El. & BI. 123, B. Div. 3b'9, establishes the balance of con1;;;, Crt>sswell, J., said th11t the owner of the venience to be on the sitle of the law, as.
mi1ws might have removed every atom of the estnhlished by Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L.
minerals without being liable to an action, Cns. 503, 512. I cannot logically distinguish
if the soil above had not fallen; and what between a first aml a second or a third or
is true of tile first subsidence seems to me more subsillences; nnd after Backhouse v.
to he necessarily trne of every subsequent Bonomi, 9 H . L. Cas. fl():l, 512, It J.s Impossul1sld1'11ce. The defendant has originally sible to sny that It was wrnng In any sense
cr0ated a state of things which rentle1·s him for the defendant to remove the coal. Cressre~ponsible if dnmage accrues.
If, by tile well, J., has said, nnd I think rlghtl;\·, that ·
llypothesi,;, the cause of action ls the damage he might remove every atom of the mineral.
The wrong. consists, and, as It appears to
result lug from the defendant's net, or nn
omission to alter tbe state of things he has fill', wholly consists. In causing nnother man
erPatetl, why may not a frl'sh action he dama;:e; and I think he may recover for that
brought? A man keeps a ferocious dog, dnmage as nnd when It occurs.
For these reasorn>, I think that the judgwhich bites his nelghl>our. Can it be con'tcntktl that, when the bitten mnn brings hi~ nwnt appealed from should be nffil'lned, with
action, he must as~ess damages for all pos- COiitS.
sibility of future bites·! A man stores waLORD BLArKm:n~. :\ly lords, at the
ter artificially, as In U~·lands v. Fleteher, Ii.
R. 3 H. L. 330. The wntrr eseape;1, nml rlose of the argument I came to the conelusweeps nwny the plnlntlfT's house. He re- slon thnt the judgment should be reversed;
lmiltls It, and the artlticlnl !'eservoir con- ancl Jil'PJ1are4' and clrculatecl an opinion continues to lenk, and swel'ps It nway again. taining the teasons which Jell me to that conCannot the plalntit'l' recover for the second clusion. )fit three of the other noble aml
house, or must he have nssessed In his first leamed lords who heard the argument have
dnmages the possihlllty of any future Inva- come to the conclusion that the judgment
sion of water flowing from the same rese!'· should be affirmed, and that must be the
vol!-? With re8pect to the authorities, the jmlgnwnt of the horn~e. I think It bett.n
case of Xlcklln v. Wllllnms, 10 Exch. 259, was to read the reasons which I had before writurged by the attorney J?eneral us an author- ten.
ity upon the question now before your lordThis Is no appeal agninst an or1ler of th••
ships, by reason of some words attributed to court of nppeal, by whkh It was order•'•l
Lord " 'estbury in Baekhouse v. Bonomi, 9 tlrnt the judgment ot' Hawkins. J .. dellveretl,
H. L. Cas. 503, 512. If Lord Westbury real- on further considerntion, on the 18th of Dely did use the words attributed to him, It Is, cember, 1883, should be re,·erse,l. and jml;{I think, open to doubt In what sense they ment entered for the plaintiff for damages
are to be undPrstood. Baron Parke, in that to he assessed hy an arbitrator to be agreP.cl
case, delivered the judgment ngalnst the upon. with costs. Before this house can say
pl11i11tlf'fs, recovering any snbRequentl;\' ac- whethe1· this order Is right or not. It Is neccruing damage. because, he snid. the cam;e essary to know what wns the C'ase on which
of action was the oriJ?inal injury to the right Hawkins, J ., directed judgment. which this
hy withdrawing support. '!'hat principle Is order reverseR, to be entered for the defemladmittedly wrong, and was expressly held ants. 'l'he writ wns issued on the 27th of
to he wrong In Bnckhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Deccmher, 1882.
C111>. Go:l. ri12, sln<'e, if that had been Jaw.
There wns an alternative def.erise thnt the
th<'l'e co11lrl ha\'e been no answer to the plea causes of nctlon did not. nor dlcl any of them,
of the st:i tnte of limitations In that case. It first accrue to the plaintlt'l' at any tiu!e wltl1Ii> '1 ilfieult to follow the m118ter of the rolls ln six years hPfore the commenC'PlllPnt of
whl•n he sa)·s it was not neces~nry to overrule the a ction; and therefore it lay on the plaiu::"\ieklin v. William><. 10 Exeh. 2.i!J. by that tlff to give evhlP1we of some ('ause of af'tion
clreision. It i>r rms to me to have been the subsequent to the 27th of December, 1876.
l think it suttl(oiently appears In Hawkins,
whole point decilletl in ~icklin v. "'llli:lms,
J.'s, judgment, that the defendnnts bail
10 Exch. !.!::i9: ancl h ow that rase so dedtled
c«rn he nn anthorlty for anything I nm nt a worked out the scams of coal of which tbcr
were lessC'('s as long ago as 1868. and that
ln><s t o 11111IPrsrnnd.
I think the decision of this c11se must de- the~· had done nothing from that time. An1l
fJPllll , as n~n ttPr of loiri<·. upon tile dPC'ishm 11s the deft•mlants seC'm to hnv{l prov!'1l 11nd
of ~·our lor1lshlps· ho111>e in B:wklrnm:;p v. rPlinl on the fact tlrnt very conRiclPrable suhHo110111I, I) H . L. Cas. i'iO:l, f.1:.!: and I clo not si1l!'nr es hnd occurred between li;lli8 and 1871.
know that It is n vuy lei:ltimate lnqniry, whid1 inj11rc1l the plniutiff·s p1·emiRl'S, and
wlwn a prln(·iple has hf'l'll laitl down hy a that the rlefl'ncl:rnts harl h e('n railed uprm
trilnm:il from whirh tllerp is no nppenl. :rn•l to clo. and harl paid for. rPpairs rendered nrc•which Is bound by its own decisions, wheth- essnry, It Is dear that the original wo1·king·
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was such as to give rise to a cause of action

as early as 1871, and that the plaintiff had

then known it. Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B.

Div. 389. was then cited. With a view to

enable the plaintiff's counsel to fully con-

sider that authority. it was arranged that the

jury should be discharged, and that the case

should be reserved for further consideration,

it being expressly admitted by the plaintiff

that damage was done by subsidence in ISHS.

On further consideration, the plaintiff's

counsel is stated by Hawkins, J.. to have

admitted that judgment must be entered for

the defendants. unless Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q.

B. Div. 389, which he intended to question in

a court of appeal, was overruled.

I think it convenient here to see what was

the decision in Lamb v. Walker. 3 Q. B. Div.

381). so as to see whether, while it stands un-

reversed. it was decisive of the case before
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Hawkins, J. Manisty. J. (at page 391). quotes

so much of the plaintiff's stalenfent of claim

as was material in that case. 'l‘here was a

ﬁrst claim. on which the referee gave t/,d.,

which I do not notice. I think the ﬁfth and

sixth paragraphs are, in effect. the same as

the amended statement of claim in the action

now at bar, and set out in the appendix (page

7). But the only plea in Lamb v. Walker. 3 Q.

B. Div. 389, was payment into court of £150,

and the issue joined was whether that was

enough. That was referred, and it was on

the award that the question was raised. The

two material ﬁndings on the award are stated

at page 392: “l2l I estimate the damage

actually sustained by the plaintiff at the date

of the commencement of the action ' ' '

at £400. (3)_I estimate the future damage

which will be sustained by the plaintiff

‘ ' " at £150." He therefore directed

judgment to be entered at £-in0. deducting

the £150 paid into court from those two sums,

amounting together to £550.

The question was raised on a rule to re-

duce the damages. and was “whether the

plaintiff was, in point of law, entitled to re-

cover the sum of £150, which the referee ﬁnds

will be sustained by the Ilhlii1tln by reason

of the defendant's acts." The decision in

Lamb v. Walker. 3 Q. B. Div. 389, was that he

was so entitled. And I think it was rightly

thought that, if damages subsequent to a

writ issued in 1871 could be recovered in an

action on that writ. they were included in the

cause of action then existing. and, conse-

quently. that decision, which was binding on

Hawkins, J., was, at that stage of the pro-

ceedings. conclusive against the plaintiff.

In Lamb v. Walker. 3 Q. B. Div. 389, (Jock-

burn, L. C. J.. differed from the majority of

the court. He said: “Taking the view I do

of the leading case of Bnckhouse v. Bonomi.

9 H. L. Cas. 503, I am unable to concur in

holding that. in addition to the amount to

which he may be entitled for actual damage

sustained through the excavation of the ad-

jacent soil by the defendant. the plaintiff is

entitled to recover in respect of prospective

damage; that is to say, anticipated damage
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-was such as to give rise to a cause of action damage; that ls to say, anticipated damage
as early as 1871, and that the plalntur bad expeeted to occur, but which bas not aetually
then known It. Lamb v. Walker. 3 Q. B. oceurred, and which may never arise." He
Div. 3.~. was then cited. ·with a vll'w to , euteri; into elahorate reasoning to support this
en:1 hie the plnintil1"s <"ounsel to full.'" <"On· · opinion, wllkb I shall ex1tmlne presently. I
sider that authority. It was arrang-e<l that the think, If that opinion had prevailed In Lamb
jury should lie dis<"ha rgl'd, and that the <"Rse v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, and a judgment
should be reserved for further consideration, had bl'en given accordingly, that dech1lo11
It being expres"i.'· :11lmitterl hy the 11lalntlt'I' i would have hPPn, not ouly not nu authority
that damage was done hy snhi>iclt~nee in l81 i8. against the plnlntitr In this (•nse. hut an unOn further eonsl1l<•rntion, thr plalntllT's thc11·Jty lu his fllvum· a8 far as tht• 1!t•fl'11se of
counsel 111 statt>d h.'" Hawkin;;. .J., to have the statute of limitations Is concl'med.
admitted that ju<lirn1e nt must lie e1111·n·1l for
There must ha\·e been some understamllng
the defendants. unl!>ss J H'lmh 'I'. \Yalkrr. 3 Q. between the counsel for the plaintiff and for
B. Div. 389, wbk·h Ile lntPnrlPcl to question in the defendants In this case as to what was to
a court of appeal, "·as o\'rtT11IP11.
be done In ease the final decision on this ver~·
Important question was In conformity with
I think it c·onvPni1·11t l11·n• to '"''' wh:tt wa!I
the <led;:.ion In uunh 'I'. \\"nlkPr. ;I Q. R Div. the opinion of Cockburn, L. C. J.; and I
:·:~m. so as to St't' whrther, while It "tatul" HH·
thlul•. though I wish It had been exp1·ei;sly
rrn>rsPcl. It was rl<'('ISl'l'e of tht> cast• h1•fore statrd, It mus t now he takPD that the defend·
Hawkins, J. '.\Iani:<ty. .l . (al Jlll!!l' 3!111. quott>s nuts' eout1sel agreed that he would not, on
so mneh of the plaintiff'>< ;;ta1t•111'\•nt of dalm the P\' itlencc then hPfort> the <"nurt, ask for 11.
as was matt>rlal In that c•as1-. ThPn• was a
vt>nlld on any of the other defenses, but
first dulm, on which thr referPe ~:n·p 1-,,1., would iu thnt ("ll><e <·owwut to have the damwhi<'b I do not notice. I think tile fifth aud airt>s s1•ttlt•1l by arbitration.
sixtll p11ragraphs are, In elfl't't. the same as
Cotkliuru. L. C. J., eouhl not, In Lamb v.
the amt•mle11 !'tatrnu•nt of elalm In thr aetion W:ill•rr. a Q. B . DI\". 3M. ha'l'e meant to go
now at bar, aml Sl't out In the npp!'urlix (pnge Ro far as to say that If a house had lieen
7). But the only pl1·a In Lamh v. Walk<'r. 3 Q.
shnken, and was evidently going to fall, but
B. Div. 389, was payment into c·om·t of n:.o, bad not yet eomplrtely fallen, when the writ
and the lssm• joined was wh<'t her that w:111 lsRuerl, the plaintiff could only recover for
€nough. That was r<'frrred, and It was 911 wllllt bad already occurred, and would have
the award that the question was rnif;ietJ. The to bring a frf'Rh actlon when a further d1i111two material findings on the award are statl'd ney fell. He has not quite sufficiently gu:mlat page 3!12: "12\ I estimate thl' dnmagr ed himself from Raying so.
Jl<'tually sustalnt>d by the plalntlt'I' at the date
In the present case, there being obscurity
·of the comruPnPemt>nt of the nl'lloo • • • In the statement or the fncts. It was. som r•at £400. (3) .I rstimate the future damage what late In the day, but with the assent of
which will be sustained 11)' the plalntilI the house, agreed to add this further admis• • • at £150." He thPrPfnrr clireded sion: "That, If thr owtwr of the arljolning
judgment to be entered nt Hoo. clt•1!11etl11~ lnud [one Cooper] had not worked his coal,
the £150 paid Into comt from those two sum;;, tlwre would have hrPH no furthC'r subshknce;
a111011otl11g together to £550.
but the appellnuts (defendants) admit that If
The t1uestlon was rnlse1l on a rnl<' to re- the coal uncil'r the r PspondPnt's (plaintiff's)
duc:>e the damages. and was "wht'ther the hrnd had not been taken out. or If the appelplaintiff was, In point of law, l'ntltlt•u to re- lants (defemlnnts) hnd left suftlelt-nt support
co,·er the sum of £150, whlc-h lhr referee fin1ls unrt('r responclent's (plnlntiff's) land, then the
. will be sustained by the plainti1. by 1·easo11 working of the adjoining owner would have
o( the drfendant's art;;."
The decision In done no harm." I do not 11ndPrstat1d this to
Lamb'" Walker. 3 Q. R. Div. 38!l, was thnt he he nn n<lmisslon that thr !nthsh!PtH·t• wns oc·was so entitlt>cl. And I think It was rightly <·aslonetl by the rE>moval by the defc•n1lants
H1011ght that, If d11111:1gPs rmbst•111wnt to a of otllt•r <·oal than thnt the l'E>lllo\·nl of whld1
writ issne1l in 18il coulll be rrcoverPd In an oec·asionecl the suh~i1lrncc In UHl. Such nu
al'tion on that writ. they were lndncled In the nilmlssiou would ha\·e raised a diffi>reut qursc:1ust~ of aetlon then l'Xlstlng. 111u1. conse·
tion. ancl one the solnt10n of which might
q1wnt1~·. thnt dc•elslon, whleh was binding on
ha'l'e ri>qulrt•d a further Investigation as to
Ha wkln:<, J., wns, at that ~tngf' of the pro- the• fads.
C!'<'<lings. conclnsh·e al!'ainst the plaintiff.
I will 11ow prorrt'd to consider the ease exIn Lamb v. Walker. :1 (J. R. Di\'. ::.-:~1. <'or·k- :t•·tly ns If It was on appeal from Lamb Y.
hurn, J,. C. J .. ditl'rred from thr majority of \\'alkPr. 3 Q. B. Div. 389. I must first ohthe court. H e sale!: ' "fuk ing the view I rlo Sl'l'Ve that )f;misty,. J., In that cast> says (:J
or the le:uling (':lSe or finl'khoui;e v. Bonomi. Q. ll. Dh·. 3!H): "It ls a wl'll-sPttled rule of
9 H . L. Cns. 503, I am unuhl P to concur In law that uumages resulting from one and the
holding that, In afldltion to the amount to same cause of action must be assessed and
which he may be entitled for nl'tnal flamnge reco'l'ered onee f or all." And It Is not disflUStalned through the excn\"atlon of the ad- puted by Cockbum, L . C. J., that the rule Is
jacent soil b~· the llef1>nrlant. thi> plaintitr Is r s tnhl!shed that "damairrs rrsultinJ? from one
~ntltled to reco\·er In respect of prosi'ective
and the same cause of action must be as-
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sessed and recovered once and for all." 3

Q. B. Div. 403. He joins issue with Manisty,

J., on the application of this rule to cases

arising from subsidence occasioned by min-

ing so as to remove support. And I think

that this rule is established as the general

rule of law. I do not think it is one of those

rules of law which depend upon natural jus-

tice. I think it is an artiﬁcial rule of posi-

tive law, introduced on the balance of con-

venience and inconvenience. I think that,

if it were res integra, a great deal might be

said against the expediency of the rule. I

know nowhere where the objections to the

expediency of the rule are- more clearly and

forcibly stated than by the lord chief justice.

3 Q. B. Div. 405.

But I think it was not disputed in the argu-

ment that at all events, when the act com-

plained of is one which would entitle the
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plaintiff to maintain an action, and recover,

as a matter of law, at least nominal dam-

ages, without any proof of damage in fact,

the rule is ﬁrmly established; and I think

all three judges in the court below agree

that the question is, what was the cause of

action in this case? They adopt the reason-

ing of Cockburn, L. C. J., in Lamb v. Walk-

er, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, that it logically follows

from Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 622,

that there are independent and distinct

causes of action, on each fresh distinct cause

of damage, though arising from the same

act of disturbing the soil. Fry, L. J., puts this

very clearly. He does not think that it is

concluded by authority, and says: “I think

we are bound to determine this question on

principle. Now, with reference to principle,

it appears to me to be plain that all damages

which result from one and the same cause of

action must be recovered at one and the same

time, and therefore we are driven to the in-

quiry, what is the cause of action in a case

of this description?" In this I completely

agree, but I have not been able to agree with

the reasoning by which it is sought to be

made out that it logically follows from the

decision in Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. &

El. 622, in this house, that there are fresh

causes of action at each fresh subsidence

,arising from the old disturbance of the

strata, occasioning fresh damage to the same

property. I decide nothing on a question

which does not here arise, viz. whether, if

the same person has two separate tenements,

say, A. on the north of the seam worked by

the defendant, and B. on the south of it, and

damage has actually occurred to A., and he

sues for the damage done to it, he is bound

to join in the action any claim which he has

or hereafter may have as to B. Whilst the

recent decision of Qrunsden v. Humphrey, 14

Q. B. Div. 141, in the cour o appeal, stands

unreversed (and I do not mean to cast any

doubt on it), it would seem that he is not.

It is desirable to see what the case of Bo-

nomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 622, really

was. The writ was issued on the 20th of

May, 1856. The declaration alleged that the
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sessed and recovered once and for all." 3 May, 1856. The declaration alleged that the
Q. B. Div. 403. He joins issue with )fanlsty, plaintiffs, as reversloners of certain buildings
J'., on the application of this rule to cases In the occupation of Parkin, were entitled to
arising from subsidence occasioned by min- have the said messuages and buildings s11ping so as to remove support. And I think ported by the mines and soil "contiguous nncl
that this rule ls established as the general near to and under the said messuages and
rule of law. I do not think 1t ls one of those bulldlngs," and then In the usual way alrnlPs of law which depend upon natural jus- leged working by the defendant, disturbing
tiee. I think it ls an artificial rule of posl- the support, by which the walls of the said
th·e law, introduced on the balance of eon- messuages were cracked and Injured, and the
nmlence and inconvenience. I think that, ground on which the said messuages and
if it were res integra, a great deal might be buildings stood subsided. The pleas were·
said agalnst the expediency of the rule. I (1) not gunty; (2) denial of Parkln's occuknow nowhere where the objections to the pancy as tenant as alleged; (3) denial of the
expediency of the rule are· rnore clearly and reversion being In the 11lalntitrs as alleged;
forcibly stated than by the lord chief justice. (4) that the plalntltrs were not entitled to.
3 Q. B. Div. 405.
have the said messuages and buildings, orBut I think It was not disputed In the argu- either of them, supported, to wit, by the
ment that at all events, when the act com- mines, earth, and soil underground contiguplained of Is one which would entitle the ous; (5) that the said alleged causes of action
plaintltr to maintain an action, and recover, did not accrue within six years before this
as a matter of law, at least nominal dam- suit. The verdict was entered for the ·plainages, without any proof of damage In fact, tiffs, subject to a special case. One very imthe rule Is firmly established; and I think portant question raised In and decided by
all three judges In the court below agree that case was as to the rights of buildings to
that the question Is, what was the cause of support, as distinguished from the rights or
action in this case? They adopt the reason- the natural soil to the support. With that
ing of <Jockburn, L. C. J., In Lamb v. Walk- we are not now concerned. The arbitrator
er, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, that It logically follows In detail stated very clearly, and, I have nofrom Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 622, doubt, very accurately, the way In which the
that there are Independent and distinct cleety coal In the Auckland coal field was
worlted. I doubt If this account would be
~auses of action, on each fresh distinct cause
of damage, though arising from the same found to be appllcable In most coal 11.elds.
act of disturbing the soil. Fry, L. J., puts this I think I may say that It would not In some.
very clearly. He does not think that It Is I do not know what Is the nature of the
concluded by authority, and says: "I think strata In the Yorkshire coal field, where the
we are bound to determine this question on present coal Iles. But It appeared quite
principle. Now, with reference to principle, clear on his statement of the case that.
It appears to me to be plnln that all damages though It was apparent In 1850 (more than
which result from one and the same cause of six years before the action) that, unless steps.
action must be recovered at one and the same were taken to stop the progress of the thrust
time, and therefore we are driven to the In- then In operation, the plalntUl"s houses would
quiry, what Is the cause of action In a case be Injured by the thrust, yet no actual Injury
of this description?" In this I completely was sustained untll 1854 (less than six years
agree, but I have not been able to agree with before the action). He also found that the
the reasoning by which It Is sought to be tl1rust would continue, and would produce
made out that It logically follows from the damage In future. There was also a 11.nddecision In Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & ing, at page 631, that It was posslbM to stop
El. 622, In this house, that there are fresh the thrust; "but the expense of so doing
been very great, and would, on
causes of action at each fresh subsidence would ha
arising from the old disturbance of the the whole, have amounted to a much larger
strata, occasioning fresh damage to the same sum than the value of the property injured."
property. I decide nothing on a question He then proceeded to find in detail the facts
which does not here arise, viz. whether, If on which It was to depend how the Issues
the same person has two separate tenements, should be entered, and then proceeded as
say, A. on the north of the seam worked by follows: "If the verdict Is to be entered forthe defendant, and B. on the south of It, and the plalntll'ls upon the Issues joined on the
d:unuge has ·actually occurred to A., and he lst, 4th, and ::ith pleas, another question fo1·
su<>s for the damage done to It, he Is bound the court Is (4) whether the defendant ls reto join in the action an1 claim which he has sponsible for all the damage which has been
or hereafter may have as to B. Whllst the sustained by the plaintiffs by reason of thL~
recent decision of »runsden v. Hum.J)hrez, 14 Injuries to their said messunges and buildQ. B. Div. 141, in the court or appeal, stands ings above described, or for any and what
unreversed (and I do not mean to cast any part of that damage, and whether he is redoubt -0n ft), It would seem that he is not.
sponsible in any and what respect for the
It ls desirable to see what the case of Bo- probabre future damage which may be occanomi v. Backhouse, El. BJ. & El. 622, really sioned in manner abore deseribed, or for th&
was. The writ was Issued on the 20th of damage occasioned by the diminution In val·

,.e
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ue of the said messuages and buildings by

reason of their insecure state and condition,

or the injuries which will probably be here-

after occasioned by the further progress of

the thrust as above mentioned." Had this

question, and more especially the part of it I

have marked in italies, been answered, it

would have decided the question afterwards

raised in Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389.

But, as the majority of the queen's bench de-

cided that the issue on the ﬁfth plea should

be entered for the defendant. the fourth ques-

tion required no answer from those three

judges, and received none. Wightman, J.,

does give an answer at page 635, which I

think, as far as it goes, is in favour of Cock-

burn, L. C. J.'s, view in Lamb v. Walker, 3

Q. B. Div. 389.

The defendants do not appear to have
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thought the fourth question of importance,

for nothing whatever was said in the argu-

ment in the exchequer chamber about it; and

though the expression in the judgment indi-

cates approval of Nlcklin v. Williams, 10

Exch. 259, so far as regarded the principle

"that no second or fresh action can, under

such circumstances, be brought for subse-

quently accruing damage, all the damage con-

sequent upon the unlawful act being in con-

templation of law satisﬁed by the one judg-

ment or accord," and seems in favour of the

view taken by the majority in Lamb v. Walk-

er, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, yet I do not think it can

be properly said that the court of exchequer

chamber, in their judgment. put their minds

to that question, which was not much, if at

all, argued before them. Before the case was

taken into this house, the damages were

agreed on at £500 ihow or on what principle

we do not know); and, that being so, the

house had no occasion to decide anything

on that fourth question. There seems to have

been no allusion to it in the argument, and I

think no one of the lords makes any reference

to it.

I think that Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L.

Cas. 503, does decide that there is no cause

of action until there is actual damage sus-

tained, and does decide that the court of ex-

chequer erred when, in Nicklin v. William,

10 Exch. 259, they said that there was an

injury to the right as soon as the support was

rendered insuﬂicient, though no damage had

occurred. But I do not think that it all fol-

lows from this that the act of removing the

minerals to such an extent as to make the

support insufﬁcient is an innocent act, ren-

dered wrongful by the subsequent damage.

That would be a great anomaly, for I think

there is no other instance in our law where

an action lies in consequence of damage

against a person doing an innocent act. There

are many where no action lies against the

doer of an improper act, unless and until dam-

age accrues. One is alluded to by Lord Cran-

worth. The cause of action against the speak-

er of words not actionable per se consists in

the speaking of the words and the damage.
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ue ot the said messuages and bulhlinA"s by
renso1t of their insecure state and condition,
or the Injuries which wlll prol>nbly be here·
after occasioned by the further progr,,ss of
the thrust as above mentioned."' llad this
question, and mo1·e especially the part of It I
have marked in Italics, been answl'rcd. It
would have decided the question afterwards
raised In Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Dh·. 3."19.
But, as the majority of the queen's bench de·
cided that the Issue on the fifth plea should
be entered for the defendant, the fourth ques·
tlon required no answer from those three
judges, and recPlved none. ""h:htnmn, J.,
does give an answer at page G3~. whleh I
think, as far as It gol•s. Is In fa vuur of Cockburn, L C. J.'s, view In Lam!> v. "'alker, 3
Q. B. Div. 389.
The defendants do not appear to have
tho\:gbt the fourth 11m·~tlu11 of Importance,
for nothing whatl' ver wnK said In the nrgn·
ment in the exchequer chaml>er about It; and
though the expression in the judgnwnt lndl·
cntes approval of Nicklin v. Williams. 10
Exch. 259, so far as regarded the principle
··that no second or fresh action can, uuder
such circumstances. be brought for subsequently accruing damage, all the damage cont<Pqueut upon the unlawful act being In contemplation of law sntlsfled by the one judgment or accord." and seems in favour of the
view taken by the majority In Lamb v. Wulker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, yet I do not think It can
be properly said that the <'ourt of exchequer
<·hnmber, In their judgment. put their minds
to that question, which was not much. If at
all, argued before them. Before the case was
tnkl•n Into this boUI!(', the dnmnges were
ngrel'd on at £:-JtJO lhow or on what prindple
we do not know); and, thnt !wing so, the
house had no oet·1111lon to dPeitle anything
on that fourth question. There sePms to have
been no allusion to It In the argument, and I
tblnk no one of the lords makes any reference
to It.
I think that Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L.
Cas. 503, does decide that there Is no cause
of action until there Is actual dnmnge sustalnro, and does decide that the court of C1'·
chequer erred when, In Nicklin v. Williams,
10 E..~ch. 259, they said that there was an
Injury to the right as soon as the support wns
rendered Insufficient, though no dnmnge had
occurred. But I do not think that It nil tollowa from this that the act or removing the
minerals to such an extent ns to mnke the
support insufficient le an Innocent act. rendered wrongtul by the subsequent damage.
That would be a great anomaly, for I think
there ls no other Instance In our law where
an action Iles In consequence of damage
against a person doing an Innocent act. There
are many where no action Iles against the
doer of an Improper act, unlt'~S and until damage accrues. One Is all111ll.'tl to by Lord Cran·
worth. The cause of a ction against the speaker of words not ndionnhle per se consists In
the speakiug or the wonls und the damage.
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It was therefore held In Littleboy v. Wright,
1 Lev. 00, on error from the palace court,

that an lnfl•rior court had no jurisdiction over
an action for calling the plalntilT a whore,
wh1>reby the plalntltr lost her marriage, unless
both the spl•aking of the words and the loss
of the nuu·ringe were aYened und shewn to
have occurred within the jurisdiction. But
the cause of action was as much the s1waklng of the words as the damage. It Is quite
cle:ir that, If the words were spoken umh•r
such circumstances as to be privileged, no
amount of damage could give rise to an action. So, where a man beats another's servant, no action nrisps to the master until there
Is liamage by the loss of the service; but no
amount of liumage would gl'l'e the master nn
netion If the beating was jusUftable. And It
a man, In breach of the duty to take reasonable cnre In the mnnngeuwnt ot n horst• In
a public street, gallops along It, no action
lies except at the Instance or a person who
bas sutrered damage. Hut no amount of damage will give a cause of actton against the
owner of the horse unless a breach of duty
Is shewn. And I think that there Is a duty
In the owner of land on which his neighbour's
land rests to rl'Rpeet It, and take care that he
does not Injure that support. This Is subject
to many qualifications, some of which were
considered In Corporation of Birmingham v.
Allen, 6 Cb. Div. 284. All I think that Is
really decided in Bnckbouse v. Bonomi, 9 H.
L. Cas. 503, at least In this house, Is that
where there Is a breach of that duty, followed
by damage, there Is a cause of action, and
that. until there Is damage, there Is no more
cause of action for the breach of duty than
there would be In n peri;on who saw the
breach of duty In the reckless rider of a
horst>, but was not damaged, though In peril.
Llttleliale, J., snld In llo<lsoll ,•. 8tnllebmss,
11 Adol. & E. 301, spPaklng of an action by a
master for beating his sen-ant per quod servltlum nmlslt: "It Is argut>li that a fresh ac·
tlon might be brought from time to time;
but that Is not so, the action being founded,
not upon the damage only, but upon the unlawful net pnd the damage. Without the special damage, this action would not be maintainable .at the plalutltr's suit. A fresh action could not be brought unless there were
both a new unlawful act, and fresh dam·
nge."

This, I think, Indicates the real principle.
Xo authority was cited on the argunwnt
agalm•t this excPpt a dietum of Xorth, C. J.,
in tlw r•·11ort of Lord Towwwnd v. Huglw~ . 2
)fod. 1;;1, whr·re he Is r••11:1rtt>tl to han• sahl:
..Tlils Is n civil action. l1ru11;.:ht h~· tile 11lalntifr
for words spoken of him. whieh, if they are
In their own nature actionable. the jury ought
to consider the damage which the party may
sustain; but, If a particular averment of special damages makes them actionable, then
the jury are only to consltler such damages
as a1·e already sustalne<l, and not such as
w:i.y happen In future, l.Jecause for such the
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plaintiff may have a new action." North, C.

J., was a great lawyer; and, though at the

moment engaged in maintaining what seems

a very bad cause, no dictum of his is to be

slighted. But this, if he did say it, was

utterly irrelevant, for his opinion was that

the words spoken were actionable, without

any special damage; such, in the case before

him, being neither averred nor proved. I can-

not therefore attach much weight to this dic-

tum. and .it has never, I think, been acted

upon. I come, therefore, to the conclusion

that the opinion of the majority in Lamb v.

V\'alker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, was the better opin-

ion.

I should say that I take a very different

view of “'hitchousc v. Fellowes, 10 C. B. (N.

S.) 765, 784, from that taken by the master

of the rolls. I think that was an action for

maintaining a nuisance, which, from time to
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time, caused fresh damage. What Williams,

J.. there says. is: “The true answer to this

objection, as it seems to me, is that no fresh

cause of action arises from each fresh dam-

age, but that where there is not only a fresh

damage, but a continuance of the cause of

damage, such continuance of the wrongful act

which caused the damage constitutes a fresh

cause of action."

This was how the court of error in Ireland

understood that case in Devery v. Canal Co.,

9 Ir. R. C. L. 19.i. So understanding it, and

approving of it, Palles, C. B., in that case,

gave judgment for the plaintiff. I-Iow that

-case is in any way in conﬂict in principle with

1\'icklin v. Williams, 10 Exch. 259, I am un-

able to perceive.

Bowen, L. J., says that, “applying the rea-

soning in Whitchonse v. Fellowes, 10 C. B.

(N. S.) 765. 784, it seems to me that there has

really been not merely an original excava-

tion or act done. but a continual withdrawal

of support." if I could take that view of

the facts, I should agree in the conclusion.

But I cannot take that view of the facts.

One consequence of doing so would be that

where the owner In fee of a scam of coal

worked it out, and died leaving it in this

state, the heir of the land in which the

worked out scam lay would be liable to an

action for continuing a nuisance. Surely, the

facts cannot be such as would produce that

£'ffcct. And, unless they are. I do not think

that they can make the defendants respon-

siblc on this ground.
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plaintiff may have a new action." North, C.
.T., was a great lawyer; and, though at the
moment engaged in maintaining what seems

a very bad cause, no <llctmn of his is to be
£lighted. But this, if he <lid say It, was
11tterly lrrc>le,·ant, for his opinion was that
:the words spoken were actionable, without
.1111~· spPeial damage; such, Ju the ease before
lllm, beln,i: neither averred nor proved. I cannot therefore attach much weight to this dictum. au<l .it has never, I think, been acte1l
1111on. I come, thE·refore, to the couclusiou
that the opinion of the majority In Lamb v.
"'alker, 3 Q. B. Div. 38!), was the better opinion.
I should say that I take a very dil1'1•rent
'View of ·w11ltt>l10us<• v. l"ellowes. 10 C. B. (X.
S.) 71;;i, 784, from thn t taken by the master
-0f the rolls. I think ti.int was an action for
maintnlulng a nuisance, which, from time to
time, caused fresh damage. \Vhat Wlllhuns,
J .. there says. is: "The true ans\n>r to this
objection, as It seems to me, ls that no fresh
.cause of action arises from each t:rel':'h <lnm:age, but that whe1·e there Is not only a fresh
damage, but a continuance of the cause of
damage, sud1 contiuunn<'e of the wrongful net
whleb caused the damnge constitutes a fresh
cause of action."
This was how the court of error In Ireland
understood that case In Devery v. Carull Co.,
9 Ir. R. C. L. 194. So understnmling It, nnd
Jtppro\'ing of it, Palles, C. B., in that case,
ga\'e judgment for the plalntif'I'. How that
case is in any way In conflict in principle with
Nicklin v. Williams, 10 Exch. 2ri!), I am un.ahle to perceive.
Bowen, L. J., says that, "appl~·ing the rensonlng In "'hlh>house v. Fellowes, 10 C. B.
(X. S.) 7fi5. 784, It seems to me that there has
really been not merely an original excavation or net done. hut a coutlnual withdrawal
.of support." If I couM take that view of
tlw fal"ts, I should agree In the con('luslon.
But I cannot tnki' that view of the facts.
()ne consequence of doing so would be that
wlwre the owner in fee of a seam of coal
worked It out, nucl died lea\·Ing It In this
state, the heir of the land in which the
-worked out ~Pam lay would be liahle to nn
netion for c·ouliunlng a nnif<nnce. Surely, the
fads ci1111wt Ile such as wonlc1 produce that
.('fl°t•l't. Aud, unle~s they arP. I do not think
thn t till·~· ca u mnke the defendants responsil •IP 011 this grotll'd.
I therefore think that the order appealrd
nga lust shoul!l he nxersi>d, and the j111Jg11w11t of the 18th or D;·rrmher, 1~~3. restore1'1.
The noble and karned lords who beard the
.case have each of tliem come to au oppol'<ite
<'ondt!Si•m. nnd the onlrr of the house will
be In conformity with their view.

I therefore think that the order appealed

against should be reversed, and the judg-

ment of the 18th or December, 1883. restored.

The noble and learned lords who heard the

case have each of them come to an opposite

conclusion, and the order of the house will

be in conformity with their view.

LORD BRAMWELL. My lords. laying

down general propositions is attended with

the same danger as giving deﬁnitions. Some

necessary qualiﬁcation or exception is gen-

erally omitted. Moreover, such propositions

are often and justly called “obiter." With

these dangers before my eyes, I shall, never-

LOHD BHA~UWELL. lily lorlls. larlng
clown ,i:enernl propt.sitions ls nttPndr1l with
the snmi> danger as giving definitions. Rouw
11t•1·e~snry qnalitieatlon or exePptiou Is gen·
erally omitted. lloreovcr, such pro1rnsitious
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are often and justly called "obiter." With
these dnngers before my eyes, I shall, nevertheless, venture on some abstract propositions.
It Is a rule that when a thing direct!)·
wrongful In itself is·done to a man, In ltsPlf
a cause of action, he must. if he sues In
respect of it, do sr once and for nil. As, If
he is beaten or wounrted. if he sues. h.e must
sue for all his damnge,-pa;;t, pre:'lmt, arnl
future, cerl:Jtlu and contingent. Hu cannot
maintain an 1wtlor. for a b1·oken arm, and
subsequently for a ln cken t•ib, though he did
not know of It wht-n •1e commern•p<l his first
action. But, if hu sustalne;I two injuries
from a blow,-one to illR 1ie1·son. another to
his propPrty; as. f0r instnnel'. danrnge to a
w11td1,-there is no doubt that be could maintain two nctlon!i in respect of the one hlow.
I may appl~· the test l mentioned In tht• argument. If he hee:une hankrupt. the right
in respect of the wat<·h would vest In his
trustee; that fo1· damage to his person would
remain In hlm. I have put the ca~e of a
trespass. The snme wonld he true of an action for consequential damages. A man
slandered or llheled hy words actionable In
themselves mm:t sue, If nt all. for all ills
damage In one nctlon. Prohahly, If he sustained spedttl damage, as that he lost a contract through being charg·pd with theft. he
might mnintnln one action for the actionahl!~
slander. another for the personal Ioss,-certaluly If the case in Shlprfin Is right. But
It ls not necessary to <l<'cirlP th i;;.
I now come to the case of where the wro111:,t
Is not actionable In Itself. Is only an lnjm·ia.
but causes a damnum. In such a eaRe it
woul<l seem that as tile action wm; only
maintainable In reRpPC't of the damagP, or
not maintainable tlll the damage, nn action
should lie every time a damage accrued from
the wrongful act. For exalllj)le, A. says to
B. that C. Is a swindler. B. refuses to enter
Into a contl'act with C. C. h1111 a cause of
action against A. D .. who wns j)l'esent n111l
heard It, also refuses to mnke such a coutrart. Surely. anotlwr nrtlon would llP.
And so one would think Jf B . snhscqiiently
refuses anothPr contra('t. Of coursi>, one can
see that framls might he praetl<'e1l. 80 thp~·
may 111 anr stntr of law. Hnt I cannot St>e
wh~· the 1<Pro11<1 action would not he maintainable if the ~eeond loss was traced to the
sprnking. Aud 1wrhnps one might npply tl1t•
same test. "'ould not the first right of action pass to the trust<'PS of C. If he hecnme
hankr1111t? If the sf!cond loss was aftrr the .·
hankrnpt's 1li~1·lu1rge, It would n ot.
'fhcn• Is still another r-lass of cnses to lie
<'OIH<illrrert. viz. thosp whe1·p the 11l"t <•:111><i11~
damage Is not in itsPlf wron~ful. .:\o rasii>r
ca1<r can br taken than tlu• above ground
e:i!'<e of nu exl"a\"atlon, wlwrehy an a1ljolning ow1wr's soil is lt>t down. It cannot be
sa icl that the act of exr·a n1 ti on Is unlawful.
A eontraet to do It eouhl hp t•nforced. Xo
lnjum·tion against It t·Guld IJe obtained un-
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less injury was imminent and certain. What

would be the rights of the person damaged

in such a case? I think the former reason-

ing would apply. If there was an excava-

tion 100 yards long, and 50 feet of the neigh-

bouring soil fell in, the right of action would

be in respect of those 50 feet. and not only

in respect of what had fallen in. but what

would in future fall in along the 50 feef.

But. if afterwards the other Tin feet fell in,

there would be a fresh cause of action.

Surely. this must be so. If 10 feet at one

end fell in. and afterwards 10 feet at the

other, it would be imp1.s:-ible to say that

there would not be two causes of action. if

the excavation was on two sides of a square,

the same consequences. The attorncy-gen-

eral denied this, and was driven to do so.

But suppose A. owned the adjoining proper-

ty on one side, and B. that \vhi(-ii was at
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right angles to it; there must then be two

causes of action.

Now, apply this reasoning to the present

case. There are by the admission of the

parties two separate and distinct damages

caused to the plaintiff by the "acts"--inchul-

ing in that word 0nti:si0ns—of the defend-

ants. One a removal of coal. and nonprovid-

ing of supports, which caused a subsidence

in l8li8. A cause of action accrued then.

Another cause of action is the removal of

coal. including. perhaps, the coal which caus-

ed the ﬁrst subsidence. but doubtless also a

removal of coal extending to a greater dis-

tancc. and not immediately under the plain-

tiff's land, and the nonproviding against the

consequences. which. when the adjoining

owner to the defendants removed his coal.

as he lawfully might (though I think that

immaterial), caused a creep in the defend-

ants‘ land. which in time caused the further

subsidence. I think this gives a second

cause of action. I think, therefore, the judg-

ment was right.

It seems to me not to matter that the sub-

sidence was of the same spot, nor that the

immediate cause of the second subsidence

was the nonexistence of coal underneath that

spot. Two damages have been occasioned to

the plaintiff.—one. (iii'eclly and immediately

by the removal of the coal under his surface;

the other. by-that and removal of other cool.

and consequent creeping and further subsi-

dence. The attorney general. as I have said.

denied that there could be two causes of ac- .

tion it‘ two (ilfft-rﬂlt parts of the plaintiﬂ"s

land subsided at two dllll'rent times. But

‘ surely there must be. Suppose the two

pieces belonged to different owners. as I

have suggested.

Oi! course. one can see the danger and in-

convenience that will foilow. This damage

accrues many years after the defendants‘

act or omission which has caused it. If my

reasoning is right. many years hence there

might be a further action from some further

subsidence. But the inconvenience is as

great the other way; for, if the defendants

are right, it follows that, on the least sub-
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less injury was Imminent and certain. What ore right, It follows that, on the least subwould be the rights of the person damaged sidence hap11euing, a cause or action accrues
in such a case? I ttllnk the former reason- once and for all, the statute of limitations being would apply. If there was an excava- gins te run, and the person injured mu:'lt
tion 100 yards long, and 50 feet of the neigh- bring his action, and dalru and recover for
bouring soil fell In, the right of action would 11ll dnnmge, nchml, possible, or contingPnt,
lie ln respect ot those 50 feet. and not only for 1111 ti me.
As to the authorities, Bnckltouse v. Bonomi,
in l"l'"llel"t of what had flllll'n In. but wlrnt
would In fut11rP fnll 111 11lo11i,t tlw ;;o fret. 0 H. L. Cn;;;. Z-IO:!. SPl.'lns den rly In the plainBut. it aftt'rwarcls the otlwr ;;11 ft'Pt fl•ll in, tiff's favour. lmlel'd, I have thought of limthere would be 11 fn•t<h l'UUSl' of action. iting my jmliruwnt to the followlng remark
Snr<'ly. this mni<t be 1"10. If 10 ft-Pt at one on It. It di•1·lrletl thnt the ex<':nntion of the
end fell in. and nfterwanls 10 feet nt the co11I was not wrongful, 11nd that the causP or
other, It wonl1l he l111p1.ssihle In sn~· that adlon IH"('l'lll't.l when the d11mage nros('. 'l'lH'
there woultl not he two f•nn,; ·•s of nttion. ]( clamaire now cornplnined of arose 11t the last
the excavation was on two si1lt s of 11 ;;qn.1rt', sull::<idence. 'l'lmt subsidence wus no part of
the same eon;;e•11wnpe;;. The alt11r111·.1·-;.:1•11- or contin1111t11'e of the fornwr subsidence, nor
eral denied this. and w:is 1lri1·en to do so. cnnsed by the snme canse only, hut by a furBut sup1)0se A. ow1w<l tht• a11J11ining 11roprr- ther <'Ull81'; In tills sense. that without this
ty on one shlf', and B. tha I whidt was at c·nnse th•• suhsitlt•n<·L• woulcl not hnn~ tnk1'n
right anglrs to It; there n111;;t tlwn be two place. Therefore. no c·11use of 11ction In respect of It aroSL' till It happened.
<:auses ot action.
:Sow, apply this reasonln~ to thP prPsP:1t
LOHD l<'IT7.ta·:IL\LD. My lords, tlle real,
·<:Ilse. The1·e are hy the a1lm!s;;iun of the
parties two sepnrnll' nnd 1iistln1·t <la111ni:"s thon~h not till' formnl. q1w;:tio11 for your
<'aused to the pL'tintilT hy tlw ··:wts..--inf'it1tl- lonlshi11i<" cll"tl.'rmluntion, Is whethrr Lamh v.
ln1? In that word 0111l>'sions-11f t hL• 1lef1•ml- Wulker. 3 Q . H. Div. :!S11. wns COrl'(•<'ll~· 1lennts. One a removal or coal. nml nontH"ovi<i- <"hlt>d. :u~· noble nnll learned friend 1Lonl
lng of supports, which e111t>'P1l n suh,;i<lPnrP BLACKHlifl::\') rightly <ie11ls with this ap11eal
In l~HR A <:ause of action ll<'<"rt11'1l tlll'n. In the same light as if it was nn appe11l from
AnuthPr l'!IUSe or action Is the rPlllonll or Lumb v. Walker. 3 Q. H. Viv. 31-l!I. I do not
coal. lnr·l1111ing, perhnps. the con! whid1 1·a11s· propose to follow 111~· nohlt> nm! lt•arn!'ll frlPll<l
ed the first subsldenee. but clotthtless nll'o n In his lnstru<:tlve ex11111innllon of Lumb v.
removal of coal exteudini.: to n irrPntPr 1lis- ""alker, 3 Q. B. Div. :~:om. :11111 Backilou:;e \".
tall<'f'. anti not lmnw1ll:ltt•l~· nnrh•r t!Je 11lnin- P.01101111. !) H. L. Ca~. G03. nnd his crltlehm1s
tiff"s lancl, and the nonprol"ifllng- ngnlu"t the on those c11ses; hut I think that we mny deeonsPquenrrs. whld!. when tlH• 111ljolnlng- cltt!'e from the authorities somt- propositions
-0wner to the c1efPnrlnntl'< rPmo1·p1J his 1·onl. 11s now srttlPcl In law. nncl 11ppli1·nble to the
.as he lawfully might (though I think thnt clr<'UlllRtauP<'S of the appeal now before your
hnmatPrinl>, <·au,.:pl) n <·rPPJI In thP t!Pft•111l- lortlsh!ps" hm1s1'. and to shnih11· cnses. I proants" land. whil'h In timP ea11,.:p1J the further crecl to 1<ta IP thosp proposition!!. though In
suhsidence. I think this irll·ps n SPC·ond doing so I 11111 eonseious of the !lunger po luten n~e of net Ion. I think. tlwrt>forr, the judg- ed out Ii~· my uohle nnd leartwtl friend, Lord
ment wns right.
BRA)IWELL.
It se<·nH1 to me not to urn tter tba t the sub(1) That the owner or the surface has a
si1IencP w11s of tl1P snme spot, nor thnt the n.aturnl 1111<l lPgal right to thP 11rnlisturhp1t
irnrueclintl" f•nusl" of the second suhsidl"nce enjoyment or that surfnee. in the absence ot
was thP nont>xlst('ll<'l' of coal uuckrnt>ath thnt any hl111llng 11grt'l'lllPnt to the contrary.
i<pot. Two dnma~P" hnn• hl.'en 0<·1·aslonrd to
(2) Thnt the owner or the suhj:1<·Pnt mintbe plnintilf.-one. <lir.. 1'11~· nnd lmml'dintt>ly erals umy ex ca v11te nnd remove th Pm to the
1i,· tht> remol"al of tit•• 1·onl 1111111'1" his surfnce; utnwst PXh•nt, hut shouhl ex1!t'l'h!P th11t right
the othPr. 11~.. that 11ml n·11101·al of other eoal. !lo as uot to dh1turb the lawful t>njuyml'nt of
aml <:onsPqurnt <·rr1•pini.: aml further !nthsi- thP ownPr of the snrfn<'P.
deut-e. The attorne.v gPnPral. As I han• snill,
i:l) That thP exenvatiou 1111<1 rt>tuornl of th1•
dPniPd thnt tlwrr <·011111 hP two 1·:1n><P~ of nc- m i1H•rnls 1lol'R not, iwr SP. eon;:tit 1111• an~· 111·tion if two cliffl'tTnt )lal't" of thP pluintitrs tionahle inntslon of the riirht of tlw oWll<'r of
laull 1m1Jsldt'd at twc tllff,.1·.. m tin11·s. But I the surface, althouirh 11ubiwq11ent en•nt><
ljllr1·l.I" thrre 11111,,,1 111'. l'llJlf"'"l' the two show thnt no a1lt'l)1t:ttP s11p1101·ts hal"e lwt.•n
plc1·Ps helongf'<I to clilTf'n•nt own('rs. as I I !('ft to s11st:1 in the snrf:tC'P.
hnYe suggested.
t-!1 Hut that whl'n. in c•o11sPl(lll'lll"l' of nut
or f·onr,.;,., one cn11 ;;p,. th" 1l:l11;.:1•r :11111 in- 1 l1•:11· i11i.; or pro1·i1ling ><nflit-it•nt supports. a di,.:conYPnlen<:e that will follow. This tlamagP tnrha111•1• of till' s11rfa1·P takt>>1 pl:H·P. that disaccrues many yenrs nftPr tl11• 11l'ft•111ln11is' turhanee Is :111 im·aslon of th1• ri;:ht of th•~
a(•t or oml!•sion whidt has enusPd It. If my owner of tltt' surface, 1111d co11stitutcs his
rea.:onlng Is rlgilt. m:in~· Yl'ar:; hPll<'l' th1•re <:nnse of ndion.
might be a further action from some furtiler
The foundation of thf' )llalntift'.'s action,
subsidence. But the Inconvenience Is as then, seems to be that, altilou;:h the excavagrf'at the other way; for, If the defl'ndants tions or the minerals were acts hy the <le-
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fendants in the lawful enjoyment of their

own property, yet, when subsequently dam-

age arose therefrom to the plaintiff in the en-

joyment of his property, the defendants be-

came responsible. For, although the law en-

courages a man to the free use of his own

property, yet if. in doing a lawful thing in

the enjoyment of that property, he occasions

damage to his neighbour, which might have

been avoided, he will be answerable for that

damage whenever it occurs.

Now, as to the cause of action in 1868;

there is no doubt that the mere excavation

prior to or in 1868 was legitimate, and not of

itself alone the foundation of any right of

action; but when the subsidence of that year

took place, and caused damage to the plain-

tiff's houses, then the defendants became

liable to make good that loss, because, though

their acts were in the lawful use of their
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own property, yet the injurious consequences

to the plaintiff might have been avoided. It

is the disturbance. then, when it arises, that

is the cause of action, and not the prior legiti-

mate acts of the owners of the minerals in

the lawful enjoyment of their own property.

But. although this be true, yet. still, the

question which arose in Lamb v. Walker, 3

Q. B. Div. 389, and which was not expressly

decided by this house in Backhouse v. Bono-

mi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503, remains now to be con-

sidered and ﬁnally decided. There was a

subsidence in 1868, causing special damage,

giving the plaintiff a cause of action; and in

respect of that damage he accepted compen-

sation, which, lt seems agreed, is equivalent

to a recovery of damages in an action if such

an action had then been instituted.

In 1882 a fresh and distinct subsidence took

place, causing special damage to the plaintiff.

It was admitted before your lordships, rather

late in the argument, but for the purpose of

better enabling your lordships to come to a

conclusion: “That after the partial subsi-

dence, in 1868, the strata remained practical-

ly quiescent until the working of the coal in

the next adjoining land by the owner thereof,

in the year 1881. which working caused a

creep and a further subsidence.“ And fur-

ther: “That, if the owner of the adjoining

,land had not worked hi coal, there would

have been no further subsidence, and that if

the coal under the respondent's (plaintiffs)

land had not been taken out, or if the appel-

lants (defendants) had left suﬂlcient support

under the respondent's (plaintiffs) land, then

the working of the adjoining owner would

have done no harm."

It will be observed on these admissions that

the partial subsidence of 1868 had practically

ceased, and that a fresh creep and subsidence

took place in 1882, which would not have

taken place if the defendants had left suf-

ﬁcient natural support under the piaintiff's

land, or, we may add, had substituted ade-

quate artiﬁcial support.

There can be no doubt that, though there

has been no act of cmnrnission by the defend-

ants since the completion of the excavation
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tendants In the lawful enjoyment ot their
own property, yet, when subsequently damage arose therefrom to the plalntllf In the enjoyment ot his property, the defendants became responsible. For, although the law en•
courages a man to the tree use of bis own
property, yet It, In doing a lawful thing in
the enjoyment of that property, ht! occasions
damage to his neighbour, which might have
been avoided, he will be answerable for that
damage whenever It o<'curs.
~ow, as to the cause of action In 1868;
there Is no doubt that the mere excavation
prior to or In 1868 was legitimate, and not of
Itself alone the foundation of any right ot
action; but when the subsidence ot that year
took place, and caused damnge to the plaintiff's houses, then the defendants became
liable to make good that loss, becam1e, though
their acts were In the lawful use of their
own property, yet the Injurious consequences
to tile plaintllf might have been avoided. It
Is the disturbance. then, when It arises, that
is the cause of action, and not the prior legitimate acts ot the owners of the minerals In
the lawful enjoyment of their ow1;1 prope1·ty.
But. although this be true, yet, still, the
question which arose In Lnmb v. Walker, 3
Q. B. Div. 389, and which was not expressly
decided by this house In Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Oas. 503, remains now to be considered and finally decided. There was a
subsidence In 1868, causing special damage,
giving thP rlnlntitr a cause of action; and In
respect of that damage he accepted compensation, which, It seems agreed, Is equivalent
to a. recovery ot damages In an action If such
an action had then been Instituted.
In 1882 a fresh and distinct subsidence took
place, causing special damage to the plaintiff.
It was admitted before your lordships, rather
late In the argument, but for the purpose of
better enabling your lordships to come to a
conclusion: "That after the partial subsidence, In 1868, the strata remained practically quiescent until the working of the con! In
the next adjoining land by the owner thereof,
in the year 1881, which working caused a
creep and a further subsidence." And further: "That, If the owner of the adjoining
land had not worked his coal, there would
have lieen no further subsidence, and that If
the coal under the respondent"s (plaintiff's)
land bad not been taken out. or If the appellants (defendants) had left sufficient support
under the respondent's {plalntitI's) land, then
the working of the adjoining owner would
have done no harm."
It will be observed on these admissions that
the partial subsidence of 18H8 had practically
censtc>d, and that a fresh creep and subsidence
took pince In 188'.!, which would not :II.ave
taken place If the defendants had left sufficient natural support under the plnlntlfl''s
land, or, we may ndd, had substituted adequate artificial support.
There can be no donbt that, though there
has been no act of C"o1wnisslon hy U1e d('fend-

ants since the completion of the excavation·
of 1808, yet, if there had been no subsidence
causing damage to the pla1ntitt prior to that
of 1882, the present action could be malntalned. But It Is alleged that as the plaintifl' had
a complete cause ot action In 1868, arising
from the prior excavation and the subsidence
of 1868, the statute of limitations then com- ;
menced to operate, and has barred the present
action. It was further argued that In 1868the plalntltr could and ought to have Insisted
on reco>el'ing once and for all any d!l.mage
that might arise prospectively from the excavation of 1868, according to the rule of law
which, In order to prevent a multiplicity of
actions, provides that damages resulting from
one and the same cause of action must be assessed and recovered once and for all.
That rule was applled by the majority of
the court In Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389,
nnd Is not controverted. It Is not lntl.exlble,
and admits of exceptions.
"'e have to consider what was the cause of
action in 1868, and whether the cause of action of 1882 (the creep and subsidence of 1882)
Is one and the same cause of action as that
of 181>8. It It Is so, then the defendants areentltled to succeed on the defense of the statute of limitations.
This appeal represents a class of cases peculiar and exceptional, to meet "•hlch, and t<>
avoid grnve Inconvenience, if not Injustice.
our flexible common law has somewhat moulded Itself. I deprecate discussing some of th~
arguments addressed to us, which seemed tome to be too fine, such as, for Instance,
whether the original act of the defendants
was "Innocent," or "perfectly Innocent." Thequestion here ls not whether the original act
of the defendants was "innocent," but
whether the defendants have oec11sloned damage to the plalntifr without any inevltablenecessltv.
I am of opinion that Coekburn, L. C. J.,_
In the case of Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div.
389, and the court of appeal In the case before us, were respectively right In resting on
Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H . L. Cas. 503, and
deducing from It a principle which governs.
the Question.
Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Oas. 503, Is.
not satisfactorily reported. We gather from
the report in your lordships' house with some
dilliculty what was actually decided. llr.
Manlsty, In hls argument In that case at your
lordships' bar, puts It thus: "The act done
was a perfectly innocent act at the tlme It
was done. The argument on the other side
Is th.1t It must be treated as having been Injurious, because It might afterwards become
so. If the action bud be<>n brought when
the act was first 1lone, the answer would have
been that the defendant lmrl a right to do
the act, and that no damage had been occasioned." Lord Westbury says: "I think It
Is abundantly clear, both on principle a~d
authority, that, when the eIJjoyment of the-·
house Is Interfered with by the actual occur-
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rence of the mischief, the cause of action then

arises, and the action may then be maintain-

ed." And Lord Cranworth adds: "it has

been supposed that the right of the party

whose land is interfered with is a right to

what is called the pillars or the support. In

truth, his right is to the ordinary enjoyment

of his land, and. until that ordinary enjoy-

ment is interfered with, he has nothing of

which to complain. That seems the prin-

ciple on which the case ought to be disposed

of."

It seems to me that Backhouse v. Bonomi,

9 H. L. Cas. 503, did decide that the removal

of the suhjacent strata was an act (I will not

say an innocent act) done in the legitimate

exercise of ordinary ownership, which, per se,

gave no right of action to the owner of the

surface, and that the latter had no right of

action until his enjoyment of the surface was

rence of the mischief, the cause of action then
arises, and the action may then be maintained." And Lorj} Cranworth adds: "It bas
been supposed that the right of the party
whose land is Interfered with Is a right to
what Is called the pillars or the support. In
truth, his right Is to the ordln:1ry enjoyment
of his land, and. until that ordinary enjoyment Is Interfered with, be has nothing of
'l\"hkh to complain. Thnt iseems the principle on which the case ought to be disposed
of."
It i<Pems to me that Bnekhouse v. Bonomi,
9 H. L. Cas. 503, did deeltlP that the removal
of the suhjacent strata was an act (I wlll not
say an Innocent act) done In the legltlm:lte
exercise of ordinary ownership, which, per 1<e,
gave no right of action to the owner of the
surface, and that the latter had no right of
action until his enjoyment of the surface was
actually disturbed. The dl!!turbance then
constituted his right of action.
There was a complete cause of action 1n

1868, In respect of which compensation was
given, but there was a llablllty to further disturbance. The defendants permltted the
state of things to continue without taking any
ste11s to prevent the oecurrence of any future
Injury. A fresh subsidence took plnce,.causlng a new and further disturbance of the
plain"tltr's enjoyment, which gave him a new
antl. dlstiuct cause of action.
It thi:i view Is eorrect, then It follows that
the cause of action now Insisted on by the
plnlntllT Is not the same cause of action as
that of 1868, but Is In point of law, as lt Is
ph~·slcally, a new and Independent cause .of
al'tion, arising In 1882, and to which the d{'·
fmse of the statute of limitations Is not :ippllcnble.
The necessary conclusion Is that Lamb v.
Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, was not correctly
decided., and that the able reasoning of Cockburn, L. C. J., In that case ought to have prevailed. Order appealed from afllrmed, and
appeal dismissed, with cost&
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actually disturbed. The disturbance then

constituted his right of action.

There was a complete cause of action in

1868, in respect of which compensation was

given, but there was a liability to further dis-

turbance. The defendants permitted the

state of things to continue without taking any

steps to prevent the occurrence of any future

injury. A fresh subsidence took place,-caus-

ing a new and further disturbance of the

piaiu'tiff's enjoyment, which gave him a new

and distinct cause of action.

If this view is correct, then it follows that

the cause of action now insisted on by the

plaintiff is not the same cause of action as

that of 1868, but is in point of law, as it is

physically, a new and independent cause of

action, arising in 1882, and to which the de-

fense of the statute of limitations is not ap-

plicahle.

The necessary conclusion is that Lamb v.

Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, was not correctly

decided, and that the able reasoning of Cock-

burn, L. C. J., in that case ought to have pre-

vailed. Order appealed from aﬂirmed, and

appeal dismissed, with costs.
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pany.

JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING CO. v.

COMPTON.

(32 N. E. 693, 142 Ill. 511.)

Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 2, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court, Third dis-

trict.

Action on the case by Sophie Compton

against the Joseph Schlitz Brewing Com-

Plaintiff obtained judgment, which

was aﬂlrmed by the appellate court. De-

fendant appeals. Reversed.

The other facts fully appear in the follow-

ing statement by MAGRUDER, J.:

.This is an action on the case, begun on

April 17, 1890, in the circuit court of San-

gamon county, by the appellee against the

appellant company. In the trial court the

verdict and judgment were in favor of the

plaintiff, which judgment has been aiiirmed
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by the appellate court. The declaration

consists of two counts. The ﬁrst count al-

leges that plaintiff was possessed of certain

premises in Springﬁeld, in which she and

her family resided, and that the defendant,

to wit, on April_20, 1885, wrongfully erected

a certain building near said premises in so

careless, negligent, and improper a manner

that on said day and afterwards, “and be

fore the commencement of this nit," large

quantities of rain water ﬂowed upon,

against, and into said premises and the

walls, roofs, ceilings, beams, papering,

ﬂoors, stairs, doors, cellar, basement, and

other parts thereof, and weakened, injured,

and damaged the same, by reason whereof

said messuage and premises became and

are damp and less ﬁt for habitation. The

second count alleges that plaintiff was the

possessor, occupier, and owner of said mes-

suage and premises, in which she and her

family dwelt, and the defendant, to wit, on

said day, caused quantities of water to run

into, against, and upon the same, and the

walls, roofs, ﬂoors, cellars, etc., thereof, and

thereby greatly weakened injured, wetted,

and damaged the same. By reason where-

of said premises became and were and are

damp, incommodious, and less ﬁt for habi-

tation. The plea was not guilty. The

proof tends to show that plaintiffs building

is a two.story brick building, with a cellar

underneath, the front room on the ﬁrst ﬂoor

being used as a butcher's shop, and the rest

of the building being used as a dwelling;

that her building was erected several years

before that of the defendant; that defend-

ant's building is on the lot west of plain-

titf‘s lot, and is about 60 feet long, having

an oﬂice in front and a beer-bottling estab-

lishment in the rear, and has one roof,

which slants towards plaintiffs property;

that there are three windows on the west

side of plaintiff's house, besides the three

cellar windows; that her wall is a little

over two feet from the west line of her lot;

that when it rains the water ﬂows against

her west wall, and some of it into her win-

dows and cellar from the roof of defend-
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JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING 00. v.
COMPTON.
(32 N. E. 693, 142 Ill. 511.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 2, 1892.
Appeal from appellate court, Third dls1:rict.
Action on the case by Sophie Compton
against the Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company. Plalntltr obtained judgment, which
was afiit'med by the appellate court. Defen<l:mt appeals. Reversed.
The other facts fully appear in the following statement by MAGRUDER, J.:
. This ls an action on the case, begun on
April 17, 1800. in the circuit court of San·
gamon county, by the appellee against the
appellant company. In the trial court the
verdict and judgment were In favor of the
plalntltr, which judgment has been affirmed
by the appellate court. The declaration
consists of two counts. The first count alleges that plaintiff was possessed of certain
premises In Sp1·fngfield, in which she arnl
her family resided, and that the defendant,
to wit, on April 20, 1885, wrongfully erected
a certain bulldliig near said premises in so
careless, negligent, and Improper a manner
that on said day and afterwards, "and before the commencement of this suit,'' large
quantities of rain water flowed upon,
against, and Into said premises and the
walls, roofs, ceilings, beams, papering,
floors, stairs, doors, cellar, basement, and
othe1· parts thereof, and weakened, injured,
. and damaged the same, by reason whereof
said messuage and premises became and
are damp and less fit for habitation. The
second count alleges that plalntil! was the
possessor, occupier, and owner of said messuage and premises, In which she and her
family dwelt, and the defendant, to wit, on
said day, caused quantities of water to run
Jnto, against, and upon the same, and the
walls, roofs, ~oors, cellars, etc., thereof, and
thereby greatly weakened Injured, wetted,
and damaged the same. By reason whereof said premises became and were and are
damp, Incommodious, and less fit for habitation. The plea was not guilty. The
p1·0of tends to show that plalntlft's building
is a two-story brick building, with a cellnr
underneath, the front room on the first floor
being used as a butcher's shop, and the rest
of the building being used as a dwelling;
that her building was erected several years
before that of the defendant; that defendant's bulleting ls on the lot west of plalntllI's lot, and Is about 60 feet long, having
au omce In front and a beer-bottling establishment In the rear, and has one roof,
which slants towards plalntllr's property;
that there are three windows on the west
side of plalntlft's house, besides the three
Pellar windows; that her wall Is a llttle
o\·er two feet from the west line of her lot;
that when It rains the water flows against
her west wall. and some of it into her win-

dows and cellar from the roof ()f defendant's building; that the eave trough Is so
far below the eave that the water runs -0ver
It Into the windows, etc.
Palmer & Schutt, for appellant.
& Hamilton, for appellee.

Patton

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).
Proof was Introduced of damage done to
plaJntUI's property after the commencement
of the suit by reason of rain storms then
occurring. The defendant asked, and the•
court refused to give, the following instruction: "The court Instructs the jury that the
suit now being tried was commenced in the
month of April, 1890, and that they are not
to take Into consideration the question as to
whether or not any damage has accrued to
plalntll'f's prop~1y since the commencement
of this suit." The question presented Is
whether plaint tr was entitled to recover
only suPh damages as accrued before and
up to the beginning of her suit, lea vlng subsequent damages to be sued for lu subse-quent suits, or whether she was entitled to
estimate and recover in one action all damages resulting both before and after the
commencement of this suit. The rule originally obtaining at common law was, that
In personal actions damages could be recovered only up to the time of the commencement of the action.\ 3 Com. Dig. tit. "Damages," D. The rufe subsequently prevailing in such actions Is that damages accru·
Ing after the commencement of the suit may
be recovered, if they are the 'Mtnflll
it
necessary result of the act complalnL'<l of,
and whe1·e they do not themselves constitute a new cause of action. Wood's l\Iayne,
Dam. § 103; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67;
Slater v. Rink, 18 Ill. 527; Fetter v. Beale,
1 Salk. 11; Howell v. Goodrich, 69 Ill. 556.
In actions of trespass to the realty, It Is said
that dama;:es may be recoYered up to the
time of the verdict, (Com. Dig. 363, tit.
"Damages," D;) and the reason why, In
such cases, all the damages may be recovered In a single action, Is that the trespass '
Is the cause of action, and the injury resulting Is merely the measure of damages. 5
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 16, cn:.se cited In
note 2. But In the case of nuisances or repented trespasses recove1·y can ordinarily
be had only up to the commencement of the
suit, because every continuance or repetition of the nuisance gives rise to a new
cause of action, and the plaintiff may bring
successive actions as long as the nuisance
lasts. McConnel v. Kibbe, 29 Ill. 483, and
33 Ill. 175; Railroad Co. v. Momtt, 75 Ill.
524; Rallroad Co. v. Scha!Ier, 124 Ill. 112, 16
....
·'
N. E. 239. The cause of action, In case of
an ordinary nuisance, Is not so much the
act of the defendant as the Injurious consequences resulting from his act, and hence
the cause of action d()('S not arise until such
consequences occur; nor can the damages

PRESE~T

PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE DAMAGES. 93-

be estimated beyond the date of bringing

the ﬁrst suit. 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.

17, and cases in notes. It has been held,

however, that where permanent structures

are erected, resulting in injury to adjacent

realty, all damages may be recovered in a

single suit. Id. p. 20, and cases in note.

But there is much confusion among the

authorities which attempt to distinguish be-

tween cases where successive actions lie

and those in which only one action may be

maintained. This confusion seems to arise

from the different views entertained in re

gard to the circumstances under which the

injury suffered by the plaintiff from the act

of the defendant shall be regarded as a per-

manent injury. “The chief ditiiculty in this

subject concerns acts which result in what

effects a permanent change in the plaintiff's

land, and is at the same time a nuisance or
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trespass." Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 94. Some

cases hold it to be unreasonable to assume

that a nuisance or illegal act will continue

forever, and therefore refuse to give entire

damages as for a permanent injury, but al-

low such damages for the continuation of

the wrong as accrue up to the date of the

bringing of the suit. Other cases take the

ground that the entire controversy should

be settled in a single suit, and that damages

should be allowed for the whole injury,

past and prospective, if such injury be prov-

en with reasonable certainty to be perma-

nent in its character. Id. § 94. We think,

upon the whole, that the more correct view

is presented in the former class of cases. 1

-Suth. Dam. 199-202; 3 Suth. Dam. 369-399;

1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) §§ 91-94; Uline v.

Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 536;

Duryea v. Mayor, 26 Hun, 120; Blunt v. Mc-

Cormick, 3 Denio, 283; Cooke v. England,

92 Am. Dec. 630, notes; Reed v. State, 108

N. Y. 407, 15 N. E. 735; Hargreaves v. Kim-

berly, 26 W. Va. 787; Ottenot v. Railroad

119 N. Y. 603, 23 N. E. 169; Cobb v.

Smith, 38 Wis. 21; Canal Co. v. Wright, 21

N. J. Law, 469; Wells v. Northampton Co.,

151 Mass. 46, 23 N. E. 724; Barrick v. Schif-

ferdecker, 123 N. Y. 52, 25 N. E. 365; Silsby

Manufg Co. v. State, 104 N. Y. 562, 11 N.

E. 264; Aldworth v. City of Lynn, 153 Mass.

53, 26 N. E. 229; Town of Troy v. Railroad

C0., 23 N. H. 83; Cooper v. Randall, 50 Ill.

317; Railroad Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339. We

do not wish to be understood, however, as

holding that the rule laid down in the sec-

ond class of cases is not applicable under

some circumstances, as in the case of per-

manent injury caused by lawful public

structures, properly constructed and perma-

nent in their character. In Uline v. Rali-

road Co., supra, a railroad company raised

the grade of the street in front of the plain-

tiﬁ"s lots so as to pour the water therefrom

down over the sidewalk into the basement

of her houses, ﬂooding the same with water,

and rendering them damp. unhealthy, etc.,

and injuring the rental value, etc. In dis-

cussing the question of the damages to

AND PROSPECTIVE DAM.\.GES.

be estlmated beyond the date ot bringing
the first suit. IS Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.
17, and cases In notes. It has been held,
however, that where permanent structures
are erected, resulting In Injury to adjacent
realty, all damages may be recovered In a
single suit. Id. p. 20, and cases In note.
But there Is much contusion among the
authorities wWch attempt to distinguish between cases where successi'l"e actions lie
and those In which only one action may be
maintained. This contusion seems to arise
from tlle different views entertained In regard to the clrcumstan<'es under which the
Injury sulfl'red by the plaintiff from the act
ot the defendant shall be regarded as a per-·
manent Injury. "The chief ditficulty In this
subject concerns acts which result In what
effects a permanent change In the plaintlrI's
land, and Is at the same time a nuhmnce or
trespass." Scdg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 94. Some
cases bold it to be unreasonable to as~ume
that a nuisance or Illegal act will continue
forever, and theretore refuse to give entire
damages as tor a permanent Injury, but allow such damages for the continuation ot
the wrong as accrue up to the date ot the
bringing of the suit. Other <'ases take the
ground that the entire controversy should
be settled In a single suit, and that damages
should be allowed tor the whole Injury,
past and proRpectlve, If such Injury be prov·
en with reasonable certainty to be permanent In Its character. Id. § 94. We think,
upon the whole, that the more correct view
Is presented In the former class ot cases. 1
· l:)uth. Dam. 199-202; 3 Suth. Dam. 369-300;
1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) H 91-94; Ullne v.
Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 53G;
Duryea v. Mayor, 26 Hun, 120; Blunt v. i\IcCormlck, 3 Denio, 283; Cooke v. Englnnrl,
92 Am. Dec. 630, notes; Reed v. State, 108
N. Y. 407, 15 N. E. 735; Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W. Va. 787; Ottenot v. Railroad
Co., 119 N. Y. 003, 23 N. E. 169; Cobb v.
Smith, 38 Wis. 21; Canal Co. v. Wright, 21
N. J. Law, 469; Wells v. Northampton Co.,
151 !\lass. 46, 23 N. E. 724; Barrick v. SdlltferdC<'ker, 123 N. Y. 52, 2G N. E. 3w; Silsby
~la.nurg Co. v. State, 104 N. Y. 5G2, 11 :-l.
E. 264; Aldworth v. City of Lynn, li.3 ~lass.
53. 2G N. E. 229; Town of Troy v. R11ilron1l
Co., 23 N. H. 83; Cooper v. Randall, GIJ Ill.
317; Railroad Co. v. Hoag, 00 Ill. 339. We
do not wish to be under1:1tood, however, as
holding that the rule laid down in the Sl'Coad class of cases Is not applicable under
some circumstances, as in the case of permanent Injury caused by lawful public
structures, properly constructed noel permanent In their character. In llline v. Itnllroad Co., supra, a railroad company ra!Rt>tl
the grade ot the street In front of the plaintiff's lots so as to pour the water therefrom
down over the sidewalk Into the basement
of her houses, flooding the s11me with water,
and rendering them d:unp, unhealthy, etc.,
and injuring the rental YlllUl', etc. In dis-
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cussing the question ot the damages to.
which the plalntUf was entitled the court
say: "The question, however, sttll remains,
what damnges? All her damages upon theassumptton that the nuisance was to be permanent, or only such damages as she sustained up to the commencement of the action"! • • • The1·e has never been in this
i;tate before this case the least doubt expre:>R('(l In any judicial decision • • •
that tile plalntilf, In such a case, Is entitle<!
to recover only up to the commencement of
the action. That such Is the rule Is aa Wl'll
settled here as any rule of law can be by rl'peated and unllorm decisions of all the
courts, and It Is the prevailing doctrine elsewhere." Then follows an exhnustl'l"e review ot the authorities, which sustain the
conclusion of the court as above announced.
In Duryea v. Mayor, supra, the action was
brought to recover damnges occasioned by
the wrongful acts of one who had dlsclmrged water and sewerage upon the land of
another, and It was held that no recovery
could be had for damages OC<'asloned by the
discharge of the water and sewage upon tilelnnd after the commencement of the action.
In Blunt v. McCormick, supra, the action
was brought by a tenant to recover damages against his landlord because ot the lntter's erection ot buildings adjoining the demised premises, which shut out the light
from the tenant's windows and doors; and
It was held that damages could only be recovered for the time which had elavsed
when the suit was commenced, and not foithe whole term. Jn Hargreaves v. l\:lmberly, supra, the action was case to recover
damages for causing surface water to tlow
on plalntltr's lot, and for Injury to his trees
by the use of coke ovens near said lot, and
for Injury thereby to his health and comfort; and It was held to be error to permit
a witness to answer the following question:
"What wlll be the future damage to the
property from the acts of the defendant?"
the court snylng: "In nil those cases where
the cause of the Injury Is In Its nature permanent, and a recovery for such Injury
would confer a license on the defendant to
continue the cause, the entire damage may
be recovered In a single action; but where
the cauf'e of the Injury Is In the nature of a
nulsanct>, and not permanent In its charucter, but of such a chnrneter that It muy be
supposed that the dl'fendnnt would remove
It rather than sufl'er at once the entire dnmagc which It may inflict If permanent. tllcn
the entire darung-e cannot be reco\"l•rt><l In a
single action; but actions mny be maintained from time to time as loug .is the <'anse
or the Injury continues." In Wells v.
Northampton Co., supra, where a rnllron•l
company malhtnlned a culvert under Its t•Jilbankment, which Injured land by discharging water on It, It was held that the ca~e
fell within the ordinary rule applicable to
continuing nuisances and continuing tree-
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passes. Reference was made to Uline v.

Railroad Co., supra, and the following lan-

guage was used by the court: “If the de

fendant's act was wrongful at the outset,

as the jury have found, we see no way in

which the continuance of its structure in its

wrongful form could become rightful as

against the plaintiff, unless by release or

grant by prescription or by the payment of

damages. If originally wrongful, it has not

become rightful merely by being built in an

enduring manner." In Aldworth v. City of

Lynn, supra, where the action was for dam-

ages sustained by a landowner through the

improper erection and maintenance of a

dam and reservoir by the city of Lynn on

adjoining land, the supreme court of Massa-

chusetts say: “The plaintiff excepted to the

ruling that she was entitled to recover dam-
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ages only to the date of her writ, and con-

tended that the dam and pond were perma-

nent, and that she was entitled to damages

for a permanent injury to her property.

An erection unlawfully maintained on one's

‘own land, to the detriment of the land of a

neighbor, is a continuing nuisance, for the

maintenance of which an action may be

brought at any time, and damages recovered

up to the time of bringing the suit. ' " "'

That it is of a permanent character, or that

it has been continued for any length of time

less than what is necessary to acquire a

prescriptive right, does not make it lawful,

nor deprive the adjacent landowner of his

right to recover damages. Nor can the ad-

jacent landowner, in such a case, who sues

for damage to his propeuty, compel the de-

fendant to pay damages for the future.

The defendant may prefer to change his use

of his property so far as to make his con-

duct lawful. In the present case we cannot

say that the defendant may not repair or re-

construct its dam and reservoir in such a

way as to prevent percolation with much

less expenditure than would be required to

pay damages for a permanent injury to the

plaintiff's land."

In the case at bar the defendant did not

erect the house upon plaintiffs land, but up-

on its own land. It does not appear that

such change might not be made in the roof,

or in the manner of discharging the water

from the roof, as to avoid the injury com-

plained of. The ﬁrst count of the declara-

tion, by its express terms, limits the recov-

ery for damages arising from the negligent

and improper construction of defendant's

building to such injuries as were inﬂicted

“before the commencement of the suit."

The second count was framed in such a

way as to authorize a recovery of damages

for the ﬂow of water upon plaintiffs prem-

ises from some other cause than the wrong-

ful construction of defendant's building;

and accordingly plaintiff's evidence tends to

show that the cave trough, designed to car-

ry off the water from the roof, was so

placed as to fall of the purpose for which it

PUE-SENT AND PHOSPECTIVE DAMAGES.

passes. Reference was mnde to mine v. was Intended. It cannot be said that the
Uallroad Co., supra, and the following lan- eave trough was a structure of such a perguage was used by the court: "If the de- manent character that It might not be chanfendant's act was wrongful at the outset, ged, nor can It be said that the defendant
as the jury have found, we see no way ln would not remove the cause of the injury
which the continuance of its structure in its rather than submit to a recovery of entire
wrongful form could become rightful as damages for a permanent Injury, or suffer
against the plaintltr, unless by release or repeated recoveries during the continuance
grant by prescription or by the payment of of the Injury. The facts in the record tend
damages. If originally wrongful, it has not to show a continuing nuisance, as the same
become rightful merely by being built In an is defined in Aldworth v. City of Lynn, suemlurlng manner." In Aldworth v. City of pra. There Is a legal obligation to remove
Lynn, supra, where the action was for dam- a nuisance; and the "law wlll not presume
ages sustained by a landowner through the the continuance of the wrong, nor allow a
improper erection and maintenance of a license to continue a wrong, or a transfer of
dam and reservoir by the city of Lynn on -title, to result from the recovery of damadjoining land, the supreme court of Massa- ages for prospective misconduct." l Suth.
chusetts sny: "The plalntll'l excepted to the Dam. 199, and notes. The question now unruling that she was entitled to recover dam- der consideration bas been before this court
ages only to the date of her writ, and con- in Cooper v. Randall, supra. The action
tended that the dam and pond were perma- was for damages to plalntil'l's premises,
nent, and that she was entitled to damages caused by constructing and operating a
for a permanent Injury to her property. flouring mill on a lot near said premises,
An erection unlawfully maintained on one's whereby chal'l, dust, dirt, etc., were thrown
own land, to the detriment of the land of a from the mill Into plalntttr's house. It was
neighbor, is a continuing nulsnnce, for the there held that the trial court committed no
maintenance of which an action may be error In refusing to permit the plaintiff to
brought at any time, and damages recovered prove that the dust thrown upon his premup to the time of bringing the suit. • • • ises by the mill after the suit was com'.fhat it Is of a permanent character, or that menced had seriously impaired the value of
1t has been continued for any length of time the property, and prevented the renting of
less than what Is necessary to acquire a the house; and we there said: "When subprescriptive right, does not make it lawful, sequent damages are produced by sul>Senor deprive the adjacent landowner of his quent acts, then the damages should be
right to recover damages. Nor can the 'l.d- strictly confined to those sustained before
jacent landowner, In such a case, who sues suit brought." It is true that the operation
for damage to his proped;y, compel the de- of the mill, causing the dust to fly, was the
fendant to pay damages for the future. act of the defendant; but It cannot be said
'.fhe defendant may prefer to change his use that lt was not the continuing net of the
of his propct·ty so far as to make his con- present appellant to allow the roof or the
duct Ia wful. In the present case we cannot eave trough to remain In such a condition
say that the defendant may not repair or re- as to send the water against appellee's
eonstruct Its dam and reservoir in such a house upon the occurrence of a rain storm.
way as to prevent percolation with much Nor ls appellant's house or eave trough any
less expenditure than would be required to more permanent than was the mill In the
pay damages for a permanent Injury to the Cooper case. In Railroad Co. v. Hoag, suplnlntlll'.'s land."
pra, a rallroo.d company had turned Its
In the case at _bar the defendant did not waste water from a tank upon the premerect the house upon plaintll'l's land, but up- ises of the plaintiff, where it spread and
on its own land. It does not appear that froze, and a recovery was allowed for damsuch change might not be made in the roof, ages suffered after the commencement of
or ln the manner of discharging the water the suit; but lt there appeared that the lee,
from the roof, as to avoid the injury com- which caused the damage, was upon plalnplained of. The first count of the declara- tll'l's premises before the beginning of the
tion, by Its express terms, limits the recov- suit, and the damage caused result.ed from
ery for damages arising from the negligent the melting of the Ice after the suit was
and Improper construction of defendant's brought. It ·was there said: "The injury
building to such Injuries as were Inflicted sustained by appellee between the com"before the commencement of the suit." mencement of the suit and the trial was not
The second count was framed ln such a from any wrongful act done by appellant
way as to authorize a recovery of damages during that time, but followed from acts
for the flow of water upon plalntltf's prem- done before the suit was commenced."
ises from some other cause than the wrong- Here, the water, which caused the Injury,
ful construction of defendant's building; was not upon plaintiff's premises, either In
and acco1·dingly plalntil'l's evidence tends to a congealed or liquid state, before the beshow that the eave trough, designed to cnr- ginning of the suit, but flowed theroon as
ry off the water from the roof, was so the result of rain storms which occurred
placed ns to fall of the purpose for which it after the suit was commenced. We think

PRE5ENT .AND PROSPECTIVE DAMAGES.
PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE DAMAGES. 95

the correct rule upon this subject is stated

as follows: “If a private structure or other

work on land is the cause of a nuisance or

other tort to the plaintiff, the law cannot re-

gard It as permanent, no matter with what

intention it was built; and da-nlges can

therefore be recovered only to the date of

the action." 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 93.

it follows from the foregoing observations

that it was error to allow the plaintiff to in-

troduce proof of (lamage to her property

caused by rain storms occurring after the

commencement of her suit, and that the in-

struction asked by the defendant upon that

subject, as the same is above set forth,

should have been given. The judgments of

the appellate and circuit courts are revers-

ed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit

court.
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Judgment reversed.

the correct rule upon this subject Is stated
as follows: "If a private structure or other
work on land ls the cause or a nuisance or
<>ther tort to the plalntitr, the Ia w cannot regard It as permanent, no matter with what
intention It was built; and da Jl.lgcs can
therefore be recovered only to the date or
the action." 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) 'I 03.
lt follows from the foregoing obsen·ntions
that It was error to allow the plnlntilf to In-

I
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troduce proof of damage to her property
caused by rain storms occurring after the
commencement of her suit, and that the Instruction asked by the defendant upon that
subject, as the same ls above set forth,
should have been given. The judgments of
the appellate and circuit courts are reversed, and the cause Is remanded to the circuit
court.
Judgment reversed.
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ULINE v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R.

CO.

(4 N. E. 536, 101 N. Y. 98.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 19, 1886.

Matthew Hale, for appellant. A. J. Park-

er, for respondent.

EARL, J. Colonie street runs at right

angles with and crosses Broadway, in the

city of Albany, and the defendant's railroad

crosses the two streets diagonally at the

place of their intersection, and had crossed

there for at least -10 years before the trial

of this action. The plaintiff owned three

houses and lots contiguous to each other, situ-

ate on the northerly side of Colonie street,

and easterly of Broadway and of the rail-

road. The lot numbers are 85, 83, and 81,

numbered in this order from Broadway. Lots

85 and 83 extend only to the northerly side

of Colonie street, while lot 81 extends to the
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center thereof. When the railroad was orig-

inally built, the two streets were somewhat

raised. About the year 1874, two additional

tracks were laid upon the defendant's road

where it crossed the two streets, one of which

was upon the easterly side thereof, and the

road-bed was raised at its intersection with

Broadway from two and a half to three feet.

It does not appear that either of the tracks,

or any part of the road-bed, was upon any

of plaintiff's land, or that she received any

damage whatever from them. But, to ac-

commodate the grade of Colonie street to the

grade of the railroad, it became necessary

to raise the street and sidewalks thereof, and

the consequence was that the street and

sidewalk in front of plaintiffs lots were ele-

vated about one foot, and all the damage

of which plaintiff complains was caused by

this elevation. She alleged in her complaint

that her lots extended to the center of the

street; that the defendant entered upon her

property (meaning her property in the street),

and tore up the pavement, raised the street,

sidewalks, and gutters, and so shaped the

street and gutters as to pour the water there-

from down over the sidewalk into the base-

ments of her houses, by means of which her

premises were made liable to be ﬂooded with

water, and had been ﬂooded with water, and

were rendered damp, unhealthy, and incon-

venient of access, and her property therein

had been injured, and the rental value and

the value thereof greatly depreciated.

\Iany exceptions were taken at the trial

on behalf of the defendant. which its coun-

sel argned before us. and relied upon for a

reversal of the judgment. -But I shall no-

tice those only which haw reference to the

rule of damages laid down by the trial judge.

Upon the trial it was claimed, on behalf of

the defendant, that the plaintiff could recover

only such damages as she had sustained up

to the commencement of the action. On the

contrary, her counsel claimed that she could

recover damages upon the theory that the

embankment placed in the street in front

of her lots was to be permanent, and that

thus it was a permanent injury to her lots,
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embankment placed In the atreet In front
of her lots was to be permanent, and that
thus It was a permanent Injury to her lots.
(4 N. E. 536, 101 N. Y. 98.)
and so the law was ruled by the trial judge.
Court or Appeuls or New York. Jan. 19, 1886.
A witness for the plalntur was asked this
Matthew Hale, for appellant. A. J. Park- question: "\Vhat, in your judgment, was
er, for respondent.
the value of these lots 81, 83, and 85 Colonie
street before the grade was raised?" This
EAilL, J. Colonie street runs at right was objected to by defendant's counsel as
angles with and crosses Broadway, in the Immaterial and Incompetent, and the objeccity of Albany, and tbe clefemlant's railroad tion was o\'"erruled, and the witness answered
crosses the two sh'eets cllagoually at the that each lot was worth $3,000, and was
place of tlleir intersection, and had crossed worth less after the change. Then he was
tllere for at least 40 years before the trial asked this question: "Ho,\· much would it
of tills action. Tile plaintiff owned three be worth since the change In the street?"
houses and lots contiguous to each other, situ- This was objected to by defendant's counsel
ate on the northerly side of Colonie street, on the grounds that It was lmmntt,rlal aml
and easterly of Broadway and of the rail· Incompetent; that a change of mnrket value
road. The lot numbers are s;:;, 83, and 81, between 18i4 and that time was no e¥1dence
numbered in this order from Broadway. Lots of damages Jn this action; that the question
8i'i and 83 extend only to the northerly side assumes that the da11111ge was pet"lllaneut;
of Colonie street, while lot 81 extends to the that the proper measure of damages was any
center thereof. When the railroad was orig- Injury to the rental ,-nine of the 11remises
inally built, the two streets were somewhat prior to the commencement of the suit nnd
raised. About the year 18H, two additional the cost of restoring the street to its former
tracks were laid upon the defendant"s road condition; and that there was nothing In the
where it erossed the two streets, one of whkh · complaint or In the e¥idence which rendered
was upon the easterly side thereof, and the mntNlal any eYidence as to the market ¥11lue
road-bed was raised at Its intersection with of the propN·ty either before or after the
Broadway from two and a half to three feet. alleged wrongful act. The trial judge ruled
It does not appear that either of the tracks,
that he would allow the Illuintiff to pron!"
or ru1y part of the road-bed, was upon any bow much the rental of the property had
of ltlaintlJ'J'"s land, or that she received any been impaired down to the commencement
dam:ige whnte\•er from them. But, to ae- of the adlon, and the actual injuries which
1·0.mmodnte the grade of Coloule street to the the property bud sustained by the flow of
grnde of the railroad, It became necessary the water into, upon, and against It by reato rnise the street and sidewalks thereof, and son of the change of the grade of the street
thP ("Onsequence wns that the strl'et nnd hy the defendant; and to this ruling plalnsldew:ilk in front ot plaintiff's lots were ele- tilI"s counsel excepted. Subsequently, upon
vated about one foot, nml all the damage further argument on the next day, the judge
of whirh plalntlfr complains was caused by reversed his ruling, and, among other things.
this elevation. She alleged In her complaint said: "Yesterday an Inquiry was made of
that her lots extended to the center of the i counsel as to the act or the defendant In constreet; that the defendant entered upon her strnetlng the additional traC'ks, an!l In rn!slng
property (meaning her property in the street), the bed of the road. I understood It to be
and tore up the pavement, raised the street, conceded that the net was a. pure trespa!<s;
sidewalks, and ·gutters, and so shapecl the that the dumping of the ground in the street
street and gutters as to pour the water there- was a ti·pspass: and that the construction
from down o¥er the sidewalk Into the base· of the trneks was a trespass, and the runments of her houses, by means of which her ning of the cars was a trespass,-and I there·
premis!'s were made liable to be flooded with fore held that no court would be justified In
water, and had been flooded with water, and assuming that an act of that character would
wcrl' rendered damp, unhealthy, and lncon- be permnnent; therefore that the permanent
Vf'niPnt of access, and her property therein depreciation in value of the property could
had b!'Pn injur('l\, and the rental value and not be the basis or the damages, but only
thl' ,-nine thPrPof grf'ntly <IPpreriated.
the de1ireelated rental during the time of th~
:'II:rny exceptions were t:tken at the trial continuance of the trespass up to the time
on hPltalf of the defernlnnt. whid1 Its coun- of th!' beg-inning of the snit, and the actual
sel nrgued before us. and relied upon for a inj11r_,. whif·h the flooding had clone to the
ren'r><al of the judgment. .But I shnll no- pl'O)ll!l'I)'. 1 think, if llH'SC facts be COl1C'l'dtice those only whlc.h hnve referell(•e to the e11. thnt the 11Iaintift' can only recover the
rnlP of d:tmngl's laid down by the trial j111lgc. rrntal whieh 8he hacl lost, and the actual inL'pon tlie trial it was claimed. on behalf of jury to the premi8 c'~ down to the time of the
the cll•frmlant, that the plalntlft' could recover bringing of the snit." He then l':lllPd att<.•ntion to the complaint, nnd said that it did
oul~· ;.nch damages as sue hnd f<Ustalned up
to the commene1•ruent of the action. On the not charge that the defoudant's nets were·
contrary, her counsel clal111ell that she could Illegal, or thnt they were a pure trespass uprecover damages upon t!Je theory that the on the street, and that the pleadings show·
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street were not illegal or unlawful, and there-

ed that the acts were legally done by the

defendant under its charter; and, further:

"if that proposition be sound, how can the

court act upon an assumption that here was i

a mere trespass committed by the railroad 1

company upon a street which they had no .

right to do? My decision yesterday rested '

upon an assumption that, purely and simply, ,

here was a trespass committed upon the

street which the company had no right to 1

commit, and which, because a trespass. the '

court could not assume would be of a per-

manent character. I'pon that supposition.

and upon that theory, it was held that the

plaintiff could not recover as for a permanent ‘

injury to the property, but must be limited .

in her recovery to the damages which she

had sustained by a loss of rental up to the
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time of bringing the action, and to the actual

injury done to the property."

Plaintlffs counsel stated that “they had

never claimed this was a case of mere tres-

pass; that, as to two of the lots, they did

not own the soil in the street, and it could

not be a trespass." The trial judge then held

that, because the acts of the defendant in the .

fore not a trespass. they might be regarded

as of a permanent nature, and that the plain- i

tiff could therefore recover for the perma-

nent injury done to her property; and he i

overruled defendant's objection to the ques-

tion; and the witness answered that each

lot. immediately after the change, was worth

about $1,500. Similar questions put by plain-

tiffs counsel to other witnesses were object-

ed to by defendant's counsel. The objec-

tions were overruled, and the witnesses an-

swered in substantially the same manner.

Evidence offered by the defendant to show

how much it would cost to restore the street

to its former condition was, on the objection

of the plaintiff, excluded.

At the close of all the evidence defendant's

counrlel moved for a nonsuit upon the follow-

ing groimds: “(ii That no title has been prov-

ed in plaintiff in the property in question;

t2) there is no proof of any interference by

defendant with property in question; (3)

plaintiff has failed to make out a cause of

action; and upon the further ground there

is no proof of any unlawful or illegal inter-

ference by defendant with the property in

question." The trial judge said: “I agree

with you; there is no proof of any illegal in-

terference. That involves another very

grave question,-—I concede that;" and he de-

nied the motion, and defendant's counsel ex-

cepted. The judge charged the jury that the

plaintiff could recover, for the permanent in-

ed 1h:1t the ads werP legally done by the 1 tlfl' hy reason of such grade." The jud1w ri•defendant under Its charter; anti, further: pllecl: "I deC'llne to charge that. I n!lwit
''[f tllat proposition be sound. how <·au the that lm-oh·ps a very <lltfteult pro!Jlem of
l'Ourt act upon 1111 assumption that here was law." I li•frndunt's counsel also askt•ll him
a nwrt> trespass committed by the rallroa1l to churg.. : "If the jury 1.Jelleve such nds
com111111y upon a street which they had no were done wlthont the iwrmission of the cit;\'.
right to do? My decision yesterday rested nnd were 1111J11wful, then thP mPnsure of damupon 1111 assumption that, purely and simply, ages would he the actual injury 1mstulned hr
hert• was 11 trespass <'ommltted upon the plnlntlfl' before the commencl'nll'nt of this 11<'tlon, lnrludlng the loss of rt>nt and the Injury
1<t1·eet whkh the com111111y Juul no rl11:ht to
commit, and whlc•h, he<'nlli<e 11 trP11pa"'"· the to the use and enjoyment of the p1·opP1'ty bceonrt <·ould not asM11m1• would he or 11 1w1·- fort' th!' 1·0111mence111ent of the action, if
.\ml tlw judgi> said: "I decline to
m11uent charactl'r. l'po11 that s11111m1<iti1111. an~·.
1111d upon that theory, It w1111 Jwl41 thnt tbe l'htll'J.:'" I hat. ht•P1111st• tlwri> Is no proof ont•
plalntilT could not rl!Co\'er us tor a pennnnent way or th!' otht'l' upon the 1111c,.tlon. \YhPthInjury to the propl'rty, but mm!! he limited er tbc1·e was an authorized or un1rnthuriiw1l
In her recov-ery to the damngPs which she act, there Is no presumption In fa'l""or of tbi•
had sustained by a loss or rental up to the trespass."
DPfendant's counsel further nskt.'ll the
time or bringing the action, and to the actual
judge to charge "that upon the e\'idl'lll'l' th1•
Injury done to thl' property."
Plaintiff's couni<el stated that "they had jury wlll not be justified in rendering u ve1·ne\"er claimed this was a t>nse of mne tres- 1 diet for the supposed dllference in markt>t
pas111; that, as to two or the lots, they dhl 1 \"Rine In the premises before and artn thl' a1·t
not own the soil In the i<trPt>t, and It could ln question," and he refused so to cbnrgP;
not be a trespass." 'l'h•• trh1J jud!(l' then ht>ill and to nil the n•fnsuls defen<lant's eounllt'I
that, because the ads of thP 1IPft•1ul:111t In th .. t>xcepted. The judge then said: "1''or thl'
. street were not lllPl!:ai or unlawful, and there- pUr))OSe of prl'11entl1111: tlutt qUPMtlon sharply,
fore not a trespass. thPy might hf' rpg:trtll'd I n1•gl1•..ti'rt to d111rg1', ns I sholl 1!0 uow, tnnt
al! of a permanent nature, and that tlw 11l11ln- the plnJntitr cnn rl'1·ov!'1' the dllf1•rt•111·P iu lht•
tUf could then-fore recover for the perma- rentnl Yalue of thr pro11r1·ty, provhll'1l you
nent Injury done to her property; and he find thnt the act of tlw 1lt•fl'ml1111t has Imo\"erruled defendant's objection to the t}Ut!S- paired the mnrkf't vahw. 1111<1 to the extent It
tlon; and the witness answered that each bas lmpairNI It;" and to this defendant'!\
lot. Immediately after the change, was worth coum1el nlso excepted.
about $1.500. Similar questions put by plulnAt the general term tlw rule ot daµiagt•11
tilf's <·ounsel to other wltnes11es W!'re ohjecf- l111tl dowu hy the trlnl judge was approved,
t'd to by defendant's coUDsel. The objec- for the reason111 givt•n by him, to-wit: That
tions were overruled, and the wltnes!!t'!! an- the raising of the street was not Illegal or
swered ID substantially the sume manner. unlawful, and was apparently pe~manent.
E\"ldenee ofl'e1·ed by the defendant to show Judge Boardman, wrltlng an opinion In
how much It would cost to restore the street which Judge Rocki>s concurred, among oilito Its formf'r <'ondltlon was. on the ohjertlon er things, Bllld: "The right of thP defendant
of tht• plalntllf, excluded.
to occupy the street must be presumed from
At the dose of all the evidence defendant's the length of tlruP It has used It." "We can<~llllL"t' I 1110\"ed for a nonsuit upon the follownot l!BY that plalntlfl' had any title to the
ing gro\md11: "ft 1 That no title has been prov- street, or that the occupation of the street tw
ed in plalntitr In the propt>rty In que11tlon; the defPndnnt was unlawful." Judge Learn121 thPrt• Is no proof of an;\' Interference IJy ed concuned In the result, apparently with
tlPft•ndnnt with propt>rty In QUPstlou; {:l) some hesltallon. He said that, In regard to
plalntltr has falle1l to make ont 11 cause of the quet1tlo11 of damages, he thought the mutaction; and upon the further ground there ter did not depend altogether "on the permnIt! no proof of anr unlawful or llli>gnl lnter- nency of the strueture"; that If A. trespasst>11
fPn>nce by dPf<•mlant with the propN·ty In on thl' land of B., and erects a stn1ct111·1\
question." The trial jud11:e said: "I ug1·ee however ~rmnnent, he supposed that In a1·with you; there Is no proof of any Illegal In- tlon for trespnss damages could be recover1•1l
terference. '.rhat Involves another very only fc-r Injuries up to the time of the corngra\"e question,-! concede that;" and he de- mem·ement of the action; and that, If the
nl<•d the motion. and defemlant's counsel ex- ti·espass were continued, another action coulll
cepted. Tbe jwlge charged the jury that the be brought. But be seemed to be of opinion
plalntlfl' could recon-r. rnr the pe1·manent In- that, as the railroad company· could legally
jury to her prope1·ty, tlw diminished market acquire property needed for Its track, and 11
\"alue thereof. He was rP1111ested by defend- right to construct its road upon a street.
aut'a counsel to chnrgt• as followa: "If the when they have taken possession, and hnve
Jury believe that the net of the defendant In In fact used a street In 11 mnnner Indicating
raising the street wa.s not unlawful, but was a permanent use, It ls not unreasonnhle thnt
hy the permlMlon of the city of Albanr, then ln an action against them daruagt•M should
the defendant Is not, under the proof. llahle be recovered for the whole Injury.
I ha\"e thus carefully and fully stated tlwseto phllntlfl' for any Injury done to the plaln-

jury to her property, the diminished market

value thereof. He was requested by defend-

ant's counsel to charge as follows: “If the

jury believe that the act of the defendant in

raising the street was not unlawful, but was

by the permission of the city of Albany, then

the defendant is not, under the proof, liable

to plaintiff for any injury done to the plain-
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facts to show the precise theory upon which

the damages were recovered at the trial term,

and the judgment was aiiirmed at the gen-

eral team; and that the theory is fundamen-

tally and ra(ii(.'ally erroneous, I can have no

doubt. Railroads are authorized to be built

by law; but, before a proposed railroad can

be lawfully built, its builders must obtain the

right of way. They cannot take private prop-

erty for that purpose without ﬁrst making

compensation therefor, and if they do they

become trespassers. If the railroad be built

upon or over a highway, the public right or

license must be obtained not only, but, so far

as individuals own private rights or interests

in the highway, or the soil thereof, they must

also be lawfully acquired; and it is equally

true, whether the railroad be built upon a

highway, or be built elsewhere without ac-

quiring the private right or property, that
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the builders are liable for all the damages

suffered by the owners of such rights and

property. As to them and their rights, the

railroad is un1awful,—a continuing nuisance

which they can cause to be abated;—and so

it has been settled by repeated decisions.

Williams v. Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Ma-

hon v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 658; Plate v.

Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 472; Henderson v.

Railroad Co., 78 N. Y. 423; Story v. Railroad

Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Mahady v. Railroad Co.,

91 N. Y. 148. But wherever a railroad is

lawfully built, with proper care and skill,

there it is not a nuisance. What the law

sanctions and authorizes is not a nuisance,

although it may cause damages to individual

rights and private property. If a railroad

be built upon a highway after acquiring the

public right,

any, in the street, or the soil thereof, then

the owners thereof are not responsible for

any damages necessarily resulting from the

construction or operation of the railroad to

private property adjacent or near to the road;

and, so, too, the law has been settled in this

state by many decisions. Radeiiffs Ex'rs v.

Mayor, etc'.,4 N. Y. 195; Davis v. Mayor, etc.,

14 N. Y. 506; Bellinger v. Railroad Co., 23

N. Y. 42; Kellinger v. Railroad Co., 50 N. Y.

206. The case of Fletcher v. Railroad Co.,

25 Wend. 462, so far as it holds a contrary

doctrine, has been overruled by the cases

just cited.

Here there was no complaint that the work

done by the defendant in the street was not

done with sufﬁcient care and skill, and it was

assumed at the trial that it was legally and

lawfully done, and that the defendant was

not a trespasser in the street. That assump-

tion implies that the defendant had the pub-

lic license to do what it did not only, but

also that it invaded no property rights of the

plaintiff in the street. The assumption was

warranted by the facts. This railroad com-

pany in a populous city had been there a

large number of years, and it cannot be as-

sumed that it was there without right, and

there is no allegation in the complaint that it

and the private property, it‘ ~
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facts to show the precise theory upon which
tlle damages were recovered at the trial term,
nnd the judgment was affirmed at the general te1im; and that the theory Is fundamentally and radically erroneous, I can have no
douut. Railroads are authorized to be built
by law; but, before a proposed railroad can
he lawfully built, Its builders must obtain the
right of way. They cannot take private property for that purpose without first making
<-ompeusatlon therefor, and If they do they
bl'comc trespassers. It the railroad be buUt
u11on or over a highway, the public right or
lk(•nse must be obtalnl'd not only, but, so far
as Individuals own private rights or lnterel'.lb;
In the highway, or the soil thereof, they must
also be lawfully acquired; and it ls equally
true, whether the railroad be built upon a.
highway, or be built elsewhere without acquiring the private right or property, that
the builders are liable for all the damages
suft'ered by the owners of such rights and
property. As to them and their rights, the
railroad ls unlawful,-a continuing nuisance
which they can cause to be abated,~and so
it has been settled by repeated decisions.
Wllliams v. Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Mahon v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 658; Plate v.
Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 472; Henderson v.
Railroad Co., 78 N. Y. 423; Story v. Railroad
Co., 00 N. Y. 122; Mahady '" Railroad Co.,
91 N. Y. 148. But wherever a rallroad ls
lawfully built, with proper care and skill,
there It Is not a nuisance. What the law
sanctions and authorizes is not a nuisance,
although It may cause damages to lndlYldual
rights and private property. It a railroad
be built upon a highway after acquiring the
public right, and the private property, if
any, In the street, or the soil thereof, then
the owners thereof are not responsible for
any damages necessarily resulting from the
construction or operation of the railroad to
private property adjacent or near to the road;
and, so, too, the law has been settled In this
state by many decisions. Radclltf's Ex'rs v.
Mayor,etc:,4 N. Y. 195; Davis v. l\Iayor,etc.,
14 N. Y. 506; Belllnger v. Railroad Co., 23
N. Y. 42; Kelllnger v. Railroad Co., 50 N. Y.
206.
The case of Fletcher v. Railroad Co.,
25 Wend. 462, so tar as It holds a contrn1·y
doctrine, bas been overrnletJ by the cases
just cited.
Here there was no complaint that the work
1lone by the defendant In the street wus not
done with sufficient care and sklll, and It wns
assumPd at the trial that It was legally and
lnwtnlly done, and that the defendant was
nut a trespasser in the street. That assumption Implies that the defendant had the public li<:ense to do what It did not only, but
also that It Invaded no property rights of the
plulntllf in the street. The assumption was
wnrrnut('d hy the facts. 'l'hls railroad company In n populous city had been there a.
In rl'e 1111 mhf'l' of years, and It cannot be assnm1>1l thn t It wni1 there without right, and
tht•re ls no allegntlon In the complaint that It

was. There was no proof that the rallroalf
embankment was made any wider on tht>
easterly side, towards the plalntlft"s lots, and
hence It may be assumed that the additional
track was laid upQD Its embankment and under rights early acquired and long possessed
by It at that place. As before stated, there
ls no proof that elt!ler the railroad tracks,
or any part of the railroad embankment, was
plac·ecl upon the soil of the plaintiff in the
!!trl'l't, and In fact neither was. Even If the
plulntUr's lots were bounded southerly by
the center of Colonie street, all the defendant did was to raise the street and sidewalk
in front of her lots so as to conform the grade
of the street to the grade of the railroad and
of Broadway, over which It passed. This,'
we ru ust assume, it had from the city the
right to do, and so much it was bound by law
to do under the general railroad act (Laws ,
1850, c. 140, § 28, subd. 5), by which it was
bound to restore the street to "such state as
not unnecessarily to have Impaired Its usefulness." Here there was no allegation nor
proof that the street, as a street for travel,
was In any way injured, and much less that
its usefulness was unnecessarily Impaired. !
It was not, 1n front of plalntlft''s premises, by \
the act of the defendant, devoted to anything
but street purposes; and, as the city could
have raised the grade of the street without
liabll1ty to abutting owners, so It could au- 1
thorlze the defendant to do so without such
liability.
V'i'e have a case, then, where the defendant
did acts In the street entirely lawful, and
where 1t was held Hable for the consequential damages to the plalntlfr's adjacent property caused by the careful use of Its lawful
authority and the proper exercise of ita legal
rights. To uphold this recovery upon such
a theory would subvert a very Important
rule of law about which there has been no
substantial question 1n this state for at lea11t
30 years. The rule was recognized by ull
the judges who wrote opinions in Story v.
Hnllroad Co., and by the judge who wrote in
Mahady v. Railroad Co., the latest cases In
which the rulr has been under consideration
here. Even If the assumption that the act1:1
done by the defendant in Colonie street were
I lawful was not warranted by tbe facts, yet,
I as the lawfulness of the acts was assumed
by the court, and substantially conceded by
plalntltf"s counsrl at the trial, the assumption
sh9uld preyall here, because but for it the
defendant might have proYed that ita acts
were lawful.
But the learned counsel for the phtlntltr.
as we understand his brief, does not attempt
to sustain this judgment upon the theory
adopted by the trial judge. He claims that
the interference by the defendant with the
street was unlawful and a nuisance, and
that, therefore, the plalntlft' was entitled to
recover damages cnu11l'd thereby; and If he
ls right In his contmtlon that this embankment placNl lu the streE't by the defendant

I
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was unlawful, and therefore a nuisance, then

the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages.

The question, however. still remains. what

damages? All her damages, upon the as-

sumption that the nuisance was to be perma-

nent? or only such damages as she sustained

up to the commencement of the action? We

have here for consideration an important

principle of law which has to be frequently

applied. and which ought to be well known

and thoroughly settled. There never has been

in this state, before this case, the least doubt '

expressed in any judicial decision, so far as

I can discover, that the plaintiff in such a

case is entitled to recover damages only up to

the commencement of the action. That such

is the rule is as well settled here as any rule

of law can be, by repeated and uniform de-

cisions of all the courts; and it is the pre-

vailing doctrine elsewhere. In Hambietou v.
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Veere, 2 Saund. 170, the learned annotator in

his note says: “So, in trespass and in tort,

new actions may be brought as often as new

injuries and wrongs are repeated, and there-

fore damages shall be assessed only up to

the time of the wrong complained of."

In Iioseweil v. Prior, 2 Salk. 460, the plain-

tiff being seized of an ancient house and

lights, defendant erected a building whereby

plaintiffs lights were estopped. There was a

former recovery for the erection, and the sec-

ond action was for the continuance of the '

erection; and it was held that the former

recovery was not a bar. In Bowyer v. Cook,

4 Man. G. & S. 236. there had been an action

of trespass for placing stumps and stakes on

plaintiffs land. and the defendant paid into

court in that action 40 shillings, which the

plaintiff took in satisfaction of that trespass.

The plaintiff afterwards gave the defendant

notice that unless he removed the stamps and

stakes a further action would be brought

against him; and in the second action it was

held that the leaving the stumps and stakes

on the land was a new trespass, and that the

plaintiIf was entitled to recover. In Holmes

v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503, the action was

trespass against a turnpike company for con-

tinuing buttresses on plaintiff's land to sup-

port its road. Plaintiff had recovered com-

pensation for the erection of the buttresses

in a former action, and the money had been

paid into court, and received by him; and it

was held that after notice to defendant to re-

move the buttresses, and a refusal to do so,

plaintiff might bring another action for tres-

pass against the company for keeping and

continuing the buttresses on the land, and that

the former recovery was not a bar to such

an action. In that case it was argued for

the defendant that (he damages given in the

ﬁrst action were to be regarded as a full com-

pensation for all injuries occasioned by the

buttresses, and were to be considered as the

full estimated value of the land permanently

occupied by the buttresses; that the damages

were in respect of prospective as well as past

injury, and that the judgment operated as a

purchase of the land. Patterson, J., said,

was unlawful, and theretore a nuisance, then
the plaintiff wae entJtled to recover damages.
The question, however. sttll remains, what
damages? All her damages, upon the as·
sumptJon that the nulsan<'t.' was to be permanent? or only aucb damages as she sustained
up to the commencement of the action? We
have here for consideration an Important
principle of law which hns to be lrt>quently
applied. and which ought to be well known
and thoroughly settled. There never bas been
In this state, before this case, the least doubt
expressed In any judicial decision, ao far as
I can discover, that the plalntltr in such a
case Is entitled to recover damagPS only up to
the commencement of the action. That such
1s the rule Is as well settled here as any rule
of law can be, by repeated and uniform deds.lons of all the courts; and It Is the prevailing doctrine elsewhere. In Hamlllt•ton v.
Veere, 2 Saund. 170, the learned annotator In
hla note says: "So, In trespass and In tort,
new actions may be brought as often as new
Injuries and wrongs are 1·epeated, and therefore damages shall be assessed only u11 to
the time of the wrong complained of."
In Roeewell v. Prior, 2 Salk. 460, the plain·
wr being seized of an ancient hom~e and
Ughts, defendant erected a building whereby
plalntltr'1 lights were estopped. There wa11 a
former recovery for the erection, and the llt'Cond action was for the continuance of the
erection; and It was held that the former
recovery was not a bar. In Bowyer v. Cook,
4 Man. G. & 8. 236, there bad been an actton
of trespau for placing stumps and stakes on
plaintitr1 land, and the defendant paid Into
rourt In that action 40 shillings, which the
plalntltr took In satisfaction of that trespass.
The plalntltr afterwards gave the defendant
notice that unless he removed the stumps and
stakes a further action would be brought
against him; and lo the second action It was
held that the leaving the stumps and stakes
on the land wa11 a new trespaBS, and that the
plalntltr was entitled to recover. In Holmes
v. WllSOll, 10 Adol. & E. 50.'l, the action waa
trespass against a turnpike company for continuing buttr~sses on plalutlff'a land to sup}Xlrt Its road. Plalntttr bad recovered compensation for the erN·tlon of the buttl'essee
In a former action, and the money bad bren
paid Into court, and received by him; am.I It
was held that after notkt> to defendant to remove the buttresse11, and a refusal to do so,
plalntlft' might hl'lng anothl'r action for trt'S·
pa88 ngalm~t the comp1111y tor k1>1>plng nml
continuing the buttrf•MsPs on thp land, and that
the former recovery was not a bar to 8nch
an action. In that case It was nrgue1l tor
the defendant that Lhe damages given In the
ftrst action were to be regarded as a full compensation for all Injuries occasioned by the
buttresees, and were to be considered as the
full estimated value of the land permanently
occupied by the buttresses; that the damages
were In respect of pro111le<'tlve as well as 1m11t
injury, and that the jmlgment operated as a

purchase of the land. Patterson, J., said,
In reply to the argument: "How can you convert a recovery and payment of damages for
the trespass into a purchase? A recovery of
damages for a nulsanee to land
not prevent another action for continuing It." Anti
It was argued by learned counsel for the
plalntltr, in reply to the argument that the
former judgment operated as a purchase of
the land: "Aa to the supposed eft'ect of the
judgment fn changing the property of the
land, the consequence of that doctrine would
be that a pers<>n who wants hla neighbor's
land might always buy It against bis will,
paying only such purchase money aa a jury
might assess for damages up to the time of
the action. U the property was changed,
when did It paee? Suppose the plalntJIT had
brought ejectment for the part occupied by
defendant's buttreBBes, would the recovery of
damages In trespa88 be a defense? There Is
no case to show that when land ls vested In
a party and fresh IDjurles are done up<>n It,
fresh actions will not lie." See, also, '.rhompson v. Gibson, 7 Mees. & W. 456; Mltcht>ll
v. Colliery Co., 14 Q. B. Div. 125; Whitehouse
v. 1''t•llowe, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 7~.
I fill(} no case in England now regarded as
authority in conftlct with these cases. The
ca11e of Beckett v. Railroad Co., L. R. 3 C. P.
81, does not lay down'a dlft'erent rule. That
cu11e arose under the railroad clauseJJ oonsolldatlon act and the land clauses consolidation
act, which require full compensation to be
1oade by railroad companies, not only for
lands taken, but also for damages to land Injuriously atrected. Under those acts the
pln.lntltr rE>covered, not only the value of hl11
lands takt>n, but for permanent Injury to hla
other lands. The case of Lamb v. WalkE>r, 3
Q. B. Div. 389, was overruled In Mitchell v.
Colliery Co., supra, and le no longer authority
In England.
·
The same rule of damages which I am trying to enforce prevails generally, and with
very rare exceptions, In the other states of
this Union. In Esty v. Baker, 48· lie. 495,
Appleton, J., said: "1.'he mere <."Ontlnuance
of a building upon anotbel"s land, even after
the recovery of damages for Its erection, le
a trespass for which an action will lie." In·
Rus!!Pll v. Brown, 63 Me. 203, the action wus
trespass quare clausum, for continuing upon
the plaintiff's land the wall of a building
9 Inches wide, and 106 feet long. The defendant pleaded In bar a formi>r judgment recovered for building the wall, antl satisfaction,
und It was held that tlw were continuance
of a structure tortlou11ly ert!<'tetl upon another's land, even after recovery and sat111factlon of a judgment for Its wrongful erection, le a trespass for which another action of
trespass quare clausum will lie, and that a
recovery with eatlsftlctlon for erecting a structure does not operate as a purchase of the
right to continue such erection. In Canal
Curp. v. Hitchings, 65 Me. 140, the action
was trespass for Oiling about 200 yardti of

will
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canal, and the justice instructed the jury,

inter alia: “Whatever diminution there is in

the value of the property by reason of the

trespass is an element of damage.“ The de-

fendant excepted to this instruction, and it

was held erroneous; that the recovery should

have been limited to such damages as were

sustained down to the commencement of the

action. Wilton, J., writing the opinion, said:

"It is now perfectly well settled that one

who creates a nuisance upon another's land

is under a legal obligation to remove it, and

successive actions may be maintained until

he is compelled to do so." “The doctrine of

all the cases i that a recovery of damages

for the erection of a building or other struc-

ture upon another's land does not operate as

a purchase of the right to have it remain

there; and that successive actions may be
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brought for its continuance until the wrong-

doer is compelled to remove it." "As a nec-

essary result of this doctrine, it has been

held, and we think correctly, that in the ﬁrst

action brought for such a trespass the plain-

tiff can recover such damages only as he had

sustained at the time when the suit was com- ‘

menced, because, for any damage afterwards

sustained, a new action may be maintained;

and the law will not allow two recoveries for

the same injury." “The injury complained of

was the iilling up of the canal. The defend-

ant, acting under authority from the city of

Portland, had extended Commercial street

over and across the canal, by means of a

solid embankment. No opening was left for

the passage of either boats or water. As-

suming that this embankment was unlawfully

placed there; that the canal should have been

bridged, not ﬁlled up,—and we have a nul-

sance upon the plaintiffs land,—something

placed there which can, and in contemplation

of law ought to be, removed,. For such an

injury successive actions may be maintained

until a removal is compelled. The damages

must therefore be limited to such as the plain-

tiff has sustained at the date of the writ.

The rule given to the jury/—namely, that the

measure of damages was the diminution of

the value of the property,—was inappropriate,

,and must have led to an erroneous result."

In Bare v. Hoffman, 79 Pa. St. 71, the plain-

tiff had a dam from which he conducted

may. be brought as long as the obstruction is

maintained. A recovery in the ﬁrst action es-

tablishes the plaintiff's right. Subsequent ac-

tions are to recover damages for a continu-

ance of the obstruction."

In Thompson v. Canal Co., 17 N. J. Law,

480, it was held that the title to lands does

not pass, by a verdict for the plaintiff, in

an action of trespass; that it remains in the

plaintiff, and therefore a verdict for dama-

ges to the full value of the land is manifest-

ly wrong. In Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio.

489, the action was case for nuisance in di-

verting water from the mill of the plaintiff.

The injury complained of in the declaration

was that the mill was rendered less useful
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<'llnal, and the justice lnst!'ueted the jury,
Inter alla: "Whatever diminution there Is In
the value of the pro11erty by rt•11110n of the
trespass is an element of 1l:11nngf'.'' The defendnut excepted to this im!tl'UC'tiou, and It
was held t~rroneous; that the recovery should
have been limited to such damages as were
sustained down to the commencement of the
action. \Vilton, J., writing the opinion, said:
"It is now i>erfectly Wl'll settled that one
who cr1>ntes a nuisance upon another's land
Is under a legal obligation to remove It, and
i<n<'eessive actions may be maintained until
he Is compelled to do so.'' "The doctrine of
nll the cases Is that a recovery of damages
for the erection of a. building or other structure upon another's land does not operate as
a purchase of the right to have 1t remain
there; and that successive actlQns may be
hrou~ht for Its continuance until the wrongdoer Is compelled to remove It." "As a nect>ssary result of this doctrine, It has lwen
hl'ld, and we think corredly, that In the Hrst
aC"tlou brought for such a trespass the plalntifl' can recover such damages only as he had
1<ustalned at the time when the suit was comuwnced, because, for any damage afterwards
su11tah1l'1l, a new action may be maintained;
and the law will not allow two recoveries for
tbt> same lnjm'Y." "The Injury complained of
waA the filling up of the canal. The defend:mt, acting umler authority from the city of
l'ortlarnl, had extended Comme1·clnl street
over nnd across the canal, by means of a
t;Olid t>mbankment. No opt>nlng was left for
1 the pasRagf.' of either boats or water. As1mmlng that this f.'mhankmt•nt was unlawfully
1>lnced tht>rf.'; that the canal shouhl have bt>f.'n
brhlged, not filled up,-and we have a nuisance u11on the plalntlft'.'s Iand,-somi>thlng
piact•ll tb.,-rf.' whl<'h can, and In contemplation
of law onght to be, removed. For such nn
Injury sn«<"e"!ooh·e actions mn~; be mnlntnlnt>d
until a rPmovnl Is compPlled. Tlw llnmni:Ps
must tht>rPfor1' ht> Iimltetl to such as the l)iftintllT has su!!tnlned at the date of the writ.
The rule given to the jury,-namely, that the
measure of damages was the diminution of
the value of the property,-was lnap11roprl11t1',
.nnd must have led to an erroneous result."
In Bore v. Hoft'nurn, 70 Pa. Rt. 71, the plnintltT Juul a dam from which he rondm·tt>ll
wnter to his tannPry, unll the defendant 11111\lt•
u llom ht>low, Into which the surplus wa h•r
o\'Pr plalutitr's dam flowed, nod from his d1tm
tlw <lt•fe1ulnnt. hy n pl1)e, <'011<lucted the wntl'r
to his tannery, hy whkh the plalntlfl' lost tlw
use of the wntt•r required to carry tht• 01T111
from his tannery, und It wns held that l'Yldenee of permanent Injury to the markl•t
value of plalotllr's tnnnt>ry wns loadml11slhh•:
that the Injury was not or sueh a charneh•r
as to nssumP that it would be pe1·manl'nt. 111111
to m1sess damages accordingly; and that, as
a general l'Ule, succei.:111\·t> actions may be
brought so long as tlJI' ohstr1wtlou Is eontlnued. Mel'CUI', J., writing tlw opinion. snlrl:
"The gene1·al rule Is that t1Ul't·l'isslve actiuns

may. be brought as long as the obstruction Is
maintained. .\. recovery In the first action estnbllshes the plnlntif'l"s i·lght. Subsequent actions are to rPeover damages for a continuance of the obstrudlou."
In Thompson v. Canal Co., 17 N. J. Law,
480, it was held that the title to lands does
not pass, by a wr11lct for the plaintlll', In
an action of trespass; that It remains In the
plain tit!', and therefore a verdict for damages to the full vahtc of the land Is manlfe11tly wrong. Ju Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio.
489, the a1•tlon wns e:tst> for nuisance In diverting wn ter from the mill of the plain tlft'.
The Injury complnlued or In the declaration
was that the mlll was rendered less useful
by reason of a diversion of a portion of the
water from the stream by means of a canal
cut by defendant. The court Instructed the
jury that the o'vnel' of the mill was entitled
to recover such damages as the jury believed
he had sustnlued by the mill-site having bet'n
diminlshecl In value In conse1111Puce of the diversion of the wnter. Rlrd111rd, C. J., writing the 011lnlon. snid: ..'l'his was going too
far. SuJ>po1<<' the party liable at all, he
w1111 only liable, undei· nny form of declaration. for the dnm:tgl's udnn lly sustalnl'tl
prior to the comnwnC'l'Illent of the suit.''
In Rn.llrnad Co. v. KPrnodll', 54 Ind. at4, It
was held that where a railroad compnn~·
In the construction or Its road-bed, v1lthont
taking the stl'ps presc1·lhed by In w to condemn Its right of way, unlawfully entl'r><
upon and takes possession of land, 1u11l suit
Is brought by the owner thereof to recon•r
dnmag't'R for stwh trPspnss, the dnmagPs assessprl Rhonlrl hwlmlt' co111pt>nt111tlon for tlw
lnjnr~· lnrth·ted, nntl such punitive rhtmagps
as 111'1' authorized by law, hut not the valut>
of the land Mu mwd or ap11roprlated; th:it
In sul·h an 11ctlou no jmlgnwnt thnt the court
trying Sll<'h enuRe Is authurlzf'cl to rendf.'t'.
will give tll\' rnllroacl co1111111n~· a title to
the lnnd appropriate1l. In Harrington ,..
Railroad Co., l 7 Minn. :!Hi lGll. 188), '1'ilPl'c•
the defendant had hullt Its road in the 1-1tr1•Pt
adjoining plnlntlft"s land, It waR held thnt
It was n continuing 11ul1<1lllce for ,...-hh·h sn«<'l'i<sl\·1· actions could be brought; aml 1m
NJnltahle aetlon for an injnnctlon was sus·
tnhtf.'cl for the renson thnt It would obvln ti'
the necessity of a 111111tl11lldty of suits. Jn
A1l11ms ...-. Hnllrontl l'o.. 1~ ~Jinn 2r.o (Gil.
:!:{H), the pl:tintlft' w11>1 the ownc>r and In
11ossc·s1do11 of u Int slt11ntp1I on the side of·
th1• >1treet, whidt nlso PXtPntlPd to tlw <'PntPr
of the stree t, suhj1•1•t only to 11 publie t>aM<'nwnt to use the same for 11tr1•pt lllll'}>lll!I.'"·
The clefen<laut, a rnllrond <'0111111111>·· without
first at'qUll'lng the i·Ight so to rlo, <"Ollstrm·h-.l
its rond along the street In fl'ont of pl11l11t1tr•s premisPs; nnd It Wiii' lwld that tlu•
dl'fenclnnt, In thm1 111111ro11rl11tlnl( thl' stn•t't
to lh1 own use. wns a trPl<JID"""'". nnd that
Its 11\"lH eonKtitntt:>il a privntl' uulHance ll"11g11l1tllt tlw pl11l11tilf. l'ntltlinir him to maintnln 1111 action tlll'refo1-, and tilat the dam··
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ages would be for the unlawful withholding

of the possession of the premises up to the

commencement of the action. Ripley, C.

J.. writing the opinion. said: "As there is

no presumption of law that such illegal

running of trains and other trespasses will

be continued in the future,—timt the unlaw-

ful act of to-day will be repeated on the

morrow,—it is, of course, obvious that while

the jury, in the present case, could asse:-is

past damages, they could not assess_the

permanent damages to accrue from an as-

sumed continued use thereafter of the land

by the defendant in the same way."

In Ford v. Railroad_Co., 14 Wis. 663, the

owner of lots abutting on a street in a city

brought an action against a railroad com-

pany to recover damages caused by the

construction of its road-bed through the
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street in front of his lots, and for an in-

junction restraining the defendant from lay-

ing down its rails in front of his proper-

ty. Dixon, L‘. J., in writing the opinion,

said: “It seems that the past damages, or

those occasioned by the trespass, might have

been assessed by the court, or the judge

might have ordered a jury for that purpose; .

but the permanent damages. or those which

would accrue to the plaintiff by the contin-

ued use of the land by the company, can

only be ascertained in the manner prescribed

by the statute."

in Carl v. Railroad Co., 46 Wis. 6|5, 1 N.

W. 295, the complaint alleged that plaintif

f

owned in 1869, and continued to own until

1873, a city lot, with a dwelling-house there-

on; that in 1869 defendant constructed its

road, with embankment and ditches, along

and on each side of the center of the street,

in front of the lot, and maintained the same

to the commencement of the action, and

thereby obstructed access to the house and

lot. and diminished their value; that by rea-

son of the premises plaintiff, before the

commencement of the action, was compelled

to sell and did sell his property for a sum

less by $1,000 than could otherwise have

been procured for it, and that defendant

had refused on demand to make compensa-

tion for the injuries so sustained, and had

taken no steps under its charter to have the

damages ascertained, and judgment was

asked for the sum of $1,000; and it was

held that the action must be treated as one

for damages for a continuing trespass, and

that the complaint stated facts sutiicient to

sustain such an action; that the plaintiff

in such an,action, however, can recover noth-

ing more than the damages to the property

resulting from the trespass between the

building of the road and the commencement

of the action; that such a recovery. would

be no bar to a future recovery by plaintiff

or his grantee for subsequent damages to

the property by a continued maintenance of

the road; and that evidence of the per-

manent depreciation in the value of the
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The judge writing the opinion said:
•1gt'11 would be for tht> unlnwrul withholding · slble.
of the pe>NN1slon of the prt'111l11P11 up to the "The reco,·ery Jn the present action wlll ht>
<'OWWeDl.'t'Wl'llt of thf' nctlon. UIJ>ley, C. a bar only as to 1lniU11gt•s sustained pre\"lous
J.. writing tLe oplnlos. snld: ...\11 thN·e 111 to the commenel'lllent of the same, and the
no pl't'sumptlon of law that 111wh llleg1tl
running of trains and other tl'l'>lllllMKt-11 will
ht• continued In the future,-thut the unlawful act of to-day wlll be rt>11eated on the
worrow,-lt 18, of course, ob\"lous that while
the jury, In the present case, could asiw"'"
imst damages, they could not &Slless the
11t•rmanent damages to accrue from au· nssumed continued use thf'rt>aftPr of the laml
by the defendant In tbt> same way."
In Ford ,.. Rallron<l Co., 14 Wis. BU3, the
owner of lots abutting on a street In a city
brought an action against a railroad comJlll.DY to re<.'O\"er damai:c11 t'lllll!l'tl by the
construction of Its road-l~d through the
street In front of bis lots, o.nd for an In·
junction restraining tbt• 1lpfcndant from laying down Its rnlls In front of his property. Dlxon, l'. J., In writing the opinion,
Mid: "It seems that the past damages, or
those oecnslont>d by the trt•sp11s11, might have
been as11PNt1l'll by the court, or the Judge
might bnvt' 01·tlered a jury for that llllrpose;
hut the permanent dama1res. or those which
would 11e1·rue to the plalntltr by the contln·
ued use of the land by the company, can
only bt• as<·t>rtalned In the manner pre1wrlbed
l1y tile statute."
In Carl ,.. Railroad Co., 46 Wis. ti25, 1 N.
W. 2'5. the complaint allPgt>d that plalntltr
owned In 1860, and contlnuPd to own until
lk7;J, a city lot, with a dwelflug-house thereon; tllat In 18<19 defendant <'onstructt>d Its
rond, with embankment and dlkhes, along
and on each side of the center of the stret>t,
In front of the lot, and maintained the same
to the commencement of the action, and
thereby obstructed access to the house and
lot. and diminished their nlue; that by reason oC the premises plnlntllf, before the
commenrement of the action, was compell<>d
to sell and did sell his property for a sum
less by $1,000 than could otbPrwlse ha,-e
been procured for It. and that defendant
had refused on demand to mnke compP11sa·
tlon for the Injuries so sustained, and bad
taken no steps under Its charter to have the
damages ascPrtalned, and judgment was
:1.!:'ked for the sum of $1,00o; and It was
held that the action must he treated as one
for damages tor a continuing trespass, and
that the complaint stat<>d facts sutftclPnt to
sustain aueb an action; that the plaintiff
In such an .action, however, can recover noth·
Ing wore than the damages to the propt•rty
resulting from the tn•spa!<s heh\"(•t•n the
building ·of the road and the commeneement
of the aC'tlon; that such a recovery would
be no bar to a future rt'covery by plnlntltr
or bis grantee for sub11equent damages to
the property b;y a continued maintenance of
the road; an1l that evidence of tht• p1•rmanent depn•clatlou In the Ynhw of the
lnn<l r('flnltlni: from such ron<l wns l1111ol111!,.;.

iilulntltr or her. graut<•es can recover In
another action for any Injury caused to the
lot by the malntt'nance of such railroad subsequent to the rommencement of this action."
In Blesch v. ltallroad Co., 43 Wis. 183, It
was held that the rule of damages In such
u <'IU!e as that, Ii! the dltrerence In value of
the use of the lot, without the l"llilroad track
and with the railroad track, between the
date of building the same and the commencement of the action. Justice Cole. In deliver·
Ing the opinion, said: "The damages recoverable In the action are, of course, for
the past Injury to the freehold and possession; that 18, the pecuniary loss which the
tre1<pass bad caused the plalntllr In the use
and enjoyment of bis property when the
suit was commenced." And. further: "One
1·eason why a railroad company can be
char~;t-d with the permanent damages for
taking land to1· Its use only In a proceeding
under the 11t11tute for asse1·tlng the right of
1 eminent domain, ls that, when such damn.·
ges art• puld, the company Is entitled to
have a clear title to the property so taken,
1 and such tltlu cannot be acquired In an actlon for a trespass or nuisance. Another
1 reason Is that, In the action to reCO\"el' damngt>!I for the nulsnncE>, the i1lnlntlff mny
! IJ11ve judgment to abate the nulsatiet>, and
It would lie clearly unjul!t that the plaintiff'
should recoYer damages for 11 contlnrnml·e
of the nul!1ance, and at the same tlml' huYt>
1 judgm<•ut to abate and remove the sum.-."
Sel', also, Canal Co. v. Bourquin, 51 Ga. 3i!I.
Jn harmony with tht'se authorities are the
views of approved text writers. 3 Bl.
Comm. ~'20; Sedg. Meas. Darn. 155; Mayne,
Dam. (1st Aw. Ed.) §§ 110, 111; 1 Suth.
Dam. 100, ID2, 369, 399. While the authorities In other states are not entirely harmonious. those which I have cltt'd give the
ge1wr11l dl·ltt ot the decisions.
But whatever dltrerence theru may be
In other states as to the rule of damages
under consideration, In this stnt1• there Is
none whatever. Here the autlwrltlt>s are
entirely uniform, that In su<"b 1111 action as
this damages can be recovered only u11 to
the commencement of the action, and that
tlw remedy of the plain ti tr Is hy successh·p
al'llons for bis damages until the nulsanee
shall he abakd. The law wus so nnnounct>d
ln nreen v. Ualkoad Co., (l:i How. Pmc. 154;
Tnylor '"· Railway Co., 50 X. Y . Huprr. Ct.
312; Duryea v. Mayor, etc., :.w Hun, 120,all cases entirely analogous to this. In McKeon ,., See, 4 Rob. 44ll, It was bl'ld that the
only damnges which the plalntllf Is entitled
to rl'cover In an action against an adjoining
oWllt'l' for a nuisance upou the prt'mlses of
tht> lnttl't" nre those for a 1kp1·r1·h1tlou of
tlw rN1t uml loss of tenants c11 usPd by imch

I
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nuisance previous to the commencement of

the action. In Whitmore v. Bischoff, 5 I‘Iun,

176, it was held that the damages which a

party can recover for a private nuisance

are those which he has sustained previous

to the bringing of the action, and that it is

error to allow a recovery for the diminution

in value of the premises based upon the as-

sumption that the nuisance is to continue

forever. In Duryea v. Mayor, etc., 26 Hun,

120, the action was brought to recover the

damages occasioned by the' wrongful act

of one who had discharged water and sew-

age ‘upon the land of another, and it was .

held that no recovery could be had for dam-

ages occasioned by discharge of water and

sewage upon the land after the commence-

ment of the action. In Blunt v. McCormick,

3 Denio, 283, the action was case for dam-
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ages in consequence of the erection of a

building adjoining plaintiff's, whereby plam-

tiﬂ:"s light was obstructed.

was defendant's tenant. The court at the

trial charged the jury that if the plaintiff ‘

was entitled to recover they should give dam-

ages for the injury which he would suffer

during the whole of his term. It was held

that this charge was erroneous, and that a

recovery could be had only for such dam-

ages as had occurred at the time the suit

was commenced, and not for the whole term. ‘

In Plate v. Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 473, the

action was brought to recover damages

caused by keeping and maintaining the de-

fendant's railroad track, and ditches along

the side thereof, in such manner as to cause .

the water to ﬂow back upon the plaintift"s

land. There had been a former recovery

of damages for the same cause, which was

alleged as a bar to the second action; but

it was held not to be a bar. The judge

writing the opinion said: “If, indeed, he

could have recovered damages, not only for

all injuries which had occurred previous to

the commencement of the action, but also

for all injuries which may possibly there-

after occur, the ﬁrst recovery would be a

bar to the second."

In Williams v. Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97, and

Story v. Railroad Co., 6 N. Y. 85, a resort to

equity was allowed because the necessity of

bringing successive actions to recover dam-

ages would thus be obviated. If, in those

cases, the plaintiffs could have recovered all

their damages, past and prospective, in actions

at law, equitable actions would have been

unnecessary and unauthorized. The case of

.\Iahon v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 658, is a pre-

cise authority; and, if there were no other,

ought to control the decision of this case. In

that case the railroad company constructed

its road and laid its tracks upon a highway

in front of Mahon's premises. His title to the

adjoining premises extended to the center of

the street, and in 1842 he commenced an ac-

tion against the railroad company to recover

damages in consequence of the construction

and operation of the railroad in the hign\vay
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nuisance previous to the commencement ot In front of his premises, and he recovered :r
the action. In "Whitmore v. Bischof!', l'i Hun, judgment. Afterwards he died, and then his
176, it was held that the damages which a l'Xecuto1·s Instituted an action to recover damparty can recover fo1· a private nuisance ages sustained, during the lifetime of the tesare those whlcb he hue sustained previous tator, subsequently to the former recovery.
to the bringing of the action, and that 1t Is for a continuance of the railroad and Its conerror to allow a recovt'l'y for the diminution , tinued operation In the street; nnd to the last
In value of the premises hast>cl upon the as- urtlon the defendant interposed as a defemu•
1mmptlon that the nui1111nce Is to continue tlw former recon·ry, and It was held not to
forever. In Duryea v. Mayor, etc., 26 Hun, he a bar. As dlsclo'*'d by the printed pa120, the action was brought to recover the 1 pet'S to bl' found ln .the state llln-ary, the decdamages oceasloued by th~ · wrongful act Jamtlon In the ti.rat action contains four
of one who had discharged water and sew- counts. In the ftrst and fourth, among other
age upon the land of another, and It wa.s things, It was alleged that the plaintlfl lawheld that no recovery could be had for dam- fully owned and poseessed a lot, and dwellages occasioned by discharge of water and ing-house thereon, aud that the defendant
sewage upon the land after the commence- caused to be wrongfully constructed an emment of the action. In Blunt v. McCormick, bankment of earth of the height of tlve feet
3 Denio, 283, the action was case for dam- In front of his premises. and wron11:fully conages In consequence of the erection of a tinued and maintained the same, and operbulldlng adjoining plaintiff"s, whereby plaln- 11.ted Its rallroad thereon, by means whereof
tltr"e light was obstructed. The plalntltr' he could not have and enjoy his free and unwal!I defendant's tenant. The court at the obstructe<l passage into and upon his lands
trial charged the Jury that lf the plalntlfl and to and from his dwelling-house, and his
was entitled to recover they should give dam- lot and dwelling-house were flooded with waages for the Injury which he would sutfer ter, and rendered damp, and his buildings
during the whole of his term. It was held and property were greatly Injured and dethat this charge was erroneous, and that a preciated In value. It ls thus seen that the
recovery could be had only for such dam- character of the injuries complained of In
ages as had occurred at the time the suit that action were like those complained of
, was commenced, and not for the whole term. here, and that a depreciation In the value of
In Plate v. Rallroad Co., 37 N. Y. 473, the the property was claimed. If the complaint
action was brought to recover damages here ls broad enough to recover for permacaused by keeping and maintaining the de- nent diminution of the value of the property.
fendant's railroad track, and ditches along upon the theory that the nuisance ·Was to be
the side thereof, In such manner as to cause permanent, BO the declaration there was
the water to flow back upon the plaintiff's broad enough to recover damages upon the
land. There had been a former recovery same theory; and lf the facts of this case are
of damages for the same cause, which was su111.clent to justify and uphold a recovery
alleged as a bar to the second action; but for permanent Injury and diminution In value
It was held not to be a bar. The judge of the property, so, clearly, were the tacts of
writing the opinion said: "It, Indeed, he that case. In the argument before this court
could have recovered damages, not only for of the second case, which ls 11.bove cited. It
all Injuries which had occurred previous to was claimed that the declaration In the tlr1o1t
the commencement of the action, but also suit was broad enough to embrace the damfor all injuries which may possibly there- ages which llahon's property sustained by
after occur, the ti.rat recovery would be a the construction of the railroad, through all
bar to the second."
time, and that, whether It was or not, the reIn Williams v. Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97, and sult should be the same, as the damnges re8tory v. Railroad Co., 6 N. Y. 85, a resort to sulting trom the construction of the railroad .
l'QUlty was allowed because the nec<'sslty of were incapable of being Sllllt up and made the
bringing successive actions to recover dam- subject of an lntlnlte number of actJons; and
ages would thus be ob¥1ated. If, in those that the true rule In such a case was that
<'ases, the plalntlfls could have recovered all the plalntltr' was at liberty to prove, and the
their damages, past and prospective, In actions jury were bound to consider, what damages
at law, equitable actions would have been might probably be the result of the act comunneceB11ary and unauthorized. The case of plained of, and the finding In one case must
Mahon v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 658, ls a pre- embrace all the damages. On the other hand,
<"lse authority; and, lf there were no other, It was clalmi!d th!lt the plalntll! In that suit
ought to control the decision of this case. In could have recovered damages legally only
that case the rallroad company constructed up to the commencement of the suit. The
Its road and laid Its tracks upon a highway court at the h'ial of the second action held
in front of Mahon's premises. His title to the that the former recovery was a bar, and upon
adjoining premises extended to the center of that ground nonsulted the plalntil!s. They
the street, and ln 1842 he commenced an ac- then appealed to the general term, where the
tion against the railroad company to recover prevailing opinion for nttirmance was written
1lnmages In consequence of the construction by Judge Allen. He held that the former re;rnd opPratlon of the railroad ln the hignwny covery was a bar; I.mt stated In his opinion
1
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that “if the wrong complained of had been

a technical nuisance, in the legal sense of the

term, a recovery for damages for the erec-

- tion would not bar an action for the continu-

ance;" that "every day's continuance would

be a legal wrong, for which an action would

lie;" that “a right cannot exist to continue a

nuisance, and every party affected by it may

insist upon its removal, and the neglect to

comply with the duty resting upon a party to

abate a nuisance which he has either erected

or maintained gives an action to any party

injured by the neglect." But he held that

the railroad was not to be treated as a nui-

sance, and that the company had permanent-

ly appropriated the highway to its use, and

therefore permanent damages could be recov-

ered; and his opinion, if sound, would uphold

this recovery. Judge Pratt wrote a dissent-
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ing opinion. taking an opposite view. In his

opinion he said: “If the injury complained

of was of that nature that he was entitled to

recover prospective damages. he should have

proved them in that suit. The law will not

suffer a party to unnecessarily split up de-

mands, and thus needlessly multiply suits."

And, t'urther: “The track and embankment

would. under such circumstances, be a con-

tinuing nuisance, and the defendants would

be liable to a new action every day so long

as they kept it up, and damages would accrue

to the owner. A person. by erecting a nui-

sance on the lands of another. or by trespass-

ing on such lands, acquires no right thereby,

and a recovery of damages for the injuries

sustained does not have the effect to vest the

title in the wrong-doer, as in the case of a con-

version of personal property." And here the

judgment was unanimously reversed. Clerke,

-1., writing the opinion, commenced by say-

ing: “If the plaintiffs testator could have re-

covered all that he was entitled to in the ﬁrst

action, it is, of course, a bar to the second;

and this depends chieﬂy. though not alto-

gether, upon the question whether the Utica

& Schenectady Railroad Company in any

way transcended the authority constitution-

ally vested in them by the legislature. If

they did. their road is a nuisancc,—a perpet-

ual nuisance,—and every day's continuance

of it is a legal wrong for which they are

liable in'damages after they have accrue( ."

And he held that the railroad company did

transcend its authority by entering upon the

highway without ﬁrst causing \Iahon's dam-

ages to be assessed and paid; and that the

illegal appropriation of the highway made it

liable to damages in successive actions as the

damages accrued. And he further said:

"The railroad company, therefore. having.

without compensation to those entitled to the

reversion of the lands. constructed, main-

tained. and operated their road upon the high-

way in question, acted and continued to act

unlawfully. are liable to damages from time

to time as they accrued, and on this ground

the second action is maintainable." In the

course of the opinion, this language is used:

A~D
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that "if the wrong comph1lned of bad l:>N>n
a technical nuitllln<'E', In the legal aense of the
term, a recovery for damages for the erection would not bar an action for the contlnuauC'e;" that "every day's continuance woulit
be a legal wrong, for which an action would
lie;" that "a right cannot exist to contlnue a
nuisance, and ever7 part;y a1l'ected by It may
Insist upon Its removal, and the neglect to
('Omply with the duty resting upon a 11&rty to
abate a nuisance which he ha• either erected
or maintained glve11 an action to any party
Injured by ihe neglect." But be held that
the railroad was not to be treau'<l as a nulllllnce, and that the company bad permanently appropriated the highway to lt1 uae, and
therefore permanent damages could be recovered; and his oplnlon, lf sound, would uphold
this recovery. Judge Pratt wrote a dlesentlog oplnlon, taking an opposite view. ID his
oplfilon bf. t<ald: "If the Injury complained
of was of that nature that he was entitled to
recover prospective damages, be should have
proved them lo that 1ult. The law will not
eutrer a party to unnecessarily split up demands, and thus needleB&ly multiply suits."
And, further: ''The track and embankment
would, under such circumstances, be a contlnulog nuisance, and the defendants would
be liable to a new action every day so long
as they kept It up, and damages would accrue
to the owner. A person, by erecting a nuisance on the lands of another, or by trespassing on such lands, acquires no right thereby,
and a recovery of damages for the Injuries
sustained does not have the effect to vest the
title In the wrong-doer, as In the case of a conversion of personal property." And here the
Judgment was unanimously reversed. Clerke,
J., wrltlng the opinion, commenced by aaylng: "ll the plalntllf'e testator could have recovered all that he was entitled to In the ftrst
action, It le, of course, a bar to the eecond;
and this depends cblefty, though not altogether, upon the question whether the Utica
ct: Schenectady Railroad Company In any
way transcended the authority constitutionally vested In them by the legislature. If
they did, their road 11 a nulaanc<',-8 perpetual outeance,-and every day's <'ontlnuance
of It 18 a legal wrong tor whleh tht>y are
liable In· damages after they have a<'1·ru('(l."
And be held that the railroad L'Ompany did
transcend Its authority by entt•rlng upon the
highway without first cnmdng }lnhon's damages to be assessed and pahl; nod that the
Ulegal appropriation of thP highway made It
liable to damages In successive actions as the
damages accrued. And be further said:
"The railroad company, thert>fore, ha'l"lng,
without compensation to those entitled to the
reversion of the lands. constructed, maintained, and operated their road upon the highway In question, acted and continued to act
unlawfully, ore liable to damages from time
to time as they accrned. and on this ground
the second RC'tlon le maintainable." In the
<'Ourse of the opinion, this language Is used:
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"If they did not transcend their autbo1·lty,
and yet. In eonstnwtlng their rond han• UPC'·
eesarlly Injured the rights of others, they arc
<'QUally 11able to re11pond for prospective as
well as accrued llamagee; and In such case
they C'annot be vexed again In a second action."
It le not apparent precisely what was nwant
by this phrase. It Is a mei:e dictum, aml
('ertalnly announces an erroneous rule of law.
It may be that the learned judge was mlsll'll
by the doctrine np1>arently lalll down ln
1''letcber v. Railroad Co., supra. The same
juclge, In Plate v. New York Cent. R. Co., supra. ;ipenking of that paragraph says: "I am
Inclined to think there ls some clerical or
typographlc·al mistake here; or, perhaps,
there was some lnallvertence on my part In
the ba11te of writing;" and that It can, "at
most, be considered nothing more than a dictum, and tben~fore cannot control the present
case."
There Is no authority to be found In this
state holding any other rule of damages In
such a e1111c. The cn111• of Henderson v. Railroad Co., 78 N. Y. 42.'l, le not In confllct, as
that was an equitable action; and In the opinion written to that case the rule Is recognized
to be oth1>rwlee In actions at law; and the
case of llahon v. Railroad Co. Is exprrs1dy
recognized, IY!d It was certainly not intende1l
to overrule or depart from It or nny of the
prior authorities. The judgment there wa11
baaed entirely upon equitable prlnclple11, aml
then It was ordered that. upon payment of'
the sum awarded by the referee, the plalntlll'
should convey the title to the defendant. If
the c·aee of :Mahon v. Railroad Co., supportt>tl,
as It le, by abundant authority, and hn!4ed upon common-law principles, which In this state
have always been recognized, le to be dlert>garded In the decision of this case, It had bettC'r be dletlnctly overruled, and no longer left
to lur<' the legal wayfarer by Its fal11e light.
See. nlMO, Schell v. Plumb, M N. Y. 592, 598.
The rule contPnded for by the plaintiff, aml
amrmi>cl hy the supreme court In this case,
would l€'nd to some embarrassments and to
great Inconvenience. The plalntlfl"!l recovery
<"annot dh·t>st her of any legal right!! she has
In the street, either to an easement 01· to the
~II: nud If we may assume that IJPr recovery woulcl har any future recovery tor tlw
pr!'('l!IP 1'111 hankment and the pr!'dse mw.
thereof' which existed at the time of the commencenwnt of her action, yet It would not
bar a reeovery If there should be a change In
the emlJankment or the use thereof. It the
defendant should run a few more trains or
care, or raise Its embankment, or widen It,
or change It In any way, the plaintiff would
be permitted to Institute a new action, and te
repeat her action every time there should be
any change. And yet she bas recovered
damages In this nl'tlon upon subst~mtiully th•~
88me theory d11111111:{es would have hrc11
awarded If there bacl heen an a11prnlseme11t
un1ler the statute which vested title In tile
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defendant. If the rule aﬂirmed be the cor-

rect one, then a railroad company authorized

to construct its road may enter upon the

lands of any private person, and t1ike them,

and in a suit for trespass the plaintiff must

recover his entire damages, and the railroad

company must become substantially vested

with the title to the land; and thus, instead

of conforming to the statute. it may acquire

‘land by a pure trespass. And so the owner

of land, instead of resorting to the constitu-

tional tribunal for the appraisement of his

damages, may have them appraised by an

action which really vests no perfect title.

Can the statute of frauds be subverted, and

a perpetual easement or right in land, with-

out a grant, be thus conveyed by mere estop-

pel? In this case has happened what may

happen in many cases. The defendant sup-

posed, and had the right in good faith to
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suppose. that it had satisﬁed plaintiffs dam-

ages and acquired all her property interest

in the street until the verdict of the jury un-

deceived it; and then, if the verdict shall

stand, it became obliged to pay her for per-

petual damages, although they had come to

an end, and to make the same compensation

which it would have been required to make

if it had acquired a perfect title under the

statute: and yet it is left without a perfect

title, liable to successive suits.on the claim,

to be established on the uncertain evidence

of witnesses that its burden upon or interfer-

ence with the street had been changed or in-

creased. It was not left the option either to

abate the alleged nuisance, or to perfect its

title, in the mode prescribed by law, to any

easement or interest the plaintiff might have

in the street.

The law will not proceed upon the assump-

tion that a nuisance or illegal conduct will

continue forever. The impolicy aml absurd-

ity of such an assumption is illustrated in

this case, as the defendant offered to prove,

and hence it may be taken as true. that since

the commencement of the action it has re-

duced the street to its former grade. The

rule laid down in the cases which I have

cited, and which I contend is the true one.

gives any party who has suffered any legal

damages by the construction or operation of

a railroad ample remedy. He may sue and

recover his damages as often as he chooses,

—once a year, or once in six years,—and have

successive recoveries for damages. He may

enjoin the operation of the railroad, and

compel the abatement of the nuisance by

an action in equity, and where his premises

have been exclusively appropriated, or where

a highway, in the soil of which he has title.

has been exclusively appropriated by a rail-

road, he may undoubtedly maintain an action

of ejectment. Brown v. Galley. Hill & D.

30.5‘; Etz v. Daily, 20 Barb. 32; Rediield v.

Railroad Co.. 25 Barb. 54. It certainly can-

not be necessary to subvert the law as it has

been well established. in order to give the

plaintiff ample remedy for any wrong which

the defendant has done or can do her in the
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dl'ft'udimt. It the rule aftlrmed be the cor- thP <lPfl'111l11nt has done or can do her In the
rl't't one, then a 1·nllroad company authorlzPtl street in front of her premises. Nor can It
to <"<>nstruct its road may enter upon the lJc ex1>edtent to Introduce Into the nomenhmds or any prtvate person, and tllkl! them, clnture of the law a new actlon,--one to rennd lu a suit for trespass the plalntlft' must cover for the conversion of real property, to
ret·ovt>r his entire damages, and the railroad be followed. by the same consequences as an
l'ompauy must bPl'ome substantially vested action for the conversion ot personal prop.
with tbP title to the land; and thus, lnstend l'l'ty.
uf l'Ouforming to the statute, it may acquire
As to this rule of damages, It matters not
'laud l>y a pure trespaM. And so the owner whnt the form of tl1e complaint In the first
ot l11nd, h;stl•nd of resorting to the constitu- action was. The plalntlft' is bound to retional tribunal for the appralsement of his cover In bis ftnit action all the clamages to
damages, way have them appraised lJy an which he Is entitled. Ir he 'is entitled to
action which really vests no perfect title. damages for permanent Injury to bit! pro11Can the statute of frauds be subverted, nnd erty, It Is not optional for him to s1111t thcm
a perpetual ensement or right in land, with- up, and recover port ol them In the first acout a grant, be thus com·eyed by mere estop- tion, and then l>rlng subsequent actions for
pel? In this case has happened what may the reRt. It entttletl to recover damages only
happen In many cases. The defendant sup. up to the commencement ot his action. no
posed, and had the right In good faith to form o! complaint will entitle him to rei>over
suppo1w, that It had satisfied plalntlft"s dam- more. In the cnse of Mabon v. Rallro1id l'o.
It was pru,·ed tl111t the former recovery was
agps null acquired all her property interest
In tht• l'ltrcet until the verdict of the jury un- for dnmuges only to the commencement of
dect•In•d It; and then, If the verdict shall tlle former aetlon, and yet that circumstance
Rtaull, It became obliged to pay her tor per- was uot deemed material.
pt>tual damages, although they had come to
Since writing the above, the case of City of
nu end, and to makP the 88me compensation North Vernon v. Voegler (Ind.) 2 N. E. 821,
whkb It would have
required to make containing a very elahorate opinion, has come
Ir It had acquired. a pPrl'ect title under tlfe to our attention. I have carefully exnmlned
1dntuti>; and yet lt Is lt•ft without a perfect that caRc, and find that It Is not authority
title, liable to su<'cessl'l"e suits.on the claim, for the 11Ialntlft' on the question now ~nder
to be establlsht>tl on the uncertain· evidence <llHcusslon. 'l'here the city had the right to
of witnesses that Its burdP11 upon or lnterfPr- grade one of Its streets, but did It so neglience with the street had been <·lmnged or ln- gently as to cause damage to the adjoining
<'reased. It was not left the option either to lots of the plaintiff, and It was held that be
nhate the alleged nuisance, or to perfect Its ecmld recover, and was bound to recover, nil
lltle, in the mode p1'PS<·rlhed by law, to any his d:nnages In a single action. It was de.-:u1rml•nt or Interest thP plulntllT mi~ht have cided that, In the absence of nPgllgence. there
in the stn•Pt.
would have been no liability for conset1uenThe law wlll not proceed upon the nssump- tlnl damages caused by what was rlg-htrully
tlon that a nuisance or lllPgal l'OU1hwt will done In the street. The judge, writing the
continue forever. The lmpollcy n111l alJsurd- opinion, said: "Our decisions have long and
lty of such an assumption Is lllui;trote<I ln stPadlly maintained. that munlelpul corporathis case, as the defe:.idnnt offered to prove, tions are not responsible tor couseqneutlal
and hence It may be tuken as true. that since Injuries resulting from the grading of streettl
the commencemPnt of the a<'tlon It has re- -when the work ls done In a careful aml 11klllduced the street to Its former gradl•. The tul manner, but they have quite as Rti>n1llly
ntle lnld down In the caAPS which I have maintained that, where the work ls done In
1·lti>d, and which I ccntend Is the tn1e one. n. negligent and unskillful manner, the corJl'lws any party who has suffered any legal poration ls liable for Injuries resulting to
adjacent property."
dnma~l'R hy the constn1ctlon or operation of
a railroad ample remtdy. He may sue and
Here there was no allegation or proof or rt-cov<'r his damages as often as be chooses, claims of negligence or unsklllfulneBB in tl11'
-onc>e a year, or 01wP In six yenrs,-and have construction of the embankment In the street;
Rll<'<'l'sRlve l'l.'<'overles for damages. He may and, as I ha\·e shown, It was aBBumed. and
enjoin the operation of the railroad, and conceded upon the trial that it was lawfully
l'om1wl the nbatelJ'ent of the nuisance by and legally constructed.. The trial judge did
an aetlon In equity, and where his premises not submit to the jury any question of neghave been exclusively appropriated, or where llgt•nce; but charged them, If they found
n highway, In the soil of whl<'h he has title, against the defendant ns to the release. then
has been exclu!llvely appropriated. by a rall- It wns absolutely liable for plaintiff's damrond, ht> may undoubtedly maintain an action ages, and that the only question for their conof ejeC'tment. Brown v. Galley. Hill & D. sideration was the amount of the damages.
308; Etz v. Dally, 20 B11rb. 32; Re11til'ld v. Hence that cnse ls an authority for the views
Hallroad Co.. 25 Barb. ri4. It certainly can- I ha \'e expri>!lsed upon the first ground of
not be necPssary to Rnhn•rt the law as It bas error herein dll<(•ussi>ll. But the case ls nl~u
bi>i>n well establh<lw1l. In order to gh·e the lnferentl111ly authority tor thP Reeond grou111l
11tnlntirr ample i-enwlly for uny wrong which of erl'or upon which I hnve hai<r1l my condu-

been

l'Ul·:l'.1-::\T .\.\JI l'!Ull'l'El'Tl\'E U.DL\.HE8.

l'lliC-\‘E.\"l‘ -\.\'li l'lHlSl'Et"l‘l\'E D.\\IAilES.
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ifullv done it can be made liable.

cease to be careless, or remedy the effects of

sion. The judge writing the opmion there

is very careful to place his decision upon

the ground that the structure in the street

was rightful, but negligently made. and he

recognized the rule, as to successive actions,

to be different where the structure is wrong-

fully in the street, and is there a nuisance.

lie said: "This is not the case of a nuisance.

it is the case of a negligent improvement in

a street. The improvement was in itself

rightful and legal. but the manner in which

the improvement was made was wrongful.

'l‘he wrong was not in grading the street, but

in the manner of doing it. It is not a uni-

sance for a municipal corporation to grade

its streets. but it is an actionable wrong to do

it negligently. The wrong in negligently
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grading the street is the basis of the action.

for there are no facts alleged constituting a'

nuisance. It is not a nuisance to do what

the law authorizes. but it may be tort to do

the authorized act in a negligent manner. It

is evident, therefore. that the cases which

hold that a continuance of a nuisance will

supply ground for an action have no inﬂu-

ence upon this case." And hence those cases

were not cited. It is clearly to be inferred

that if that court had been dealing with the

case of an unlawful embankment placed in

the street it would have held that successive

actions could be maintained. But I am of

opinion that that decision is clearly unsound

as to the precise question adjudged. What

right was there to assume that the street

would be left permanently in a negligent con-

dition, and then hold that the plaintiff could

recover damages upon the theory that the

5-arelessuess would forever continue? "Xma-

'nicipality or a railroad corporation. undcr_

proper authority, may erect an embankment

in a street; and, if the work be carefully

and skillfully done, it cannot be made liable;

for the consequential damages to adjacenti

fproperty; but if it be carelessly and unsklll

It may

its carelessness, and it may apply the requi-

site skill to the embankment; and this it may

do after its carelessness and unskillfuiness,

and the consequent damages, have been es-

tablished by a recovery in an action. The

moment an action has been commenced, shall

the defendant in such a case be precluded

front remedying its wrong? Shall it be so

precluded, after a recovery against it? Does

it establish the right to continue to be a

wrong-doer forever by the payment of the

recovery against it? Shall it have no beneﬁt

by discontinuing the wrong, and shall it not,

be left the option to discontinue it? And,

shall the plaintiff be obliged to anticipate his~

damages with prophetic ken, and foresee

them long before—it may be many years be-I

fore—they actually occur. and recover them

all in his ﬁrst action? I think it is quite‘

absurd and illogical to assume that a wrong-

of any kind will forever be continued, and

slon. The judge writing tht> opmlon thl're
Is very careful to place his cledl!lon upon
the ground that the stn1cture In the street
was rlghtruJ, but negligently mnde. nnd he
recognized the role, as to SU('('c>Sslve aetlons.
to be different where the struc-ture Is wrongfully In the street, and Is tht>l'l' a nul><nnce.
111• AA Id: "This Is not tilt' ('Ill<<' of a UUl>'ll uc•e.
It i11 the case of a negligent impro'l"emeut In
it i,itre<'I.
The· llllproYemeut was In ltsl'lf
1·i1Chttul and lt>g111. hut the manner In whkh
tlw im11ro¥enwnt wns modi' was wrongful.
The wroug was not In gmding the street, but
In the manner of doing It. It Is not n nul"ance for a municipal corpo1·atlon to grn<le
its stret'ts. hut It ls an aetlonahle wronJr to <fo
It neglhn•ntly. The wrong In negligPntJ~· i
grading the- s11·c•t>t Is the basis of tlw n<'tlon. I
for there are 1111 fnl'ls alleged constituting n· j
uulsan<'e. It Is not a nulsnnee to do wbnt 1
the law authorizes, hut It mny be tort to do
the authorl7.etl act In a nefi?'llgent manner. It
ls evident, therefore. that the- cases whld1 i
hold that a contlnuan<'e of a nuisance will
supply ground for an action ha,·e no influence upon this case." And hence those caiJ(•s
were not cited. It Is <'IE'nrly to be inf1>rrNl
that If that court hncl ht>en tlPaliug with the
<·nse of au unlawful emlmukment plueed In
the str1>et It would have hE>lil that suct·l'~slve
actions could be mnlntainrd. Hut I nm of
opinion that that decision is denrly uni,iouud
as to the precise question ndjudµ-etl. \\'hat
right wa,; there to assume that the strPt>t
would be- left permanently In a n<'glig1•11t <·011<lltion, and then bold that tht> plalntltr 1·0111tl
re-cover damages upon the theory that the
<'arelesimess would fore¥er continue? - A - 11111nlclpnllty or a railroad corpomtlon. unli<'r
)!roper authority. may erect an embankmE'nt
In a street; and, If the work be carefully
and skillfully done, It cannot be mnde llal>le J
tor the consequential damages to adjnePnt \
, property; but If It be carelt>ssly and unsklll · ·
, full'\" done It cnn be made liable. It ru11v
~o be careless, or remedy the ell'ects .;,
its carelessness, and It may apply the requisite skill to the embankment; and this It may
do after Its carelessness and unsklllfulnes><,
and the consN1uent rlnmagefl, have bet>n c1<tnhllshed by a reco¥ery In an aetion. The
moment an action bas been commencell, shall
the defeudant In such n case be prel'iuded
from n-metlylng its wrong? Shall It be RO
preclmk<l, nfter a recovery against It? Does
It estuhlish the right to continue to be a
wrong-<lner forever by the payment of the
reco,·ery against It? Shall It ha,·e no benefit
by dl!wontlnnlnfi?' the wrong, And shall it not .
be left the option to discontinue It? Arni
shall the plaintiff be obliged to anticipate his ·
1lamages with pro11hetle ken. and foresee
them long heforP-it may be many years bf>-'.
fore-they actually occur. aml re('over th~m
all ln his first action? I think it Is quite,
:ahsurd and lllogkal to assume thnt a wrong ·
of any kind will fore'l"N' be continued, and
that the wrong-doer will not discontinue or'
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r<•uwdy It; and thnt the con\-enlent and just
role-, sauctloned by nil the authorities In this
11tate. and by tbt> great weight of authority
d"ewhere, Is to permit recoveries In sueh
C'ast•lj by sm·c('11slve actions until the wrong
or nul11nnce shall be terminated or abatNl.
But, whether that case was prollerly decld1~1
or not. it 111 not In conflict with the coneluslous I l11n·e reached In thl" ea""• but Is In
rutlre hnrmony with them. The-refore, UJlflll
hoth grounds conslliered In this cnse, tlwr•~
shouhl he a reversal of this jndgmrnt, nnd a
new trial.
All concur, exce1Jt DANFOU'l'H. .T.. who
rends dissenting opinion, and ~llLLEU, J.,
not voting.
DAXFORTH, J. (rllsf!entlng). Tlw aetlon
was comnwuced Non•mher 5, IR7R. l'pou th1•
first trial the plalntift' had a n•rllkt. which
11110n ap11<•al was set ashlc>. l'.pon the seeoncl
the jury 111,;agreed. rpon the third and ]a!<t
she again snceeeded, and the rt•sult has heen
npproved by the general term. It Is now ohjPl'led by the defemlant tlt:tt the trh1l 1·011rt
erred (1) In Its rulings on the qul'stlon of
1l11mnfi?'E'F1: (:?) in regard to evldPllC'l'; (:~) In
ltR l'11nrge to the jury,-and hence the case
should go back again tor another trial.
'l'hP pfaiutltf allP!.(Pd and prove1l that llhP
owned and occupied, In person arnl by tenants. certain Improved lots of land lying on
the nortlwrly side or Colonie .street. 11ml f'X·
tPncllng to Its center; that between tht• homw"'
on those lots and the traveled roadway w11;o n
slliewi1lk; and, by her complaint, aJJegPll th:H
the defemlant entered upon the prope1·ty, and
tore up the pavement In Colonie street In
front of the houses, raised the street higher
than It was before, and also the 11treet wl'1'1t
of 11nld premises and hetwee-n said housel! and
the west side of Broadway, and tore up nnrl
ral><rtl the sldt>walks In front of her hollR<'l',
and ralse<l aml ttllerl up thf' gutter In front
of them, and so shaped the street and gutter>1
as to pom· the water therefrom down over
saltl sidewalk and Into the basements of said
hou,;es, by reason of which the premises arc
made liable to be flooded with water. and
have been at dlft'erent times flooded with mmt
filth. and water, and the property thPt'Pin lnJurPd. nml the sald premlse-s rende1·1•ll dn11111
and unhealthy, and by wblch the rental vnlut•
of said houses was grt>atly deprPrlated; :intl
also that the shape given to the snrfnee of
snhl street by the defendant Is sueh as to
make- the approach to said housl's lneonvenlent nnd unsafe, and to Interfere with thl' use
of tlw sa111~. and depreclntl' its vnlnl'. n111l that
said strl'et Is made so steep In Its drrllne oil
the north side that wagons cannot s11fel.r or
conveniently stand In front or said premhws •
of said plnlntltr; and asked for damages sustained hy reason of thei<e acts. 'I'hc evidence
fairly teuded to est.'lblish the truth of these
nn!rnu.•ut><. an1l showed that the acts compla ln<>cl of were <1011!' hy thr tlrfpmlit nt In
wiclPning and raising its road-hrd and mak-
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PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE DA\;lAGES.

, vexed for the same cause.

ing additional tracks. In doing this they

raised the carriage-way of the street from two

to three feet, making it higher than the side-

walks. Evidence was received, against the

objection of the defendant, to show a depreci-

ation, caused by these changes, in the market

value of the houses and lots, and afterwards

witnesses were called by the defendant to

speak upon the same subject. The question

was fairly litigated. The defendant did not

claim that damages did not result from its

acts, but insisted that “the proper measure

of damages should be any injury to the rental

value prior to the commencement of the suit,

and the cost of restoring the street to its

former condition: that there is nothing in the

complaint or in the evidence which renders

material any evidence as to the market value
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of the property, either before or after the al-

leged wrongful act;" but the court held that

there was nothing in “the case to show that

the alteration in the street, and construction

of tracks, was for a temporary purpose. or a

mere trespass; but. on the contrary, appeared

to be of a permanent kind and character, and

the complaint suﬂlcient." The case was sub-

mitted to the jury, in a way not excepted to,

to say upon the evidence whether there had in

truth been a depreciation of the property aris-

ing from the acts of the defendant in and

upon the street; but, being asked by the de-

fendant's counsel to charge “that under the

evidence the jury will not be justiﬁed in ren-

dering a verdict for the supposed differencé

in market value in the premises before and

after the act in question," the judge refused

to do so, and added: “For the purpose of

presenting that question sharply, I charge

that the plaintiff can recover the difference in

the market value of the property, provided

you ﬁnd that the act of the defendant has ,

impaired the market value, and to the extent i

it has impaired it." Defendant's counsel ex-

cepted. The defendant asked the court to

charge: “If the jury believe such acts were

done without the permission of the city, and

were unlawful, then the measure of damages

would be the actual injury sustained by plain-

tiff before the commencement of this action,

including the loss of rent and the injury to the

use and enjoyment of the property before the

commencement of this action, if any." The

court declined to charge that, saying: “There

is no proof one way or the other upon that

question. Whether this was an authorized

or an unauthorized act. there is no presump-

tion in favor of the trespass." Defendant's

counsel excepted.

Upon this branch of the case the defendant

is without merit, unless it is liable to be again

It took possession

of the plaintiff's property without permission,

and is called upon to pay so much only as

will make good her loss,—no more than she

would have been entitled to had the defendant

made her an involuntary vendor under com-

pulsory proceedings, by which the same result

Pirn8B!liT AND PHOSPECTI\"E DAl1AG:ES.

ing additional tracks. In doing this they
raised the carriage-way ot the street from two
to three teet, making It higher than ihe sidewalks. Evidence was received, against the
objection of the defendant, to show a cleprecl11 tion, caused hy these changes, In the market
,·alue ot the houses and lots, and afterwards
witnesses were called by the defendant to
speak upon the same subject. The quf'stlon
wns talrly litigated. The defendant did not
('Jnim that damages did not result from Its
acts, but insisted that "the proper measure
of damages should be any Injury to the rental
value prior to the commencement ot the smt,
and the cost of restoring the street to Its
former condition; that there Is nothing In the
complaint or in the evidence which renders
material any evidence as to the market value
of the property, either before or after the alleged wrongful act;" but the court held that
there was nothing In "the case to show that
the alter3tlon In the street, and construction
of tracks, was tor a temporary purpose, or a
mere trespass; but, on the contrary, appeared
to be of a permanent kind and character, and
the complaint sufficient." The case was submitted to the jury, In a way not excepted to,
to say upon the evidence whether there bad In
truth been a depreciation ot the property arising from the acts ot the defendant In and
upon the street; but, being asked by the defendant's counsel to charge "that under the
PVidence the jury wlll not be justified In rendering a ve1·dict :for the supposed difference
In market value In the premises before and
after the act In question," the judge refused
to do so, and added: "For the purpose ot.
presenting that question sharply, I charge
that the plalntl1T can recover the dl1Terenee In
the market value ot the property, provided
you find that the act ot. the defendant has
Impaired the market value, and to the extent
It bas Impaired It." Defendant's counsel ex·
et.>pted. The defendant asked the court to
<"barge: "It the jury belleve such acts were
rlone without the permission of the city, and
were unlawful, then the measure of damages
would be the actual Injury sustained by plaJnt11T betore the commencement of this adlon,
Including the loss ot rent and the Injury to the
use and enjoyment ot the property betore the
1~ommence ment ot. this action, It any."
The
court declined to charge that, saying: "There
Is no proot one way or the other upon that
q1wstion. Whether this was an authorized
or an unauthorized act, there Is no presumption In favor ot the trespass." Defendant's
counsel excepted.
Upon this branch of the ease the defendant
Is without merit, unless It Is liable to be aga1n
. vexed for the same cause. It took possession
or the plaintiff's property without permission,
and Is called upon to pny so much only as
will make good her los s,-no mot·e than she
would have been entitled to bad the defendant
made her an Involuntary venrl01· under compnl!;ory p roc·ef'cllngs, h y wh!eh the &m1e result
would have bec-n reached. In s1wh a C':1se as-

tuteness would be misapplied, when the onlypurposc is to obtain a new trial, to be fol·
lowed, as Is conceded, by a verdl<'t tor somr
amount, and, after that, statutory proceedings to acquire title In deference to the law
(Laws 1R47, c. 272; L.'lWS 18:-.>0, c. 140, § 21.
amemled by Laws 1869, c. 237, § 1) which
provides tor a case where a railroad company
shall not have acquired a valid and sufficient
title to any land upon which they shall have
con!ltrncted their track. Under these statutes application might be made to the court
by petition, and compensation for the lan1?
determined by a Jury. It Is true, these arenot the proceedings before us, but the samething has been accomplished.
The defendants were without title. They
have constructed their tracks, and the compenSJ.tlon to be made has been determined by
a Jury. In some way, It cannot be doubted
that the plalnt11T Is entitled to damages oreompensatlon upon the scale applied by the
trial court. Of course, the defendant shoultl
not be Hable to enlarged compensation, nor t<>
a double payment. Here there Is no unuswt
compensation. It Is measured by the amount
for which the property would be depreciated
In mnrket value by the change of roadway t&
aceommodate the new tracks and structure
which the del'.endant placed upon the street.
This represents merely the plaintiff's actual
loss and damage, and Its payment should pr<>tect the defendant from further action. I
think It will. Where the wrong consists of
a single act of destruction, the cause ot action Is complete, and the party Injured must
have tull compensation in the 11.rst suit, ·not
only tor the act, but for all the consequences
which could arise from It. Clegg v. Dearden,
12 Q. B. 57tt
The statutes referred to, allowing the assesRment ot compensation where the railroad company bas without right placed Its tracks upon
the land of another, In terms apply to any
such case, and go upon the assumption that
the appropriation of the use ot the land, and
the structure placed upon It, are permanent;
and such Is Its nature. It Is tor the purposes
of Its Incorporation; public policy requires
that It should remain, and although In the
first Instance without right, yet, ntter compensation has been determined and paid, the company become possessed of such land during
the continuance of the corporation. Laws
1847, c. 404, § 3.
This principle was applied In the Henderson
Case, 78 N. Y. 423, where, In behalt ot the
defendant, it was argued. as It Is here, that
the defendant's acts amounted simply to a
series ot tresp:1sses which might be the subject ot fresh actions,-a new one every day .
The defense did not prevail, and unless a
distinction favorable to the defendant can bedrawn from the tact that this Is an action at
law, and that a suit in equit v, it ls deeiRIY<'
here. In that cnse full compensation was
awardecl upon conditions whl.!h, when complied with, protected the defendant in the en-
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joyment of the property trespassed upon. In

this case the same result follows. The com-

plaint charges, as the result of the defend-

ant's acts, depreciation of the value of the

property,—in substance, diminution of its mar-

ket value. That suggested the proper inquiry,

and would be the proper measure of compen-

sation in any proceeding to acquire title or

ﬁx compensation for an unwilling vendor.

The evidence was directed to that end. The

charge of the judge gave that question to the

jury as the only one which, when answered,

was to determine the amount of damages.

The complaint shows, indeed, as consequent

upon defenuant's act, not only that water has

been directed into the basements of the houses,

but that they are thereby “made liable to be

ﬂooded"; and as consequent upon that and

other effects, depreciated in value. That was

the subject of the action. The other things
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were simply its ingredients, not independent

or of themselves causes of action, but mere

effects of the act complained of, resulting in

diminution of value to the property, for which

alone damages were demanded and given.

The record shows these things, and that the

adjudication covered all damages prospective

as well as past that might be sustained by the

plaintiff by reason of the act of the defend-

ant.

The appellant cites various cases in support

of a contrary view; but I think them in-

applicable. So far as those from the courts

of this state are concerned, they relate to

acts which obviously were or might be of a

temporary and not permanent character.

The Mahon Case, 24 N. Y. 658, was of the

former class. It was considered in the Hen-

derson Case, supra, and thought to be no ob-

stacle in the way of allowing complete and

ﬁnal damages where the act causing injury

was necessarily permanent. In other states

the courts differ. The appellant cites the

Carl Case, 46 Wis. 625, 1 N. W. 295; but

on the other hand are Town of Troy v.

Cheshire R. Co., 23 N. H. 83, quoted in the

Henderson Case, supra, 435; Powers v. City

of Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa, 652; Railroad v.

irabiil. 50 Ill. 241. Still others are cited by

the respondent. It cannot be necessary to

refer to them.

The concession of the appellant is, in sub-

stance, that the correct measure of damages

was adopted, provided the defendant is se-

cure against further interference by the plain-

tiff. as it was in Henderson's Case, supra.

The struggle, then. is over the form of the

action. There is little in it. The defendant

has. and will have during its corporate life,

the enjoyment of the premises. and the plain-

tiff will have been paid for its surrender.

Nothing more could have been secured by

either, whether by statutory proceedings or

by suit in equity.

The next question arises on the new matter

set up by the defendant as a defense, viz.,

that one Sarah Wallace, the plaintit'f's moth-

er, was in possession of the premises, claim-

ing to be owner at the time of the act com-
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joyment of the property trespassed upon. In
this case the earn!' result follows. The complaint charges, al! the result of the defend·
ant's acts, depreciation of the value of the
property,-ln substanee, diminution of its market value. That suggested the proper Inquiry,
and would be the proper measure of compensation In any proceeding to acquire title or
fix compensation for an unwllllng vendor.
The evidence was dlreeted to that end. The
charge of the judge gave that question to the
jury as the only one which, when answered,
was to determine the amount of damages.
The complaint shows, Indeed, as consequent
upon defenuant's act, not only that water hai1
been directed Into the basements of the bow~es,
but that they are thereby "made liable to be
tlooded"; and as consequent upon that and
other etrects, depreciated In value. That was
the subject of the action. The otbet" things
were simply Its Ingredients, not Independent
or of themselves causes of action, hut mere
effects of the act complained of, resulting In
diminution of value to the property, tor which
alone damages were deman1.1ed and given.
The record shows these things, and that the
adjudlcatlon covered all damages prospective
as well as past that might be sustained by thr.
plalntltr by reason of the act of the deft•mlant.
The appellant cites various cases In su11port
of a contrary view; but I think them Inapplicable. So far as those from the courts
of this state are concerned, they relate to
acts which obviously were or might be of a
temporary and not permanent charad1•r.
Tlie Mahon Case, 24 N. Y. 658, was of the
former class. It was considered In the HPnderson Case, supra, and thought to be no obstacle In the way of allowing complete and
final dam.sates where the act causing Injury
waa necessarily permanent. In other statt-s
the courts differ. The appellant cites the
Carl Case, 46 Wis. 625, 1 N. W. 295; but
on the other hand are Town of Troy v.
Cheshire R. Co., 23 N. H. 83, quoted In the
Henderson Case, supra. 435; Powers v. City
of Council Bluft's, 45 Iowa, 652; Railroad v.
Grabm, 50 Ill. 241. Still others are cited by
ihe respondent. It cannot be necessary to
refer to them.
The conc1>ssion of the appellant le, In substance, that the correct measure of damages
was adoflted, provided the defendant Is secure against further Interference by the plalntltr, as It was In Henderson's Case, supra.
The struggle, then, Is over the form of the
action. There Is little In It. The defendant
has, and will have during Its corporate lite,
the enjoyment of the premises, and the plaintltl' will have been paid for Its surrender.
Nothing more could have been secured by
either, whether by statutory proceetllnge or
by suit In equity.
The next question arises on the new matter
aet up by the defendant as a defense, viz.,
that one Sarah Wallace, the plalntUT's mother, was In possession of the prPmlses, dnlm-
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ln11: to be owner at the time of the act complained of, and that she agreed with the defendn ut to receive $500, In full settlement
thert>for, and for a ateneral release. and that
this sum was In fact paid to her on the
thirtieth of September, 1875, In the present'\'
of one De Pfuhl; and alleged that, In exet>ntlng it, Mrs. Wallace acted In behalf and
by the authority of the plalntllT. These
things were controverted. The name of Mrit
Wallace was alleged to be a forgery, and
that no money was received by her, and
whether It was or not was made the lmDOl'tant question upon the trial. Among other
things, the defendant gave In evidence a
check made by It on the Chemical Bank for
$500 payable "to the order of Sarah Wallace." This purported to be lndorsed "S.
Wallace," then by De Pfuhl as second Indorser, and after him by Wendell, cashier, to
the Fourth National Bank of New York, or
order. There was no direct evidence either
that Mrs. Wallace signed the receipt, or lndorsed or received the check. De Pfuhl was
a lawyer by profession, and, at the times In
question, In the employ of the defendant,
"In the law, real-estate, and claim department" Bis tPRtimony was taken In 1880.
but his recollPt>tlon of the events was sll::::ht
and Imperfect. He 11aid he had many lntPrvlews with l\lrs. Wallace on the subject of
settlement, hut could recall nothing said "by
her, by 1llm111>lf, or any one else." He hurl
no recollection of seeing l\lrs. Wallace sign
the receipt. but had no doubt the slgnaturE>
to It of bis name as witness was genuhll'.
adding: "I have no recollection of seeing
Sarah Wallace sign that paper, but I have no
doubt that she did, from the fact or my witnessing her signature. The body of the paper Is In my own handwriting. I cannot
remember anything about the drawing or
execution of this paper." Being shown the
check, he said: "I believe the name 'Fran<'ls
De Pfuhl,' on the back of this check, Is In
my handwriting. I have no doubt that Mrs.
Sarah Wallace wrote the name 'S. Wallace'
on the back of this check. I have no recol·
lectlon about this t>heck bl'lng t>nshf'd at any
bank In the dty or Alban~-. I do not know
who had the monpy on said check. I have
no recollection of anything turtbPr In regard
to said check."
Witnesses tor plalntUr, qualified to speak.
discredited the genuineness of the signature
purportlnat to be that 'ot M:rs. Wallace. The
plalntltr testified that she went with her
mother a number of times to the defendant's
omce about the damage, and always when
her mother went she, "so far as sbe knew,"
was with her; shows an olTer of $500. and
Its rejectloh, and other circumstances Indicating efl'.orts to compromise, but failure to do
so; and that she first' beard It claimed that
any money had been paid when It was 1wt
up by the dPtendanfl'! nnf-lwer. In 1875 lwr
mother was r..5 years ohl. and they lived together during her life. She k1•11t bank-nc-
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counts then and for some years before, at

the F. & M. Bank, and at the Albany Sav-

ings Bank. Her bank-books were produced

by the witness. These were all her mother

had. It was her habit to deposit all her

rents and other money to these accounts, so

far as witness knew. She kept but a triﬂing

sum of money by her at any time, and had

no expenses except those known to witness,

nor debts, nor any busmess transaction call-

ing for $500, or any such sum. Witness

knew all her business transactions, and to

her knowledge she did not have any such

sum of money as $500 in 1875, or at any

subsequent period; nor at the time of her

death, in 1877, did she have any money what-

ever in the house. The bank-accounts ran,

in one case from 1870, and in the other from

1869, both to 187'], and the accuracy of the
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pass-books was proven by ofﬁcers of the dif-

ferent banks. The pass-books were then of-

fered in evidence, against the objection of

the defendant. The exception then taken

raises the second point made by the appel-

lant. In its support the learned counsel cites

the case of Carroll v. Deimel, 95 N. Y. 252.

There the matter of “no deposit" in the bank

was brought out as an independent and isolat-

ed fact. As such it had no legal tendency to

prove the issue. Here it takes its place in

the affairs of Mrs. Wallace, and, combined

with other circumstances in evidence, was

proper for the consideration of the jury. Of

itself it proved nothing; but when her con-

duct in the disposition of money was shown;

when it appeared that her habit was uni-

form in regard to it; that she incurred no

debts; kept little money about her, but uni-

formly placed such as she received in one of

two banks,—it would permit an inference that

so large a sum as $500 would have gone in

that direction had she received it: and if not

found there, that fact might, with other cir-

cumstances, bear upon the question of its

receipt. True. she might have received and

lost it, or otherwise disposed of it. That

was also to be weighed by the jury. It was

part of the defense that, with knowledge of

the plaintlf f and in her behalf, the claim for

damages had been settled and paid for to

Mrs. Wallace. . How was this to be disprov-

ed? The plaintiff had not received the mon-

ey. Sarah Wallace was dead. Might not

the tenor of her conduct be shown? Would

not the fact that, after the time of the al-

icged payment, she was or was not possessed

of a sum of money of that or about that

amount, otherwise unaccounted for, be rcle-

vant? It seems to be so. A state of things.

then, which gives an opportunity to show it

in her possession at that time, or to show

that it was not in her possession, may be

proved: and. as her habit of business was to

deposit money received in one or the other

hank, information as to that fact must also

be relevant. The defendant says the money

was paid. The evidence tends to show that.

if paid, it would have been deposited. That
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c·u1mts then and tor some years before, at
the F. & M. Bank, and at the Albany Saviugs Bank. Her bnnk-books were produced
by the witut•s11. These were all her mother
had. It was her habit to depolflt all her
1·tmts u1u.l other wouey to these accounts, so
far as witness knew. She kept but a trlfllug
sum of money liy her at any time, and hud
no expenses except those known to witnesH,
nor del>ts, nor any business transaction calllug for $500, or any such sum. 'Witness
knew all her business truusactlons, and to
her knowledge she did not have any such
sum of money as $500 In 18i5, or at any
subsequent verlod; nor at the time of her
death, in 1877, did she have any money whate,·er In the house. The bank-accounts rau,
In one case from 1870, and In the otller from
1869, both to 1877, and the accuracy of the
pnss-books was proven by omcers of the different banks. The pass-books were then offC'red In e'l"ldeuce, against the objection of
the dt>femlant. The exce11tlon then taken
rnlse!r the second point made by the appellimt. In Its support the learned counsel <'Iles
tile case of Carroll v. Delmel, 95 N. Y. 252.
There the matter of "no deposit" In the bank
was brought out as an independent and Isolated fact. As such It had no legal tendency to
prove the issue. Here it takes lts place in
the affairs of Mrs. Wallace, and, combined
with othe1· circumstances in evidence, was
proper for the consideration of the jury. Of
Itself It proved nothing; but when her conduct in the disposition of money was shown;
wht>n It avpeared that her habit was uniform In regard to It; that sbe Incurred no
debts; kept little mont>)' about her, but uniformly placed such as she received In one of
two banks,-lt would permit an Inference that
so large a sum as $500 would ha'l"e gone In
that direction had she received It; and If not
found there, that fact might, with other cir·
cumstances, bear upon the Question of Its
receipt. True. she might have rel'dYed ancl
lost It, or otberwlst> disposed of It. That
was also to be weighed by the jury. It was
part of the defense that, with kuowledgr of
the plalntuf and In her behalf, the elnlm for
damages bad been sett!Pd lllld paid for to
Mrs. Wallace.. How was this to be clisproved? The plalntlft' had not received the money. Sarah Wallace was dead. l\Ilght not
the tenor of her conduct be shown? Would
not the fact that, after the time of the all<•ged pa~·ment, she was or was not possessed
of a sum of money of that or about that
amount, otherwise tmaccotmtecl for, bt> relevant? It seems to be so. A state of things.
then, which gi'l"eS an opportunity to show It
In ht>r possession at that time, or to show
that It wn11 not In her possession, may be
proved: nncl. as her habit of busluess wns to
dt•poslt money r!'celved In one or the other
hank. lnforrnntion as to thnt fact must also
be relevant. The defendant says the ruonPy
was pnld. 'l'he e'l"ldenee tends to show that.
If paid, It would have been deposited. That

It was not deposited, therefore, Is inconsistent with Its re!'elpt, and le pertinent evldenee
that It wa1:1 not 11ald. The conduct of Mrs.
"'111111(-e at that time may speak, although
she ls unable to. What she did or what she
did not do, and even her orulsslon to mention
the receipt of money to her daughter, the
l)JnlntllT, for whom the defendant assumes
she acted, and to whom, therefore, 1t would
have been natural, If not her duty, to men·
tlon It if wade, also bas a bearing upon the
question whether payment was In fact made.
Notwithstanding the evidence of De Pfuhl
as to the signature to the release, and the
lndorsement of the draft In the name of Mrs.
Wallace, It was conceded by the defern11lnt
that neither slgnnture wus made hy her. The
claim upon this trial was that it was made
by l\Irs. 'Cline, the plalntllT. and thP court
charged the jury to Inquire whether }lrs.
Ullne did write those names, and whether
"the $500 was paid to either, or paid as they,
or either of them, dil'ected the money to be
paid. If Mrs. Ullne," he said, "slg11e1l the
name of Mrs. Wallace to those papers, uud
the $r>OO has been paid, then she cannot recover. If, ou the other . hand, she did not
sign the papers, or If she did sign them, and
the $500 has not been paid either to her .or
to her mother, or to such persons a.a she or
either of them dlrel.'ted It to be paid, tbm
she can recover, and should recover such
dumnges as you find the property bas been
Injured by the act of the detend11nt." And
later on, after presenting the eYldence In n
manner satisfactory to both parties, the
learned judge said: "If you find that Mrs.
Ullne did sign the receipt, and did indorse
the check In her mother's name, nnd, further,
that either she or her mother received tbe
money, or 1t was paid to some person to
whom they directed It to be paid, then your
verdict must be for the defendant."
There was no exception to the charge lo
any respect, but at Its close the counsel for
the defendant asked the court to charge "that
If Francis De Pfuhl received the money o.n
the check under Mrs. Wallace's lndorsement,
and nt her request, In so doing he acted as
her agent, and the payment to him was a
11nyment to Mrs. Wallace." And the court
replied: "If she made him her agent for the
purpose of rt>f'eivlng the money for her, just
ns you reqtwsted, then the loss would be
hers, and uot the loss of the comIJany. If,
however, De Pfuhl, acting In behalf, or professedly actln11: In behair, of the l.'ompany,
proposed to her, If she would sign her name
to the p11pers, he woq.ld go nncl get the money
for the purpose of completing the arrangement with ber, and would return her the
money, then I think that the loss will be the
loss of the company, and not the loss of
Mrs. Ullne or Mrs. Wallace."
It was not suggested by the defendant that
the evhlenee would not warrant a finding In
Plther nlt<>rnntlve. The charge reque11t<>d
was glYen. T11rre was no refusal. It was

PHESE~T A~D

PRESENT AND PR0SI‘ECT[VE DAMAGES.

109

not error to state to the jury the law upon

the other state of facts. The request “that

if De Pfuhl's indorsement on the draft raises

any presumption that he received the money

on it, the legal inference is that he so re-

ceived it for and on account of Mre. Wal-

lace, the payee, and that the money so re-

ceived by him was a paymcm to Mrs. “'al-

lace, if her indorsement was gemiinc," was

not unlike the one referred to. and was well

disposed of. The court had already charged

upon the question as affected by the indorse-

ment, and could not, in view of the conces-

sion and course of trial. be required to sub-

mit any proposition to the jury which as-

sumed that the signature purporting to be

that of Mrs. Wallace was genuine. But if

the request be treated as implying also that

the signature was by her authority. then the
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court properly answered it. Amplifying

what in substance had been twice stated. he

declined to pass directly upon that question.

saying: “I think it depends upon how the

jury tind upon that fact. If Mrs. l‘line or

Mrs. Wallace wished this man to obtain the

money upon this check for them, and desired

him to go to the bank for their beneﬁt

and draw the money. then, if he used the

money and mlsapplied it, it would not be the

loss of the company. If. however, lie Pfuhi,

professing to act for his employer, the de-

fendant. proposed to her that he would ob-

tain the money for her in order that the

transaction might be completed, and she, un-

der those circumstances, put her name upon

the paper, and sent him to the bank, then

she would not be chargeable with the loss of

the money if De Pfuhl did not pay it ovcrz"

adding: “As both of these theories are con-

sistent with the appearance of the paper, I

cannot say as matter of law that either one

is the presumptive one upon the more face

of the papers." There was no error in this.

Nor was it claimed that the learned trial

judge either misstated the evidence, or the

ﬁndings which it would support. The court

cannot be contined to a single abstract propo-

sition, but might. and it was its duty to.

submit to the jury in its discretion such topics
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not error to state to the jury the luw UPoll
the other state of facts. The request "thnt
if De Pfnhl's lndorsement on the draft raises
any presumption that be rec-el\"e1l the money
on It, the legal Inference Ill that he so re£'t'i\"C<l It for nnd on account of '.\Irs. 'Vnllace, the payee, and thnt thP mont>y so r1•ceived by him wus ll 11:1)·uu•ut to '.\h·s. "'nllace, if her hulor11eweut wn,,; gp1111i111., .. w:1s
not unlike the one referred to. anti wns w ..u
1llsposed of. The court h111l alrt>:HJ~· <'11:1r~t>1l
upon the l)Uestlon a.s alTt><'tetl by the lndorst>ment, ant.I could not, In view of the L'Olll't'l!slon and <·onr!'e or trlnl. h1.• r1•11uin·1I to 1<11hmlt any proposition to thr jury whll')1 assmned that the i;ignnturP 1mrportiug to l>e
that of Mrs. "'nllnl'e wns g1•nulne. Hut If
the r1.·q11i>st \IP trl•ntt•d as hnplylng also thnt
th<> sl1mat11re was by her anthority, tlwn till'
courr pruJJt•rly nnswert>tl It. Ampllfylug
what In !'IUlJstnnf'e had ht•Pn twh·e !'lt11tP1l. h1•
dt>l·lhw<l to pnss dire<'ll~- upon that question.
saying: ""I think 1t de1wnt111 upon how the
jury tlncl upon that fad. If Mrs. T'lhw or
llr11. "'alhiee wl,.hed this man to ohtnin the
uwue~· npon this l'heek for them. and desired
him ro go to the hank for their h1•111•flt
am! draw the money, then, If he 11!'1<'<1 the
mom·~· and ruls:ipplif'fl It, It would not he the
lo!<!l or the eom1111ny. If. howev<'r, J)(> Pfuhl,
profes!llng to ac·t for hi!! em11loyer, the defrnclnut. propo,.ed to hrr that hi' wonhl obtain the money for hl•r In 01·dp1· that the
rr:111sactlon might be rompleted. nnd she. und1•r those clrcumstnuc<'!l, put be1· naml• ui>on
the JJapt>r, and sC>nt him to tht> hank. tht>n
she would not be chargeable with the Ios!l or
the money It De Pfuhl did not puy It on•r:·•
adding: "As both or these tlworiPS are <"ollslsteot with the app<'aranee of the paper. I
cannot say as mattPr of lnw that l•lrher otw
Is the pre1rnmptlve one upon t1w nwre r111·e
of the papers." Therr wn11 no error lu thl11.
Nor was It claimed that th!' learnf'fl trial
judge either misstated the e\"hlC'11ce, or tlw
findings which It woul1I 11upport. The court
111nnot be conthwd to a slugle abstraet propo11ltlon, but might. and It wn" its dut~· to.
submit to tht' jury In Us dlsc1·etioo such to1>11·s
as either bore upon or were In that conuectlon worthy or their attention.
The other ex<·t'ptlons have been examined.
They Point to no error. The lssnes w1•re
carefully trlt>d, and we think thP j111lg1111•11t
rendered upon the verdict shoulrl stand. It
hi therefore affirmed.

as either bore upon or were in that connec-

tion worthy of their attention.

The other exceptions have been examined.

They point to no error. The issues were

carefully tried. and we think the judgment

rendered upon the verdict should stand. It

is therefore atiirmed.

NOTE. In Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W.

Va. 787, the court, after disposing of other

matters, said:

It is also assigned as error that the court per-

mitted the witness Butterﬁeld to give his opin-

ion as to the amount of damage the plaintiffr

i

had suffered by the acts of the defendant; and

Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464. is cited. it is there

held, that the opinion of a witness as to the dam-

age a ditch would cause to the lands of a party

is not proper evidence. Elliot, J .. delivering the

:SOTE. In Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 20 W.
Va. 787, the court, after disposing of other

matter&, B&id:

It is also assigned as error that the court permitted the witness Butterfield to give hi11 opinion aa to the amount of damage the 11laintiffH
bad suffered by the acts of the defendant; and
Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464, is cited. It is there
held, that the opinion of a witness as to the damage a ditch would ca use to the lauds of a party
iii not proper evidence. Elliot, .T.. delivering the
opinion of the court, says: "Opinions of witIH'l!Jlt'!! a11 to the amount or benc•fit or 1.hlnmite
1111sta ined hy a party an> not comP<'tent." lie
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cites a liue of Indiuun decisions to sustain him.
and further Mys: "It mny well be held, that
these cases declare the general rule correctl~-.
since to hold otherwise wouhl he to 1mt the wit·
nesses in the place or the juror>', and commit to
them the amount or the reeovl'r~·. A contrary dot·triue would also \'iolate thl' rniP. that wit111'Nsc>'
cuunot expre1ui an opinion upon the prech;c point.
whieh the i,..i;111•i; present for tht• decision of th•·
jury." But till' lt•ariwd court did hold in that
t'll1'l'. that "thl' npinion of 0111• ncquainted with
the J>ropt•rty ai< to iti< ,·nine with nod without th<'
ditch is prot>t>r e\·it11•nc1!." :\'ow, it "ePm" t.o
1111•. that it j,. u \'Pry ni1·1• 11i,.tinetion. If th•·
witm•"s fr><tifies, thnt tlw proprrty is worth
$1,000 without the dit<'h 111111 $~IHI with th1·
ditch, bus be not itiv1•11 hiR 011i11ion. that th•·
land WUH d1u11Hged j111:1t $200': \Yhy mu~· th1•
rnquiry n•Jt at once he made: "How much i"
thf.'.11\Dd injured by the diti•h r Ir he llnSWl'rl'
$::.'OI), then can not nil his reason11 for hi,.
opinion be elieite..I on erosi;-examinutiou '! In
Suow v. Ruilrond. O.'i Mc. 2:10. It i!I lwid, that
when the value or real l'Atatt' takrn for a rail·
road, or the umount or danrnge e11111<1••l by stll'h
taking is in que1<tion, 1wrsons 11cq1111interl with
it 11111~· 11t11 le tlwir opinions as to its ,·nine, 01·
ne to th<> umount or dnmage done. ir nll is not
tnkl'n. In Vandine v. Burpee, 13 Mete. (~Ins,..)
:!AA. a rasl' mu<'h likr tlus, it a)lpe11re1l, that
011 the trial of 1111 R<'tion to reco\"er d1111mg1•1<
for injury dom' to thP plaiotifl"H gardrn 111111
nnr11ery by the smoke, heat and ga11 prot"1•edi11g
from the defc111lant'11 hri1•k kiln. arter two 1rn r·
deners. who had much l'Xperience lo r11isi11i:
and t·ultivntiug fruit tr"''"· shrubs 1111d plants.
bad te1<tilie1I to the p11rti1•11lars of the pluintiff""
injury. thPy Wl're nsk<>tl by the plaintiff. "'\'but
was the amount of d11111ngr" <'llllSPtl L.1· tlw in·
jury, to which they hat! 'lwfore tP'4titietl: 11n1l
it WllS helil that tht•KI' witnCKHl'K might gin·
thPir opiniou a11 to thl' 11mou11t of llll<'h !111111·
ft.ICI'. Dewey, J., suid: "It sPem1< to UK thut it
would be imtmll'ticnhle to di1<tH•11sc with thi"
BP<'cies of te1<timo11y in many action" of tron·1·
for personal propt•rt~·. whPre no 1ll'tail of ful't11
could adequutl'ly iuform the jury of the value
of the urticlr><. Thi' opinion of a witness as
to the value of a horse is llltll'h more sati11tactory evidenPe thun 11 detuilecl 1<tt1t1•ment of bis
11izl', Polor. age. &c.• to gin• thP jury the req·
uisitl' inform:itiun to l'Uahle them to 1111!less
damugCI! for the COnVPl'Mion or l!lll'h II horae."
In Hnilroad Co. "· Foremun. 24 \V. Vu. 662,
it wa11 held, thu t Hllt'h ('\'itletlt'C WllK admiRKlhlP. The court in thnt t'l\Rt' 1<11id. hy Hreen, .J.:
"ThPr<' is no ohjPl'ti1111 to tnkiug thP opinion
of witnesses Ill< to l'ith1•r the amo1111t of dnm·
agt>>1 or 111< to tlw a11J111111t of th" b1•11Plit. It iA
thP usual pra<"tit·P in thi" ><tat<' nm! \'ir1o:i11ia."
He <'iteR n ·nmnh<'I' of )lt'rtinrnt nnthoritiPli to
111111tai11 the position.
Hut thP court •lid l'rr in [ll'rmilting the witDl'llll lll(lliUi;t tllt' ohjPl tiou of I ht• tlt!fl'tlllnnfs
1•ou11sl'I to nmm·l'r tlw following question:
"~tatr it you can what will be the probahle
d:imnl(c that will occur in the future from
wbnt hail already been done to the nm in the
wny or di1o:gi111(, or ehanging it11 1•011r"'' ?" 'l'h<'
witm•><s nmnn•red, dl'feudant rxceptiDI( to question und answer: "-\Yell it is 1n·1•tty hurd for
me to nm1wer the q11e11tion as to the amount or
damal(e, but I think it will he <'On11iderahle,
providl'll the water c·ourse is ll'ft in thP i;nme
conditi11.n it is, hecnuRe it is waHhing out nnturnlly ~.Jo:ht against the bank; and if it hnd
been left full Op level to tht' rond where tht>
water us<'ll to go, of eounoe the bunk would
have held up. Thi11 has took halt the lot
nway; but the prospect is there will he a
l(rent deal of Hlips there W'ith the run." Why
thi!l evidence 'Was offered I do uot understand.
The counsel for the defendant in error in his
hr\1•r aays: "The plaintiffs were unquestionably l'ntitled to recover in this ndion the dam·
&Jtl'8 which were likt•ly to occur in 'the future
as W<'ll as tho~e which had ulrPndy occurred
0

110

110

in the past." He cites no authority, neither

does he gresent any argument. It seems to me

that hot reason and authority are agamst his

position.

In Smith v. Railroad, 23 W. Va. 453. Green,

J'.. said: “Where the damage is of n perma-

nent character, and affects the value of the es-

tate, a recovery may be had at law of the en-

tire damages in one action; but where the ex-

tent of the wrong may be apportioned from

time to time, separate actions should be

brought to recover the damages sustained. He

cites Troy v. Railroad Co., 23 N. H. 101;

Turnpike Co. v. Stevens. 13 N. H. 28: Parks

v. City of Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Blunt v. Mc-

Cormick, 3 Denio, 283; Thayer v. Brooks. 17

Ohio, 489; Anon., 4 Dall. 147; Tucker v. New-

man, 11 Adol. & E. 40. ,

In Thayer v. Brooks. supra, the action was

case for nuisance in diverting the water from
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the mill of the defendant in error, and the

court held that the rule of damages in an ac-

tion for nuisance is the injury actually sustain-

ed at the commencement of the suit.

In Blunt v. McCormick, supra. the court

said: “The rule of damages laid down by the

court was erroneous. In this action the plain-

tiff could only recover for injuries actually sus-

tained before suit was brought, and not for

supposed prospective damages. Supposing the

lease to contain a covenant not to obstruct the

light, and the action to have been brought on

such covenant, the_ rule of damages would be

otherwise, for the covenant being a smgle

cause of action, one recovery on it would be an

absolute bar to any future action. But a _re-

covery in an action on the case, for obstructmg

the light prior to the time when the action

was commenced would not bar a future suit

for the continuance of the same injury."

In Turnpike Co. v. Stevens, supra, it was

held. that where an action on the case was

brought to recover damages for laying out a

highway around a turnpike gate, so as to di-

vert the travel from the turnpike, and dam-

ages were recovered for the loss of toll occa-

PR lCb‘I‘l.\' 'l‘ A N 1) 1' ROS l'It‘C'l'l \'E DAMAG ES.
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sioned by the opening of the higlm-ay to the

date of- the plaintiffs suit. subsequent suits

might be maintained for further damage ac-

cruing from time to time, as long as the high-

way was kept open. A recovery had been had

before for dividing the tolls, and it was insist-

ed that no action could be maintained for con-

tinuance of the road after recovery had been

once had for the opening of the way. But Up-

ham, J., for the court, said: “This is erroneous.

The cause of action remains so long as the

cause of the injury is upheld by the defendant.

It has been in the defendant's power at any

time to discontinue the grievance complained

of, and so long as this power remains it would

be unjust to visit him with damages except

during the actual time the damage has been

sustained. The injury is not necessarily per-

manent in its character, and recovery therefor

can only be had for the past, as it may cease

in the post." He cites no authority, neitht>r
does he presl'nt any argument. It seems to me
that both reaiion and nuthority are against his
position.
In Smith v. Railroad, 28 W. Ve. 453, Green,
J., said : "Where the damage ls of a permanent character, and affects the value of the estate, a recovery may be had at law of the entire damages in one action; but where the extent of the wrong may be apportioned from
time to time, separate actions should be
brought to recover the damages sustained. He
cites Troy v. Railroad Co., 23 N. H. 101;
Turnpike Co. v. Stevens. 13 N. H. 28; Pnrks
'"· City of Roston, 15 Pick. 198; Blunt v. M<'Cormick, 3 Denio, 283; '.rhayer v. Brooks. 17
1 lhio, 489; Anon., 4 Dall. 147; Tucker v. Newman, 11 Ado!. & E. 40.
In Thayer v. Brooks, supra, the action was
l'ase for nuisance in diverting the water from
the mill of the defendant in error, and the
court heltl thut the rule of damages in an nc·
tion for nuisance is the injury actually sustained at the l'Ommencement of the suit.
In Blunt v. McCormick, supra. the court
said: "'l11e rule of damages laid down by the
court wns erroneous. In this action the plain·
tiff could only recover for injuries actually sustained before suit was brought, and not for
supposed pro11pective damages. Supposing the
lease to contain n covenant not to obstruct the
light, ond the a<'tion to have been brought on
such covenunt, the rule of damages would be
otherwise, for the" covenant being a single
cause of action, one recovery on it would be an
absolute bar to any future action. But a recover1 in nn action on the case, for obstructing
the hght prior to the time when the action
was commenced would not bar a future suit
for the contiunance of the same injury."
In Turnpike Co. v. Stevens, supra, it woe
held. that where an action on the case was
hronght to recover damages for laying out a
highway around a turnpike gate, so 11.s to dl\•ert the travel from the turnpike. and dam·
nges were recovered for the loss of toll occa-

sioned by the Ol?ening of the highway to thtdnte of. the plamtitrs suit. 1mh11N1uent snits
might be mamtained for further uamage accruing from time to time, a8 long a8 the high"
way wae kept open. A recovery had been had
before tor dividing the tolls, and it was insisted that no action could be maintained for oontinnance of the road after recovery had been
once had for the opening of the way. But Up.
ham, J., for the court, said: "This is erroneoue.
The cause of action remaine 110 long ae the
cause of the injury is upheld by the defendant.
It has been in the defendant's power at an1
time to discontinue the grievance complained
of, and 110 long ae thie power remains it would
be unjust to visit him with damagee except
during the actual time the damage bas been
sustained. The injury is not necessarily per·
manent in its character, nnd recovery therefor
can only be had for the past, as it may cease
at any moment. The injury is of the same
character as that arising from a nuisance, and
is subject to the same rule of law."
It seems to me that in all those caees, where
the cauee of the Injury is in its nature permanent, and a recovery for such injury would
confer a license on the defendant to continue
the cauee, the entire damage may be recovered
in a eingle action; but, where the cause of the
injury ie in the nature of a nuisance and not
permanent in its character, but of such a
character that it may be supposed. that the
defendant would remove it, rather than suffer
at once the entire damage, which it might inflict, if permanent, thep the entire damage
can not be recovered in a single action; but actions may be maintained from time to time,
ne long aa the cauee of the injury continues.
Here the cause may be removed, and it is suppoeed will be by the defendant, rather than
submit to having the entire damages recovered
against him, for a permanent injury, or to suffer repeated recoveries ae long as the cause
of the injury continues. The court erred in
admitting this evidence, and for thh1 reawm
the judgment will have to be reversed.
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STODGHILL v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.

(5 N. W. 495, 53 Iowa, 341.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. April 20, 1880.

Appeal from circuit court. Wapeiio county.

Christopher Stodghill was the owner of a

farm of some 480 acres in Wapelio county.

Part of said farm consisted of a tract of 29

acres of creek or pasture land. The defend-

ant's right of way for its railroad was located

along the north line of said tract. The nat-

ural channel of North Avery creek ran across

the right of way upon said tract. meandered

through it, and recrossed the north line of

the land and the right of way. When the

railroad was constructed, bridges were built

across the creek which spanned the channel

and did not obstruct the passage of the water

in the stream, nor divert it from where it

was wont to ﬂow. In 1874 the defendants
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cut a channel on the north side of their right

of way and ﬁlled in the bridge where the

stream entered plaintiff's land with earth,

which diverted the stream into the new chan-

nel entlrely, “except as the water backed

through a culvert at a point where the water

recrosses the right of way; the said bridge

at the last named point having been previ-

ously removed, a culvert there constructed,

and the stream ﬁlled in at this point, except

the culvert aforesaid."

Christopher Stodghili commenced an action

against the defendant for damages to his land

by reason of the diversion of the stream.

He recovered a verdict and judgment for one

dollar and costs. The cause was aﬂirmed

upon appeal to this court. See Stodghill v.

Railroad Co., 43 Iowa, 26. Said Stodghili

died in the year 1876, and by his last will

and testament, which was duly admitted to

probate, he devised the said 29 acres, with

other of his lands, to the plaintitlf. This ac-

tion was commenced in February, 1877, to re-

cover damages for continuing to divert the

water from the natural channel of said creek,

and for a judgment, directing the abatement

and removal of the embankments in the origi-

nal channel. There was a trial by the court,

without the intervention of a jury, and a

judgment was rendered for plaintiff for one

dollar actual damages, and $75 exemplary

STODGIDLL ,., CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.
(5 N. W. 496, 53 Iowa, :Hl.)
Supreme Court ot lown. April :..>O, 1880.
Appeal from circuit court. Wn1wllo county.
Christopher Stodghill was the owoe~ of a
farm of some 480 acres ln Wapello county.
Part of said farm consisted of a trnct of 29
acres of creek or pasture land. '£he defendant's right of way for Its railroad was located
along the north line of said tract. The natural channel of North Avery creek mo across
the right of way upon Bald tract, meandered
through It, and recrossed the north line of
the land and the right of way. When the
railroad was constructed, bridges were built
across the creek which spanned the channel
and did not obstruct the passaite of the water
lo the stream, nor divert lt from where It
was wont to ftow. In 187-i the defendants
cut a channel on the north side of their right
of way and filled In the bridge where the
stream entered plaintiff's land with earth,
which diverted the stream Into the new channel entirely, "except as the water hacked
through a culvert at a point where the water
recrosses the right of way; the aald bridge
at the last named point having been previously removed, a culvert there constructed,
and the Btream lilied In at this point, except
the culvert aforesaid."
Christopher Stodghill commenced an action
against the defendant for damages to his land
by reason of the diversion of the stream.
Be recovered a verdict and judgment tor one
dollar and costs. The cause was amrmed
upon appeal to this court. See Stodghill v.
Railroad Co., 43 Iowa, 26. Said Stodghill
died ln the year 1876, and by his last wlll
nnd testament, which was duly admitted to
J•rolmte, he devised the said 2H acres. with
otht>r of his lands, to the plalnttrr. This action was commenced In J<'ebruary, 1877, to re<~ver damages for continuing to divert the
waler from the natural channel of Bald creek,
and for a Judgment, directing the abatement
nnd removal of the embankments In the orig!·
nnl channel. There was a trial by the court,
"·lthout the Intervention of a jury, and a
judgment was rendered for plttlntltr for one
clollar actual damages, and
exemplary
clmuages, and an order was made requiring
the dPfendant to abate and remove snld obstructions from the nntnral channel of the
<"reE>k. Defendant appc.•als.
Stiles & Lathrop, for 11p1wllun.t. Wm. llcXett and H. B. Hendershott, for appellee.

'i5

damages, and an order was made requiring

the defendant to abate and remove said oh-

structions from the natural channel of the

creek. Defendant appeals.

Stiles & Lathrop, for appellant. Wm. Mc-

.\ett and H. B. Hendershott, for aP1)t-ii(‘t-.

ROTHROCK, J. 1. When the earth was

deposited in the channel of the creek, and

raised to a suﬂicient height to cover over the

bridge, and make a solid embankment upon

which to lay the railroad track, the water in

the creek was at once turned into the new

channel. The principal question in the case

is whether the judgment for damages, in fa-

vor of Christopher Stodghill. was a full adju-

dication for all injuries to the land, not only

up to the commencement of that suit. but for

all that might thereafter arise.

UOTHROCK, J. 1. When the earth was
dPpo!lltt'fl ln the channl'l of the crPPk, and
rnli<1'<l to a sufficient hl'lght to covt>r ornr the
bridge, and mnk" a solid emhnnkment upon
which to lay the railroad track, the water In
the creek was at once turned Into the new
<'hannel. The prlncl11al question In the case
Is whether the Judgnwnt tor damages, in fa'·or ot Christopher Stocl1o?hlll. WR!'( a full ndjudlf·atlon for all Injuries to the lnnd, not only

up to the commencement of that suit, but for
nil that might thereafter arise.
Io Powers v. City ot Council Blutrs, 45
Iowa, 002, the question being as to what Is
a permanent nuisance, it was held that where
· u was of 11uch u charttcter that Its contlnu~
ance is necl'H88rlly an Injury, and that when
It Is of a permanPnt characMr, that will continue without chnngt' from any cause but
human labor, the damage Is original, and
may be at once fully estimated and compensated; that successive actions will not lie.
and that the statute of limitations commences
to run from the time of the commencement
of the Injury to the property. That was a
cause where the plalntll'f sought to recover
damages against the city for diverting the
natural channel of a stream called Indian
creek by excavating a ditch In a street In
such a manner that It widened and dr.epened,
by the action of the water, so a11 to Injure
plalntll'f'a lot abutting upon said street. The
same rule was recognized In Town of Troy
v. Cheshire R. Co., 3 Fost. (N. H.) 83. In
that case the defendant constructed the embankment of its railroad upon a part of ll
highway. The nctlon was by the town to
recover damages. The plaintiff claimed that
It was entitled to recover tor the entire damages tor the permanent Injury. The court
said: "The railroad Is, In Its nnture, design
and use, a permanent structure, which cannot be assumed to be liable to change. The
appropriation of the roadway and materials
to the use of the railroad Is therefore a permanent diversion of that property to that new
use, and a permanent dispossession of the
town of It as the place on which to maintain a highway. '£be Injury done to the town
Is, then, a permanent Injury, at once done
by the construction of the railroad, which Is
dependent upon no contlng(•ncy of which the
law can take notice, aud for the Injury thus
done to them they are entitled to recover at
once their rell80nable damages."
The case at bar Is a much stronger Illustration of what ls a permanent nuisance or trespass, for which damages, past. present and
prospective, may be recovered, than Powers
v. City of Connell Bluffs. In this cnse the
damages, to the whole extent, were at once
apparent. The water was diverted from the
natural channel as soon ns the embankmPnt
wni;o raised to a sulftclent height to turn the
current Into the new channel. The Injury to
the lnnd was then susceptible of estimation.
as It ever afterwards could be, and without
<'nlcnlatlng 1111~· futurr contingencies. · In thr
othe1· ctttil'. whNl th(• wate1· commi>nced to
flow In the new dmnnel, the plaintiff's lots
were not Injured. It required time to wash
a way the banks and work hnckwnrd before
the Injury commenced. It Is not necessary
to dwell upon this que11tlon. 'l'he rule established' In Powers v. City of Council Bluffs.
supra, Is decisive of the ense. RP1>. also, Railroad Co. v. Mnher (l-!1111. Ct. 111.) Chi. Leg.
N. July 5, 1879. Counsel for nppellees con-
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tend that the railroad embankment is not per-

manent. because it is liable to be washed out

by freshets in the stream, and cannot stand

without being repaired.

There is no evidence in this record tending

to show that the embankment is insuﬂlcient‘

to accomplish the purpose for which it was

erected; that is“, to make a solid railroad

track and divert the water into the new

channel. One witness testiiied that it is from

16 to 18 feet high. We will not presume that

defendant was guilty of such'a want of en-

gineering skill as not to raise its embank-

ments so that they will not be affected by

high water. It seems to us that a railroad

embankment of proper width. and raised to

the proper height, is about as permanent as

anything that human hands can make. Be-

fore leaving this branch of the case, it is
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proper to say that the acts complained of

were done within the limit of the defendant's

right of way, and the injury, if any. to the

plaintiffs land was consequential. The de-

fendant did not enter upon plaintiffs land to

take a right of way for its railroad, and

Christopher Stodghill did not bring his action

to recover upon that ground. As we have a

statute providing for proceedings to condemn

the land necessary to be taken for right of

way for railroad purposes, it may be that the

mode of ascertaining the damages prescribed

by the statute must be pursued. See Daniels

v. Railroad Co., 35 Iowa, 129. That question

is not in this case, and we only refer to it

lest we may be misunderstood.

2. (‘hristopher Stodghill. in his petition in

the former action, averred that the diversion

of the stream from its natural course across

said land perpetually deprived him from the

use thereof, to his great damage in the prose-

cution of his business, and in the deprecia-

tion in value of his said farm and pasture

iands, and he claimed damages in the sum

of $499. The court instructed the jury in

that case that they were not to consider the

question in regard to any permanent damage

to the land, for the reason that plaintiff had

the right to institute other suits to recover

damages sustained after the ('oIinn0n('0nu1nt

of the action.

But the plaintiff claimed danmges generally.

and by his pleading he and those holding un-

der him must be bound. Indeed. we do not

understand counsel for appellee to contend

otherwise. The damages being entire, and

susceptible of immediate recovery, the plain-

tiff could not divide his claim and maintain

successive actions. The erroneous instruc-

tions of the court to the jury did not affect

the question. It was the duty of the plain-

tiff to have excepted and appealed.

“An adjudication is ﬁnal and conclusive,

not only as to the matter actually determined.

but as to every other matter which the par-

ties might have litigated and have had de-

cided, as incident to or essentially connect-

ed with the subject-matter of litigation."

Freem. Judgm. § 249. And see Dewey v.

Pltl<;RENT AND PR08PECTI\"E D.BL\GES.

tend that the railroad embankment Is not permanent. because It Is liable to be washed out
h~· fre!!hets In the stream, nnd cannot stand
without being repaired.
There Is no evidence In this l'ecord tending
to show that the embankment Is lnsufllclent ·
to uccomtlllsh the purpose for which It was
ere<'t('(l; that ht, to make a solid railroad
track uml dh·ert the water Into the new
<"hannel. One witness testllied that It Is from
ltl to 18 feet high. We will not presume that
1lefend1mt was guilty of such.a want of en·
irlneerlng skill as not to rais<' Its embankments so that they will not be alfected by
high wnter. It seems to us that a railroad
c>mbankment of proper width. and raised to
the pro11er height, Is nbout 0.11 Jll'l'lll1tnent as
anything that human hands cnn make. Before leaYlng this branch of the case, It Is
proper to say that the acts complalne<l of
were done within the limit of tbt> defendant's
1·lght of way, and the Injury, If any, to the
11lalnwr's land was consequential. The defendant did not enter upon plo.lntlft'.'s land to
take a right of'. way for Its railroad, and
Christopher Stodghill did not bring bis action
to recover upon that ground. As we have a
statute providing for proceedings to condemn
tile laml necessary to be taken for right of
way for railroad purposes, It may be that the
modi' of asl'ertalnlng the damages preR<'rlbed
by tht• Rtatute must be pursued. See Daniels
v. Rullroad Co., 35 Iowa, 129. That q1wi;tlon
Is not In this case, and we only r(•fer to It
lest we may be misunderstood.
2. f'hrl!ltopher Stodghill, In bis petition In
the forwer action, averred that the diversion

of the strl'am from Its natural course ncros!t
said land perpetually deprived him from tht>
use thereof, to his great damage In the prosecution of his business, and In the depreciation In value of his said fam1 aml pasture
lands, and he claimed damages In the sum
of $400. The court Instructed the jury in
that case that they were not to consider the
question In regard to any permanpnt damage
to the land, for the reason that plnintllf had
the right to Institute other suJts to recoYer
tlamages sustained after the rommt>ll('t'mt•nt
of the action.
But the plalntllr claimed dnmn!(l'!I gPnl'mll~-.
and by his 11leadlng he and th08(' holding under him must be bound. Indeed. we do not
understand <'oun11el for appellee to contend
otherwisl'. The da11111ges being entire, and
suscc>ptlble of lmmP<llate recovery, the plain·
tiff <'ould not divide hlll ~lalm and maintain
successh'e actions. The erroneous lnstruettons of the court to the jury did not afre<'t
the question. It was the duty of the plalntlft'. to have excepted and appealed.
"An adjudication ls final and conclusive,
not only as to the matter actually determined,
but as to e\•ery other matter which the par·
ties might have litigated and have bad decided, a11 ln<'ldent to or essentially connected with the subject-matter of litigation."
Freem. Judgm. § 249. And see Dewey v.
Peck, 33 Iowa, 242; Schmidt v. Zaht>nRdnrt.
30 Iowa. -mR

'l'ltl' f01•t•1wlug considerations dispose of the
cast'. and It ht>l'Ollll'S unn~ssary to examine
or detl'rmlue other questtona discussed by
rounsel. Reversed.

•
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FILER v. NEW YORK (‘E.\"l‘. R. CO.

(49 N. Y. 42.)

_Court of Appeals of New York. 1872.

Action by VVilliam F. Filer against the New

York Central Railroad Company for damages

for personal injuries sustained by plaintiﬁ"s

wife while alighting from defendant's train.

Judgment for plaintiff. and defendant appeals.

Aﬂlrmed.

.Court o! Appeals of :\l'w York. 18i2.
Action by "-'illlnm F. Flier ni.:-nlnst tlw :\t'W
York Central Hallroad l'olllpnny for 1h1111:1ges
ror personal lujurit>s sust:1i1wd h~· plniutllf"s
wife while alighting from defe111J11nt"s tmiu.
Jml;:mput for pl:iintitf. anti llef1•111ln11t appt•uls.
Atti1111ed.
Ueorge U. llunger. fnr llJll>t>llant.
?tlarti111l11le. for re,.:po111lt•11t.

J. 11.

George G. Manger. for appellant.

ltlartindalc. for respondent.

J. 11.

ALLEN, J. h‘necessive actions cannot be

brought by the plaintiff for the recovery of

damages, as they may accrue from time to

time. resulting from the injury complained

of. as would be the case for a continuous

wrong or a continued trespass. The action

is for a single wrong, the injury resulting
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from a single act, and the plaintiff was en-

titled to recover not only the damages which

had been actually sustained up to the time

of the trial. but also compensation for future

damages; that is. compensation for all the

damages resulting from the injury. whether

present or prospective. The limit in respect

to future damages is that they must be such

as it is reasonably certain will inevitably and

necessarily result from the injury. To ex-

clude damages of that character, in actions for

injuries to the person, would necessarily. in

many cases. deprive the injured party of the

greater part of the compensation to which

he is entitled. Curtis v. Railroad Co., 18 N.

Y. 534; Drew v. Railroad Co.. 26 N. Y. 49.

Any evidence therefore tending to show the

character and extent of the injury and its

probable results. as well as the probability of

a return of the disease induced by the injury,

in the ordinary course of nature, and without

any ext1insic superinducing cause, was com-

petent to enable the jury to determine the

compensation to which the plaintiff was en-

titled.

In the case of a fractured limb, it was

thought that the present and probable future

condition of it were proper matters of in-

quiry. Lincoin v. Railroad Co.. 23 Wend.

425. The consequences of a hypothetical

second fracture were deemed too remote. The

question to Dr. Faling as to the probability,

from his experience and medical knowledge,

of a recurrence of an inﬂammation of the in-

jured muscle. and his answer that he could

not say the probabilities were very strong.

but that he should feel. speaking from ex-

perience. that there was danger of the return

of the inﬂammation and accumulation of the

linid. was competent.

The evidence was that of a medical ex-

pert, as to the ordinary or probable course

LAW DA M.2d Ed.—8

of disease in the injured muscle. which had

resulted directly from the injury complained

of, and related to the future condition of the

person injured. so far as that condition could

be ascertained from medical learning and ex-

perience. So too the opinion of the saun-

ALI.lo;~, J.
~m·1·Ps8l\"e actlon11 cannot be
brought by the plnlutit'f for thr rreuvrry of
damages, as they moy aecrue from tlnw to
time. resulting from the Injury co111pl11lned
of. as would be the case for a c·untlnuons
wrong or a contlnuetl tr!'~fl!'IS>I. Tiu• n<'tlon
Ii; for a single wrong. the Injury re11ultlng
from u slll~le act, uml the plulntlff """" 1•11·
titled to rl'<·on'r not only the darunit•"' which
hml ht'en actu:1lly sustuhw1l up to th•• time
of the trial. hut also co1111w111<:1tlo11 for future
damages; rhat Is. compl'l1sntio11 fur :ill the
,Janu1:,:t>s re•rnltlng from the lujnry. wh .. tht'r
present or pros(>t'crlve. The limit ill restit>•·t
to future damages Is that tbPy mu,;t he ,;ueh
11s it Is reasonably certain will lnl'vltahl,\· 111111
necessarily result from the Injury. To ex·
elude damages of that character, lu net Ions for
Injuries to the person, would nre1•ss:1rlly. In
many cases. deprive the Injured party of the
;:1-eater part of the compeusatlon to whfrh
be ls entitled. Curtis v. Railroad <..'<>., 18 X.
Y. 534; Drew v. Rallroail Co.. :.?n ~. Y. 41).
Any evltlence thel"efore tending to show the
character and extent of the lujury and Its
probahle results. as well as the prohnhlllty of
a return of the dJsea.se Induced by the Injury,
In the ordinary course ot nature, and without
any extrinsic superlndnclng cau~e. Willi com·
petent to f'nnhle the jury to determine the
mmpenAAtion to whkh thP plaintiff was enlitlctl.
In tbP <"Rile of a fractured limb. It was
thought that the prE>l'tent aud probable future
condition or it wt>rf' proper mnttrrs of In·
quiry. Lincoln Y. Railroad Co.. Zl Wend.
_.2a. The co111<eq11E>ncl'!' or a hypothetical
SK'Ond !ractun> were deeme1l too remote. The
question to Dr. l<'allng as to the prnlJablllty,
from hill expt>rlence and mP11l1·al knowlellge,
of a recurrence of an luflarumatlon of thf' Injured muscle, and his 11n11w1>r rhat ht• 1·ould
not say the probnbllltil'll wl.'rf' 'l"l'l',\. >'trong.
hut that be should fl'l'I. Ht11•11klllg from experienw. that there Wllll danger of the rl'tllrn
of th<• lntlammatlon and nr1·m11ul11tlon of the
1111111. was competent.
The evltl1>nce Will! tb11t or a medical expert, aa to the ordinary or probable course
LAW DA~I.21l Ed.-8

uf tll>'PllSI' In the lujured mus<'le. which had
1·p~ulte•l 11it"Pdly from the lnjmy complaitw<I
of. mu! rt•hltt>•I to tl\e future eomlltlon of the
(lt'rson lnjurell. 110 far as tllut ('Ollllltion eouhl
hf' as1·p1·ta ine•I from 11w11i1·11I lt·m·uing 11 ml ex·
pl'rh•1w<'. So too tlw oplulnn of the snmt•
ph~·,:i.-lan. that ht• ,.;houltl t'Xj11•1·t. If tlwre Wl'I'<'
nu I\'lllrll of intl:1111matluu. ti.Jot the gt•npml
ltt•ulth of )fr,.:. l"lll'r woul1l impl'O\"l'. lJut wo11!1l
ulwn~·s h•' so111ewh;lt impalrPtl. wns prop .. r
111ul 1·01111wt1•11t. to 1•nahle the jury to a,.;l"l'l'·
taln the 11<·t11:1I extf'nt of the injury to Ill!'
plaint ill.
TIJerP Is no f'Vitience otlwr thnn thnt of
ex11Prts hy whld1 courts anti jurll's ean d1'tt•rmlne wlwtllC'r n dlsense or an Injury 1111!'<
heen or mn he perm:rnc•utly cured. or wl111t
its elfect will be upon the IH'nlth aml c111111blllt~· of the lnjut't'1l person lu the fntllrt'.
The hypothetical opinion of Dr. Hilhrnm as
to the 1·1111st' of thl' :th8t"<'SS. was eompett>ut.
anti lht• nnsw1•r. l":tntlonsly itlven. that If thPy
c·oul•I lill1l uo otlwr 1·1111i>P, th1•y would natnr·
ally attribute It to tllC' Injury 1·011111lailll'<I of.
and that siu·h injury n·1·pl\·1•1l In ISlH wns
1·nm11t>Wnr to pro1hw1~ tlw co111lltio11 he saw ill
· 1sui, wt•rt> propl'rly allowed.
8onw latitude 1111111t llt'l'•'"'"arlly ht• ~in•n
In the examination of medlcul t•xpPrts. 1111tl
In the propoumlin~ of hypothetical tllll'slions
for· thci1· opinions. the lwtlt•r to enahle tht'
jury to polls upon the q1wstlons suhmltt1•1l to
them. The opinion Is th1~ oplulon of th•• l'X11.. rt. anti If the fuels nrt• found by tlH' jury
n:,i the counsel by his 11uei;tlous nssumPs tlw111
to lw. thl' opinion mny han• somP Wl'lght.
othe1·wlsc not. It Is the prlvlll'ge of the 1·01111·
sci In such cns<'B to as.~mne, within the limit,.
of the "''iden1'C', any stat<' or tacts whi<'h ht·
clnlms the evld<'nce justlftes, and h11Yr tlw
opinion of expert;.1 upon the f11ct11 thus a~
sume11. The fnctR nrt• n11sume<l for the purpus1>s of the question, 1uul for no other purpose.
There w11s no rrror In !ht! refuiml to d1nr)!."P
ns requestl.'11. 'rht' qnestlon suhmlttNI wn1<
whether the abscess and c·onl!l.'QtWnt lllnes11
were c11us('(I b~· the lnjur~· n>celvrd in ~ovt'rn·
be1·, 18H4. and It that was found In the atHrmntl\"e. the plnlntlft'. If th1• other fnPIR wPre
foun1l In his favor. was rntltled to recovt>r.
There was no evl1lenPc authorb:lo)!." th!' sul:·
rnls!<lon of the qtwstlon whC'ther the ahst•Ps1t
might not h11ve been In part e11u111•d hy tin•
Injury Rpokl'll of. nnd In part by som1• otlwr
llll':Jns. The oth1•r questions made u1mn tbi!<
appeal are con11ifle1·ed and dl!<p()sed of In tluurtlon at the RUlt of Helen M. Flier.
There was no e1·ror upon the trial. and tht•
Judgment must be atHrmed. All roncur ex(-ept CHURCH, C. J., w]\o did not vote.
.Judgment aftlrmed.
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PARKER v. RUSSELL.

(133 Mass. 74.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
l~rnnklin. June 28, 1882.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Franklin. June 28, 1882.

Action by Isaac Parker against Electa P.

Russell. The declaration alleged “that the

defendant, in consideration of the convey-

ance by the plaintiff to the defendant of cer-

tain real estate in Deerﬁeid, promised and

agreed to support and maintain the plaintiff,

furnishing him with all things necessary and

convenient in sickness and in health, during

the natural life of the plaintiff; that the de-

fendant accepted said conveyance, and has

occupied and used said estate, but has re-

fused and neglected and still neglects and

refuses to perform her said agreement."

The evidence showed that in March, 1873.

the defendant, for a good consideration, agreed
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to support the plaintiff during his life; that

she did support him in her house from that

time till October 1, 1878, when her house was

destroyed by ﬁre; and that for two years since

the ﬁre the defendant had furnished no sup-

port to the plaintiff.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff

for $972.25; and found specially that the

support of the plaintiff. under the terms of

the contract, from the date of the ﬁre to the

date of the writ, was of the value of $377.40,

and that the same from the date of the ﬁre to

Action by Isaac Parker against Electa P.
lltt!lsell. The declaration alleged "that the
defendant, In consideration of the convey~nce by the plalntllf to the defendant of certain real estate In Deerfield, promised anll
ngreed to support and maintain the plalntltr,
furnishing him with all things necessary and
convenient In sickness and In health, during
the natural life of the plaintiff; that the defendant accepted said conveyance, and has
occupied and m;ed said estate, but has refused and neglected and stlll neglects nnd
refuses to perform her said agreement."
The evidence showed that in March, 1873,
the defendant, for a good consideration, agreed
to support the plalntttr during his life; that
she did support him In her house from that
time till October 1, 1878, when her house was
destroyed by tlre; and that for two years since
the tlre the defendant had furnished no support to the plnlntllr.
The Jury returne<l a verdict for the plaintiff
tor '972.25; and found specially that the
suppo1"t of the plaintiff, under the terms of
the contract, from the date of the tlre to the
date of the writ, was of the value of $3i7.40,
and that the same from the date of the tlre to
the date of the· trial was of the value of
$473.60. The defendant excepted.
A. De Wolf, for plaintiff. F. L. Greene, tor
d!'femlant.

the date of the‘ trial was of the value of

$473.6(). The defendant excepted.

A. De Wolf, for plaintiff. F. L. Greene, for

defendant.

FIELD, J. In an action for the breach of

a contract to support the plaintiff during his

life, if the contract is regarded as still sub-

sisting, the damages are assessed up to date

of the writ, and not up to the time when the

verdict is rendered. Fay v. Guynon, 131

Mass. 31.

But if the breach has been such that the

plaintiff has the right to treat the contract as

absolutely and ﬁnally broken by the defend-

ant, and he elects so to treat it. the damages

are assessed as of a total breach of an entire

contract. Amos v. Oakley, 131 Mass. 413;

Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592; Remelee v.

Hall, 31 Vt. 592; Fales v. Hemenway, 64 Me.

373; Sutherland v. “',ver, 67 Me. 64; Lamo-

reaux v. ltoife. 36 N. H. 33; \Iullaly v. Aus-

tin. 97 Mass. 30; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y.

362.

Such damages are not special or prospec-

tive damages, but are the damages naturally

resulting from a total breach of the contract,

and are suffered when the contract is broken,

and are assessed as of that time. From the

nature of the contract they include damages

for not performing the contract in the fu-

ture as well as in the past. The value of

the contract to the plaintiff at the time it is

broken may be somewhat indeﬁnite because

the duration of the life of the plaintiff is un-

certain, but uncertainty in the duration of a

life has not, since the adoption of life tables,

been regarded as a reason why full relief in

FIELD, J. In an action tor the breach of
a contrnct to support the plalntll'l during his
life, It the contract Is regarded as stlli subsisting, the damaies are assessed up to date
of the writ, and not up to the time when the
>erdlct Is rendered. Fay v. Guynon, 131
l\lass. 31.
But If the breach has been such that the
plalntlft' has the right to treat the contract as
abl'IOlufely and finally broken by the defendant, and he elects tlO to treat It, the damages
are assPsscd as of a total breach of an entire
rontract. Amos v. Oakley, 131 :\lass. 413;
l'lch<>ll v. Plumb, U5 N. Y. 592; RemelE><> v.
Hall, 31 Yt. 58'2; Fales v. Hemenway, 64 lie.
373; SuthPrlnnd v. Wyer, 67 lie. 64; Lamorenm:: v. HolfP. 36 ~. JI . 33; llullaly v. Austin. 97 )lass. 30; H oward v. Daly, 61 N. Y.
3tl2.

Ru<'h llnnrni:es nre not spl'clal or prospectln• 1l11mages, but are the damages naturally

1"t>1<ultlng from a total breach of the contract,
nn<l are 1m1Trred when the contract Is broken,
nncl are as;;:e!<sc>d as of that time. From the
nature of thP contra.ct they Include damages
for not JWl"formlng the <'ontract In the tutnr<' as wt>ll 1111 In the past. 'l'he value of
the contrn<'t to the plnlntll'l nt the time It Is
l1rokP11 111:1>· he soml'wlmt hult•flnltl' hl'C'ause
the 1lurn tlnu of the life of the plaintiff Is un-

certain, but uncertalnty In the duration of &
life has not, since the adoption of life tables,
been regarded as a reason why 11111 rellPf In
damages should not be al'lorded for a failure
to perform a contr:wt which by its terms
was to continue during lite.
When the defendant, for example, absolutely refuses to perform such a contract after
the tlmP for entering upon the performance
has begun, It would be a great hardship to
compel the plaintiff to be ready at all times
during his life to l>e supported by the defendant, It the defendant should at any time
change his mind; and to hold that he must
resort to successive adlons from time to time
to obtain his damagr,s piecemeal, or else leave
them to be recovere,I as an entirety by his
personal representallTes alter his death.
Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, decides
that an absolute refusal to perform a contract
before the performance Is due by the terms
of the contract Is not n. present breach of the
contract for which any action can be maintained; but It does not decide that an absolute refusal to perform a contract after the
time and under the conditions In which the
plalntlft' Is entitled Lo require performance.
ls not a breach cf the contract, even although
the contract Is by Its terms to continue In the
future.
The cases cited by the defendant are not
Inconsistent with t.lese views. In Pierce v.
Wooownrd, 6 Pick. 206, the declaration was
tor a breach of a negative promise, namely.
"not to set up the business of a grocer" wltliln certain limits; and It was held that the
damages could be assessed only to the date
of the writ. The defendant might at any
time, without tt.c cor:sent · of the plaintlft',
stop carrying on the bL1 slness, when the plaintiff's damages would necessarily cease.
Powers v. Warr., 4 Pick. 100, was an action of <'OVenant broken, brought by the overseers of the poor, under St. 1793, c. 59, I 5,
for the hrench of a covenant to maintain an
apprentice under an Indenture of n11prentl<'eshlp. The court in the opinion· spenk of the
common-lnw rulE> m assPsslng damages only
to the date of the writ. But the statute under which thP action was brought prevented
the ov<>rsN~rs tr.:>m treating the contract ai1
wholly nt nn end. because It gaye the aplH"<'ntice R right :>f action when the tem1 Is
expire1l, "for damages for thE> <'RUBI'S afore·
said, othl'r thnn such, If nny, ·ror which damages may hnve been reco,·ered as nforesnld,"
thnt Is, h.r the overseers.
Hamblrton v. Veere, 2 Saund. 169, was an
action on the case for enticing away an apprentice; and Ward v. Ulch, 1Vent. 103, was
an action for abducting a wife; and neltlwr
throws much light on the rule of damagps
for breach of a contract.
Horn v. Chandler, 1 l\lod. 271, WllS co>enant broken upon an Indenture of an Infant
npprentl<'e, who under the custom of London
had bonml himself to serve the plaintiff for
se>en yl'ars, the deelnratlon alleged a _101111

PRESEX1' AND PHOSl'EUTI VE DAM.AGES.
PRIQSEX '1' AN D Plt(lS1'E(_iTl \'E DAMAGES. 1 15

of service for the whole term, a part of which

was unexpired; on demurrer to the plea, the

declaration was held good, but it was said

“that the plaintlf f may take damages for the

departure only, not the loss of service during

the term; and then it will be well enough."

But if this be law to-day in actions on in-

dentures of apprenticeship, it must be re-

membered that they are peculiar contracts,

in which the rights and obligations of the

parties are often affccted by statutory regu-

lations. and in some cases they cannot be

avoided or treated as at an end at the will

of the parties.

In this case, the declaration alleges in ef-

feet a promise to support the plaintiff dur-

ing his life, from and after receiving the

of service for the whole term, a part of which
was unexpired; on demurrer to the plea, the
declaration waa held good, but It was said
"that the plalnt11r may take damages for the
departure only, not the loss of service during
the term; and then It will be well enough."
But If this be law to-day In actions on indentures of apprenticeship, It must be remembered that they are peculiar contracts,
in which the rights and obligations of the
parties are often all'ected by statutory regulations, and In sowe cases they cannot be
avoided or treated alt at an end at the will
of the parties.
In this case, the declaration alleges In effect a promise to support the plalutltr during his life, from and after receiving the
conveyance of cerWn real estate, an acceptance of such conveyance, and a neglect and
rf".tusal to perform the agreemenl These are

115

suftlclent allegations to enable the plalnUtr
to recover damages as for a total breach.
The co\trt instructed the jury that, "If the
defendant for a period of about two years
neglected to furnish aid or support to the
plaint!!!', without any fault of the plaintiff,
the plaintiff might treat the contract as at an
end, and recover damages for the breach of
the contract as a whole." We cannot say
that this lnstructton was erroneous as applied to the facts ln rvldence In the cause,
which are not set oul
The jury must bne found that the plaintiff
did treat the contract as finally broken by
the defendant, and the propriety of this finding on the evidence ls not before us. Judgment on the verdlct for the larger sum.
NO'l'E. See, also the cases under head of
''Damages tor BreaCh of Contract for Per~onal
Services," post, 314.

conveyance of certain real estate, an accept-

(

ance of such conveyance, and a neglect and

refusal to perform the agreement. These are
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sufﬁcient allegations to enable the plaintiff

to recover damages as for a total breach.

The court instructed the jury that, “if the

defendant for a period of about two years

neglected to furnish aid or support to the

plaintiff, without any fault of the plaintiff,

the plaintiff might treat the contract as at an

end, and recover damages for the breach of

the contract as a whole." We cannot say

that this instruction was erroneous as ap-

plied to the facts in evidence in the cause,

which are not set out.

The jury must have found that the plaintiff

did treat the contract as ﬁnally broken by

the defendant, and the propriety of this ﬁnd-

lug on the evidence is not before us. Judg-

ment on the verdict for the larger sum.

NOTE. See, also, the cases under head of

"Damages for Breach of Contract for Personal

Services," post. 314.

v

•
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DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAM.-&GI‘IS—lN CO.\"J.‘RAUT.

HADLEY et al. v. BAXE.\'DALE et ul.

(9 Exch. 341.) -

Court of Exchequer, Hilary Term. ‘Feb. 23,

1854.

The ﬁrst count of the declaration sia ted that,

before and at the tithe of the making by the

defendants of the promises hereinafter men-

tioned, the plaintiffs carried on the business

of mllicrs and meal men in co-partnership, and

were proprietors and occupiers of the City

Steam Mills, in the city of Gloucester, and

were possessed of a steam engine, by means

of which they worked the said mills, and

therein cleaned corn, and ground the same

into meal, and dressed the same into ﬂour,

sharps, and bran; and a certain portion of

the said steam engine, to wit, the crank shaft

f the said engine, was broken, and out of

epair, whereby the said steam engine was
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prevented from working. and the plaintiffs

were desirous of having a new crank shaft

made for the said mill, and had ordered the

same of certain persons trading under the

name of W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, in the

county of Kent, who had contracted to make

the said new shaft for the plaintiffs; but be-

fore they could complete the said new shaft it

was necessary that the said broken shaft

should be forwarded to their works at Green-

wich, in order that the said new shaft might

be made so as to ﬁt the other parts of the said

engine which were not injured, and so that it

might be substituted for the said broken shaft;

and the plaintiffs were desirous of sending the

said broken shaft to the said W. Joyce & Co.

for the purpose aforesaid; and the defendants.

before and at the time of the making of the

said promises. were common carriers of goods

and chattels for hire from Gloucester to Green-

wich, and carried on such business of common

carriers under the name of Pickford & Co.;

and the plaintiffs, at the request of the defend-

ants, delivered to them, as such carriers, the

said broken shaft, to be conveyed by the de-

fendants as such carriers from Gloucester to

the said W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, and

there to be delivered for the plaintiffs on the

second day after the day of such delivery. for

reward to the defendants; and in considera-

tion thereof the defendants then promised the

plaintiffs to convey the said broken shaft from

Gloucester to Greenwich, and there, on the

said second day. to deliver the same to the

said W. Joyce & Co. for the plaintiffs; and, al-

though such second day elapsed before the

commencement of this suit, yet the defendants

did not nor would deliver the said broken shaft

at Gre wlch on the said second day, or to the

said . Joyce & Co. on the said second day,

but wholly neglected and refused so to do for

the space of seven days after the said shaft

was so delivered to them as aforesaid.

The second count stated that. the defendants

being such carriers as aforesaid, the plaintiffs,

at the request of the defendants, caused to be

delivered to them as such carriers the said

broken shaft, to be conveyed by the defend-

ants from uioucester, aforesaid, to the said
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worked. The ste.'nn engine was manufactur-

ed by Messrs. Joyce & Co., the enginee1s, at

Greenwich, and it became necessary to send

the shaft as a pattern for a new one to Green-

wich. The f1acture was discovered on the

12th, and on the 13th the plaintiffs sent one

,f their servants to the oﬂice of the defend-

ants. who are the well-known carriers trad-

ing under the name of Pickford & Co., for the

purpose of having the shaft carried to Green-

wich. The plaintiffs‘ servant told the clerk

that the mill was stoplwd, and that the shaft

must be sent immediately; and in answer to

the inquiry when the shaft would be taken

the answer was that if it was sent up by

1weive o'clock any day it would be delivered

at Greenwich on the following day. On the

following day the shaft was taken by the de-

fendants, before noon, for the purpose of be-
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ing conveyed to Greenwich, and the sum of

£2 ~is. was paid for its carriage for the whole

distance. At the same time the defendants‘

clerk was told that a special entry, if requir-

ed, should be made, to hasten its delivery.

The delivery of the shaft at Greenwich was

delayed by some neglect, and the conse-

quence was that the plaintiffs did not receive

the new shaft for several days after they

would otherwise have done, and the work-

ing of their mill was thereby delayed, and

Ihe_v thereby lost the proﬁts they would oth-

erwise have received.

On the part of the defendants it was object-

ed that these damages were too remote. and

that the defendants were not liable with re-

spect to them. The learned judge left the

case generally to the jury, who found a ver-

dict with £25 damages beyond the amount

paid into court.

Kcating & Dowdeswell, showed cause.

“'hateley. Willes & Phipson, in support of

the rule.

The judgment of the court was now deliv-

ered by

ALDEltSO\', B. We think that thereought

to be a new trial in this case; but in so do-

ing we deem it to be expedient and necessary

to state explicitly the rule which the judge,

at the next trial. ought, in our opinion, to di-

rect the jury to be governed by when they

estimate the damages.

It is, indeed, of the last importance that

we should do this; for, if the jury are left

without any deﬁnite rule to guide them, it

will, in such cases as these, manifestly lead

to the greatest injustice. The courts have

done this on several occasions; and in Blake

v. Railway Co., 21 L. J. Q. B. 237, the court

granted a new trial on this very ground, that

the rule had not been deﬁnitely laid down to

the jury by the learned judge at nisi prins.

"There are certain established rules," this

court says, in Alder v. Keighlcy, 15 .\ices. &

W. 117, “according to which the jury ought

to ﬁm." And the court in that case adds:

“And here there is a clear rule that the

amount which would ha - 1- '

i the contract had been kept is the measure of

11!'.i
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or putting up at the time. and that they only

wished to send back the broken shaft to the

engineer who made it, it is clear that this

would be quite consistent with the above cir-

cumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay

in the delivery would have no effect upon the

intermediate proﬁts of the mill. Or, again,

suppose that, at the time of the delivery to

the carrier, the machinery of the mill had

been in other respects defective then, also,

the same results would follow.

true that the shaft was actually s nt back to

serve as a model for a new one, and that the ‘

want of a new one was the only cause of the

stoppage of the mill, and that the loss of prof-

its really arose from not sending down the

new shaft in prope.r time, and that this arose

from the delay in d ivering the broken one

to serve as a modelj But it is obvious that
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in the great multitide of cases of millers

sending of! broken shafts to third persons by

a. carrier under ordinary circumstances, such

consequences would not, in all probability,

Here it is ‘

have occurred; and these special circum-

stances were here never communicated by the

plaintiffs to the defendants. It‘ follows,

therefore, that the loss of proﬁts here cannot

reasonably be considered such a consequence

of the breach of contract as could have been

fairly and reasonably contemplated by both

the parties when they made this contract.

For such loss would neither have ﬂowed nat-

urally from the breach of this contract in the

great multitude of such cases occurring un-

der ordinary circumstances, nor were the spe-

cial circumstances, which, perhaps, would

have made it a reasonable and natural conse-

quence of such breach of contract, communi-

cated to or known by the defendants. The

judge ought, the1efo1e, to have told the jury

‘ that upon the facts then before them they

ought not to take the loss of proﬁts into con-

sideration at all in estimating the damages.

There must therefore be a new trial in this

case.

Rule absolute.

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN CONTRACT.

or putting up at the time, and that they only
wished to send back the broken shaft to the
engineer who made It, lt Is clear that this
would be quite consistent with the above cir·
cumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay
In the delivery would have no effect upon the
Intermediate profits of the mill. Or, again,
suppose that, at the time of the delivery to
the carrier, the machinery of the mill had
been ln other respects defectlve~then, also,
the same results would follow. Here it ls
true that the shaft was actually s nt back to
serve as a model for a new one, and that the
want of a new one was the only cause of the
stoppage of the mlll, a.nd that the loss of profits really arose from not sending down the
I.iew shaft ln proper time, and that this arose
from the delay In djivering the broken one
to serve as a model. But lt Is obvious that
In the great multlt1 <le ot cases of millers
sending off broken shafts to third pel'80ns by
a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such
consequences would not, In afl probabllltJ,

1

have occurred; and these special circumstances were here never communicated by the
plaintiffs to the defendants. It · follows,
therefore, that the loss of profits here cannot
reasonably be considered such a conseqnl'nce
of the breach of contract a.s could have been
fairly and reasonably contemplated by both
the parties when they made this contract.
For such loss would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract In the
great multitude of such cases occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which, perhaps, would
have made It a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract, conununlcated to or known by the defendants. The
judge ought, therefore, to have told the jury
that upon the facts then before them they
ought not to take the loss of prodts Into consideration at all In estimating the damages.
Tht:re must therefore be a new trial ID thla

case.
Rnle absolute.
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CORY v. THAMES IRONWORKS & SHIP-

BUILDING 0O.

(L. R. 3 Q. B. 181.)

Court of Queen's Bench, Hilary Term. Jan. 17,

1868.

This was an issue directed by the court of

chanccry under 8 & 9 Vlct. c. 109, to ascer-

tain the amount of damages to which the

plaintiffs were entitled, inter alia, by reason

of the delay by the defendants in the deliv-

ery of the hull of a ﬂoating boom derrick, un-

der a contract of sale.

At the trial before Shee, J., at the sittings in

London, after Hilary term, 12461. a verdict

was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to a case

to be started by an arbitrator.

1. The plaintiffs are coal merchants and

ship owners, having a very large import trade

in coal from Newcastle and other places into
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the port of London. The defendants are iron

manufacturers and ship builders in London.

2. The plaintiffs had introduced, at the

docks where they discharged the cargoes of

coal from their ships, a new and expeditious

mode of unloading the coals by means of iron

buckets, which were worked by hydraulic

pressure over powerful cranes, and the plain-

tiffs‘ trade having considerably increased they

were desirous of improving the accommoda-

tion offered in the discharge of their vessels

by the above mode; this the defendants were

not aware of.

3. The defendants had been building for the

Patent Derrick Company the hull of a large

vessel called a patent boom derrick, which

was constructed and ﬁtted with heavy and

powerful machinery for raising sunken ves-

sels or other similar purposes requiring great

power. The derrick was a large ﬂat-bottom-

ed iron vessel or ﬂoat, 250 feet long by 90

feet wide and 14 feet deep, divided by iron

bulk heads of great strength into more than

eighty compartments, measuring generally 15

feet long by 13 feet wide, she was decked

over all and had hatchways leading from the

deck to the interior.

4. During the constructing of this vessel the

derrick company became insolvent, and as

the defendants could not obtain payment for

the vessel they were obliged to take it upon

their own hands and sell it for the best price

they could obtain.

5. On the 1st of October, 1861. the plaintiffs

entered into the following agreement with

the defendants: The defendants agree to

sell and the plaintiffs agree to purchase “for

the sum of £3,500, the hull of the ﬂoating

boom derrick now lying in Bugsby's Hole in

the river Thames. It is agreed between the,

parties hereto that payment shall be made in

the following manner, that is to say, the sum

of £350 at the signing of this memorandum,

a further sum of £1.40‘) when possession is

given, which is to be given within three

months from the date hereof, and the sum of

£1,750 by a bill of exchange to be dated on

the day when possession is given, and to be

drawn at six months‘ date" by the defend-

CORY v. THAMES IRONWORKS & SIDP·
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the day when possession Is given, nnd to hl'
drawn at six months' date" by the def1•1Hlanta and accepted by the plalntltra. The de(L. R. 3 Q. B. 181.)
fendants were to be at liberty to sell the
tripod, boom, and other machinery in tbe
Court of Queen's Bench, Hilacy Term. Jan. 17,
buJJ.
1868.
6. The plalntU!'s purchased the derrlrk for
This was an Issue directed by the court of tl}.e purposes of their business, In order to
chancery under 8 & 9 Viet. c. 100, to ascer- erect and place In It, as they In fact did, lnrg,~
tain the amount of damages to which the hydmullc cranes and machinery, such as thpy
plalntl1fs were entitled, Inter alla, by reason had pre,·Jously used at the docks, an<I by
of the delay by the defendanta In the deltv- means of these cranes to transship their coals
ery of the hull of a floating boom derrick, un- from colliers Into barges without the necessity tor any Intermediate landing, the derder a contract of sale.
At the trial before Shee, J., at the sittings In rick, for this purpose, being moored In the
Londo;'i, after Hilary term, 1SH4, a verdict river Thnmes, and the plalntl1fs paying the
was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to a case conservators of the river a large reut for allowing It to remain there.
to be started by an arbitrator.
1. The plalntUrs are coal merchants and
7. The derrick was the tlrst vessel of the
ship owners, having a very large Import trade kind that had ever been built In this country,
In coal from Xewcastle and other places Into and the purpose to which the plaintiffs sougf1t
the port of London. The defen<lants are Iron to apply It was entirely novel and excepmanufacturers and ship builders In London. tional. Xo bull or other vessel bad ever been
2. The plaintiffs had Introduced, at the fttted either by coal merchants or others In a
docks where they discharged the cargOE's of similar way or for a similar purpose; and
coal from their ships, a new and expeditious the defendants at the date of the agreement
mode of unloading the coals by means of Iron had notice that the plalntUrs purchased the
buckets, wblcb were worked by hydraulic derrick for the purpose of their business, conpressure over powerful cranes, and the plain- sl<lerlng that It was Intended to be use<I as·
tiffs' trade having considerably Increased they a coal store; but they bad no notice or knowlwere desirous of Improving the accommoda- edge of the special object tor which It wns
tion offered In tbe discharge of their veaaels purchased and to which It was actually n11by tbe above mode; tb1s the defendants were plled.
not aware of.
8. At the date of the agreement the defend8. The detendanta had been building tor the ants belleved that the plalntl1fs were purPatent Derrick Company the bull of a large cbaBlng the derrick tor the purpose of using
vessel called a patent boom derrick, which her In the way of their business as a ronl
was constructed and fttted with heavy and i store; but the plaintiffs had not at that time
powerful machinery tor ralslng sunken ves- ' any Intention of applying the derrick to any
sel• or other umilar purposes requiring great other purpose than the Bpe<·lal purpose to
power. The derrick was a large flat-bottom- which she was In tact afterwards applied.
ed Iron veseel or tloat, 250 feet long by 00
9. It the plaintiffs hnd been prevented from
feet wide and 14 feet deep, divided by Iron applying the derrick to the special purpose
bulk heads of great strength Into more than tor which she was purchased and to which
eighty compartments, measuring generally 15 abe was applied, they would have endeavfeet long by 13 feet wide, she was decked oured to sell her to persons In the hulk trade
over all and bad hatchways leading from the as a hulk tor storing coals, and had they
deck to the Interior.
been unable to sell her, they could and would
4. During the constructlng of this vessel the have employed her In that trade and In that
derrick company became Insolvent, and as way tbem11elvea; that was the moat obvious
the defendants t'Ould not obtain payment for use to which such a vessel was capnhle of
the vessel they were obliged to take It upon being applied by persons In the plnlntltra'
their own bands and sen It tor the best price business, but the hulk trade Is a dlstlnrt
they could obtain.
branch of tile coal trade, and neither forme<l
5. On the lat of October, 1861, the plnlntitrs nor forms any part of the business carried on
entered Into the following agreement with by the plah1tlffs; and the derrick being an
the defendants: The defendants agree to entirely novel and exceptional vessel and the
sell and the plalntltra agree to purchase "for first of the kind built, no veaael of the sort
the sum of £3,500, the huJJ of the floating bad ever been applied to such a purpose. 'l'he
boom derrick now lying lo Bugsby's Hole In derrick was, however, capable of being apthe river Thames. It ls agreed between the. plied to and profitably em1>loyed for that purparties hereto that payment ahaJJ be made In pose, and had she been purchased for thnt
the following manner, that Is to say, the sum purpose her non-delivery at the time fixed by
of £350 at the signing of this memorandum, the agreement would have occasioned loss
a further sum of £1.400 when possession Is and damage to the plaintiffs to the amount
given. which Is . to be given within three of £420.
10. Great dlfllculty wna experienced In remonths from the date hereof, and the sum of
n;;r,o by a bill of exchange to be dated on .moving the tripod and other things from the
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hrll in consequence of their enormous weight

and size, and the hull was not cleared until

the latter end of May, 1862, when it was

found that some damage had been done to

the bottom and other parts of the vessel in

the course of removing the machinery.

11. Upon the hull being cleared, the de-

fendants gave notice to the plaintiffs that

they were ready to deliver it to them.

12. The plaintiffs, however, refused to re-

ceive the hull until the damage had been

properly repaired, and some difference arose

between the respective surveyors of the

plaintiffs and defendants as to the extent of

the injury and the proper mode of repairing

it. The plaintiffs continued to make objec-

tions to the sutiiciency of the repairs until the

1st of July, 1862, when the vessel was deliv-

ered.
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13. The plaintiffs, on the 1st of October,

1861, duly paid to the defendants £350 in

part payment of the purchase-money, and

they also duly paid the remainder of the pur-

chase-money at the time when the hull was

delivered to them.

14. The three months within which, accord-

ing to the terms of the agreement, the de-

fendants were to give up to the plaintitis pos-

session of the hull, expired on the 1st of

January, 1862, but the defendants did not

deliver it to the plaintiffs until the 1st of

Jul_\‘, 1862.

15. The injury caused to the bull in the re-

moval of the machinery depreciated her to

the amount of £50.

to. The plaintiffs, in anticipation of the de-

livery of the bull in January, 1862, entered

into a contract with Sir William Armstrong

for the construction and delivery to them at

a very heavy outlay of the necessary machin-

ery for the purpose for which they purchased

the hull, and in consequence of the delay in

the delivery of the hull by the defendants

the plaintiffs were prevented from taking

delivery of the machinery from Sir William

Armstrong. and the plaintiffs, on the 25th

of July, 1862, paid Sir Willlam Armstrong

£3,000, the interest of which was lost to

them. The plaintiffs also purchased, at a

large cost, two steam tugs to be used, in con-

junction with the bull, in towing the coal

barges to and from the same, and which

steam tugs were comparalively useless to the

plaintiffs during the time in which the hull

was undelivered, and the interest‘of the

money expended on the same was lost to the

plaintiffs; but none of the circumstances

were known to the defendants.

17. if the defendants had delivered the bull

to the plaintiffs in proper time the plaintiffs

would have realized large proﬁts by the use

of it in the aforesaid manner, and they were

put to great in(.'onveniencc and sustained

great loss owing to their not having posses-

sion of the bull to meet the great increase in

their trade.

18. The plaintiffs also lost £8. 15s. for in-

terest upon the portion of the purcinlse-mon-
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merely technical rule, via, that you are to en-

deavor to ascertain the real amount of dam-

ages that the plaintiff has sustained, and if

it is just and reasonable that the defendant

should make good this amount, he must pay

it: provided that if he had no notice of any

circumstance which makes the plaintitl"s loss

greater than it ordinarily would he. he cannot

be called upon to pay this extra damage; and

' the court of exchequer say if this limit were

not put there would be no limit to what de-

fendants in certain circumstances might be

called upon to pay; and therefore, say the

court, in order to recover from the vendor the

damage accruing on account of some special

sub-contract or other circumstance. the vendee

must affect hhn with notice. And the court lay

down the rule that the plaintiff can only re-

cover such damages as are the natural result
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of the breach of contract in ordinary circum-

stances, or,—which would appear to be an-

other mode of expressing the same thing,—

what were in the contemplation of both par-

ties at the time of the contract.

[BLACKB['R.\'. J. The damages are to be

what would be the natural consequences of

a breach under clrcumstances which both par-

ties were aware of.]

Accepting that as the statement of the law.

what are the facts here? 'l'he subject-matter

of the contract is entirely novel: and the pur-

pose for which it was intended to be used in

point of fact was entirely novel and excep-

tional; but any use of this hull would be novel

and exceptional. so that the £420 comes as

much within the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.

9 Exch. 341. 2% Law J. Exch. 179, as the other

and larger loss actually sustained.

[(X)CKBURN, C. J. No doubt, in order to

recover damage arising from a special pur-

pose the buyer must have communicated the

special purpose to the seller: but there is one

thing which must always be in the knowledge

of both parties, which i that the thing is

bought for the purpose of being in some way

or other proﬁtably applied]

No doubt; but the arbitrator has not found

that. He ﬁnds the special purpose for which

the hull was bought. and to which it was

in fact applied. and also the amount of dam-

‘age which the plaintiffs would have suf-

fered had they applied it to another special

purpose.

[BL-\(Jl(BUltN, J. Yes: but the arbitrator

(paragraphs 8 and 9) says that was the most

obvious purpose. and the one to which the de-

fendants supposed the hull was intended to

be applied]

But it is a use totally distinct from that to

which the plaintiffs applied and intended to

apply it.

[COi’.‘KBl‘RN. C. J. The two parties cer-

tainly had not in their common contemplation

the application of this vessel to any one spe-

ciﬁc purpose. The plaintiffs intended to ap-

ply it in their trade, but to the special pur-

pose of transshipping coals; the defendants be-

lieved that the plaintiffs would apply it to the
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which one of them has broken, the damages

which the other party ought to receive in

respect of such breach of contract should

be such as may fairly and reasonably be

considered, either arising naturally, i. e.

according to the usual course of things, from

such breach of contract itself [that is one

alternative], or such as may reasonably be

supposed to have been in the contemplation

of both parties, at the time they made the

contract, as the probable result of the

breach of it." Now, in the present case

the breach of contract was the non-delivery

at the agreed time of a hull capable of be-

ing used as a hulk for storing coals, and the

consequences that would naturally arise

from such non-delivery of it would be that

the purchaser would not be able to earn

money by its use, and this loss of proﬁt
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during the delay would be the measure oi.

the damages caused by the non-delivery.]

But the purpose supposed by the defend-

ants was not part of the business of the

plaintiffs, the hulk trade being a distinct

branch; so that it is impossible to say that

the loss of proﬁt which might have been de-

rived trom this supposed purpose could have

reasonably been contemplated as the nat-

ural consequence of the defendants‘ breach

of contract.

[MELLOR, J. That is tying down the ar-

bitrator's ﬁnding too strictly. There must

be some proﬁtable purpose, and this was the

most obvious proﬁtable purpose. Suppose

there are two equally proﬁtable but distinct

modes of using the same thing, and the buy-

er contemplates one use, and the seller the

other, it is not because the one party con-

templated one use and the other the other,

that the buyer is not to get any damages at

all.]

The answer is, such a case is not within

the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.

341, 23 Law J. Exch. 179.

UOUKBURN, C. J. I think the construc-

tion which Mr. Coleridge seeks to put upon

the case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.

341, 23 Law. J. Exch. 179, is not the correct

construction as applicable to such a case

as this. It that were the correct construc-

tion, it would be attended with most mis-

chievous consequences, because this would

follow, that whenever the seller was not

made aware of the particular and special

purpose to which the buyer intended to

apply the thing bought, but thought it was

for some other purpose, he would be re-

lieved entirely from making any compensa-

tion to the buyer, in case the thing was not

delivered in time, and so loss was sustained

by the buyer; and it would be entirely in

the power of the seller to break his contract

with impunity. That would necessarily fol-

low. if Mr. Coleridge's interpretation of Had-

ley v. Bnxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 23 Law J.

Exch. 179, was the true interpretation. My

Brother BLACKBURN has pointed out that

that is not the true construction of the lan-
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ages could never be anything but what both

parties contemplated; and where the buyer

intended to apply the thing to a purpose which

would make the damages greater, and did not

intend to apply it to the purpose which the

seller supposed he intended to apply it, the

consequence would be to set the defendant

free altogether. That would not be just, and

I do not think that was at all meant to be

expressed in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.

341, 23 Law J . Exch. 179. Here the arbitrator

has found that what the defendants supposed

when they were agreeing to furnish the der-

rick was that it was to be employed in the

most obvious manner to earn money, which

the arbitrator assesses at £420 during the six

ages could never be anything but what both
MELLOR, J. I am entirely of the same
parties contemplated; and where the buyer .opinion. The question Is, what ls the limit of
Intended to apply the thing to a purpose which damages which are to be given against the
would make the damages greater, and did not defendants tor the breach of this contract?
Intend to apply It to the purpose which the They wlll be the damages naturally resulting,
seller supposed he intended to apply lt, the and which might reasonably be In contempln·
consequence would be to set the defendant tlon of the parties as likely to ftow, from the
free altogether. That would not be just, and breach of such contract. It Is not because the
I do not think that was at all meant to be parties are not precisely ad idem as to the use
expressed In Hadley v, Baxendale, 9 Exch. ot the article In question that the defendants
34:1, 23 Law J. Exch. 179. Here the arbitrator are not to pay any damages. Both parties
ha.s found that what the defendants supposed contemplated a profitable use of the derri<'k;
when they were agreeing to furnish the der· and when one ftnds that the defendants con·
rick was that It was to be employed 1n the templated a particular use of It as the obmost obvious manner to earn money, which vious mode In which It might be used, I think
the arbitrator llssesses at £420 during the six as against the plalntltrs they cannot complain
months delay; and, &JI I believe the natural that the damages do not extend beyond that
consequence of not delivering the derrick was which they contemplated as the amount likely
that that sum was lost, I think the plalntltrs to result from their own breach of contract.
should recover to that extent.
Judgment tor the plalntltra accordingly•

months delay; and, as I believe the natural

consequence of not delivering the derrick was

that that sum was lost, I think the piaintiffs
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should recover to that extent.

. opinion.

MELLOR, J. I am entirely of the same

The question is, what is the limit of

damages which are to be given against the

defendants for the breach of this contract?

They will be the damages naturally resulting,

and which might reasonably be in contempla-

tion of the parties as likely to ﬂow, from the

breach of such contract. It is not because the

parties are not precisely ad idem as to the use

of the article in question that the defendants

are not to pay any damages. Both parties

contemplated a proiitahle use of the derrick;

and when one ﬁnds that the defendants con-

templated a particular use of it as the ob-

vious mode in which it might be used, I think

as against the plaintiffs they cannot complain

that the damages do not extend beyond that

which they contemplated as the amount likely

to result from their own breach of contract.

Judgment for the plaintiffs accordingly.

•
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Ing In the case to shew tl!at there was any
diminution In the value between_ those days.
The plalntllTs' claim, therefore, In that reCourt of Common Pl<'us. 'l'rinity Term. June 6, spect, would be covered by the £20 paid iuto
18i2.
court.
But they claim to be entitled to £26i 3s. {hi.
The plaintiffs, who were under a contract to
over
and above that sum, on the ground that
SUilPIY a quantity of military shoes to Hickson & Sons in London tfor the use of the these shoes had been sold by them at 4s. a
French army), at 4s. per pair, an unusunlly pall- to a consignee who required them for u
high price, to be delivered there by the 3d contract with a French house for supply to
of February, 1871, sent the shoes to the de- the French army, wWch price he would have
fendants' station at Kettering In time to be been bound to pay if tile shol'S had been dedelivered In the usual course In the evening livered on the 3d of February. The special
of that day, when they would have been ac- price which the consignee had agreed to pay
cepted and paid for by the consignee; and the was the consequence of the extraordina1·y destatlon·master had notice (which for the pur- mand arising from the wants of the l~rench
pose of the case was assmped to be notice to army; and the refusal of the consignee to acthe company) at the time that the plulntlt'fs cept the goous on the 4th was eaused by the
were under a contract to deli'l"er the shoes cessation ot the demand for shoC>s of that
by the 3d, and that, unless they were so de- character by reason of the war having come
livered they would be thrown on their hands, to an end. The market-price, ther<.'fore. we
hut no notice was giYen to the defendants must assume, to have been 2s. 9d. a pair when
that the contract with Hickson & Sons was, the shoes were delivered to the carriers: and
owh1g to very exceptional .circumstances, not: the circumstance which caused the differenee
an ordinary contract. The shoes uot nrrl'l"lng was that the plaintiffs had bad the adrnntage
In Lontlon until the 4th, Hlf'kson & Sons re- of a coutrnct at 4s. a pair before the extrnorjPC'ted the41, oud the plaintiffs were ultinrntely dhn11·y demand had ceased. \Vas that, then,
otiliged to sell them at a loss of ls. 3d. per an excC>ptlonal contract? It was not, I toke
pnlr,-=-2s. !ld. per pair being the ordinary mar- it, at the time the contract was entered into;
but it was at the time the shoes were delivlwt value.
ered to the carriers. The plnintltTs sustained
~awbrldJ?e &
Wrentmore, for plaintiffs. a loss of ls. 3d. a 1mir on the 4;;95 pairs of
RPale. Marigold & Beale, for defendants.
shoes which they failed to deliver in pursuance of their contract. It was, so to SJ>Pllk.
WILLES. J. This case raises a very nice a penalty thrown upo{ them by reason of
question upon the measure o.f damages to the breach of contract. In that point of view.
whld1 a common cn1Tler Is liable f<ir a brl.'nch the contract was an e CPJltional one at the
of his contract to carry goods. \It would time the shoes were dellverPd to the C'arriPrs;
seem that the damages which he ls to pay and they ought to bave been informed of the
for a late delivery sl!ould be the amount of fact that by reason of special circumstances
the loss which In the ordinary course of things the sellers would, If the delivery had taken
would rl.'sult from his nPglect.I The ordinnry place in time, have been <.'ntltled to retelve
consequence of the non-dPll~ery of the goods from the consignee a larger price for the
bf're on the 3d of February would he that the shoes than they would have been entitled to
consignee might reject them, and so Uwy In the ordinary course of trade.\ It must be
would be thrown upon the market gerwr:ill~-, rPmembered that we are dealing £...-1th the cnse
Instead of going to the particular purchaser;J of a common carrier, who is hound to accC>pt
and the measure of damages would ordinarily' the goods. It would be hard Indeed If the
be In respeet of the trouhle to which the con- law were to fix him with the further liability
signor would be put in disposing of them to which Is here sought to be imposed upon him,
another customer, and the d!IIereuce betwt>en hecause he has vecel"'ed a notice which does
the vnlue of the goods on the 3d and till' not disclose the \speelal and exceptional couamount renllze1l by n reusonahle sale. I That sequ<.'n<'C'S which will or may result from a
prima fade would be the sum to be p!id, In delnyC'd delivery.) I think the law In this
the alJseuce of some notice to the carrier rC>SJlPl't has gone quite as far as good sense
which would r£>rnl£>r him liable for fmmething warrnnts. The cases as to the measure of
wore special. These consequences would re- damages for a tort do not «pply to a casP
for to the value of the goods at the time of of contract. That was suggested in a case
tlwlr <!!'livery to the currier, the goo1ls bd11g In Bulstrode,-Everarrl Y. Hopkins, 2 Bul~t.
1·onsignert to an ordinary market 1rnrt bPing 3:32.-but the notion was corrN:tC>ll In Hadl!'y
goods in dally use and not subject to mueh v. B7"tendale, 9 Exch. 841, 2:l Law J. Exch.
tluetuatlon in price. In tltl' pn•sent case. tnk- liV. \The llama1n·s are to be limitt•cl to those
iug 2s. \Jd. pe1· pair as the ,·aJue of the shoe!'!, thnt are tl11• natural and ordinary consethe ordinary damagC>s would be the trouble quences which muy be supposed to ha'l"e heen
the plai11tift"s werP pnt to In procuring some In the conh•mplntlon of the parties at thl'
one to take thPm at that prit'1>, plus the dif- time of making the rontrn<.:t., I go turthN'.
f1' l'C'll<'C', if an)·. in the market ,·aJue b<.'twt•t' n I arlh<>l'C' to what I said In Saw-Mill Co. v.
tl1<• :..:u and the -!th of l•'ebruary. I find uoth- Kettll'ship, L. R. 3 C. J>, 4U9, ut p. 509, viz.
HOTINE v. }IIDLAND RY. 00.
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\

HORNE v. MIDLAND RY. CO.

(L. R. 7 O. P. 583.)

Court of Common Pleas. Trinity Term. June 6,

1872.

The plaintiffs, who were under a contract to

supply a quantity of military shoes to Hick-

son & Sons in London (for the use of the

French army), at 4s. per pair, an unusually

high price, to be delivered there by the 3d

of February, 1871, sent the shoes to the de-

fendants' station at Kettering in time to be

delivered in the usual course in the evening

of that day, when they would have been ac-

cepted and paid for by the consignee; and the

station-master had notice (which for the pur-

pose of the case was assumed to be notice to

the company) at the time that the plaintiffs

were under a contract to deliver the shoes
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by the 3d, and that, unless they were so de-

livered they would be thrown on their hands,

but no notice was given to the defendants

that the contract with Hickson & Sons wa,

owing to very exceptional-circumstances, not

an ordinary contract. The shoes not arriving

in London until the 4th, Hickson & Sons re-

jected them, and the plaintiffs were ultimately

obliged to sell them at a loss of 1s. 3d. per

pair,—'—2s. 9d. per pair being the ordinary mar-

ket value.

Sawhridge & Wrentmore, for plaintiffs.

Beale. Marigold & Beale, for defendants.

WILLES, J. This case raises a very nice

question upon the measure of damages to

which a common carrier is liable f r a breach

of his contract to carry goods-. It would

seem that the damages which he is to pay

for a late delivery should be the amount of

the loss which in the ordinary course of things

would result from his neglect.‘ The ordinary

consequence of the non-delivery of the goods

here on the 3d of February would he that the

consignee might reject them, and so they

would be thrown upon the market generally,

instead of going to the particular purchaser;

and the measure of damages would ordinaril

be in respect of the trouble to which the con-

signor would be put in disposing of them to

another customer, and the difference between

the value of the goods on the 3d and the

amount realized by a reasonable sale.!That

prima facic would be the sum to be p id, in

the absence of some notice to the carrier

which would render him liable for something

more special. These consequences would re-

fer to the value of the goods at the time of

their delivery to the carrier, the goods being

consigned to an ordinary market and being

goods in daily use and not subject to much

ﬂuctuation in price. In the present case. tak-

ing 2s. 9d. per pair as the value of the shoes,

the ordinary damages would be the trouble

the plaintiffs were put to in procuring some

one to take them at that price, plus the dif-

ference, if any. in the market value between

the Lid and the 4th of February. I ﬁnd noth-

ing in the case to shew that there was any

diminution in the value betweenthose days.

(L. R. 7 C. P. 583.)
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that “the knowledge must be brought home to

the party sought to be charged, under such

circumstances_that he must know that the

person he contracts with reasonably believes

that he accepts the contract with the special

condition attached to it." Was there any

notice here that the defendants would be held

accountable for the particular damages now

claimed? In the ordinary course of things,

the value of the shoes was 2s. 9d. a pair at

the time they were delivered to the defend-

ants to be carried. There was no change in

their market value between the 3d of February

and the 4th; and no notice to the carriers

that the consignees had contracted to pay

for them the exceptional price of 4s. a pair.

The defendants had no notice of the penalty,

so to speak, which a delay in the delivery

would impose upon the plaintiffs. It would,
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as it seems to me, be an extraordinary result

to arrive at, to hold that a more notice to

the carriers that the shoes would be thrown

upon the hands of the consignors it they did

not reach the consignees by the 3d of Feb-

ruary, should ﬁx them with so large a claim.

by reason of facts which were existing in the

minds of the consignors, but were not com-

municated to the carriers at the time

For these reasons, I come to the conclusion

that enough has been paid into court to cover

all the damages which the plaintiffs are en-

titled to recover, and that there must be judg-

ment for the defendants.

KEATING, J. I am of the same opinion.

upon the ground stated by my Brother

WILLES, viz. that the damages claimed are

the consequence not of that which could have

been contemplated by the parties, but of an

exceptional state o1. ‘ things. No doubt, a car-

rier who fails to deliver in due time goods en-

trusted to him is linble, in damages for the

ordinary and natural consequences of his

breach of contract. But I think, giving the rur-

lest effect to Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341.

23 Law J. Exch. 179, and the rule there laid

down, but which ought not to be extended,

we cannot hold the defendants liable in re-

spect of a loss resulting from an exceptional

state of things which was not communicated

to them at the time. There must, lf it he

sought to charge the carrier with consequen-

ces so onerous, be distinct evidence that he

had notice of the facts and assented to ac-

cept the contract upon those terms. That

evidence is not disclosed in this case.

Judgment for the defendants.

NOTE. See this case atiirmed in exchequer

chamber. L. R. 8 O. P. 131.
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GRIFFIN v. COLVER et al.

(16 N. Y. 489.)

Court of Appeals of New York, March Term,

1858.

Action to recover the purchase price of an

engine. Defendants sought to recoup dam-

ages for delay in delivery of the engine.

There was a judgment for plaintiff, from

which defendants appealed.

John C. Churchill, for appellants.

for respondent.

D. Coats,

SELDEN, J. The only point made by the

appellants is that in estimating their dam-

ages on account of the plaintiffs failure to

furnish the engine by the time speciﬁed in

the contract, they should have been allowed

what the proof showed they might have

earned by the use of such engine, together
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with their other machinery, during the time

lost by the delay. This claim was objected

to, and rejected upon the trial as coming

within the rule which precludes the allow-

ance of proﬁts, by way of damages, for the

breach of an executory contract.

To determine whether this rule was cor-

rectly applied by the referee, it is necessary

to recur to the reason upon which it is

founded. It is not a primary rule, but is a

mere deduction from that more general and

fundamental rule which requires that the

damage claimed should in all cases be

shown, by clear and satisfactory evidence,

to have been actually sustained. It is a

well-established rule of the common law

that the damages to be recovered for a

‘breach of contract must be shown with cer-»

1tainty, and not left to speculation or conjec-

ture; and it is under this rule that proﬁts

are excluded from the estimate of damages

in such cases, and not because there is any

thing in their nature which should per se

prevent their allowance. Proﬁts which

ould certainly have been realized but for

he defendant's default are recoverable; those

which are speculative or contingent are not.

Hence, in an action for the breach of a

contract to transport goods, the difference

between the price, at the point where the

goods are and that to which they were to

be transported, is taken as the measure of

damages; and in an action against a vendor

for not delivering the chattels sold, the ven-

dee is allowed the market price upon the

day ﬁxed for the delivery. Although this,

in both cases, amounts to an allowance of

proﬁts, yet, as those proﬁts do not depend

upon any contingency, their recovery is per-

mitted. It is regarded as certain that the

goods would have been worth the estab-‘

lished market price at the place and on the

day when and where they should have been

delivered,

On the other hand, in cases of illegal cap-

ture, or of the insurance of goods lost at sea,

there can be no recovery for the probable

loss of proﬁts at the port of destination. The

principal reason for the diiicrencc between

lJiiLE()'.i' AND (JOSb'klQUE){'l'iAL DAMAGES-—1N (JON'l‘RACl‘.

1:‘?

the breach of one contract from availing

himself of some other collateral and inde-

pendent contract entered into with other par-

ties, or from performing some act in rela-

tion to his own business not necessarily

connected with the agreement. An instance

of the latter kind is where a canon of the

church, by rwson of the non-delivery of a

horse pursuant to agreement, was prevented

from arriving at his residence in time to col-

lect his tithes.

In such cases the damages sustained are

disallowed, not because they are uncertain,

nor because they are merely consequential

or remote, but because they cannot be fairly

considered as having been within the con-

templation of the parties at the time of

entering into the contract. Hence the objec-

tion is removed, if it is shown that the con-
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tract was entered into for the express pur-

pose of enabling the party to fulﬁll his col-

lateral agreement, or perform the act sup-

posed. Sedg. Dam. c. 3.

In Blanchard v. Ely the damages claimed

consisted in the loss of the use of the very

article which the plaintiff had agreed to

construct; and were, therefore, in the plain-

est sense, the direct and proximate result of

the breach alleged. Moreover, that use was

contemplated by the parties in entering into

the contract, and constituted the object for

which the steamboat was built. It is clear,

therefore, that the rule of Pothler had noth-

ing to do with the case. Those damages

must then have been disallowed, because

they consisted of proﬁts depending, not, as

in the case of a contract to transport goods,

upon a mere question of market value, but

upon the ﬂuctuations of travel and of trade,

and many other contingencies. The cita-

tlnn, by Cowen, J., of the maritime cases to

which I have referred, tends to conﬁrm this

view. This case, therefore, is a direct au-

thority in support of the doctrine that when-

ever the proﬁts claimed depend upon con-

tingencies of the character referred to, they

are not recoverable.

The case of Masterton v. Mayor, etc., of

Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61, decides nothing in op-

position to this doctrine. It simply goes to

support the other branch of the rule, viz.,

that proﬁts are allowed where they do not

depend upon the chances of trade, but upon

the market value of goods, the price of labor,

the cost of transportation, and other ques-

tions of the like nature, which can be ren-

dered reasonably certain by evidence.

From these authorities and principles it is

clear that the defendants were not entitled

to measure their damages by estimating what

they might have earned by the use of the

engine and their other machinery had the

contract been complied with. Nearly every

element entering into such a computation

would have been of that uncertain character

which has uniformly prevented a recovery

for speculative proﬁts.

But it by no means follows that no allow-

l:.'.8
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to be estimated by ascertaining the amount

of business which could have been done by

the use of the engine, and the proﬁts that

would have thence accrued. This claim was

rejected by Mr. Justice Harris, before whom

the cause was tried, upon the precise ground

taken here. But he, nevertheless, held that

compensation was to be allowed for the "loss

of the use of the plaintiffs mill and other

machinery." He did not, it is true, specify

in terms the mode in which the value of

such use was to be estimated; but as he had

previously rejected the probable proﬁts of

the business as the measure of such value,

no other appropriate data would seem to

have remained but the fair rent or hire of

the mill and machinery; and such I have no

doubt was the meaning of ‘the judge. Thus

understood, the decision in that case, and
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the reasoning upon which it was based, were,

I think, entirely accurate.

Had the defendants in the case of Bian-

chard v. Ely, supra, taken the ground that

they were entitled to recoup, not the uncer-

tain and contingent proﬁts of the trips lost,

but such sum as they could have realized by

chartering the boat for those trips, I think

their claim must have been sustained. The

loss of the trips, which had certainly oc-

curred, was not only the direct but the im-

mediate and necessary result of the breach

of the plaintiffs' contract.

The rent of a mill or other similar prop-

erty, the price which should be paid for the

charter of a steamboat, or the use of ma-

chinery, etc., are not only susceptible of

more exact and deﬁnite proof, but, in a ma-

jority of cases would, I think, he found to

be a more accurate measure of the damages

actually sustained in the class of cases re-

ferred to, considering the contingencies and

hazards attending the prosecution of most

kinds of business, than any estimate of an-

ticipated proﬁts; just as the ordinary rate

of interest is, upon the whole, a more accu-

rate measure of the damages sustained in

consequence of the non-payment of a debt

than any speculative proﬁt which the credit-

or might expect to realize from the use of

the money. It is no answer to this to say

that, in estimating what would be the fair

rent of a mill, we must take into considera-

tion all the risks of the business in which it

is to be used. Rents are graduated accord-

ing to the value of the property and to an

average of proﬁts arrived at by very ex-

tended observation; and so accurate are the

results of experience in this respect that

rents are rendered nearly if not quite as cer-

tain as the market value of commodities at

a particular time and place.

The proper rule for estimating this por-

tion of the damages in the present case wi1s,

to ascertain what would have been a fair

price to pay for the use of the engine and

machinery, in view of all the hazards and

chances of the business; and this is the rule

which I understand the referee to have

DmECT .AND
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to be estimated by asce11aining the amount
of business which could have been done by
the use of the engine, and the profits that
would have thence accrued. This claim was
rejected by l\Ir. Justice Harris, before whom
ti.le cause was tried, upon the precise ground
taken here. But be, nevertheless, held that
compensation was to be allowed for the "loss
of the use of the plalntilf's mill and other
machinery." He did not, it Is true, specify
In terms the mode in which the value of
such use was to I.le estimated; but as he bad
previously rejected the probable profits of
the business as the measure of such value,
no other appropriate data would seem to
have remained but the fair rent or hire of
the mill and machinery; and such I have no
doubt was the meaning of 'the judge. Thus
understood, the decision in that case, and
the reasoulng upon which it was based, were,
I think, entirely accurate.
Had the defendants in the case of Blanchard v. Ely, supra, ta.ken the ground that
they were entitled to recoup, not the uncertain and contingent profits of the trips lost,
but such sum as they could have realized by
chnrterlng the boot f<>r those trips, I think
their clalm must have been sustained. The
loss of the trips, which hlld certainly occurrect, was not only the direct but the immediate and necessary resul~ 1>f the breach
of the pllilntllfs' contract.
The rent of a mill or other similar property, the price which should be paid for the
charter of a steamboat, or the use of machinery, etc., are not only susceptible of

DAMAGE::l-IN CONTHACT.

more exact and definite proof, but, in a majority of cases would, I think, be found to
be a more accurate measure of the damages
actually sustained in the class of cases referred to, conside11ng the contingencies an<l
hazards attending the prosecution of most
kinds of business, than any estimate ot anticipated' profits; just as the ordinary rate
of interest Is, upon the whole, a more accurate measure of the damages sustained in
consequence of the non-payment e>f a debt
than any speculative profit which the creditor might expect to realize from the use <J!
the money. It is no answer to this to say
that, in estimating what would be the fair
rent of a mill, we mu.st tn.ke Into consideration all the risks of the business ln which It
is to be used. Rents are graduated ucording to the value of the property and to an
average of profits arrived at by very extended observation; and so accurate are the
results of experience in this respect that
rents are rendered nearly if ne>t quite as certain as the market value ot commodities at
a particular time and place.
The proper rule for estimating this p01·tlon e>f the damages In the present case was.
to ascertain what would have been a fair
price to pay tor the use ot the engine and
machinery, in view of all the hazards and
chances ot the business; and this is the rule
which I understand the referee to have.
ndopted. '!'here is no error in the other al-·
lowances made by the referee. The judg..:
ment should, therefore, be atllrmed.
Judgment afflrmed.
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LEONARD v. .\'EW YORK, A. & B. ELEC-

TRO—\IAGNI€'l‘IC TEL. CO.l

(-11 N. Y. 5-H.)

Court of Appeals of New York. 1870.

The defendants in 1856 owned and oper-

ated a telegraph between Buffalo and New

York, connecting at Buffalo with the Western '

Union Telegraph Company to Chicago, and

at Syracuse with a line to Oswego. The

plaintiffs were manufacturers of, and dealers

in salt, at Syracuse. and had agents, Magill

& Pickering at Chicago, and Staats at Os-

wego. Magiil & 1‘icl..'erin;; had authority to

order salt from Staats for sale at Chicago.

On Sept. 24, 1856, Magiil & Pickering. act-

ing for plaintiffs. delivered to the Western

l'nion Company at Chit-ago, a dispatch to

be sent to Slants at ()<\\-ego, as follows:

“D. B. Staats, Oswegol Send 5.000 sacks of
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salt immediately. .\lagill & Pickering." Q-And

paid the usual charges for transmission. The

dispatch was sent by the Western Union

Company to Buffalo. and there delivered to

the agent of the defendants. It was trans-

mitted by the defendants over their line to

Syracuse; and in transcribing it at this point

for the purpose of delivery to the Oswego

line, the agent of defendants negligently

wrote the word "casks" in place of "sacks.“

so that when the message was delivered to

the Oswego line, and by that line to Staats,

it read as follows: “D. B. Staats. Oswego:

Send 5,000 casks of salt immediately. \Iagill

& Pickering."

The term “sacks" in the salt trade desig-

nates ﬁne salt in sacks containing fourteen

pounds, and the term “casks" designates

coarse salt in packages containing not less

than three hundred and twenty pounds.

Staats received the telegram on the after-

noon of Sept. 24, 1856, and that evening or

the next morning, chartered the schooner S.

H. Latbrop, to take the salt to Chicago, and

shipped by her 2,733'.100/28° barrels of coarse

salt. As soon as Staats received the dis-

patch he telegraphed to plaintiffs at Syra-

cuse as follows: “Shall I ship \Iagill &

Pickering 5.000 casks? Just received or-

der." On Sept. 25, plaintiffs answered Staats

by telegram. as follows: “You may ship

Magill & Pickering the 5.000." The last dis-

patch was received hy Slants on the 25th,

and on the same day he telegraphed plain-

tiffs: “Ship along immediately; ﬂeet in,

Magill & Pickering telegraphed, send us 5,-

000 casks salt immediately; I suppose

coarse." The plaintiffs received the last dis-

patch on Sept. 25. On Sept. 26, plaintiffs

telegraplfed from Syracuse to Magill & Pick-

cring at Chicago, as follows: "What kind of

salt do you want? Coarse or ﬁne? Answer."

On the same day Magill & Pickering answer-

1 Opinions of HUNT and I.()'l"l‘. JJ.. and dis-

senting opinions of “'()OI)liUl“l" and DAN-

IELS. JJ.. omitted.

LAW DA\I.2d Ed.—9

ed the plaintiffs as follows: “Three-quarters

ﬁne; balance coarse." Plaintiffs immediate-
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cago, with the costs of transportation added

thereto, with interest from the time of the ar-

rival of said salt at Chicago." Judgment was

aﬂirmed.

The cause was submitted in June, 1868; a

reargument was ordered in Sept. of the same
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cago, with the costs of transportation added
thereto, with interest from the time of the arrival of said salt at Chicago." Judgment was
affirmed.
The cause was submitted in June, 1868; a
reargument was ordered in Sept. of the same
year, and it was reargued Jn l\larch, 1869;
and the court being again divided, another reargument was orde1·ed, which took place at
the January term, 1870.

year, and it was reargued in .\Iarch, 1869;

and the court being again divided, another re-
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argument was ordered, which took place at

the January term, 1870.

Grosvenor P. Lowery, for appellants.

Charles Andrews, for respondent.

EARL, C. J. The appellant seek a re-

versal of this judgment upon two grounds,

and unless we ﬁnd its position right in refer-

ence to one or both of them, it is conceded

that the judgment must be afﬁrmed.

1. It claims that the plaintiffs‘ agent,

Staats, was guilty of negligence in not stop-
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ping and unloading the vessel, after he re-

ceived plaintiffs‘ dispatch of the 26th of

September, and thus avoiding most of the

damage which plaintiffs sustained. Before

this dispatch was received, the loading of the

vessel was completed, the bill of lading was

signed and delivered to the master, and he

had procured his clearance from the port of

Oswego. Staats knew these facts, and knew

also that it was usual for vessels, at that

season of the year, to hurry their departure.

Relying upon these facts, and supposing the

vessel had actually sailed, he made no effort

to detain her. From all this, the referee

found that there was no negligence on the

part of Staats, and I see no good reason for

disturbing his ﬁndings. There were sufﬁcient

grounds for concluding, in good faith, that the

vessel had sailed; the facts indicated that she

had sailed, and I do not see how Staats could

be charged with the want of ordinary dill-

gence, in relying upon them. The greatest

degree of diligence would doubtless have re-

quired Staats to have made inquiries for the

vessel, after he received the dispatch. But he

was only bound to ordinary diligence, and I

do not see how we can ﬁnd the want of such

a degree of diligence against the ﬁnding of

the referee, and in favor of a party, who

upon this question, has the aﬂlnmatlve. Ham-

ilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 76; Milton v.

Steamboat Co., 37 N. Y. 210; Costigan v.

Railroad Co., 2 Denio, 609; Dorwin v. Pot-

ter, 5 Denio, 306; Shear. & R. Neg. § 598.

But aside from this, it is by no means cer-

tain that Staats could have obtained the salt

from the vessel, if he had made the effort

.

He had made a valid contract to have the

salt transported to Chicago, and the other

party to the contract had taken possession

of the salt, and entered upon the execution

of the contract. What right had Staats to

take the salt away from him? I know of no

process of law by which he could have done

it. And what right did the defendants have

to ask Staats to violate his contract with

that third party, in order to shield it from

the consequences of its own wrong? I am

EARL, C. J. The appellant seeks a reversal of this judgment upon two grounds,
and unless we find its position right in reference to one or both of them, it Is conceded
that the jtulgment must be affirmed.
1. It claims that the plaintil'ls' agent,
Staats, was guilty of negligence In not stopping and unloading the vessel, after be re/ ceived plalnti1Is' dispatch of the 2Gch of
September, and thus avoiding most of the
damage which plalntil'ls sustained. Before
this dispatch was received, the loading of tht'
vessel was completed, the bill of lading was
signed and delivered to the master, and be
bad procured bis clearance from the port of
Oswego. Staats knew these facts, and knew
also that it was usual for vessels, at that
season of the year, to hurry their departure.
Relying upon these facts, and supposing the
vessel had actually sailed, be made no el'lort
to detain her. From all this, the referee
found that there was no negligence on the
part of Staats, and I see no good reason for
disturbing his findings. There were sufficient
grounds for concluding, In good faith, that the
-vessel had sailed; the facts Indicated that she
bad sailed, and I do not see how Staats could
be charged with the want of ordinary diligence, In relying upon them. The greatest
dl'gree of diligence would doubtless ha-ve required Staats to have made Inquiries for the
vessel, after be received the dispatch. But he
was only bound to ordinary diligence, and I
do not see bow we can find the want of such
a dt•gree of dlllgence against the finding of
the referee, and in favor of a party, who
upon this question, has the affirmative. Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 76; Milton v.
Steamboat Co., 37 N. Y. 210; Costigan v.
Railroad Co., 2 Denio, 609; Dorwin v. Potter, 5 Denio, 306; Shear. & R. Neg. § 598.
But aside from this, It ls by no means cert.'lln thnt Staats could have obtained the salt
from the vessel, !! he had made the eO'.ort.
He bad mnde a valid contract to have the
salt transported to Chicago, and the other
party to the contract bad taken possession
or the salt, and entered upon the execution
or the contmct. What right bad Staats to
take the snit away from him? I know of no
process or law by which he could have done
It. And what right did the defendants have
to ask Stnnts to violate his contract with
that third party, In order to sblel<l It from

the consequences ot its own wrong? I am
therefore clearly of the opinion that the alleged negligence furnishes no defense to the
action.
2. It ls also claimed that the referee adopt- 1
ed an erroneous rule of dllllllages, and that ·
the plaintiffs should not in any event have recovered more than they actually disbursed
for freight on the salt to Chicago. The
measure of damages to be applied to cases as
they arise bas been a fruitful subject of discussion in the courts. The difficulty ls not
so much In laying down general rules, as ln
applying them. The cardinal rule undoubtedly Is, that the one party shall recover all the
damages which bas been occasioned by the
breach of contract by the other party. But
this rule Is modified In its application by two
others. The dnmages must flow directly and
naturally from the breach of contract, and
they must be certain, both ln their nature and
In respect to the cause from which they proceed. Under this latter rule speculative, contingent and remote damages, which cannot be
directly traced to the breach complained of,
arc excluded. Under the former rule, such
damages are only allowed as may fairly be
supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties when they made the contract, as might naturally be expected to follow Its violation. It is not required that the
parties must have contemplated the actual
damages which are to be allowed. But the
damages must be such as the parties may
fairly be supposed to have contemplated
when they mude the contract. Parties entering into contracts usunlly contemplate that
they will be performed, and 11ot that they will
be violated. They very rarely actually contemplate any damages which would flow from
an~· lJreach, and very frequently have not
sutficient Information to know what such damages would be. As lioth parties are usually
e11ually liound to know and be Informed of
the facts pertaining to the execution or breach
of a contract which they have entered into,
I think a more precise statement of this rule
ts, that a party ls liable for all the direct
damages which both parties to the contra.ct
would have contemplated as flowing from its
breach, If at the time they entered !nto it they
had bestowed proper attention upon the subject, and had been fully informed of the
facts. In this case then, In what muy 1u·operly be called the fiction of law, the defendant must be presumed to have known that
this dispatch was an order !or salt, as an
article of merchandise, and that the plaintiff
would fill the order as delivered; and that if
the salt was shipped to Chicago, It would be
shipped there us an article ot wercl'lllndlse, to
be sold ln the open mzuket. And the market
price ln Chicago being less than the market
price In Oswego, that they would lose the
cost of transportation, and the dil'terence between the market price at Chicago and the
market prire at Oswego. I think therefore
that the rule ot damages adopted by the
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referee was sufﬂciently favorable to the de-

fendant. The damages allowed were certain,

and they were the proximate, direct result of

the breach.

I do not think, under the facts of this case,

that the plaintiffs, when they found the state

of the Chicago market, were bound to reship

this salt to Oswego. For any thing that ap-

pears in this case, the cost of transportation

to Oswego would have been equal to the dif-

ference in the market price between the two

places. Then there was the risk of the lake

transportation at that season of the year,

and the uncertainty in the Oswego market

when the salt should again be landed there.

If the plaintiff had shipped it, and it had

been lost upon the lake, the total loss would

not have been chargeable to the defendant.

By the wrongful act of the defendant, the salt
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had been placed in Chicago, one of the largest

commercial centers in the country, and the

plaintiffs had the right to sell it there in good

faith, and hold the defendant liable for the

loss.

I have therefore reached the conclusion that

the judgment must be adirmed; and in reach-

ing this conclusion, I believe I am sustained

by princlples'well settled, and by adjudged

cases quite analogous. Sedg. Dam. 37; Had-

ley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 841; Saw Mill Co.

v. Nettleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499, 508; Wilson

v. Dock Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 177; Griﬂin v.

Colver, 16 N. Y. 489; Hamilton v. McPherson,

28 N. Y. 72; Kent v. Railroad Co., 22 Barb.

278; Medbury v. Railroad Co., 26 Barb. 564;

Scoville v. Grifﬁth, 12 N. Y. 509; Cutting v.

Railway Co., 13 Allen, 381; Squires v. Tele-

graph Co., 98 Mass. 232; Telegraph Co. v.

Wenger, 55 Pa. St. 262; Telegraph Co. v.

Dryhurg, 35 Pa. St. 298; Williams v. Barton,

13 La. 404.

Judgment aﬂirmed, with costs.

GROVER, J., dlssents.

referee was sufficiently favorable to the defendant. The damages allowed were certain,
and they were the proximate, direct result of
the breach.
I do not think, under the facts of this case,
that the plalntllfs, when they found the state
of the Chicago market, were bound to re-ship
this salt to Oswego. For any thing that appears in this case, the cost of transports tlon
to Oswego would have been equal to the di!terence In the market price between the two
places. Then there was the risk of the lake
transportation at that season of the year,
and the uncertainty ln the Oswego market
when the salt should again be landed there.
If the plalntllf had shipped It, nnd it bad
been lost upon the lake, the total loss would
not have been chargeable to the defendant.
By the wrongful act of the defendant, the salt
bad been placed In Chicago, one of the largest
commerdal centers In the country, and the
plalntufs had the right to sell It there ln good
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faith, and hold the defendant liable for the
loss.
I have therefore reached the conclusion that
the judgment must be e.lllrmed; nnd ln reaching this conclusion, I believe I am sustained
by ,principles •well settled, and ~Y adjudged
cases quite analogous. Sedg. Dam. 3i; Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341; Saw Miil Co.
v. Nettlesblp, L. R. 3 C. P. 400, f;08; Wilson
v. Dock C-0., L. R. 1 Exch. 177; Griffin v.
Colver, 16 N. Y. 489; Hamilton v. McPherson,
28 N. Y. 72; Kent v. Railroad Co., 22 Bnrh.
278; Medbury v. Railroad Co., 26 Barb. 5G-l;
Scovllle v. Griffith, 12 N. Y. 500; Cutting v.
Railway C<>., 13 Allen, 381; Squires v. Telegraph Co., 98 Mass. 232; Telegraph Co. v.
Wenger, 55 Pa. St. 262; Telegraph C-0. v.
Drylmrg, 35 Pa. St. 298; Williams v. Barton,
13 La. 404.
Judgment amrmed, with costs.
GROVER, J., dissents.
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BOOTH v. SPUYTEN DUYVIL ROLLING

MILL CO.

(60 N. Y. 4 .)

Court of Appeals of New York. 1875.

Action against the Spuyten Duyvil Rolling

Mill Company for breach of a contract to

make and deliver by a certain date a quan-

tity of steel caps for rails. At the time of

making the contract, defendant was inform-

ed that the caps were to be used in making

rails to ﬁll a contract which plaintiff had

made with the New York Central Railroad

Company, but defendant was not informed

as to what price plaintiff was to receive for

the rails. Both parties knew that the caps

could not be procured elsewhere in time to

ﬁll the sub-contract. The caps alone had no

market value. Defendant's mill was burned

Court of Appeals of New Y~rk. 1875.
Action aghinst the Spuyten Duyvil Rolling
Mill Company for breach of a contract to
make and deliver by a certain date a quantity ot steel caps for rails. At the time of
making the contract, defendant was lnformed that the caps were to be used In making
ralls to fill a contract which plalntitr had
made with the New York Central Railroad
Company, but defendant was not Informed
as to what price plalntltr was to receive fol'
the rails. Both parties knew that the caps
could not be procured elsewhere In time to
fill the sub-contract. 'l'he caps alone had no
market value. Defendant's mill was burned
before the time for furnishing the caps had
expired, and they were never furnished.
There was a judgment for plalntlll'., from
which defendant appealed.

before the time for furnishing the caps had
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expired, and they were never furnished.

There was a judgment for plaintiff, from

which defendant appealed.

CHURCH, C. J. The point made, that the

ﬁestruction of the mill by ﬁre was an excuse

for the non-performance of the contract by

the defendant, is not tenable. in the ﬁrst

place it does not appear nor is it found as a

fact, that the burning of the mill prevented

such performance. The contract was made

December 27th, and the steel caps were to

be delivered on the 1st of April thereafter.

The mill burned on the 10th of March; and

the proper construction of the ﬁnding is, that

the defendant was prevented after that time

from completing the contract, but there was

ample timcprior to that event to have man-

ufactured the eaps. A party cannot post-

pone the performance of such a contract to

the last moment and then interpose an acci-

dent to excuse it. The defendant took the

responsibility of the delay. But the case is

not within the principle decided in Dexter v.-

Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, and the authorities upon

which it was based. That principle applies

when it is apparent that the parties contem-

plated the continued existence of a particular

person or thing which is the subject of the

contract. as in the case of the Musical Hall

destroyed by ﬁre (Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best

& S. 826); in the case of an apprentice who

became permanently ill (Boast v. Frith, L.

R. 4 C. P. 1); and of a woman who, from

iliness, was unable to perform as a pianist

(Robinson v. Davison, L. R. 6 Exch. 269).

In these and analogous cases a condition is

implied that the person or thing shall con-

tinue to exist. In Dexter v. Norton, supra,

this principle was applied to relieve a party

from damages for a failure to deliver prop-

erty which was burned without his fault,

but it has no application to a case of this

character. There was no physical or natural

impossibility, inherent in the nature of the

thing to be performed, upon which a condi-

tion that the mill should continue can be

predicated. The article was to be manu-

factured and delivered, and whether by that

particular machinery or in that mill would

CHURCH, C. J. 'fhe point made, that the
!destruction of tbe mill by fire was an excuse
I tor the non-performance of the contract by
the defendant, ls not tenable. In the first
place it does not appear nor is It found as a
fact, that the burnlng of the mill prevented
such performance. The contract was made
December 27th, and the steel caps were to
be delivered on the 1st of Apr\} thereafter.
The mill burned on the 10th of March; and
the proper construction of the finding ls, that
the defendant was prevented after that time
from completing the contract, but there was
ample time ·prior to that event to have manufactured the caps. A party cannot postpone the performance of such a contract to
the last moment and then Interpose an accident to excuse it. The defendant took the
respcnslblllty of the delay. But the case ls
not within the principle decided In Dexter v ..
Not·ton, 47 N. Y. 62, and the authorities upon
which It was based. That principle applies
when It Is apparent that the parties contem·
plated the continued existence of a particular
person or t!J.lng which Is the eubject of the
contrnct, as in the case of the Musical Hall
destroyed by fire (Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best
& 8. S:!G); In the case of nn apprentice who
became permanently III (Boast v. Frith, L.
H. 4 C. P. 1); and of a woman who, from
lllnl's.,, was unable to perform as a pianist
(Robinson v. Davison, L. R. 6 Exch. 260).
Jn tlu~se and analogous cases a condition ls
lm11Iled that the person or thing shall continue to exist. In Dexter v. Norton, supra,
this principle was applie{l to relieve a party
from damages for a fnllme to deliver pl'Operty which was burned without his fault,
but It has no application to a case of this
character. There was no physieal or natural
Impossibility, Inherent In the natme of the
thing to be perfornwd. upon whkh a condition that the mill :o;hould continue can be
predicated. Tlle artide wa~ to be manu-

factured and delivered, and whether by that
particular machinery or in that mill would
not be deemed material. True, the contract
specifies the mill as the place, but It nece~
sarlly has no Importance, except as designating the place of delivery. For aught that appears, other machinery could have been sub-stltuted. The defendant agreed to furnish a
certain manufactured article by a specified
day, and It cannot be excused by an accident, even It It prevented performance. If
ft sought protection against such a contingency It should have been provided for in·
the contract. Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N.
Y. 99; Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272;
School Dist. v. Dauchy, 2.3 Conn. 530. This.
case belongs to a class clearly distinguishable
from those before refc1·red to.
The more Important question relates to thel
proper rule of damages. The referee finds/
that prior to the contract with the defendant,
the plalntltr had contracted with the !\ew
York Central Railroad Company to sell and
deliver to It by the let ot June, four hundred
tons of rails to be composed of an iron foundation and steel caps, tor the Invention of
which the plalntltr had obtained a patent; ,
nnd that when the contract was made with. ;
the defendant he Informed lt that he wanted ·
the caps to perform the contract; that It they!
I had been delivered by the 1st of April thei
plaintiff could have pe1·formed his contract;'
and he finds, also, facts showing that the
plaintiff would have realized the amount of
profits tor which the recovery was ordere<l.
The damages for which a party muy recover tor a breach of contract are sm:h ~8
ordlnarlly and naturally fiow from the nonperformance. They must be proximate and
certain, oc capable of certain ascertainment,
and not remote, speculative or contingent.
It ·1s presumed that the parties contemplate·
the usual and natural consequences of a
breach when the contra.ct Is made; an<l if
the contract Is made with reference to special circumstances, fixing or all'ectlng the
amount of damages, such special circumstances are regarded within the contemplation or the parties, and damages may be assessed accordingly. For a brooch or· au executory contract to sell and deliver personal
property the memmre of damages Is, ordinarily, tbe difference between the contract-price
and the market-value of the article at the
time and place of delivery; but If the contract I
ls made to enable the plalnti!T to perform a '
sub-contmct, the terms of which the defend·
ant knows, he may be held liable for the
diffe1·ence between the sub-contract-price and
the principal contract-price, and this ls upon
tho ground that the parties have Impliedly
fixed the measure of damages themselves, or ·
rather mnde the contmct upon the basis of a.
fixed rule by which they may be as..<;e~e<l.
'.rhe authorities cited on both sides recogni7'-!
these geneml rules. Griffin v. Col'l"er, l(j ~.
Y. 48!1; Borries v. Hutchinson, 114 E. C. J..
415; Horner v. Railroad Co., L. R. 7 C. l'. .
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587; Hadley v. Baxendale, 26 Law & Eq.

398; Stockweli v. Phelps, 34 N. Y. 364;

Messmore v. Lead Co., 40 N. Y. 422; Ran-

dall v. Raper, 96 E. C. L. 82; Parks v. Tool

.Co., 54 N. Y. 586; Cary v. Iron Works Co.,

L. R. 3 Q. B. 181; Smeed v. Foord, 1 El. &

El. 002; British Col. Co. v. Nettleship, L. R.

3 C. P. 499; Horner v. Railroad Co., L. R.

8 Exch. 131. The diﬂiculty is in properly ap-

plying general rules to the facts of each par-

ticular case. Here it is found in substance

that the contract was made to enable the

plaintiff to perform his contract with the rail-

road company, and that this was known to

the defendant. It is insisted however that as

the price which the railroad company wasto

pay the plaintiff for the rails was not com-

municated to the defendant it cannot be said

that it made the contract with reference to
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such price. It is expressly found that there

was no market-price for the steel caps, and

it does not appear that there was any market-

price for the completed rail. The presump-

tion is. from the facts proved, that there was

not. It was a new article, and the contract

was made to bring it into use. The result of

the able and elaborate argument of the learn-

ed counsel for the defendant is, that in such

a case, that is when, although the contract

is made with reference to and to enable the

plaintiff to perform a sub-contract, yet if

the terms of the sub-contract, as to price,

are unknown to the vendor, and there is no

market-price for the article, the latter is not

liable for any damages, or what is the same

thing, for only nominal damages. I have

examined all the authorities referred to, and

I do not ﬁnd any which countenances such

a position, and there is no reason for exempt-

ing a vendor from all damages in such a

case. It is not because the vendee has not

suffered loss, as he has lost the proﬁts of his

sub-contract; it is not because such proﬁts

are uncertain, as they are ﬁxed and deﬁnite,

and capable of being ascertained with cer-

tainty; it is not because the parties did not

contract with reference to the sub-contract,

when it appears that the contract was made

for the purpose of enabling the vendee to

perform it. If the article is one which has

a market-price, although the sub-contract is

contemplated, there is some reason for only

imputing to the vendor the contemplation of

a sub-contract at that price, and that he

should. not be held for extravagant or ex-

ceptional damages provided for in the sub-

contract. But the mere circumstance that

the vendor does not know the precise price

speciﬁed in the contract will not exonerate

him entirely. He cannot in any case know

the precise market-price at the time for per-

formance. Knowledge of the amount of dam-

'ages is impracticable, and is not requisite.

It is only requisite that the parties should

have such a knowledge of special circum-

stances, affecting the question of damages,

as that it may be fairly inferred that they

contemplated a particular rule or standard .

Mr; Hadley v. Baxendale, 26 Law & Eq.
398; Stockwell v. Phelps, 3t N. Y. 364;
.Mcll6lllore v. Lead Co., 4-0 N. Y. 422; Ran<lall v. Raper, 96 E. C. L. 82; Parks v. Tool
Co., M N. Y. 586; Cary v. ll'on Works Co.,
L. R. 3 Q. B. 181; Smecd v. Foord, 1 El. &
El. 1m; British Col. Co. v. Nettleshlp, L. R.
3 C. P. 499; Hornm· v. Railroad Co., L. R.
8 Exch. 131. The difficulty Is in properly applying general rules to the facts of each particular case. Here It ls found In substance
that the contract was made to enable the
plalntllf to perform bis contract with the railroad company, and that this was known to
the defendant. It is Insisted however that as
the price which the railroad company was .to
pay the plalntUr for the rails was not communicated to the defendant it cannot be said
that It made the contract with reference to
sucb price. It Is expressly found that there
was no market-price tor the steel caps, and
It does not appear that there was any marketprice for the completed rail. The preswnptlon ls, from the tacts proved, that there was
not. It was a new article, and the contract
was made to bring it Into use. The result ot
the able and elaborate argument ot the learned counsel tor the defendant Is, that In such
a case, that ls when, although the contract
ls made with reference to and to enable the
plaintitr to perform a sub-contract, yet it
the terms of the sut>'.contract, as to price,
are unknown to the vendor, anu there ls no
m:J.rket-prlce for the article, tbe latter ls not
liable tor any damages, or what le the same
thing, for only nominal damages. I have
~xamlned all the authorities refen-ed to, and
I do not find any whkh countenances such
a position, and there le no reason tor exempting a vendor from all damages In such a
~se. It ls not because tbe vendee has not
sutrered loBS, as he has lost the profits ot bis
sub-contract; It le not because such profits
are uncertain, as they are fixed and definite,
and capable of being ascertained with certainty; It ls not because the parties did not
contract with reference to the sub-contract,
when It appears thnt the contract wns made
for the purpose of enabling the vendee to
perform It. If the article le one which has
a market-price, although the .sub-contract ls
contemplated, there is some reason tor only
Imputing to the vendor the contemplation ot
a sub-contract at that price, and that he
should not be held tor extravagant or ex<'Cptiona.l damages provided for In the subcontract. But the mere circumstance that
the vendor does not know tbe prechie price
specified in the contract will not exonerate
him entirely. He cannot In nny case !mow
the precise market-price at tile time for performance. Knowledge or the amount of dam. ages ls tmpractlcable, and ls not requisite.
It le only requisite that the parties should
; have such a k1:owledge of special clrcum. stances, allecting tbe question of damages,
·as that It may be fairly Inferred that they
("ODtemplated a particular rule or standard
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for estimating them, nnd entered Into the
contract upon that basis. In Hadley v. Bnxenunle, 9 Exch. 341, whkh Is a lealllng .::ase
on the subject In the English courts, the
court after speaking or the general rule, say!!:
"It the special circumstances under which the
contract was actually made were comllluuicated by the plalntllle to the defendants, nnd
thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contrart,
which they would reasonably contemplate,
would be the amount of Injury which would
ordinarily follow from a breach of the .contract under the !'peclal circumstances, so
known and communicated."
Thie case has been frequently referred to,
and the rule ae laid down somewhat crltlcleeu; but the criticism Is confined to the
character or the notice, or communication of
the special circumstances. Some of the
judges, In commenting upon It, have held
that a bare notice of special consequences
which might result from a breach of the contract, unless under such circumstances as to
Imply that It formed the basis of the agreement, would not be eumclent. I concur with
the views expressed In these cases; and I
do not think the court In Hadley v. Baxendale, intended to lay down any different doctrine. Sec authorities b.e fore cited. Upon the
point Involved here, whether the defendant
le exempted from the payment of any damages when there le no market-price, and the
price In the sub-contract ls not known, th~re
Is no conflict of authority that I have been
able to discover. In the first place, there Is
considerable reo.son for the position that
where the vendor ls distinctly Informed that
the purchase Is made to enable the vendee
to fulfill a sub-contract, and knows thnt there
ls no market-price for the article, be assumes tbe risk of being bound by the price
named In the sub-contract, whatever that
may be, but It le unneces:mry to go to that
extent. It ls sutllclent to hold, what appears
to me to be clearly just, thnt he ls bound
by the price, unless It Is shown that such
price ls extravagant, or ot an unusual and
exceptional character. The presumption le,
that tbe price at which the property was sold
was lte fair value, and that le to be taken as '
the market-price fo1· the purpose or adjusting
the damages In the partlcular case. '.fhis
presumption arises here. The profits were
not unreasonable, certainly not extravagant.
About fifteen per cent was allowed for profits,
Including the use of tbe patent, and no evidence was oll'ered, or claim run.de, that the
price was not the fair value of the article.
\Ve must assume that it was, and hence
within the contemplation of the parties. The
case of Borries v. Hutchinson, 114 E. C. L .
443, le quite analogous to this. The article,
caustic soda, wns purchased to be sold to a
foreign correspondent, which the defendant
kn1>w. There were ~everal Items of damage
claimed. The profits on the sub-contract
were conceded, and the muuey paid into court,
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but the court held, in passing judgment, that

the plaintiff was entitled to recover such

proﬁts. Erie, C. J., said: “Here the ven-

dor had notice that the vendee was buying

the caustic soda, an article not ordinarily

procurable in the market, for the purpose of

resale to a sub-vendee, on the continent. he

made the contract, therefore, with the knowl- ‘

edge that the buyers were buying for the

purpose of fulﬁlling a contract which they

had made with a merchant abroad."

The case of Elbidger v. Armstrong, L. R.

9 Q. B. 473, also illustrates the rule. That

was a contract for the purchase of six hun-

dred and sixty-six sets of wheels and axles,

which the plaintiff designed to use in the

manufacture of wagons; and which he had

contracted to sell and deliver to a Russian

company by a certain day, or forfeit two
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roubles a day. The defendant was informed

of the contract, but not of the amount of

penalties. Some delay occurred in the de-

livery, in consequence of which the plaintlf!

had to pay £100 in penalties, and the action ‘

‘

was brought to recover that sum. There was

no market in which the goods could be ob- '

tained, and the same point was made there

as here, that the plaintiff was only entitled

to nominal damages; but the court says:

“When from the nature of the article, there

is no market in which it can be obtained,

this rule (the difference between the contract

and market value) is not applicable, but it

would be very unjust if, in such cases, the

damages must be nominal."

It is true that the court held that the plain-

tif f could not recover the penalties as a mat-

ter of right, mainly upon the ground that

such a consequence was not, from the nature

of the notice, contemplated by the parties;

and yet the judgment, directing the amount

of the penalties pa-id, was allowed to stand,

as being a sum which the jury might reason-

ably ﬁnd. Cary v. Iron Works Co., L. R. 3

Q. B. 181, decided that when the article pur-

chased was designed by the purchaser for a

peculiar and exceptional purpose unknown to ,

the seller, the latter was nevertheless liable

for the damages which would have been in-

curred if used for the purpose which the

seller supposed it would be used for.

The case of Horner v. Railway Co., L. R.

8 C. P. 134, is not in conﬂict with the posi-

tion of the plaintiff. In that case the article

had a well-known market-value. The sub-

contract was at an unusual and extravagant

price, of which the defendant was not in-

formed. Besides, the defendant was a car-

rier, and it was seriously doubted by some

of the judges whether the same rule would

apply to a carrier as to a vendor. The ques-

tion in all these cases is, what was the con-

tract? and a carrier who is bound to take

property offered at current rates would not,

perhaps, be brought within the principle by

a notice of ulterior consequences, unless such

responsibility was sought to be imposed as
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MATHER v. AMERICAN EXP. CO.

(138 Mass. 55.) '

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.‘

Hampshire. Nov. 1, 1884.

Action against the American Express Com-

pany for breach of a contract to transport a

package containing an architect's plans for a

house. There was a ﬁnding for plaintilf, and

defendant excepted.

J. 6. Hammond,

(138 Mau. 56.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetta.
Hampshire. Nov. 1, 1884.
Action against the American Express Company for breach of a contract to transport a
package containing an architect's plans for a
house. There was a finding for plaintitr, and
defendant excepted.
J. O. Hammond, for plalutUr. D. W.
Bond, for defendant.

Bond, for defendant.

for plaintiff. D. W.

FIELD, J. It is not denied that the de-

fendant is liable in damages for the reason-

able cost of the new plans, and for other ex-

penses, if there were any reasonably incurred

in procuring the new plans; but it is denied

that the defendant is liable in damages for

the delay in constructing the house occasion-
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ed by the loss of the plans. It is assumed

that the plans had no market value, and

were only useful to the plaintiff. The rule

of damages then is their value to the plain-

tiff. As new plans could not be bought in

the market ready made, some time necessar-

ily must be consumed in making them, and

the plaintiff contends that the value of the

plans for immediate use, or for use at the

time he would have received them from Bos-

ton. if the defendant had duly performed its

contract, is their value to him, and that this

Value is made up of the cost of procuring the

new plans and the damages occasioned by

the delay. Whatever he calls it, it is dam-

ages for the delay in constructing the house,

caused by the loss of the original plans, that

he seeks to recover. It does not appear that

FIELD, J. It Is not denied that the defendant ls liable In damages for the reasonable C06t of the new plans, and for other expenses, If there were any reasonably Incurred
In procuring the new plans; but lt Is denied
that the defendant ls liable In damages for
the delay In constructing the house occnsloned by the loss of the plans. It ls assumed
that the plans had no market value, and
were only useful to the plalntltr. The rule
of damages then ls their value to the plalntltr. As new plnns could not be bought In
the market ready made, some time necessnrlly must be consumed In making thew, and
the plalntitl' cont!'nds that the value of the
plans for immediate use, or for use at the
time he would have received them from Boston. If th" ilt>fernlnnt bnd duly performed Its
contract. ls their value to him, and that this
value Is matle up of the cost of procuring the
new plans and the damages occasioned by
the delay. Whatever he calls It, It ls damages for the delay In constructing the house,
caused by the loss of the original plans, that
he seeks to recover. It does not appear that
the defendant bad notice of the contents of
the package at the time It was delivered tor
traDsportatlon. or any notice or knowledge

the defendant had notice of the contents of

the package at the time it was delivered for

transportation, or any notice or knowledge

that the plaintiff needed the plans for the

construction of a house which he had begun

to build. The damages caused by the delay

are not such as usually and naturally arise

solely from a breach of the contract of the

defendant to carry the package safely to its

destination, nor were they within the rea-

sonable contemplatlon of both parties to this

contract, as likely to arise from such a

breach. The fact that the plans had a spe-

cial value to the plaintiff, and could not be

purchased, does not touch the question of in-

cluding in the damages the injury to the

plaintiff occasioned by reason 0i. other con-

tracts which he had made, and of work which

he had undertaken in expectation of having

the plans for use immediately, or after the

usual delay involved in sending the plans to

Boston, and in having them traced and re-

turned to him. Damages for such injury are

not given unless the circumstances are such

as to show that the defendant ought fairly to

be held to have‘ assumed a liability therefor

when it made the contract

.

We think that Hadley v. Baxendale, 9

Exch. 341, which has been cited with ap-

proval by this court, governs this case.

'---------- -
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that the plaintiff n~cJcd the plans for the
construction of a house which be bad begun
to build. The damages caused by the deL'ly
are not such as usually and naturally arise
solely from a breach of the contract of the
defendant to cnrry the package safely to lt11
destination, nor were they within the reasonable contemplation of both parties to this
contract, as likely to arise from such a
breach. The fact that the plans had a special value to the plalntitr, and could not be
purchased, does not touch the question of including In the damages the Injury to the
pln.lntlfr occasioned by reason of other contracts which he had made, and of work which
he had undertaken In expectation of having
the plans for use Immediately, or after the
usual delay Involved In sending the plans to
Boston, and In having them traced and returned to him. Damages for such Injury are
not given unless the circumstances are such
as to show that the defen<lnnt ought fairly to
be held to have· assumed a llab111ty therefor
when It made the contract
We think that Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Exch. 341, which has been cited with appt"Oval by this court, governs this case.
The case of Green v. Railroad Co., 1'.!S
:!'!lass. 221, on which the plalntitr relies, was
an action to recover the value of an "oil
painting, the portrait of the plalntltr's father."
The opinion attempts to lay down a rule for
determining the value of such a palntlng
when the plaintiff had no other portrait of
his father, and when, so far as appears, it
had no mark.et value; but the opinion does
not discuss any question of damages not Involved In determining the value of the por·
trait to the plaintiff. The plaintiff In that
case made no claim tor damages occasioned
by a loss ot a profitable use of the portrait.
Exceptions sustained.
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ABBOTT et a1. v. HAPGOOD et 11l.

(22 N. E. 907, 150 Mass. 248.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

(22 N. E. 907, 150 Mase. 248.)
Snpreme Judicial Conrt of Maseachusetta.
Worcester. Nov. 29, 1889.

Worcester. Nov. 29, 1889.

Report from superior court, Wofcester

county; HAMMOND, Judge.

This is an action brought to recover damages

for breach of contracts made by the defendants

to furnish the Penn Match Company, Limited,

of Philadelphia, certain machines used in the

manufacture of matches, and certain match

splints for the manufacture of matches. Tile

said contracts are the same which were be-

fore the supreme judicial court in the case of

Match Co. v. Hapgood, 141 Mass. 145, 7 N.

E. Rep. 22. The plaintiffs in this writ are

described as “Francis R. Abbott, Charles

Kee, and Wm. B. Kempton, all of Philadel-

phia, in the state of Pennsylvania. as they

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:10 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

are copartners and associated together in

business under the ﬁrm name and style of the

‘Penn Match Company, Limited.‘ " The dc-

fendants did not call attention at the trial to

the speciﬁc fact that they made any point in

defense that the use in the writ of the pres-

ent tense of the verb in f‘as they are co-part-

ners" described this ﬁrm as it existed at the

date of the writ, viz., May 12, 1888. It had

in fact appeared in the plaintiffs' testimony

that Kempton had been in the business only

a year or two, and was not connected with it

at all when this suit was brought. It being

agreed that the questions raised by the de-

murrer might be raised at the trial with the

other questions, the following evidence ma-

terial to the questions raised by the report

was put in: The plaintiffs Abbott and Kee,

with one William Brown, entered into acou-

tract under the act of assembly of Pennsyl-

vama approved June 2. 1874. Brown died

about January 13, 1882. and the affairs of

that concern were wound up, and a release

from the administrator of Brown's estate was

given February 7, 1882. The defendants had

sold match splints to said concern, and had

received a letter dated January 23, 1882,

signed “1'l:NN Maren Co., Luu-rnn, FRAN-

cis R. Annorr, 'l‘r.," ordering one each of de-

fendants' “setting" and “rolling-off" ma-

chines, and at the time of the contracts sued

on were making said machines. About the

middle of February, lS\,'2, the plaintiff Kemp-

ton agreed verbally to join them in forming

a company, under the said statute of Penn-

sylvania, of the same name as the former, to

prosecute the same business of manufactur-

ing matches. in l‘hiladelphia. The plaintiffs

together agreed that they would organize

said company under said statute, and would

build a factory for the purpose of such man u-

factory, provided they could get the machin-

ery, such as is mentioned in the contracts '

sued on. Thereupon, for. the purpose of car-

rying out said agreement, and in the name of

and for the beneﬁt of the projected company.

the plaintiffs apphed to the (left-ndants, who

made the contracts in qnestlon, the plain-

l tiffs made known to the defendants that the

R<'port from superior court, Worcester
eounty; IIA11rnOND, Judge.
This is an action brought to recover damages
for breach of contracts made by the defendants
tofu rnish the l'en n Match Company, Li 111 ited,
of Philadel1·hia, CPrtain machines used in the
manufacture of matches, nnd certain match
spli11ts for the ma 11 ufacture of matches. ~he
snid conlriwts are the same which were before the supreme judicial court in the case of
Match Co. v. Hapgood, 141 Mass. 145, 7 N.
E. Rep. 22. The plaintiffs in this writ are
descritl('d RS "Francis H. Ablmtt, Charles
Kee, and Wm. B. Kempton, all of Philadelpliia, in the state of Pennsylrnnia, as tht>y
are copartners and associated togethe.. in
busine."8 under the firm name and style of the
• J>enn Match Company, Limited.'" The dofendauts did not c11ll 11ttention at the trial to
the specific fact that they made any point in
defense that the use In the writ of the pres·
ent tense of the verb in ~·as they are co-part.
ners" described this firm as It existed at the
date of the writ, viz., May 12, 188t:!. It had
in fart appeared in the plai nliffs' testimony
that Kempton had been in the business only
a year or two, and was not connected with it
at all when this suit was bro11ght. It being
agreed that the qm·stwns raised by the de.
murrer might be raised at the trial with the
other questions, the following evidence ma·
terial to the questions raised by the report
was put in: The plaintiffs Abbott and Kee,
with one William Brown, entered into a con·
tract under the act of assPmbly of Pennsyl·
van1a approvl'd June 2, 1874. I.frown died
about January 13, 188~. nnd the aliuirs of
that concern wei·e wound up, and a relt<ase
from the administrator of Brown's t>state was
given February 7, 1882. The dt>fendants had
sold match splints lo said concern, and had
rect>i ved a letter dated Jan nary 23, 1882,
signed "l'J::NN MA1'Cll Co., J,u11-rED, FnAN·
<.11s R. AnnoTT, Tr.," onleri ng one rach of da.
fendants' "sl'tting" and "rolling-off" ma·
chint>s, and at the time of the contracts sued
on were making saicl mar.hines. About the
middle of February, 18'!::!, the plaintiff Kempton agreed verlmlly to join them in forming
a company, under the said statute of Pennsylvania, of the same name as the former, to
JHosecute the same lmsi 11ess of manufactu r·
ing matd1e:1, in l'hiladelphia. The plaintiffs
together agreed that they wo11ld organize
said company under saitl statute, and would
b11il<I a factory for the purpose of such rnanu.
factory, provided tlwy conlll get the machinery, such as is menlioned in the co11tracls
s111~d on.
Thereupon, for. the purpose or carrying out said agret'rnent, arul in tht• name of
and for the benefit of th~ pr1>jel't<'1l company,
the plaintilfa applied to tlw cleft.ndants, who
made the contracts in q11c::1t:on, the pl•lill·

DAMAGES-IN

CO~TRACT.

tiffs made known to the defendants that the
projected company would proceed with .its
organization, und would cause a factory to
be bum for it only in case they could make a
contract with the defendant!\ Lo furnish the
machines. The pla_inliffs told the defendants
they would like them to give a written con·
tract for the maC"hines alrt>ady onlered,-that
is, one rolling-off machine and one setting
machine,-and also attach to it an additional
order for four more setting machinrs and
one rolling.off machine. After some conver·
satiun, the defe111l11nts signed and delivned
the contracts sued on. After the contracts
were m11de, the plaintiffs gave up the idea of
building the factory jointly, and Abbott and
Kempton proceeded to build the factory for
the use of the firm, with the arrangement
that it shu:ild be verlially leased to the Penn
Match Company, Limited, for the purpose or
transacting its hu~iness, tu.wit, the match
business the plaintifJs had agret>tl to go into.
The factory wa~ completed about July 15,
1882, and the Penn .Match Company paid
rent from that timti. On Octouer 8, 1882,
the plaintiffs made an agreement to carry out
the arrangement entered into in February,
1882, and no business w11s done until after
July 15th, when the factory was finished, elC·
cept that the plaintiffs made some match·
bolCes, with a view preparat:>ry to this com·
pany (the Penn Mat!'h Company) being or·
ffanized, and so as to have them on hand.
The records required by the statutes of Pennsyhania, as to limited partnerships, were
duly made. Evidence was offered that in
May, 1882, th~ defendants, after some letters
slating that the machines would soon be
made, refused to perform said contracts.' The
plaintiffs offered evidence of damage to tl1e111,
as individuals, indt>pendent of their membership of their association. They likewise of·
fered evidence of expenses incurred and dam.
ages suffered by the association in conse.
quence of the defendants' refusal to deliver
the machines and the match splints. The
defendants pnt in the judgment for the de.
fendants, which wa.'I rendered on the demur·
rer 11fler the decision of the supreme judicial
court in Match Co. v. II11pgood, 141 Mass.
146, 7 N. E. He1" 22.
The clefentlanls asked the courl to rule:
(1) There is 110 evidence lo warrant a verdict
for the plaintiffs. (2) The contracts are in
terms with the Penn ~latch Company, Lim·
. ited, and that company was not organized at
the time of the contracts, and there never was
any contract whic'h would bind that company,
and the vlaintiffs cannot recover. (3) The
judgment in the case of Penn Match Com.
pany, Limited, v. Hapgood and another is a
a bar to this action. (4) If, after the cleath
of llrown, the present 11laintiffs agreed together to form a limit1•d partner~hip, undt>r
the stat11t11 of Pennsylvania, which has b~en
put into the case, for the manufacture of
matches, unde1· the name of the" Penn .l\latch
Company, Limited," and with the purpose
and to the end of doing so, and in the name

DIHECT AND COXSEQVEXTIAL DA.MAGE:;-JN
DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN CONTRACT.

137

of and for the beneﬁt of the projected limited

partnership procured these contracts, the

afonsaid judgment is a bar to recovery in

this case. The court declined to rule as re-

quested by the defendants, and ruled that the

association, by the agreement of October 3,

1882, is so far different from the organiza-

tion of the plaintiffs, as general partners,

that in this case no damages suffered by

the association can be assessed, and the

only damages which can be recovered are

such as the plaintiffs themselves have suf-

fered independently of their membership of

the association.

excepted to this ruling, so far as it limit-

ed damages. The court overruled the de-

fendants‘ demurrer, and they appealed; the

ruling being that the plaintiffs could recover

such damages as they suffered independently
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of the association formed under the statute,

by reason of the non-performance of the con-

tracts. A verdict was directed for the plain-

tiffs, with the understanding that the case

should be reported, and the same is now re-

ported, for the determination of the supreme

judicial court. If the rulings are correct, the

parties agree that the case shall be sent to an

assessor to assess the damages. If the de-

murrer should have been sustained, or if, up-

on the evidence, a verdict should have been

ordered for the defendants, the verdict is to

be set aside, and judgment for the defendants

entered; unless the ground for ordering judg-

ment is such that it could have been cured

by amendment. if it had been pointed out at

the trial, in which case the court shall enter

such judgment or order as shall seem just.

If the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such

of and for the benefit of the projected limited
partntir~hlp procnroo tht'Se co11tr11.cts, the
afort'said judgment is a ba1· to recovery iu
this case. The court declined to rule as requested by the defemlanls, and ruled that the
association, by the agreement of October 3,
1882, is so far different from the organi7.ation of the plaintiffs, as general partners,
that in this case no damages suffered by
the nssociation can be nsscssed, and the
-0nly dam11ges which can be recovered are
such as the plaintiffs themselves have suffered independently of their membNship of
the association. 'Ihe plainliffs objected and
ilxcepted to this ruling, so far as it limited damages. The conrt overruled the defendants' d!'mnrrl'r, and they appealed; the
ruling being that the p~aintiffs coohl recover
such damages as thl'y suffered indrpendenUy
of the nssoemtion fornwd under the statute,
by reason of the non-performance of the contracts. A verdict was dirE>cted for the plainlilTs, with the understanding that the case
should be reportt>d, and the same is now reported, for the determination of the supreme
judicial comt. If the rulings are c..irrect, the
parties Agree that the case shall be sent to an
assl'ssor to 11ssess the dam1t)!!'8. If tho demurrer should have been sustained, or if, upon the evidence, R verdict should have be!'n
ordered for the deft'nd1rnts, the verdict is lo
be set aside, 1rnj). judgment for the defendant.~
entered; unless the ground for ordering judgment is such that it could have been cured
Ly amendment, If it had been pointed out at
the trial, in wflich case the court shall enter
8Uch judgment or order as shall seem just.
If the plaintiffs are entilled to recover such
damages as were sutrered by Lhe ass9ciatio11
organized under the agreement of October 3,
l~!j2, the verdict is to ue st:t aside, and a uew
trial ordtired.
IV. S. B. Hopkins, for plaintiffs. F. P.
6oulding, for dcfe11da11ls.

damages as were suffered by the association

organized under the agreement of October 3,

1882. the verdict is to be set aside, and a new

trial ordered.

W. S. B. Hopkins, for plaintiﬂs.

Goulding, for defendants.

F. P.

KNOWLTON. J. According to the terms

of the repo1t in this case, if the demurrer ‘

should have been sustained, on grounds which

could have been removed by amendment, the

plaintiffs are to be permitted to amend. The

defendants have made no point upon the

use of the present tense instead of the past

tense in the allegation in the writ as to the

partnership of the plaintiffs. and, if that is

material, it may be corrected by amend-

ment. In each count of the declaration,

after alleging that there was a valuable

conside1ation for the defendants' contract,

the plaintiffs aver that the contract was

reduced to writing, and set out as the

contract a writing which shows no consider-

ation nor mutuahty, but merely an undertak-

ing on one side. To state the contract truly,

they should set out in each count their own

agreement which constituted the considera-

tion for the agreement made by the defend-

ants. The substantive grounds of defense

rest upon the ruhngs. and refusals to rule, in

KNOWLTON. J. According to the terms
of the rl'po1t in this ca11P, if the demurrer
should have been 11usLained, on groumls which
could have been rl'mOvt•d by arnt>nd111ent, the
pl11inti1Ts are to be permitted to amt'nd. The
defendants have made no point upon the
use of the present tense inste11d of the past
tense in the allegation in the writ as to the
partnership of thti plaintiffs, and, if that is
material, it may be conected by amendment. In each count of the declarnlion,
after alltlging that there was a valuaLle
consideration for the dt'ft>ntlants' contract,
the pli1i11tiffs aver that the contract was
reJuced to writing, and set out as the
contract a writing which !lhows no consiueration nor mutualitv, but merelv an undertaking on one side. 'i'o state the contract truly,
tliey shoul1I set out in t>ach count tlwir own
agreement which constituted the consideration for the agreement 111a1ltl by the dl'fend·
ants. The suiJ~tantive grounds of defense
rt>st upon the rulings, aml refusals to rule, in
ret;artl lo the effect of the evidence. There
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was an 11tt£>mpt to recover nncler the contracts now before 11s, by a suit brought in the
nai~ie of th" Penn .Mutch Company, Limited,
a~a111st these defendants.
In that case the
plaintitr was allt>ged to be a corpuration, and
the hearing and decision were upon a demurrer which admitted that allegation to be true:
, If we 11ssume that the limited partnerRhip
: organized under the laws of Pennsylvania was
' eo far an entity, Bl'parate from th0 persons
: who were membt•raof it, that ilcould suea11d
' be sued in this commonwealth us a co1poration can, it is quite clear that it was not a
party to t.he contracts drclared on. Maleh
Co. v. Hapgood, 141 Mass. 145, 7 N. E.
H.ep. 22.
If a contra..:t is made in the
name and for the bt'nefit of a projected
corporation, the corporation, after its
organization, cannot Lecome a party to
the contract, e\·en by adoption or rl\tlfi·
cation of it. Kelner v. Baxtn, L. R. 2
C. P. 174; Gunn v. Insurance Uo., 12 C. B.
(N. B.) 694; Melhado v. Hail way Co.• L . H.. 9
C. P. 503; In re Enginee1 ing Co., L. U. 16
Ch. Div. 125. Upon the fads reported in
the prest>nt ca!!e, the deft>tHlants, as well as
the }llaintilfs, must have 11111.lt>r~tood that the
limited partnership was only projected, anti
that the plaintiffs. acting jointly as individuals, or as genernl part nns, cons tit utPd the
only party who could contract with the cl~
fendants in the manner proposed. It is evidrnt that bnth parties inlen1leu to PntAr i11to
binding contracts. As recited in the report,
for thti purpose of carrying out theil" ugree' ment to form a limited partnership, "and in
the name of nnd for the bt>nefit of the project! ed company, the plaintiffs applied to the defend11nls who m:1de the contrn!'ts in question,
and the plaintiffs made known to the defend: ants that the projeded company would proceed with its organization and would cause
a faclory to Le built for it, O!llY in case t\1~y
I conld m;1ke a contract with the defendants
to furnish the machines."
We are of opinion, in view of the facts
known to both parties, that the plaintiffs
must be deemed to have been jointly contracting in the only way in which th ..y conld
lawfully contract, and that they assumed the
n111uo "l1 en11 .Match Cu11111any, LimiltJ," us
that in which the\' chose to do business, in
rl'ference to the pn;jel"led limile1l partnership,
until their organization should be completi-d,
and they should turn over the business to the
new company, which would Le composed of
themselves in a new relation. This set>HHl to
be warranleu by the language of the rt'po1 t,
and entirely con!;istent with their puq o;;e
ma•le known to the defendants, and in tliis
way only can effl'ct be given to their acts.
The judgrne11t in the former suit is no bar to
this action, for that suit was brought by a
different l•laintiff.
On the 11ubj l•ct of dam:iges, the report dot's
not sufliciently slate the evidence lo enable
us fully to detrrruinP the rights of the parties.
As we undPrsland tlw nrle laid down by the
presiuing justice, that •;the only damages
J
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which can be recovered are such as the plain-

tiffs themselves have suffered independently

of their membership of the association," we

are of opinion that it is too narrow. In the

view which we take of the agreement, the

plaintiffs contracted for articles to be deliv-

ered to themselves. They informed the de-

fendants that they had agreed to organize a

limited partnership, of which they were to

be the sole members, and that they made the

contracts to enable them proﬁtably to carry

0!! business in their new organization. By

reason of the defendants' breach of contract,

the plaintiffs were unable to turn over to the

new company the property which they should

have received for that purpose, and they have

been unable to establish that company. and

start it in its work under such favorable au-

spices, and with such an equipment for the
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transaction of a proﬁtable business, as if the

defendants had performed their contracts.

The only damages for which the defendants are

liable to any one must be recovered in this

action, and, inasmuch as the machines could

not be procured in the market, we are of

opinion that the parties must be presumed to

have contracted in reference to the declared

purpose for which they were to be furnished,

and that that purpose may be conside1ed in

assessing the damages. Machine Co. v. Ry-

der, 13‘J Mass. 366; Manning v. Fitch, 138

Mass. 273; 'l‘ownsend v. Wharf Co., 117 Mass.

501; Somers v. Wright, 115 Mass. 292; Cory

v. Iron-Works, L. R. 3 Q. B. 181; Portman

v. Middleton, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 322; McHuse v.

Fulmer, 73 Pa. St. 365.

We do not intimate that the plaintitfs are

to receive any damages as members of the

limited partnership, but only that the dam-

ages which they suffered, if any, by reason

of the defendants' preventing them from suc-

cessfully establishlng and ﬁtting out a busi-

ness to be conducted by them as a limited

partnership, may be recovered. The mere

fact that they arranged to conduct their busi-

ness by a limited partnership, under the stat-

nte of l'ennsylrania. does not deprive them

of the rights which they then had in the busi-

ness, nor of the advantages which properly

belonged to it. The value of the articles con-

tracted for may be estimated in reference to

their intended use in the business for which

the defendants were to furnish them. The

plaintiffs are to have leave to amend their

writ and declaration as they shall be ad vised,

and the case is to stand for trial. So ordered.

DIHECT AND CONl':iEQUE.NTIAL DAMAGES-IN CONTiiACT.

which can be recovered are such as the plaintiffs themselves have suffered i!1.dr.J1rl!<.le1_1tly
of their membership of the association," we
are of opinion that it is too narrow. In the
view which we take of the agreement, the
plaintiffs contracted for articles to be delivered to themselves. They informed the defe11tlnnts that they bad agreed to org~nize a
limited partnership, of which they were to
be the sole members, and that they made the
contracts to enal.Jle them profitably to carry
O!l business in their new organization. .By
reason of the defendants' brrat:h of contract,
the plaintiffs were unable to tum over to the
new company the properly which they should
have received for that purpose, and thry have
heen unable to establish that company, and
start it in its work under such favorable auspices, and with such an equipment for the
transaction of a profitable business, as if the
defendants bad performed their contracts.
The only damages for which the defendants are
liable to any one must be recovered in this
action, and, inasmuch as the machines could
not be procured in the market, we are of
opinion that the parties must be presumed to
have oontracted in reference to the declared
purpose for which they were to be furnished,

and that that purpose may be consi,Je1 ed iu
assessing the damages. Machine Co. v, Ryder, 139 Mass. 366; Manning v. Fitch, 188
.Mass. 273; Townsend v. Wharf Co., 117 Mass.
501; 8omt>ns v. Wright, 115 Mass. 292; Cory
v. Iron-Works, L. H.. 3 Q. B. 181; Portman
v. Middleton, 4 C. B. (N. 8.) 322; Mc Huse v.
Fulmer, 73 J:>n. St. 365.
We do not intimate that the plnfntiffs are
to receive any damages as members of the
limited partnership, but only that tho damages which they suffered, if nny, by reason
of the defendants' preventing them from successfully establishing and fitting out a business to be conducted by them as a limited
partnersh1p, may be recovered. '.fhe mere
fact that they arranged to conduct their busi·
ness by a limited partnership, under the statute of J:'en1:!1ylvania, does not dt>prive them
of the rights which they then had in the business, nor of the 11dvantages which properly
belonged to it. The value of the articles contracted for may be estimated in reference te>
their intended use in the business for which
the defendants were to furnish them. The
plaintiffs are to have leave to amend thefr
writ nnd declaration as they shall be ad\'ised,
and the case is to stand for trial. Su ordered.
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BROWNELL et al. v. CHAPMAN.

(51 N. W. 249, 84 Iowa, 504.)

Feb. 2, 1892.

Appeal from superior court of Council

Bluﬂfs; J. E. F. McGee, Judge.

Action on a contract. in substance as fol-

lows: “April 12th, 1889. D. Chapman, Esq.,

Council Bluffs, Iowa—Dear Sir: We will

furnish you one of our Scotch marine boil-

ers, 54 dla., 84 long, made of 60,000 T. S.

marine steel shells. 5-16; ' ' ' all the

above delivered and set up, (you to do all

wood-work.)-for the sum of ten hundred

and twenty-three dollars, ($1,023.00.) We

will allow you three hundred and sixty dol-

lars ($360.00) for your two engines, boiler,

heater, and inspirater, wheels, shafting, and

couplings. Hoping to receive your order, we

are, yours truly, Brownell & Co. P. S. We
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guaranty to deliver above in thirty days from

April 13th. It is understood you are to have

90 days' option on sale of engine and boiler

you have." “Accepted. D. Chapman." This

action is to recover the balance of the con-

tract price, after deducting the $360 for the

defendant's engines, etc. There was a fail-

ure to deliver the boilers, etc., on the part

of the plaintiffs for some 18 days after the

time speciﬁed in the contract; and the de-

fendant presents a counter-claim because of

the failure and for defective workmanship

in putting in the boilers. A reply put in is-

sue certain allegations of the counterclaim,

and a trial by jury, resulting in a verdict

and judgment for the defendant for $31.25.

The plaintiffs appeal.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Isaac Adams, for appellants. D. B. Daily,

Emmet Finley, and Ambrose Burke, for ap-

peilee.

GRANGER, J. 1. Lake Manana is a

small lake in the vicinity of Council Bluffs,

in Pottawattamie county, and is a summer

and pleasure resort. Boats are used on

the lake for the accommodation of visitors,

and among them was one known as the “M.

F. Rohrer," belonging to the defendant. The

boat was operated on the lake in the season

of 1888, and the boilers and machinery con-

tracted for, as known to the parties, were to

reﬁt the boat for use in the season of 1889.

A breach of the contract on the part of

plaintif f by a failure to deliver within the

time is not questioned, and the important

question on this appeal is as to the proper

measure of damage. The superior court ad-

mitted evidence to show, and instructed the

jury on the theory, that the measure of dam-

age was the rental value of the boat during

the time the defendant was deprived of its

use in consequence of the breach. The ap-

pellants‘ thought is that the measure of dam-

age is the “interest of the capital invested in

the boat." This latter rule has something

of mpport in authority, but it is far out-

weighed by the number of cases and the rea-

soning supporting the rule adopted by the

court. In considering the question we must
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tlcle has never been rented it has no rental

value, any more than it would to say that

because an article had never been sold it

has no market value. We should assume

that an article suitable and adapted for use

at a time and place has both a market and

rental value, at least until the contrary ap-

pears. In Jemmison v. Gray, 29 Iowa, 537,

this court approved_an instruction that “the

fact, if proven, that 12,213 ties could not

have been purchased for immediate delivery

in the market at the places where said ties

were to be delivered on the 1st day of Oc-

tober, 1869, would not, of itself, establish

the fact that there was not 2. market price

for such ties at such time and place." The

holding affords a strong presumption in favor

of a market price. A like presumption

would prevail in favor of an article having a

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:10 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

value for hire at a time and place where such

articles are in demand for use. The testi-

mony shows that boats. varying in size were

rented on the lake during the season, both

by the day and for trips. This boat had per-

haps twice the carrying capacity of any other

boat on the lake, and in that respect formed

an exception; but the rental value of boats

depended on their size and adaptation for

use, and it was competent for persons hav-

ing knowledge of the business and prices

paid for other boats to give an opinion as to'

the rental value of such a boat as the one in

-question. It is contended that the method

of ascertaining the rental value involves the

uncertainties and facts on which proﬁts are

excluded as a rule of damage; but we think

not. It is true that rental values are general-

ly ﬁxed from a calculation of the proﬁts to

be derived from the use, but the rental is a

ﬁxed, deﬁnite value, agreed to be paid, and

the bailee assumes the uncertainties as to

the proﬁts.

The appellants say: “For an analogous

case to the one at bar, in there being an at-

tempt to prove a rental value to property

when the facts showed that the property in

question had no rental value, the court is

referred -to Coal Co. v. Foster, 5'.) Pa. St. 3 "'."

The case, as we we read it, is without a

bearing on the question. The defendant

agreed to furnish for the coal company an

engine of a particular size and make. There

was no other engine of the kind that the

company could use. There was a delay in

the delivery, and the company was compell-

ed to transport its coal by horse||-power, as it

had before done. The trial court gave the

rule “that ihedneasurc of damage for the de-

lay was the ordinary hire of a locomotive

during the period of delay." The reviewing

court gave the rule as the diffQrencc between

the cost of transporting the coal by horse and

by locomotive power, but placed its ruling

on the fact that the parties knew there was

ne other engine to be operated on the track

of the cotnpany, and could not have had such

damage in view in making the contract. it

will be seen that the cases are different. If

Dll!ECT A.ND

CO~SEQUENTU.L

tlcle has never been rented It has no rental
value, any more than lt would to say that
because an article had never been sold It
has no market value. We should assume
tbat an article suitable and adapted for use
at a time and place has both a market and
rental vnlue, at least unt'l the contrary appears. In Jemmlson v. Gray, 29 Iowa, 537,
this court approved.an lnstruction that "the
fact, If pro\'en, that 12,213 tles could not
have ])C('n purchased for immediate dellvery
in the market at the places where sald ties
were to be delivered on tile 1st day of October, 1869, would not, of Itself, establish
th~ fact that there was not a market price
for such ties at such time and place." The
holding affords a strong preaumption in favor
of a market price. A like presumption
would prevnll ln favor of an article having a
value for hire at a time and place where such
articles are In demand for use. The testlmony shows that boats. varying in size were
rented on the lake during the season, both
by the day and for trips. This boat had perhaps twice the carrying capacity of any other
boat on the lake, and Ip that respect formed
an exception; but the rental value of boats
depended on their size and adaptation for
use, and it was competent for persons having knowledge of the business and prices
paid for other boats to glve an opinion as to
the rental value of such a boot as the one in
question. It ls contended that the method
of ascertaining the rental value involves the
uncertainties and facts on which profits are
excluded as a rule of damage; but ";e think
not. It ls true that rental values are genemlly fixed from a calculation of the profits to
be derived from the use, but the rental ls a
fixed, definite value, agreed to be paid, and
the bailee assumea the uncertainties as to
the profits.
The appellants say: "For an analogous
ease to the one at bnr, In there being an attempt to prove a rental value to property
when the facts showed that the property In
t]Uestiou had no rental value, the court Is
refe1Ted .to Coal Co. v. l!'oster, 50 Pa. St. 365."
The <'ase, as we 've read it, is without a
bearing on the question. The defendant
agreed to furnish for the coal company an
eni:iue of a particular size and make. The1·e
was no other engine of the kind that the
compan~· could use. There was a delay in
the delivery, and the company was compelled to trnn!'port its coal by horse-power, as it
had before done. Tile tl"lal court gave the
rule "that the-4ncasnre of damage for the de·
lay was the ordiunry hire of a locomotive
<luring the period of d<•lay." The reviewing
<:onrt gave the rule as the difference between
1he cost of transporting the coal by horse and
l>y locomotive power, hut placed its ruling
on the fact that the parties knew there was
:u..;. other engine to be operated on the track
-0f the compa ny, ::ind could not llnve had :mch
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damage In view In making the contract. lt
will be seen that the cases are dilierent. If
In tile case at bar the defendant's boat bad
been opemted at an additional cost by doing the same amount of work during the
delay, it would be reasonable to sny the damage to him was the difference In the cost.
But his Is au entire loss of use, and the value
of such use ls the damage, where it is proximate, and not speculative or uncertain.
2. A part of the counter-claim ls for loss
of time by men kept ln readiness by defendant to do the part of the work belonging to
him ln adjusting the boilers and machinery,
as provided by the contract. On this brnucli
of the case the court gave the following Instruction: "(5) It you find from the evidence, and under the third and fourth Instructions, that there was a contract, as set
out, between plaintlfrs and defendant, and
that plnintl!Is were In default In carrying
out said contract; and If you find that, by
reason of such default, defendant was damaged; and if you fmihe1· find that defendant
was in readiness to carry out his part of
said contmct at the time specified therein;
and that at the time he was lu readiness to
rnn and operate his boat; and that the boat
was necessarily idle during the period of
plaintiffs' default, by reason of such default,
-then the defendant would be entitled to
recover the ordinary and reasonable rental
vnl•1e of sald boat during the time of said
default, n.nd such i·easonable and necessary
amount (If there be any such amount) as he
may have been required to pay to any men
that he may have employed during said enforced idleness for the purpose of running
said boat, if he had any such men in his
employ who remained in his employ and idle
by reason of such default; and If you find
that the defendant had placed himself in
readiness to work upon said boat himself
11. t the time specified In the contract for the
furnishing of said machinery, and that he
necessarily remained Idle during the time of
such default, if any, of the plnintlffs, and
used ordinary dlllgence to find other employment for that time, you will then further
find the fair and reasonable value of his
services during the period of such default
as part of the damage, if any, which defendant sustained." Complaint ls made of the
instruction, ns stating an eri·onoous rule of
damages, but we discover no error. If, because of the breach, the defendant lost his
or the time of his employcs, for such time
aml expense he should be relmbUl'setl. The
rule Is recognized in Mining Syndicate v.
1"rasc1-, supra. The instruction fairly protects the rights of the plainti.trs. A 11uml1Pr
of other qu<'!ltions are argued, nil of whi"11
we have examined, and find no prPjuclit-ia I
error. It woulll serve no goo<l pm·pose to
ext1md the opinion to }>resent them. Thl•
judgment is atfirmed.

c

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN CONTRACT.

MASTERTON ET AL. v. MAYOR, ETC.,
OF CITY OF BROOKLYN.
(7 Hill, 61.)
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MASTERTON ET AL. v. MAYOR, ETC.,

Supreme Court of New York.

Jan. Term,

18-!5.

OF CITY OF BROOKLYN.

(7 Hill, 61.)

Supreme Court of New York. Jan. Term,

1845.

This was an action of covgmnt commenc-

ed in 1840, and tried at the New York cir-

cuit in June, 1843, before Kent, C. J. The

case was this: January 26, 1836, a cove-

nant was entered into between the defendants

and the plaintiffs, by which the latter agreed

at their own risk. costs and charges, to

furnish, cut, ﬁt, and deliver (properly and

suﬂiciently prepared for setting). at the site

of the city hall in the city of Brooklyn, all

the marble that might be required for build-

ing the said city hall, according to certain

, plans and speciﬁcations then exhibited and
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" signed by the respective parties, and in

conformity with such drawings, molds and

patterns as should from time to time be far-

nished by the superintendent or architect of

the said city hall; all of the said marble to

be of the same quality as that used for the

ornamental and best work on the new custom-

house in the city of New York, and of the

best kind of sound white marble from Kain

& Morgan's quarry, in Eastchester, free from

spalts, cracks, and blemishes, and wrought

in the best manner of workmanship, and

tooled and rubbed. etc., as should be ordered

by the superintendent. It was further

iagreed by the plaintiffs that they would pro-

gceed forthwith to the execution of the work

i with all diligence and with a sufﬁcient force;

‘and that they would commence the delivery

of the marble as soon after the opening of

navigation in the spring as might be re-

quired, and continue delivering the same in

such order and at such times and as fast as‘

the superintendent should direct. They also

agreed that the marble thus delivered should

be subject to inspection and rejection by the

superintendent, and remain at the risk of the

plaintiffs until the superintendent inspected

and accepted it. And the defendants, in

consideration of the above stipulations,

agreed to pay the plaintiffs the sum of $271,-

600, at the times and in the manner follow-

ing, viz. the sum of $10,000 when the base-

ment of the said city hall was half up; the

sum of $15,000 when the whole of the base-

ment was up; the sum of $20,000 when the

lirst story was half up; the sum of $20,000

when the whole of the ﬁrst story was up;

the sum of $20,000 when the second story

was half up; the sum of $20,000 when the

whole of the second story was up; the sum

of $20,000 when one-half of the cornice of

the superstructure was up; the sum of $20,-

000 when the whole of the cornice was up;

the sum of .,\'.')ll,000 when the columns and

capitals were up; the sum of $25,000 when

the entahiature was complete; the further

sum of $20,000 when the interior work was

done; and the remainder when the building

was ﬁnished. '1‘he declaration alleged a

This was an acUon or cov~1Jrnt commenced In 18-10, und tried at the New York circuit In June, 1843, before lient, C. J. The
case was this: January 26, 183(), a covennnt was entered Into between the defendants
and the plalntlll's, by which the latter agreed
at their own risk. costs and charges, to
furnish, cut, fit, and deli\"e1· (properly and
sufficiently prepared tor setting), at the site
ot the city ha11 In the city or Brooklyn, nil
the marble that might be required for builtllng the said city hall, according to certain
, plans and speclfkntlon8 then exhibited and
' signed by the respective parties, and In
conformity with such drawings, molds and
patterns as should from time to tlrue be furni!'11ed by the 1rnpe.-lntendent or architect of
the said city !mil; all or the said marble to
be of the same quality as that used for the
urnameutal and best work on the new customhouse In the city of :Sew York, and or the
best kind of sound white marble from l{aln
& Morgan's quarry, In Eastchester, tree from
epalti>, cracks, and blemishes, and wrought
In the best manner of workmanship, and
tooled and rubbed, etc., as should be ordered
by the superintendent. It was further
agreed by the plalnturs that they would proceed forthwith to the execution of the work
with all diligence and with a sutftclent force;
and that they would commence the delivery
Qf the marble as soon after the opening of
navigation In the spring as might be required, and continue delivering the same In
such order and at such times and as fast as
the superintendent should direct. They ah10
agreed that the mn.1·ble thus delivered should
, be subject to Inspection and rejection by the
~ superintendent, and remain n.t the risk of the
plaintills until tlle superintendent Inspected
and accepted It. And the defendants, In
con!'lderntlon of the above stipulations,
agreed to 11ay the plalntll!s the sum ot $271,600, at the times nnd In the manner tollowlug, viz. the sum of $10,000 when the hasement or the said city hall was half up; the
sum of $1:;,ooo when the whole of the basement was up; the sum or $20,000 when the
lirst story wns hnlf up; the sum of $20,000
when the whole of the first story was up;
the sum of $:!0,000 when the second story
was half up; the sum or $:.!0,000 when the
whole of the second story was up; the sum
of $:!0,000 when one-half of the corniee of
the sup('rstructnre was up; the sum of $'.W,000 when the whole of the ('Ol'llice was up;
the SUIU of :::;,11,(HJO Wht•IJ the eol1111111s UlllJ
capitals were u1'; the s11m of $:.!•i.OUO when
the en ta hlature was complete; the further
sum of $20.000 when the lnterlor work was
done; anti the remaiurler wl1en the buil1li11g
was finished. The dcelarntion alleged a.
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breach ot this covenant In 1837, and claimed)
various Items of special damage.
March 7, 183G, the plalntitl's entered Into a.
covennnt with Kain & Morgan. This covenant, after referring to the one entered Into
with the defendants, and reciting a part of
the i:nme, provided that Kain & Morgan
should furnish from their quarry, In Eastchester, all the marble required for erecting,
, completing and finishing the city hall In the
city of Brooklyn, in such blocks, pieces and
proportions, and in such condition for working, as ls usual and customary; and deliver
the same to the plaintiffs, free or nil ex- \
pense, on a wharf ln the city of Brooklyn,
etc.; the blocks to be delivered so that there
should be sufficient time to work and fit the
same for the said superstrneture, and equal
ht quality to that used fol' the superstructure
and Interior above the basement of the new
custom house In the city of New York, etc.
The remainder of the covenant was as follows: "And the said parties of the first
part (the plaintlll's). In conslde!'lltlon, etc.,
do hereby covenant and agree to pay the
said parties of the second part (Kain & Morgan) In the agg1·egnte the sum of $112,3:..15,
which awount shall be paid In dltrerent
sums, from time. to time, out of tbe sum of
$271,000 to be paid by the said mayor, etc.
(the defendants), to the snld parties of the
first part, as the same from time to time
may be pa.Id to them, etc.; that Is to say:
The said parties of the first part shall a.ad
will make payment to the said parties of the
second part at the same times that they,
the eaJd parties of the first pa.rt, receive
· their payments from the mayor, etc. (the defendants). And the several payments thus
to be made to the said parties of the second
part shall bear the same proportion, respectively, to the whole amount they are to receive f1·oru the said parties or the ftrat part n.s
the corresponding payment to the said parties
of the first part by the mayor, etc., bear to
the whole amount they are to receive under
their contract from the saJd mayor, etc.
And It is expressly understood and mutually
covenanted and agreed that In no event slmll
the parties of the second part look to the
said parties of the first port, or hold them
res110nslble for any payments, until the imiu
parties of the first part are first placed 111
sutliclent ftwds by the mayo1·, etc. (the defemlauts), to enable them to make such payment al'('Ordlng- to the herein last beforeruentJoned provil'ions," etc.
The C'OYenant with Kain & lllor~an was
rend in evidence by the plalntllls, subject to
the right of the clefewlnnts to rnlse suC'h obj~tlons to its admissibility, dnring the progress of the cnm<1\ as they might think proper. 'l'he plaintllTs also proved thnt they
commenced the delivery of the marble in
pursuance of the covenant between them and
the defendants, and continued so to do until
.Tuly, 18:17, when the defe ndant~ suspended
operations upon the building for wnnt of

142

142

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES--IN CONTRACT.

funds, and refused to receive any more ma-

terials of the plaintiffs, though the latter

were ready and offered to perform. The

entire quantity of marble necessary to ful-

till the contract on the part of the plaintiffs,

according to the estimates made at the trial,

was 88,819 feet. At the time the work was

suspended, the plaintiffs had delivered 14,-

779 feet, for which they were paid the con-

tract price. The plaintiffs then had on

hand, at Kain & Morgan's qu'arry, about

3,308 feet, which was suitably ﬁtted and pre-

pared for delivery. A witness swore that

this was not of much value for other build-

ings, and would not probably bring over

two shillings per foot. Other witnesses

swore that, had the work progressed with

ordinary diligence, it would have taken

about iive years to complete the contract on
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the part of the plaintiffs. Considerable testi-

mony was given tending to show the cost

of marble in the quarry, and the expense of

raising, dressing, and transporting it to the

place of delivery. And the plaintiffs offered

to show “what would be the difference be

tween the cost to them of the marble in the

contract, and the price that was to be paid

for it by the contract," which evidence was

objected to, but the circuit judge admitted

*‘it, and the defendants excepted. The wit-

nesses answered that in 1836 the difference

would be about 20 per cent.; in 1837, from

25 to 30 per cent.; in 1838, about 25 per cent.;

in 1839, from 25 to 30 per cent.; and in

18-ll), from 30 to 40 per cent. The witnesses

‘ also testiﬁed that the ordinary proﬁt calcu-

lated upon by master stone cutters was from

10 to 20 per cent., and that 15 per cent; was

a fair living proﬁt. All this testimony was

objected to, but the circuit judge admitted

it, and the defendants again excepted.

When the plaintiffs rested, the defendants

moved that all the testimony, in relation to

the contract of Kain & Morgan with the

plaintiffs, and the contract itself, be exclud-

ed from the consideration of the jury as ir-

relevant, but the circuit judge overruled the

motion, and the defendants excepted.

The circuit judge charged the jury, among

other things, that they were to allow the

plaintiffs as much as the performance of the

contract would have beneﬁted them; that

the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for the

unﬁnished marble not accepted, subject to

a deduction of what should be deemed its

fair market value; that the jury should con-

ﬁne the damages to the loss of the plaintiffs;

but that the beneﬁt or proﬁts which they

would have received from the actual per-

formance constituted such loss. The cir-

cuit judge also charged as follows: “The

defendants ought to be allowed what the

jury should think just as to interest on the

outlays of the plaintiffs; also what the jury

might think just for the risk of transporta-

tion, and the reasonable value of the marble

unacccpted and unquarried. As to damages

on the rough marble to be delivered by Kain
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funds, and refused to receive any more ma- & !\Jorgan, It appears by the contract with
terials of the plalntlfl's, though the latter the defendants that the plaintiffs were obwere ready and o1fered to perform. The lij:'ed to procure It from this quarry. The
entire quantity of marble necessary to ful- plaintiffs' contract with Kain & Morgan, if
fill the contract on the part of the plaintiffs, made in good faith, was entered Into as a
acco1·ding to the estimates made at the trial, reasonable part of the performance by the
was 88,819 feet. At the time the work was plaintlfl's of their own contract; and if the
suspended, the pla!ntlfl's had delivered 14,- defendants, by stopping the work, obllged
779 feet, for which they were paid the con- the plaintiffs to break their contract with
tract price. The plaintitl's t.gen had on Kain & l\lorgan, then the damages on the
hand, at Kain & Morgan's quarry, about latter ought to be allowed to th'e plainturs,
3,308 feet, which was suitably fitted and pre- who would be responsible to Kaln & Mor- .
pared for delivery. A witness swore that gan for the same. The jury, In respect to .,
this was not of much value for other bulld- this contract, are to give the dl1ference beings, and would not probably bring over tween the contract price and what it would
two shilllngs per foot. Other witnesses cost Knin & Morgan to deliver the article,
swore that, had the work progressed with deducting the value of it to them, and makordinary dHlgence, it would have taken ing all proper allowances as In the case of
about five years to complete the contract on the principal contract. In fixing the dam- .
the part of the plaintiffs. Considerable testi- ages to be allowed the plaintitl's, the jury are
. mony was given tending to show the cost to take things as they were. at the time the
of marble In the quarry, and the expense of work was suspended, and not allow for any
raising, dressing, and transporting it to the increased benefits they would have received
place of dellvery. And the plaintiffs o1fered from the subsequent fall of wages or subseto show "what would be the ditl'erence be- quent circumstances." etc.
-tween the cost to them of the marble In the
The defendants excepted to the charge,
contract, and the price that was to be paid and requested the circuit judge to instruct
It by the contract," which evidence was the jury, among other things, that no dam/objected to, but the. circuit judge admitted ages should be allowed on account of any su~ 1
-- lit, and the defendants excepted. The wit- posed profits which the plaintift's might have
nesses answered that in 1836 the di1ference made out of the unfinished work; and that
would be about 20 per cent.; In 1837, f1·om the damages allowed sh<>uld be confined to
!!5 to 30 percent.; in 1838, about 25 per cent.; the actual loss which the plaintiffs had susin 1839, from 25 to 30 per cent.; and in tained. The judge refused to charge fur1840, from 30 to 40 per cent. The witnesses ther, and the defendants excepted. The jury
also testified that the ordinary profit calcu- found a verdict In favor of the plaintiffs for
lated upon by master stone cutters was from $72,999, and the defendants now moved for
10 to 20 per cent., and that 15 per cent was· a new trial on a blll of exceptions.
a fair living p1·ofit. All this testimony was
D. Lord and C. O'Conor, for plaintiffs. B.
objected to, but the circuit judge admitted
F. Butler and G. Wood, for defendants.
it, and the defendants again excepted.
When the plalntit'l'.s rested, the defendants
moved that all the testimonY. in relation to
NELSON, C. J'. The damages for the
the contract of Kain & Morgan with the marble on hand, ready to be delivered, were
plaintiffs, and the contract itself, be exclud- not a ma.tter in dispute on the argument.
ed from the consideration of the jury as Ir- The true measure of allowance In respect to
relevant, but the circuit judge overruled the that Item was conceded to be the difl'erence ·
motion, and the defendants excepted.
between the cootract price and the market ·
The circuit judge charged the jury, among value of the article at the place of delivery. .
other things, that they were to allow the This loss the plaintiffs had actually sustainplaintiffs as much as the performance of the ed, regard being had to their rights as accontract would have benefited them; that quired under contract.
,...the plaintifl's were entitled to recover for the
The contest arises out of the claim for damunfinished marble not accepted, subject to ages In respect to the remainder of the mar-.
a deduction of what should be deemed Its ble which the plalntifl's had agreed to furnish,'
fair market value; that the jury should con- but which they were prevented trom furnish·
fine the damages to the loss of the plaintlft's; Ing by the suspension of the work In July,
but that the benefit or profits which they 1837. This portion was not ready to be dewould have received fr<>m the actual per- Uvered at the time the defendants broke up
formance constituted such loss. The cir- the contract, but the plalntifl's were then
cuit judge also charged as follows: "The willing and oft'ered to perform in all things
<lefendants ought to be allowed what the on their part, and the case assumes that they
jury should think just as to Interest on the were possessed of suftl.cient means and abll·
outlays of the plaintiffs; also what the jury ity to have done so.
might think just for the risk of transportaThe plalntlft's Insist that the gains they
tion, and the reasonable value of the marble would have reallzed, over and above all ex·
unaccepted and unquarrled. As to damages penses. In case they bad been allowed to peron the rough marble to be delivered by Kain form the contract, enter Into and properly
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constitute a part of the loss and damage oc-

casioned by the breach; and they were ac-

cordingly permitted in the course of the trial

to give evidence tending to show what

amount of gains they would have realized if

the contract had been carried into execu-

tion.

On the other hand, the defendants say that

this claim exceeds the measure of damages

,allowed by the common law for the breach

They insist that it]

is simply a claim for the proﬁts anticipatedl

of an executory contract.

from a supposed good bargain, and that these

are too uncertain, speculative, and remote

form the basis of a recovery.

it is not to be denied that there are pro s

or gains derivable from a contract which are

uniformly rejected as too contingent and
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speculative in their nature, and too dependent

upon the ﬂuctuation of markets and the

chances of business, to enter into a safe or

reasonable estimate of damages. Thus any

supposed successful operation the party

might have made, if he had not been prevent-

ed from realizing the proceeds of the con-

tract at the time stipulated, is a considera-

tion not to be taken into the estimate. Be-

sides the uncertain and contingent issue of

such an operation in itself considered, it has

no legal or necessary connection with the

stipulations between the parties, and cannot,

therefore, be presumed to have entered into

their consideration at the time of contracting.

It has accordingly been held that the loss of

any speculation or enterprise in which a par-

ty may have embarked, relying on the pro-

ceeds to be derived from the fulﬁllment of

an existing contract, constitutes no part of

the damages to be recovered in case of

breach. So a good bargain made by a ven-

dor, in anticipation of the price of the article

sold, or an advantageous contract of resale

made by a vendee, conﬁding in the vendor's

promise to deliver the article, are considera-

tions always excluded as too remote and con-

tingent to affect the question of damages.

Clare v. Maynard, 6 Adol. & E. 519, and Cox

v. Walker, in the note to that case; Walker

v. Moore, 10 Barn. & C. -116; Cary v. Gru-

man, 4 Hill, 627, 628; Chit. Cont. 458, 870.

The civil law is in accordance with this

rule. “In general," says Pothier, “the par-

ties are deemed to have_ contemplated only

the damages and interest which the creditor

might suffer from the nonperformanee of the

obligation, in respect to the particular thing

which is the object of it, and not such as may

have been incidentally occasioned thereby in

respect to his other affairs. The debtor is

therefore not answerable for these, but only

for such as are suffered with respect to the

thing which is the object of the obligation,

‘ “Damni et interesse ipsam rem non habltam."

1 Evans. Poth. 91.

5, § 2. arts. 3-6.

When the books and cases speak of the

proﬁts anticipated from a good bargain as
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appeared that the defendant contracted in

November for a quantity of oil, one-half to

be delivered to him in February following,

and the rest in March; but he refused to re-

ceive any part of it. And the court held that

the plaintiff was entitled to the difference

between the contract price and that which

might have been obtained in market on the

days when the contract ought to have been

completed. See M'Lenn v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.

The case of Leigh v. Paterson, 8 Tauut. 540,

was one in which the vendor was sued for

not delivering goods December 31st, accord-

ing to his contract. It appeared that in the

month of October preceding he had apprised

the vendee that the goods would not be deliv-

ered, at which time the market value was

considerably less than December 31st. The

court held that the vendee had a right to re-
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gard the contract as subsisting until Decem-

ber 31st, if he chose and recover the differ-

ence between the contract price, and the mar-

ket value ou that day. See, also, Gainsford

v. Carroll, 2 Barn. & C. 624.

The above are cases, it will be seen, in

which the proﬁts of a good bargain were re-

gnrded as a legitimate item of damages, and

constituted almost the only ground of recov-

ery. And it appears to me that we have only

to apply the principle of these cases to the

one in hand, in order to determine the meas-

ure of damages which must govern it. The

contract here is for the delivery of marble,

wrought in a paticular manner, so as to be

ﬁtted r use in the erection of a certain build-

ing. The 'plaintiffs‘ claim is substantially

one for Jnot accepting goods bargained and

sold; as much so as if the subject-matter of

the contract had been bricks, rough stone, or

any other article of commerce used in the

process of building. (The only diﬂiculty or

embarrassnlent in applying the general rule

grows out of the fact that the article in ques-

tion does not appear to have any well-ascer-

tained market value. But this cannot change

the principles which must govern, but only

the mode of ascertaining the actual value of

the article, rather the cost to the party pro-

ducing it) Where the article has no market

value, an investigation into the constituent

elements of the cost to the party who has

contracted to furnish it becomes necessary;

and that, compared with the contract price,

will afford the measure of damages)" The

jury will be able to settle this upon evidence

of the outlays, trouble, risk, etc., which enter

into and make up the cost of ﬁle article in

the condition required by the contract at the

place of delivery. ‘If the cost equals or ex-

ceeds the contract price, the recovery will of

course be nominal, but, if the contract price

iexcoeds the cost, the difference will constitute

the measure of damages)

It has been argued that inasmuch as the

furnishing _of the marble would have run

through a period of ﬁve ycars,—of which

about one ywr and a half only had expired at

the time of the suspension,—the beneﬁts
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‘ will be obliged to go into an inquiry as to

the actual cost of furnishing the article at

the place of delivery; and the court and jury

should see that in estimating this amount it

be made upon a substantial basis, and not

be left to rest upon the 1oo e and specula-

tive opinions of witnesses. he constituent

elements of the cost should be scertained

from sound and reliable sources;\ from prac-

tical men, having experience in the particu-

lar departmen of labor to which the con-

tract relates. t is a very easy matter to

ﬁgure out large proﬁts upon paper; but it

will be found that these, in a great majority

of the cases, become seriously reduced when

subjected to the contingencies and hazards in-

cident to actual performance. [A jury should

scrutinize with care and watchfuluessany spec-

ulative or conjectural account of the cost of
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furnishing the article that would result in a

very unequal bargain between the parties, by

which the gains and beneﬁts, or, in other

words, the measure of damages against the

defendants, are unreasonably enhanced.

They should not overlook the risks and con-

tingencies which are almost inseparable from

the execution of contracts like the one in

question, and which increase the expense in-

dependently of the outlays in labor and cap-

ital.

These views. it will be seen, when con-

trasted with the law as expounded and ap-

plied by the circuit judge, necessarily lead to

the granting of a new trial. .

BEAHDSLEY, J. The circuit judge clearly

erred in that part of his charge to the jury

which related to the con ract of the plaintiffs

with Kain & Morgan. n2‘No damages are al-

lowable on account of t s contract, nor am I

able to see how it can be regarded as rele-

vant evidence upon any disputed point con-

nected with theamount for which the de-

fendants are liable. ‘‘

The main question in the case arises out of

the claim of the plaintiffs in respect to that

portion of their contract with the defendants

which remained wholly unexecuted in July,

1837.‘ I think the plaintiffs are entitled to

recover the amount they would have realized

as proﬁts had they been allowed fully to

execute their contract. (The defendants are

not to gain by their wrongful act, nor is that

to deprive the plaintiffs of the advantages

they had secured by the contract, and which

would have resulted to them from its per-

formance. £he jury must, therefore, ascer-

tain wha i would probably have cost them

to complete the contract, over and above the

materials on hand, including the value of the

marble required, the labor of quarrying and

preparing it for use, the expense of transpor-

tation, superintendence, and insurance against

all hazards, together with every other ex-

pense incident to the fulﬁllment of the under-

taking. The aggregate of these expenditures

is to be deducted from the amount which

would be payable for the performance of this
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will be obliged to go Into an inquiry ns to
the actual cost of furnishing the article at
the place of delivery; and tbe court and Jury
should see that in estimating this amount It
be made upon a substantial basis, and not
be left to rest upon tbe loo;;e and specula·
tive opinions of witnesses. trhe constituent
elements of tbe cost should be 11scertained
from sound and relia ule sources;\ l from practical wen, having experience in the particular departmen\ot labor to which the contra.ct relates.
t is a very easy matter to
figure out large profits upon pnper; \mt It
will be found that these, in a great majority
of the c·ases, become seriously reduced when
suhjet'led to the contingencies and hazards Incident to actual perf01·mn11ce. {A jury should
scrntinlzewlth care and wntcbfulncssany speculative or conjectural account of the cost of
furni!'hing the r.rtlde that would result in a
very unequal bnrgain betwePn the parties, by
which the gains and benefits, or, IJ:\ other
words, .the measure or damages against the
defendants, are unreasonably enhanced.
They should not overlook the risks and con·
tlngcncles which are almost Inseparable from
tile execution ot contracts like the one in
question, and which increase the expense independently or the outlays ln labor and capital.

These views, It will be seen, when contrasted with the law as expounded and applied by the circuit judge, necessarily lead to
the granting of a new trial.
BEAlWSLEY, J. The circuit judge clearly
erred in that part or his charge to the jury
which related to the colract ot the plalntitTs
with Kain & Morgan. No damages are al·
lowable on account of t s contract, nor am I
able to see how It can be regarded as relevant evidence upon any disputed point con·
nected with the. a~ount for which the defendants are liable. I
The main question In the case arises out of
the claim of the plalntll'rs in respect to that
portion of their contract with the defendants
which remained wholly unexecuted lo July,
18:.li. · I think the plalntll'rs are entitled to
recover the amount they would have realized
es profits had they been allowed fully to
execute their contract. (The defendants ore
not to gain by their wrongful act, nor is that
to deprive the plalnt1ffs of the advantages
they had secured by the contract, and which
would have resulted to them from its performance/ frhe jury must, therefo1·e, ascertain wha !~would p1·obably have cost them
to complete the contmct, over and above the
matermls on hand, lnclU<.ling the value of the
marble required, the labor of quarrying and
preparing It for use, the expense of trausportation, superintendence, and Insurance against
all hazards, together with every other expense Incident to the fulfillment of the undertaking. The aggregate of these expenditures
is to be deducted from the amount which
would be payable for tile performance of this
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part of the contract, accortllng to the prit-es
therein stipulated, and the balance will IJe
the damages which the Jury ~hould allow tor
the item under consideration. I
{Remote and contingent damages, depending
dn the result of suc'cessive schemes or Investments, are never allowed for the violation
of any contract. -But profits to be earned
and made by the faithful execution of a fair
contract are not of this description. A right
to damages equivalent to such profits re1mits
directly and Immediately from the act of the
party who prevents the contract from being
performed.
'Vhere a vendor has agreed to sell and deliver personal property at n pnrticulur (lay,
and fnils to perform his contract, the .ven<lee
may recover In damages the difference between the contract price and the market value
ot the property at the foue when 1t should
hnve b~~n dellver~dJ Chit. Cont." (?th ~m.
Ed.) 440, Dey v. DOx, 9 Wend. 1-9, Gamsford v. Carroll, 2 Barn. & C. 624; Shepherd
v. Hampton, 3 Wheat. 200; Quarles v. George,
23 Pick. 400; Shaw v. Nudd, 8 Pick. O; 2
Phil. Ev. 104. So, If a person who has
agreed to purchase goods at a certain price
refuses to receive them, he must pay the difference between their market value and tbe
enhanced price which he contracted to pay.
2 Starkie, Bv. (ith Am. Ed.) 1201; Boorman
v. Nash, 9 Barn. & C. 145.
These principles are strictly applicable to
the present case. In reason and justice there
can be no difference between the damages
which should be recovered for the breach of
an ordinary agreement to buy or sell goods
and one to procure building materials, flt
them for use, and deliver them In a finished
state, at a stipulated price. In neither case
should the wrongdoer be allowed to prottt by
bis wrongful act. The party who Is ready
to perform Is entitled to a full Indemnity tor
the loss or his contract. (He should not be
made to suft'er by the delinquency of the
other party, but ought to recover precisely
what he would have made by performance.)
This is as. sound In morals as It ls in law.
Shannon v. Qomstock, 21 Wend. 4Gl; Miller
v. Mariner's Church, 7 Green!. 51; Shaw v.
l'\udd, 8 Pick. 13; Swift v. Barnes, 16 I'ick.
ll>li; Royalton v. Turnpike Co., H Vt. 311.
The plaintitrs were not bound to wait till
the period bad elapsed for tbe complete performance of the agreement, nor to make suc·
cesslve offers of performance, In order to recover all their damages. '.fhcy might regard the contract as broken up, so far as to
absolve them from making further efforts to
perform and give them a right to recover full
damages as for a total breach. I am not prepared to l!:ly that the plnlutltl's might not
have brought successive suits on this covenant, bad they from time to time made :.,..
peated otrers to perform on their part, which·
were refused by the defendants, but this the·
plaintiffs were not bound to do.
Thern can i.Je no serious difficulty in as-
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sessing damages according to the principles

which have been stated. he contract was

made in 1836; and, acco ing to the testi-

mony, about ﬂve years would have been a

reasonable time for its execution. That time

has gone by. The expense of executing the

contract must necessarily depend upon the

prices of labor and materials. If prices ﬂuc-

tuated during the period in question, that

may be shown by testimony.\ In this respect .

there is no need of resorting to conjecture,

for all the data necessary to form a correct

estimate of the entire expenses of executing

the contract can now be furnished by wit-

nesses.

If the cause had been brought to trial be-

fore the time for completing the contract ex-

pired, it would have been impracticable to

make an accurate assessment of the dam-
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ages. (This is no reason, however, why the

injured party‘should not have his damages,

although the diﬂiculty in making a just as-

sessment in such a case has been deemed a

suﬂicient ground for decreeing speciﬁc per-

formanc . Adderly v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S.

607, and cases there cited. In Royalton v.

Turnpike Co., 14 Vt. 311, 324, an action was

brought on a contract which had about twelve

years to run. And the court held, in grant-

ing a new trial, that the rule of damages

“should have been to give the plaintiffs the

difference between what they were to pay

the defendants, and the probable expense of

performing the contract; and thus assess the

entire damages for the remaining twelve

years." No rule which will be absolutely

certain to do justice between the parties can

be laid down for such a case. Some time

must be taken arbitrarily at which prices are

to be ascertained and estimated; and the

day of the breach of the contract, or of the

commencement of the suit, should perhaps be

adopted under such circumstances. But we

need not, in the present case, express any

opinion on that point. No conjectural esti-

mate is required to ascertain what would

have been the expense of a complete execu-

tion of this contract; but the state of the

1 market in respect to prices is now susceptible

of explicit and intelligible proof. And where

that is so, it seems to me unsuitable to adopt

an arbitrary period, especially as the esti-

mate of damages must, in any event, be

somewhat conjectural.

I think the defendants are entitled to a new

trial, and that the damages should be assess-

ed upon the principles stated.

BRONSON, J. As the marble had no mar-

kot value, the question of proﬁts involves an

inquiry into the cost of the rough material in

the quarry, and the expense of raising, dress-

ing, and transporting it to the place of deliv-

ery. There may have been ﬂuctuations in

the prices of labor and materials between the

day of the breach and the time when the con-

tract was to have been fully performed; and

this makes the question on which my broth-

ren are not agreed. I concur in opinion with
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SHERMAN CENTER TOWN CO. v. LEON- I have pa-oiitabty carried on the hotel busi-

ARD.

(26 Pac. 717. 46 Kan. 354.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. May 9, 1891.

Error from district court,

county; Loms K. PRATT, Judge.

Hardy & Sterling, for plaintiff in error.

Bagley & Andrews, for defendant in error.

Sherman

.IOH.\S'll'()N. J. Thomas P. Leona rd rr- -

covered a judgment for $600 against the

lSherman Center Town Company as dam-

'.age for the breach of acontract. Leon-

ard owned a hotel in Itasca.and Sherman

Center: which was three miles away, was

a candidate for county-scat of Sherman

county.

increase the population and inﬂuence of

Sherman Center and strengthen its can-
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didacy, held out inducements to the citi-

zens of the surrounding towns to remove

their buildings and establish themselves

in business in Sherman Center, and unite

in an effort to make that town the coun-

ty-seat of the county. Accordingly they

entered into an agreement with Leonard

by which Leonard was to join them in

building up the town, and remove his

hotel from Itasca, in consideration of

which the company was to convey to

him certain lots in Sherman Center, and

provide at its own e.\'peu.\r men and ma-

chinery to remove the hotel, and place it

over a cellar of equal size. and on a foun-

dation of a similar kind, asit was then

resting upon in Itasca. 'l‘he plaintiff ai-

ieged that the company had failed and re-

fused to remove the hotel in accordance

with the terms of the contract; that the

other buildings which were then situated

in Itasca have been removed to Sherman

Center, and the town of Itasca has be-

come depopulated, and the business of

hotel-keeping of no value; and that the

hotel now stands alone, with no town

nearer toit than Sherman Center, which is

nearly three miles distant. He further ai-

ieged that it was a large and well-fur-

nished hotel. and that the cost of its con-

struction and the furniture contained

therein was about $4,500. It is alleged

that the cost of removal would be about

the sum of $00, and that he suffered dam-

ages by the refusal of the company to

comply with the contract in the sum of

r$l.200. He therefore asked judgment for

$2.000. The company by its answer de-

nies the execution of the contract, or that

it is authorized by its charter to enter in-

to the contract alleged tohave been made.

There are several errors assigned by the

company, but only one of them requires

attention. it appears that the company

has conveyed the lots to Leonard, as stip-

- ulated in the contract, but the hotel has

not been removed, and, according to

plaintiff's testimony, the non-removal is

owing to the refusal of the company to
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contract-results in the loss of deﬁnite

proﬁts, which are asurtainable, and were

within the contemplation O1 the contract-

ing‘ parties. they may generally be recov-

ered; but the prospective protits do not

furnish the correct measure of damages in

the present case. Aside from the remote,

conjectural, and speculative character of

the anticipated beneﬁts, it cannot be said

that the loss of them is the direct endan-

nmidable consequence of the breach.

The plaintiii‘ could not sltidle an indeli-

nite len,e,'th_of time, and safely count on the

recovery of $150 per month as damages.

If there was a breach of the contract, it

was his duty. upon learning of it, to at

once remove the building‘. or employ oth-

ers to do so. and charge the cost of the re-

moval to the town company. The law

] requires that the injured party shall do
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whatever he reasonnbiycan, and improve

all reasonable opportunities to lessen

the injury. From the testimony it ap-

pears that Leonard could have procuredl

others to move the hotel: and in such a

case the ordinary measure of damages is

the cost of removal, and the reasonable

expenses of avoiding the consequenc

the defendant's wrong. Railway Co. v.

Mihlman. 17 Kan. 224; Loker v. Damon.

17 Pick. 284; 1 Sedg. Dam. 165, and cases

cited. Counsel ior plaintiff in error say

y the court: but the ad-

mis i of the objectionable evidence,

nga s the opposition of the plaintiff in

error would indicate that the cour

adop d an incorrect measure of damages.

and id not limit the recovery to.tb_e_ex-

pense of the remoyal. The liability of the

plaintiff in Error ior any loss is not con-

ceded. It is shown in the testimony that

soon after the time ior the removal of the

building the people O! Sherman Center

abandoned the attempt to obtain the

county-seat, and all or nearly ll of them

I-F/bliaclaimed

by plainﬁﬂin error that Leo ard objected

to the removal ol his building mftil the-

question of the location of the county-seat

was settled. He testiﬁed at the trial thag

he did not intend to move the buildingx-

to Sherman Center. and that he would

not move the building at all, until the

county-seat was permanently located. I!

the non-removal of the building was due

to the lault of Leonard, he is not entitled

to recover anything. This is a disputed

question of fact, which must be settled on

another trial. For the error of the court

in admitting testimony the judgment of

the court below will be reversed. and

moved to another place. I ‘

cause remanded for a new trial. All the

justices concurring.
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THOMAS, BADGLEY &. W. .\IA. 1 CO.

v. WABASH, ST. L. & P. RY. .

(22 N. W. 827, 62 Wis. 642.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. March 31, 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun-

ty.

Chapin, Dey & Friend, for appellant. Van

Dyke & Van Dyke, for respondent.

COLE, C. J. On the tenth of November,

1882, the plaintiff, as consignee, caused to be

delivered to the defendant, a common car-

rier, at St. Louis, 11 pipemachine, circular

||shaft, box of dies, and wrenches accompany-

‘ing, and being a part of the pipe-machine,

to be transported over its road and connect-

ing lines to Milwaukee. The machine and

its attachments were badly broken and de-

stroyed while in the custody of the defend-
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ant through the negligence of its servants.

‘The machine was a patented one, and the

right to make and sell it was vested in the

manufacturer at St. Louis, of whom it was

purchased by the plaintiff. The machine

was devised for cutting pipe and making t

nipples, and was ordered by the plaintiff to

be used in its business in Milwaukee, of

ﬁtting pipe and manufacturing brass goods,

etc. The plaintiff sues to recover damages

for the loss of the machine, and the loss of

its use in its business while another was be-

lug procured. The case was tried by a jury,

which found a special verdict. The plaintiff

had judgment for the value of the machine,

which was proven to be $275, and for the loss

of its use for 85 days, at the rate of $1.50 per

day, and interest thereon from the com-

mencement of the action.

The questions presented on the appeal are

as to the proper rule of damages. There

was evidence which tended to show that the

machine, though badly broken and some of

its parts destroyed, might have been repair-

ed by the patentee at St. Louis, who was

the manufacturer. The plaintiff refused to

accept the machine at Milwaukee, but left

it in the possession of the carrier, and or-

dered a new machine of the manufacturer.

One question arising in the record is wheth-

er it was thp duty of the plaintiff, under the

circumstances, to have received the machine

in its damaged condition, and to have made

proper and reasonable exertions to have it

repaired, so as to render the loss to the car-

rier as light as possible. There is a class of

.cases which decide that it is not only the

moral but the legal duty of a party who

seeks redress for another's wrong, to make

use of his opportunities of lessening the dam-

age caused by the other's default. If it had

been within the power of the plaintiff to

have supplied the broken parts of the ma-

chine, or to have repaired it with reason-

able labor and expense, it might have been its

duty to have done so within this rule of law.

delivered was useless; that the cost and ex-

pense to the plaintiff to repair it would have

amounted to the price of a new machine.
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the bill of lading that in case of loss or dam-

age to goods during transportation, whereby

.' the defendant incurred a responsibility, that

:' then it should only be liable for the value of

the property computed at the place and time

of shipment. This was precisely the extent

of the rccovery' on this item of damages.

The next question is, was the plaintif f en-

titled to recover for the loss of the use of

the machine while another was being pro-

cured to supply the place of the one destroy-

ed‘! This question, upon the circumstances

of this case, we think must be answered iii

the negative. n the ﬁrst place, it is to be ob-

served that there is no allegation in the com-

plaint, and no proof was give on the part of

the plaintiff, which tended to show that the

defendant had notice of the use to which the

machine was to be put, or even knew that the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:10 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

plaintiff intended to use it in its business.

On the contrary, the agent of the defendant

who made the contract of shipment ays he

had no notice of the purpose for which the

machinery was to be used. He said he was

applied to by the manufacturer in St. Louis

about this particular shipment, and gave

special rates, less than the regular tariff, on

representation made by the manufacturer

that the goods were not liable to injury, and

that he wanted to introduce the machine,

which was a new one, through the west, and

wished the assistance of the witness in do-

ing so. This is all the knowledge the de-

fendant had about the property, or the use

to which it was to be put. It is said the

fact that the consignee in the bill of iading

was a manufacturing company was suﬂicient

notice that the machine was intended to be

used by it in its business. We do not think

so. The defendant certainly had no notice

of the business in which the plaintif f was

engaged, and did not know that this ma-

chine had been procured for ﬁtting pipe and

making nipples. Should we presume—as we

i have no right to do—that the defendant had

knowledge of plaintiff's business, surely we

could not presume that this machine was

' ordered by it for immediate use.

This being the state of the evidence, on

what ground can the plaintiff claim dam-

ages for loss in the use of the machine? The

president of the plaintiff testiﬁed that his

company was doing business of steam-ﬁtting

and selling pipe at wholesale, and in the fall

of 1882 he was told he would need a ma-

chine to cut the pipe. This was the reason

for buying the machine. He says: “We

were, besides, doing some steam-ﬁtting our-

selves. and, of course, we have to cut pipe

all the time to get special lengths, and in-

stead of using men we paid a man to do it

with the machine. The machine would do

the work of one man." This is really all

there is in the case to base a claim for loss

in the use of the machine upon. The de-

fendant did not know what the machine was

designed for: did not know the use to which

it was to he put; did not even know the

DIHECT .A.ND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN CONTRAC'l'.

the blll of lading that ln case of loss or dam- plaintiff would use it; and, of course, did
age to goods during transportation, whereby not know that the plalntitr would sustain
: the defendant incurred a responsibility, that any special damage if the property failed to
: then It should only be liable for the value ot be delivered promptly, In good order. From
the property computed at the place and time the nature of the subject It ls difficult to
of shipment. 'l'hls was precisely the extent state an inflexible rule of damages which
will aJ:}ply to all contracts. This court has .
, of the recovery· on this Item of damages.
} \ Tile ne..\:t question is, was the plaintitr en- often referred to, and llas p111ctlcally acted ~
titled to recover for the loss of the use of upon, the rule laid down In the leading case
tile machine while another was being pro- of Hadley v. Bax:endale, 9 Exch. 3.U. In
cured to supply tile place of the one destroy- that case the plaintiffs, who were owners of
ed'/ This question, upon the circumstances a fiour-mlll, sent a broken Iron sba!t to an
of this case, we think must be answered lb office of the defendant, a common ca1Tler, to
the negative. fVJ:n the first place, it Is to be ob- be conveyed to the consignee, to have a new
served that there Is no allegation in the com- shaft made. The defendant's clerk was told
plaint, and no proof was give on the part of . that plaintiff's mlll was stopped, and that
the plalntitr, which tended to show that the the broken shaft must be delivered Immedidefendant bad notice of the use to which the ately to the consignee, but It was delayed
nmchlne was to be put, or e\"en knew that the for an unreasonable time. In consequence
plaintiff Intended to use it In its business. of the delay the plalnti!Is did not receive the
On the contrary, the agent of the defendant new shaft for some days after the time they
who made the contract of shipment says be ought to have receiYed It, and they were
bad no notice of the purpose for which the unable to work their mm for want of the
machinery was to be used. He said he was new shaft, and thereby Incurred a. loss of
applied to by the manufacturer in St. Louis profits. The court held that under the cirabout this particular shl1)ment, and gave cumstances such loss could not'be recovered
special rates, less than the regular tnrlft, on in an action ngalnst the common camer.
representation made by the manufacturer because the special circumstances were nevthat the goods were not liable to Injury, and er communlcnted to It by the plaintiffs. Althat he wanted to introduce the machine, derson. B., In giving the decision, states the
which was a new one, through the west, and rule of damages as follows:
wished the assistance of the witness In do"Where two parties have made a contract.
ing so. This Is all the knowledge the de- which one of them has broken, the damages
fendant had about the property, or the use which the other party ought to receive In reto which it was to be put. It Is said the spect of such breach of contract should be
fact that the consignee In the bill of lading such as may fairly and reasonably be conwas a manufacturing rompnny was suftlclent sidered either arising naturally, i. e., acnotice that the machine was Intended to be cording to the usual course of things, from
used by it In its business. We do not think such breach of contract Itself, or such as
so. The defendant certainly had no notice may reasonably be supposed to have been In
of the business in which the plaintiff was the contemplation of both parties, at the
engaged, and did not know that this ma- time .they )Ilade the contract, as the probchine had been proeured for fitting pipe and able result of the breach of it.} Now, it' the
making nipples. Should we presume-as we special circumstances under w1ilch the conr have no right to do-that the defendant had
tract was actunlly made were communicated
', knowledge of plaintiff's business, surely we by the plaintltrs to the defendants, and thus
· could not presume that this machine was known to both parties, the damages resultordered by it for immediate use.
ing from the breach of such a contract, which
This being the state of the evidence, on they would reasonably contemplate, would
what ground can the plalntur claim dam- be the amount of injury which would ordiages for loss In the use of the machine? Tbe narily follow from the breach of contract
president of the plalntltr testified that his under these special circumstances so known
company was doing business of steam-fitting and communlcatod. But, on the other hand,
and Relling pipe at wholesale, and in the fall If these special circumstances were wholly
of 1882 he was told be would need a ma- unknown to the party breaking the contract.
chine to cut the pipe. This was the reason he, at the most, could only be supposed to
for buying the machine. He says: "We have had in his contemplation the amount
w<'re, besides, doing some steam-fitting our- of injury which would a.rise generally, and,
seh'cs. and, of course, we have to cut pipe In the g1·eat multitude of cases, not affected
all the time to get special lengths, and In- by any specinl circumstances from such a
stead of using men we paid a man to do It breach of contract."
with the machine. The machine would do
This rule has been sometimes criticised,
the work of one man." This ts really all and It has been said that, gene1·ally, when
there Is In the case to bnse n claim for loss parties enter Into a contract, they do not
In the use of the machine upon. The de- ronteruplnte its breach or the probable result
fendant dill not know what the machine was of a breach, and that the rule might be more
dcsignc~<I for: <lid not know the:> nse to which
accurately ex:pres!'<ed. See Palles, C. B .. In
it was to h• put; uiu uot even know the Hamilton 1. ~IcGill, 12 Ir. Law, 202. But,
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without reﬁning on the rule, its application

to the question we are considering is ob-

vious and decisive; for here the defendant

was not informed by the plaintiff that the

machine was one which it needed for use in

its business of cutting and titting pipe, and

that it was procured for that purpose. If

one desires to trace the judicial discussion

of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, he will

tind a most excellent and accurate analysis

of the English and American decisions in

/note a, 1 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.) top p. 218.

Also see note 2 to section 772, Iintch. Carr.

p. 597.

In Brayton v. Chase, 3 Wis. 456, which

was an action by the vendee against the

vendor for failure to deliver a reaper which

the plaintiff purchased to harvest his crops,

the plaintiff sought to prove that he suffered

great loss and damage in his crops, and in
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the extra expense of hiring hands, by rea-

son of the non-fulﬁllment of the contract to

deliver. The evidence was excluded, and

this court aﬂlrmed the ruling, holding that

such damages did not result naturally and

directly from the injury complained of. It

may be doubtful whether this decision is

entirely consistent with Richardson v. Chyno-

weth, 26 Wis. 656; Smeed v. Foord, 1 El. &

El. 602; Gee v. Railway Co. 6 Hurl. & N.

211; Collard v. Railway Co. 7 Hurl. & N. 79;

Elbinger Actien-Gesellschafft v. Armstrong,

L. R. 9 Q. B. 473; Wilson v. Railway ()o. 9

C. B. (N. S.) 632; Griﬂin v. Colver, 16 N. Y.

490; Vicksburg & M, R. Co. v. Ragsdale, 46

.\Iiss. 458; and cases of that class. For, as

we unde1stand the Brayton Case, the vendor

knew that the reaper was wanted for the

purpose of harvesting the plaintiff's crop

that season. If it were not delivered in time

for that purpose the parties might well be

presumed to have known that the vendee

would be put to additional expense in secur-

ing his cropst But still the case is fully sup-

ported by British Columbia Saw-mill Co. v.

Nettleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499. In this case

“the platntlffs delivered to the defendant's

servants, on a quay at Glasgow. for ship-

ment on board the defendant's vessel. which

lay along-side, several cases containing ma-

ehinery, which was intended for the crec-

tlon of a saw-mill at Vancouver's island.

The master gave a bill of lading for them,

describing the cases as containing “merchan-

dise." The defendant knew generally of

what the shipment consisted. On the ar-

rival of the vessel at her destination, one of

the cases, which contained machinery with-

out which the mill could not be erected,

could not be found on board, and the plain-

tiffs were obliged to send to England to re-

place the lost article. Held, that the defend-

ant was liable for the loss of the machinery,

as delivery to the defendant's servants along-

side the vessel was equivalent to a delivery

on board. Held, also, that the measure of

damages for the breach of the contract was

the cost of replacing the lost articles in Van-

couver's island, with interest at 5 per cent.
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BRIGHAM et al. v. CARLISLE.

(78 Ala. 243.)

Dec. Term, 1884.

Appeal from circuit court, Lee county;

Henry D. Clayton. Judge.

Action against Brigham & Co. for breach

of a contract employing plaintiff as a trav-

eling salesman to sell goods on commission.

There was a judgment for plaintiff, from

which defendants appealed.

J. M. Chilton, for appellants.

Barnes, contra.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

W. H.

CLOPTON, J. It may be conceded that

at common law a defendant can insist upon

the beneﬁt of the statute of frauds by plea

of the general issue. Under our statute,

which provides that “in all suits where the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:10 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

- defendant relies on a denial of the cause of

action as set forth by the plaintiff he may

plead the general issue, and in all other

cases the defendant must brieﬂy plead spe-

cially the matter of defense." The statute of

frauds must he pleaded, or it will be consid-

ered as waived. Ritch v. Thornton, (35 Ala.

309; Petty v. Dill, 53 Ala. 641. No plea of the

statute of frauds having been interposed, the

validity of the contract, because not in writ-

ing, cannot be raised by a charge.

If the statute had been pleaded, the con-

tract, as set out in the bill of exceptions,

does not come within its inhibition. It was

made in September, 1881, and, as testiﬁed

by the plaintiff, was to commence on the

1st of October, and continue at least eight

months, and longer if mutually desirable at

the end of that time. By its terms it was

‘capable of performance within a year. The

statute applies to contracts which, by ex-

lpress stipulation, are not to‘ be performed

within one year from the making thereof,

and not to contracts which by their terms are

determinate within that period, but may be

continued longer at the option of the parties.

Heﬂin v. Milton. 69 Ala. 35-i.

The third charge requested by the defend-

ants based their right to abandon the con-

tract on the naked fact, unexplained, that the

plaintiff did not commence the performance

of the contract until January 1, 1882. The

violation of a contract by one of the parties,

or when he is unable to perform the acts or

services stipulated, may be suﬂicient to an-

thorize the other party to abandon it. Sick-

ness of the plaintiff for a protracted period,

such as would probably have disabled him

from making sales during the appropriate

season, as contemplated and intended by

the contract, might perhaps have authorized

the defendants to abandon the contract; but

there was no implied condition that the

plaintif f would continue in health. Its

tabaudonment in such case is at the election

of the defendants; and they will be held to

have waived their right to renounce the con-

tract when, after the delay has terminated,

they regard and treat it as continuing and
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(But there are damages, which are in the

contemplation of the parties at the time of

makingthe contract,andare the natural and

proximate results of ltsbreach which are not

recoverable. The parties must necessarily

contempiat the loss of proﬁts as the direct

and necessary consequence o1 the breach of

a contract. and yet all proﬁts are not with-

in the scope of recoverable damages. here

are numerous cases, however, in which prof-

its constitute, not only an element, but the

measure, of damage. While the line of de-

marcation is often dim and shadowy, the

distinctive features consist in the nature

and character of the proﬁts. When they

form an elemental constituent of the con-

tract, their loss the natural result of its

breach, and the amount can be estimated

with reasonable certainty,—such certainty as
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satisﬁes the mind of a prudent and lmpartial

person,—they are allowed. The requisite to

their allowance is some standard, as regular

market values, or other established data, by

reference to which the amount may be sat-

isfactorily ascertained. Illustrations of prof-

its recoverable are found in cases of sales

of personal property at a ﬁxed price, evic-

tions of tenants by landlords, articles of part-

nership, and many commercial contracts.

On the other hand, “mere speculative prof-

its, such as might be conjectured would be

the probable result of an adventure, defeated

by the breach of a contract, the gains from

which are entirely conjectural, and with re-

spect to which no means exist of ascertain-

ing even approximately the probable results,

cannot, under any circumstances, be brought

within the range of recowrable damages."

1 Suth. Dam. 141. Proﬁts speculative, con-

jectural orremote are not, generally, regarded

as an element in estimating the damages. In

Pollock v. Gantt, 69 Ala. 373, it is said:

"‘What are termed 'speculative damages‘-

V

that is, possible, or even probable, gains, that

it is claimed would have been realized but

for the tortious act or breach of contract

charged against a defendant—are too remote,

and cannot be recovered." The same rule has

been repeatedly asserted by this court. Cul-

ver v. Hill, 68 Ala. 66; Higgins v. Mansﬁeld,

62 Ala. 267; Burton v. Holley, 29 Ala. 318;

White v. lililler, 71 N. Y. 118; French v.

Ramge, 2 Neb. 254; 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 574;

Oimstead v. Burke, 25 Ill. 86. The two fol-

lowing cases may serve to illustrate the dif-

ference between proﬁts recoverable and not

recoverable. In Insurance Co. v. Noxson,

8-i Ind. 347, an insurance agent, who had

been discharged without cause before the

expiration of his contract, was allowed to

include in his recovery the probable value of

renewals on policies previously obtained by

him, upon which future preminms would, in

the usual course of business, be received by

the comp ny, on the ground that the amount

of compe ation due on such renewals can

be ascertained with requisite certainty by

( But there are damages, which are In the
or the parties at the tlme of
making the contract, and are the natural and
proximate results of Its breach which are n()t
recoverable. JThe parties must necessarily
~ntemplat'° the loss of profits as the direct
and necessary consequence or the breach of
a contract, and yet all profits are not ~lth
ln the scope of recoverable damages. r.1.here
.are nnmN·ous cases, however, In which prof.Its constitute, not only an element, but the
measure, of damage. While the line of demarcation ls orten dim and shadowy, the
1llstlnctlve features consist In the uature
and character of the profits. When they
form an elemental constituent of the contract, their loss the naturnl result of Its
breach, and the amount can be estimated
with reasonable certalnty,-iluch certainty as
satisfies the mlml of a prudent and lmp11.1"tlal
person,-they are allowed. The requisite to
their allowance Is some standard, as regular
market values, or other established data, by
l"e!erence to which the amount may be satisfactorily ascertained. lllustrntlom1 of profits recoverable are found In cnses of sales
or personal property at a fixed price, evictions or tenants by laudl()rds, articles or partnership, and many commercial contracts.
On the other band, "mere speculative profits, such as might be conjectured would be
the probable i·esult of n.u aclventure, defeated
by the lweach of a contract, the gains from
which are entirely conjectural, and with respe<?t to which no means exist or ascertaining even approximately the probable results,
cannot, under any clrcumstanees, be brought
within the range of recovemble damages."
1 Suth. Dam. 141. Profits speculative, conjectural or remote are n()t, generally, regarded
as an element In estimating the damages. In
Pollock v. Gantt, M Ala. 373, It Is said:
/ "What ar~ termed 'speculative damages'. that ls, possible, or even probable, gains, that
it ls claimed would have been realized but
for the tortlous act or breach of contract
charged against a defendant-are too remote,
cand cannot be recovered." The same rule has
been repeatedly asse1"tecl by tills court. Culver v. Hill, 6S Ala. GG; Higgins v. Mansfield,
62 Ala. 267; Burton v. Holley, 29 Ala. 318;
White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118; French v.
Ramge, 2 Neb. 2:H; 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 574;
Olmstead v. Burke, 2;) Ill. 8G. The two following cases may serve to Illustrate the difference between profits recoverable and not
recoverable. Iu Insmirn<'e Co. v. Noxson,
~ Ind. 347, an lnsumnce agent, who had
been discharged without cause before the
expiration or his contract, was allowed to
Include in his recovery the probable value of
renewals on policies previously obtained by
him, upon which future premiums would, In
the usual course of business, be received by
V the comp9ny, on the ground that the amount
of compe'bsation due on s1wh renewals can
be nscertnined with re!}ui;;ite certainty by
I the use of actuary's life ta hies aud compnrl80nR, and that the basis of the right to dam~ntemplatlon
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ages existed, and was not to be built In the
future. In Lewis v. Insurance Co., 61 Mo.
534, whlch ls cited with approval In the
other case, the same rule as to the probable
v-alue ()f renewals was held; but it was also )
held that an estimate of the probable earnings or the agant thereafter, derived trom //
proor of the amount of his collection!.' and
commissions before the breach of the contract, In the absence of othe1· proof, ls too
speculative to be admissible.
Profits are not excluded from recovery because they are profits; but, when excluded,
it Is on the ground that there are no critc11a
by which to estimate the amounCwIIlitlie
certainty on which the adjudications of
courts and the findings of juries should be
based. 'l'he amount ls not susceptible of
proof. In 3 Suth. Dam. 157, the author discriminatingly obsen·es: /'When It is advisedly said that profits are uncertain and
speculative, and cannot be rec()vered, when
there Is nu alleged l()Ss of them, It ls not
meant that profits are not recoverable merely because they are such, nor because profits are necessarily speculative, contingent,
and too uncert11ln to be proved; but they are
r<'JectE'd when they are so; and It Is probable
that the Inquiry for them has been generally
proposed wMn It must encl 1n fruitless uncertainty; and there!orelit Is more a general
truth than a general prlil'l!lple that a loss or
profits Is~ ground on which damages cun
be gi~en." Vhen not allowed because speculative, co tlngent, and uncertain, their exclusl()n ls founded by some on the ground of
remoteness, and by others on the presumption that they arc not In the legal contemplation or the parties. )
The plalntifr, by the contract, undertook
the business of traveling salesman for the
defendants. The amount of his commissions
depended, not merely on the number and
am()unts of sale~ he might make, but also on
the proportional quantity of the two classes
of goods sold, his commissions being different on each. 'I'be number and amounts of
sales depended on many contingencles,-the
state of trade, the demand tor such goods,
their suitableness to the dlfl'erent markets,
the fiuctuatlons of business, the skill, energy,
nnd Industry with which he prosecutecl the
business, the time employed In effecting different sales, and upon the accept-nnce of his
sales by the defendants. There are no criteria, no established data, by reference to
which the p1·ofits are capable of any estimate.
They are purely speculative and conjectural.
Besides, the evidence Is the mere opinion
and conjecture ()f the plalnti.IT, without giving any facts on which It was based. '!"he
bare statement, uncorrob~rnted by any facts,
and without a basis, that "the reasonable
sales would have b<'<'n fifteen thousand dollars, and that the net profits on that amount
or sales would have been four hundred and
fifty dollars," Is too conjectural to be admissible. 'Vnshburn v. Hubbard, 10 Laus. 11.
Reversed ancl remanded.
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HITCHCOCK v. SUPREME TENT OF

KNIGHTS OF )lACC:\‘BEES OF

THE WORLD.

(58 N. W. 640, 100 Mich. 40.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. April 10, 1894.

lirror to circuit court, §aginaw county;

John A. Edget, Judge.

i

be agreed upon between him and the tents.

The aforesaid proportion of charter fee,

, membership fee, per eapita tax, etc., shall

I

7

Action by Edward M. Hitcheock against -

the Supreme Tent of the Knights of Mac-

cabees of the World. From a judgment in
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his favor, plaintiff brings error on account of

insuiiiciency. Reversed. ‘

The defendant is a corporation organized

under the laws of this state, and author-

ized to issue endowment certiﬁcates, payable

on the death oi."Tnembers, to beneﬁciaries

selected by them, and is operated under the ‘

lodge system, the lodges being known as

“tents." It was incorporated in 1885 by ﬁve

incorporators, three of whom constituted the

board of trustees. A Mr. Boynton was sec-

retary and one of the trustees, and to him

was committed the chief management of '

, the association. The organization appears to

' have met with great favor, and before the

close of the ﬁrst year was in active operation

in many states and in Canada. It had from

50 to 75 agents engaged in organizing tents.

These agents were compensated by a part

of a membership fee, a certiﬁcate fee, and i

a quarterly per capita tax. No tents could

places of 5,000 population, or with less than

25 members in places of over 5,000 popula-

tion. Plaintiff was a man of considerable

experience in organizing associations of this

character. Negotiations between him and

Mr. Boynton resulted in the execution of a

contract dated October 5, 1885, by which

plaintiff was given the sole control of in-

stituting and organizing new tents or subor-

dinate bodies in the state of Indiana. The

contract ﬁxed the following compensation for

, his services: “First. Sixty dollars of the

charter fee for each tent he or his deputies

may institute in said state of Indiana. Sec-

i

be instituted with less than 15 members in ‘

ond. All the membership fee on all over ‘

ﬁfteen, and under twenty-ﬁve, members put

in new tents on organization. Third. One-

half the membership fee on all members put

into new tents on organization, over twenty- ‘

ﬁve members. Fom'th. All the per capita

itax collected by him from the ﬁrst ﬁfteen

members in each new tent. Fifth. One-

fourth of the annual per capita tax on the

entire membership in the state of Indiana

shown to be in good standing on the books

of the supreme tent at the close of each

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DA\I.\GES—IN CONTRACT.

155

terprise is more expensive than that which

follows, and that after the work is fairly

started it is easier to organize tents than at

ﬁrst. He also offered a statement taken

from the books of the defendant, showing

the organization of 40 tents after the breach

of the contract; 125 members in new tents,

over 15 and under 25; 66 members in new

tents, over ‘.15; and the total number of

new members. From this statement he

made up his total claim. as follows: Char-

ter fees, 40 tents, $2,400; membership fees

under clause 2 of the contract, $625; mem-

bership fees under clause 3, $165; per capita

tax under clause 4, $300; per caplta tax un-

der clause 5, $2,956.83.

The rule governing these cases is estab-

lished by an unbroken line of authorities,-

that damages which are pm-ely speculative
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in character, and dependent on so many

contingencies that they cannot be traced

with reasonable certainty to the breach of '

the contract, are not allowable. The diﬂl-

culty lies in determining whether the facts

of a particular case bring it within or with-

out this rule. There is no sounder basis for

damages for breach of contracts of this char-

acter than the proﬁts, when they can be de-

termined with proximate and reasonable cer-

tainty. In fact, there is no other basis.

They are the natural and proximate results of

a breach, which the law presumes that each

party foresees. The rule does not require

that such data be furnished that they can

be computed with mathematical exactness.

When one breaks a contract which the other

party has partly performed, and the violator

then performs the work himself, from which

he has reaped the proﬁts which the other

party might have made, he cannot escape

liability for damages, if such other party

can show the proﬁts made while he was

execnting it, and the beneﬁts received from

its subsequent completion. The contract in

ithis case was speciﬁc and deﬁnite in all

respects, ﬁxing the amount of work, and

the price. It was contemplated that the

1 plaintiff should make proﬁts, and the de-

1 fendant was to be beneﬁted by his work.

These results were being successfully accom-

)plished when the contract was broken. In

L case of a breach by plaintiff, defendant could

perform the work, and recover as damages

the difference between the price agreed up-

on and the cost of completion. In case of a

breach by defendant, the proﬁts lost consti-

tute the legitimate measure of damages.

The law is not so blind to justice as not to -

require the defendant to respond in damages,

if there is any reasonable basis for their

ascertainment. There is ifo presumption,

egal or otherwise, that the plaintif f could

not have completed the work. The defend- ‘

ant was satisﬁed with the uceess of the

plaintiff. It is a fair presumption that he

would have succeeded. It is a fair infer-

ence from the evidence that the defendant's

oiiicers broke the contract because of this

156 DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN CONTRACT.

we think this case comes within, and is 304, 52 N. W. 609. The case of Wnkeman

ruled by, the following authorities: Wake- v. Manufacturing Co. is similar in its facts

man v. Manufacturing Co.. 101 N. Y. 205, 4 to the present case, and many of the author-

N. E. 264; Treat v. liiles (W'ts.) 50 N. W. ities are there collated and discussed. Judg-

896; Mueller v. Spring 00., 88 Mich. 390, mont reversed, and new trial ordered. The
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50 N. W. 319; Oliver v. Perkins, 92 Mich. other justices concurred.
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6

ALLISON v. CHANDLER.

(11 Mich. 542.)

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 20, 1863.

Crror to circuit court, Wayne county.

C. I. Walker, for plaintiff in error. Jerome

& Swift and A. B. Maynard, for defendant

in error.

CHRISTIANCY, J. When this cause was

formerly before us (Chandler v. Allison, 10

Mich. 460), one of the questions involved

was whether Allison, the plaintlff, was

rightfully in possession of the store at the

time the trespass was committed, or wheth-

er his right of possession was dependent up-

on Chandler's election to rebuild, and ceased

when that election was made; and one of

the grounds upon which the judgment in
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that case was reversed was the rejection of

evidence tending to show that Allison‘s

right of possession was thus qualiﬁed. But

as the case now appears before us upon ex-

ceptions taken on the new trial, the ﬁnding

of the jury, whether right o1 wrong,—uo ex-

ception having been taken to the evidence

or the charge upon this point,—rcquires us

to treat this question, so far as we are now

to consider the case. as settled in favor of

the plaintiff; and the defendant must be

considered as a trespasser, entering upon

the premises and tearing down the store

while in the rightful possession of the plain-

tiff, under a lease for a term which would

not expire till the 1st day of May following.

The only question presented by the pres-

ent bill of exceptions, and not already dis-

posed of by our former decision, is the ques-

tion of damages; and in this action of tres-

kaass (as parties are under no necessity of

protecting themselves by contract against

trespasses) the question of damages is to be

treated in all respects as it would have been

had the trespass been committed by a party

between whom and the plaintiff the relation

of landlord and tenant did not exist, except

so far as the good faith of the defendant,

and the absence of malice on his part,

might preclude the plaintiff from the recov-

ery of damages of a punitory and exem-

plary character, beyond the amount which

would compensate the actual loss. Upon

this point (the question of exemplary dam-

ages) we think the court below was right in

instructing the jury that, if they should

ﬁnd the defendant, in tearing down the

store, acted in good faith, and under an

honest belief that he had a legal right to do

so, then the plaintiff could only recover his

actual damages. This qualiﬁcation of the

right of a jury to give punitory or exempla-

iry damages in actions of trespass is, we

ink, in accordance with the principle up-

Et which such damages are sometimes al-

wed to be given. But whether the rulings

of the court upon the admission of evidence,

and in the charge to the jury, did not lay

down too narrow a rule for the estlmationi
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down too nar1·ow a rule· for the estlmatloDf
of actual damages, l8 the main question tori
our consideration.
While In many cases the rule of damages
Supreme Court of Michigan. Oct. 20, 1863.
ls plain and easy of application, there ure
Error to circuit cou1·t, Wayne county.
many others In which, from tbe nature of
C. I. Walker, for plaintltr In error. Jerome the subject-matter, and the peculiar circum& Swift and A. B. }!aynard, for defendant stances, It Is very difficult-and In some
in error.
cases impossible-to lay down any definite,
fixed rule of law by which the damages acCHRISTIANCY, J. When this cause was tually sustained can be estimated with a
formerly before us (Chandler v. Alllson, 10 reasonable degree of accura<:y, or en•n a
Mich. 460), one of the questions involved probable approximation to justice; and the
was whether Allison, the plalntltr, was Injury must be left wholly, or lu ~1·eat part,
rightfully in possession of the store at the unredressed, or the question must be left to
time the trespass was committed, or wheth- the good sense or the jury upon all the fn<'ts
er his right of possession was dependent up- and circumstances of the case, nilled by
on Chandler's election to rebuild, and ceasetl such advice and Instructions from the court
when that election was made; and one of as the peculiar fucts and circumstances of
the grounds upon which the jud~ment in the case may s~m to ret1uire. But the
that case was reversed was the rejection ot strong inclination of the courts to a<lmlnlsevidence tending to show that Allison's ter legal re<lress upon fixed and certain
right of possession was thus qualified. But rules has sometimes led to the adoption of
as the case now appears before us upon ex- such rules In cases to which they could not
ceptions taken on the new trial, the finding be consi11tently or justly applie<l. Hence
of the jury, whether right o. wrong,-no ex- there ls, perhaps, no branch or the law upon
ception having been taken to the evidence which the1·e ls a greater coW11ct of judicial
or the charge upon this polnt,-requlres us decisions, and none in which so many mere·
to treat this question, so far as we are now ly arbitrary rules have been adopted. "'eto consider the case, as settled In favor of have carefully examined all the cases cited
the plalntitr; and the defendant must be In the very elaborate briefs of the resr>ectlvc
considered as a trespasser, entering upon counsel, and the most approved elementary
the premises and tearing down the store treatises upon the subject, and, without atwhile In the rightful possession of the plaln- tempting here to compare and analyze them
tUr, under a lease for a term which would (which would require a treatise), we are
not expire tlll the 1st day of May following. compelled to say that the line of mere auThe only question presented by the pree- thority upon questions of damages llke that
ent blll of exceptions, and not ah'eady dis- here presented, If any such line can be·
posed of by our former decision, Is the ques- traced through the coW11ct of hostile deciltlon of damages; and In this action of tres- sions, Is too confused and tortuous to guide·
iipaSS (as parties are under no necessity of us to a safe or satisfactory result, without
protecting tbewselves by contract against resort to the principles of natural Ju1:1tlcetrespasses) the question of damages ls to be and sound policy which underlie these questreated in all respects as It would ha,·e been tions, nn<l which have sometimes been overhad the trespass been committed by a party looked, or obscured by artificial distinctions
between whom and the plalntilI the relation and arbitrary rules.
The principle or compensation for the loss
of landlord and tenant did not exl!!t, except
so far as the good faith or the defendant, or Injury sustained Is, we think, that which
and the absence ot malice on llls pa1·t, lies at the bnsls of the whole question of
might preclude the plalntltr from the recov- damages In most actions at common law,
ery of damages of a punltory and exem- whether ot contract or tort. We <lo 11ot
plary clm111cter, beyond the amount which here speak of those actions in which 1m::.iwould compensate the actual loss. Upon tory or exemplary damages may be given,
this point (the question of exemplary dam- nor of those whose principal object Is the
ages) we think the court below was right In establishment of a right, where merely nomInstructing the jury that, If they should inal damages arc proper. But, with these
find the defendant, In tearing down the exceptions, the only just theory of an nctio11
store, acte<l In good fnltb, and under nn for damages, and Its primary object, would
honest hP! ipf that he had a legal right to do seem to be thnt the damages to be recover
\ so, then tl!e plnlntltr could only recover his ed should compensate the loss or Injury susactual damages. This qualltlcntion of the tained. "'e con<:ur entirely with the court
right of a jury to give punitory or exempla- of appeaw In New York In Griffin v. Colver,
ry damages In actions or trespass Is, we 10 N. Y. 4!)2, In repudiating the doctrini,
ink, In accordance with the p1·lnclple up- adopted by Mr. Sedgwick from Domat
n which such damages nre sometime!! al- (Sedgw. Dnm. 3, 37, 38, etc.), that "the law}
wed to be given. But whether the rulings aims not at the satisfaction, but the diviof the court upon the admission of evidence, sion of the loss." Such, It Is true. Is often
and In the charge to the jury, did not lay the result of nn action, but neYer the object
ALLISON "· CHANDLER.
(11 Mich. 542.)

!
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-of the law. The law may, and often does,

fail of doing complete justice, from the im-

perfection of its means of ascertaining

truth, and tracing and apportioning effects

to their various causes; but it is not liable

to the reproach of doing positive injustice

by design. Such a doctrine would tend not

only to make the law itself odious, but to

corrupt its administration, by fostering a

disregard of the just rights of parties. In

actions _uunn contracg especially, and those

nominally in tort, but Substantially upon

contract, courts have thought it generally

safer, upon the whole, to adopt certain def-

inite Iules for the government of the jury

by which the damages could be estimated,

at~the risk of falling somewhat short of the

actual damages, by rejecting such as could

not be estimated by a ﬁxed rule, than to

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:10 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

leave the whole matter entirely at large

with the jury, without any rule to govern

their discretion, or to detect or correct er-

rors or corruption in the verdict. In such

cases, therefore, there has been a strong in-

clination to seize upon such elements of cer-

tainty as the case might happen to present,

and as might approximate compensation,

and to frame thereon rules of law for the

measurement of damages, though it might

be evident that further damages must have

been suffered, which however, could only be

estimated as matter of opinion, and must

therefore be excluded under the rules thus

adopted. And it is not to be denied that this

course of decision has sometimes been ex-

tended to actions purely of tort.

But whatever plausibility there may be in

the theory of Mr. Sedgwick when applied to

actions upon contract,—a plausibility which

arises from mistaking the result for the ob-

ject,—the injustice of such a principle, when

applied to cases of actual, positive tort, like

that here in question, would be so gross as

to shock all sense of justice.

It has been frequently said that the rule of

amages, where there is no fraud, willful neg-

ligence, malice, oppression, etc., is the same in

actions of tort as in those upon contract. But

though the remark is doubtless true in its ap-

,plication to those cases of tort where, from the

nature of the case, elements of certainty exist,

by which substantial compensation may be

readily estimated, and other cases which are

but nominally in tort, we do not think it can

be accepted as a principle of universal applica-

tion; nor, in our opinion, can it be justly ap-

plied to any case of actual, aggressive tort,

where, from the nature and circumstances of

the case itself, no such elements of certainty

are found to exist, or none which will apply

substantially to the whole case: nor to any

case where the rule applicable to breaches of

contract would exclude a material portion of

the damages the injured party may have suf-

fered, though the amount of the latter may not

be capable of accurate calculation by any ﬁxed

and deﬁnite rule.

There are some important considerations
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The law may, and often does, which tend to limit damages in an action upon
fall of doing complete justice, from the im- contract, which have no application to those
perfection of its means of ascertaining purely of tort. Contracts are made only by
truth, and tracing and apportioning e!Iects the mutual consent of the respective parties;
to tlwlr various causes; but it Is not liable and each party, for a consideration, thereby
to the reproach of doing positive injustice consents that the other shall have certain
by design. Such a doctrine would tend not rights as against him, which he would not othonly to make the law itself odious, but to erwise possess. In entering into the contract
corrupt its administration, by fostering a the parties are supposed to understand Its ledls1·cgard of the just rights of parties. .1Jl. gal effect, and, consequently, the limitations
.actiJ)U5 JWOll .c ontratt. especially, and those which the law, for the sake of certainty, has
uomlnally in tort, but1mbstantlally upon fixed for the recovery of damages for its
contract, courts have thought It generally breach. If not satisfied with the risk which
safer, upon the whole, to adopt certain def- these rules Impose, the parties may decline to
inite rules for the government of the jury enter Into the contract, or may fix their own
by which the damages could be estimated, rule of damages when, ln their nature, the
at-the risk of falling somewhat short of the amount must be uncertain. Hence, when suit
actual damages, by rejecting such as could Is brought upon such contract, and It Is found )
not be estimated by a fixed rule, than to that the entire damages actually sustained can
leave the whole matter entirely at large not be recovered without a violation of such
with the jury, without nny rule to govern rules, the deficiency Is a loss, the risk of which
their disc1·et1on, or to detect or cor1·ect er- the pm·ty voluntarily assumed on entering Into
rors or con·uption in the verdict. In such the contract, for the chance of benefit or ad-cases, therefore, there hns been a strong in- vantage which the contract would have given
clination to seize upon suf.'h elements of cer- him In case of performance. His position is
tainty as the case might happen to present, one in which he has voluntarily contributed to
and as might approximate compensation, place himself, and in which, but for his own
and to frame thereon rules of law for the consent. he could not have been placed by the
measurement of damages, though it might wrongful act of the opposite party alone.
Again, In the majority of cases upon conbe evident that further damages must have
been suffered, which however, could only be tract, there ls little difficulty, from .the nature
estimated as matter of opinion, and must ef the subject, In finding a rule by which subtherefore be excluded under tha rules thus stantial compensntion may be readily estimatadopted. And It Is not to be denied that this ed; and It is only in those cases where this
course of decision has sometimes been ex- cannot be done, and where, from the nature ot
tended to actions purely of tort.
the stipulation, or the subject-matter, the acBut whatever plausibility there may be In tual damages resulting from a breach, are
the theory of Mr. Sedgwick when applied to more or less uncertain in their nature, or diffi.actions upon contract,-a plausibility which cult to be shown with accuracy by the evinrises from mistaking the result for the ob- dence, under any definite rule, that there cnn
ject,-the injustice of such a principle, when be any great failure of justice b adhering to
applied to cases of actual, positive tort, like such rule as will most nearly ap
!mate the
that here In question, would be so gross as desired result. And It ls prec y in these
to shock all sense of justice.
classes of cases that the parties
e It in their
It has been frequently said that the rule of power to protect themselves
mst any loi<s
mages, where there ls no fraud, willful negto arise from such uncertain
by estimating
gence, malice, oppression, etc., Is the same in their own damages In the co
ct itself, and
tlons of tort as In those upon contract. But providing for themselves th ules by which
though the remark Is doubtless true In Its ap- the amount shall be measur , In case of a
11llcatlon to those cases of tort where, from the breach; and if they neglect this, they may be
mtm·e of the case, elements of certainty exist, presumed to have assented to such damages as
by which substantial compensation may be may be measured by the rules which the law,
readily estimated, and other cases which are for the sake of certainty, has adopted.
but nominally In tort, we do not think it can
Again, In analogy to the rule that contracts
be accepted as a principle of universal applica- should be construed as understood and astion; nor, In our opinion, can lt be justly ap- sented to by the parties,-11' not as a part ot
plietl to any case of actual, aggressive tort, that rule,-damages which are the natural
whel'e, from the nature and clrcumstB.nces of and, under the circumstances, the direct and
the case Itself, no such elements of certainty necessary result of the breach, a.nu.>ften ver
are found to exist, or none which will apply p
· · r ·ec
b u~ t
substantially to the whole case; nor to any be considered as having been within t~ co~
case where the rule applicable to breaches of tempfafion of thal"espGctiV~r!l_es att!!e._iifil_e..
· ··
contract would exclude a material portion of of ~·Ing Into the contract.
the damages the injured party may have sufNone Of these several considerations have
fered, though the amount of the latter may not any bearing In nn action purely of to1·t. The
be capable of accw·ate calculation by any fixed Injured party has consented to enter Into no
relation with the wrongdoer by which any haz.and definite rule.
There are some lmpol'tant considerations anl of loss should be incul'red; nor has he re-

~
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ceived any consideration, or chance of beneﬁt

or advantage, for the assumption of such haz-

ard; nor has the wrongdoer given any consid-

eration, nor assumed any risk, in consequence

of any act or consent of his. The injured par-

ty has had no opportunity to protect himself

by contract against any uncertainty in the es-

timate of damages; no act of his has contrib-

uted to the injury; he has yielded nothing by

consent; and, least of all, has he consented

that the wrongdoer might take or injme his

property or deprive him of his rights, for such

sum as, by the strict rules which the law has

established for the measurement of damages

in actions upon contract, he may be able to

show, with certainty, he has sustained by such

taking or injury. Especially would it be un-

just to presume such consent, and to hold him

to the recovery of such damages only as may
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be measu1ed with certainty by ﬁxed and deﬁ-

nite rules, when the case is one which, from

its very nature, affords no elements of cer-

tainty by which the loss he has actually suf-

fered can be shown with accuracy by any evi-

dence of which the case is susceptible. Is he

to blame because the case happens to be one

of this character? He has had no choice, no

selection. The nature of the case is such that

the wrongdoer has chosen to make it, and upon

every principle of justice he is the party who

should be made to sustain all the risk of loss

. which may arise from the uncertainty pertain-

ing to the nature of the case, and the diﬂiculty

of accurately estimating the results of his own

Iwrongful act. Upon what principle of right

can courts of justice assume, not simply to

divide this risk, which would be thus far un-

just. but to relieve the wrongdoer from it en-

tirely. and tluow the whole upon the innocent

and injured party? Must not such a course of

decision tend to encourage trespasses, and op-

erate as an inducement for parties to right

themselve by violence, in cases like the pres-

ent?

Since, from the nature of the case, the dam-

ges cannot be estimated with certainty, and

there is a risk of giving by one course of trial

less, and by the other more than a fair com-

Jpensation,—to say nothing of justice,—does not

sound policy require that the risk should be

thrown upon the wrongdoer instead of the in-

ljured party? However thi question may be

answered, we cannot resist the conclusion that

it is better to run a slight risk of giving some- ‘

what more than actual compensation, than to

adopt a rule which, under the circumstances of

the case, will, in all reasonable probability,

preclude the injured party from the recovery

of a large proportion of the damages he has

actually sustained from the injury, though the

amount thus excluded cannot be estimated

with accuracy by a ﬁxed and certain rule.

i,Certainty is doubtless very desirable in esti-

, ating damages in all cases; and where, from

‘_ e nature and circumstances of the case, a

lie can be discovered by which adequate com-

l ‘ nsation can be accurately measured, the rule

s 'ould be applied in actions of tort, as well as

-celved any consideration, or chance of benefit In those upon contract. Such Is quite ~ener
<>r ad\·antage, for the a~-umption of such hnz- ally the case In .trespass and trover for the
ard; nor bas the wrongdoer given any consid- taking or conversion of personal property, It
erati'Jn, nor assumed nn~· risk, In consequence the property (as It generally ls) be sucl.1 as can
of any act or consent of bis. The Injured pnr- be readily obtained In the market and bas a
ty bas bad no opportunity to protect himself market value. But shall the injured party I~
by contract against any uncertainty in thi> es- an action of tort, which may happen to furnls
timate of dn.mages; no net of his has contrib- no element of certainty, be allowed to recove
uted to the Injury; he has yiehle<l nothing by no damages (or merely nominal) because he
-consent; and, least of all, has he consented cannot show the exact amount with certainty,
that the wrongdoer mlglJt take or injw·c bis though he ls ready to show, to the satisfaction
property or deprive him of his rights, for such of the jury, that he has suffered large damages
sum as, by the strict rules which the Jaw bas by the lnjUt-y? Certainty, It Is true, would
established for the measu1·ement of damages thus be nttaine<l; but it would be the certainin actions upon contract, he may be able to ty of injustice. An<l, though a rule of ccrshow, with certainty, he has sustained by such talnty may be found which will measure a partaking or injury. Especially would it be un- tion, and only a portion, of the damages, and
just to presume such consent, and to hol<l him exclude a very material portion, which It cnn
to the recovery of such damages only ns may be rendered morally certain the Injured party
be measured with certainty by fixed and defl- has sustained, though its exact amount cannot
nite rules, when the case Is one which, from be measured by a fixed rule; here to apply
its ;cry nature, nlrords no clements ot cer- nny such rule to the whole case, ls.to misapply
talnty by which the loss he has actually suf- It; an<l so tar as It excludes all damages
fered can be shown with accuracy by any evl- which cannot be measured by It perpetrates
dence ot which the case Is susceptible. Is he positive Injustice under the pretense of admlnto blame be('ause the case happens to be one lsterlng justice.
of this chnracter? He has hnd no choice, no
The In w does not require Impossibilities,
!'!election. The nature of the case Is such that nud cannot, therefore, require a higher dethe wrongdoer has chosen to mnke it, and upon gree of certainty than the nature of the
fevery principle of justice he is the party who case admits. And we can see no good reason
/should be made to sustain all the risk of loss for requiring any higher degree of certainty
, which may arise from the unce11alnty pertain- In respect to the amount of <lamages than
Ing to the nature of the case, and the difficulty In respect to any other branch of the cause.
<>f accurately estimating the results ot bis own Juries are allowed to act upon probable and
Jwrongtul act. Upon whn.t principle of right Inferential, as well as direct and positive
can courts of justice assume, not simply to proof. And when, from the nature of the case,
divide this risk, which would be thus far un- the amount of the damages cannot be esti~
just, but to relieve the wrongdoer from It en- mated with certainty, or only a part of them
tirel~·. and throw the whole upon the Innocent
can be so estimated, we can see no objection
and injured party? l\Iust not such a course of to placing before the jury all the facts and
decision tend to encourage trespasses, and op- clrcwnstances of the case, having any tende1·ate as an Inducement for pati.ies to right ency to show da.mages, or their p1·01Jable
themselves by violence, in cases like the pres- amount; so n.s to enable them to make the
ent?
most intelligible and probable estimate which
Since, from the nature of the case, the dam- the nature of the case will permit. This
1tges cannot be estimated with certainty, and should, of course, be done with such instruclthere ls a risk of giving by one course of trial tlons and advice from the court as the cirless, and by the other more than a fair com- cwnstances of the case may require, and as
)pensatlon,-to say nothing of justlce,-does QOt may tend to prevent the n.llowance of such
sound policy require that the risk should be as may be merely possible, or too remote or
!thrown upon the wrongdoer Instead of ti.le In- fanciful In their character to be safely conUured party? However this question may be sldered as the result of the Injury.
answered, we cannot resist the conclusion that
In the adoption of this course It will sellt Is better to run a slight risk of giving some- dom happen that the court, hearing the evlwhat more than actual compensation, than to dence, will not thereby possess the means of
adopt a rule whicl.J, under the circumstances of forming a satisfactory judgment whether
the case, will, In all reasonable probability, the damages a1·e unreasonable or exorbitant;
predude the injured party from the recovery and, If satisfied they are so, the court have
of a large proportion of the damages he has always the power to set aside the verdict
actually sustained from the Injury, though the and grant a new trial.
amount thus excluded cannot be estimated
The justice of the principles we have enwith accuracy by a fixed and certain rule. doovored to explain will, we think, be sum\Certalnty Is doubtless very desirable In estt- clently manifest In their application to the
ting damages In nll cases; aml where, from present case. The evidence strongly tended
e nature and circumstances of the case, a to show an ouster of the plalntll? for the
e can be discovered by which adequate com- balance of the term by the defendant's ad.
nsntlon can be accurately measured, the rule I This term was the property of the plalntil!;
ould be applied in actions of tort, as well as and, as proprietor. he was entitled to all the

l
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beneﬁts he could derive from it. He could I

not by law be compelled to. sell it for such ,

sum as it might be worth to others; and, i

when tortiously taken from him against his will, he cannot justly be limited to such sum ,

—or the difference between the rent he was 1

paying and the fair rental value of the prem- i

ises—if the premises were of much greater i

and peculiar value to him, on account of the

business he had established in the store, and 1

the resort of customers to that particular

place, or the good will of the place. in his

trade or business. His right to the full en-

joyment of the use of the premises, in any

manner not forbidden by the lease, was as

clear as that to sell or dispose of it, and

was as much his property as the term itself,

and entitled to the same protection from the

laws. He had used the premises as a jewel-

ry store, and place of business for the re-
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pairing of watches, making gold pens, etc.

This business must be broken up by the

ouster, unless the plaintiff could obtain an- |

other ﬁt place for it; and-if the only place

he could obtain was less ﬁtted and less valu- ‘

able to him for that purpose, then such busi-

ness would be injured to the extent of this

difference; and this would be the HMHI, di-

mt, and im.media..te.eonsequence of the injury.

To conﬁne the plaintiff to the difference be-

tween the rent paid and the fair rental value

of the premises to others for the balance of

the term would be but a mockery of justice.

To test this, suppose the plaintiff is actually ;

paying that full rental value, and has estab-

lished a business upon the premises, the clear

gains or proﬁts of which have been an aver-

age of one thousand dollars per year, and he i

is ousted from the premises. and this busi-

ness entirely broken up for the balance of the

term, can he be allowed to recover nothing but

six cents damages for his loss? To ask such

a question is to answer it. The rule which

would conﬁne the plaintiff to the difference

between such rental value and the stipulated

rent can rest only upon the assumption that

the plaintiff might (as in case of personal ,

property) go at once into the market and oh- '

tain another building equally well ﬁtted for ‘

the business. and that for the same rent;

nd to justify such a rule of damages this

assumption must be taken as a conclusive

presumption of law. However such a pre-

sumption might be likely to accord with the

fact in the city of New York, in most west-

ern cities and towns it would be so obviously

contrary to the common experience of the

facts as to make the injustice of the rule

gross and palpable. But we need not further

discuss this point, as a denial of any such

presumption was clearly involved in our'

former decision.

The plaintiff in this case did hire another

store, “the best he could obtain, but not

nearly o good for his business"; “his cus-

tomers did not come to the new store, and

there was not so much of a thoroughfare by

it,—not one-quarter of the travel; and he

relied much upon chance custom, especially

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE:3-IN TORT.

benefits he could derive from It. He could
not by law be compelled to. sell It for such
sum as It might be worth to othe1·s; and,
when tortlously taken from him against his
will, he cannot justly be limited to such sum
-or the difference between the rent he was
paying and the fair rental value of the premises-if the premises were of much greater
and J:X'CUliar value to him, on account of the
l.mslness be had established in the store, and
the resort of customers to that particular
place, or the good will of the place. in llis
trade or business. His right to the full enjoyment of the use or the premises, in any
manner not forbidden by the lease, was as
clear as that to sell or dispose of It, and
was as much bis pl'Operty as the term itself,
and entitled to the same protection from the
laws. He bad used the premises as a jewelry store, and place of business for the repairing of watches, making gold pens, etc.
This business must be broken up by the
ouster, unless the plalntifr could obtain another fit place for It; and. If the only place
he could obtain was less fitted and less valuable to him for that purpose, then such business would be Injured to the extent of this
difference; and this would be the IUIJJl!'al, lil~t, and lmmQ!liote eonsequence of the Injury.
To confine the plalntifr to the ditrerence between the rent paid and the fair rental value
ot the premises to others for the balance of
the term would be but a mockery of justice.
To test this, suppose the plaintltr Is actually
paying that full rental value, and has established a business upon the premises, the clear
gains or profits o! which have been an average of one thousand dollars per year, and he
ls ousted from the premises, and this business entirely broken up for the balance ot the
term, can he be allowed to recover nothing but
six cents damages tor bis loss? To ask such
a question Is to answer It. The rule which
would confine the plaintiff to the difference
between such rental value and the stipulated
rent can rest only upon the assumption that
the plaintiff might (as in case of personal
property) go at once Into the market and obtain another building equally well fitted tor
the business. and that for the same rent;
nd to justify such a rule of damages this
assumption must be taken as a conclusive
presumption of lnw. However such a presumption might be likely to accord with the
fact In the city of New York, in most western cities and towns It would be so obviously
coutmry to the common experience of the
facts ns to make the Injustice of the rnle
gross and palpable. But we need not further
discuss this point, as n denial of any such
presumption was clearly involved in our
former uedsiou.
The plaintiff in this case did hire another
store, "the best he could obtain, but not
nr:irly so good for bis hm1iness"; "his customers did not come to the new store, and
there was not so much of a thorou~hfare by
lt,-not one-quarter of the travel; and he

relied much upon chance custom, especially/
In the watch-reparlng and other mechanical
business." This Injury to the plaintiff's business WIUI as clearly a part of his damages as
the loss of the term Itself. This point, also,
was decided in the former case, and we there
further held that the declaration was suffi.cient to admit the proof of this species of
loss.
Now, lf the plalntlfr ls to be allowed to
recover for this lnju1·y to his business, It
would seem to follow, as a necessary consequence, that the value of that business before the Injury, as well as after, not only
might, but should be shown. as an Indispensable means of showing the amount o!
loss from the injury. It the business were a
losing one to the plaintiff before, his loss
from Its being broken up or diminished (If
anything) would ce1'tainly be less than If It
were a profitable one. It is not the amount
of business done, but the gain or profit arising from It, whleh constitutes Its value.
But it ls Insisted that loss of profits con\
stitutes no proper ground or element of dam
ages. If there be any such rnle of law It I~
certainly not a unive1·snl, and can hardly b"'I
called a general, rule. Decisions, it is true,
may be found which seem to take It fo1·
granted that the rule ls universal. But there
are numerous cases, even for breach or contract, in which profits have been properly
held to constitute not only an element, but
a measure (and sometimes the only measure),
ot damages, as In Masterton v. Mayor, 7 H111,
61; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 344.
And In actions for breach of contract In not
delivering goods (as wheat or other articles)
having a marketable value, as well as In
most actions of trespass or trover for the
taking or conversion of such property,-whereever the difference between the contracj
price. Ol' the market value at the time o
taking or conversion, and the higher market
value at any subsequent period, ls held to
constitute the damages,-ln all such cases
this difference of price Is but another name
for profits, and Is yet very properly held to
be a measure of damages. 'l'here ls nothlng1
therefore, In the nature of profits, as such
which prevents their allowance as damages
But In many, and perhaps the majority, of
cases upon contract In whlch the question
has arisen, they have been held to be too
remote or dependent upon too many contingencies to be calculated with reasonable certainty, or to have been within tile contemplation of the parties at the time of entering Into the contrnct.
But there are also cnses for breach of contract where, though the profits were In their
nature somewhat uncertain and contingent
(and in most of them unite as much so as
in the present case), they were yet held to
constitute, not str.il'tly a memmre, but an
element of damairt's proper for the consi<l<'l'lltlon of a jury to ennhle them to form a jml:::ment or prnbalJle estimate of the damages;
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as in \Ic.\'eiil v. Reid, 0 Bing. (SS; Bagley

v. Smith, 10 X. Y. 489; Gale v. Leckie, 2

Starkie, 107; Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19;

Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71. And see

Passenger v. Thorburn, 35 Barb. 17. And

in Waters v. Towers, 20 Eng. Law & Eq.

410, the jury were allowed to take into con-

sideration the proﬁts which might have been

made upon a collateral contract, though void

by the statute of frauds (and see McNeill

v. Reid, supra), while by the American au-

thorities proﬁts of this description have been

almost uniformly rejected. But whatever

may be the rule in actions upon contract,

we think a more liberal rule in regard to

lamages for proﬁts lost should prevail in

ctions purely of tort (excepting perhaps the

action of trover). Not that they should be

allowed in all cases without distinction, for
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tberc are some cases where they might, in

their nature, be too entirely remote, specula-

tive, or contingent to form any reliable basis

for a probable opinion. And perhaps the

decisions which have excluded the anticipat-

ed proﬁts of a voyage broken up by illegal

capture or collision may be properly justiﬁed

upon this ground. Upon this, however, we

express no opinion. But gene1ally, in an ac-

tion purely of tort, where the amount of

proﬁts lost by the injury can be shown with

reasonable ce1tainty, we think they are not

only admissible in evidence, but that they

constitute, thus far, a safe measure of dam-

ages; as when they are but another name

for the use of a mill (for example), as in

White v. Moseley. 8 Pick. 356; or for the use

of any other property where the value or

proﬁt of the use can be made to appear with

reasonable certainty by the light of past

experience, as might often be done where

such proﬁts had been for a considerable

time uniform at the same season of the year,

and there are no clrcumtances tending to

show a probable diminution, had the injury

not occurred. And possibly the same view,

subject to the like qualiﬁcations, might have

been taken of the proﬁts of the plaintiffs

business had it been conﬁned to the me-

chanicai trade of repairing watches and mak-

ing gold pens, particularly if done purely as

a cash business. But this business seems

to have been carried on with that of the

sale of jewelry. He kept a jewelry store,

and the proﬁts of so much of -his business as

may be regarded as mercantile business

are dependent upon many more contingen-

cies, and therefore more uncertain, especially

if sales ‘are made upon credit. Past proﬁts,

therefore, could not safely be taken as the

exact measure of future proﬁts; but all the

various contingencies by which such proﬁts

would probably be affected should be taken

into consideration by the jury, and allowed

such weight as they, in the exercise of good

sense and sound discretion. should think

them entitled to. Past proﬁts in such cases,

where the business has been continued for

some length of time, would constitute a very

as iu ::\kNeill v. Rehl, 0 Bing. US; Bagley
\". Smith, 10 N. Y. 4Sll; Gale , .. Leckie, :.!
Sturkie, 107; Ward ,.. Smith, 11 Price, 19;
Driggs T. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71. And see
Passenger v. Thorburn, 3S Barb. 17. And
In Waters v. Towers, 20 Eng. Law & Eq.
410, the jury were allowed to take Into co1111itleratlon the prodts which might have been
made upon a collateral contract, though void
hy the statute of frauds (and sec ::\IcNelll
v. Ueld, supra), while by the American au·
I horltles profits of this deecrlptlon ha>e l>ePu
ulwost uniformly rejected. But whatever
may be the rule In actions upon contract,
ve thlnk a more liberal rule In regard to
lamages for profits lost should prevaJI In
ctlons purely of tort (excepting perhaps the
<:tion of trover). Not that they should be
allowed in all cases without dlstluctlon, tor
there a.re some cases where they might, In
their nature, be too entirely remote, speculative, or contingent to form any reliable basis
for a probable opinion. And perhaps the
decisions which ba\"e excluded the anticipated profits of a voyage broken up by illegal
capture or colllslon may be properly justifiecl
upon this ground. Upon this, llowever, we
express no opinion. But generally, ln an action pmely of tort, where the amount of
profits lost by the Injury can be shown wltll
reaBOnable ce11alnty, we thlnk they are not
only admissible In evidence, but that they
constitute, thus tar, a sate measure of damages: as when they are but another name
tor the use of a mill (for example), as In
White v. Moseley, 8 Pick. 356; 01· for the use
or any othe1· p1·upe1ty where the value 01·
profit of the use can be made to appear wltll
reasonable certainty by the light of past
experience, as mlgbt often be tlone where
such prodts llad been tor a co11slde1'11ble
time uniform at the surue season of the year,
nnd there are no clrcumstauces tending to
!!bow a probable diminution, bad the injury
not oecurretl. And possibly the same view,
subject to the like quullficatlons, might have
Ileen taken of the prodts or the plaintiff's
lnudness had It been confined to tile me·
cl.umlcal trade of repairing watehes and making gold pens, particulnrly If done purely ns
n cash business. But this buslnes;i seems
to have been carried on wltll tlmt of the
sale of jewelry. He kept a jewelry store,
and the profits of so much of his business as
may be rega1·ded llJ mercantile business
are dependent upon many more contlngen<'ies, and therefore more uncertain, ei1pcclnlly
it sales ·are made upon credit. Past prufit::1,
therefore, could not Mfely be taken as the
exact meRBure or future profits; but all the
various contingencies by which such }>rofits
would probably be ntrected should be taken
Into consldemtlon by the jury, antl allowed
such weight as they, In the exerclr;e of good
sense and sound dis<>retlon. should think
them entitled to. 1'11::<t protitH In such coses,
where the business hns heen contluue<I for
SQme length of time, would constitute a Yery
L .\ "' l>.\.U.:!d E1l.-- ll

~

•

D.UIAGE~IN

TORT.

161

matcl"ial aill to the jury In arriving at a fair
p1·obable estimate of the futnro profits, bad
the lmsiness still continued without 1nter111ptlon.
Acc01'dl11gly such past profits have been
allowed tor this purpose, both in actions ex
· contmctu and ex dellcto, though more frei queutly in the latter, wllere trow the nature
i of the case no element of greater certainty
apperu:ed, and the actunl damall:es must be
more or less a mutter of opinion; and where,
as in the present case, though somewhat In' conclusive, lt was the best evidence the
nature of the case admitted. See Wilkes \".
Hungerford, 2 Bing. N. C. 281; Ingram v.
Lawson, 6 Bing. N. c. 212; Lacour v. Mayor,
4 Duer, 406; and the following in actions
upon coutract: D1·Jggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend.
71; Bagley v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 489.
But lt Is urged by the counsel tor the defendant that damages fOl" the loss of profits
! ought not to be allowed. because they could
not have been within the contemplation or
the defendant. Whether, as matte1· of fact,
this ls likely to have been tl11e, we do not
deem it lm11ortllnt to inquire. It Is wholl)·
llllmaterlal whether the defendant, In committing the t1-espass, actually contemplate~ I
this or any other species of damage to tlw
plaintiff. This ls a consldel'lltlon which lt1
confined entirely to cases or contracts, where
tile question ls, what was the extent of
obligation, In this respect, whll'b both partie.i
umlerstood to be created by the contract?
ut where a party commits a trespass bel
must be held to contemplate all the damages
which may legitimately follow from bis II·
legal a.ct. And where a party, though acting
in good faith, yet knowing his right to be
disputed by a party in poesesslon, instead of
rl sot1.lni; to a judldnl trial of bis right, as·
sumes to take the lnw Into bis own hand::<,
and IJy violence to s1>lze the prope11y or right
In dispute, he must be held thereby to ni;sume, on the one hand, the risk of being
able to show, when the other party brings
him Into court, that the property or right
was his, or that his act was legal; or, on\
the other, of paying all the damages the ·
Injured pnrty may have suffered from the
injury; and, lt those damages are In their
11ature uncertain, then such as, from nil the
circumstances, or the best light the nature of
the case affords, a jury, in the exercise of
good sense and sound discretion, may find to
be a tun compensation.
We are therefore entirely satisfied that nil
the questions put to the witness Alllsou
touched the nature. extent, and profits of the
business before and after the trespass were
c0mpetent, and hup1·operly overruled; and
that the charge of the court, so far as It excluded all consideration or the good will of
the pince, its peculiar value to t11e plalntltT,
and his probable profits, was erroneous.
'l'be judgment must be reve1·sed, with costa
to the plaintllT, and a new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
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DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN TORT.

HILL v. Wi.\'SOR.

(118 Mass. 251..)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suffoik. Sept. 4, 1875.

At the trial of an action of tort for per-

sonal injuries sustained in consequence of

the defendants' steam-tug striking the fender

of a bridge on which the plaintiff was at

work, the plaintiffs evidence tended to show

that the fender, which was built to protect

the bridge, consisted of piles driven perpen-

dicularly into the bed of a stream about

twelve feet apart, with other piles driven at

an angle to each of these, one of which was

fastened to the top of each perpendicular

pile, with a cap on top extending along the

whole row of piles; that the plaintiff was at

work standing on a plank nailed to the piles,

and, in order to ﬁt an inclined pile to the

perpendicular one and the cap, he had put in
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a brace about a fcot long to keep the in-

clined pile and the upright one apart while

he was at work; that, while so at work, he

saw the tug coming towards the fender. and

tried to get on the cap, when the tug struck

the fender some distance from him, and the

jar caused the brace between the piles to

fall out, the piles came together, he was

caught between them, and severely injured.

The defendants' evidence tended to show that

the plaintiff was not seen by those on the

tug until after the accident, though other.

men at work on the fender were seen; that

the tug was drifted against the fender by

the tide, and then started up; that it was

the only way it could get away from the

fender; and that it was usual for vessels.

when so caught by the tide, so to do.

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.

HII.L v. Wl:\"SOR.
(118 Mass. 251.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Mnasacbusetta.
Snlfolk. Sept. 4, 1875.
At the tt·lal of an action of tort for personal Injuries susta:ned in consequence of
the defendants' steam-tug striking the fender
of a bridge on whi<.:h the plalntltl' was at
work, the plalntltf's evidence tended to show
that the fender, which was built to protect
the bridge, conslsled of piles driven perpendicularly into the bed of a stream about
twelve feet apart, w1th other plies drlnn at
an angle to each of these, one of which was
fastened to the top of each perpeudlenlnr
pile, with a cap on top extending along the
whole row of piles: that the plaintiff was at
work standing on a plnuk nailed to the piles,
and, in order to flt an Inclined pile to the
perpendicular one L.nd the cap, he had put In
a brace about a !cot long to keep the ln<'llned pile and the upright one apart while
he was at work; that, while so at wol'k, he
saw the tug coming towards the fender. and
tried to get on the cap, when the tug struck
the fender some distance from him, and the
jar caused the brace between the piles to
ran out, the piles c.ame together, he was
caught between t.hem, and severely lnjnrl'd.
'l'he defendants' evidence tended to show thnt
the plaintiff was not seen by those on the
tug until after the accident, though other.
wen at work on the tender were seen; that
the tug was drifted against the fender by
the tide, and then started up; that It was
the only way It could get away from the
fender; and that It wns usual for ves11els,
when so caught by the tide, so to do.
E. H. Derby and W. C. Wllllamson, for
plaintiff. O. W. _H_?~ Jr., and W. A.
~rnnroe, foc· aetendants.

E. H. Derby and W. C. Williamson, for

plaintiff. O. W. H_ol_mes,_Jr., and W. A.

Munroe, foifdefendants.

COLT, J. In actions of this description,

the questions whether the plaintiff was him-

self in the ‘exercise of due care, and the de-

fendants' act negligent. whether the injury

uffered was due to that act, as well as the

mount of damage to the plaintiff, are, as a

general rule, practical questions of fact to be

settled by the knowledge and experience of

the jury. The defendants' liability depends

upon circumstances which, as the cases arise,

are of inﬁnite variety and combination. If

there is any evidence upon which the jury

may legally found a verdict for the plaintiff,

that verdict cannot be disturbed on excep-

tions as matter of law, unless there has been

some error in the conduct of the trial, or the

judge has failed to state the true test of lia-

bility in his instructions as applied to the

facts disclosed.

Under the instructions given in the present

case. the jury must have found that the in-

jury of the plaintiff was caused by the neg-

lcct or want of ordinary care on the part of

those who. as agents and servants of the

defendants, had cha’ge of the tug-boat; and

that this negligence consisted in not using

such care in its navigation and management

as persons of ordinary prudence would use

COLT, J. In actlcns of this description,
the questions whether the plalntltf was hlmself In the ·exercise of due care, and the deendants' act negligPnt, whether the lnJnry
utrered was due to that act, as well as the
· mount or damage to the plalntlft', are, as a
g.Pneral rule, pract1"al quc>stlons of fact to be
St~ttled by the knowledge and experience of
the jury. The defendnntM' liability depends
upon ch'cumstances whkh, as the cases arlsP,
llre of Infinite variety :md C'omhlnatlon. If
thC're ls any evltlenC'e upon whleh the Jury
mny legally found a verdict for the plaintiff,
that verdlC't cannot be disturbed, on exc<>ptlons as mutter of law, unle11e there has bePn
BOme error In the conduct of the trial, or the
jmlgP has failed to 11tate the true test of 1111lilllty In his Instructions as applied to the
fn<'tl1 tllsdosed.
Under the lnstrnltlons given In the prl'f1e11t
cn!I<', the jury must hnve found that the Injury of the plaintiff was caused by the neg1<•1·t or wont of ordinary care on the 11art of
thos<> who. as agent11 and servantt1 or thP
tl<'ft-111lnnts, had cha• ge of t'be tug-bout; and

~

that this ne&llgence consisted In not u1d11g
such care in Its na·;fgatlon and management
as persons of ordl11ary prudence would use
under circumstances of like exposure and danger. 'l'bey must have also found that the
plaintiff was himself In the exercise ot due
care In attempting to escape the peril to which!
he was exposed by the defendants' conduct.
and that his injury was therefore due solely
to the defendants' negligence. 'l'he evidence
reported justifies these fl.ndlngs. The structure upon which the plalntur was at work
was Imperfect and out ot repair. Its condition at the time, the plaintiff's exposed position upon It, and the knowledge of that exposure which those In charge of the boat had,
or In the exercise of due care might have
had, were elements affecting the question of
the defendants' negligence to which the attention of the jury was especially ~led. It
cannot be said, as matter ot law, that the
Jury might not properly fl.nd It obvlo ly probable that Injury In some form woultl be caused to those who were at work on the tender
by the a l of the defendants In running
against 1t This constitute& negligence, and
It ls not n essary that Injury In the precise
form In which It In tact resulted should have
been foreseen. It Is enough that It now a11pears to ha'ie been a natural and probable
consequence.f Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111
Mass. 136, and cases cited.
A majority of the court are of opinion thnt
there was no error In refusing to give th"
speclftc Instructions requested; and th11t, so
far as they contain correct propositions of law
applicable to the tacts presented, they appear to havf) been given. The rourt was not
bound to a<lopt the precise language ot the
request. As to the second and sixth, It Is
enough to say that there Is no rule of law
whleh exempts one from the consequences of
his negligent conduct upon proof that he
proceeded In the usual mamwr antl took Hw
usual course pursued by partleK l'lhullnrly 11lt 11·
ated, although M was rithout notice that h •
could not safely do so. '.fhe defendants <·an ·
not protect th<'ruRelves by proving the Clll'•'lPss practices of others, and the clrcumstanee11
here were such ns to justify the lnferenl'I'
that the defenlnts were bound to take notice
of the danger.
The third n
fourth reque11ts lmpropl'rly
made the plalntltf's right to recover wholly
depl•ndent on tlw fn<'t that notice to the 111>fendnnts bad bePn given by the partle11 In
charge of the work, tbnt the fender was uot
In proper condition for use, although thrrt•
was evid<'nce thnt the.men on the tug saw
the workmen on the bridge and the dangPr to
whkh they .were exposed in time to have pr<'wnted the Injury.
The seventh and eighth are In effect requests tor lnstrtl('tlons that the defen<lnnts
were not liable It they us<'d ordinary care, nod
this rule was given to the jury, as we haYe
seen.
Exe('ptlons .o\"errulcd.

DIRECT AND cox::;EQUENTIAL DA.MAGES-IN TORT.
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SCHUMAKER v. ST. PAUL & D. R. (48 N. W. 559, 46 Minn. 39.)

SCHUMAKER v. ST. PAUL & D.R. CO.
(48 N. W. M9, 46 Minn. 39.)
Supreme Oonrt of Mlnueeota. April 8, 1891.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 8, 1891.

Appeal from district court. Ramsey

county; KELLY. Judge.

Wm. H. Bliss, for appellant. Erwin :2:

Wellington, for respondent.

COLLINS, J. To plaintiff's complaint

herein the defendant corporation inter-

posed a demurrer, upon the ground that

it failed to state facts sufﬁcient to consti-

tute a cause of action. Upon the argu-

ment of this appeal defendant contended

that its negligence in the premises was in-

sufﬁciently pleaded: that the injury com-

plained of. provided the same could besald

to have been the result of defendant's act,

was not proximate, but was too remote a

consequence to be chargeable to it; and,

further. that from the allegations of the
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complaint it was manifest that plaintiff

himself was guilty of contributory negli-

gence. Very little need be said on any of

these points,for none are well taken. The

complaint contains much that is superﬁn-

ous, but in respect to negligence itavers the

defendant's duty to have been to furnish

transportation to plaintiff, a car-repairer

in its employ. from the wrecked caboose,

which he had been sent out to repair by

the foreman. back to St. Paul, when he

had completed his work, and that it

rwrongfully, unlawfully, and negligently

failed and omitted so to do, or to furnish

plaintiff with transportation to any other

place where shelter or food could be ob-

tained, and that by reason ofsuch negligent

failure and omission plaintiff was com

pelled to and did walk to the village of

White Bear,a distance of nine miles,in the

night-time, in extremely cold and danger-

ous weather. that being the nearest point

at which the necessary shelter and food

could behad; thatplacing rciianceuponde-

fendant‘s performance of its duty towards

plaintiff when he had completed his work.

by furnishing transportation back to St.

Paul from the place on its line of road

where he had been taken to repair the ca-

boose, plaintiff was wholly unprepared

with means for properly sheltering or

clothing himself. It was also uverred

that the facts and circumstances with ref-

erence to the location of the caboose, the

inclemency of the weather, the distance to

shelter or food, and that plaintiff, by rea-

son of his reliance upon being transported

back to St. Paul when through with his

work. had not provided himself with

proper clothing for such weather, were

then well known to the defendant. The

negligence of the defendant might have

been speciﬁed with greater certainty, but

from an inspection of the pleading it ap-

pears that defendant is charged with hav-

ing unnecessarily and unreasonably placed

its servant,tbe plaintiff.in serious danger,

from which injury resulted, by carelessly

and negligently omitting to perform a

Appeal from district court, Ram11ey
county; KKLJ.Y, Judge.
U"m. H. Bliss, for appellant. Erwla &
R'Pllln/lton, for rl'8pondent.
COLLINS, J. To plalntlft'e complaint
herein th•• defendant corporation interposed a nemurrer, upon the ground that
it failed to Rtate facts &Umcleot to constitute a cttuse of action. Upon the argu.
ment of this appeal defendant contended
that its oe11:llgence In the premises was lnsutHclently pleaded; that the lrijury complained of, provided the same coulJ be ea Id
to have been the reeult of defendant's act,
wue not proximate, bot wae too remote a
co11eequence to be chargeable to It; and,
further, that from tile llllegntluus of the
complaint It wae manifest that plaintiff
himself was guilty of contrlllutory negligence. Very tittle need be said on any of
thet1e points, for none arewell taken. The
comphtlnt contains much that ls 1mperHuoue, bot In respect to negllirence It ft vere the
defemlaot'e duty to ha\•e been to furnlflh
transportation to plulntlft, a car-re1111lrer
In Its employ, from the wrecked cnhu11se,
wbtcb he had been sent out to rPpalr by
the foreman, back to St. Paul, when he
had completed his work, and that It
,wrongfully, unlawfully, and negligently
failed and omitted HO to do, or to furoh1h
plaintiff with transportation to any other
place where ebelter or food could be obtained, and that by reason ofeuch 11egllgent
failure ana omleslon plaintiff w11e cum
pelled to and did walk to the village or
White Dear, a distance of nine miles, In the
night-time, In extremely cold nod damreroue weather, that heing the nl'arest point
at which the nec¥eRary Hhelter and food
could be had; that Jtlaclng reliance upon defendant's flerformance Of ltR dutytowurdt1
plaintiff when he had completed hie work,
by furnishing transportation back to St.
Paul from the place on lte line of road
where be had been taken to repair the caboose, plaintiff was wholly unpr<!pared
with means for properly Hbeltt-rlng or
cloth Ing llimeelf. It was allm u verred
thn t the facts and clreumi;tanct•H with reference to the location or the caboose, thti
lnelemenl'y of tile weather, the dlet11nct1 to
Rhelter or food, and that plaintiff, by reueon of hie rellance upon being transported
back to St. Paul when through with hlH
work. had not provided hlmeeU with
proper clothing for such weather, were
then well known tu the defendant. The
negligence of tho defendant might hn ve
been er1eclfled with greater certainty, but
from an Inspection of the plendtng It appears that defendant le charged with having unnect:esarlly and onrea1moubly plal'ed
ltH servant, the plaintiff, In eerlootc dunger,
from which Injury reenlted, by carelet111ly
and nl'p;llgently omitting to perform a
duty lmmedlately connected with bis
work, on the perform once nf w hlch be had
a right to and did ~ly. With full knowledge of the situation as to we11tber an•l
the locallty,coneequently of the danger to
be apprehended, It nt-glected and aban-

doned the plaintiff under clrcumstanceM
which he ulleges resulte<I. In perl!lonal Injury to him . It bad no m°"' right to unnecessarily an•f unreasonably Juave him In
a dangerous place. to expo11e him to ati
unnece1111ary end unreasonable rlHk from
the elements, by falilng to furnish trnm-iportatlon from the place where he barl
been put Rt work, when that work WUH
comoleted, it being Its duty so to du, according to the complaint, than It had to
oonecesearlly and unreasonably expoHe
blm to rh1ks and dangers while he was at
work ,-eueh rlskR and dangers as were
dleco\•erable b:r the use of ordinary rirecautlon and dlllgence. The defendant
should have been reasonably dlllp;ent, an<l
could not, without Incurring llablllty, de·
iiert the plaintiff In the manner and under
the circumstances set forth 1n the complaint.
·
·
'l'he Important question tn thlR ca11e,
however, Is whethf'r. from tha cmnplnint[
It appears that deft>ndant le liable for th
Injuries which resulted from plulntiff'11 efforts to obtutn Ahelter and food on the
occaelon referrPd to; the former. aH be
forti stated, nraruing that, as allt-ared, they
are too remote, und are not the proximate reeults of Its act. It Is averred thut,
by reu11on of the onavolduble e:1pu11url' of
the [tlalntlff, he was made sick, contracted
rbeumatltim, hat1 e\·er since 111uftered grent
pain end 1•ony, and has heen permanently Injured. It must not be forgotten that[
the gra. va
n of the action le the 11egllgenl'e
u ml ca relesene;;;e of tile defE"nda n t In leu vlng
J.•lalntlff at a place where Jlcould uot procure either ebelteror food~ It le an action
In tort, nnd not fOJ' a hre ch of contract.
It le the negligence of the dt-fendant which
le com11lalned of, a nil not the breuch or a
cuntrad to return the pin In tiff to !::It. Paul
when he hod pPriormetl his lahor. It was,
of course, eHsentlnl that the plulntiff'e relation with the defendant l>e matlc to
appeur, fur, unlPBR be was a sel'\·unt to
whom the defendant owed a duty, there
CUii Id arise no Ila bill ty hy re!on of ltfl neglect to perform that duty. ThA relutlun
of mallter and servant firs ha vlng bt't'n
shown to exltit, the law flxeH the duty of
tbefurmertowarde the latter, and a vlolntlon of this 1111~ le a~ not a breech
of the contract. This, tben, lH an action In
which the wro g-doer le Jlahle fur the nuturul and probable cunsequenl'ee of lttt 11PgllJ1;ent act or omission; the genPral ruleH
wnlch limit the <lamagee In actions of
of tort being, lo many respects, dl!ent
from those In actiun11 on contructA. Th
Injury must be the ~lrect re-Hult or th ml11conduct attributed and the generul rule
In respect to dam \gee Is thut whoe\"er
commit!! a treHpHSI' or other wrongful act
le liable for all the direct Injury resulting
therefrom, although 1mch reHultlng Injury
could not have bet.an contPmplaJed DH
probahle reHult of tltc act done. I St-tlg
Dam. 130, note, Rnd caees cited; lfford v.
Ruilroad Co., II Colo. aaa, ll! Puc. R"P· 219,
a caHe much like this. He who cur.:.mits
A trespa11e mu>1t be held to conte11111lutc
all tile dumagee which may leal•lmutely
flow from hl>1 lllf'gul act, whether he
may hRve forl!Been the1n or not; and,
BU far BH It ls plainly tr11cettble, hf' ,-UU~t
mu ke com.(K'DHa tloo for tbe wrung.
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DIRECT AND CONSEQUEl\'TIAL DAMAGES—IN TORT.

The damages cannot be considered too

remote if, according to the usual ex-

perience of mankind, injurious results

ought to have been apprehended. It is not

necessary that the injury in the precise

form -in which it, if fact, resulted, should

have been foreseen. {It is enou;:,h that it

now appears to have been a natural and

probable consequence. I Hill v. Winsor, H8

Mass. 251. The question is whether the

negligent act complained of—leaving the

plaintiff in the open countryI in the night-

time, in extremely cold and dangerous

weather, along distance from shelter or

food—was the direct cause of the injuries

mentioned in the complaint, or whether it

\was a remote cause. for which an action

'wili not lie, and it must be taken for grant-

d that the walk of nine miles and incident
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exposure brought about the alleged sick-

ness, pain, aml disability. There was no

intervening independent cause of the in-

jury, fur all of the acts done by the plain-

tiff. his effort to seek protection from the

inclement and dangerous weather, were

legitimate, and compelled by defendant's

failure to reconvey him to the city. Had

he remained at the caboose, and lost his

hands, or his feet, or perhaps his life, by

freezing. no doubt could exist of the de-

fendant's liability. It must not be permit-

ted to escape the consequences of its

wrong because the injuries were received

in an eﬂort to avoid the threatened dan-

ger, or because they differ in form or seri-

ousness from those which might have re-

sulted had the plaintiff made no such ef-

fort. An efﬁcient, adequate cause being

found for the injuries received by plaintiff,

it must be considered as the true cause,

unless another. not incident to it. but in-

dependent of it, is shown to have inter-

vened between it and theresult. Thisis the

substance of very clear statements of the

law found in Kellogg v. Railway Co., 26

Wis.223, and in Railway Co. v. Kellogg. ‘J4

U. S. 469. -And upon the point now under

consideration we fail to distinguish be-

tween the case at bar and Brown v. Rail-

wayCo.,54 Wis.342,11 N. W. Rep.3:'\6,91l,—.

an action brought to recover for like dam-

ages said to have been caused by directing

passengers to alight from a train at a

place about three miles distant from their

destination. At all events, the question

as to what was the proximate cause of a

plain tiff's injuries is usually one to be de-

termined by ajury. As was said in Rail-

way Co. v. Kellogg, supra, the true rul

is that what is the proximate cause of a§\

injury is ordinarily one for a jury. it is

not a question of science or legal knowl-

edge. it is to be determined as a fact, in

view of the circumstances attending it.

Finally, the defendant insists that plain-

tiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

because, from the complaint, it appears

that he was wholly unprepared with

l

DIHECT AND CONSEQUEXTIAL DA}lAGES-IN TOR'f.

The cln111nge11 cannot be cumd1lered too
remote if, according to the usual experience of mankind, lnjurloa11 results
ought to have been apprehended. It Is not
necessary that the Injury In the precb1e
form· In which it, iJ,I fact, resulted, should
have bet>n foreseen. l It is enough that It
now appeurs to have been a natural and
probable con1<equence. r Hill v. Winsor, 118
Mass. 251. The question Is whether the
negllgP-nt act com1>lalned of-leaving the
plulnttn in the open country In the nighttime, in extremely cold and dangerous
weather, t1 long rtlstance from shelter or
food-was the dlrect cause of the Injuries
mentioned in the complaint, or whether It
1was a remote 'cause, for which an action
- E:vlll not lie, and It mustbetaktm for grantd that the walk of nine miles ancl lnclllent
xposure brought about the alleged 1:1lckne11s, pain, noel dlsabillty. There was no
Intervening Independent cause of the Injury, fur all of the nets clone by the plaintiff, his effort to 11eek protection from the
Inclement and daoger<1us weather, were
lebritlmate, and compelled by defendant's
failure to recom·ey him to the city. Had
he re1nalned at the caboo&e, and lost his
hands, or hls feet, or perhaps his life, by
freezing-, no doubt coulrl exist of the de·
fcmJant'e liability. It most not be permitted to escnpe the conseqmmces of Its
wrong because the injuries were recelvecl
In an effort to avoid the threatened unnger, or because they differ In form or serl11u1111ess from those which might have reHulted had the plnintlff made no such effort. An ellicieut, adequate cau11e being
found for th3 lnjmies recel'\°ed by plaintiff,
ft must be considered as the true co use,
unless another, not lncltlcnt to It. but: Independent of It, is shown to have Intervened between it and tl1ert'Bult. Thls ls the
substance of very clear statements of the
lnw founii In Kellou"' v. Hallway Co., 2li

Wis. 22".3, and In Railway Co. v. Kello~g. !14
U. S. 469. ·And upon the point now undl!r
consil1erntlon we ran to distinguish hetween the case at bar and Brown v. Rallway l'o., 54 Wl11.842,ll N. W.Rep.a.'16,911,lln action brought to recover for like 1'11101ages said to have been caused by directing
passengers to alight from a train at a
place about tbree miles distant from their
destination. At all events, the question
as to what was the proximate ca use or ».
phtln tiff's lnjurleR le usually one to be 1!Cltermlned by a Jury. As was said tu Rullway Co. v. Kellogg, supra, the true rul~
is thnt what 18 the proximate cause of au
Injury le or<llunrily oue for a jury. It Is
not a question of science or legal knowleuge. It le to be determined as n fact, In
view of the circumstances attending It.
Flua.lly, the defendant Insists that plalntlH was guilty of contributory negligence,
because, from the complaint, it appears.
that he wall wholly unprepared with
l'lothlng sufficient for the occnslon, nnd
because be left the shelter of the caboose
when he nndertook his Journey upon foot
to the :vlllagl-' of White Bear. The plaintiff, undouhtedl.v, went prepared with such
clothing as he would ordinarily and naturally need ror the occasion, had the defendant performed Its alleged duty, and
this was all thnt was required of him.
He wa~ not obliged to anticipate the defendant's nrgllgence or omission, and prepare for It, nor does It follow that, because there was a eabouse at the place""
where he worked, It afforded him allequnte and proper shelter fo1• the nigh~
If this wne the fact, It can quite properl.
be shown aR a. derense upon the trlul o ·
the case. But the complRint negative
Buch a conclusion. Order affirmed.
MITCHELL. J., did not participate lo.
the making and filing of this deciillon.

•
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VOSBURG v. PUT!'i."EY.
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CON"~EQUENTIAL

(l!O

N. W. 400, 80 Wis. 623.)

VOSBURG v. PUTNEY.

(50 N. W. 403. 80 Wis. 523.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Nov. 17, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Waukesha

county; A. Scorr Snoss, Judge. Re-

v'ersed.

Action by Andrew Vosburg against

George' Puthey for personal injuries.

From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant

appeals.

The other facts fully; agplear in the fol-

lowing statement by Y , J.:

The action was brought to recover dam-

ages for an assault and battery,alleged to

have been committed by the defendant up-

on the plaintiff on February 20. 1889. The

answer is a general denial. A . the dateof

the alleged assault the plaintiff was a

little more than 14 years of age, and the
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defendant a little less than 12 yea rs of

age. The injury complained of was caused

by a kick inﬂicted by defendant upon the

leg of the plaintiff, a little below the knee.

Thefransaction occurred in aschool-room

in Waukesha, during school hours, both

parties being pupils in the school. A

former trial of the cause resulted in a ver-

dict and judgment for the plaintiff for

$2,800. The defendant appealed from such

judgment to this court, and the same was

reversed for error, and a new trial award-

ed. 78 Wis. 84, 47 N. W. Rep. 99. The case

has been again tried in the circuit court,

and the trial resulted innverdlct forplain-

tlff for $2,500. The facts of the case, as

they appeared on both trials, are sufﬁ-

ciently stated in the opinion by Mr. Jus-

tice ()n'ro.\' on the former appeal,and re-

quire no repetition. On the last trial the

jury found a special verdict, as follows:

u(1) Had the plaintiff during the month

of January, 1889, received an injury just

above the knee, which became inﬂamed,

and produced pus? Answer. Yes. (2)

Had such injury on the 20th day of Feb-

ruary, 1889, nearly healed at the pofnt of

the injury? A. Yes. (3) Was the plain-

tiff. before said 20th of February, fame, as

the result of such injury? A. No. (4)

Had the tibia in the plaintiff's right leg

become inﬂamed or diseased to some ex-

tent before he received the blow or kick

from the defendant? A. No. (5) What

was the exciting cause of the injury to the

plaintil‘f'sleg? A. Kick. (6) Did the de-

fendant, in touching the plaintiff with

his foot, intend to do him any harm? A.

No. (7) At what sum do you assess the

damages of the plaintiff? A. Twenty-ﬂve

hundred dollars." The defendant moved

forjudgment in his favor on the verdict,

and also for a new trial. The plaintiff

moved for judgment on the verdict in his

favor. Themotionsofdefendant were over-

ruled, and that of the plaintiff granted.

Therenpon judgment for plaintiff. for

$2.500 damages and costs ofsuit. was duly

entered. The defendant appeals from the

8uprc-me Court of Wisronsin. Nov. 17, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Waukesha
A. ScoT'l' 8LOA.!>., Judge. Reversed.
Action by Andrew Vosburg against
George Putaey for per11onal Injuries.
From a Judgment for plaintiff, defendant
appeals.
The other facts fully app_ear In the following statement by LYON, J.:
The action was brought to recover 1l1uuagee for Rna11sault and battery,aJleged to
buve been committed by the uefendunt upon the plaintiff on February :W. 1~9. The
answer le a gP.neral denial. .\ _ the date of
the alleged ussault the plaintiff was a
little more than 14 years of age, and the
defendant a little lll&s than 12 yea ni of
age. 'l'he Injury complained of woe caused
by a kick lnfilctf'd by defendant upon the
lea: of the plaintiff, a little below the knee.
The t ransuction occurred In a school-room
Jn Waukesha, during school hour11, both
parties being 1mplls lo the schoul. A
former trial of the cnuse resulted in a verdict and Judgment for the plaintiff fur
f2,800. The delendant appealed from such
Judgment to thl11 court, and the same was
reversed for error, and a new trial a wnrded. 7~ Wl11. x!, 47 N. W. Rep. 00. The case
hns been uguln tried In the clreult court
ond the trial reHulted In a nrdlct for pluln ~
tltr for $2,000. 'l'he facts of the ca11e, a11
tht-y up11eare1l on both trlal11, are sutHc1 ....11t1y 11tnted In the 011lnlon by .Mr. Justice On"l'ox on the former appenl, ntlfl require nu rt>petitlou. On the last trial the
Jury found a speclul verdict, aa follows:
"(11 Had t1\e plaintiff 1lurlng the month
of Junuury, 1889, received an Injury Just
nbove the knee, which became lnfi111necl,
and produc,eu pus? Answer. Yea. (2)
Hnd such injury on the 20th day of Fel>Tuary, 11-!l-'9, nearly he.aled at the point or
the Injury? A. Yell. (3) Was the plain·
tiff. before sal!l 20th of J.<·ebruary, lame, ail
the result of such Injury? A. No. (4)
Had the tibia in the plalntl1f'11 right leg
become l11tlF1med or dleeaeell to some extt>nt belore he recrtved the blow or kick
from the defendant? A. No. (5) What
was the exciting cause of the Injury to the
plalutlff's leg'! A. Kick. (6) IJld the defendant, In touching the plalutlrr with
his foot, Intend to do him any harm? A.
No. (7) A.t what 11um do you aesee11 the
1iamal.(eH of the plaintiff? A. Twenty-five
hundred dollars." 'l'he defendant moved
for ju<lgnumt In bis favor oo the verdict,
and 11lso for a new trial. The plaintiff
mo,·ed for jmlgment on the verdict In hl11
favor. The motions or defrndant wt-re overruled, and tbnt of the plaintiff grunted.
Theren1>on judinnent for plnln tiff. for
f2.500 damages and costs orsult, wtt11dulv
euterP.d. The defendant appeuls from tlie
judicmen t.
'l'. W. Hal~llt (J.V. Q11arles,ofcoun11el) ,
for appellant, to eustnln the propo111tion
thut where there le noe\'ll Intent there can
h! 1~0 recO\•ery, cltecl: 2 Green!. Ev.§§ 828a: 2 Add. Torts,§ 790; Cooley, 'l'ortM, p,
16!?; Cowar1I v. Buddeley, 4 Hurl. & N. 478;
~unty;
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Cbrletophereon v. Bare, 11 Q. B. 478; Hollman v. Eppera, 41 Wis. 251: Krnll v. Lull,
49 Wbt. 405, 5 N. W. Rep. 874; Ol'ttul111l v.
Transportation Co., 16Fed. Rer.7.>; Brown
v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292.
Ryan a: Merton, for respondent.

LYON, J. (after statln~ tbefncts}. Several errors are assigned, only three of
which will be considered.
I. The Jury ha vlng found that the defendant, In touching the plnlntlft with bis
foot, did not Intend to do nim any harm
counsel for defendant maintain that th~
plaintiff has no cause of action. and that defendant's motion for judgment on the special verdict should have heen granted.
In support of thi11 proprndtlon counsel
quote from 2 Green!. Ev. § !:;3 the ruh~\
that" the Intention to do haru; 111 of the
essence of ao assuult." Such' is the rule,
no doubt, in actions or prosecutions lur
mere ae11aults. Bnt this is nn action to
recover damages for an alleged ueRoult
and battery. In such caBe the rule ls correctly stated, In many or the authorities
cltt"rl by counsel, that plalntirr muet show\
either that the Intention wall unlawful, or
thut the defendant le In fault. If the Intended act Is unlawful, the Intention
commit It must necP.S11arlly be unlawful.
Hence, ae applied to thl11 caRe, if the kicking of the plaintiff by the defendant wa11
an unlawful act, the Intention of defendant to kick him was alHo uni/\ wful. Had
the rmrtiee been upon the play-gronnde
of the school, eng;agetl In the mmal boy.
IHh Rports, the defendant bei1111: free from
malice, wantonnes11, or ne~lli.tenc<', and
lntl'ndlng no harm to 1ilalntlff in what bt•
did, we sbouhl hi?sltate to bult.l the art of '
th<' defendn nt unhl\vful, or that he couhJ
he hel1I lluble In this action. Some co1111lder11tlon ie due to the Implied llcenM of
the play.ground11. But It appears that
the lnj ury Wl\S lnftlcte1l In the 11ehool. after
It had been cAllt!d to order h.v the teacher,
and nfter the regular exercises of the
school had commenced. Under these cir~
cumstances, no Implied license to do the
act cumplnined of existed, and 1rnch act
was a violation of the order RIHl decorum
of the school, and necessarily unlawful.
H ence we are or the opinion thn t, un1lf'r
the evldem·e and verdict, the at'tlun muy
bl' sustulne1l.
II. The plaintiff test!Hed , as u wltneHB In
hie own behulf, as to the clrcu11111tances of
the Rllt>ged Injury Inflicted upon him bv the
def1•1ulnn t. an cl nlso in rea:a rd to the wound
be l'Peelvecl in January, near the1iumcknee,
men tionl'd In the special verdict. 'I'he defendant clnlmetJ that such wound was the
proxlma te cause of the Injury to plnlntlff'11
Jeg, In thn t It produced a 1llseat1ed condition of the bone, which disease wa11 ln acti \"e progres11 when he received tlrn kick
and that sueh kkk did nothing more than
to change the loctttlon, and perha11s somcwha t hasten the pro1lrcs11, of the disease.
The trstlmony ol Dr. B11con. a witness for
plaintiff, (who was plaintiff's attending
physician,) elicited on croes-ex1tmlnatlon
tends to some extent to establish such
claim . Dr. Bacon fir11t saw the Injured leg
oo Fehruury 2;',th, and Dr. Philler, also
one or pluintiH's wltne:1se11, flrt1t su w It

toj
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,on the shin-bone."

March 8th. Dr. Philler was called as a

witness after the examination of the plain-

tiff and Dr. Bacon. On his direct examina-

tion he testiﬁed as follows: “I heard the

testimony ofAndrew Vosburgin regard to

how he received the kick, February 20th,

from his playmate. I heard read the tes-

timony of Miss More, and heard where he

said he received this kick on that day."

(Miss More had already testiﬁed that she

was the teacher of the school, and saw de-

fendant tanding in the aisle by his seat,

and kicking across the aisle, hitting the

plaintiff.) The following question was

then propounded to Dr. Philler: “After

hearing that testimony, and what you

know of the case of the boy, seeing it on

the 8th day of March, what, in your opin-
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ion, was the exciting cause that produced

the inﬂammation that you sawin that

boy's leg on that day?" An objection to

this question was overruled, and the wit-

ness nnswered: “The exciting cause was

the injury received at that day by the kick

It will be observed

that the above question to Dr. Philler

calls for his opinion as a medical expert,

based in part upon the testimony of the

plaintiff, as to what was the proximate

cause of the injury to plaintiff's leg. 'l'he

plaintiff testiﬁed to two wounds upon his

leg, either of which might have been such

proximate cause. Without taking both

of these wounds into consideration, the

expert could give no intelligent or reliable

opinion as to which of them caused thein-

jury complained of; yet. in the hypothet-

ical question propounded to him, one of

these probable causes was excluded from

the consideration of the witness, and he

was required to give his opinion upon an

imperfect and insufﬂcienthypothesis.—one

which excluded from his consideration a

material fact essential to an intelligent

opinion. A consideration by the witness

of the wound received by the plaintiff in

January being thus prevented, the wit-

ness had but one fact upon which to base

his opinion, to-wit, the fact that defend-

ant kicked plaintiff on the shin-bone.

Based, as it necessarily was. on that fact

alone, the opinion of Dr. Philler that the

kick caused the injury was inevitable.

when, had the proper hypothesis been

submitted to him, his opinion might have

been different. The answer of Dr. Philler

to the hypothetical question put to him

may have had, probably did have, a con-

trolling inﬁinence with the jury, for they

found by their verdict that his opinion

was correct. Surely there can be no rule

of evidence which will tolerate a hypothet-

ical question to an expert, calling for his

opinion in a, matter vital to the case,

which excludes from his consideration facts

already proved by a witness upon whose

testimony such hypothetical question is

DIRECT AND
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March 8th. Dr. Phlller wae called as a
.witness after the f'Xamlnatlon of the plaintiff and Dr. Bacon. On hie direct examlnathm he testified us follows: "I beard the
testimony or Andrew Voebur~ In regHrc1 to
how he 1·eeeh·ed the klr.k, February 20th,
from his playmate. I heard reall the testimony or Miee More, and heard where he
said he recPlved this kick on thut day,"
(Miss More had ulread.v testlHed that she
was the teachrr of the school, and !law defendant standing In the aisle by his seat,
and kicklnJ!; ncross the ah~le, hitting the
plnlntlff.) 'l'he following question woe
then propounded to Dr. Phlller: "After
hearing that testimony, and what you
know or the case of the boy, eeein.ir; It on
thA 8th day or March, what, In your opinion, was the excitin11: cause that produced
the Inflammation that you ea w In that
boy'11 leg on tbat day?" An objt:>ctlon to
thh1 queHtlon was overruled, and the witness nnewered: '"l'he exciting cause wae
the Injury received at tba t day by the kick
on the shin-bone. ., It wlll be observed
· that the 11 hove question to Dr. Pillller
call11 for hie opinion as a medical expert,
baPed In part npon the tPstimon,\' of the
plaintiff, ae to what was the proximate
cause or the Injury to plaintiff's leg. The
plaintiff tel!tlfted to two w ounde upon his
leg, either of which ml11:ht ha\'e bl'en eucb
proximate cause. Without taking both
ul thE:l!e wounds into cont!lderatlon, the
expert conld give no Intelligent or reliable
opinion as to which of them ~a used the lnjnry complained of; yet, in the hypothetical question propounded to him, one or
these probable causes wae excluded from
the consideration of the witness, and he
wae required to give hll! opinion upon an
Imperfect and lnsufflchmt hypotheels,-one
which excluded from his consideration a
material ract e11eenti11l to an lntPlligent
opinion. A consideration by the wltne111!
of the wound received by the plaintiff In
.January being thne prevented, the witness had bot one fact upon which to base
hie opinion, to-wit, the fart that defendant kicked plaintiff on the shin-bone.
BaHed, ae It necessarily waR, on that fact
aloue, the opinion of Dr. Phlller thut the
kick caused the injury wae lne\·itnble,
when, had the proper hypotheele been
aulimltted to him, hie oolnlon might have
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been different. The answer or Dr. Phlller
to the hypothetical qnestlon put to him
muy have had, probably did have, a controlling Influence with the Jury, for they
found by their verdict that his opinion
waR correct. Surely there cau be no rnle
of evidence which will tolerate a hypothetical question to an expPrt, callln11: for hie
opinion In a matter vital to the cne~.
w hlch excludes from his ronsldera tlon facts
alrearly proved by a witness upon whose
testimony such hypothetical question le
ba11ed, when a consideration of such facts
by thP P.Xpert Is absolutely essential to enable him to form an Intelligent opinion
concerning such matter. The objection to
the question put to Dr. Philler should
have been sustained. The error In permitting the witnesR to answer the quel!tlon
Is material, and necessarily fatal to the
Judgment.
III. Certain questions were proposed on}
behalf .of defendant to be submitted to
the jury, founded upon the theory that
only such d1tmages contd be recovered ae
the defendant might reasonably be eup.\
pmrnd to hRve contemplated ae likely to
result from his kicking the plaintiff. The·
court refmied to Ruhmlt Ruch questions to
the Jnr.v. The ruling was rorrect. The
rule of dnmagee In actions for torts wae
held In Brown v. Railway Co., M Wle. 842,
11 N. W. Rep. 3:16,911, to he that thP.wron~~
doer ie liable for all Injuries reeultlnic di
rectly from the wrongful act, whether they
could or could not have been foresePn by
him. The chief JuRtlce and the writer of
thle opinion dissented from the Judgment
In that caee,chlefly because we were of the
opinion that the complaint stated a cause
of nction f'X contractu, snd not ex df'licto,
nnd hence thnt a different rule of damtt.gee
-the rule here contended for - wae applicable. We did not question that the
rule In actions for tort wae correctly
stated. Tha.t case rules this on the qneetlon of damage11. The remaining errors
assigned are upon the rulings of the court
on objections to testimony. These rulings are not very likely to be repeated on
another trial, and are not of sufficient importance to require a review of them on
this appeal. The Jmhtml'nt or tl1e clrcul~
court must he reversed, and the cause will\
he remanded for a new trial.
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TUNNICLIFFE v. BAY CITIES CONSOL.

' RY. CO.

(61 N. W. 11, 102 Mich. 624.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 7. 1894.

Error to circuit court, Bay county; Andrew

C. Maxwell, Judge.

Action by Louise M. Tunnicliffe, by her

next friend. William H. Tunnicliffe, against

the Bay Cities Consolidated Railway Compa-

ny, for personal injuries. Judgment was

rendered for plaintiff, and defendant brings

.

A~I> CO~SEQl"ENTIAJ,

TUNNlCLIFFE v. BAY CITIES CONSOL.
RY. CO.
(61 N. W. 11, 102 Mich. G2-l.)
Supreme Court of Micblgao. DPt'. 7, 1894.
Error to circuit court, Bay county; Andrew
C. Maxwell, Judge.
Action by Louise M. Tunnlclllfe, by her
next ft-lend, William H. Tnnnlclltl'e, against
the Bay Cities Consolidated Railway Company, for personal Injuries. Judgment was
rendered for plalntl~, and defendant brings
error. Reversed.
T . .A. E. & J. C. Weadock, for appellant.
James Van Kleeck, for a11pellee.

error. Reversed.

T. A. E. & J. C. Weadock, for appellant.

James Van Klecck, for nppellee.

\

MO.\TGOMERY, J. Plaintiff is a married

woman and a minor. She sues by her next

friend to recover for personal injuries re-

ceived while attempting to alight from a
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car of the defendant. Plaintiff recovered,

and defendant brings error. The negligence

alleged was that "while plaintiff, with the

consent and permission of said defendant,

with due care and diligence on her part, was

passing out of said car, and onto and over

the rear platform of the same','Tbr the pur-

pose of alighting therefrom and leaving said

car, and was stepping from the platform of

said car to the steps thereof, said car being

then and there stationary, said defendant

carelessly and negligently caused said car,

from which she was then departing and

stepping off, to be suddenly started, jerked,

and moved forward, by means whereof this

plaintiff, while in the exercise of proper care

and diligence on her part, was thrown down

and against said car, and down and upon

the platform thereof, and down and upon

and against the steps of said. car, and her

dress skirt or skirts caught on said bolt, so

negligently put, placed, and permitted to be

and remain in said platform by said defend-

ant as aforesaid, and she was held fast to

and against said car, and against the plat-

form of said car, and to and against the

steps thereof, and partially upon the ground,

and was so held, dragged, and carried along

by the motion of said car," etc. The decla-

ration had previously alleged that defendant

had "carelessly and negligently‘ placed. and

permitted to be and remain, an iron bolt,

extending and projecting above the rear

platform, to wit, ﬁve inches."

1. In the course of the charge to the jury,

the circuit judge asked for suggestions from

counsel. Defendant's counsel therenpon ask-

ed the court to charge that the plaintif f could

not recover under any circumstances by rea-

son of the location of the bolt or pedal, and

called attention to a portion of the charge

of the court as follows: “I do not under-

stand that it is seriously contended by the

defendant if the accident happened because

of this bolt remaining in an improper place

during the journey, to endanger women get-

ting off the car, but what the company is

llable,"—and asked that it be modiﬁed. The

plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that

MONTGOMERY, J. Plalntur Is a married
woman and a minor. She sues by her next
friend to recover for personal Injuries received while attempting to alight from a
car of the defendant. Plalntlll' recovered,
and defendant brings error. The negligence
alleged was that '"while plalntlll', with the
consent and permission of said defendant.
with due care and dlllgence on her part, was
passing out of said car, and onto and over
the rear platform of the sam~r the purpose of alighting therefrom and leaving said
car, and was stepping from the platform of
eald car to the steps thereof, said car being
then and there stationary, said defendant
carelessly and negligently caused said car,
from which she was then departing and
stepping oil', to be suddenly started, jerked,
and moved forward, by means whereof this
plaintltl', while In tbe exercise of proper care
and dlllgence on her part. ~·as thrown down
and against said car, and down and upon
the platform thereof, and down and upon
and against tile steps of said. car, and her
dress skirt or skirts caught on said bolt, so
negligently put. placed, and permitted to be
and remain In said platform by said defendant as aforesaid, and elle was held fast to
and against said car, and against the platform of said car, and to and against the
steps thereof, and partially upon the ground,
and was BO held, dragged, and carried along
by the motion of said car," etc. The declaration had preylously alleged that defendant
had "carelessly and negligently placed, and
permitted to be and remain, an Iron bolt,
extending and projecting above the rear
platform, to wit, five Inches."
1. In the coul'8e of the charge to the jury,
the circuit judge asked for suggestions from
counsel. Defendant's counsel thereupon asked the court to charge that the plalntltl' could
not recover under any circumstances by reaaon of the location of the bolt or pedal, and
called attention to a portion of the charge
of the court as follows: "I do not undel'atand that It le seriously contended by the
defendant lf the accident happened because
of this bolt remaining In an Improper place
during the journey, to endanger women getting otr the car, but what the company ts
llable,"-and asked that It be modified. Tile
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plalntltl"s testlmony was to the effect that
she was In the act of stepping oil' the car
when It started, and that she was thrown
backward, and her clothing caught.
She
further testified: "I took It for granted that
my clothes were caught; I didn't know In
what. I could not see, but In my struggle
I threw my arm behind me, and, as I did 110.
my hand came down on something that projected from the platform, and I pulled my
skirt, and a bolt came out from ·the platform." On cross-examination she testified:
"I should think the bolt had no part In
throwing me down, 'aside from the jerking
of the car." It Is claimed by the defendant
that there was no room under this testimony
for the jury to ftnd that her clothing was
caught before she was thrown backward.
But we think this constrnctlon of the testimony is too narrow. It would appear from
the charge of the court that defendant bad
contended before the jury that plalntlll''s
story was unreasonable and that the Injury
could not have occurred in the manner supposed by plalntlll'. The jury had a right to
construe the facts, and If, lo their judgment,
It was more reasonable to suppose that her
clothing had been caught upon the bolt without her knowledge before the car started,
and threw her to the ground, we cannot say
that the circumstances of the case did not
furnish a justlftcatlon for that inference.
2. On the trial the plalntltr was permitted,
against the defendant's objection, to testify
that before the Injury she had painted for
profit, and was able to earu five to ten nnd
fifteen dollars per week, and that by the
injury she was rende1~d unable to do tills
kind of work. The court charged the jury
upon the aubject of damages u followtJ:
"She ls entitled to recover, in case you so de·
termlne from the evidence,-she le entitled,
first. to the value of her time. Whatever
It was worth a month or week, you will
give it her, If you come to that conclusion,
as I said before." It was error to admit
this testimony, and permit the recovery for
the impairment of the plalntltl"s ablllty to
earn money. 'l'he husband ls, prlma facle,
entitled to the earnings of the wife. Hicks
v. McLachlan, 94 Mich. 282, 53 N. W. 1107.
But it le contended in the present case that,
as the husband was a party to the proce.-'{]lngs as next friend to the plalntlll', he would
be estopped by the verdict from bringing
suit hereafter to recover these damages, and
hence that no injury · could have been done
defendant; and Baker v. Railroad Co., 91
Mich. 298, 51 N. W. 897, le cited as sustaining this contention. The case cited fully
recogulzes that the objection as made In a
suit prosecuted by the next friend ls good;
but It was held In that case that Inasmuch 118
such testimony was admitted, and as plalntlll' actually received payment upon the judg·
ment In his capacity as next friend, he ought
not to be permitted to recover It again lo his
Individual capacity. In the present cast!,

168
168

the defendant, upon making the objection,

had no reason to apprehend that the plaintift

expected to claim a recovery for any dam~

ages not within the issue, and particularly

was this true under the circumstances of

this case, as it appears conclusively that the

defendant could not have understood that it

was necessary to offer any proof to meet the

plaintiff's testimony; for, after the plaintiffs

testimony, above quoted, had been given, a

question was put to another witness on the

same line, which was objected to, and the

court said: “I think the husband is entitled

to the wages. I guess there is no use going

into that in this case at all." After this,

certainly, the defendant's counsel could not

be expected to meet such proofs as had crept

in on this subject; and the subsequent

charge, above quoted, was not only errone-
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ous as matter of law, but, given, as it was,

after the previous intimation which cut oﬂf

proofs, on the part of the defendant, was

based upon a necessarily ex parte showing

3. The testimony tended to show that one

of the results of the injury to plaintiff was

a miscarriage. The court charged the jury

as follows: “As to this child, if the plain-

tif f lost a child by reason of the liability of

l

i

l

D.HL\GE~-l'.\'

the defendant in this case, you may give ‘

damage for it.

prospective services of the child is a recog‘

nized element in that regard, and you may

give what it is reasonably worth." This

charge was clearly erroneous. There was,

The society, enjoyment, and I

physical or mental suffering attending til‘

miscarriage is a part of it, and a proper sub,

ject for compensation. But the rule goes no

further. Any injured feelings following the‘

miscarriage, not part of the pain naturally

attending it, are too remote to be consid-]

ored an element of damage. If the plain-

tiff lamented the loss of her offspring, such

grief involves too much an element of senti-

ment to be left to the conjecture and caprlce

of a jury. If, like Ki_lQ1_9L_§l£§ZﬂDt-:05-he!

children. and would not be comfortgd, a

q es on o con numg (amagg_jg_p;g;gpted,

t9.o4io'lL('lte to "(.§_\_v_(‘_1igl1_(:d_l)y_t1_t_u'_.sc‘.i1.lte-!

whl_ch_t.l1e_1aLv has ' _t, jnygn ." The only

case which we‘ lave found wh ch is in scem~

ing conﬂict with this is that of Smith v

Overby, 30 Ga. 241; but the supreme court

of that state, in the later case of Railroad

Co. v. Randall, 85 Ga. 297, 11 S. E. 706, it

treating of a charge which permitted of a

recovery for the pain, suffering, or sorrow

resulting from miscarriage, said: “We would

suggest that the word ‘sorrow' be omitted

from the charge of the court on the next

trial. It is most too remote to be considerm

an element of damage, unless it is that sor

row which accompanies the actual injury

and is suffered at the time of the miscar

TOUT.

the <11•fendant, upon making the objection, j physical or mental suffering attenlling th~
miscarriage ls a part of it, and a proper sub,
(•xpectccl to claim a recovery tor any dam. : ject tor compenRat1on. But the rule goos n'l
ages not within the Issue, and particularly further. Any Injured feelings following the!
was this true under the circumstances of miscarriage, not part ot th.e pain naturalll'J
this case, as it appears conclusively that the attending It, are too remote to be considdefendant could not have understood that it ered an element of llllmage. It the plalnwas necessary to offer any proof to meet tue tltr lamented the loss of her offspring, such
i1lalntift"s testimony; for, after the plalntiff'a grief involves too much an element of sentitestimony, above quoted, bad b('(.•n given, a ment to be left to the conjecture and caprice
question was put to another wit1wss on the of a jury. It, like ll.!.wbel, she wi:pt fpr her
same line, which was objected to, and the children. aml would not b comfor , a
eourt snit\ : "I think tbe husband Is entltle1l q es on o con mung dama_ge is nresi:u~ted,
to the wages. I guess there ls no use going ~tetoue~~d._lu' ..a.~ .JI~~
into that In this case at all." After thl11, w4!.ch...1h~w h11S~e_t,Uly_euts,:<1." The onl!
cert&lnly, the defendant's counsel could not case which
nave found which Is in Beelll·
be expected to meet such proofs as had crept Ing conflict with this 111 that of Smith v
in on this subject; and the suhseque!lt Overby, 30 Ga. 241; but the supreme court
<'barge, above quoted, was not only errone. of that state, In the later case of Railront'
ous as matter of law, but, given, as lt wrui, Co. v. Randall, 85 Ga. 2t>7, 11 S. E . i06, h
ufter the previous Intimation which cut off treating of & charge which permitted of a
proofs, on the part of the deflondant, was N'<'overy for the pain, suft'l'1;ng, or sorrow
based upon a llPCc>ssarlly l'X parte sbowln~
rt•sultlng from miscarriage, said: "We would
3. The testimony tended to show that on.\ suggPl!t thnt the word 'sorrow' be omitted
of the results of the Injury to plaintll'l was 1 from the charge of the court on the next
n miscarriage. The court eharged the jury trial. It Is most too remote to be eonsldere!j
as follows: "As to this child, It the plnlu· an element of damage, unless it Is that sor
tll'l lost a rhlld by rl•ason of the liability of row which accompnnles the actual Injury
the dl•fl'ndant in this case, you may give and ts suffered at the time of the mlsca•·
damage for it. 'l'he society, enjoyment, and rlage. The loss of the child by a mis<'arprospl'{·tlve services of the child is a recog. riage would affect women so differently tlmt
ulzPCl element In that regard, and you mny 1t would be bard for men, sitting as jurors,
~h·e what it is reasonably worth."
This to estimate it as an element of damage; and
ehargt' was dearly erroneous. There Wild, we therefore think that It would be better to
of course, no proof in the case as to the omlt in the future any lnstrnctlon to the
pro,.;pel"livc parulngs of the child. even if Ju~ jury upon the question of son·ow ns an elemotht-r would be the proper person to rl"
ment or damage. Pain and suffering giv~
cove1· for sueh loss. Nor would the loss of a wide latitude to juries, and there are very
the child's sodety be u pro1)('r elPment of few complaints made of the smallness of
damages. "While the jm·y Is allowed to con· the amounts found by juries upon these two
sider till' ease with all· its facts, 111111 to take elements of damage,"-dtlng the case ot
iuto uceouut, to1· the p111·11os1~ of compPnsa- Bovee v. Town of Danville, above cited.
tlon, not only the physic11l pain, but nl8Q See, also, 5 Am. & Eng. Bue. Law, 42.'
Numerous other questions are dlscusse1l
mental 1mffPring, in determining the awar<l
of damages, and while, of necessity, this in the briefs of counsel, but we think it unInvolves to some extent a consl<lcratlon of necessary to consider them at length. Thmm
the nature of the Injury, and cannot exclude relating to tbe expressions of pain and comfrom the consideration of the jury the fact plaints of present suffering are within the
that the physical and mentnl sul'fprlng of thn previous rulings of this court. See Glrur•J
motll('L" by reason of such an injury would v. City of Kalamazoo, 92 Mich. 610, 52 N.
lw more intense thuu In the cnse of the W. 10:!1; Lucus v. Railway Co., 92 Mich. 41:!.
onliuary fracture of a limb, yet beyond thlR 52 N. W. Hi:>, and cases cited. None of th"
otller questions are likely to arise on a Dl'\\"
it would not be comJlClt•ut for the jury rn
trial. For tbe errors pointed out, the ju1h~
1w, and to attempt to compemmte for the
l«lITow and grieving of the motlwr.
As waa ment will be reversed, with costs, and a new
1mid in Bovee v. Town of Danville, 53 Vt. trial orde1-ed.
183: "It the violence done her person result·
ed In the miscarriage, the miscarriage was a
GRANT, ;r., did not sit. 'l'he other juslegitimate result of sucb nPgllgence. Any tices concurred.
had no reason to a11prehend that the plalntll't
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v. VILLAGE OF CLINTONVILLE.

ltit)

.\IcNA\lARA v. VH.LAGE OF CLINTON-

VILLE.

(22 JS. W. 472, 6'i Wis. 207.)

Supreme Court or Wisconsin.

Feb. 3. 1885.

(22 N. W. 472, 62 Wia. W.)

Feb. 3. 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Waupaca county.

About 6 o'clock on the evening of Decem-

ber 22, 1881, the plaintiff started from a drug-

store in the village to go to his boarding-

place. In doing so, it became necessary to

cross New London street in front of the drug-

store, and go southward to, and then upon

the sidewalk on, the east side of that street.

That sidewalk crossed a ravine over a tretic-

work, and upon each side of it, and imme-

diately over the trestle-work there was a

railing. The north end of the sidewalk com-

menced about four rods north of the north

end of the trestle-work; and near the north

end the surface of the walk was about six
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inche above the surface of the ground; and

as it approached the trestle-work where the

railing began, the surface of the walk he-

came more elevated from the ground until at

a point near the north end of the trestle-

work, where it was about 30 inches above

the surface of the ground; and that is the

point where the testimony tends to show that

the piaintiff stepped or fell off the walk and

was severely injured. The night was very

dark. and the plaintiff had no light. It had

rained. The walk was about ﬁve feet and

four inches wide, and turned to the west-

ward about seven inches in nineteen feet.

There was no railing or barrier on either side

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

of this elevated walk north of the north end .

of the trestle-work. The plaintiff‘s testi-

mony tends to prove that at the time of the

injury he was walking carefully, with his

hands out before him feeling for the railings

as he approached them. The plaintif f was

familiar with the locus in quo. At the close

of the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant

moved for a nonsuit, which was denied. The

jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed his

damages at $1,350. The defendant -moved

Appeal from circuit court, Waupaca county.
About 6 o'clock on the evl'nlng or December 22, 1881, the plalnt.11T started from a drugstore In the \"lllage to go to his boardlng)llace. In doing so, It became necessarv to
(·ross x .. w Loodou street In front or the tirugstore, 1rnd go southward to, aml then upon
the sidewalk on, the east side of that strpet.
'l'hut sidewalk cro11sed a ravine O'l"er a trestlework, and upon each side or It, and Immediately oYer the trestle-work therP w1u1 a
railing. The north end of thP "ltl<'WHlk l'Offimenced about four rods north of the north
end of the tn·,.tle-work; and neal' the north
end the surface of the w11lk was ubout six
Inches above the smface or the ground ; and
JlS It appl'ouched the trestle-work where the
railing began, the surface of the wulk became more elevated from the ground until at
a point near the north eod or the trest~
work, where It was about 30 Inches 111.>ove
the surface of the ground; and that Is tile
point where the testimony tends to show that
the plalntllf stepped or fell orf the walk and
was se>erely Injured. The night was very
dark. and the plalntilT had no light. It had
rained. The walk was about tive feet and
four Inches wide, and turned to the westwnrd ahout se>en IJiches In nineteen flof't.
There was no ralllng or barrier on elthC'r side
of this t-k·rnted walk north or the north entl
of tht> trestle-work. The plalntll'f's te!'ltlmony tends to prove that at the time of the
injury he was walking carefully, with his
luuuls out l><>for<' him feeling for the railings
Jls he approached them.
The plnlutll'f wns
fnmllinr with the locus In quo. At the rlose
of the plalntltl"s testimony, the defrndant
moved for a nonsuit, which was denletl. The
jury found for the plalntl1f, and assessed his
damages at $1,350. The 1lefendant ·moved
for a new trial upon the minutes of the judge,
and the same was overn!led. From the judgment C'ntered therNn this appeal Is brought.
Finch & Barber and F. M. Gurnsey, for appellant. E. P. Smith and John F'. Burke. for
respondPnt.

for a new trial upon the minutes of the judge,

and the same was overruled. From the judg-

ment entered thereon this appeal is brought.

Finch &, Barber and F. M. Gurnsey, for ap-

pellant. E. P. Smith and John F. Burke, for

respondent.

CASSODAY, J. Upon principles too well

established by this court to require reitera-

tion, the question whether the sidewalk was

defective at the place of the injury was

for the jury, and not for the court. Kaples

v. Orth (Wis.) 21 N. W. 633: Hill v. (‘ity of

Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 246. 14 N. W. 25:

Wright v. Fort lioward, 60 Wis. 119, 18 N. W.

750; Kenworthy v. Town of Ironton, 41 Wis.

IH7; Kavanaugh v. City of Janesville. 24 Wis.

G21: Cuthbert v. City of Appleton, 2- i Wis. 383.

The same is true with respectto the plaintiffs

alleged contributory negligence. Id. Such

negligence,'vvhen not disclosed by the plain- ingly increased the damages. The jury

tii.'f's testimony, is purely a matter of defense.

Kelley v. Railway Co. (Wis.) 19 N. W. 522;

CASSODAY, J. Upon principles too well
.-stnbllt<hed by this court to require reiteration, the qtwstlon whether the sidewalk was
defecth·e at the place or the Injury was
for thP jury, arnl not for the court. Ii:aples
v. Orth (Wis.) 21 X. W. r.:t1; Hill v. ('itv of
Fond du L:H'. r.1; Wis. 2·Ui. 14 N. W. · 2":
Wright v. Fort Jlowurd, 60 Wis. 110, 18 N. W.
7:".0; Kt-nworthy ,., Town of Ironton, 41 Wis.
t>l7; Knnmaugh v. City of .TanPsvllle. 24 ·w1s.
ii21: Cuthh(•rt v. City of Appleton, 24 Wis. 383.
'fhp same Is trtH'wlth respPc tto the plalntllf'1
nllegell !'ontrllmtory negligence. Id. Such
negligence, when not dlsC'lost>d by tlw plain-

lti!I

tltr's testimony, Is purely a matter or defense.
Kelley v. Railway Co. (Wis.) 19 N. W. 52'l;
Wright v. Fort Howard, 60 Wis. 125, 18 N.
W. 750; Hoth v. Peters, 55 Wis. 405, 13 N.
W. 219; Randall v. Telegraph Co., M Wis.
147, 11 N. W. 419. Here, the court went so
far as to Indicate that the burden of proving
the absence of contrll>utory negligence wns
on the plaintiff. There ls no ground for the
defendant's exception to the submission of
these questions to the Jury, nor to the manner In which they were submitted. Exceptlon ls taken because the court refused to
charge, In effect, that during the time plain' tllf had no diploma he could not recoYer "for
1 any loss of servlc1!" which he had sustained
· as a practicing physl~lan. Under the stat~
' ute the plntntllf could not" recover compen
: satlon for 1rnl'l1 Sf'rvl<"E'S rendered during thnt
, period; nor 1·011ld he. during that period, testify as such expert. flev. Rt. § 143G. But
1 neithrr of those questions is here lnvolvf•d.
The stntutP did not undertnke to mukc the
buslnPss or SPL'Ylce unlawful, nor to prohibit or punish the reception of voluntary
paynl('nts for such sPrvlces. Lurk 'I". Ripon,
52 Wis. 201, 8 N. W. 815. The law In this
n·spect hns not been changed by the act to
, preYent quacks from d1>celvlng the people
b~· assuming a professional title.
Chapter
2GH, Laws 1881; chapter 40, Laws 1882.
loss sustained through Inability to contln11'1
a lucrative profei1slonnl practice may be con
sldered In estlmntlng such damagPs. Phillips v. Rulhrny Co., 5 C. P . Div. 280; Ehrgott '" ?tlnyor, etc., 00 N. Y. 264. 'l'ht•st!
things being so, the plalntltr was not precluded fMm recovering such damages as h~
had actually sustalnerl, even though he had
no diploma fo1· a portion of the time he was
so dlsnhled, and hPnce the Instruction wlU!
properly rejN·tt'tl. Luek v. Ripon, ;:;2 \Vis.
201, 8 N. W . 81ii.
i Exception ls taken because the court charged the jury, In elfect, that It they found ·
for the plalntllf, then no deduction should be
made from the damages sustained; by reason
ot his disability ha vlng been prolonged In
consequence of a predisposition to Inflammatory rheumatism, and because the court
refused to charge, In el'fect, that the plaintiff could not recover If the Injury was the
rPsult of the disease, and not the direct and
proximate result of the defendant's negligence. There Is no evidence that woui<l
warrant the jury In finding that the 11isPase
Interfered In the least with the plalntilT's
powers of locomotion, or In any way contributed to his stepping or falling from the
sidewalk at the time and place In question.
The jury haYe found, In effect, that there
was no negligence on the part or the plalntllf contributing to the Injury, and hence
that It was the direct and proximate result
of the defendant's negligence alo1w. Th~
presence or the disease may have aggravated and prolonged the Injury, and correspondingly Increased the damages. The jury
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were expressly authorized to include in their

verdict such increased or additional damage,

and we must assume that they did. Was

this error? Under the repeated decisions of

this court, we must answer this question in

the negative. Oliver v. La Valle, 36 Wis.

592; Stewart v. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584; Brown

v. Railway Co., 54 W15. 342, 11 N. W. 3536,

911. In one of these cases the plaintiff was

allowed to recover increased damages by

reason of an organic tendency to scrofula in

his system, and in each of the others by rea-

son of a miscarriage in consequence of the

injury. In the Brown Case the distinction

was made between actions for tort, where

the wrong-doer is held liable for all in-

juries naturally resuiting directly from the

wrongful act, though unforeseen, and ac-

tions for the breach of contract, where the
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damages are limited to such as arise nat-

urally from such breach of contract itself,

or from such breach committed under circum-

stances in the contemplation of both parties

at the time of the contract, “as in Flick v.

Wctherbee. 20 Wis. 392; Richardson v. Chy-

noweth, 26 Wis. 656; Candee v. Telegraph

Co., 34 Wis. 71; Walch v. Railway Co., 42

Wis. 23; Hill v. Chapman. 59 Wis. 218, 18

N. W. 160; Hadley v. Baxendalc, 9 Exch.

341; Hobbs v. Railroad Co., L. R. 10 Q. B.

111; Hone v. Railway Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 131;

Jones v. George, 48 Am. Dec. 280; Baglcy

v. Railroad Co., 30 Am. Law J. 490.

The rule applicable to contracts thus quot-

ed is taken from the opinion of the court in

the recent case of Hamilton v. it-Ia(;iii, L. R.

12 Ir. 202, and is there said to be a more

accurate statement than is found in Hadley

v. Baxendale. To the same effect are the

notes to that case in Shir. Lead. Cas. 227-

230, and Harvey v. Railroad Co., 124 Mass.

425. See, also, the late case of McMahon

v. Field, 7 Q. B. Div. 595, where the plain-

tiff recovered on contract for the injury to

his horses, who caught cold from unneces-

sary exposure to the weather. In that case

Hobbs v. Railway is severely criticised and

narrowly limited, if not entirely overruled.

The distinction taken in the Brown Case has

been recognized in several of the more recent

cases, and in some of them that decision is

expressly sanctioned. Railroad Co. v. Kemp,

30 Am. Law J. 92,'61 Md. 74, 619; Railroad

Co. v. Eaton, 9-1 Ind. 474; Ehrgott v. Mayor,

etc., 96 N. Y. 281; Tice v. Munn, 94 N. Y.

621; Murdock v. Railroad Co., 133 Mass.

15; Beauchamp v. Mining Co., 50 Mich. 163,

15 N. W. 65; McMahon v. Field. 7 Q. B. Div.

591; and see Mr. Irving Brown's notes, 47

Am. Rep. 381, 387; 41 Am. Rep. 53, .-' . See.

also, as bearing upon the question, Railroad '

Co. v. Staley, 1 Am. Law J. (Ohio) 136, 30

Am. Law J. 110; Lewis v. Railway Co.

(Mich.) 19 N. W. 744. In actions on con-

tracts of carriage it has often been held that

a corporation or party could not by contract

wholly exempt itself from all liability for

injury inﬂicted by its own negligence. Rich-

DIHI<X,'T AND

cu~~EQUENTIAL

were expressly authorized to Include In their
verdict such lnc1·ea>1ed or additional damages,
and we must assume that they did. Was
this error'! Untler the repeated decisions of
this court, we must answer this questlon In
the negative. Oliver v. La Valle, 36 Wis.
502; Stewart v. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584; Brown
v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N. W. 356,
011. In one of these cases the plalntllr was
allowed to recover Increased damages by
reason of an 01·ganlc tendency to scrofula In
· his system, and in each of the others by reason of a miscarriage In consequence of the
Injury. In the Brown Case the distinction
was made between actions for tort, where
· the wrong-doer ls held liable for all Injuries naturally resuttlng directly from the
wrongful act, though unforeseen, and actions for the breach of contract, where the
damages are limited to such as arise nat·urally from such breach of contract Itself,
or from such breach committed under circumstances In the contemplation of both pni·tles
at the time of the contract, "as In !<'lick v.
Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 392; Richardson v. Chynoweth, 26 Wis. 656; Candee v. Telegraph
Co., 34 Wis. 471; Walch v. Railway Co., 42
Wis. 23; Hill v. Chapman, 59 Wis. 218, 18
N. W. 100; Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.
341; Hobbs v. Railroad Co., L. R. 10 Q. B.
111; Hone v. Railway Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 131;
Jones v. George, 48 Am. Dec. 280; Bagley
v. Railroad Co., SO Am. Law J. 490.
Tbe rule applicable to contracts thus quoted Is taken from the opinion of the court In
the recent case of Hamilton v. MaGlll, L. R.
12 Ir. 202, and is there said to be a more
accurate statement than Is found In Hadley
v. Baxendale. To the same effect are the
notes to that case In Shir. Lead. Cas. 227230, and Harvey v. Railroad Co., 124 Mass.
425. See, also, the late case of McMahon
v. Field, 7 Q. B. Div. 595, where the plalntllr recovered on contract for the Injury to
his horses, who caught cold from unnecessary exposure to the weather. In that case
Hobbs v. Railway 18 severely crltldsed and
narrowly limited, If not entirely overruled.
The distinction taken In the Brown Case has
been recognized In several of the more recent
cases, and lo some of them that decll!lon Is
l'Xprcssly sanctioned. Rallrond Co. v. Kemp,
30 Am. J,aw J. 92, 61 Md. 74, G19; Rallrond
Co. v. Eaton, 94 Ind. 474; Ehrgott v. lfnyor,
etc., 96 N. Y. 281; Tice v. Munn, 94 N. Y.
H21; Murdock v. Railroad Co., 13:i Mass.
t:J: Beauchamp v. Mining Co., 50 Mkh. 16.3,
15 N. W. 65; McMahon v. Field. 7 Q. B. Dlv.
501; nnd see Mr. Irving Brown's note!'!, 47
Arn. Rep. 381, 387; 41 Am. Hep. iJ:J, r.8. ~ee.
also, as bearing upon the qm'1<tlon, H111lro111l
Co. v. Staley, 1 Am. Law J. <Ohio) 13G, 30
Am. Law J. 110; Lewis v. Hallway Co.
(Mich.) 19 N. W. 744. In actions on contracts of carriage It has often been held that
a corporation or party could not by contract
wholly exempt Itself from all llablllty for
Injury Inflicted b)' Its own negligl'ncl'. Rich0

/T

DAMAUES-1.N TOUT.

ardson v. ltallway Co. (Wis.) 21 N. W. 50;
Canfield v. Railroad Co., 45 Am. Hep. 268~
Sager v. Rnllroad Co., 50 Am. Dec. 600. · In~
such cases the damages recoverable ca·n not
be within the contemplation of the contract
for they are recovered In spite of it. In Mc
Mahon v. Flel~ one of the judges went S<> ·
far as to say that "the parties never con~
templated a breach, and the rule should
rather be that the damage recoverable ls
such as ls the natural and probable result o
the breach of contract." To the sitme elrec
ls Ehrgott v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 280. In
this New York case the court say: "When
a party commits a tort resulting In a personal Injury, he cannot foresee or contemplate the consequences of his tortlous act.
• • • A city may leave a street out or
repair, and uo one can anticipate the possible accidents which may happen, or the Injuries which may be caused. • • • Th~
true rule, broadly stated, ls that a wrong
doer ls liable for the damages which h
causes by his misconduct." 96 N. Y. 281.
"The general rule In tort," says Mr. Sutherland (3 Suth. Dnm. 714), "Is that the party
who· commits a trespass, or other wrongrul
act, Is Hable for all the direct Injury resulting from sueh act. although such resulting
Injury could not have been contemplated ns.
the probable result of the act done." This
ls expressly sanctioned In the Maryland case
cited where a cancer was the Intervening
cause. It Is a contradiction to say that parties contemplate-have Jn mind-things of
which they are suppol!ed to be unmindful.
In the case cited from Indiana the court sny
a wider range of Inquiry ls permissible In
actions for tort than for the simple breach
of a contract. See Shirley's notes, 329. In
that case the court quotes approvingly the
rule stated by Mr. Thompson, which ls substantially the same rule quoted from Addison approvingly In the Maryland case, that
"whoever does a wrongful act Is answerable
for all the consequences that may ensue In
the ordinary and natural course ot events,
though such consequence be Immediately ans
directly brought about by Intervening cans
If such lnter\'enlng causes were set In m
tlon by the original wrong-doer." Here the
action Is not on contract, but for a tort consisting of a breach of statutory duty. The
defect In the walk ls supposed to have been
known to the omeers of the munlcltlnllty.
The predisposition to Inflammatory rheumatism was an Intervening eanse, but It was
set In motion by the tortlous act complaine<l
of. It Is not likely that the om(•t>rs of the
vlllaice ll<'tnally contemplated that the lujm·y
In qut>11tlon would result from the dett>ct In
the walk. They must have known, howe\'er, thnt all classes of peoplt>, Infirm as well
as firm, tllseased as well ns healthy, were
liable to tra,·el upon the walk. l!uder ordinary circumstances the Infirm and diseased
would ha,.(' no difficulty In passing over the
walk without Incurring injury.
But the
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plaintiff, under the circumstances stated, as

found by the jury, incurred the injury with-

out any fault on his part. The mere fact

that he was more susceptible to serious re-

sults from the injury by reason of the pres-

ence of disease, did not prevent him from

rccovering the damages he had actually sus-

tained.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the
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circuit court is aﬂlrmed.

plaintiff, under the circumstances stated, as
tound by the jury, lncum,d the Injury without any fault on hls part. The mere fact
that he was more susceptible to serious results from the Injury by reason ot the pres-

171

ence of disease, did not prevent him from
rrro'l"l'rlng the damages he had actually sustained.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the
rlrrnlt court Is aftlrmed.
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WESTERN RAILWAY OF ALABAMA v.

MUTCH.

(11 South. 894; 9? Ala. 19-1.)

Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 1, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Lee county; J.

M. Carmichael, Judge.

Action by George Mutch, administrator of

James Thomas Mutch, against the Western

Railway of Alabama, to recover for the al-

leged negligent killing of his intestate by de-

fendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant

appeals. Reversed.

After the rendition of the judgment for

plaintiff, defendant moved the court for a

new trial on the following grounds: (1) Be-

cause the jury found contrary to the evidence{

(2) because the evidence did not authorize a

verdict against the defendant; (3) because

Mr. Augustus Barnes, one of plaintiff's at-
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torneys, in his argument to the jury, in

speaking of defendant's employes who were

witnesses in this case, said “that he would

not say, as a north Alabama attorney had

said, that they ‘testiﬁed with halters around

their necks;' but he would say that they tes-

tiiied with a conscious regard to their posi-

tion." The court overruled the motion for a

new trial, andthe defendant duly excepted.

On this appeal, prosecuted by the defendant,

there are many assignments of error, in

which were included the overruling of de-

fendant's motions for a new trial, but under

the opinion it is deemed unnecessary to notice

1'.

MUTCH.
(11 South. 894; 97 Ala. 194.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 1, 1892.
Appeal trom circuit court, Lee county; J.
M. Carmichael, Judge.
Action by George Mutch, administrator ot
James Thomas Mutch, against the Western
Hallway of Alnb:una, to recover tor the al·
leged negligent killing of bis Intestate by defendant. Judgment tor plaintltr. Defendant
appeals. Reversed.
After the rendition of the judgment tor
plalutl!r, defendant moved the court for a
new trial on the following grounds: (1) Because the jury found contrary to the evidence;
(2) because the evidence did not authorize a
verdict against the defendant; (3) because
~Ir. Augustus Barnes, one of plalntltr's attorneys, In his argument tr- the jury, In
speaking of defendant's employee who were
witn~sses In this case, said "that he would
not say, as a north Alabama attorney had
said, that they 'testified with halters around
their neck~;· but he would say that they testified with a conscious regard to their position." The court overruled the motion for a
new trlnl, and ·the def(•ndant duly excepted.
On this appeal, prosecuted by the defendant,
there are many assignments of error, In
which were Included the overruling of defendant's motions for a new trial, but under
the opinion It ls deemed unnecessary to notice
them In detail.
· Geo. P. Harrison and R. F. I,lgon, J'r., for
appellant. A. & R. B. Barnes, W. J. Samford,
and J. M. Chilton, for appellee.

them in detail.

' Geo. P. Harrison and R. F. Ligon, Jr.. for

appellant. A. 8; R. B. Barnes. W. J. Samford,

and J. M. Chilton, for appeilee.

STONE, C. J. The plaintiff, George Mutch,

was a resident of Opeiika. His son, James

Mutch, was 9% years old, well grown and de-

veloped for his age, and, in intelligence and

brightness, was above the average of boys

of his age. He went at large without being

attended by a nurse or protector, and was at-

tending school. The Western Railway of Ala-

bama runs through Opellka, and has a sta-

tion and depot in that city or town. There

was an ordinance of force in Opelika which

made it unlawful to run a train of cars with-

in the corporate limits at a higher rate of

speed than four miles an hour, and imposing

a penalty for its violation. A freight train

of the railroad was coming into Opelika on

an afternoon in March, 1889. It had box

cars, and attached to the side of one of them

was a ladder, placed there to enable brake-

men to reach the 0op of the car. The little

boy, James, having placed himself at the side

of the track, attempted to seize the ladder as

it passed him, that he might climb up on it,

and thus enjoy a ride. He did succeed in

catching a round of the ladder, but, in at-

tempting to ascend, he missed his footing, fell

under the train, and was so injured and

crushed that he died of the wounds. Up to

this point there is no coniiict or uncertainty

in the testimony. The present suit was

brought against the railroad, and seeks to re

STONE, G. J. The plalntltr, George Mutch,
was a resident of Opelika. His son, James
Muteh, was 9'1! yent'S old, well grown nnd developed for his age, nnd, In Intelligence and
brightness, was above the average of boys
of his age. He went at large without being
attended by a muse or protector, and wns attending school. The Western ltallway of Alabama nms through Opellkn, and has a station and depot in that city or town. There
wns an ordinance of force In Opelika which
made It unlawful to run a train of cars within the corporate limits at a higher rate of
speed than four miles an hour, and Imposing
a penalty for Its violation. A freight train
of the railroad was coming Into Opelika on
an afternoon In ~fnrch, '\889. It had box
cars, and attached to the side of one of them
wns a ladder, placed there to enable brak&men to reach the top ot the car. The little
boy, James, having placed himself at the side
or the track, attempted to seize the ladder as
It passed blm, that be might climb up on tt,
and thus enjoy a ride. He did succeed In
catching a round of the ladder, but, In attempting to ascend, be missed hl.s footing, tell
under the train, and was so injured and
cmshed thnt be died of the wounds. Up to
this point there ls no conflict or uncet·talnty

in the testimony. The p1·escnt suit w~s
brought against the railroad, and seeks to re
cover damages from It for this alleged negll
gent kllllng ot plalntUf's Intestate. The n
llgence charged (and there ls no other pr tended, or attempted to be shown) ls that the
train was being moved at a greater rate of
speed than four miles an hour. Some of
plalntll'f's witnesses testified that lt was moving at the rate of six or seven miles an hour.
On the other band, defendant's witnesses
placed the speed, some as low as three, and
none above four, miles nn hour. This was
not the first time Intestate had attempted to
spring on moving trains, and be bad been
more than once cautioned against such attemptB. Assuming that the speed of the
train was In e.xcess of four miles an hour,
was there a caueal connection between such
breach of duty on the part of the railroad
company and the Injury done to plnlntUl'.'s
lntestnte?
•
Persons who perpetrate torts are, as a rule.
responsible, lllld only responsible, for the
proximate consequences of the wronga they
commit. In other words, unleea the tort ~
the proximate cause of the Injury complained
of. there ls no legal accountability. In that
able and valmtble work, 16 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 4;-s6, is this lan~ge: "A. 'proximate~
cause' may be de.flned as that cause which I
natural nnd continuous seauence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, producing
the result complained ot, and without wblch
that result would not bave occurred; and it
ls laid down In many cases, and by leading
text writers, that, In order to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act not amounting
to wanton wrong, 18 the proximate cause of
an Injury, It must appeer that the Injury was
the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence or wrongful act, and that It was
such as might or ought to have been foreseen,
In the light of the attending circumstances."
On po.ge 431 or the same volume It ls eald:
"To coustltute actionable negligence, there _
m11st be not only a causal connection between
the negligence complained of and the Injury
sulrered, but the connection must be by a
nntural and unbroken seQUenc-e, without Intervening ettlclent causes; so tllat, but for
the negligence of the defendant. the Injury
would not hnve occurred. It must not only
be a cause, but It must be the proxlmatethat Is, the direct and Immediate, efficlentcause of the Injury." That philosophic law
writer Dr. Wharton, (I..aw of Negligence, I
715,) expresses the principle as follows: "If
the consequence fiows from any particular
negligence, according to ordinary natural sequence, without the Intervention of any human agency, then such sequence, whether
foreseen as probable, or unforeseen, ls imputable to the negligence." Quoting from
Chief Baron Pollock with apparent approval,
he (In section 78) snys: "I entertain consld·
ernble doubt whether a person who hns been
guilty ot negligen~ is responsible for all the
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consequences which may under any circum-

stances arise, and in respect of mischief

which could by no possibility have been fore-

seen, and which no reasonable person could

have anticipated. I am inclined to consider

the rule of law to be this: That a person is

expected to anticipate and guard against all

reasonable consequences, but that he is not

by the law of England expected to anticipate

and guard against that which no reasonable

man would expect to occur." In the same

ection he quotes approvingly the following

language from Lord Campbell: “If the

wrong and the legal damage are not known

by common experience to be usually in se-

quence, and the damage does not, according

to the ordinary course of events, follow from

the wrong, the wrong and the damage are

not sufﬂciently conjoined or concatenated, as
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cause and effect, to support an action." In

Shearman & Redﬂeid's Mw of Negligence

(section 26) the principle is thus stated: “The

proximate cause of an event must be under-

stood to be that which, in a natural and con-

tinuous sequence, unbroken by any new

cause, produces that event, and without

hich that event would not have occurred."

The authorities from which we have quoted

are everywhere regarded as standard. What

they assert is but the condensation of the ut-

terances of a very great number of the high-

est judicial tribunals, wherever the principles

of the common law prevail. See 16 Am. &

Eng. Enc. Law, 428, 429; Railway Co. v.

Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; Herring v. Skaggs, 62

Ala. 180; Daughtery v. Telegraph Co., 7 5 Ala.

168. Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. (N. S.) 29, 41

E. C. L. 422, is the strongest of the cases re-

lied on in support of the present action. The

injury in that case occurred in a city. The

headnote contains a summation of the facts

as follows: “Defendant (a cart man) negli-

gently left his horse and cart unattended in

the street. Plaintiff, a child seven years old,

got upon the cart in play. Another child in-

cautiously led the horse on, and plaintiff was

thereby thrown down, and hurt." It was held

that the action was maintainable for the re-

covery of damages, “and that it was properly

left to the jury whether defendant's conduct

was negligent, and the negligence caused the

injury." In delivering his opinion, Lord

Denman used the following language: “If I

am guilty of negligence in leaving anything

dangerous in a place where I know it to be ex-

tremely probable that some other person will

unjustitiably set it in motion, to the injury of a

third, and if that injm-y should be so brought

about, I presume that the suilerer might have

r0(ir€'SS by action against both or either of

the two, but unquestionably against the ﬁrst.

' ' ' Can the plaintiff, then, consistently

with the authorities, maintain his action,

having been at least equally in fault? The

answer is that, supposing that fact ascertain-

ed by the jury. but to this extent: that he

merely indulged the natural instinct of a

child in amus.-ing himself with the empty cart

COD8equences which may under any clrcum· ' and deserted horse, then we think that the
stancee arlae, and In respect of mischief defendant cannot be permitted to avail him·
which coold by no posalblllty have been fore- self of that fact. The most blamable careseen, and which no rellllODllble person could le88nese of his servant having tempted the
have anticipated. I am Inclined to consider child, he ought not to reproach the child with
the rule of law to be this: That a person ls yielding to that temptation." Reading the
xpected to anticipate and guard against all case of Lynch v. Nurdin in the light shed upeasonable consequences, but that be Is not cn It by Lord Denman's rea110nlng, no one
by the law of England expected to anticipate <'8.D fail to note the marked difference between
and guard against that which no reasonable that case and the one we have In baud. '.fhe
:nan would expect to occur." In the same argument by which the learned lord cbief
ectlon be quotes approvingly the following 'ustlce supported the 'udgment he announced
language from Lord Campbell: "If the hwr no application to the present one. That
wrong and the legal damage are not known case was manifestly decided on the wellby common experience to be usually In se- recognized principle that If one leave dangerquence, and the damage doea not, according ous machinery, or any other thlng of similar
to the ordinary course of events, follow from nature, unattended, and In an exposed place,
the wrong, the wrong and the damage are and another be Injured thereby, an action on
not sufficiently conjoined or concatenated, as the Ct\se may be malntalned for such Injury,
camie and effect, to support an action." In unless plaintiff was guilty of contributory
Shearman & Redfteld's Law of Negligence negligence. Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. Div.
32i; Kunz v. Clty of Troy (N. Y. App.) 10 N.
(section 26) the principle 11 thus stated: "The
roxlmnte cause of an event must be under- E. 442; Stout v. Railroad Oo., 2 Dill. 294,
tood to be that which, In a natural and con- Fed. Cns. No. 13,504; Beach, Contrlb. Neg.
nuoua aequence, unbroken by any new H 140, 206. Infants of tender years, and1
ause, produces that event, and without wnntlng In discretion, are not amenable to
hlcb that event would not have occurred." the disabling effects of contributory negll
he authorities from which we have quoted gence. In the oplnlon of the court ln the cnt1e
nre everywhere regarded as standard. What of Lynch v. Nurdln the causal connection bethey assert ls but the condensation of the ut- tween the negllgence and the Injury was so
terances of a very great number of the high- direct and pa.tent that the driver, exercising
est judicial trlbmials, wherever the principles ordinary care and prudence, sbould hnve anof the common law prevail. See 16 Am. & ticipated and guarded against It. The lm}lll·
Eng. Enc. Law, 428, 429; Railway Co. v. cation from Lord Dewnan's language ls very
Kellogg, 94 U. S. 400; Herring v. Skaggs, G2 stt"oog that he regarded the cart man's con·
Ala. 180; Daughtery v. Telegraph Co., 7G Aln. duct as groesly ~gllgent. Contributory neg168. Lynch v. Nurdln, 1 Q. B. (N. S.) 29, 41 ligence Is no defense to Injuries which result
E. C. I ... 422, ls the strongest of the cases re- trom gross negligence. But the principle delied on In support of the present action. The clared ln Lynch v. Nurdln Wilt!, If not mateInjury In that case occurred In a city. The rially shaken, at least shown to be Inapplicaheadnote contains a summation of the facts ble to a case like the present one, In the two
as follows: "Defendant (a cart man) negli- later English casee of Hughes v. Yac11.e, 2
gently left his horse and cart unattended In Hurl. & <'. 744, and Mangan v. Atterton, L. R.
the street. Plaintiff, a child seven years old, 1 Exch. 2:19. See, nlso, l\lcAlpln v. Powell,
got upon tbe cart In play. Another child In- 70 N. Y. 12tl; Wendell v. Railroad Co., 91 N.
cautiously led the horse on, and plaintiff was Y. 420; Rnllroad Co. v. Bell, 81 Ill. 76. The
thereby thrown down, and hurt." It was held case or ~IeMsenger v. Dennie, 137 Mass. 197,
that the action was maintainable for the re- ls a stt·oug authority against the right to
covery ot damages, "and thnt It was properly maintain the present action. Anotber case
Iett to the jm·y whether defendant's conduct 1·elle<l on in support or the present actlo.n ls
was negligent, and the negllg~nce caused the Hallroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401. That
injury." In dellnrlng hls opinion, Lo1·d case Is wholly unlike the present one, and
Denman used the following language: "If I rests on a different p1·inclple. The neglinm guilty of negligence In leaving anything gence of defendant's agent was manifest, and
dangerous in a place where I know It to be ex- the Injury was the llllturnl consequence or
tremely probable that some other pet"l;Oll will tbe negligence. Had the tlrlver been looking
unjustifiably set It In motion, to the injury of n nbead, as be sbould have been, be would
third, and If that Injury should he so brought have seen the child's danger, nnd could and
about, I presume that the s11tTere1· might have would have stopped his car before bis horses
redre88 by action ngnlnst botJ1 or either ot did the injury. The causal connection In
the two, but unquestionably ngnlnst the ftrst. thnt cnse was complete, because the injury
• • • can the plalnt!IT, then, consistently resulted so naturally ~rom the dliver's lnntwith the authorities, maintain his nctlon, tention that the law regards It as the p1·obnhaving been at least equally In fault? The ble com;equence of bis negligence. None of
answer ls thnt, supposing that tact ascertain- the cnses cited support the contention of aped by the jury. but to tlils extent: that be pellee.
merely Indulged the natural Instinct ot a
The ordlwrnce ot Opelika, rl'!.'ll'lctlng the
d1ild In nllltu:ing h:.;nsclf with the empty cnrt speed of trains within the corporate limits to

~

~

174
174

DIRECT AND CONb‘.EQUEN'i'IAL DAMAGES-—IN TORT.

four miles an hour, had one purpose,—one pol-

icy. Opelika is a town probably of four or

more thousand inhabitants. The railroad

antedated the town, and caused its location

there. It runs centrally through the busi-

ness portions of the place. In such condi-

tions, men pursuing business avocations, as

well as idlers and curiosity seekers, will con--

gregate about the depot and track of the rail-

road, and will be constantly crossing, if not

standing on, the track. They do both.

Knowing this habit of men, most towns

located on railroads have ordinances requir-

ing trains passing through them to move at a

low rate of speed. Why? Not because they

apprehend that reckless persons will at-

tempt to board the train while in motion.

The wildest conjecture would scarcely take

in an adventure so fraught with peril. The
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policy was to enable persons who might be

standing on the track, or whose business pur-

suits required them to cross it, to get off the

track, and thus escape the danger of a col-

lision. The ordinance had no other aim.

\We hold as matter of law that there was

no proof whatever in this case tending to

show a causal connection between the negli-

gence charged and the injury suffered. To

illustrate our views: Let us suppose that

the negligence charged against the railroad

company had been, not the too rapid move-

ment of the train, but some imperfection, de-

cay, or derangement of the ascending ladda

which caused plaintiff's intestate to fall and

lose his life. Would any one contend the

railroad company would be liable for such

accident? And is there a difference in prin-

ciple between the case supposed and the one

we have in hand? Charge No. 21, the gen-

eral charge in favor of the defendant, ought

to have been given. The great English com-

mentator sald, "Law is the perfection of hu-

man reason." This, in a sense, is true. It

is the expression of the combined wisdom of

the legislative body. Itis the creature, how-

ever, of human thought, and nothing human

is perfect. Nor is it true that legislative

policy is unchanging. Conditions change,

and the law which should adapt itself to hu-

man wants must change with them. Still,

while the law stands on the statute book, it

should be obeyed and conformed to as a rule

of action. If we cut loose from its restraints.

we expose ourselves to the tempests of hu-

man passion and human prejudice, and, like

a ship at sea without rudder or compass, will

surely be dashed on some of the many

shoals which are found all along the voyage

of life.

Trial by jury is a bulwark of American, as

it has long been of English, freedom. It

wisely divides the responsibility of determi-

native adjudication, of punitive administra-

tion, between the judge, trained in the wis-

dom and intricacies of the law, and 12 men

chosen from the common walks of nonprofes-

sional life; chosen for their sound judgment

and stern impartiality. The one declares the

DIHECT AND CON:SEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TOR'r.

folµ' miles an hour, had one purpose,--0ne policy. Opelika Is a town probably of four or
more thousand Inhabitants. The railroad
nntedated the town, and caused Its location
there. It runs centrally through the business portions ot the place. In such conditions, men pursuing business avocations, as
well as Idlers and curiosity seekers, wlll con-'
gregate about the depot and track ot the railroad, and wlll be constantly crossing, It not
standing on, the track. They do both.
Knowing this habit ot men, most towns
located on railroads have ordinances requit·lng trains passing through them to move at a
low rate ot speed. Why? Not because they
apprehend that reckless persons wlll attempt to board the train whlle In motion.
The wildest conjecture w1>uld scarcely take
In an adventure so fraught with peril. The
policy was to enable persons who might be
standing on the track, or whose business pursuits required them to cross It, to get olr the
track, and thus escape the danger ot a collision. The ordinance had n1> other aim.
~We hold as matter of law that there was
no proof whatever in this case tending to
sh1>w a causal oonnectlon between the negligence charged and the Injury sulrered. To
Illustrate our views: Let us suppose that
the negligence charged against the railroad
company had been, not the too rapid m1>vement ot the train, but some Imperfection, decay, or derangement ot the ascending ladder
which en.used plaintiff's Intestate to fall and
lose his life. Would any one contend the
railroad company would be liable for such
11ccldent? And ls there a dltrerence In principle between the case supposed and the one
we have in hand? Charge No. 21, the general charge In favor of the defendant, ought
to have been given. The great English commentator said, "Le.w ls the perfection ot human reason." This, In a sense, Is true. It
Is the expn'Sslon of the combined wisdom ot
the leg Isla tive body. It . Is the creature, h1>wever, of human thought, and nothing human
Is perfect. Nor ls It true that legislative
policy ls unchanging. Conditions change,
and the law which should adapt Itself to human wants must change with them. Still,
while the law stands on the statute book, It

I

should be obeyed and conformed to as a rule

ot action. It we cut loose from Its restraint!!,
we expose ourselves to the tempests ot human passion and human prejudice. and, .like
a ship at sea without rudder or compass, wlll
surely be dashed OD aome ot the many
shoals which are round all along the voyage
ot life.
Trial by jury Is a bulwark ot American, as
It has long been of English, freedom. It
wisely divides the responslbllity ot detel'Hli·
native adjudication, ot punitive admlnlstrotion, between the judge, trained in the wisdom and lntrlcacles of the law, and 12 men
chosen from the common walks ot n1>nprofesslonal lite; chosen for their sound judgment
and stern lmpal'tlallty. The one declares the
rules ot law applicable to the leeue or Issues
formed, In the light ot the testimony adduced; the other weighs the testimony, dete1·mines what facts It proves, and, molded
by the law as declared by the court, renders
its verdict. In the jury box, and under tlw
oath the jurors have solemnly sworn on the
holy evangelists of Almighty God, there Is
no room tor friendship, partiality, or prejudice; no permissible discrimination between
friends and enemies, between the rich and
the poor, between corporations and natural
persons. The ancients painted the Goodess
of Justice as blindfolded, and jurors must
be blind to the personal consequences ot
the verdicts they render. It the testimony convinces their judgments 1>f the existence of certain facts, they must be blind to
the conseQuences which result from those
facts. A wish that It were otherwise furnishes no excuse for deciding against their
convictions. Justice thus administered commands the apprnbation ot heaven and earth
alike; and a verdict thus rendered meets all
the requirements ot the juror's oo.th, In the
fullest sense of the word,-a true expression
of the convictions fixed on the minds of the
jury by the testimony. Independent of tlw
legal question considered above, and which
we have declared to be determinative of this
case, the verdict 1>t the jury was so palpably ngninst the evidence that a new trial
ought to have been granted OD that account.
Reversed and remanded.
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CHAMBERLAIN v. CITY OF OSHKO .

(54 N. W. 618, 84 Wis. 289.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Feb. 21, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court. Winnebago

county; George W. Burnell, Judge.

Action by Anna Chamberlain against the

city of Oshkosh to recover for personal in-

juries caused by defendant's alleged negli-

gence. From a judgment for plaintiff, and

an order denying a new trial, defendant ap-

CHAMBERLAIN Y. CITY OF OSHK.Og[_
(M N. W. 618, M Wia. 289.)
Supreme Court of Wleconain. Feb. 21, 1893.
Appeal from clrcult court, Winnebago
county; George W. Burnell, Judge.
Actlon by Anna Chamberlaln agalnst the
dty ot Oshkosh to recover for personal injuries caUBed by defendant's alleged negll·
gence. From a judement tor plalntllr, and
an order denying a new trial. defendant ·appeals. Reversed.
H. I. Weed, for appellant.

peals. Reversed.

H. I. Weed, for appellant.

Finch & Barber, for respondent.

For an ordinary, general, and transient

slipperiness, due to the ordinary action of

the elements only, and capable of being

removed by such ordinary action of the ele-

ments, there is no liability, but for a local,

unusual, and permanent slipperiness, caused

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:10 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

by a defect in the street, and which the ordi-

nary action of the elements would not re-

move, the city is liable. Cook v. City of

Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 270, 27 Wis. 191; Per-

kins v. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 435;

Hill v. City of Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242, 14

N. W. Rep. 25; Stilling v. Town of Thorp,

54 Wis. 528, 11 N. W. Rep. 906; Grossenbach

v. City of Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31, 26 N. W.

Rep. 182; Paulson v. Town of Pelican, 79

\Vis. 445, 48 N. W. Rep. 715; McDonald v.

City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 251, 47 N. W. Rep.

434; Cromarty v. City of Boston, 127 Mass.

329; Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 105 N. Y.

2%, 11 N. E. Rep. 642; Todd v. City of Troy,

61 N. Y. 506; Pomfrey v. Village of Sara-

toga Springs, 104 N. Y. 459, 11 N. E. Rep.

43; Kinney v. City of Troy, 108 N. Y. 567,

15 N. E. Rep. 728; Kenney v. City of Cohoes,

(N. Y. App.) 3 N. E. Rep. 189; Speilman v.

Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443;

Keith v. City of Brockton, 136 Mass. 119:

Cloughessey v. City of Waterbury, 51 Conn.

405; Congdon v. City of Norwich, 37 Conn.

414; Burr v. Town of Plymouth, 48 Conn.

460; Landolt v. City of Norwich, 37 Cont.

615; Dooley v. City of Meriden, 44 Conn. 117;

Hubbard v. City of Concord, 35 N. H. 52;

Darling v. Town of Westmoreland, 52 N. H.

401; Clark v. City of Chicago, 4 Biss. 486:

Mosey v. City of Troy, 61 Barb. 580; Mayor,

etc., v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; City of Provi-

dence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Evans v. City

of Utica, 69 N. Y. 166; Darling v. Mayor.

etc., 18 Hun, 340; Evers v. Bridge Co., Id.

144; Blakeley v. City of Troy, Id. 167; Thoma|t

v. Mayor, etc., 28 Hun, 110. In all these

cases the test of liability is whether the

city is responsible for the slipperiness, either

in its formation by a structural defect in

the sidewalk, or by allowing it to remain

too long after it is formed. Smooth and

level ice may be dangerous as well as rough

ice, and the question simply is, was any

negligence of the city the cause of its forma-

tion or retention? The following cases are

a direct authority on this point: Cromarty

v. City of Boston, 127 Mass. 329; Spellman

v. Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443;

Finch & Barber, tor respondent.
For nn ordinary, general, and transient
slipperiness, due to the ordinary action of
the elements only, and capable of belng
removed by such ordinary action ot the elemen ts, there Is no llablllty, but tor a local,
unusual, and permanent sllpperlness, caused
by a detect in the street. and which the ordl·
nary action of the elements would not remove, the city ls Hable. Oook v. City of
Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 270, 27 Wis. 191; Perkln8 v. City ot Fond du Lac, M Wls. 435;
Hill v. City of Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242, 14
N. W. Rep. 25; Stilling v. Town of Thorp,
54 Wl.s. 528, 11 N. W. Rep. 006; Grossenbnch
v. City of Milwaukee, 65 Wls. 31, 26 N. W.
Rep. 182; Paulson v. Town of Pelican. 79
Wis. 44.5, 48 N. W. Rep. 715; McDonald v.
City ot Ashland, 78 Wis. 251, 47 N. W. Rep.
434; Cromarty v. City ot Boston, 127 Mnss.
329; Taylor v. Olty ot Yonkers, 105 N. Y.
202, 11 N. E. Rep. 642; Todd v. City ot Troy,
01 N. Y. 506; Pomfrey v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 104 N. Y. 459, 11 N. E . Rep.
4.'J; Kinney v. City of Troy, 108 N. Y. 567,
15 N. E. ltep. 728; Kenney v. City of Cohoes,
(N. Y. App.) 3 N. E. Rep. 189; Spellman v.
Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443;
Keith v. City of Brockton, 136 !\IruJS. 119;
ClougheBBey v. City of Waterbury, 51 Conn.
405; Congdon v. City of Norwich, 37 Conn.
414; Burr v. Town of Plymouth, 48 Conn.
4GO; Lan11olt v. City ot Norwich, 37 Coli!..
615; Dooley v. City ot Meriden, 44 Conn. 117;
Hubbard v. City ot Concord, 35 N. H. 52;
Darling v. Town ot Westmoreland, 52 N. H.
401; Clnrk v. City of Chlcngo, 4 Biss. 481i;
l\Iosey v. City ot Troy, 61 Barb. 580; Mayor,
etc., v. Marriott, 9 Md. 100; City of Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Evans v. City
of Utica, 69 N. Y. 166; Darling v. Mayor,
etc., 18 Hun, MO; Evers v. Bridge Co., Ill.
144; Blakeley v. City of Troy, Id. 107; Thomu:i
v. Mayor, etc., 28 Hun, 110. In all these
. cases the test ot llnblllty ls whether the
city ls responsible for the sllpperlness, either
in its formation by a structural detect in
the sidewalk, or by allowing lt to remain
too long after it la formed. Smooth and
level lee may be dangerous as well as rough
Ice, and the question simply Is, was any
ne1tllgence of the city the cause of Its formn·
tlou or retention? The following cases are
a lllrN't authority on this point: Cromarty

li5

v. City ot Boston, 127 Mass. 329; Spellman
v. Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 M888. 443;
Cloughessey v. City ot Waterbury, 51 Conn.
405; Paulson T. Town of Pelican, 79 Wis. 445,
48 N. W. Rep. 715. It the condltlon ls artlfi·
cl.al. instead ot natmil, and ls caused by th~
JJ.qligence of_ the cltz, the cl,!l Is J.IWllA.
The case ofSPellman v. Inhabitants ot Chic·
opee, supra, ls almost identical in the tacts
with the case at bar.

•

ORTON. 1. This action Is to recover damages for a personal injury to the plaintiff, occasioned by the want ot repair nnd ddectlve
condition ot a walk in Merritt street, in the
city ot Oshkosh. The defect ls thus descrlb -d
in the complaint: "The said street, known "B
'Merritt Street,' at a certa!n place h s Id
street to wit, on the south side of said Mer. ltt
street, on the southeast corner thereof whe a
said Merritt street intersects with Ford str et
of said city, was, (on the 21st day of Febru·
ary, 1889,) and for a period ot four wee'•s or
more had been, unsafe, lnsufficl n'. defective,
and badly out ot repair, in this, to wit, that nt
the point of junction between tl·e stone crossing on the south s'de of said M ·rritt str rt,
where said Merritt street intersects wilh
Ford street, and the sidewalk on the south
slde ot said Merritt street, where said st ine
croBBlng ends, the nuthorlU-s of the 'lty or
Oshkosh, to wit, this defendant, negllg ntly
permitted a. large hole to exist w.t:1ln the
usu:il rne ar.d course ot travel ovPr said st" e
crossing and sldew 11.k. and ne::-llge:ltly p ·rmltted and allowed said hole to l'x·s· an I remain without placlng anY guard over or
around the same, and negli-;e... tlv al'ow<d
said hole to become tilled with wat ·f. and t >
become frozen over with a large surf ice of
smooth Ice, and negligently failed to pl ice
any protection, guard, or cover over or around
salrl surface of Ice, ard tnlled to take an'· pri!caution to prevent or w rn to avelers Ovt!r ,;;I l
crossing or sidewalk from walkin!t upon nrd
over said surface of lee. Tlwt persons trav·
ellng over and upon said crossing and sidewalk were compelled to walk upon and over
said surtnce of Ice, and that the aforesaid ,
city authorities, to wit, the defendant, neg·
llgently talled to provide a safe and sutftclent
crossing or passage over or around said large
b'Urtace of smooth lee." The p·a ntl!'!'s i'ljury, and the mnnner of It, are substnntlnlly
described as follows: The plalntltr, w' Ile
traveling upon said Merritt str et and ov r
the said stone cros 1ng, ''did by necesslt)' a i ·I
in the ordinary course of travel. wall< u ,, n
and over &'lid large surface of lee, and w11· ·out any fault on her part Rhe fell upo 1 s · ·<l
sur·nc£> of Ice with Jn"e it 1orce," ar.d ece·v '<i
great bodily Injuries therefrom. ArtPr the
plnlntltr was sworn as a wltn· ss in her own
behalf, the defenifnnt city lnterpose1l a demurrer ore tenus on he ground hat the complaint did not state a cause of acfon. nnd tJ·e
objection to any evidence un ·'er It was overruled, and ex. e,..lon t.1b.en. The plnlntl!'! te;..

•
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tiﬁ d that when she came to that point “hrr

feet came from under her, and she came

down on her back. She did not notice any

barriers or guards around this place, or any

ashes upon the sidewalk where she slipped."

According to the evidence, the depression in

the street, where the water had accumulated

which made the ice on which the plaintiff

slipped down and was injured, was made by

the junction of a sidewalk coming down

Ford street with the stone cross walk over

Merritt street. It‘ would seem that the slight

difference of the grade of the two streets

made the depression. The slopé of the plank

sidewalk down to its junction with the stone

cross walk was only four inches, and the de-

pre.<slon in the stone or. ss walk where the ice

accumulated was from an inch to an inch anl

a half. The plank walk was over the gutter
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on Merritt street . This defect, it any, ap-

pears to have been in the plan of the wo|k

and its construction. At the (onC1n ion of the

testimony the defendant's motion for a non-

suit was overruled. The jury found a special

verdict “that the cross walk was in a defect-

ive and dangerous condition," and “that such

condition caused the plaintiff's i jury," and

assessed her damages at $1,1(l0.1it will be

observed that the complaint does 1ot charge

that the plaintiff's injury was Oil.ns(d by a

hole or depression in the cross walk, but that

it was caused wholly by the- smooth surface

of the i e at that place, and such was th,

erid me. The plaintiff slip ed and ftll on the

smooth surface of the ice.‘ The ice was the

proximate cause of the injury.\ The depres-

sion in the walk where the _ice formed, it a

defect, and a cause of the injury in any sen=e

was a remote, and not the proximate, cause

of the injury. But at this time there was n)

hole, or even depression, at that place. It

was ﬁlled up by the ice. It is too plain for

argument that the cause of the pla‘ntiff‘s

injury, both by the comp‘aint and test rony,

was t e smooth smfIce of the ice on the (re s

walk._ The special verdict is careful not to

state the defect or dangerous condition. It

will be observed, also, thtt the neglirenre

of the city consists, "in failing to provide a

safe crossing or passage over and around sail

large surface of smooth ice. and allowal..and

permitted said crossing to remain in such in-

suﬂit-lent, unsafe, and defective conditl nfor

a p. riod of four weeks, and fa'led to take any

precaution to prevent or warn travelers over

said crossing or sidewalk from walking upon

and orersaid surface of ice." The existence

and continuance of said ice for four w(?‘.‘ks

was the presumptive notice to the city of tie

nmr-:cT AND

tifi d that whrn llhe came to that point "brr
feet came from under her, and she came
do,,·u on her bnck. She did not notice any
barriers or guards around this place, or any
IU!hes upon the sidewalk where she slipped."
According to the evidence, the depression In
the s'.rcet, where the water had accumulated
which made the ice on which the plnlntllT
slipped down and wns injured, was made by
the junction of a sidewalk coming down
Ford strl'et with the stone cross walk over
Menitt street. It' would seem that the sllg:;t
difference of the grade of the two streets
mnde the depression. '1'he slop~ of the plank
sidewnlk down to its junction with the stone
cross walk was only four inches, and the depre.-ston In the ston~ er.· ss walk where the lee
nccumulated was from an Inell to an inch anl
a half. The plank walk wns over th:! gutter
on Jlerrltt street. This defect, if any, appenrs to have been tn the plan of the wo1k
and Its construction. At the conclu Ion of the
testimouy the defendant's motion for a nonBUit was overruled. The jury found a special
verdict "that the cross walk was In a defective and dangerous l!Onditlon," and "that such
comllflon ca.used the plaintitr's ~ury," and
assessed her damages at $1,100. It will be
ohservPd that the complaint does ot charge
that the plaintUT's injury was cnm;rd by a
h '.Jle or depression in the rross walk, but that
it was cnused wholly by the- smooth surface
of the l~ at thnt plncP, and such wa3 th">
eYid nee. ) The plalntitr sllpr·d and ft ll on the
smooth surfnce ot the Ice.·. The Ice was the
pr-Jxlmnte cause of the injury.\ The drpresston lo the walk where the! ice 'tormed, If n.
defect, and a cause of the injury In any rnn' e.
was a remote, and not the proximate, can-;e
of tlle injury. But at this time there wns n >
hole, or even depression, 1 at that p!ac::>. It
wns filled up by the ice. .·It ls too plain for
argum('nt that the caus~. ot the pln'ntitr's
injury, both by the <'Omp'alnt and.tes'l iony,
was tbe smooth sm t: ce of the ice on the < ro 11
walk.' The special verdlct ls carel'ul not to
stnt,• the defrct or d.mi::<>rous condition. It
will be observed, nlso, th tt the ne;;ll ~eme
of the cit.v con!'ists "in falling to provid ~ a
safe crossing or passage over nn·l nround !'all
large sm·face of smooth tee. nnd nllow~<l .anll
permitted s:11tl crossing to remnin in sueh lnsum<'l!'nt, unsafe, and defe::tlve roudlti. n for
a p rlod ot tour weeks, and fa' led to take any
prt·cautlon to prevent or warn travelers ov!'r
said crossin~ or sidewnlk from walking upon
and 01·er said surface of lee." The existenc~·
and contlnunnce of said le ~ for tour w ePks
wns the prPsumptive qottce to the city of t!·e
defect complalnt>d or. : The plnlntltr does not
complain of being- inJttr<d by the hole or depressl.on, but by the "large sunace of smooth
lee." 'The dep:-eso;ion was the CfiUS!! of t 11e
water uccnmnlatiug ·there, nnd the wnkr,
combin,·d ~1th a low temperature, caused the
lee to form whl<'h injured the plnlntltT. The
d<•111·t•s<ion was a remot ) ca us~ er Cat'.S ) of
<'nil~• s. The proximate or direct cau'e w11s

defect complained of. j The plaintit‘f does not

complain of being injurcd by the hole or de-

pression, but by the “large surface of smooth

ice." 1The depression was the cause of the

water acctunuiating' there, and the water,

combined with a low temperature, caused the

ice to form which injured the pinintiff. The

depression was a rcmot: cause cr cars} of

t-{lnsis. The proximate or direct cause was

CON~EQUENTIA.L
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DAMAGES-IN TORT.

the lee, and this must be. the cau;;e of ac11on.
"Causa proxlma, non remotn, spectatur,"-the
proximate, a.nd not the remote, cause, must be
considered. The cause nearest in order of
causation, which Is adequate to produce the
result, is the direct cause. In law, only the
direct ra.use Is considered. These are. familiar maxims."/ "The proximate enuse Is the
cause which leMs to, and ts Instrumental in
producing, the result.'~ 3 Amer. & Eng. Eno.
Law. 45; State v. Rabrond Co., 52 X. H. l:i28.
Jn this case the hole or depression is not th ·
cause ot the injury for which on action m~y
be brought. It is too remote. There ls a direct cause ot the Injury, and that Is the lee on
which she slipped down, and that Is the only
one which can be considered. The defect in
the street or walk is the ice, and the negligence of the city consists In allowing It t<> remain. This was dangerous to the traveling
public, arid the cause of the plalntl!f's Injury
In the law and by the complolnt and testimony. This tee was 'Slllooth and level, and
accumulated through the sole agency of the
elements and in the order of nature. .No argument, speculation, or casuistry can make this
case any ditrerent from this. The main and
Important question which first presents Itself
on the demurrer to the com(llalnt, and again
on the motion tor n. nonsult, ls, Is such a condition of the walk an actionable dtfect? This
question is settled by this court in the negative in many cases, after a very :full exambatlon ot the autho11tles e:sewhere, which we
need not cite. "When the walk is slippery because of the smooth surface of the snow and
lee which had accumulated upon it," such a
detect is not actionable. Cook v. City ot Milwaukee, 24 ·Wis. 270, 27 Wis. 191. In
Perkins v. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis.
435, "the walk was entirely covered with
packed snow nnd lee, and the whole surface ot the walk was very smooth and
slippery." · It was held thnt such a condition of the walk did not alone constitute
an actlona ble defect; a.nd so in Grossenbarh v.
City of Milwaukee, G5 'Vis. 31, 26 N. W. Rep.
182. '!'his holdiug is most reasonable. Such 1~
defect In a walk or street ts common and
natural everywhere lo the winter season, and
such actions would be numberkss, unreason1)
ble, and oppressive. The munlclpalltles are
powerless to prevent or remove such a common and natural condition. The authoritl~
cited by the learned counsel of the responde:; t
are not applicable to this case. They arc
cases where other defects combine with
the ice to Clluse the injury. Such defect;
must be pl'('sent with the ice, and they together constitute a cause of act:on; as,
where the Ice ls formed on 11. steep d .•cllvlty or desrending grade, or there ls some
other conclitlon of the wnlk, which, to~ether with the ke. makes the walk dangerous, as tn Grossenbach v. City of ~Iilwaukee
and Perkins v. City of Fontl du La<'.
suprn, nnd other cases In this court. But
here the hole 01· depression docs not com-
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bine with the ice, and is not present

with it. There is no hole at the time,

as it is ﬁlled with ice, and the surface

is made level as ice can be anywhere.

The plalntif f was not injured by stepping into

the hole, but by slipping on the ice. But I

have said enough of this. The hole was only

the remote cause, or cause of causes, which

LAW DAM.2d Ed.+12

produced the result, and was not the direct,

eﬂicient, or adequate cause, which alone is ac-

tionable. The court should have sustained

the demurrer ore tenus, or, failing in that,

ought to have ordered a nonsuit on the evi-

dence. The judgment of the circuit court is

reversed. and the cause is remanded for av
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new trial.

blne with the lee, and Is not present
with it. There is no hole at the time,
u 1t is filled with tee, and the surface
ts made level as tee can be anywhere.
The plalntt.tr was not tnjur<'d by stepping into
tbe hole, but by slipping on the ice. But I
have said enough of this. The hole was only
the remote ca.use, or cause ot causes, which
LAW DAM.2d Ed.....,...12
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produced the result, and was not the direct,
emctent, or adequate cause, which alone ls actionable. The court should have sustained
the demurrer ore tenus, or, tailing 1n that,
ought to have ordered a nonsuit on the evidence. The judgment of the circuit co:.irt l>
reversed. and the cause Is remanded tor u v
new trtaL
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BLYTHE et al. v. DENVER & R. G. RY. CO.

(25 Pac. 702, 15 Colo. 333.)

Supreme Court of Colorado. Jan. 10, 1891.

Commissioners' decision. Error to dis-

trict court, Arapahoe county.

Plaintiffs in error brought suit against

the defendant as a common carrier for

the loss of a package of merchandise con-

sisting of gold and silver watches, watch-

cases and movements, of the alleged value

of $726.95, delivered to defendant at Ala-

mosa by one J. B. Moomaw, to be carried

as an express package, directed to and to

be delivered to plaintiffs at Denver. The

package was not valued, and was accept-

ed and receipted for as an ordinary pack-

age at a nominal valuation of $50, upon

which charges of 65 cents were paid in ad-

vance for its transportation. The de-
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fendant, after denying the material alle-

gations of the complaint, admitted the

receipt of the package, the payment of the

money forits transportation, the execu-

tion and delivery of its receipt for the

same, and specially alleged as defenses:

First, that the car in which such package

was being transported was blown from

the track by a furious wind. and the car

and contents destroyed by ﬁre, and that

the loss was by inevitable accident and

“the act of God:" second, that the ship-

per irauduently concealed the value of the

package, and it was received as being only

of the value of $50; that it was placed in

the body of the car, where ordinary puck-

ages were usually carried; that defend-

ant had a ﬁre-proof safe in the car, and

had the shipper given the true value, and

paid transportation for such value, the

goods would have been placed in the safe,

and would not have been lost; that, by

the terms of the receipt given, defendant

. wasexempted from anyliabilityexceeding

$50. A replication was ﬂied putting in

issue the special matters pleaded in de-

fense, and averring negligence in not se-

curing the package in the safe, and in not

making proper efforts to save the prop-

erty at the time of the disaster. The case

was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict

for the defendant, and judgment upon the

verdict.

Lucius P. Marsh, for plaintiffs in error.

Wolcott & Vaile, for defendant in error.

REED, C., (after stating the facts as

above.) It is conceded that the wrecking

of a portion of the train, such portion con-

sisting of one engine and four cars, one

being the express-car in which the goods

were being carried, was by “the act of

God," and inevitable. It is also conceded

in argumentthathavingucoal ﬁre burning

in a stove, and a lighted lamp in the com-

partment, as testiﬁed to, was not negli-

gence on the part of the carrier. Counsel

for plaintiffs in error in reply say: “In the

brief of defendant in error, counsel have

assumed for us a claim which we havenot

DIRECT A.ND CONSE~NTIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.

BLYTHE et al. v. DENYER & R. G. RY. CO. , gence was In not making the requisite
efforts to save the goodt1 after the peril
(25 P111c. 702, 15 Colo. 333.)
hall been Incurred. We make no claim
that the~ was nes;rllgence In carrying a
Supreme Court of Colorado. Jan. 10, 1891.
stove in the car. " By thesP concessions,
two important qneHtlons are eliminated,
CommlRsioners' dt'CiHion. Error to dis- and the lRsues are narrowed, the only
tril't court. Arapahoe eonnty.
questions remaining being: First. Was
Plalntlffs In error brought suit agnlnRt "the act of God" the proximate autl dh-ect
the defendant as n common carrier for cau11e of the loRB 1mstaincd, so as to exthe !ORB of a oacka.ii:e of merchandise con- onerate the carrier from liability, or was
sisting of gold and Rlh·er watches, wateb- it tne remote ranse, and the fire against
cases and movements, of the alleiced value which the carrier Is supposed to be an In·
of f726.95, dellvt'red to defendant ut Ala- suror the proximate and direct cause?
mosa uy one J.B. Moomaw, to be curried Second. After tho wrecking nnd oYerturnns nn express package, directed to and to ing or the truin by "the act of Gorl," was
be 1le1h·ered to plaintiffs at Denver. The the carrier guilty of negligence In fulling
package was not valued, and was aeel'ptto protect and secure the goods tn the
ed and recei)lted for as nn ordinar.i.· pack· burning car?
nge ut a nominal valuation of $50, upon
Great ublllty and research have been e:xwhich charges of 65 cents were paid in ad- Pl'nrle<l lu attempting to arrive at ancl devance for Its transportation. The de- termine upon Rome p;eueral definition of
fendant, after denying the matt-rini allt\- the terms "proximate" and "remote"
gatlons of the complaint, admitted the causes and establish a rule and a line of
re<'elpt of the pal'kugl', the pu:yment of the tlemarkution IJetween the two. 8uch efmoney for its tram;portatiou, the execu- forts appear to have Ileen but partially
tion nnd delivery of Its reeelpt for the 1mcce1o;sful. Both have receiYed varioua
same, and Rpecially alleged ai;i defenses: definitions, though rllffcrently worded,
.First, that the cur In which snch package amounting to practically the smne thing.
was being tr11n11ported was blown from
But, In almost every instance where they
the track by a furious wind, and the car ha \'e been nttempted to be npplied, their
and content11 destroyed hy fire, and that
upplicahillty eeenui to have been deterthe losR was by tnevitahlo acclrl<'nt and
mined IJy the pc1.• ullnr circumstances of the
"the act of God:" second, that the ship- case umle rconsideration.· Websterdf'fines
per frnuduently conceule!I the value of the "proximate cause," "that which lmmepackage, and It was received us being only 1llutely 11rcl'c1les an produces the effect,
of the value of '50: that It was plnced In
us rlhitlnguishd from th~rernote, mediate,
the body of the car, where ordinary puck- or predisp0t1lng cuuRe." An cl. })let. Law:
ages were nsually carried: that defend- "'The uearest, the Imm late, the direct
ant hnd a Hre-proof 11afo in the cur, and cause; the ettlclent. cnuse: the ca1111e that
bud the shipper given the trne value, and 1;ets anothPr or other cnuses In operation,
paid transportation for such value, the or dominunt en use." But with these deft·
goods woultl have been placed In the sure,
nltlons In view, when two causes unite
and would not have been lost; that, by
to produce the loss, the question still re·
the terms of the receipt glYen, defendant
mains, which was the proximate cause'!
wasexempted from unyllabllltyexceeding In Insurance Co. \'. 'l'weed, 7 Wall. 52, the
$50. A replll'atlon wus ftled putting In latelameuted Mr. Justice MILi.KR said:
Issue tho special matters pleaded In de- "We have had cited to us a Keneral review
fen&e, an:l a verriug negligence In not l!C· or the doctrine of pwxlmnte and remote
curing the p11ek11gc In the 11afe, aud In not causes, as It hns arl1<en and been cleci<led
making proper eHortB to save the prop- In the courts In a grent vurlety of cases.
erty at the time of the rllsaster. The c~se It would he an unprofitnhlP lnllor to enwus tried to a jury, resulting In a ver1hct
ter Into an exu min a tlon of these cases. If
for the defendant, and judgment upon the
we could dednce from them the best POB·
verdict.
sihle expression of the rule, it would reLuci11.<J P. Marsh, for plaintiffs In error.
main after all to decide each cusr. largely
Jl'olcott &; Valle, for defendant in error.
upon the Bplclal facts belonging to It, and
often upon the ''ery nicest discriminaREED, C., (aftt:r 'ltntfng the facts as tions." In Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. NorRbo,·e.) It h; conceded that the vrrC("klng
wich & N. Y. 'I'rnnR(J. Co., 12 Wall. 199, In
of a portion of the train, 1mch portion con- deliYering the opinion o~ the court, Mr.
sb1tlug of one engine and four cart1, one Justice STtwl'm snld: ~And cel'talnly,
being the expres11-car In whlrh the goods that cauKe which set thQ bthel' In motion,
were being carried, was b.v "the act of anrl gave to it Its efficiency to do harm
'Jod," and Inevitable. It ls also conceded
at tlie time of ~he disaster, must rank as
In argumeu t that having a coal tire burnin1t predominant." ; In Railroad Co. v. Kello~g.
In a Rtove, and a lli;thted lamp In the com- 94 U.S. 475, It Iii said: "'fhe Inquiry n.uet
partment, as testified to, was not negll- therefore alwnyi,ibe whether therewasany
~euce on the part of the carrier. Counsel
tntermedia te cause ulsconmoeted from tho
for plaintiffs iu error In reply say: "In the
primary fnult, nnd self-operating, which
brief of defendant In error, counsel h&.ve
produced the lujnry." In Insul'ance Co. v.
at1sumed for us a claim which we have not
Boon, 95 U. 8. 1!30, It Is said: "The proxmade, and they then proceed tu demolish imate cltlnse Is the efficient cause; the one
such assumed l'lalm. They nesmne for that neceBBurlly sets the other ea uses In
us that we claim there was negligence In
operation. The caueeR that are merely
carrying In the car a stove with tire In it.
Incidental or Instruments of a superior or
• • • There \Hiii negllf,!ence,-we may controlling n~~ncy are not the proximate
call It by that nawe,-IJut such negll- causes and the re81wnsfhle ones, tbou1th
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they may be nearer in time to the result.

Itis only when the causes are independ-

ent of each other that the nearest is, of

course. to be charged with the disaster."

Leaving out of consideration, as we

must, by concession of counsel, all ques-

tion of negligence in regard to the burning

lire in the stove. a lighted kerosene lamp,

and regarding each of them as securely

protected against damage as prudence

would require. and applying the rules

above laid down, it becomes apparent

that the overturning and wrecking of the

car by the violence of the wind was the

proximate, direct, and efficient cause of

the loss, and the ﬁre ioiiowing, ii not in-

stantaneously, immediately after, with-

out negligence or any wrongini act of th

carrier intervening to produce it, must be
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regarded as resulting and incidental. It is

ably contended in argument, and many

supposed authorities in support of the po-

sition are cited. that the negligence of the

carrier in iaiiing to use proper exertion to

save the contents of the car, after it was

overturned, rendered the deiendant liable

ior the loss. Ii, by proper diligence and

attention the goods could have been res-

cued. a iailure to secure them would have

ﬁxed the liability of the carrier. 'll‘here

can be no doubt of the correctness of this

conclusion. The questions, what was the

proximate cause of the 1O:-is, and of negli-

gence. were questions of iact to be deter-

mined by the jury irom the evidence, un-

der proper instructions irom the court.

There was not much coniiict of testhnony.

In Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, snpra,it is

said: “In the nature of things. there is in

every transaction a succession of events,

more or less dependent upon those preced-

ing, and it is the province of the jury to‘

look at this succession of events or facts,

and ascertain whether they are naturally

and probably connected with each other

by a continuous sequence, or are dissev-

ered by new and independent agencies;

and this must be determined in view of

the circumstances existing at the time."

The jury found as a fact that the “act of

God“ was the proximate cause. and also

found as a iact that there was no negli-

gence. Viewed in the light of all the evi-

dence, and of attendant circumstances,

the ﬁnding of the jury was inlly warrant-

ed. The iorce of the gale was such as to

blow the cars irom the track over the em-

bankment. It was shown to be almost

impossible ior men to stand or walk, and

they were compelled to prostrate them-

selves under the lee of the track or bank

to escape its inry. The air was so inll of

' cal than substantial.

dust and ﬂying material thatscarcely any-

thing could be seen. The car contained

inﬂammable material, and the ﬁre suc-

ceeded the overturning almosl: instantane-

ously. The messenger escaped with"great

they may be ne11rer In time to the result.
It ls only when the cnuses nre Independent of each other thnt the nearet1t ls, of
cOUt'fle, to be charged with the dlsuster."
Lt-nvlug out or com~illeratlon, ns we
must, by concei;Hloo of counsel, all quest.Ion of uegligt•nce In regurd to the burnlnit
fire In the sto\·e, a lighted kerosene lamp,
and regnrdlng eacb or them as securely
protl'i:ted against dnma11:e as prudence
would require. and applying the rules
llllove laid down. It brromPH apparent
that the overturulng an<l wrC't:klng of the
car by the violence of the wind was the
proximate, direct, and efficient C8UHe or
the losR, and tbe fire following, If not lnstnn taneously, Immediately after, without negligence or any wronw;ful act of th
carrier intervening to procluce it, mm1t be
!"f'garded as re1mlti11g and lncldeutnl. It ls
ably contended In urgumrnt, und many
s1111p0Hed authorltlN1 In sn)Jport of tht• position arP cited, thut the nPgligeuc<' of the
carrier in falling to m1c 11rupcr cxertiou to
SH\"e the conte11tts of the cur, after it was
o \'er turned, remh'rccl the dl'le1ul!l 11t llu ble
for the losa. Ir, h.r proper dill~t>nce nnd
attention the goocl>1 could hu n.' uN'n re11<'Ut'1l, a failure to st•ctire them would huve
fixed the llubllity of the currie1·. 'J'hPre
cuu be no doubt of the correctnN1s of this
conclusion. The qncstionH, whut WllH the
proxiUllltC CaURC of the )Ol-IS, lllHJ or Jll'gJigence. were 11u!'stluns of fuc.:t to hl' determined by the jury from the evidence, un•lcr proper Instructions from the court.
1'11ere was not much conflict of te1:1timc>ny.
In Rall road Co. v. Kellogg, Hupra, It is
said: "In the nature of thiug-s. thcrti ts in
t•\·ery tran1111ctlon a succt•1:11:1iu11 of cventA,
more or lc1-1sdependt>ntupon thoRe 11n•ce<llng, anrl It Iii the province of the jury tc)
look at thiH RUc<'eRf!lon or evl'ntR or fucts,
an1l ascertain whether they are nnturnlly
1111<1 probably connected with ench other
hy a continuous 11cquence, or are dissevered hy new and ln1lcr1en1lent ng,•11cif's;
and thlH must be determined In view of
the clreunu1t1111ce11 existing ut the time."
The jury found as a. fact thut the" uct of
God" wai;o the proximate cause, and alfm
found ns a fact that there wns no m•gllgence. Viewed In the light of nil tlw e\·I·
clem·e, and of attendant cireumstunce.i,
the finding of the Jury waR fully warranted. The force of the gale wnR such as to
blow the cars from the track over the emhankment. It was shown to be almust
Impossible for DlE'll to stand or walk, nnd
they were compelled to prostrate themselves under the lee of the track or bank
.to escHpe It• fury. The air was so full of
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dust and flying material that scarcely anything could be s~n. 'l'he car contained
Inflammable material, and the tire succeeded the overturning almost iostantaneom1ly. The messPngcr eRcaped wltbgreat
ditftl"ulty, and not wl thou t injury from
the tlameR. The position of the cnr w111t
such thn t nll mon1 ble goods must hu Yo
been hurled Into the corner or the top of
thP car. From the forre of the wind, and
comhu11tlble material or the car, It Is obvious that the deRtrnctlon of the car nnd
co11tl'11t11 woe inevltuhle In a very hril'f
space or time, and tho t lUIY U ttempt to
rt•iscue the goods would buve been unavailing.
Considerable crltlcl11m Is directed to tho
lnstructlonR of the court. Some of thm;e
crltlchied, and upon which errors are asBiKned. nre In rt'gnrd to nPgligence In the
use uf the stove and lamp. As counsel
concecles in hie tlnnl argunwnt that theri.>
wuR 110 ne11:ligence In thut re,.pect, a review of them hecom!'!I ur111eccisisnry. Consldernhle attention Is gi\·en to the eigl1th
lnHtrnction. 111 whleh the lrnrned jurlg-e
chu r~1·1l: "Where one IA pursuing a lawful
an1e11tion, 111 a lawful manner, nnd something occurs which no human skill or precaution coulrl forei'P11 or proven t, und HH n
co111:1equc11ce the nccidt•nt takes nluce. this
IH1:t11lt'd ·111cvitable uccident' or the 'act of
Gori.'" 'l'he objection ur~ed b1 more technieal thnn subi;it1111tinl. Whlleltis,po!-!Hlhly,
not t!'chni1:111ly correct, und while there IH
a IPJ?;nl distinl"tion between "lne\·ital.Jle ucchh-11t" and the" act of Gori," we cnn sre
nothing in It to the prc•jndil:e of the plain-·
tiff, or that could have mlRll'1l the jury
Tlw l111111euinte rc1rnltlng c1rnRe produdn~
the lo,,;11 was the fire, which might properly he termed an "lncvltnl.Jle nccld1mt"
growing out of the former cllRnMter; while
the direct cause of the agt·~cy that worked
the clt>>1tructlon w a11 the "act of Jorl.~ /
putti11~ the resulting ngen
at work. \1'.af
think the charge, tnkPn ns A whole, ' ""' a
fulr ftllcl Impartial statenwnt of the luw,
aucl should he RUHtnined. Wo uuvlse that
the judgment be affirmed.
RICH.llOND &nd BISSELL, CC., concur
rln11:.
PER CURI AM. For the reaeons stated
in the forrgoing opinion tba Judgment j8f
the court below Is affirmed.
ELLIOTT, J., having tried thlM cao11e
below,dld not participate iu this decision •
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HAWERLY v. STATE LINE 8:. S. R. CO.

(19 Atl. 1013, 135 Pa. 50.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 19,1890.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Brad-

ford county.

Action by Leroy Ilaverly against the State

Line & Sullivan Railroad Company for dam-

age caused by ﬁre. The testimony showed

that on May 11. 1880, about 4 or 5 o'clock P.

M. a train of defendant's passed over its road,

and near the tract of land where plaintiff was

lumbering; that soon afterwards smoke was

seen issuing from a stump in the line of the

defendant‘s right of way; that one of plain-

tiﬂ"s agents was sent to put out this ﬁre,

who, returning, reported he had done so;

that no further smoke was seen in or around

DIRECT AND CONJENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.

HAVERLY v. STATE LINE & S. R. CO.
(19 At!. 1013, 135 Pa. 50.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. .May 19, 1890.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Brad·
ford county.
Action Ly Leroy Haverly against the State
Line & Sullivan Hailroad Company for damage caused by fire. The testimony showed
that on May 11, 1880, about 4 or 5 o'clock P.
:ai. a train of defendant's pas!!erl over its road,
and near the tract of land where plaintiff was '
lumbering; that soon aftl'rward11 smoke wall
seen issuing from a stump in the line of the
defendant's right. of way; that one of plaintiff's agents was tient to put out this lire,
wllo, returning, reported he had done so;
that no further smoke was seen in or around
the stump until about 10 o'clock A. M. of the
following day, when the plaintiff himself
sent a servant, who, finding thA stump on
fire, poured water thereon until he s11p: osed
it W1t8 entirely extiuguished, and he remained there half or three-quarters of an
hour, until he satisfied himself that no fire
remained; that about noon of the same day,
the wind coming up and blowing lively, a
fire broke out on said tract In the vicinity of
said 11tump, which could not, on account of
the wind, be controlled by the plaintiff or his
agents, and destroyed a quantity of logs in
which the plaintiff had an interest. Plaintiff.
obtained judgment. Defendant appeals.
Edward 0tJe1'tun, John F. Sanderaou, and
Rod11ey A. Merc1tr, for appellant. H. N. ,
Williams, I. McPhe1·son. E. J. Angle, and
R. H. Williama, for appellee.
0

the stump until about 10 o'clock A. M. of‘ the

following day, when the plaintiff himself
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sent a servant, who, ﬁnding the stump on

ﬁre, poured water thereon until he supposed

it was entirely extinguished, and he re-

mained there half or three-quarters of an

hour, until he satisﬁed himself that no ﬁre

remained; that about noon of the same day,

the wind coming up and blowing lively, a

ﬁre broke out on said tract in the vicinity of

said stump, which could not, on account of

the wind. be controlled by the plaintiff or his

agents, and destroyed a quantity of logs in

which the plaintiff had an interest. Plaintifb

obtained judgment. Defendant appeals.

Edward Ooerton, John F. Sanderson, and

Rodney A. Mercur, for appellant. H. N.,

Williams, I. McPherson. E. J. Angle, and

R. H. Williams, for appellee.

MITCHELL, J. The test by which the line

is to be drawn between proximate and re-

mote cause, in reference to liability for the

consequences of negligence, has been ﬁrmly

established by the three cases of Railroad Co.

v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353; Railroad Co. v. Hope,

>80 Pa. 517. 313; and Hoag v. Railroad Co., §._5_

Ea. St. 293. It is most elaborately expressed

by iief Justice AGNEw in Railr Co. v.

Hope, in the following languagelzaghe jury

must determine, therefore, wheth r the facts,

constitute a continuous succession of events.

so linked together that they become a natural

whole, or whether the chain of events is so

broken that they become independent, and

the ﬁnal result cannot be said to be the nat-

ural and probable consequence of the pri-

mary 'ause,—the negligence of the defend-

ants"? And the rule is again put somewhat

more ersely by the present chief justice in

Hoag v. Railroad Co., as follows: “The in-

jury must be the natural and probable conse-

quence of the negligence,—such a conse-

quence as * * * might and ought to

have been foreseen by the wrong-doer as

likely to flow from his act.'-' The three lead-

ing cases above referred to, though frequent-

ly cited on opposite sides of the same argu-

ment, are not at all in conﬂict in principle.

The different results which were reached in

them depended not on any different view of

I

MITCHELL, J. The teat by which the line
is to be drawn lietween prnximate and remote cause, in reference to liability for the
consequences of negligence, has been firmly
establishPd by the th re• cast's of Railroad Co.
v. Kerr, 62 l'u. St. 353: Railroad Co. v. Hope,
80 Fa. ::it •. 3Z3; and Hoag v. Railroad Co., .§2
Ya. S~. ~9~_. It is most elaboratt:1ly expressed
bYCltief Justice AGNEW in Raihfi Co. v.
HopP, in the following language: "The jury
must detnmine, therefore, wheth r the t'acts
constitute a continuous succtssion of events.
so Ii nked to~ether that they become a natural
whole, or whether the chain of events is so
brolH·n that they become independent, and
the linal result cannot be said tu be the natural and prohahle consequence of the primary use,- the ne~ligence of the defend·
ants." And the rule is again put somewhat
more ersely by the present chief justice in
Hoag v. Hail road Co., as follows: "The injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligtmce,-such a consequence as "' "' "' might and ought to
have been foreset:>n by the wrong-doer as
likely to flow from his act.'! Tl1e three leading cases above rt>ferrl'd to, though frequently cited on opposite sides of the same argu·
111e11t, are nl•t at all in conflict in principle.
The different results which were 1eached in
them tleptmded uut on any dilTt:>rent view of

"a

the law, but of the facts, and on the appllcation of the familiar doctrine that, where a
plain inference is to be dmwn from undi.s·
puted facts, the court. will decide it 1111 a
matter of law. In Railroad Co. v. Kerr the
negligence had been held by the court below
to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff''
loss. This court held that it was remote, and
did not award a new t'enire, but said that it
would do so if plaintiff should desire it upon
grounus shown. Tile question was then
new; anj, from what was &1tld about thll
1'enire, tile court itself does not seem to have
lieen entirely cli>ar that it should be deciderl
as matte1· of law. It may lie doubted whether, on the same facts, the court would not
now send it to a jury. Certainly no subsequent case has assnmed to decide where the
facts were so near the line. Hoag v. Railroad
Co. was a much clearer case, and so were
Railway Co. v. Taylor, 104 P11. St. 806;
West Mahonoy 'l'p. v. Watson, 116 Pa. St.
344, 9 Atl. Hep. 430; Railway Co. v. Trich,
117 Pa. St. 390, 11 .A.ti. Re11. 627; and th~
other ca!les where the court has pronounced
lht:> negligence to be remote as malterof law.
But, whatever the result of the views taken
of th!\ facts in these cases, the pl'inciples or
decision are the same in all.
In the present case the learned judge left
the question of proximate or remote cause to
the jury, in sulistantial conformity with th~
doctrine of Railroad Co. v. Hope. Appellant,
however, claims that the succession of events
was so broken as to b1·ing the case under
Hoag v. Uailroad Co., and require the judgeto direct the jury in Its favor: I The ureak in .
the cJ1in of events was merely\ a gap In the·
time. Had the fire extended from the stump
to pla ntilf's lumber without interval, on the
same afternoon, this case would have been exactly parallel with Railroad Co. v. Hope. But
the fact that the lire smouldered awhile in
the stu'Ilp, and. after it was supposed to have
been extinguished, hroke out »gain the nPxt
1 day, while it makes the conclusion less.
ohvious that the damage wa.~ done by the
samti fire, does not interpose any new cause,
or enable the court to say as matter of law
that the casual connection was uroken. The
sequence from the original fire to the burning of plaintiff's logs was Interrupted by two·
apparent cessations of the tire, \but the jury
have found that the cessations -A·ere only apparent, leaving iutnvals of time in the visible progress of the lire, but making n~.
real lireak at all in the 1tctual connection.)
In Hailroad Co. v. Ktttr, (page :itit>.) it is said
by THOMPSON, C••J., ,that the rule "is not to
be controlled by tim<;<>!-. distance, but by the
succession of events;" .and in Hoag v. Hailruad Co., TRUNKEY, 't!. J ., in charging the
jury, had quuteJ the foregoing, and added:
"Whether the lirecommunicate.f to the plaintiff's property within a few minutes, or afler .
the lapse of hours, from the negligent act,
may be immaterial." It is said in this case
that the agents of plaintiff ori thP. gro1111cl I.lid
not anticip•~te a further ic<pread of the lire aft-
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er the interval of time, and therefore it can-

not be assumed that the defendant should

have anticipated it.

ﬁre had been put out, not because they did

not see the danger of its spreading while it

was burning; and this was the danger that

appellant was bound to contemplate, to.wit,

the natural and probable consequence of the

original act, not the effect of sh supposed

extinguishment subsequently. ‘éhe pauses

‘ in the progress of the ﬁre, there re, and the

lapse of time, while matter for the considera-

tion of thejury in determining the continuity

of effect, do not of themselves make such a

Kchange as requires the court to say that they

|break the connection.

But it is argued th. it was not until the

next morning after the ﬁre started in the

stump, and during the time when it was ap-
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parently extinguished, that the wind rose,

and became a new cause of the spread of the

ﬁre to plaintiff's lumber. This, however,

was, like the point already considered. de-

pendent on the circumstances. In Railroad

Co. v. Hope, one of the facts was a strong

wind which carried the ﬁre, and so, also, it

was in Railroad Co. v. Lacey. 89 Pa. St. 458,

and in Railroad Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. St.

129; and in this last case, TRUNKEY, J., says

the jury “could also determine whether dry

weather and high winds in the spring-time

are extraordinary, and whether, under these

conditions, * " * the injury was within

the probable foresight of him whose negli-

gence ran through from the beginning to the

end." No doubta hurricane or a gale maybe

But the agents of plain- ,

tilt did not expect it because they thought the I

‘ rison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171.

such as to be plainly out of the usual course

of nature, and therefore to be pronounced by

the court as the intervention of a new cause.

Such a wind would be like the ﬂood in Mor-

dinary danger of wind helping a tire to spread

is one of the things to be naturally anticipated.

The lapse of time before the wind rose, in this.

case, was therefore not clearly a new cause

to be so pronounced by the court, but a cir-

cumstance to be considered, with the others,

by the jury. On this branch of the case,

generally, the injury was not more remote

from the alleged cause than in Railroad Co. v.

Hope, supra, Railroad Co. v. Lacey, 89 Pa. St.

458, and Railroad Co. v. Mclieen, 90 Pa. St.

129, and not so much so as in Fairbanks v.

Kerr. 70 Pa. St. 86, and Pailroad Co. v. Keigh-

ron, 74 Pa. St. 316, in all of which the ques-

tion was held to have been properly submitted

to the jury.

There remains only the question of con-

tributory negligence, and we do not ﬁnd any

evidence that would have justilied taking

this from the jury. If plaintiff had not

known of the ﬁre in the stump, he would

have had no duty in regard to it; but, know-

ing of it, he was bound to take all reasonable

and practicable measures to prevent its

spreading to his lumber. He was not an

er the inten·al of time, and therefore it cannot be assumed that the defendant should
have anticipated it. llut the agents of phiintift did not exptlct it because they thought the
fire bad been put out, not because they did
not see the danger of its spreading while it
was burning; and this was the danger that
appellant was bound to contemplate, to-wit,
the natural and probable consequence of the
original act, not the effect of L,I~ supposed
extinguishment sut>seq ueully. }, 'he pauses
I in the progress of the fire, there re, and the
l!!.pse of time, while matter for the consideration or the jury in determining the continuity
\ of +"ffect, do not of themselves make such a
change as requires th~ecourt to say that they
!break thti connedion.
But it is argued th. It was noL until the
next morning after he Hre started in the
stump, nm! during the timll when it was apparently extinguished, that the wind rose,
and became a new cause of the spread of the
fire to plaintiff's lumlier. This, however,
was, like the point already considered, dependent on the circumstances. In Uailroad
l:o. v. Hope, one of the facts was a strong
wind which carrie,I the fire, and so, also, it
was in Railroad Co. v. Lacey, 89 Pa. St. 458,
and in Uailroad Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa, St.
129; and in this last case, T1rn~KEY, .T., says
the jury "could 111.so determine whether dry
weather and high winds in the spring-Lime
are extraordinary, and whether, under these
conditions, • • • the injury was within
the probable foresight ot him whose negligence ran through from the beginning to the
end." No doubt a hurricane or a gale mny be
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such as to t>e plainly out of the usual course
of nature, and therefore to be pronounced by
the court as the intervention of a new cause.
Such a wind would be like the flood in .Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171. But the or- ,
di nary danger of wind helping a fire to spreadJ
is one of tile things to be naturally anticipl1ted.
The lapse of time before the wind rose, in this.
case, was therefore not clearly a new cause
to be so pronounced by the court, but a circumstance to be considered, with tile others,
by the jury. On this branch of the calle,
generally, the injury was not more remote
from the alleged cause than in Railroacl Co. v.
Hope, supra, Hailroad Cu. v. Lacey, 89 l'a. St.
458, antl Railroad Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. St.
129, antl not so much so as in :Fairbanks v.
Kerr. 7tJ Pa. St. 86, antl Hail road Co. v. Keighron, 74 Pa. St. 316, in all of which the question was l1elli to have been properly submitted
to the jury.
There remains only the question of contributory negligence, and we do not find any
evidence that would have justified taking
this from the jury. If plaintiff had not
known of the fire in the stump, be would
have had no duty in regard to it: bnt, knowing of it, he was bound to take all reasonable
and prarticable measures Lo prevent its
spreading to his lumber. He was not an
insurer. The measure of his duty in this
regard was reasonable care and diligence,
antl whether he usetl these was fairly and accurately submitted to the jury. That they
found against the defendant's view wa!I no
fault of their instruction aa to the law. Jullgment affirmed.
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LEWIS v. FLINT & P. M. RY. CO.

(19 N. W. 744, 54 Mich. 55.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. June 11, 1884.

Error to Wayne. Plaintiff brings error.

Blodget & Patchin and C. I. Walker, for

DIRECT A.ND CONSEcrNTIAL DAMAGES-IN TOH.T.

LEWIS v. FLINT & P. M. RY. CO.
(19 N. W. 744, 54 Mich. 55.)
Supreme Court of :Michigan. June 11, 1884.
En·or to Wayne. Plaintiff brings error.
Blo<lget & Patchin and C. I. Walker, for
appellant W. L. Webber and 0. F. Wisner, for :1.ppellee.

appellant. W. L. Webber and O. F. Wis-

ner, for appellee.

COOLEY, C. J. Action to recover dam-

ages for a personal injury. The facts as

they appeared on the trial were as follows:

The plaintiff resides in the township of

Huron, a few miles east of Belden station,

on the road of defendant. He was at

Wayne station on the evening of January

12, 1883, awaiting the train which was to go

south past Belden in the night. The train

left Wayne at 3:05 in the morning of the

13th, and he,proenred his ticket and took

passage for Belden, where the train was
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due at 3:30. The night was dark, cold, and

wet. The train stopped when “Belden"

was called, and plaintiff got off. Belden

was only a ﬂag station for this train, and

there was no one in charge of the station-

house, and no light there. When plaintiff

got off the train he was told by the brake-

man or conductor that they had run by the

station about two car lengths, and he re-

plied that if that was all, it was no matter,

as he had to go that way. An east and

west highway crosses the railroad about 24

rods south of the station-house,' which the

plaintiff would take in going to his home.

If he was two car lengths beyond the sta-

tion-house, he would still be north of the

highway; and, supposing that to be the

case, he followed the track along south, in

preference to going back to the‘ station-

house, from which a passage east of the

track would have led him to the highway.

The plaintiff knew the place well, and knew

that on the track he must cross an open

cattle-guard to reach the highway. He had

crossed this before, and sometimes found a

plank laid over it. Passing on he soon came

to trees which he knew were some distance

south of the highway, and he then knew the

information given him as to where he was

when he alighted from the train was erro-

neous. He turned about to retrace his

steps, and followed the track in the direc-

tion of the highway. This he did carefully,

because it was very dark, and he knew

there was an open cattle-guard on the south

side of the highway, as well as on the north

side. He was looking for this cattle-guard

constantly and carefully. There were burn-

ing kiins near to the track on his right, and

the smoke from these affected his eyes, but

he saw a switch light, which he knew was

near the crossing, but‘which at the time

was too dim to aid him. He continued to

approach the cattleguard carefully, intend-

ing, if there was a timber or plank over it, to

cross upon that; and if not, then to pass

down into it and climb out. In the dim

light he saw what he believed to be the cat-

tle-guard, which seemed to be several paces

COOLEY, C. J. Action to recover damages for a personal injury. The facts as
they appeared on the trial were as follows:
The plaintiff resides in the township of
Huron, a few miles east of Belden station,
on the road of defendant. He was at
"'nyne station on the eYeulng of January
lZ 1883, awaiting the trnln which was to go
south past rlelden ln the night. The train
left Wnyne at 3:05 in the morning of the
13th, and he procured bis ticket and took
passage for Belden, where the train was
due at 3 :30. The night was dark, cold, and
wet. 'l'he train stopped when "Belden"
was called, and plaintiff got otr. Belden
was only a flag station for this train, and
there was no one in ch:irge of the stationllouse, and no light there. When plaintiff
got off the train he was told by the brakeman or conductor that they had run by the
station about two car lengths, and he replied that if that was all, it was no matter,
as he bad to go that way. An east and
west highway crosses the railroad ahout 2-1
rods .Outh of the station-house; which the
plaintiff would take in going to his home.
If he was two car lengths beyond the Ptatlon·house, he would still be north of the
highway; and, supposing that to be the
case, he followed the track along south, In
preference to going back to the· stationhouse, from which a passage east of the
truck would have led him to the highway.
The plaintiff knew the .place well, and knew
that on the track he must cross an open
cattle-guard to reach the highway. He bad
crossed this before, and sometimes found a
plank laid over It. Passing on he soon came
to trees which he knew were some distance
south of the highway, and he then knew the
information given him as to where be was
when he alighted from the train was erroneous. He turned about to retrace his
steps, and followed the track In the dlrec.
tion of the highway. This he did carefully,
because it was very dark, and he knew
there was an open cattle-guard on the south
side of tlie highway, as well as on the north
sf<lc. He was looking for this cattle-guard
constantly and carefully. The1·e were burning kllns near to the track on his right, and
the smoke from these affected his eyes, but
he saw a switch light, which he knew was
near the crossing, but · which at the time
was too dim to aid him. He continued to
approach the cattle-guard carefully, Intending, lf there was a timl.Jer or plank over It, to
c1-oss upon that; and if not, then to pass
down Into it and climb out. In the dim

light he saw what he believed to be the cattle-guard, which seemed to be several paces
ofl', but at the very next step one foot slipped, and as he attempted to save himself by
springing upon the other, the other foot
caught, and he was precipitated into the
cattle-guard, and he received an injury of a
very serious and permanent nature. He
was for a time senseless, but" then succeeded In drawing himself out by his elbows.not being able to use his lower lhnbs,-and
with great difficulty he reached a neighboring tavern, where he was cared for.
On the trial a claim was made on the part
of the defense that the plaintiff was negligent in following the railroad track back to
the cattle-gunr<l, and in attempting to cross
it, when he might ham left the track to the
right and passed along the field until he
came to the highway; and evidence was
given to show that he would have encountered no impediments. But, ln such a night
as this was, It Is not clear that the field
would have afforded a safer passage than
the hlgh way, and his failure to take it
would at most only raise a question of negligence on his part which would necessarily
go to the jury. Railroad Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 118; Billings v. Breinig, 45
Mich. 72, 7 N. W. 722; Railroad Co. v. Miller. 46 Mich. 537, 9 N. W. 841; Marcott v.
Uailroad Co., 47 Mich. 7, 10 N. W. 3. Io
this case the court took the case from the
jury, and directed a ve1-dict for the defendant. This direction ls understood to have 1
been given on the ground that the injury ·
which the. plaintiff suffered was not pro.xi-}
mate to the wrong attributable to the defendant, and for that reason would not support an action. The wrong of the defendant consisted in carrying the plaintiff past
the station, and then giving him erroneous
lnformntiori as to where he was. If the injury su!'l'ered wns not a proximate consequence of tills wrong, the instruction of the
court was right; otherwise, not. The difficulty here ls In determining what ls and
whnt Is not a proximate consequence in contemplation of lnw.
1•'01· the plnintill', the cases are cited In
which lt has been held that one whose negligence causes a fire by the 1.1preadlng of
which the property of another Is destroyed,
is liable fo1· the damages, though the property for which the compensation was claimed was only reached by the fire after it had
passed through Intervening flel<ls or buildings. Kellogg v. Railroad Co., 26 Wls. 223;
Fent v. Railroad Co., 59 Ill. 349; Wiley v.
Railroad Co., H N. J. Law, 248; Railrond Co.
v. Kellogg, W U. S. 460. But these cases,
we think, are not analogous to the one before us. The negligent fire wns the direct
and sole cause of the Injury ln each Instance, and there was no intervening cnu!'le
whatever. The cases are in harmony with
Hoyt v. Jelfers. 30 Mich. 181. The cnse 1•f
Pennsylvania Co. v. Hong In n<l, 78_ .!fill. ~:;,
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seems, at ﬁrst view, to be more in point.

The action in that case was brought by a

woman, who, in consequence of misinforma-

tion on the part of the person in charge

of a railroad train, left the car in the night-

time at the wrong stopping place, and wan-

dered about for an hour or more before

she could ﬁnd shelter, taking cold from ex-

posure. But here, as in the other cases cit-

ed, there was no cause intervening the

wrong complained of and the resulting m-

jury, and the question of proximate cause

does not appear to have been raised in the

case. Smith v. Packet Co., 86 N. Y. 408, is

also relied upon, but it is unlike this in the

important particular that the intervening

cause, which, after the ﬁrst wrong on the

part of the defendant, operated to bring in-

jury to the plaintiff, was a neglect of proper
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care, which the court held was due from the

defendant to the plaintiff under the circum-

stances, so that all the injury received was a

proximate result of the defendant's neglect

of duty.

The case of Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,

5'i Wis. 342, 11 N. W. 356, more nearly re-

sembles the present case than any other to

which our attention has been called by coun-

sel for the plaintiff. The facts, as stated in

the prevailing opinion, are the following:

The plaintiffs, with their child, 7 years old,

were being carried on defendant's cars, with

Mauston for their destination. and when they

arrived at a station three miles east of Maus-

ton they left the train, under the direction of

the brakeman, who told them they were at

Mauston. It was in the night; it was cloudy

and wet; there was a freight train standing

on a side track where they were put off the

train; there was no platform, and no lights

visible, except on the freight train. Plain-

tiffs soon ascertained they were not at Maus-

ton, but did not know where they were.

They did not see the station-house, though

there was one, hidden from their view by

the freight train. Tney supposed they were

at a place two miles east, where the train

sometimes stopped, but where there was no

station-house. They started west on the

track towards Mauston, expecting to ﬁnd a

house where they might stop, but did not ﬁnd

one until they came to a bridge, within a

mile of Mauston, and then they thought it

easier to go on to that place than to seek

shelter at the house, which was a considera-

ble distance from the track. Mrs. Brown

was pregnant at the time, and when she ar-

rived at Mauston was quite exhausted. She

had, during the night, severe pains, which

continued from time to time, and were fol-

lowed by ﬂowing, and at length by a miscar-

riage, inﬂammation, and serious iliness.

The plaintiffs claimed that the miscarriage

and subsequent sickness were all caused by

the walk .\Irs. Brown was compelled to take

to get from the place where they were left

by the train to \Iauston, and the question

in Ihe ca.-e was whet her the defeinlant was
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seems, at first ;lew, to be more in point.
The action in that case was brought by o.
woman, who, In consequence of mlslnforma·
tion on the part ot the person in charge
ot a railroad train, left the car in the night·
time at the wrong stopping place, and wan·
dered about for an hour or more before
she could find shelter, taking cold from ex·
posure. But here, as in the other cases cit·
ed, there was no cause intervening the
wrong complained of and the resulting lD·
jury, and the question of proximate cause
does not appear to ha•e been ral11ed in the
ca11e. Smith v. Packet Co., 8G N. Y. 408, Is
also relied upon, but it ls unlike this in the
lmpormnt particular that the Intervening
cause, which, after the first wrong on the
part of the defendant, operated to bring In·
jury to the plalntlfl', was a neglect of proper
care, which the l'Ourt held was due from the
defendant to the plalntlfl' under the circumstances, so that all the Injury recdved was a
proximate result of tbe defc>Julant"s neglect
of duty.
The case ot Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
54: Wis. 34:2, 11 N. W. 35U, more nearly re·
sembles the present case than nny other to
which our attention has been called by counsel tor the plalntlfl'. The facts, as stated In
the pre,·alllng opinion, are the following:
The plnlntlfl's, with their rhild, 7 years old,
were being carried on deremlnnt's cars, with
!\lauston for their destination. and when they
arrived at a station three miles cast of Mauston they left the train, under the dh·ectlon of
the brakeman, who told them they were at
:\Iaus ton. It was In the night; It was cloudy
and wet; there was a !re!ght train standing
on a side tmck where they were )IUt off the
train: there was no platform, and no llgbta
'tlelble, except on the freight train. Plain·
tlfl's soon ascertained they were not at Mauston, but did not know where they were.
They did not see the stntlon-houae, though
there was one, hidden from their view by
the freight train. Tney suppoRcd they were
at a place two mile!! east, where the troln
sometimes stopped, but whe1·e there was no
station-house. They started west on tbe
track towards Mauston, expecting to find a
house where they might stop, but did not find
one until they came to a bridge, within a
mile of Mauston, and then they thought It
easier to go on to that pince than to seek
shelter at the house, which was a considerable distance from the trnek. Mrs. Brown
was pregnant at the time, nncl when she arrived at Mauston was quite exhnusted. She
had, during the night, severe pains, which
l'ODtlnued from time to time, and were followed by ftowlng, and at leni,,rth 1.Jy a mlscurringe, lnflammatlou, and serious llln!'Hs.
The plnlntltrs claimed that the mlscarringe
and subscquept sickness were all caused by
the walk :\Ire. Brown was compelled to take
to get from the pince where they were left
hy th<' tralu to :\!a11f'ton, nml the <tUCHtlon
In the l'<lse wns wlldher the defL•rnlant wns
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liable for the Injury to :\Irs. Brown, admitting It to have been caused by bet· walk.

The majority of the court finding that
"there was no Intervening independent
cause of the Injury other than the act of the
defendant," and that "all the acts done by
the plalnt.ifl's, and from which the Injury
flowed, were rightful on their part, and
compelled by the act of the defendant," held
that "the Injury to Mrs. Brown was the di·
rect l'l:'.'sult of the defendant's negligen<'e,
and that such negligence w1111 tbe proximate,
and n-ot the remote, cause of the lnjul'y,'"
quoting LorJ Ellcnbo1·ougb In Jones v. Boyce,
1 Starkie, 493, thnt ''If I place a man tu such
a situation that he must adopt a perilous al·
ternath·e, I am responsible for the conse· ·1
quences."
The case of Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 844,
ls opposed to the case In Wisconsin, as are
also Hobbs v. Railroad Co., L. R. 10 Q. B.
111, and Francis v. Transfer Co., !\lo. App.
7. But It ls not neces~ary to express any
opinion upon the conflict which these cast•s
disclose, because in the case before us there
wns an Independent cause Intervening the
fault of the defendant and the Injury the
plaintlfl' sustained, and from which the injury resulted as a direct and Immediate consequence. To show what Is understood by
lnten-<'nlng cause, 1t may be useful to refer
to a few cases:
Ltvle v. Janson, 12 East, 648, was a t•.ise
of insurance on a ship warranted fr4! of
American condemnation. In sailing out of
New York she w1111 damaged by perils of the·
sea, stranded, and wrecked on G<>vernor's
Island, and then seized and condemned. It
was the peril of the sea that caused the ;essel to be seized and condemned; but as th().
condemnation was the proximate cause o!
the loss, the Insurers were held not liable.
A similar case ls Delano v. Insurance Co.,
10 l\Iass. 3:tt, where a like result was reach·
ed.
In Tisdale v. Norton, 8 Mete. (llass.) 388,
the facts were that a highway was defective
anu the plalntlfl', who was using it, went
out of it Into the adjoining field, where he
sustained an Injury. He brought suit
ngnlnst the town, whose duty it was to keep
the highway in repair. But the court held
that only as a remote cause rould the In·
jm·y of the plaintiff be said to be due to the
defect In the highway. The proximate, not
the remote, cause Is that which Is referred
to in the statute which gi\·es an action
against the town; and the p1·oxlmnte cam~e
in this case was outside the highway, not
within It.
In Anthony v. Slnld, 11 :\Ictc. (:\lass.) ::!00,
the plnlntllf, who was contractor with n
town to support for a specified time and for
a fixed sum nil the town paupers in sickness
and In health, brought suit against one who,
it was allegc<l, had aseiaulted and uentcn 01w
of the pauJlers, ns n conisc11m'nre ot whlc-11
the pluintltI was put to iuc:rt'asecl expel. : ~

i
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for care and support, but the action was held

not maintainable.

In Silver v. Frazier, 3 Allen, 382, it was

decided that a principal whose agent has

disobeyed his instructions, induced to do

so by the false representations of a third

party, cannot maintain an action against

such third party for the damage sustained.

Said Bigelow, C. J.: “The alleged loss or

injury suffered by the plaintiff is not the

direct and immediate result of the defend-

ant's wrongful act. Stripped of its teclmi-

cal language, the declaration charges only

that the agent employed by the plaintiﬁ‘.I to

do a certain piece of work disobeyed the

orders of his principal, and was induced to

do so by the false statement of the defend-

ant. In other words, the plaintiff alleges

that his agent violated his duty, and thereby
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did him an injury, and seeks to recover dam-

ages therefor by an action against a third

person, on the ground that he induced the

agent, by false statements, to go contrary to

the orders of his principal. Such an action

is, we believe, without precedent. The im-

mediate cause of injury and loss to the plain-

tif f is the breach of duty of his agent. This

is the proximate cause of damage. The

motives or inducements which operated to

cause the agent to do an unauthorized act

are too remote to furnish a good cause of

action to the plaintiff."

In Dubuque Wood & Coal Ass‘n v. Du-

buque, 30 Iowa, 176, the facts were that the

plaintiff had a quantity of wood deposited

at one end of a bridge, which was to be tak-

en over the bridge into the city of Dubuque.

The bridge was out of repair, and, while

awaiting repair by the city, whose duty it

was, the wood was carried away by a ﬂood.

The plaintif f sued the city for the value of

his wood; but it was held he could not re-

cover. Beck, J., in deciding the case, il-

lustrates the principle as follows: “An own-

er of lumber deposited upon the levee of the

city of Dubuque. exposed to the ﬂoods of the

river, starts with his team to remove it.

A bridge built by the city, which he at-

tempts to cross, from defects therein, falls,

and his horses are killed. By the breaking

of the bridge and the loss of his team he

is delayed in removing his property. On

account of this delay his lumber is carried

away by the ﬂood and lost. The proximate

consequence of the negligence of the city is

the loss of his horses; the secondary conse-

quence, resulting from the ﬁrst consequence,

is the delay in removing the lumber, which

ﬁnally caused its loss. Damage on account

of the ﬁrst ls recoverable, but for the second

is denied." Similar to this are Daniels v.

Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532; and McClary

v. Railroad Co., 3 Neb. 44. In each of these

cases the negligence of the defendant left

the property of the plaintiff where, by an act

of God,—in one case a ﬂood, and in the other

a tornado,—it was lost or injured, and in

each the act of God, and not the negligence,
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for care and support, but the action was held was held to be the proximate cause (}f Injury.
not maintainable.
'
In Silver v. Frazier, 3 Allen, 382, It was
In Schetrer v. Railroad Co.• 105 U. S. 249,
decided that a principal whose agent has It appeared that, by a collision of railroad
disobeyed his lnstructlons, Induced to qo trains, a passenger was injured, and, beso by the false representations of a third coming thereby disordered in mind and body,
party, cannot maintain an action against he, some eight months thereafter, committed
such third party for the damage sustained. suicide. Action was brought against the
Said Bigelow, C. J.: "The alleged loss or railroad company as the negligent cause ot
Injury suffered by the plaintiff ls not the his death. Miller, J., speaking for the court,
direct and Immediate result of the defend- and referring to Insurance Co. v. Tweed,
ant's wrongful act. Stripped of Its techni- 7 Wall. 44, and Ilallroad Co. v. Kellogg,· 94
cal language, the declaration charges only U. S. 469, said: "The proximate cause of
that the agent employed by the plaintiff to the death of Scheffer was his own act of self•
do a certain piece of work disobeyed the destruction. It was, within the rule in both
orders of his principal, and was Induced to these cases, a new cause, and a sufilclent
do so by the false statement of the defend- cause of death. The argmuent Is not sound
ant. In other words, the plaintiff alleges which seeks to trace this Immediate cause .
that his agent violated his duty, and thereby of the death through the previous stages
did him an Injury, and seeks to recover dam- of mental aberration, physical suffering, and
ages tberef<>r by an action against a third eight months' disease and medical treatment,
person, on tbe ground that he Induced the to the original accident on the railroad."_
agent, by false statements, to go contrary to
In Bosch v. Rail1-ond Co., 44 Iowa, 402,
the orders of his principal. ·such an action the plaintiff's house took fire, and the fire
ls, we believe, without precedent. The Im- department, because, as was alleged, of the
mediate cause of Injury and loss to the plain- wrongful occupation and expansion of the
tiff is the breach of duty of his agent. This river bank, were unable to get to the river
ls the proximate cause of damage. The to obtain water for putting out the fire.
motives or Inducements which operated to Plaintiff sued the defendant for the loss of
cause the agent to do an unauthorized act his property, but the court said the acts of
are too remote to furnish a good cause of defendant complained of "have no connection
action to the plaintiff."
with the fire, nor with the hose or other
In Dubuque Wood & Coal Ass'n v. Du- apparatus of the fire companies. They are
buque, 30 Iowa, 176, the facts were that the Independent acts, and their Influence In the
plaintiff had a quantity of wood deposited destruction of plaintiff's property Is too reat one end of a bridge, which was to be tak- mote to be made the basis of recovery."
In this last case, Metallic Compression Co.
en over the bridge Into the city of Dubuque.
The bridge was out of repair, and, while "I". Railroad Co., 100 Mass. 277, was referred
awaiting repair by the city, whose duty it to and dlsilngulshed. The facts there were
was, the wood was carried away by a flood. that the plaintiff's building was on fire, and
The plaintiff sued the city for the value of water was being thrown upon It through
his wood; but It was held he could not re- hose, when an engine of defendant was
cover. Beck, J., In deciding the case, Il- recklessly run upon the hose and severed It,
lustrates the prlnelple as follows: "An own- thereby defeating the efforts to distinguish
er of lumber deposited upon the levee of the the fire. which otherwise were likely to
city of Dubuque, exposed to the floods of the succeed. In that case the relation of the
river, starts with his team to remove It. plaintiff's injury to the defendant's act was
A bridge built by the city, which he at- . direct and immediate. So it was also In
tempts to cross, tram defects therein, falls, Billman v. Railroad Co., 76 Ind. 166; Lane v.
and his horses are killed. By the breaking Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; nnd Ricker
of the bridge and the loss ot his team be v. l<"reeman, 50 N. :s;. 420,-all of which nre
ls delnyed lu removing his property. On ruled by the Squib Case, (Scott v. Shepherd,
account of this delay his lumber ls carried 2 W. BI. 892;) and so, perhaps, are Fairaway by the flood and lost. The proximate banks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 91); and Lake v.
consequence of the negligence of the city ls Milliken, 62 Me. 240.
the loss of his horses; the secondary conseIn Henry v. Railroad Co., 76 Mo. 288, it
quence, resulting from the first consequence, appeared that the plaintiff was wrongfully .
Is the dclny In removing the lumber, which commanded to get off a caboose or the definally caused Its loss. Damage on account fendant, where he had a right to be. He
of the first Is recoverable, but for the second obeyed the command, and, while upon the
ls denied." Similar to this are Daniels v. ground, stepped upon a track, where he was
Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532; and McCiary run upon and Injured by a train. Hough,
v. Railroad Co., 3 Neb. 44. In ench of these J., speaking for the court, said : "It Is per<"nses the negligence of the defendant left haps proltable that if the plaintiff had not
the property of the plnintilT where, by an net been ordered out of the caboose he would
of Go<l,-ln one case n flood, and in the othe1· not have been injured. But this hypothesis
a tornndo,-lt was Jost or Injured, and In does not cstnbl!sh the legal relation of ca.use
each the act of God, nud not the negligence, nnd eliect bet ween the expulsion and the
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injury. If the plaintid had not left home

he certainly would not have been injured

as he was, but his leaving home could not

therefore be declared to be the cause of his

injury. As the plaintiffs injury was neith-

er the ordinary, natural, nor probable conse-

quence of his expulsion from the caboose,

such expulsion, however it might excite our

indignation, in the absence of any regulation

of defendant to justify it, cannot be con-

sidered in this action, and the legal aspect of

the case is precisely the same that it would

have been if no such expulsion had taken

place. It is to be regarded as if the plain-

tiff had gone to the caboose and could not

get in because it was locked. or, being able

to get in, chose to remain outside."

Further reference to authorities is need-

less.
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proximate, not the remote cause is to be re-

garded, is obscure and difﬁcult in many

cases, but not in this. By the wrong of the

defendant the plaintiff was can-ied past the

station where he had a right to be left, and

beyond where he had a right, from the in-

formation received from defendant's serv-

ants, to suppose he was when he left the car.

For any injury or inconvenience naturally

resulting from the wrong, and traceable to

it as the proximate cause, the defendant‘E

But before any in- ,

jury had been sustained the plaintiff dis- ‘

may be held responsible.

covered where he was, and started back for

the road which he had intended to take. -,

Whatever danger there was to be encounter-

ed in the way was to be found in the cattle-

guard, and this he understood and calculated

upon. Evidently it did not appear to him

of a formidable nature; for, on the supposi-

tion that he was north of the highway when

he left the train, he had voluntarily started

south with the expectation of crossing the

cattle-guard on that side, over which he

might or might not ﬁnd a plank laid, when

by stepping back a few rods, where he sup-

posed the station-house to be, he might pass

from thence out to the highway by the pas-

sage-way for persons and vehicles leading

from the station-house to it, and thereby avoid

the cattle-guard altogether. It is very clear

that he did not anticipate danger. Neither,

probably, would any other person have an-

ticipated it. The crossing was a simple

matter; it was only to ascertain ﬁrst wheth-

er a plank or timber was laid across, and if

so to cross upon it; and if not, to step down in-

to the excavation and out on the other side.

Where was he to look for danger? The night

was dark, it is true, but even by the sense

of feeling, when he knew he was within a

few feet of the cattle-guard, one would ex-

pect him to be able to determine its exact

location. But then something happened

which it is evident that the plaintiff, with

full knowledge of all the facts, did not at

all expect and had not feared. Misled ap-

parently by visual deception, he moved for-

A~D

CONSEQUENTIAL

D.UU.G~S-Dl

TOUT.

185

Injury. It the plalntllT had not left home j ward under a supposition that the cattlebe certainly would not have been Injured guard, upuu the brink of which he already
as he was, but bis leaviug home could not stood, was some paces otr, and bis deceptherefore be declared to be the cause of bis tlon, with the slipping of Ws foot, concurred
injury. As the plalntilr's injury was nelth- to produce the Injury. What was this but
-er the ordinary, natural, nor probable conse- pure accident? It was an event which hapquence of his expulsion from the caboose, pened unexpectedly and without faulL The
such exvulslon, however It might excite our defendant or Its agents had not produced the
Indignation, In the absence of any regulation deception or caused the foot to slip; and such
of defendant to justify It, cannot be con- wrong as the defendant had been guilty of
sldered In this action, and the legal aspect of was In no manner connected with or related
the case Is vreclsely the same that it would to the injury except as It was the occasion
have been If no such expulsion bad taken for bringing the plalntur where the accident
place. It is to be regarded as It the plain- occurred. It was after the plalntltr had
titr had gone to the caboose and could .not been brought there that the cause of Injury
get In because It was locked, or, being able unexpectedly ar08e. If Hghtnlng had cbanto get in, chose to remain outside."
ced to strike the plaintur at that place, the
Further reference to authorities Is need- fault of the defendant and Its relation to
less. The application of the rule that the the Injury would have been the same as
proximate, not the remote cause Is to be re- now, and the Injury could have been charged
garded, ls obscure and dlftlcult In many to the defendant with precisely the same
cases, but not In this. By the wrong of the reason as now. If the accidental discharge
defendant the plaintttr was ca.N"ied past the of a gun In the hands of some third person
station where he bad a right to be left, and had wounded the plalntUr as he approached
beyond where be bad a right, from the In· the cattle-guard, the connection of defendfonnatlon received from defendant's serv- ant's wrong with the Injury would have
ants, to suppose he was when he left the car. been precisely the same which appea1·s here.
For any Injury or Inconvenience naturally But the proximate cause of Injury In the
resulting from the wrong, and traceable to one case would have been the act of God;
lt as the proximate cause, the defendant In the other, Inevitable accident; but not
may be held responsible. But before any In- more plainly accident than was the proxljury bad been sustained the plalntltr dis- mate cause here. Back ot that cause In this.
covered where be was, and started back for case were many otheni, all conducing to
the road which be had Intended to take. bring the plalntltr to the place of the danger
Whatever danger there wns to be encounter- and the injury; the act of the defendant
-ed in the way was to be found In the cattle- was the last of a long sequence; but, as beguard, and this he understood and calculated tween the causes which precede the proxlupon. Evidently It did not appear to him mate cause, the law cannot select one rather
<Jf a. formidable nature; for, on the supposl- than any other as that to which the final
tlon that be was north of the highway when consequence shall be attributed, and It stops
he left the train, be had voluntarily startM at the proximate cause, because to go back
south with the expectation of' crossing the of It would be to enter upon an Investigation
~attle-guard oo that side, over which he
which would be both endless and useless.
might or might not find a plank laid, when
The injury being the result of pure acclby stepping back a few rods, where he sup- dent, the party upon whom It has chanced to
posed the station-house to be, he might pass fall Is necessarily left to bear it. No compenfrom thence out to the highway by the pas- satlon can be given by law In such cases.
sage-way for persons and vehicles leading Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Gibbons v. Pepper,
·from the station-house to It, and thereby avoid 1 Ld. Raym. 3~; Losee v. Buchanan. 51 N. Y. ,
the cattle-guard altogether. It Is very clear 476; Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62; Morris
that be did not anticipate danger. Neither, v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75; Brown v. Collins, 53
probably, would any other person ba~e an- N. H. 442; Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 3()3;
ticlpated It. The crossing was a simple Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. Law, 339;
matter; It was only to ascertain first wheth· Paxton v. Beyer, 67 111. 132; Express Co. v.
-er a plank or timber was laid across, and If Smith, 33 Ohio St. 511; Plummer v. State,
110 to cross upon It; and if not, to step down In4 Tex. App. 310; Parrot v. Wells, 15 Wall.
to the excavation and out on the other side. 524; Holmes v. Mather, L. R. 10 Exch. 2Gl.
Where was be to look for danger? The night A case like this appeals strongly to the
was dark, It ls true, but e\"en by the sense sympathies, but sympathy cannot rule the
of feeling, when he knew he w11s within a decision.
few feet of the cattle-guard, one would exUpon the undisputed facts of the case the
pect him to be able to determine Its exact plaintitT has no right of action for the Injury
location. But then something happened which has befallen him, and the circuit court
which It ls evident that the plalntlfl', with was correct In so holding. The question
full knowledge of all the facts, did not at what judgment shall be rendered In the case
all expect and bad not feared. Misled ap- 1.s for the present reserved.
parently by \"lsual deception, be moved forThe other justices concurred.
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YVOOD v. PE\'.\'$YL"A\'IA R.

(35 Atl. 699. 177 Pa. St. 306.)

K>.

(35 Atl. 000. 177 Pa. St. 306.)
su 11 reme Court of l'ennsylrnnia .

Oet. 5. 18!)1>.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 5, 1896.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Phila-

delphia county.

Action by Joseph Wood against the Penn-

sylvania Railroad Company. Judgment for

defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Atiirmed.

li‘rederi('k J. Knaus and Thomas Leaming,

for appellant. John Hampton Barnes and

Geo. Tucker Bispham, for appellee.

Appeal from court or common pleas, PblladelphitL eountr.
Aetion by Joseph ·wood against the Penn·
Rylnrnia Railroad Company. Judgment for
cll•ft•ncl11nt. l'laiutiff uppeuls. Allirmed.
Frt' cleri<·k J. Knaus nncl Thomas Leaming,
fur appt•llnnt. John Hampton llnrnes and
Geo. Tucker Bispham, for appPllee.

DEAN, J. We take the facts as stated by

the court below, as follows: “On the 26th of

October, 1893, the plaintiff, having bought a

return ticket, went as a passenger upon the

railroad of the defendant company t'rom

Frankford to Holmesburg. After spending

the day there, attending to some matters of

business, he concluded to come back upon a

way train, due at Holmesburg at 5 minutes
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after 6 in the evening. While waiting for

this train, the plaintiff stood on the platform

of the station, which was on the north side

of the tracks, at the eastern end of the plat-

form, with his back against the wall at the

corner. To the eastward of the station, a

street crosses the railroad at grade. How

far this crossing is from the station does not

appear from the evidence. It was not so

far away, however, but that persons on the

platform could see objects at the crossing.

For at least 150 yards to the eastward of the

crossing the railroad is straight, and then

curves to the right. About 6 o'clock an

express train coming from the east up-

on the north track passed the station, and

the plaintiff, while standing in the position

described, was struck upon the leg by what

proved to be the dead body of a woman. and

was injured. The headlight of the approach-

ing locomotive disclosed to one of the wit-

nesses who stood on the platfrom two wo-

men in front of the train at the street cross-

ing, going from the south to the north side ,

1
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St. 293, to these facts, the question on which

the case turns ls: “Was the injury the natu-

rnl and probable consequence of the negli-

gence,—such a consequence as, under the sur-

rounding circumstances, might and ought to-

have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as

likely to ﬂow from his act?" As concerns

the situation of plaintiff at the time of his

injury, and the relation of that fact to the

cause, whether near or remote, we do not

consider it important. He was where he

had a right to be,—ou the platform of the

station. That he had purchased a ticket for

passage on defendant's road, and was wait-

- ing on its platform for his train, has no par_

ticular bearing on the question. The duty

of defendant to him at that time was to pro-

vide a platform and station, safe structures,

for him and others who desired to travel. In

this particular its duty was performed. The,

injury is not in the remotest degree attribu- .

table to the platform or the station. It is

DJ.;AN, J. ·we take the facts ai; statecl by
the court below, as follows: "On the '.!lith ot
Oetober, 18!13, the plaintiff, having bought a
return ticket, went us a passenger upon the
railroacl or the defendant company from
Frankforcl to Hohnt•Hburg. Afte1· spending
the day there, attending to some matte1·s of
businP~s . he conclude<l to come back upon a
way train, due at Holmcsburg ut ;; miuutl•s
nfter 6 In the evening. While waiting for
this train, the plaintiff stood on the platform
or the station, which was on the north sicle
of the tracks, at the eai;tern end of the platform, with his bnck against the wnll at the
corner. To the eastward or t11e station, 9.
ist ree t crosses the raill'Olld at gmde. How
fnr this croi;sing is from the station doPs not
a11pear from the evidenee. It was not so
fat• awny, however, but thnt p<.'rsons on the
platform could see objects at the crossing.
For nt lea11t 150 yarcl11 to the eastw:u·d of the
crosi-;ing the railroad Is strnight, and then
<'urves to the right.
About 6 o'cloc·k an
exprt>ss trnin eomini:: from the east upon the no1·th truck pnssed the station, nnd
the plnintiff, while stancling in the position
de><cribed, waR struck upon the leg by what
proved to be the dead body of a woman. and
was injured. The benclllglit of tlw approaching locomotive disclosed to one of the wit·
uesses who stood on the platfrom two women In front of the train at the street crossing, going from the south to the north side
or the traeks. One succeeded in getting
across In safety, ancl the other was strnck
just nhout ns she rt>nehecl the north rnil.
How the woman came to be upon the tr:H'k
lhl'l't' ii; nothini: in the evidence to show.
"l'ht•rP wns evitl<'nce thnt no hell wns rung or
whistle hlown upon the trnln whieh struck
t!JP woman Ill' fore it cnme to the crm1!:'ing.
nrnl some eviclenee that it was runniug nt
the rnte of from 50 to GO miles an hour.
l"pon this state of fact11, thl' trial judge ent<•rc•cl a nornmit." Tiu.• eonrt In l1anc having
aftc•rwm-cl!I rl'fUSl'cl tu take off the nonKuit,
we have thl!; 1111pe:11.
'Vns tlw lll'g'lif:l'll<'I' of dl'fenclnnt tilt' Jll'OX·
lmah• <'llUfle of plrrlnlitf's in,lmy'! .Tuell{<' l'c•n·
nypnck!'l', clPlin·rini: the opinion or n majority of the c•onrt lwlow. <·011d11tlt•1l It w a s n ot,
and r<.'fllst•1l t o tnk<· olf the mmsnit. Applying the rule in Hoag v. Hailroad Co., S;:i l'a.

1

1

St. 2!l3, to these fncts, the qut•stion on whkb
the case turns ls: "Wns the injury the natu·
ral and probable cousequence or the negli·
genC'e,-such 11 const'quence us, under the t1m·roundlng circumstances, mlgllt nud ought to
ha n~ been foreseen by the wrongdoe1· as
likPly to flow from his net r
As COllCl'l'llS
the situntion of plaintiff nt the time of his
injury, and the relation of that faet to the
cause, whether neur or remote, we do not
cou1;ider It important. He wns wlll're he
had a right to be,--0n the platform of Hie
st n ti on. Tba t he had pun·hased a ticket for
p11i<snge on defenclant's road, and was waiting on Its platform for his train, has no par ..
tieula1· bearing on the question. The duty
or clPfendant to him at that time was to provide a platform ancl Rtation, safe structures,
for him nnd others who ch~i;ired to travel. In
this particular Its duty was lJerformed. The
In.fury Is not In the remotei;t clt•gree ath·ibutahlf' to the platform or the station. It is
sutttek•ut to say, when there, he was not a
tre><p:r><ser on derendant's property, and
thl'refore his action does not rail for that
1·pason; but he is In no more favorable situatiou as a suitor than It' be bad beeu walking
nlong!;lde the railroad, on the public highway, or at any other pince whl're he bad a
rigllt to be. The rule quoted In Hoag v.
Huilroad Co.. suprn, Is, In substance, the eonclusion ot· Lord Bacon, and the one given In
Brown's Legal Maxims. It Is not only the
well-settled rule of this state, but Is, gen·
erally, that of the United States. Prof. Jagganl, In his valuable work ou 'l'orts, after a
rt'ference to very many of the cases decided
In a large number of the states, among them
Hoag v. Hnllroad Co., comes to this conclusion: "It is ndmit ted that the rule Is cllfllcult of application. But It Is genPrally held
that. In order to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act not amounting to wanton
wrong, Is a proximate cause of an injury, it
must appear that the injury was the nnt·
ural and probable eonst•c1uence or the negligence or wrou:-;ful net, and that It ought to
have been fo!'l•seen in the light of the atten<liug clrcumstauees." Jag. 'l'orts, c. 5.
Judge Cooley ~tates the rule thus: "If the
orii:inal net was wrongful. and would not·
urally, aecordiug to the ordinary course or
e,·ents. prove Injurious to some others, and
result, nud does a<"tnally result, In lujnry,
through the i?1trrventiou of other causes not
wrongful, the injury Rhall be referred to the
wrougful c1111s('. pnssing through thoKe
whi<"h w<.'re innocent." Cooley, Tort!!, 6!1.
'J'hi!". nl:>o, Is in substnuce the rule of H ongo
v. Hnilroacl Co. All the speeulntions and
refinPments or the 1ihllo"oplwn• on the exnrt
rl'lations or cause nnd cll'ret hPlp us VPl',V
littl<' in the cl<'tt•rminntion of rult•s of so<'i:il
concluet. The jnriclical causr, iu surh a.
case'. as we have helcl ovc>r nncl over, Is hl'st
asc·prlain(•(l In the J>l'al'tieal alTnirs ot lire
hy tht• appli<-atlon to tl11.• fart!" of the rule in
Ho11g v. Hailroad Co. Aclnpting that rul<.' as
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the test of defendnni‘s liability, how do we '

determine the natural and probable conse-

quences, which must be foreseen, of this '

act? We answer in this and all like cases:

from common experience and observation.

The probable consequence of crossing a rail-

road in front of a near and approaching

train is death. or serious injury. Therefore,

acting from an impulse to self-preservation,

or on the reﬂection that prompts to self-

preservation, we are deterred from ci'ossing.

Our conduct is controlled by the natural and

probable consequence of what our experi- ‘

ence enables us to foresee. True, a small

number of those who have occasion to cross

railroads are reckless, and, either blind to or

disregardful of consequences, cross, and are

injured, killed, or barely escape.‘ But this

recklessness of the very few in no degrce
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disproves the forcsccableness of the conse- ‘

quences by mankind generally. Again, the

competent railroad engineer knows from his

ownexperience and that of others in like

employment that to approach a grade high-

way crossing with a rapidly moving train

without warning is dangerous to the lives

and limbs of the public using the crossing.

He knows death and injury are the probable .

consequences of his neglect of duty; there-

fore he gives warning. But does any one

believe the natural and probable conse-

quence of standing 50 feet from a crossing,

to the one side of a railroad, when a train is

approaching. either with or without warn-

ing, is death or injury? Do not the most

prudent, as well as the public generally, all

over the land, do just this thing every day,

without fear of danger? The crowded plat- I

forms and grounds of railroad stations, gen-

erally located at crossings. alongside of ap-

proaching, departing, and swiftly passing‘

trains, prove that the public, from experi-

ence and observation, do not, in that situa- ,

tion, foresee any danger from trains. They

are there because, in their judgment, ai- ‘

though it is possible a train may strike an 1

object. animate or inanimate, on the truck, ‘

and hurl it against them, such a consequence

is so highly improbable that it suggests no

sense of danger. They feel as secure as if‘

in their homes. To them it is no more prob-

able than that a train at that point will jump

the track and run over them. If such a ‘

consequence as here resulted was not nat-

ural, probable, or foreseeable to anybody

else, should defendant. under the rule laid .

down in Hoag v. Railroad Co., be charge- -

able with the consequence? Clearly, it was ‘

not the natural and probable consequence

of its neglect to give warning, and therefore

was not one which it was bound to foresee.

The injury. at most, was remotely possible, as

distinguished from the natural and probable

consequences of the neglect to give warning. ‘

-As is said in Railroad Co. v. Trich, 117 Pa.

St. 399, 11 Atl. 627: “llesponsibili'ty does

not extend to every consequence which may '

-possibly result from negligence." What we .

the t.•st or <lPfentlant'!! liahility, how do we '
<h>tt•rmi1w rhe n11tural antl prohable conse•
quPnC'Ps. whlrh must he forE>sren. of' this
art? \Ye 111Jswer in this and nil like C'asPs:
from common experlenee nnd obsen·ntlun.
The probnhlr ronsequenee of crm~slng a 1·allruall lu front of a near null approaehlng
train Is death, or Sl'riuus Injury. Therefore,
nettng from an Impulse to sl'if-prcst•rvntion,
or ou the refit>ctlou that prompts to s••lt·
prl'sl'lTaLlon, we arc (IL•terrl'tl from erossilrg.
Our f·onduet is ('Ontrnll\'d by the natural and
probable conse1111P11l'e of what our experlt>nee enables us to fon•see. True, a sma II
num!Jer of those who ha\'e oeensluu to cross
railroads are reekless, and, ellher blind to or
disregardful of consequ(•nees, <:ross, and are
injured, killed, or harPly P!ll'Upe.' But this
rl'<:·klessness ot thl' very few In no d1•A'n•e
dispro·n'8 the for<>s1•eablenrss or the consequences by mankind J:'Pnernlly. Ai.:nln, the
com11etent railroad t•ng-lneer knows from hi!!
own · experlPnre and th11 t of otlwrs In 11ke
employment that to apprnneh a gradt' highway crossing with a rapidly moving train
without warning Is dangerous to the liYes
and llmb11 of the puhllc using the crMslng.
He knows death and Injury are the probable
conse11uen<'es or his nPgket or cluty; tlwre tore he giYes warning. But doPs any one
believe the natural nnd probable <'onsequence of standing 50 feet from a C'ros:<ing,
to the one side of a rajlrond, when a train !s
approaching, either with or without warning, Is death or Injury? Do not the most
prndent, as well as the public genPrally, all
over the lancl, do just this thing every dny,
without tear of danger"! The crowded platforms amt grounds or railroad stations, gen·
erally located at ero11sings, alongslcle of llP·
proaehlng, clepartlng, and 11wlftly passing
trains, prove that the public, trom experl·
enC'e and observation. do not, In that situation, fort>See any flnn;:Pr from trains. Thf'y
are there be<'mlsE', In their judgment, although It Is possible a train may strike au
ohjeet, animate or Inanimate, on the triwk,
and hurl It against tlwm, sue11 a consr11uence
Is so highly huprolmble thnt It tmi.:;:ests no
senst> of 1l:tnger. ThPy f1•1•I as sPenr.. ns tr·
In their homPB. To them It Is no morP p!'llhable than that a train at thnt point will jump
the track ancl run over the m. Ir sueh a
consequence as here result l'<l was not nat·
nral, probable, or forrsP<' :thle to anyhody
else, should defendant. under the rule la id
11own In Hoag v . Hailroad Co.. be ch a r~e
able with the conseqne nf'e? CIParly, It wus
not the natural an<l prohahle eon,.;pqn<'nce
of Its nt>gleet to gtye warning. and thl>rpfore
was not one which It was bound to forPsr<>.
'l'he injurr. at most, was rPmotl'ly pos,.;ililt>, ns
distinguislw<l from tlw natural aml prol111hle
eon;;equen('es of the n Pglef't to give warning.
. As ls 1<aitl In Hallroad Co. v. Trif'i1. 117 l'a.
l't. 300. 11 Atl. G27: "H<'"ll"usihmty <l•ws
not extend to e very f'OllS<'fJUl'll<'e whl<-h may
.pu:>sil.Jly re.suit from negligi•nee." \\'hat we
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hn\"e said thus tar is on the assumption the
accident was en used solely by the negliJ:'ence or defendant, or by the concurring negligence or defendant nntl the om• killed going upon the track with a loc~Hnotln! in full
view.
'l'hls being an action by an lnnor-Pnt thirtl person, he cannot be depri\·p1I of
his remedy bt>ea use his injury resulted from
the conl'\llTPnt negligence of two others. He
fails becnul<e his Injury was a conse11uence
so remote that clL•feudaut coul1I not reasonably fO!'l'Sl'(' it.
But therP Is another view which may be·
t:1lwn of this evidence. Assuming deftondant was negligent, did that negligPnce contribute In any degree to the result? The
uneoutradleteli eYidence showed the train
rould lw s1•en from 150 to 200 yards distant.
Plniutitf himself h•stitles he ht>aru It corning,
although he heard no whlstit' or bt•ll ; and
all his wituei,:ses had notice of It. EYen
those sitt hlA' In the wa itiug mum got up to
go out, supposing It was their train. Some
heard the rnmhllng; !Wille saw the beaulight. Assume, then, the fact to be that no
wnrning was given by bell or whistle, and in
thnt p:irtl<'nlar ilPFPtlllnnt, In Its general duty
to the public, was negligent, was this the
carn'le of the injury? To so !Incl, we mu!!t
prPsume the deeeusecl and her companion
fuli(•d to hear or see what all the others saw
or heard. There Is no renRon for such presumption. \\'hile, In the absence of any evidence on the question, the prl'fmmptlon
woulu he that th1~ two wonwn, before crossing, stopped, looked, and listened, and then,
becausP no warning was given. they, without apprPhem1lon or danger, attempted to
cros!!, still, when all the other wltneHses with
like opportunit~· either saw the hPn111lght orhenrd the rumblinA' of the apt1roachlng train,
the rl'a~onable pl'PR1111111tlon Is they saw and
heard It too. If this be so, thPy attemptl'd
to cross with the same knowl!'tlge of the
same prril thPy would have ha<l If the bell
had Ul't'll rung anti whistle blown. Therefore the sole causp of the Injury wa!! not the
nPA'ligPnce or defendant, but the negligence
ot deepased. In sueh case there could have
l.Jet•n no rPeoYery by the rr11n.•sentativPs of
the de<·eased woman. _for, whatever might
ha,·e l.Je<•n the ncgligenl'e of dl'flondnut. It
was no more the eause of the nel'it!Pnt than
If it hnd twgledt>tl to give warning at some
othPr <'ros,;iug. 'rhe ease coulcl not have
reaC'hl'tl the jury unlPss tlwy bad been permitted to Infe r shP had IH'ither. SPen nor
hranl the same warnlnA's that all plaint itr•s
wit1wsses saw nnd heart!. It the companion
of <le1"<>:1sed, or other witnri<sP!!, had testitiPd
thPy ne ithe r saw nor hearcl the approal'hingy
trnin, the cai,:e woulcl have bppn altogether
differPnt; but. as it s tood. then• was no proof
that thp ailt•gecl llPglig-enee Of defpndan
eontrihntNI to the dPath of thl' woman. In
this view the Ul'A'lig-Pll<'l' W:t>! not even C'O'Il·
rnrrPnt. Trn<>. tl1Pre was neg"ll\!Pllf'l', but
tile smue result fofluwed as if 1kft•11dunt bnd
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exercised care. Therefore the injury was such warning if the public be apprised of

attributable to her sole negligence. While the danger by other sounds or signals. The

the proper warning on approaching a cross- injury -then is caused solely by the neglect of

lug is the sound of a whistle or the ringing the injured person to heed the danger.

of a hell, no accident can be properly said to On both grounds we think the nonsuit was
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be the consequence of the neglect to give Properly entet‘ed- The judgment is ﬂﬂirmed-

DIHECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-IN TORT.

excr<'ised care. Therefore the injury was
attributable to her sole negligence. While
the proper warning on approaching a crossing is the sound <>f a whistle or the ringing
of a bell, no accident can be properly said to
be the consequence or the neglect to g1ve

.

such warning If the public be apprised of
the danger by other sounds or signals. The
Injury then ls caused solely by the neglect of
the Injured person to heed the danger.
On both grounds we think the nonsuit was
properly entered. The judgment ls amrmed.
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GI~:S v. DELAWAR~ CANAL CO.
(26 Atl. 70, M Vt. 213.)
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.

GILSON v. DELAVVARI~ CANAL CO.

(26 Atl. 70, 65 Vt. 213.)

Supreme Court of Vermont, General Term.

Dec. 22, 1892.

Exceptions LT0ID Rutland county court;

Thompson, Judge.

‘Action by E. P. Gllson, receiver, against the

Delaware & Hudson Canal Company, to re-

cover damages for the diversion of a water

course. whereby plaintiffs quarry was ﬂood-

ed. Judgment was entered in favor of plain-

tiff, and defendant excepts. Judgment af-

ﬁrmed.

The plaintiff brought suit as the receiver

of the Dorset Marble Company. His evi-

dence tended to prove that the defendant had,

by the construction of its railroad embank-

ment, diverted an ancient water course from
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its accustomed channel into his quarry, and

had also collected and discharged surface

water into said quarry. The railroad of the

defendant, at the point complained of, was

constructed in 1884, along a steep hillside. At

one point there had been for many years a

water course which drained at certain seasons

of the year a considerable territory, but which

during a considerable portion of the year was

entirely dry. From the point where this

water course crossed the line of the defend-

ant's railroad the land gradually descended

towards the quarry of the plaintiff. In con-

structing its railroad the defendant made no

provision for the passage of the water running

in this water course underneath its track. and

the complaint of the plaintiff was that the de-

fendant had thereby diverted this water

course, and discharged it, together with the

surface water which was collected by this

embankment, into his quarry. The land, at

the point where the water course crossed the

line of the defendant's railroad, belonged to

the Vermont Marble Company, as did the

land between that point and the plaintiff's

quarry. Upon this land of the Vermont Mar-

ble Company, and in close proximity to the

defendant's quarry, were two abandoned

quarries, owned by said Vermont Marble

Company, and these abandoned quarries were

partially ﬁlled with water at all times. The

effcct of the defendants embankment, as

constructed, was to deﬂect whatever water

ran in the water course and whatever sur-

face water ran down the sidehill, and to con-

duct it along the side and into the ﬁrst of

these abandoned quarries. When this quar-

ry became ﬁlled with water the water would

overﬂow into the second abandoned quarry,

which lay adjacent to the quarry of the

plaintiff. This quarry was separated from

the plaintiffs quarry by what appeared to be

a solid wall of rock, and this dividing wall

rose to such a height upon the surface that

the water would ﬂow over the track of the

defendant before passing into the quarry of

the plaintiff. From the depression around

the ﬁrst abandoned quarry a culvert was

constructed underneath the defendants track.

Supl'('roe Court of Vermont, General Tenn.
Dec. 22, 1892.
Exceptions irom Rutland county court;
Thompson, Judge.
action by E. P. Gilson, receiver, against the
Delaware & Hudson Canal Company, to reCOYer damages for the diversion of a water
course. whereby plalntUJ's quarry was flooded. Judgment was entered In favor of plaintllT, and defendant excepts. Judgment affirmed.
The platntltr brought suit as the receiver
of the Dorset Marble Comp:my. His evidence tended to prove that the defendant had,
hv the construction of Its railroad emhnnkn~ent. dh·erted an ancient wntN course from
Its acc11stome1l channel Into his quarry, and
had also collected and discharged surface
water into snit! quarry. TI1e railroad of the
defendant, at the point complained of, was
constructed tn 1884, along a steep hillside. At
one point there bad beeu for many years a
water course which drained at certain seasons
of the year a considerable territory, but which
during a considerable portion of the year was
entirely dry. From the point where this
water course crossed the line of the defendant's railroad the land gradually descended
towards the quarry of the plalntltr. In constructing Its railroad the defendant made no
provision for the passage of the water running
In this water course underneath Its track, and
the complaint of the plalntltr was that the defendant had thereby diverted this water
course, and discharged It, together with the
surface water which was collected by this
embankment, Into his quarry. The land, at
the point where the water course crossed the
line of the defendant's railroad, beloni;:ed to
the Vermont Marble Company, as did the
land between that point and the plalnt!IT'e
quarry. Upon this land of the Vermont )farble Company, and In close proximity to the
defendant's quarry, were two abandoned
quarries, owned by said Vermont )fnrble
Company, and these abandoned quarries were
partially filled with water at all times. The
effect of the de(endanrs embankment, as
constructed, was to deflect whatever water
ran In the water course and whatever surface water ran down the sillPhlll, and to conduct It along the side and Into the first of
these ahantloneu quarries. 'Vhen this quarry bec:ime filled with water the water woul1l
overflow Into the second abandoned qunrry,
wltlch lay adjacent to the quarry of the
plalutilT. This quarry was separated from
the plaintlfT's quarry hy what appeared to he
a solid wall of rock, and this dividing wall
rose to suclt a height upon the surface that
the ~n1ter would flow ovPr the track of the
defendant hefore pas11lng Into the quarry of
the plalntur. From the depression around
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the first abandoned quarry a culvert was
constructed underneath the defendant's track.
The claim of the defendant wns that this
culvert was su11lclent to carry olr the water
which was conducted as above described Into the first abandoned quarry, and there was
no que!!tlon but what It had proved sufficient
from 1884, when the embankment was constructed, down to the time of the Injury. In
JnmtaQ·, 1888, occurred a freshet which the
witnesses described as the most serious eYer
known In that locality. In the course of this
freshet large quantities of water rnn down
the hlllslde, were turned by the defendant's
embankment, and discharged Into the first
abandoned quarry. This quarry was filled
up by the unusual llood of water. and thereupon the water overflowed Into the second
abandoned quarry, rising In that quarry
to a point considerably above that at which
It ordinarily stood. From this quarry It
burst through the dividing wall which separated It from the plaintiff's quarry, whereby
the damage complained of was done. Theevldence of the defendant tended to show
that the ancestors of the plalnt!IT, at some
time previous to the construction of the defendant's railroad, had, In the excavation of
the plalntllT's quarry. encroached some 8
or 10 feet upon the lands of the Vem1ont
~Iarble Company, and thereby so weakened
the dividing wall that It had burst through
under the pressure of the water. The defendant claimed that If the ancestors of the
plalntltr had trespassed upon the lands of
the Vermont Marble Company, and In so doing so weakened the dividing wall as to occasion the Injury In question, the plnlntitr
could not recover, and requested the court
to so Instruct the jury. This the court declined to do, and Instructed the jury that,
In determining the Issue lnvoh'ed, It was Immaterial whether the plalnt!IT's ancestors.
hnd or hnd not worked over onto the land of
the Vermont ~Iarble Company, and that, Irthey had, It would be no defense to this action, to which the defendant excepted.
F. G. Swlnlngton, tor plalntllf.
Prouty, for defendant.

C. A..

ROWELL, J. It Is a maxim of the law
that the Immediate, not the remote, c111ise
of an event Is regarded. In the application
of this maxim, the Jaw rejects, as not constituting ground for an action, damage not
flowing proximately from the act complained
of. In other words, the lnw always refers
the damage to tile proximate, not the remote,
cause. It is laid down In many cases 11nd by
lending text writers that, in order to warmnt a finding that negligence or an 11ct not
amounting to wanton wrong ls the proximate cause of an Injury, It must appear that
the Injury was the natural and probable seqnenee of the negl!gl'IH'e or the wrongful net,
and that It was s11d1 as might or ought to
have been foreseen In the light of the attend-
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ing circumstances; but this rule is no test

in cases where no intervening eiiicient cause

is found between the original wrongful act

and the injurious consequences complained

of, and in which such consequences, although

not probable. have actually ﬂowed in un-

broken sequence from the original wrongful

act. This is well illustrated by Stevens v.

Dudley, 56 Vt. 158, which was this: Defend-

ant was a marshal at the fair, and, in chain-

ing the track for a race, he turned off a

man's team so negligently that the man was

thrown from his wagon. his horse broke

loose, and ran against plaintiff's wagon. and

injured him. The court below charged that

defendant was not liable unless he might

reasonably have expected plaintiff's injury

to result from his act. Held error, and that

the court should have charged that if the de-
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fendant negligently turned the team oilf the

track, and thereby the team was deprived of

the control of a driver, and became fright-

ened, and ran over plaintiff's team, and cans-

ed the injury, without any superior, uncon-

trollable force, or without the negligence of

. a responsible agent, having intervened. the

defendant would be liable, although he did

not anticipate, and might not have anticipat-

ed. such consequences from his negligent act;

in other words, that the court should have

charged that if defendant's act was negli-

gent. and in the natural order of cause and

ffcct the plaintiff was injured thereby, the

defendant was liable. Smith v. Railway Co.,

L. R. G C. P. 14, in the excheqner chamber,

is to the same eﬁ‘ect. There the company's

workmen, after cutting the grass and trim-

ming the hedges‘ bordering the railway,

placed the trimmings in heaps between the

hedge and the line, and allowed them to re-

main there for several days during very dry

weather. which had continued for some

weeks. A ﬁre broke out between the hedge

and the rails, and burned some of the heaps

of trimmings and the hedge, and spread to a

stubble ﬁeld beyond, and was thence car-

ried by a high wind across the stubble ﬁeld

and over a road, and burned plaintiffs cot-

tage. 200 yards away from where the ﬁre

began. There was evidence that an engine

had passed the spot shortly before the ﬁre

was ﬁrst seen, but no evidence that it bad

emitted sparks. nor any further evidence

that the ﬁre originated from the engine: nor

was there any evidence that the ﬁre began

a the heaps of trimmings, and not on the

parched ground around them. The court

below held that the plaintiff could not re-

cover, because no reasonable man would

have foreseen that the ﬁre would consume

the hedge. and pass across a stubble ﬁeld.

and so get to plaintiff's cottage, at a dis-

tance of 200 yards from the railway. cross-

ing a road in its passage. In the exchequer

‘chamber, Chief Baron Kelly said that he

felt pressed, at ﬁrst. by this view, because

he then and still thought that any reasonable

man might well have failed to anticipate
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lug circumstances; hut this rule Is no test such a concurrence of circumstances as the
in cases where no intervening efficient cause case presented; hut that, on consideration,
Is found bE>tween the original wrongful act he thought that was not the true test of de11nd the Injurious consequences complained ( fendant's liability; thnt It might be that deof, and in which such consequences, although fendant did not anticipate. and was not
not prohable, have actually Howed In un- bound to anticipate, that plalntlfl"s eottage
brokl'n sequence from the original wronj?ful would be burned as the result of Its neglill<'t. This is well Illustrated by Stevens v. gence; but yet, If lt was aware that the
Dudley, !:iU Yt. Ui8, which wns this: Defcnd- heaps were lying by the side of the rails.
nnt was a marshal at the fair, and, in chain- and that It was a dry se11son, and that, therei11g the tra('k for a rnce, he tumed oft' a fore, b~· being left there, the henps were lilH'man's team so nt•j?ligently that the man was ly to c,at<-h fire, defendant was bound to }lrothrown from his wagon. Ws hor8e h1·oke vi<le against all eircumstances that might
loose, and ran agninst plaintiff's wagon. and re:mlt from this, and was responsible for
injured him. The court below chnrged that nil natu:·al con>'equences of It; nud with
defendant was not liable unless he might this agreed all the jml1?es. Channell, B., said
rPnsonnhly have ex11ectNI plaintiff's injury tb11t, where there Is no direct evldenee of
to t"<•sult from his act. Held error, and that neglii;\'enc:e, the question what a re11sonahle
the court should h:1ve <'hargt:>d that If the de- man might foresee ls of Importance In confendant llP1?li1?ently tm·npd the team off the sidering whrther there Is evidence for thr
track. aml thereby the team w11s de1n·ln•d of jury of negligence or not; and ~Ii"..Justice
the control of 11 driver, 11nd hpcame frii.rht- Bl:wkhuru sflid that what the drfendaut
enecl. and rnn over plaintiff's team. and cuus- might reasonably anticipate was materinl
e1l the injury. without 1111y superior. uncon- only with referenee to the question wlwthtrollahle forcC', or without the neirligence of er it was negligPnt or not. but could not aln 1·csponsihle agent, h:n·ing intN\'l'nc<I. the tPr !ti; liahility If It was negligent. In n~·
cll'fendant would be liable, although hP rllrl l:mcls '" FletehPr, L. R. 3 H . L. 332. fin the
not antlcipute, and might not have antl<'ipat- housr of lords.) Lord Crnnworth sa~·s. that,
ed. sueh consequenePs from bis negligC"nt net; In rnm:i<lcri11g wlwthrr a defendnnt is ll11hle
In other words, that the court should have to a plaintiff for d11mage that the lattrr has
l'lmrgecl that If rlC"femlllnt's net was 1wgli- su8tai11e11. the question In geneml Is not
l!.'Pnt. and In the natural order of C'ause nnd whethPr the defendant has acted with due
ff Pet the plaintiff' was injnred thereh)·, the
care alHI eaution, but whether his nets ocl·aclt•fernlnnt was liable. Smith v. Railway Co., Rioned the dnnrnge; that this is 1111 well exL. It. II C. P. H. In the exrll('f!Uer chamher, plninrd In the old case or Lambert v. Besser.
Is to the snme cffN·t. There the l'Omtmny's T. Raym. 421, reported by Sir Tl!omas Rn~·
w0t·k111en, 11fter cuttinJ! tlw 1?rnss and trim- mond; that thr doctrine Is founded i11 good
ming the hedges· bordering the rnilway, sense. for where one, in managing his owu
plnt·etl the trhnmlngR In lwnps h1>tw1•en the affairs. causes. howPvPr lnno<'entl~·. d11mage
hPrlgr and the line. and allowed them to rE>- to another. it is obviously only just that he
main thl're for several d11ys during n•ry dry should be the llllrty to suffer; that he Is
wra tlwr. which h11d c·ontlnuecl for some bound so to use his own 11s not to injure 11nweeks. A tire broke out between tl!e lwdge other. In Smith ''· Fletelwr. L. R. 7 Ex<"h.
:wd the l'llils. nnd burned some of the hC'aps ~05, defendants' mines adjoined nnd comof trimmings and the hedge, and sprC"ad to a munkated with plaintlfl"s mlnrs, and on the
stnhhle field beyond, 11nd was HwneP car- surface of defendants' land were certain holried by a high wind acro>'s the stubhlt> field lows and openings. partly c11ust>d hy defendand o\·er a i·oad, and lmrned plaintif'l'"s cot- 11nts' workings, and partly made to f11cllitnte
t11gP. 200 ~·ards a wny from where the fire them. Across the sm·f:lee of defl'ndants'
hfga n. Thc~re was evidr1we that an <'ngine 11111d there ran a brook, which the~· hall dlhnd pnsscd the i;pot shortly beforn the fire '\'erted from its original course into nn artlwns first seen, but no evidence that it hall fici11I (•h11nnel they had maclP, 11nll. which. by
emlttPd sparkR, nor 11ny further PYitlence reason of <'Xceptlon111ly heavy rains, overthnt the fire orlgln11ted from the engin<': nor Howrd Its banks, and quantities of w11ter
was there any evlllenee that the fire he1?11n poured from it into said hollows and openn the he11ps of trimmings, and not on the ings, where already the rains had caused an
1mrehe1l ground around them. The court unusual nmount of water to collect, and
below held that the plaintiff could not re- thence, through fissure!! and cracks, water
c•over, hrc>ause no reasonable man would passed Into defenllants' mine, and so Into
1111 ve rorPseen that the fire would consume plalntifI's mine. If the land had been in
the hedge, and p11ss across a stubble field. its natural condition, the water would have
and so get to plaintiff's cottage, nt a dls- Rpread over the surface. and done no h11rm.
t1111ce of 200 yards from the railway. cross- 'l'he defendants tendered evidence to show
ing a rond In its passage. In the exchequer that they had t11ken every reasonable precaud1mnber. Chief Baron Kelly s11l<l thnt be tion to guard 11g11 lm1t ordinary emergencies,
frlt pressed, 11t first. by this view, bec>anse and . that they had, by diverting and Improvlw thrn nnd still thought that any re111>on11hle ing the wntrr course. nnd otherwise, greatly
man might well have fnlled to antklpate ie,,:~enl'd the cbanee of water escaping from
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the surface of the land into their own mines,

and thence into the plaintiff's mine; and con-

1he snrfn<"e of the land Into their own mines,
Jilld thence Into the plaintiff"s mine; and contendrd. that they were not liable for the consequpuc·e!i or nn exceptlon:il flood. It wns
<•onrPded that they b:ul not been guilty of
any personal nt•glige1H P; but the court ruled
that they were absolutely liable for the consequences, and rejected the evhll•rn·t'. und
a Yerdlct was taken for the plnlntltY, whiC'h
was allowed to stand. Baron Hrnmwt>ll, in
disposing of the case In hanc, sul(\ that the
dt•feml:rnts, for their own purposes, and without proYiding the means of Its getting away
without hurt, brought the water to the place
whence It e:,1raped, and did the mlsrhll'f, and
that that made a l'ase ugainst them l'all!ng
for an nuswrr. a11d thnt tht•y nnswercll:
"We brought the wnter there, Indeed, and
did not provide a suttkieut outlet fo1· It; \mt,
had we not altl'r<'ll the original rours<' of the
sh·<'am, it wouhl have eseaped in greater
qm1111ith•s, and l\onl' more misl'hiPf,"- whid1,
he said. wns no auswrr. SPe Cahill Y. Eastmnn. l~ ~Ilnn. :l'..!4. (Gil. 2!l::!.)
In the casl' at har the defrnd:rnt. tor purposf's of Its own. wrongfully turm'1t the
hrook from its natural channel, nml lrt It
flow towards plaintiff's quarry. not knowing whnt would hnppen, wht>rl'hy lnr;.:e nml
unusual quantitlf's of water Wl're hrou;.:ht
to and accumulated In the marble eou1pa11~"s
nhnndoueu quarries, nnrl It wa8 the 1lnty of
the defendants to !WP that no lhlmagc was
thereby done; and the fnct that It did not
know. and had no reason to suspect, that
the plaintiff's predecessors had worked thl'lr
0

tended that they were not liable for the con-

sequences of an exceptional ﬂood. It was

conceded that they had not been guilty of

any personal negligence; but the court ruled

that they were absolutely liable for the con-

sequences, and rejected the evidence, and

a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, which

was allowed to stand. Baron Bramwell, in

disposing of the case in banc, said that the

defendants, for their own purposes, and with-

out providing the means of its getting away

without hurt, brought the water to the place

whence it escaped, and did the mischief. and

that that made a case against them calling

for an answer, and that they answered:

“We brought the water there, indeed, and

did not provide a sutiicient outlet for it; but,
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had we not altered the original course of the

stream, it would have escaped in greater

quantities, and done more mischief,"—which,

he said. was no answer. See Cahill v. East-

man. 18 \Iinn. 32-l. (Gil. 292.)

In the case at bar the defendant, for pur-

poses of its own. wrongfully turned the

brook from its natural channel, and let it

ﬂow towards plaintiff's quarry, not know-

ing what would happen, whereby large and

unusual quantities of water were brought

to and accumulated in the marble company's

abandoned quarries, and it was the duty of

the defendants to see that no damage was

thereby done; and the fact that it did not

know, and had no reason to suspect, that

the plaintiff's predecessors had worked their

quarry out of bounds, and thereby weakened

the wall between it and the adjacent quarry,

makes no difference, unless such fact consti-

tutes contributory negligence imputable to

the plaintiff. Now, an act or omission of a

party injured, or of those for whose acts

and omissions he is responsible, in order to

constitute contributory negligence, must have

related to something in respect of which he

or they owed to the defendant, or to those in

whose shoes he stands, the duty of being

careful, and have been negligent, and, in

the production of the injury, haw operated

as a proximate cause, or as one of the proxi-

mate causes, and not have been merely a

condition. It follows, therefore, that when

there is no duty there can be no negligence.

In working their quarry, the plaintiffs prede-

cessors 'did not know, and could not possibly

anticipate, the then nonexistent circumstan-

ces,—that years afterwards the defendant

would build a new road where it did in 1584,

and wrongfully turn the brook into the quar-

ries above, whereby their quarry would be

endangered if they weakened the wall by

working out of bounds. Their act in this

respect was not wrongful as to the defend-

ant. and they owed the defendant no duty

concerning it. and therefore negligence is not

predicable of it, even though it was wrong-

ful as to the marble company, with the rights

of which the defendant in no way connects
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quarry out of bounds, and the1·eby weakened
the wall between it and the adj:tcent quarry,
makes no difference, unless such fact constitutes contributory negllgt>nce hnputable to
the plnlntllT. Now, an· act or omission of a
party Injured, or of tboi;e for whose acts
and omissions he Is responsible, In order to
constitute C(}ntrlhutory negligence, must haYe
rC'lated to something In respeet of which he
or they owed to the defendant, or to those in
whose shoes be stands, the duty of being
eareful, and have heen negligt>nt. and, In
thl' production of the Injury, ha,-e operated
as a 11roximnte <'ause, or as one of the proximate rauses, and not have hl'<'ll merely a
condition. It follows, therefore, that when
tlll're Is no duty thl·re can be no ncgllgenl'e.
In working their quarry, the pl11lntllT's predecessors did not know, and could not possibly
antlelpat<>. the then nonrxlstl'nt C'lrcnm>ltances.-that years afterwards the defendant
would build a new road where It did In 1884,
:md wrongfully turn the brook Into the quarrl,,,. nhon', whereby tlwfr quarry wonhl he
endanger{'(l If they wenkenr<l the wall \Jy
wo1·ki11g out of hounds. Theh· net In till;;
rrsped wns not wrongful II!' to the defendant. an<l they owed the defendant no duty
Pone<>mlng it. and thel'l'fore ni>gllgence Is not
Jll'P<ll!'ah\p of It, e\·en though it was wronl!;ful 118 to t hi' mnrhle eomp:rny, with the rights
of whid1 th1• 1\!'fl'mlnnt In no way eon11e<'l1:<
Itself. 'l'he state of the wall, legally eonsitlered, was not n 11roximate rl\use of. the lujnry. hut was merely a eonclltion' that made
the Injury possihle. .Tudgment 11.ffl.rmed.
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KEEBLE v. KEEBLE.

(5 South. 149, 85 Ala. 552.)

Dec. 8, 1888.

Appeal from city court, Dallas county; John

Haralson, Judge.

This was an action brought by the appel-

lant, Henry C. Keeble, against the appellee,

Julia P. Keeble, as the executrix of R. C.

Keeble, deceased, for the recovery of money

alleged to be due the plaintiff by the de-

fendant's testator. The defendant pleaded

the general issue, payment, accord and satis-

faction, and set-off. The only question in the

case arose on the instruction given the jury

by the court, founded on the facts set out

in the eventh plea. The demurrer to this

plea was overruled by the court. It was, in

substance, that plaintiff and defendant's tes-

tator had been in partnership in the mercan-
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tile business. Plaintiff sold out to defend-

ant's testator, but was employed by the lat-

ter as business manager. The terms of the

employment imposed on plaintiff the obliga-

tion to wholly abstain from the use of in-

toxicating liquors, and, in the event he should

become intoxicated, that he should pay, “as

liquidated damages," the sum of $1,000. The

plea alleged that plaintiff violated his promise

to keep sober, and thereby became bound to

pay to defendant's testator said sum of $1,000,

(5 South. 149, 85 Ala. 552.)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 8, 1888.

Appeal from city court, Dallas county; John
Haralson, Judge.
'l'his was an action brought by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble, against the appellee,
Julla P. Keeble, as the executrix of R. 0.
Keeble, deceased, for the recovery of money
all<'ged to be due the plalntll'l'. by the defendant's testator. The defendant pleaded
the general Issue, payment, accord and satisfaction, and set-oft'.. The only question In the
case arose on the Instruction given the jury
by the court, founded on the facts set out
in the seventh plea. The demurrer to this
plea was overruled by the court. It was, In
substance, that plalntltf and defendant's testator had been In partnership In the mercantile business. Plalntllr sold out to defendant's testator, but was employed by the latter as business manager. '£he terms of the
employment Imposed on plalntllr the obligation to wholly abstain from the use of Intoxicating liquors, and, In the event he should
become Intoxicated, that he should pay, "as
liquidated damages," the sum of $1,000. The
plea alleged that plalntlfT violated his promise
to keep sober, and thereby became bound to
pay to defendant's testator sold sum of $1,000,
which sum was oft'.ered as a set-oft'. to plaintiff's demand.
Mr. Roy and White & White, for appellant.
Pettus & Pettus, for appellee.

which sum was offered as a set-of f to plain-

titl"s demand.

Mr. Roy and White & White, for appellant.

Pettus & Pettus, for appellee.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

SOMERVILLE, J. The only question in

this case is whether the sum of $1,000, agreed

to be paid by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble,

to Richard C. Keeble, the testator of the ap-

pellee, as mentioned in the written contract

of employment between the parties, is to be

regarded by the court as a penalty or as

liquidated damages. The city court held it,

in effect, to be liquidated damages, by char-

ging the jury to ﬁnd for the defendant, if

the facts set out in the seventh plea were

satisfactorily proved. The solution of this

question is one which the courts have often

confessed embarrassment in determining. No

one rule can be announced which will fur-

nish a single test or criterion for all cases,

but, in most cases, a multitude oi! considera-

tions are to be regarded in seeking to reach

the real intention of the parties. The follow-

ing general rules may be deduced from the

authorities, each having more or. less weight,

according to the peculiar circumstances of

each case, and the nature of the contract

sought to be construed: (1) The court will

always seek to ascertain the true and real in_-

tention of the contracting parties, giving due

weight to the language or words used in the

contract, but not always being absolutely con-

trolled by them, when the enforcement of

such contract operates with unconscionable

hardship, or otherwise works an injustice.

(2) The mere denomination of the sum to be

paid as “liquidated damages," .or as “a pen-

SO!\IERVILLE, J. The only question In
this case is whether the sum of $1,000, agreed
to be paid by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble,
to Richard C. Keeble, the testator of the appellee, as mentioned In the written contract
of employment between the parties, Is to be
regarded by the court as a penalty or as
liquidated damnges. The city court held It,
In effect, to be liquidated damagPs, by charging the jury to find for the defendant, lf
the !acts set out in the seventh plea were
satisfactorily proved. The solution of this
question Is one which the courts have often
confessed embarrnssment In determining. No
one rule can be announced which will furnish 11 single test or criterion for all cases,
but, In most coses, a multitude of considerations are to be regarded In seeking to reach
the renl Intention of the parties. The followh:g genPml rules may be deduced from the
authorltit>s, each having more- or. less weight,
according to the peculiar clrcnmstnnct>s of
each case, and the nature of the contract
sougllt to be construed: (1) The court will
always seek to ascertain the true and real ID~
tentlon of the contracting parties, giving due
weight to the language or words used In the
contract, but not always being absolutely controlled by thl'm, when the enforcement of
such contrnct operates with unconscionable
hardship, or otllerwlse works an Jnjm1tlce.

(2) The mere denomination of the sum to be
paid as "liquidated damages," .or as "a penalty," ls not conclusive on the court ns to
Its real character. .Although designated as
"liquidated damages" It may be construed as
a penalty, and often when called a "penalty"
It may be held to be liquidated damages,
where the Intention to the contrary Is plain.
(3) The courts are disposed to lean against
any Interpretation of a contract which wlll
make it liquidated damages; and, In ell cases
of doubtful Intention. will pronounce the stipulated sum a penalty. (4) Where the payment of a smaller sum Is secured by an obligation to pay a larger sum, It will be held
a penalty, and not liquidated damages. (5)
Where the agreement Is for the performance
or non-performance of a single net, or of several acts, or of several things which are but
minor ports of a single complex act, and the
precise damage resulting from the violation
of each covenant Is wholly uncertain or Incapable of being ascertalneu save by conjecture, the parties may agree on a fixed sum
as liquidated damages, and the courts will
so construe it, unless It Is clear on other
grounds that a penalty was really intended.
(6) ·when the contract proYldes for the performance of several acts of dlft'erent degrees
of Importance, and the damages resulting
from the violation of some, although not all,
of the provisions are of easy ascertainment,
and one large gross sum ls stipulated to be
paid for the breach of any, it will be construed a penalty, and not as liquidated damages. (7) When the agreement provides for
the performance of one or more acts, and the
stipulation Is to pay the same gross sum for
a partial as for a total or complete breach of
· performance, the sum will be .construed to
be a penalty. (8) Whether the sum agreed
to be paid Is out of proportion to the ac~ual
damnges, which will probably be sustained
by a breach, Is a fact Into which the .court
will not ente1· on lnqmry, if the intent Is otherwise made clear that liquidated damages, and
not a penalty, are In contemplation. (9) Where
the agreement Is In the nlternatlve, to do one
of two nets, but is to pay a l11rger sm~ · of
money In the one event than In the other,
the obllgor ha\'lng his election to do either,
the amount thus agreed to be paid will be
held liquidated damages, and not a penalty.
(10) In applying these rules, the controlling
purpose of which Is to ascertain the real Intention of the parties, the court will conslcler
the nature or the contract. the terms ot the
whole Instrument, the consequences naturally
l'l'sultlng from a breach of its stipulations,
and the peculiar circumstances surrounfllng
the transaction; thus permitting each case to
stand, as far as posslllle, on its own merits
and peeulinrlties. These rules are belle\'ed
to be sustained by the preponflerance of judicial decisions. Graham v. Bickham, 1 Am.
Dec. 328, and note, pp. 331-3-10; Wllllams V'!
Yance, 30 Am. IlPp. 26. anfl note, pp. 28--36;
1 l'urn. Eq. Jur. U 4-!IJ -!lti; .Mcl'herson v.
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Robertson, 82 Ala. 459. 2 South. 333; Hooper

v. Railroad Co., 69 Ala. 52!): Watts v. Shep-

pard, 2 Ala. 4‘.25; Bish. Cont. § 1452; Curry

v. Larer, 7 Pa. St. 470; Foley v. McKeegan,

4 Iowa, 1; Nash v. Hermosilla, 9 Cal. 584;

Muse v. Swayne, 2 Lea, 251; 2 Greenl. Ev.

§ 258.

The appellant was in the employment of the

appellee‘s testntor as a business manager, at

very liberal wages, having been a partner

with him in the mercantile business, under

the ﬁrm name of R. C. Keebie & Co. Al-

though he was but an employe. having sold

to R. C. Keeble his entire interest in the part-

nership business. he remained ostcusibly a

partner. The terms of the employment, re-

duced to writing, imposed on the appellant,

Henry Keeble, the obligation, among other

duties, “to wholly abstain from the use of

intoxicating liquors." and "to continue and re-
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main sober," giving his diligent attention to

the business of his employer, and promising,

in the event he should become intoxicated,

that he would pay, “as liquidated damages,"

the sum of $1,000, which the testator, Rich-

ard Keeble, was authorized to retain out of

a certain debt he owed the appellant. The

appellant violated his promise by becoming

intoxicated, and remained so for a long time,

and acted rudely and insuitingly towards the

customers and employes of the testator, and

otherwise deported himself, by reason of in-

toxication, in such manner as'to do injury to

the business. it is not denied by appellant's

counsel that this is a total breach of the prom-

ise to keep sober; nor is it argued that the

damage resulting from the violation of such a

promise can be ascertained with any degree of

certainty; nor even that the amount agreed

to be paid as liquidated damages, in the event

of a breach,' is disproportionate to the dam-

ages which may have been actually sustained

in this case. But the contention seems to be

that, inasmuch as it was possible for a breach

to occur with no actual damages other than

nominal, the amount agreed to be paid should

be construed to be a penalty. Unless this

view is correct, the application of the fore-

going rnles to the construction of the agree-

ment manifestly stamps it as a stipulation

for liquidated damages, and not a penalty.

It is argued, in other words, that becoming

intoxicated in private, while off duty, would

be a violation of the contract. but would be

attended with no actual damage to the busi-

ness of R. C. Keebie & Uo. This fact would,

in our opinion, except the case from the oper-

ation of the rules above enunciated. There

are but few agreements of this kind where

the stipulation is to do or not do a particular

act, in which the damages may not. accord-

ing to circumstances. vary, on a sliding scale,

from nominal damages to a considerable sum.

One may sell out the good-will of his busi-

ness in a given locality, and agree to abstain

from its further prosecution. or. in the event

of his breach of his agreement, to pay a cer-

LAW DA\I.2d Ed.—13

tain sum as liquidated damages; as, for ex-

D.A~IAGES.

l!l3

Rohert~n. 82 Aln. 45!1. 2 South. :1:l:l: Hooper 1 taln sum as liquidated damagPs; as, for exv. Rai~road Co:;- 69 .~In. :i~!l: \~·ntt~..~· She~ ample, not to practice one's prof Pssion as :1
pa1il. 2 Alu. 4 ..a: Bish. ll•Ut. 9 H.1... Curry physil'ian 01· lawyer, not to nm a steam-boat
v. Lnrn, 7 Pn. St. 470: FolPy ,., :\leKePgnn, on a <·••rtnln river or to eur1·y on the hotl'I
4 Iowa, 1: Xash v . .Hermo!<llla. !I Cal. f>84; I business In a 1mrticular town, not to re-estalJMnsr ,., Swayne, 2 Len, 231; 2 Greenl. Ev. lish a newspaper for a given prriod, or t(}
carry on n partlculnr hrnn{'h of l111,..inc»o1s with§ !!~8.
The appellant was In the t>111plo1ynwnt of the in 11 certain dlstnnce from a nametl city. Jn
npp<•llee's testator ns n busim·ss mnnnger, nt nil such cases, as often decided, It Is compevery lllJernl wages. bnvlni;: ht•1·n n partner tent for the parties to stipulate for the paywith him In the llH'l'<'lllltile busilll'ss, mull'!' ment o! a gross snm by way of liqul1lntc•tl.
the firm name of R. C. KeehlP & Co. Al· dnmnges for the violation of the agreement,
though he was but nu employe, h1n·i11~ sohl and for the very rPnson that sneh llawages
to H. C. K1•ehh' his pntil'<' infPI'f'>il in thr part- are un{'ertnln, fluctuating, a111l lnenpahle of
nership huslnrss. he rf'mninerl osti•nsihly a e11sy ascertainment. \Yillinms v. Y,a ni'r, 30
partn<>r. 1'he terms of the employrnPnt, re- Am. Ht•p. 2<J-31, note; Grnham v. Bickham, 1
duecll to writing, imposeu on the nppellnnt, Am. Dt•c. 3~G-3:18, note; 1 Porn. E•1. .Tur.
lknry Keeble, the ohlli;:ntion, nmong other § 442, note 1. It Is elrar thnt eneh of these
uutif's, "to wholly nbstain from the use of ·rnrious agreements may be violated by a sublutoxienting liquors." 11111! "to continue nrn.l re- stantial 1Jrt•111.:b, and yt•t 110 uama;.:t•s mli;:ht
main !'Ober," i:ivin:;- bis 11ilig(•1Jt attention to accrue exe1•pt sneh 11:; Ill'(' nominal. 'J'h(;
the husiness of his employPr. null promising, obllgor may practice meull'ine, and possibly
In the event he should hl'l'Ome lntoxicatet.I, never Interfere with the prnetice of the other
that he would pny, "as llquidn!Ptl damages," cohtrnl'!ing party; or lnw, without lmving a
the smn of $1,000, which the te~tatClr, Rich- paying client; or he mny run a steam-boat
ard Keeblr. was authorized to retain ont of without a passenger; or an hotel without a
a certain debt he owe1I the appt•llnnt. 'l'he guest; 01· carry on a newspaper without the
appellant violated his promise by becoming least Injury to any competitor. But the law
lntoxleated, and remained so for a long time, will not enter upon an investigation ns to tbeand acted rudely nod Insultingly towards the qunntum of clamnges In such cnses. This Is
customers nnd employes of the testator. nnd the very matter settled by the agreement of
otherwise deported himself, by reason of In- the parties. U the act agreed not to be done
toxication, In such manner ns to do Injury to Is one Crom which, In the ordinary eourse of
the business. It Is not denied by appellant's events, damages, incnpnble of asc·prtainnw11t
counsel that this Is a total breach of the prom- save by conjecture, are lia!Jle naturally to folise to keep sober; nor Is It argued that the low, sometimes more and sometimes less, acdamage resulting from the violation of such a cording to the aggravation o! the net, the
promise can be ascertained with any degree of court will not stop to Investigate the extent of
ce1·tnlnty; nor even that the amount agreed the grievance complained of as a total breach,
to he paid as liquidated damages, In the event but will nceept the sum agreed on ns n pro1w1
of a IJrench; Is disproportionate to the dam- nnd just measurement, by way of llquhlnteC.
ages which may have been actually sustained damages, unless the real Intention of the parIn this case. But the contention seems to be ties, untler the rules above nnnouneed, tlethat, Inasmuch as It was possible for 11 breach signed it as a penalty. W1~ mny ncltl, moreto occur with no actual damages other than over, that no one can a<'curatl'ly estimate the
nomlnnl, the amoant agreed to be paid should physiological relation between prlYate nnd
be eonstrued to be a penalty. l!nless this public drunkenness, nor tile cnusnl connecvit•w is correct, the npplieation of the fore- tion betwe{'n lntoxlention one time nnit n scoregoing rules to the construction of the agree- of times. The latter, In each instance, mny
ment manifest!~· stamps It as a stipulation follow from the former, and the one may
tor llquillnte1l dnmni.:es, and not a penalty. nnturnlly leiHl to the other. There would
It Is argued, In other words. that becoming Sl'em to be nothing harsh or unr1>asonable in
Intoxicated In private, while 011' duty, would stipulating against the very source and behe a violation of the <'ontruf't. hut would be ginning o! the more nggrnYnted evil sought to
attended with no at:'tnnl damage to the busi- be nvolrl!'d. The duty rPsting on the court.
ness of R. C. KeelJle & Co. 'l'his fact would, In all these cases, ls to so apply the settli>1l
In our opinion, excl.'pt the cai;;e from the oper- rul('s of coni::trnction as to ascerta ht tile ie;.:nl·
ation of the rull.'s above enuncinteit. There I~· expres!>i•tl nnrl real lntt>ntion of the pnrtit•s.
are but few agr\.'ements of thi>i kind where Courts a1·e \lllUPr no obllgntions, nor ha,·e tht•y
the stlpuln tion Is to do or not <lo a particular the power, to make a wiser or IJel ter contral'l
net, In which the damages mn)· not. accord- for either of the partil's thnn he may be snping to clrcumstancPs, vary. on n sli<ling scale, po:;ed to have made for himself. The court
from nominal damnges toll eon!!ldPrahle sum. bPlow, In our judgrrwnt, did not err In holdOne m1ty sell out the good-will of his busi- ing, as It did, by Its rulings, that the sum
ness lu 11 gln·n lo<'ality, mu! ngrpe to nlJstuin agrPell to be palll the llP1Wllt·1"s tl.'stntor was
from its furtlwr prosN'11tion. or. 111 the c\·ent liqnitlatc>d dnmnges, null not a penalty. Afot his brend1 of his ngrerment, to pay a cer- firmed.
LAW DA~1.2d I<.;d.-13

I

194

194

LIQUIDATED AND UNIJIQUIDATED DAMAGES.

MONMOUTH PARK ASS-‘N v. WALLIS

IRON WORKS.

(26 Atl. 140; '55 N. J. Law, 132.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 6, 1893.

Error to supreme court.

Action on a contract by the Monmouth

Park Association against the Wallis Iron

Works. Plaintiff had judgment, and defend-

ant brings error. Reversed.

The other facts fully appear in the follow-

ing statement by DIXON, J.:

The plaintiff brought an action in the su-

preme court against the defendant to re-

cover $6,384.66, and interest, as a ﬁnal bal-

ance for work done, chieﬂy, under a sealed

contract between them. providing for the

construction of a grand stand at the Mon-

mouth Park race course. The present writ
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of error is prosecuted by the defendant to

review questions of law raised at the trial in

the Hudson circuit. The following is a copy

of the contract: -

“Articles of agreement made and concluded

this ﬁrst day of October, A. D. 1889, by and

between the Wallis Iron Works, a corpora-

tion of New Jersey, of the ﬁrst part, and the

Monmouth Park Association, of the second

part, witnesseth, that for and in considera-

tion of the covenants and payments herein-

after mentioned, to be made and performed

by the said party of the second part, the said

party of the ﬁrst part doth hereby covenant

and agree to furnish all the labor and ma-

terials, and perform the work, necessary to

complete, in the most substantial and work-

manlike manner, to the satisfaction and ac-

ceptance of the chief engineer of the said

party of the second part, a grand stand at

the race course of said party of the second

part, at Monmouth Park, Monmouth Co., New

Jersey, excepting the necessary excavation,

incidental thereto; the said ‘work to be ﬁn-

ished as described in the approved plans and

following speciﬁcations, and agreeably to

the directions received from the said chief en-

gineer, on or before the ﬁrst day of March,

1890 case the said party of the ﬁrst part

shall ully and entirely, and in conformity

to the provisions and conditions of this agree-

ment, perform and complete the said work,

and each and every part and appurtenance

thereto, within the time hereinbefore limited

for such performance and completion, or

within such further time as, in accordance

with the provisions of this agreement, shall

be ﬁxed or allowed for such performance and

completion, the said party of the ﬁrst part

shall and will pay to the said party of the

second part the sum of one hundred dollars

for each and every day that they, the said

party of the ﬁrst part, shall be in default,

which said sum of one hundred dollars per

day is hereby agreed upon. ﬁxed, and deter-

mined by the parties hereto as the dam-

ages which the party of the second part will

suffer by reason of such default, and not by

way of penalty. And the said party of the
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MONMOUTH PARK ASS'N v. WALLIS
IRON WORKS.
(26 Atl. 140; 55 N. J. Law, 132.)
Court of Errors and Appenls of New Jersey.
March 6, 1893.
Error to supreme court.
Action on a contract by the Monmouth
Park Association against the Wallis Iron
Works. Plaintilr had judgment, and defendant brings error. Reversed. .
The other facts fully appear In the following statement by DIXON, J.:
The plalntltr brought an action In the supreme court against the defendant to recover $6,384.66, and interest, as a final balance for work done, chlefiy, under a sealed
\!ontract between them, providing for the
constrnctlon of a grand stand at the Monmouth Park race course. The present ·w rit
of error ls prosecuted by the defendant to
review questions of law ralsed at the trial In
the Hudson circuit. The following ls a copy
of the contract:
"Articles of agreement made and concluded
this first day of October, A. D. 1889, by and
between the "\\'allls Iron Works, a corporation of New Jersey, of the first part, and the
Monmouth Park Association, of the second
part, witnesseth, that for and in consideration of the covenants and payments hereinafter mentioned, to be made and performed
by the said party of the second part, the said
party of the first part doth hereby covenant
and agree to furnish all the labor and materials, and perform the work, necessary to
complete, in the most substantial and workmanlike manner, to the satisfaction and acceptance of the chief engineer of the said
party of the second part, a grand stand at
the race course of said party of the second
part, at Monmouth Park, Monmouth Co., New
Jersey, excepting the necessary excavation,
Incidental thereto; the said ·work to be finished as described In the approved plans and
following speciftcatlons, and agreeably to
the directions received from the said chief engineer, on or before the fi.rst day of March,
1890:t~ case the said party of the first part
shal~J~-~Uy and entirely, and In conformity
to the provisions and conditions of this agreement, perform and complete the said work,
and each and every part and appurtenance
thereto, within the time herelnbefore limited
for such performance and completion, or
within such further time as, In accordance
with the provisions ot thls agreement, shall
be fixed or allowed for such performance and
completion, the said party of the first part
shall and will pay to the said party of the
second part the sum of one hundred dollars
for each and every day that they, the said
party of the first part, shall be lo default,
which said sum of one hundred dollars per
day Is hereby agreed upon, fixed, and determined by the parties hereto as the damages which the party of the second part will
sutrer by reason of such default, and not by

way of penalty. And the said pnrty (\f the
second part may and shall deduct and retain
the same out of any moneys which may be
due or become due to the party of the first
part under this agreement.
"Specification. The entire work to be constructed and finished, In every part, In a
good, substantial, and workmanlike manner,
according to the accompanying drawings and
specifications, to the full extent and meaning of the same, and to the entire satisfaction,
approval, and acceptance ·of the chief en·
glneer and owners of the said party of the
second part, and under the supervision and
direction of such agent or agents as they
may appoint. Additional detail and working
drawings will be furnished, In exempllflcatlon
of the foregoing, from time to time, as may
be required; and It Is distinctly understood,
thnt all such additional drawings are to be
considered as virtually embraced within, and
forming a part of, these specifications. Figured dimensions shall In all cases he taken
In preference to sc:ile measurements. The
said engineer shall have the right to make
any alterations, additions, or omissions of
work or materials herein specified, or shown
on the drawings, during the progress of the
structure, that he may find to be necessary,
and the same shall be acceded to by the said
party of the first part, and carried Into effect, without In any way violating or vitiating the contract. If any additions, alterations, or omissions are made In the structure during the progress of the work, the
value of such shall be decided by the t1ald
chief engineer, who shall make an equitable
allowance for the same, and shall ad<l the
amount of said allowance to the contract
price of the work, If the cost baa been Increased, or shall deduct the amount, If the
cost has been lessened, as he, the said chief
engineer, may deem just and equitablt.>. 'fhe
said party of the second part will pay for no
extra work or material unless orderetl In
writing by them, through their treasurer.
Any disagreement or difference between the
parties to this contract, upon any matter or
thing arising from these specifications, or the
drawings to which they refer, or to the contract for the work, or the klud or quality of
the work, required the:.iby, shall be decM~d
by the said chief engineer of the party of
the second part, whose decision and intCi"pretatlon of the same shall be considered
final, conclusive, and binding upon both parties. All materials and labor used throughout the structure must be of the best of their·
several kinds, and subject to the approval of
the chief engineer. The said chief en~loeer
shall have full power, at a.ny time during the
progress of the work, to reject any materials
that be may deem unsuitable for the purpose
for which they were Intended, or which are
not In strict conformity with the spirit of
these specifiratlons. He shall also have the
power to cause any Inferior or unsafe work
to be taken down and altered at the cost
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of the said party of the ﬁrst part. Partic-

ular care must be taken of all the ﬁnished

work, which work must be covered up and

thoroughly protected from injury or deface-

ment, during the erection and completion of

the structure. All refuse material and rub-

bish that may accumulate during the prog-

ress of the work shad be removed from

time to time as may be directed by the chief

engineer, and, on the completion of the work,

the structure, grounds, and streets be thor-

oughly cleaned up, and the surplus material

and rubbish removed. The said party of the

second part will not transport free any of the

workmen or materials for this work, but all

materials must be shipped in the name of the '

party of the ﬁrst part, and in no case shall

it be shipped in care of, or in the name of,

the company, or any of its otiicers or em-
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ployes, and said party of the tirst part must

pay the regular freight rates arranged for

with the freight department.

“And the said party of the second part

doth promise and agree to pay to the said

party of the ﬁrst part, for the work to be

done under this contract, the following prices,

to wit: One hundred and thirty-three thou-

sand ($133,000) dollars. On or about the last

day of each month, during the progress of

this work, an estimate shall be made of the

relative value of the work done and deliver-

ed, to be judged by the engineer; and ninety

per cent. of the amount of said estimate shall

be paid to the party of the ﬁrst part on or

about the ﬁfteenth day of the following

month. And when all the work embraced in

this contract is completed, agreeably to the

speciﬁcations, and in accordance with the

directions, and to the satisfaction and ac-

ceptance, of the engineer, there shall be a

ﬁnal estimate made of said work according

to the terms of this agreement, when the bal-

ance appearing due to the said party of the

ﬁrst part shall be paid to them, within thirty

days thereafter, upon their giving a release,

under seal, to the party of the second part,

from all claims and demands whatsoever

growing in any manner out of this agreement,

and upon their procuring and delivering to

the parties of the second part full releases. in

proper form, and duly executed, from me-

chanics and material men, of all liens, claims,

and demands for materials furnished and

provided, and work and labor done and per-

formed, upon or about the work herein con-

tracted for under this contract. It is fur-

ther covenanted and agreed between the said

parties that the said party of the ﬁrst part

will at all times give personal attention, by

competent representative, who shall superin-

tend the work. It is further agreed that the

contractors are not to interfere in any way

with the construction of the bookmakers‘

stand, members' stand or the paddocks, or

other work. It is further agreed and under-

stood that the work embraced in this con-

tract shall be commenced within ten days

from this date, and prosecuted with such
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()f the ea.Id party of tbe first part. Partic- force as the engineer shall deem adequate
ular care must be taken of all tbe tlnlsbed to Its completion within the time specified;
work, which work must be covered up and and If at any time the said party of the ttrst
thoroughly protected from Injury or deface- part shall refuse or neglect to prosecute the
ment, during the erection and completion of work with a force eufHclent, In the op[lllon
the structure. All refuse material and rub- of the said engineer, for Its completion withbish that may accumulate durlng the prog- in the time specified In this agreement, then,
rE.-ss of the work sha.l be removed from In that case, the said engineer In charge, or
time to time as may be directed by the chief such agents as the engmeer shall designate,
engineer, and, on the completion of the work, may proceed to employ such a number of
the structure, grounds, and streets be thor- workmen, laborers, and overseers as way,
-ougbly cleaned up. and the surplus material In the opinion o! the said engineer, be neces.and rubbish removed. The said party or the sary to Insure the completion or the work
second part will not transport free any of the within the time herelnbe!ore limited, at such
workmen or materials for this work, but nil wages as he may find necessary or expedient
materials mm;t be shipped In the name of the I to give, pay all persons so employed, and
party of the first part, and In no case shall charge over the amount so pale\ to the prirty
It be shipped In care of, or In the name of, ot the first part as for so much money paid
the comp.1ny, or any or Its officer11 or em- ' to them on said contmct, or for the fallme
ployes, and said party of the first part must ti) p1·osecute the work with an adequate
pay the regular freight rates arranged for force, for noncompllance with his dire<"tlons In regard to the manner of conwith the freight department.
"And the said party of the second part structing It, or, for any other omission or
doth promise and agree to pay to the said neglect of the requirements of this agreeparty of the first part. for the work to be ment and specifications on the part of the
done under this contract, the following prices, party of the first pa1·t, the snld engineer
to wit: One hundred and thirty-three thou- may, at his dlseretlon, declare this contmct,
sand ($133,000) dollars. On or about the last or any portion or section embraced In It,
day of each month, during the progress or void. And the !'nld party or the first pnrt hath
this work. an estimate shall be made of the further covenanted and agreed to take", use,
relative value of the work done and deliver- provide, and make all proper, necessary, nnd
ed, to be judged by the engineer; and ninety sufficient precautions, safeguards, and proper cent. of the amount of said estimate shall tections a_gainst the occurrence or happening
be paid to the party of the first part on or or any accident, Injuries, damages, or hurt to
about the fifteenth day of the following any person or property during the progress
month. And when all the work embraced In of the construction of the work herein conthis contract Is completed, agreeably to the i tracted for, and to be responsible for, and to
spcclficntlons, and In accordance with the Indemnity and save harmle~s. the said pardirections, and to the satisfaction and ac- ties or the second part, and the sni<l engineer,
ceptance, of the engineer, there shall be a from the payments of all sums of money by
final estimate made of said work according reason of all or nny such accidents, Injuries,
to the terms of this agreement, when the bal- damages, or hurt that may happen or occur
ance appearing due to the said party of the upon or about snld work, and from all fines,
first pa.rt shall be paid to them, within tlllrty penaltil•s. nnd loss Incurred tor or by reason
days thereafter, upon their giving a release, or the violntlon of any city or borough ordiunder seal, to the party of the second part, nance or regulation or law of the state, while
from all claims and demands whatsoever the said work ls In progress of construction.
growing In any manner out of this agreement, And It ls mutually agreed and distinctly unand upon their procuring and delivering to derstO<Ji} that the decision of the chief enthe parties of the second part full releases. In gineer shall be final 1md conclusive In n ny
proper form, and duly executed, from me- dispute which may arise between the parchanics and material men, of all liens, claims, ties to this agreement, relative to or touching
and demands for materials furnished and the samt:'.
"In witness whereof, the parties herein
provided, and work and labor done and performed, upon or about the work herein con- named have hereunto set their seals, and
tracted for under this contract. It ls fur- caused their presents to be signed by their
ther covenanted and agreed between the said secretary, the day and year herein first
parties that the said party of the first part above named. As to Wallis Iron Works,
will at all times give personal attention, by James I. Taylor. Wallis Iron Works. [Seal.)
competent representative, who shall superin- Wm. T. Wallis, Sec'y. The Monmouth Park
tend the work. It ls further agreed that the Ass'n. [Seal.] By A. J. Cassatt, President.
contractors are not to Interfere In any way Witness to signature of A. J. Cassatt: T.
with the construction of the bookmakers' M. Croft
"It ls hereby further agreed that, In addistand, members' stand or the paddocks, or
other work. It ls further agreed and under- tion to the work herelnbefore described nod
stood that the work embraced In this con- provided for, the said party of the first part
tmct shall be commenced within ten days shall provide as bearing pieces to receive
from this date, and prosecuted with such ends of purllns, and In lieu of the angle Irons
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already provided for, 3x6 angle irons, 10 8-10

lbs. per foot, and 7 feet long, well bolted to

roof truss and to puriin ends. The party o}

the ﬁrst part will also construct, complete, the

front steps to grand stand, as per revised

sheet No. 26. In consideration of the fore-

going changes, the party of the second part

agrees to pay the additional sum of nineteen

hundred and seventy-one ($1,971.61) dollars.

Wallis Iron Works. [Seal.] Wm. T. Wallis,

Treas. [Seal.] The Monmouth Park Ass‘n.

By A. J. Cassatt, President. Witness this

11th day of December, 1889||: T. M. Croft."

Added to this are “Revised Speciﬁcations,"

the last clause of which is: “Payments. On

or about the ﬁrst day of each month, the en-

gineer will make an approximate estimate

of the amount of work erected and delivered

under these speciﬁcations during the preced-
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ing month, and the contractor will be paid

ninety per cent. of the amount of these esti-

mates. Thirty days after the acceptance of

the completed work by the owner, the retain-

ed ten per cent. will be paid the contractor,

upon his furnishing satisfactory evidence that

no liens or unsatisﬁed claims exist on the

work, or any part of it." These speciﬁcations

were also signed and sealed by the parties.

LIQFIDATED

A~D L"~LIQUIDA TED

already provided ior, 3xG angle Irons, 10 8-10
lbs. per foot, and 7 feet long, well bolted to
roof truss and to purlln ends. The party oJ.
the first part wlll also construct, complete, tbe
front steps to gmnd stand, as per revised
sheet No. 26. In consideration of the fo1·egoing changes, the party of the second part
agrees to pay the additional sum of nineteen
hundred and seventy-one ($1,971.61) dollars.
Wallis Iron 'Yorks. [Seal.] Wm. T. Wallis,
Treas. [Seal.] Tile Moumoutll Park Ass·n.
By A. J. Cassatt, President. Witness this
lltll day of December, 1889: T. M. Croft."
Added to this are "Hcvised Specifications,"
the last clause of which is: "Payments. On
or about the first day of each month, the engineer will make au approximate estimate
of the amount of work ereeted and delivered
under these specifications dw·ing the preceding month, and the contractor will be paid
ninety per cent. of the amount of these estimates. Thirty days after the acceptance of
the completed work by the owner, the retained ten per cent. will be paid the contractor,
upon his furnishing satisfactory eviden<.-e that
no liens or unsatisfied claims exist .. on the
work, or any part of it." These specifications
were also signed and sealed by the parties.
The pleadings are sumclent to warrant the
questions Involved in the exceptions taken
at the trial.
Jos. D. Bedle, for plalntitr In error. Gilbert Colllns, for defendant In error.

The pleadings are suﬂicient to warrant the

questions involved in the exceptions taken

at the trial.

Jos. D. Bedle, for plaintiff in error. Gil-

bert Collins, for defendant in error.

DIXON, J. (after stating the facts). The

ﬁrst exception to be considered took its rise

from the fact that the structure was not com-

pleted within the time limited by the con-

tract, nor until 94 days after the expira-

tion of a month's extension of that time.

The defendant claimed a deduction or set

off of $100 for each day's delay. The plain-

tid met this claim by insisting that the

clause in the contract mentioning the $100

per day is unintelligible, and therefore nuga-

tory, because in its opening line it reads:

“In case the said party of the ﬁrst part shall

' ‘ ' to fully and entirely," etc., omitting

any effective verb. We agree, however, with

the trial judge, in thinking that the context

shows the verb which should be supplied.

It makes the $100 payable for each day that

“the party of the ﬁrst part shall be in de-

fault." This plainly indicates the verb “fall"

as the omitted word, to be supplied as an

equivalent for the expression, “be in default."

The right of a court of law to read an in-

strument according to the obvious intention

of the parties, in spite of clerical errors or

omissions which can be corrected by perusing

the instrument, is sufficiently vindicated by

the decision of this court in Sisson v. Don-

neily, 36 N. J . Law, 432. See, also, Burcheil

v. Clark, 2 C. P. Div. 88.

Taking the clause thus perfected, the plain-

tif f urged that the $100 a day was a penalty;

and so the trial judge ruled. requiring that

the defendant should prove the actual dam-

ages, and be allowed only for what was

DIXON, J. (after stating the tacts). The
first exception to be ronsldered took Its rise
from the fact that the structure was not completed within the time limited by the contract, nor until \H days after the expiration ot a month's extension of that time.
The defendant claimed a deduction or set
otr ot $100 tor each day's delay. The plalntifl' met this claim by Insisting that the
clause In the contract mentioning the $100
pe1· day Is unlutelllgible, and therefore nugatory, because in Its opening line It reads:
"In case the said pa~·ty of the first part shall
• • • to fully and entirely," etc., omitting
any effective verb. We agree, however, with
the trial judge, In thinking that the context
shows the verb which should be- supplied.
It makes the $100 payable for each day that
"the party of the first part shall be In default." This plainly Indicates the verb "fall"
as the omitted word, to be supplied as an
equivalent for the ex1iresslon, "be In default."
The right of a court of law to read an instrument according to the obvious Intention
of the P'.i1·ties, In spite of cle1·ical errors or
omi1<sions which can be corrected by perusing
tlJe instrument, is sufficiently vindicated by
the decision of this C'Qurt in Sisson v. Donnelly, 36 N. J. Law, 4;{2. See, also, Burchell
v. Clark, 2 C. P. Div. 88.
'raking the clause thus perfected, the plalntlfl' urged that the $100 a day was a penalty;
and so the trial judge ruled. requiring that
the defendant should prove the actual dam-

D.-UL\<:ES.

ages, and be aliowed only for what was
proved. To this ruling the defendant excepted. In determining whether a sum which
contracting parties bave declared payable on
dC'fnult in performance of their contract is
to be deemed a penalty, or liquidated damages, the general rule is that the agreement
of tbe parties will be etrectuated. Their
ag1·eement will, bowevc!", be ascertained by
considering, not only particular words in
their contract, but the whole scope of their
bargain, including the subject to which It
relates. If, on such consideration, It appears
that they ha rn provided f.or larger damages
than the law permits, e. g. more than the
legal rate for the nonpayment of money, or
that they have provided tor the same damages on the brencb of any one of several
stipulations, when the loss resulting from
such breaches clearly mt1st differ In amount,
or that "they have named an excessive sum
in a case where the real damages are certain, or readily reducible to certainty by
proof before a jury, or a sum which it would
be unconscionable to award, under any of
these C'Qndltlons the sum designated Is deemed a penalty. And If It be doubtful, on the
whole agreement, whether the sum ls Intended llB a penalty or as liquidated damages,
It will be construed as a penalty, because the
law favors mere Indemnity. But when damages are to be sustained by the breach of a
single stipulation, and they are uncertain In
amount, and not readily susceptible of proof
under the rules ot evidence, then, If tbe parties have agreed upon a sum as the measure
of compensation for the breach, and that sum
ls not disproportionate to the presumable
loss, It may be recovered as liquidated damages. These are the general principles laid
down In the text books, and recognized In the
judicial Reports ot this state. Cheddlck's
Ex'r v. Marsh, 21 N. J. I.aw, 4~; Whitfield
v. Levy, 35 N. J. Law, 140; Hoagland v.
Segur, 38 N. J. Law, 230; Lansing v. Dodd,
45 N. J. Law, 525. In the present case the
default co°'sists of the breach of a single
covenant, to complete the grand stand as described In the approved plans and specifications within the tlme limited. It Is plain that
the loss to result from such a breach 111 not
easily ascertainable. The magnitude and Importance of the grand stand may be Inferred
from its cost,-$133,000. It formed a necessary part of a very expensive enterprise.
The structure was not one that could be said
to have a definable rental value. Its worth
depended upon the success of the entire venture. How tar the noncompletlon of this
edifice might affect that success, and what
the profits or losses or the scheme would be,
were topics for conjecture only. The conditions, therefore, seem to have been such as to
justify the parties in settling tor themselves
the measure of compen~atlon. The stlpulntlons of parties tor specified damages on the
breach of a contract to build within a limited
time ha¥e frequently been enforced by the
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courts. In Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 Term R. 32,

£10 per week for delay in ﬁnishing the parish

church; in Duckworth v. Alison, 1 Mees. &

W. 412, £5 per week for delay in completing

repairs of a warehouse; in Legge v. Har-

lock, 12 Q. B. 1015, £1 per day for delay in

erecting a barn, wagon shed, and granary;

in Law v. Local Board (1892) 1 Q. B. 127,

£100 and £5 per week for delay in const1uct-

ing sewerage works; in Ward v. Building

Co., 125 N. Y. 230, 26 N. E. 256, $10 a

day for delay in erecting dwelling houses;

-and in Malone v. City of Philadelphia (Pa.

.

Sup.) 23 Atl. 628, $30 a day for delay in com-

pleting a municipal bridge,—were all deemed

liquidated damages. Counsel has referred

us to two cases of building contracts, where

a different conclusion was reached: Mul-
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-doon v. Lynch, 66 Cal. 536, 6 Pac. 417, and

Clements v. Railroad Co., 132 Pa. St. 445, 19

Atl. 274, 276. In the former case a statutory

rule prevailed. and in the latter the real dam-

age was easily ascertainable, and the stipu-

lated sum was unconscionable. In the case

at bar we have no data for saying that $100

a day was unconscionable. The sole ques-

tion remaining on this exception, therefore, is

whether the parties have agreed upon the

sum named as liquidated damages. Their lan-

guage seems, indisputably. to have this mean-

ing. They expressly declare the sum to be

agreed upon as the damages which the de-

fendant will snffer, they expressly deny that

they mean it as a penalty, and they provide

for its deduction and retention by the de-

fendant in a mode which could be applied

only if the sum be considered liquidated dam-

ages. Bnt it is argued that as the contract

authorized the engineer of the defendant to

make any alterations or additions that he

might ﬁnd necessary during the progress of

the structure, and required the plaintiff to

accede thereto, it is unreasonable to suppose

that the plaintiff could have intended to bind

itself, in liquidated damages, for delay in

completing such a changeable contract. But

this argument seems to be aside from the

present inquiry, which is, not whether the

plaintiff became responsible for damages by

reason of the noncompletion of the grand

stand on the day named, but whether, it it

did become so responsible, those damages

are liquidated by the contract. On the ques-

tion ﬁrst stated, changes ordered by the en-

gineer may afford matter for consideration;

on the second question, they are irrelevant.

Certainly the bills of exceptions do not indi-

cate any alterations or additions which, as

matter of law, would relieve the plaintiff

courts. In Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 Term R. 32, rette to the plalntilJ, was lllegally received In
£10 per week for delay ln llnlshlng the parish
evidence. It was offered and admitted as a.
ehurch; ln Duckworth v. Alison, 1 Mees. & . decision by the chief engineer of the defendW. 412, £5 per week tor delay in completing ant under the contract. Since It was writrepairs of a warehouse; In Legge v. Har- ten after the completion of the work, and
lock, 12 Q. B. 1015, £1 per dny for delay ln 'lfter the writer had cc>ased to be the engierecting a barn, wagon shed, and granary; neer of the defendant, and without notice to
in Law v. Local Board (1892) 1 Q. B. 127, the defendant, it could not possess the char£100 nnd £5 1ier week for delay in con!'truct- aeter attributed to It.
The only other exception which It appears
lng sewerage works; In "Tard v. Building
Co., 125 N. Y. 230, 26 N. E. 2;:iG, $10 a useful to notice Is that relntlng to the existday for delay In erecting dwelling houses; ence of claims by outside parties. '11w agree·and tn Malone v. City of Philntlelphia (Pa. ment contains two clauses on this subject.Sup.) 23 Atl. 628, $;:;0 a day for deluy in com- one under the head, "Specification;" the othpleting a municipal brldge,-were all deemed er, untler tl1e head, "Revised Spedficutlou."
liquidated damages. Counsel has referred It seems proper to llold that the latter clause
us to two cases of building contracts, where Is substituteu in the contrnct for the former,
a different conclusion was 1·eached: Mul- and there~ore it only need be considered. It
doon v. Lyneh, 66 Cal. :>3G, Ii Pae. 417, nud rends: "Tl..tlrty days after the acceptauce of
Clements v. Railroad C<>.. 132 Pa. St. 4-15, 10 the completed work by the owner, the reAtl. 274, 276. In the former case a statutory tained ten per cent. will be paid the contractrule prevalled, and In tile latter the real dam- or, upon his furnishing satisfactory evidence
age was easily nscertainnble, and the stipu- that no liens or unsatisfied claims exist on
lated 1mm was unconscionable. In the case tlle work, or any part of It." The expresat bar we have no data for saying that $100 sion, "liens or unirotlstted claims on the work,"
a day was unconscionable. '!'he sole ques- must mean claims which can be enforced
tion remaining on thls exception, therefore. Is against the work, and such claims could exist
whether the parties have agreed upon the only under our mechanic's llen lnw. By
sum named as liquidated damages. 'l'llelr lan- "liens" the parties intended clnhns flied unguage seems, indisputably, to have this meon- der that law; by "unsatisfied claims," they
ing. They expressly declare the sum to be intended claims which were not, but might
agreed upon as the damnge.s which the de- be, !lied under that law. The statute (Hefendant will suffer, they expressly deny that vlslon, p. GGS, § 2) provides "that when any
they mean It as a penalty, and they provide building shall be erected, in whole or In pan,
for Its deduction and retention by the de- by contract In writing, such building, and
fendant In 11 mode which could be applled the land whereon It stands, shall be liable to
-only if the sum be considered liquidated dam- the contractor alone for work done or maages. But it ls argued that as the contract terials furnished In pursuance of such conauthorized the engineer or the defendant to tract: provilled such contract, or a duplimake any alterations or additions that he cate thereof, be filed In the office of the cle1·k
might llnd necessary during the progress of of the county In which such lmlldiug Is sit·
the structure, and required the plalntltr to uate before such work done or matetials fur.accede thereto, lt Is unrea80nnble to suppose nishetl ;" and (section 13) "that no debt· sllnll
that the plillntilT could have Intended to bind be a lien by virtue of this act unless a claim
Itself, In liquidated damages, tor delay In Is filetl as herelnbefore providP.d within one
-eompleting snch a changeable contract. Hut year from the furnishing the materials or
this argument seems to be aside from the performing the labor for which such debt is
present inquiry, which Is, not whether the due." The contract between these partlet1
plaintiff became responsible for damages by was !lied January 2, 1890. Hence no li<"ns
reason of the noncompletlon of tlle gran1l eould n1ise in favor ot outside parties for
$land on the clay named, but whether, It it work done or materials furnished after that
<lld become so responsible, those damnges date. For work clone or mate1inls furnished
are liquidated by the contract. On the ques- liefore that date, no debt would be a lien untion first stated, changes ordered by the en- less a claim were !lied within a year, I. e.
gineer may afford matter for consideration; before January 2, 1801. At the date Inst
on the second question, they are Irrelevant. named, no such claim was filed, And, so far
Certainly the bllls of exc<'ptions do not lndl- as appears, no such claim was ever flied.
Nl te any nlte111tlons or additions which, ns
The suit was commeneed l\Inrch 12, 18Ul.
matter of law, would relieve the plalntllJ We think these facts furnished satlsfnetory
from responsibility for the admitted delay, evidence that there were no liens or unsatisand conse't1uently there may have been fied claims on the work when the action was
ground for considering the defendant's dam- brought, And that on this point there was no·
ages. It there was, the amount of tlle dam- en·or at the trlal.
ages was adjusted by the contract at $100
The othei· l'xceptlons adverted to hy coun.c;el
per day. "'e think tlie mling at tlle ckcuit for the defendant are either untenable, or on
on this point was erroneous.
questions not llkely to arise upou a new trial.
We think, nlRo, that the lett!'r, Exhibit P Let the jU<lgment he ren•1·sl•ll, and a n•nlre
-8, wi·itten Septemhc1· 10, 1800, by F. Latou- de novo be awardetl.

from responsibility for the admitted delay,

and consetmently there may have been

ground for considering the defendant's dam-

ages. If there was, the amount of the dam-

ages was adjusted by the contract at $100

per day. We think the ruling at the circuit

on this point was erroneous.

We think, also, that the letter, Exhibit P
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(24 Atl. 170, 148 Pa. 645.)

KECK v. manna.

(24 Atl. 170, 148 Pa. 645.)

May 2, 1892.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Le

high county; ‘Edwin Albright, Judge.

Assumpsit by Emeline C. Keck against Syl-

vester Bieber on a bond whereby he prom-

ised to pay her $2,000 upon the non-perform-

ance of certain conditions. There was no

dispute as to the breach of condition, and

a verdict was directed for plaintiff for the

full amount of the bond. From a judgment

entered thereon, defendant appeals. Re-

versed.

Jas. S. Biery and Edward Harvey, for ap-

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 2, 1892.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Lehigh county; ·Edwin Albright, Judge.
Assumpslt by Emeline C. Keck against Sylvester Bieber on a bond whereby he promised to pay her $2,000 upon the non-performs.nee of certain conditions. There was no
dispute as to the breach of condition, and
a verdict was directed for plalntitr for the
full amount of the bond. From a judgment
entered thereon, deft!ndant appeals. Reversed.
Jas. S. Biery and E<IJ.vfrd Harvey, for appellant. C. J. Erdman,, and R. E. Wright's
Sons, for appellee.

pellant. C. J. Erdman and R. E. Wright's

Sons, for appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

MITCHELL, J. The general principle up-
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on which the law awards damages is com-

pensation for theloss suffered. The amount

may be ﬁxed by the parties in advance, but,

where a lump sum is named by them, the

court will always look into the question

whether this is really liquidated damages or

only a penalty, the presumption being that

it is the latter. The name by which it is‘

called is but of slight weight, the controlling

elements being the intent of the parties and

the special circumstances of the case. The

subject has always presented diﬁiculties in

the formulation of a general rule, and es-

pecially in its application. The books are

full of inharmonious decisions. In no state,

however, have the dlﬂlculties been more suc-

cessfully minimized than in Pennsylvania,

and in no case that I have seen is there a

better gene1alization than that by Agnew,

J., in Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450:

"In each case we must look at the language

of the contract, the intention of the parties

as gathered from all its provisions, the sub-

ject of the cont1act and its surroundings, the

ease or difﬁculty of measuring the breach in

damages, and the sum stipulated, and from

the whole gather the view which good con-

science and equity ought to take of the case."

The only criticism to which this would seem

to be fairly open is that it does not perhaps

give suﬂlcient prominence to the intention

of the parties as the controlling element, and

it should therefore be read in connection

with the restatement of it by our late Broth-

er Clark, in March v. Allabough, 103 Pa. St.

335: “The question ‘ ' ‘ is to be de-

termined by the intention of the parties,

drawn from the words of the whole contract,

examined in the light of its subject-matter

and its surroundings; and in this examina-

tion we must consider the relation which the

sum stipulated bears to the extent of the in-

jury which may be caused by the several

breaches provided against, the ease or diﬂi-

culty of measuring a breach in damages, and

such other matters as are legally or neces-

sarily inherent in the transaction." The in-

tent of the parties being, therefore, the prin-

cipal object of ascertainment, Greenleaf lays

'
l\IITCHELL, J . The general principle upon which the law awards damages ls compensatlon for the loss sutrered. The amount
may be fixed by the parties ln advance, but,
where a lump sum is named by them, the
court will always look into the question
whether this ls really liquidated damages or
ouly a penalty, the presumption being that
lt ls the latter. The name by which It ls
called ls but of slight weight, the controlling
elements being the intent of the parties and
the special circumstances of the case. The
subject has always presented dlmcultles In
the formulation of a general rule, and especially In its application. The books are
full of Inharmonious decisions. In no state,
however, have the dlflcultles been more suecessfully minimized than in Pennsylvania,
and In no case that I have seen ls there a
better gPnerallzatlon than that by Agnew,
J., In Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450:
"In each case we must look at the language
of the contract, the intention of the parties
as gathered from all its provisions, the subje<'t of the contract and its surroundings, the
ease or difficulty of measuring the breach In
damages, and the sum stipulated, and from
the whole gather the view which good conscience and equity ought to take of the case."
The only criticism to which this would seem
to be fairly open ls that it does not perhaps
glve suflclent prominence to the intention
of the parties as the controlling element, and
it should therefore be rend in connection
with the restatement of It by our late Brother Clark, In March v. Allnbough, 103 Pa. St.
3;fj; " The QUl:'iltion • • • is to be determined by the intention of the parties,
drawn from the words of the whole contract,
examined In the light of its subject-matter
and its surroundings; and in this examlnatlon we must consider the relation which the
sum stipulated bears to the extent of the Injury which may be caused by the seycral
breaches provided against, the ease 01· dltH·
culty of mens urlng a lll'ench in damnges, nnd
such other matte rs as are lc>;;ally 01· ncces-

snrily Inherent In the transaction." The Intent of the parties being, therefore, the ptinclpal object of ascertainment, Greenleaf lays .
down certain rules as the result of the cases,i'.
and, among them, that the sum ls to be
taken as a penalty "where the agreement ·:
contains several matters of dltrerent degrees
of importance, and yet the sum named is
payable for the breach of 'any, even the
least." 2 Greenl. Ev. § 258. This rule is
appl'Oved in Shreve v. Brereton, 51 Pa. St.
175, and the present case falls exactly withla
it. The conditions of the appellant's bond
are two-First, he Is to "save, defend, keep
harmless, and indemnify the said Emelina
c. Keck" from llablllty by reason of the as- ·
slgnment to him over the head of Nelser,
and the termination of the latter's mining
rights. This ls clearly a covenant for lndemnity only, and, as no breach was assigned.
need not be further discussed. But, secondly, he is to pay the royalty accruing In the
future, and "keep and perform all the covenants, condltlons, and stipulations of the said
lease and &BSlgnment." Turning now to the
lease, we find that plaintiff's covenants with
Kemmerer, which appellant thus bound himself to keep and perform, were to save harmless and Indemnify him against all costs and
damages to his neighbors from the washing
of the ore, to run the water ln such places as
the lessor should order, to pay a stipulated
royalty, to fill up holes made and left ln the
search for ore, to produce or pay royalty upon a minimum of one thousaad tons a year.
"to use the old wagon road for hauling said
Iron ore, and, ln case there o.re gates or bars
on said rond, • • • to keep said gates
and bars In repair, • • • and keep them
shut when through," etc. The assignment
adds to these a covenant to pay plaintltr,
the assignor, an additional royalty upon a
sliding scale of the price of ore per ton. N<>
better lllustratlon of the propriety of the rulereferred to could be stated. Here are numerous covenants of the most varied kinds
aud lmportnnce. The covenants to lndemnlfy against claims by Nelser, and against
damages to the neighbors by the operation
of washing, are undertakings which may b&
of se11ous magnitude; and under Dick v. Gnskill, 2 Whart. 184; Shreve v. Brereton, 51
Pa. St. 175; Moore v. Colt, 127 l'a. St. 289, lS
Atl. 8,-and similar cases, the recovery for a
breach would probably not be limited by the
sum named In the bond. On the other hand,
the covenants. to ti.II up the holes made in
prospecting for ore, and to keep the gates on
the old wagon road In repair and shut, ar&
against such trivial Inconveniences that it
would savor of absurdity to suppose that theparties meant to stipulate for l!\2,000 damages
for the breach of any one of them. We are
therefore of opinion that defendant's fourth
point, that the contract of the parties was
for a pennlty, should have been affirmed.
It will not follow, however, as appellee seems
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to fear, that her recovery must be limited to

the loss of the royalty due her at the time

of bringing suit, and that she must bring re

peated suits for future failures to pay. The

to fear, that her recol"ery must be limited to
the loss of the royalty due her at the time
of bringing suit, and that she must bring repeated suits for future failures to pay. The
defendant has, by his acts, disabled himself
absolutely and permanently from performance of his covenants. Under such clrcum-

stances, the plalntlfr may sue on the contract from time to time for the royalties due,
and for such other dn.mages as she may suffer, or she may, at her election, treat the
contract as rescinded, and claim damages
In one action for the entire breach. Judgment reversed, and venlre de novo awarded.

defendant has, by his acts, disabled himself

absolutely and permanently from perform-

ance of his covenants. Under such circum-

stances, the piaintiil‘! may sue on the con-

tract from time to time for the royalties due,

and for such other damages as she may sut-

fer, or she may, at her election, treat the

contract as rescinded, and claim damages

in one action for the entire breach. Judg-

ment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.

1.0“) pﬂ.‘\33?'

W1 pi-7/W
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(18 S. W. 262, 91 'l'enn. Ui4.)
Supreme Court of Tennessee. Jan. 26, 1892.

TENNESSEE MANUF'G CO. v. JAMES.

(18 S. W. 262, 91 Tenn. 154.)

Supreme Court of Tennessee. Jan. 26, 1892.

Error to circuit court. Davidson coun-

ty; W. K. McAI.t.is'r|,IR, Judge.

Action by Minnie Jame,a minor, by

her next friend, against the Tennessee

Manufacturing Company, to recover on a

quantum meruit; for work and labor per-

formed by her for defendant. Judgment

Error to circuit court, Davidson county; W. K. McALI.ISTER, Judge.
Action by Mtunle James, a minor, by
Iler uex t fricud, against tha Tennessee
.Manufacturing Company, to reco'rer on a
.qmrntum meruit for work and IBbor performed by her for defendant. Judgment
for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Reversed.
· ·
Dlckln1o111n & Frazer, for plaintiff In E'rrur.
E. J. Wickware, for clt>ft'udant in error.

for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Reversed. ‘ '

Dickinson &Frazer, for plaintiff in error.

E. J. Wickware, for defendant in error.

LURTON, J. \Iinnie James, a minor, was

an employe of the appel1ant. n corpora-

tion engaxzed in the manufacture of cotton

goods. The contract of employment was
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in writing, and was with the minor and

her father. By one ofthe provisions of the

contract it was stipulated that the em- ‘

ploye should give two weeks‘ notice of her ‘ '

intention to quit. Itis further provided

that, in caseshe should leave without giv-

ing two weeks‘ notice, “or tail or refuse

to faithfully work during a period of two

weeks after giving notice of an intention

to leave, ' * ' then it is herebyagrced

that the amount stated below for the

class to which I may belong is agreed

upon as liquidated damages due said Ten-

nessee Manufacturing Company at the

time of my failure to comply with the

terms of this contract, to compensate it

for all danmges, both actual and exem-

plary, and all loss, arisingfrom my failure

[O carry out the terms of this agreement:

and it is further agreed upon that said

amount, applicable to the class of em-

ployee to which I may belong, shall be de-

ducted from any sum which may be due

me by said company, whether on account

of services rendered or otherwise." The

class to which appeilee belonged was that

of those receiving 50 cents per day and un-

der $l. The damages stipulated for this

class was $10. At the foot of this agree-

ment, which was signed by appeilee, was

this further agreement signed by her fa-

ther: “The foregoing agreement has been

read by me, and, fully understanding the

same, it is also agreed to by me, asbinding

both me and my daughter, Minnie James,

who is legally disqualiﬁed from making

this contract, to all its terms and con-

ditions. I agree, further, that said Minnie

James is hereby authorized to receive the

wages of said work, and that all sums

paid to said employe are to be accepted

as fully discharging all liability, to the full

amount so paid; and said wages are to

be subject to all the conditions of this con-

tract, as though said employe was legally

empowered to act in person." Appeiiee

grave notice of her intention to leave, and

thereafter worked 10 days, but at the end

of that time quit without any excuse. At

LUR'fON, J. lllnnle .Jaml.'11, a min•>r, wn11
.1n PmployP of tlu~ a111wJl11nt. u (•n1·1u1rutlon engaged In the manufacture of cotton
guod11. The contract of employment was
In writing, and wes with the rulnm· end
Iler rather. By one of the provlsiuns of the
contract It was stipulutt>d that the emJ>loye Bhould give two weeks" notice of her
intt'ntion to quit. It Is further pro\•lded
that, in caseshe should leave without giving two weeks' notice, "or tall or refuse
to faithfully work during a period or two
weeks ufter giving notice uf an lntt>ntlon
to lcav11, • • • then it Is herehy agreed
thet the amount 11tated below for the
class to which I may lwlom1 is a~reed
upon a.;; liquldatt>d damages due saltl Tentu!Hsee Manufact nrlng Company at the
time of my failure to comply with the
terms of this contract, to compeni,iate It
(or all damages, both ac•tual and exemplary, an<l all los11, arlslngfrom my fullure
co cari·y out the terms of this agreement;
encl it is further agreed upon that said
emount, applicable to the class of employee to which I muy bt>loog, shall be deductt>d from eny sum which may be dne
me by said company, whether on account
of Sl'rvlces renderl:'c1 or otherwii;e." 'I'he
t:laHti to wlllr.h appcllee helon1ted wati that
~f those rect!lvlng 50 cen ls p<:r day and under $1. The dn muges stlpulatl:'rl for this
class wus $10. At the foot of thlH agreemen~. which was sic;ned by appcllee, wa11
this further agreement 11igoe!l by her fa1hf'I': "The foregoing agreement baB been
retHI by me, and, fully unde1·standing the
su 111e, it is also ngreec.J to by me, as binding
both me und my daughter, Minnie James,
who IB legall.v disqualified from muklog
thl11 contract, to all Its terms an<l eonditiuns. I agree, further, thnt said .Minnie
Ju mes ls llereby uuthorlzed to receive the
wages of s11lrl work, 01111 that all sums
Jrnid to suid employe are to be acceptttd
.os fully diischtirgiug all llubllity, to the full
nmonnt Ho paid; and said wag-es are to
be 1<ubject to all the coudi tlons or this cuotrnct, 1111 though said employe wus legnll.v
empowered to act in person." Appellee
j!n ,.e notice of her Intention to leave, and
thereurter worked 10 duys, but at tbe end
of that time quit without nny excuse. At
the time she quit there wuH due her 2Q
duys' wnges, lncludlnK tile llJ dayti after
h1·r notice. If the stipulation as to damllJ!PH IB Invalid, then the company Is due
h1•r $10; if vnlid, then nothillj.!; is due ht-r.
1'11011 quitting 11he hrought suit, by her

father ae nt>xt friend, upon a. quantum
mer11it. The contract hu11 been set up aa
a deren.,e to her Malt.
'l'he circuit Judge being of opinion that
the contract wu11 invalid, 8S beln& one
with a minor who had a legal right to
repudiate same, gave Juditment for the
plaintiff. In this we tlllnk his honor erred.
Jr the contract lu1d been alone with the
minor, she might undoubtedly •repudiate
It, and recover ur,on a qu:111t11m nierult•
The Jaw would give the lufnnt the prlvl·
Jege or judging wh1>ther such a con tract
waR tieneHclal· ur not, and or avoiding It
If she elected to do so, and recovering the
value of her eer\•lces 88 If she worked
without any contra1·t. JU Amer. & Eng.
Enc. Law, tit." Infnnt." But t.hlerontract
was in le.w with the hlthl'r, who agref'd
that the wages In law due tu lllm wight
be paid over to hit' t'hlt<l, "subject to all
·the conditions of tills contract." 'fhe
wug11e of a 111lnor, peculiar clrcumstnnces
out of the way, ure clue to the futher.
'!'his eprlnµ;s from his legul duty to sup, ·port and educate his child. He may permlt tlle n1lnor to tuke and use his own
earnings. This is culled "emuncipution,"
I 1tn<l e111anclr>a ti on wilt lJe a defense to the
fath .. r's suit for tile minor's wages. It
mny be expl'ess or imvlled; entire or partial. It UJay he concll tional. It muy be
In writing or oral; for the whole minority
or f•1r a shorter tl'rm; as tu a part of the
child's wages or as to the whole. Emancl1mtlon will not enlarge the minor's capacity to •·ontruct; it simply precludes
the fu ther from nest-rtlng his claim to tbe
wages of his !!hild. Birsh. Cent.§ 898. If
one employ 11 minor with notice of the
non-emancipation or the infant, It will be
no defense to tht> father's suit for the
wages that the child has rel'eived them.
On the other hand, payment to the father
will be 110 derense to the minor's i,iult, If
the employer knew or the fact of emancipation. 'l'hese p1lnclples or the common
law a1·c well settled, and have not l>een
affected by statute. Cloud t'. Hamilton,
11 Humph. 105. The ea11es in America are
collected in a note to Wilsou v. Mc}lillan,
33 Amer. Rep. 117.
In view of these principles, we must construe the cuntract of the fnth~r as un
emuncipatlon, subject to the cou<.lltiuns us
to clamagei,i in c1111e hie child shall quit
without cau11e ancl without the stipulated
notice. It iB as much as tf he had said:
M My child Is lt
minor. As such, l um t'll·
titled to her wages. I am will Ing that she
shall work In your mill, and that the
wages she may Pam shall be pait:l to her.
I a~ree thut she shall comply with this
contruct, nnd, tr she does not, then tl1e
wage1:1 legally due me shall be detained l>y
yc•u to tho extent 11ro\·ided In the contract
I make for her, nnd only 11uch wage11 p11ld
to her as I wuulu be entitled to r('{'elve If
the contract were exclusively with me."
'!'his woe a condltlonnl emancipation, under a special contract mude lJy and with
the father fur himi,ielf noel his child. Her
t'lllanclpotlon was portial. The rather,
having 11. legal right to her entire wages,
hus stlpulate<l that none shall be paid her
beyontl the sum tlue nnder this agreement
with him. 1f tblB contract Is binding on
1
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him, the minor cannot recover beyond its

limits. it the contract is invalid as to

him, as stipulating for a penalty, then il:

will not be in the way of plaintifi's suit.

We agree with the circuit judge in holding

that this contract does not iall within the

case of Schrimpi v. Manufacturing Co., 86

Tenn. 219, 6 S. W. Rep. 131. 'l‘hat case

concerned a contract construed as stipu-

lating for a penaltyin case of a breach. It

was held not to he an agreement for liqui-

dated damages, because the iorieiturecov-

ered all the wages due at time of breach,

regardless of amount due, and rega1dless

as to whether the arrcarages were the

consequence ofthe deiault ofthecompany.

It wasa contract harsh and unconscion-

able. It preserved noproportion bet ween

the sum iorielted and the actual damages,
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and put all employes upon same looting, .

whether much or little was earned. much

or little due, when breach occurred. 'l‘he

damages were to be all that was due. in

any case. To one, this might have been

the wages of months: to another, the

earnings of but a day. But in that case

Chiei Justice 'l‘Unsr:r quoted and indorsed

the language of CA1\u'nhJl.i., J., in Richard-

son v. Woenler, 26 Mich.9U, where he said:

“ We have no diiiiculty in holding that the

injury caused by the sudden breaking of!

of a contract of service by either party in-

volves such diiiiculties concerning the act-

ual loss as to render a reasonable agree-

ment ior stipulated damages appropriate. .

Ii 0. ﬁxed sum. or a maximum within

Which wages unpaid and accruing since

the last pay-day might be iorieited,should

be agreed on. and shall not be unreason-

able oran oppressiveexaction, there would

seem to be no legal objection to the stip-

ulation,ii both parties are equally and

justly protected." Applying these prin-

ciples to the case for judgment, we have

no diﬁicuity in holding that the stipula-

tion here is ior liquidated damages, and

not for a penalty, and that thecontract is

neither unreasonable nor oppressive.

“The tendency and preierence of the law is

to regard stated sums as a penalty, be- ‘

cause actual damages can then be 1ecov-

ered, and the recovery limited tosuchdam-

ages. This tendency and preierence, how-

ever, do not exist when the actual dam-

ages cannot be ascertained by any stand-

ard. A stipulation to liquidate damages

in such cases is considered favorably." 1

Snth. Dam. 490. This contract of employ-

ment on its iace aiiords no data by which

the actual damages likely to result from

its non-observance can with any certainty

be ascertained. Such a circumstance has

been regarded as justilying the courts in

,/

holding the sum stipulated as liquidated

I damages.

The plaintiff in error was a cotton-mill,

having in its employment hundreds of
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blm, the minor cannot reco'fer bl',rond Its holding the sum 11ti1>ulateu us Jiqu\rited
limits. JI the contract Is Invalid ae to damageR.
bim, as E1tlp11Jatl11g lor a pcnulty, then it
The plaintiff In erl'Ur was a cotton-mlll,
will out be In the way of plalutlff'R suit.
having in ltt! employment hundreds or
We aJrree with the circuit JurJ~e In holding
bands. 'l'he work le divided Into manv
that this contrHct dnerJ nut fall wit bin the lle1111rtnw11t1<.
'l'hl' rn w
111Hterl11I i.;
<'&Se of Schrimpf v • .Munufacturlnl-\' Co., !'<ti banllle<l liy one Ret of bu nils, and put In
'1.'er1n. ~19, 6 :s. W. Hep. 131. That cnHe condition hlr another, and the second deconcerned a contract construed as stlpu- partment 11tlll furtl.ier ad\•ances Its manulu ting for a penalty lo cnse or a breach. It fllcture; aud so on, through succei;i,;ive
was hei.t not to he Hll agreenwnt for Jlqul- stuges of progretie. The evldt>nce slW\YS
dnt£:d damugP.11, hecauHe the forfeiture cov- that each depurtment le dependent upon
ered all the wages due at time of breuch,
that Immediately below It. Now, H the
regardless of amount due, and regurdlerJS operatives of one department CJ nit, or their
l\l! to whether the arreurages were the work Is dPlnyed, its effect Is felt in ull to a
Jl;reuter or less degret~. It is also shown
conse~uenee of.the default oftheco11111auy.
Ir w111:1 a coutruct hnrHh 81111 11nc111111cio11- that it Is not al wuys easy to replace an
able. lt prcser'l"cd no 11roportl0n het ~·cl•n , operu th·e ut once, and thnt the u11cxpecied
the Rom forfeited nn<l tbl' uctunl dnn111~~11. quitting of e\·en one hund will to su111e ex·
tent nflect che re1rnlts throughout the mill.
and put all em11loserJ 1111011 1rn111e !outing,
YPt the evidence shows that It would be
whether much or little was earned, much
lmpoi;Rihle tu t•alculate with any certainty
or little due, when lirt-nch uccurrt'<l. The
the prerlt1e, actuul loBs due to a11 une:x·
damag1•s were to he all that wuR dul'. in
pected brench of on employc·s En~age
.any c111m. •ro une, this might bu ,.e LH' mJ
the wugcs of months; to 1tnother, the ment; tlwu~h It is Rhown that tl1ere nre
-ettrnlngrJ of but a clay. But lu thnt ca1o1e some departments of work where the quit·
ting of a smnll nun1brr oi lrnnds, without
Chief J mitlce T1.;ns~:Y quoted an cl lndurHl'li
the lauguuge of C.011•11E1,'1., J ., In Hie hard. notice, would stop the entire mill, u11d
throw other huuclred11 out ulemployme11t.
son v. WueUIPr, 26 Mich. \JO, where iw Hnld:
In this day ul gre11t fm·tories, und the
.. WP ha'l"e nu difttculty In holding thut the
Jnjury cam~ed liy the sudllPn lH·l•ukinQ: ull t•on11eq neut division of lu l.Jor Into i;epu ru te
lie part men ts, I\ liegree of In terd<'pc11clerwe
~If 0 COIJtract ol Hen•lce by either purty lovolveR 14uch difttculttes cunn•1·nin11: the act- among em11loyes exiHt~, which I.hey oug-ht
uni lusR llR to remler a rt>usunnLte u11:ree- and do i·L>eugnize, und which mukes the
ul>llga tlon of each to the whole, and to
ment for stipulutPd dumni.ceR apprupriutc.
the common employer, all the more Im11 a fixer! sum, or a maximum within
-..vh'.ch wnges unpaid nnd acl'rulng RincP portant. 'fhA cn11e Is one, tlwn, where the
the last pay-day mi~ht tie forfeited, should eertuinty of 1:101110 du mage, and the uncertnlu ty of meuns unt..I st1111'111rcls l>y which
l>f' a~re«>IJ on, 01111 shall not bP unreu1m11thu actual damage can he ascertuined, ruable or an oppresl!lveexo<'tlon, there would
q 11ire the eourtM to nphohl the <'Ontrart
8et!ll1 to be no legul ol>jectlou to the Rtipula tlun, U hutb pnrtlerJ are equally uud ·ns one for llquldatPd damages, and not as
juRtly 1>rotef'ted. n Applying these prln- proyidl11g for a pPualty. '!'he sum fixed Is
-clple:t to the caHe for judgment, we have certain. It Is proportionecl to the earning
no difttculty in holding that the Rllpuld- cu fiacl ty uf the em ploye, an<l hence pres um·
tion here lt1 for llquiclutPd damap;PI!, nnd ahty with regurd to the purtlcular result1:1
not for a 11enalty, and that thecontraet. h1 of u lirt•nch in each department. Ther·e Is
ueltl.ier unreaHunable nor oppre11sive. no h11r1h1hip In thA agreenwnt 1·eq11irlng
2 weeks' notice. JI the operative leaves
~The tendency uml preference of the low Is
to regard stu ted su111R ad a penalty, be- for guud c1111se, the contract wonld not
apply. If a hie to work, the pay contlnul's
~a uRe uctual dumagt•11 can then be recovered, anrl therecoveryllmlt<'d tosuchdum- 1111 til notice huH befHJ worked out.
'fhut she returut•d the next day after
agee. 'l'llls tent.Jency and 1neference, howt>ver. rlu nut !'Xb!t. whPu the uctunl clnm- quitting, t11Hl offered to work out her uo·
tice, ls 110 t•ompliunre. 'l'he mischier had
&~PS cnnnut be oseertnlned by any standbeen <Jone. 8he hud 'foluntarily, and withard. A stipulation to lic1uid11te dumuges
In such c1tHes Is conl'lldcrcd luvorahly. ·· 1 out pretem1e of ex1;11se, or asking tu lie re.
Su th. Hum. 4W. This contract of employ- leused, gone off, und left her work standing, 1111<1 cndeu\'o_red to get others to go
ment on Its face affor1ls no d11t11 h.V which
with her. ThedamageR ha<l occr11e1l, and,
th" actual c1amngcs likely to result from
under the fucts of this cm~e, appella11t was
ltR nun-ol>scrvauNi cun with any certainty
not L>ound tu restore her. He n•rse. Jud;;he a;ict•rtaln!!cl. 8uch a cll·r:umst.auce has
meut here for pl a.in tlH in errnr.
beeu regardell ae jui;tlfylng the courts in
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LIQUIDATED AND UNLIQUID.ATED DAMAGES.
TODE et al. "· GROSS.

LIQUIDATED AND UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES.

. ma king,

(28 N. E. 469, 1..."'7 N. Y. 480.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divl·
sion. Oct. 6, 1891.

TODE et al. v. GROSS.

(28 N. E. 469, 1W N. Y. 480.)

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi-

sion. Oct. 6, 1891.

Appeal by defendant from ajudgment

of the general term of the supreme court

in the second judicial department, afﬁrm-

ing a judgment entered upon the decision

of the court after a trial without a jury.

Afﬁrmed.

Action for breach of covenant to recov-

er the sum of $5,000 as stipulated dam-

ages. On the 15th of October, “$4, the de-

fendant owned a cheese factory situate in

the town of Monroe, Orange county, com-

prising two parcels of land, with the

buildings thereon, and a quantity of ﬁxt-

ures, machinery, and tools connected

therewith. For some time prior, with
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the assistance of her husband, Conrad

Gross, her brother-in-law, August Gross,

and her father, John Hoffman,she had

been engaged in the business of manufact-

uring cheeses at said factory known as

“ From,nge de Brie." “Fromage d'Isigny,"

and “Nenichatel." Such cheeses were

made by a secret process known only to

herself and her said agents. On the day

last named, she entered into a sealed

agreement with the plaintiffs, whereby she

agreed to sell and transfer to them the

said factory and all its belongings, togeth-

er with the “good-will, custom, trade-

marks, and names used in and belonging

to the said business," for the sum of $25,-

000, to be paid and secured March 1, 1885,

when possession was to be given. Said

instrumentcontained a covenant on her

part that she would "communicate after

the ﬁrst day of March, 1885, or cause to be

communicated, to" said plaintiffs, “ by

Conrad Hross,John Hoffman, and August

Gross, or one or other of them, the secret

of the manufacture of the cheeses known

as ‘Fromage de Brie,' ‘Nenichatel,' and

‘D'Isigny,' and the recipe therefor, and

for each of them, and will instruct or

cause to be instructed them, and each of

them, in the manufacture thereof. And

that she and the said Conrad Gross, John

Hoffman, and August Gross will refrain

from communicating the secret recipe and

instructions for the manufacture of said

cheeses, or either of them. to any and all

persons other than the above-named par-

ties of the second part, [plaintiffs,] and

will also, after the ﬁrst day of April, 1885.

refrain from engaging in the business of

manufacturing, or vending of

said cheeses, or either of them, and from

the use of the trade-marks ornames, or ei-

ther of them, hereby agreed to be trans-

ierred in connection with said cheeses, or

either of them, or with any similar prod-

uct, under the penalty of ﬁve thousand

dollars, which is hereby named as stipu-

lated damages to be paid by the party of

the ﬁrst part, [defendant,] or her heirs,

•

Appeal by defendant from a judgment
of the general term or the supreme court
In the 1:1ecund judicial department, affirming n judgment entered upon the dt>eisioa
of the court after a trial without a jury.
Atfirmed.
Action for breach of covenant to recover tlJ" sum of $5,000 a11 stipulated Clamages. On the 16th of October, 1~84. the ti~
felll.lan t owned a chel'se factory sitna ta In
the town of Monroe, Orange county, comprising two parcels of land, with the
bulldlngR thereon, and a quantity of fixture1:1, machinery, and tool11 connected
therewith. For some time prior, with
the assistance of her husband, Conrail
Gross, her hrother-111-law, August Gross,
and her father, John Hoffman, she had
been engaged In the business of manufacturing cheeses at said factory known ae
"From.nge de Brie," "Fromage d'lsigny,"
and ":Seufchatel." Sul'l1 cheeses were
made hy a secret proce1:1s known only to
ht-r1:1elf and bt-r said agents. On the day
last named, 11he enterecl Into a sealed
agreement with the plalnt-lffe, whereby she
agreed to sell and tran11fer to tl.Jem the
said factory and all Its belongings, togt-ther with the "good-will, custom, trademarks, and names used In and belonging
to the 1mid l:nudne1n1," for the sum of $25,000, to be puld and secured March 1, 1AA5,
when pos1:1ession was to be given. ~aid
instrument contained n covenant on her
part that Rhe would "communicate after
the first day or March, JR85, or cause to bf'
communicated, to" said plaintiffs, "by
Conrad Hross,John Hoffman, and Augm1t
Gross, or one or other of them, the secret
of the manufacture of the cbee11es known
11s 'Fromoge df' Brie,' 'Neufchatel,' and
• D'IHigny,' and the recipe tl.Jtirefor, and
for each ot them, and wlll Jnst1·uct or
cause to be lnstructeu them, and each of
them, in the manufacture thereof. And
that she and the said Conrad Gro1:1s, John
Hoffman, and August Grose will refrain
from communicating tbe secret recipe and
Instructions for tl.Je manufacture of said
cheesP.s, or either or them, to any and all
pe~one other th11n the above-named pnrti<>s of the second part, [plalutiHs,] aud
will also, after the fil'st day of April, 1885,
refruin from engaging In the business of
making, munufact urlng, or vendlug or
saiu cheeses, or either or them, and from
the use of the tra<le-marke or names, or either of them, hert-by agreed to be traneft>tTed In connection with said cheeses, or
ei tber of them, or with any similar product, under the penalty of five thouemnd
dollars, which fl:1 hereby named as stipulated dumuges to he paid by the part~· of
the first part, [11P.fencla11t,] or her heirs,
executor1:1, administrators, or assigns, in
cm;e of a violation by the party of the
first part [defendant] of this co,·enant,
of thi11 contract, or uny p11rt thereof. within five years from the du te hereof." She
further covenanted that shu herself. uR
well as "s111il Conrucl C>ross, John Hoffman, uud Aug-ut;t Ul'Ol!t!, dul'lng und up to

arnl un tll the first day or May, 1885, Ahalt
continue unll remain In said couu ty or
Orauge, and from time to time, and at all
reasonable tiwe1:1 during said period, hy
herself, or by said Conrad Gross, .John
Hoffman, and August Grose, whenever so
rt-quested by the said parties of tbe 1:1econd
part, [plaintiffs,) Impart to them, or either of them, the secret of making such
cheeses, and euch or them, and insh·uct
them, and each of them, in the process of
manufactnrlng the aamE'. 1rnd each or
them, as fully as ehe or the said Conrad
Gross, John Hoffman, or AuguRt Bross,
or either of them, are informed concerning the sume." Both parties appear to
huve duly kept and performed the agreement, except that, as the trial court found,
"suh11equent1y to the 1Ht day of May, 1885,
Conrad Gross, the hnHband of defendant,
went to New York city, and engaged In
the bu11mes11 of selling •foreign and l'lomestic fruits, and all kinda of cheese and sao1:1ages, &c.,' • • • 11nd while so engaged
• • • sold and personally dtilivered
from his place of buRlness to one John
Wassung three .boxes of cheese marked
an<l numed 'Fromage d'lslgny,' and having substantially tbe same trade-mal'ke
thereon as thnt sold hy defendant to
plaintiffs, 11nd having stamped thtreon
the nu me 'From age d'lslgny,' and that
11ald cheese so sol1I by him to said Was.
sung was a similar product to that formerly manufactured by defendant." Also,
that "said August Gross, the brotber-lnlaw of rlefendant, subElequent ti) the lRt
day of May, 18H5, f.'ngaged In the business
or retailing fancy groceries lo the city of
New York. and In and during ~he full or
1887, and prior to the commencement of
this action, kept for sale at his place of
business In New York city boxes of cheese
marked or stamped • Frorun~e d'Isigny.'"
'l'he court further found that the cheese
so sold by Conrad GroR11 'Jnder the naml'I
of "Fromaged'lRigny, ""wa;inever11ohl by
plaintiffs, nor made or manufaccure<l by
them, or eith!lr or them, but thu t the
Rnrue was a similar product." The court
found 011 conclui;ilons of Jaw thut said
agreement was a reasonable one, and
wae founded upon u good and sufficient
cousldera tlou; that said 11ale by Conrad
nnd sal<l keepln~ fur 1:1nle b:v August
Gross was a direct violation of the covenant in question; that the restriction huposed was no more than th" interei;ts of
the pnrties required, and the t It was not
In restraint of trade or against public
poll<'.v. Judgment was ordere<l for the
1ilalntiHs rm· the eum of $5,000 as stipulated dama.~es.
John Fennel, for appellant. Henry Ba·
con, for respondents.

VANN, J. (after stating the facts).
'rhe buE1i11ess cHrrietJ on by the defen<lunt watt founded ou a 11e<:ret process
known only to herself nod her agents.
8he had the right to continue the bus!·
nes1:1, an<l by keeping her secret to enjoy
Its benefits to any practicable extent.
8be ail;o had the right to sell the bu11lneAs,
including as an essential part thereof the
secret 11rm:esil, and, In order to place the
purchmiers In the same posi tiou tlrn t she
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occupied, to promise to divulge the secret

to them alone, and to keep it from every

one else. In no other way could she sell

what she had, and get what it was worth.

Having the right to make this promise,

she also had the right to make it good to

her vendees, and to protect them by cove-

nants with proper safeguards against the

consequences of any violation. Such a

contract simply left matters substantially

as they were before the sale, except_ that

the seller of the secret had agreed that she

would not destroy its value after she had

received full value for it. The covenant

was not in general restraint of trade, but

was a reasonable measure of mutual pro-

tection to the parties, as it enabled the

one to sell at the highest price, and the

other to get what they paid for. It im-
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posed no restriction upon either that was

not beneﬁcial to the other, by enhancing

the price to the seller. or protecting the

purchaser. Recent cases make it very

clear that such an agreement is not op-

posed to public policy. even if the restric-

tion was unlimited as to both time and

territory. Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y.

473, 13 N. E. Rep. 419; Hodge v. Sloan, 107

N. Y. 2‘14, 17 N. E. Rep. 335; Leslie v.Lorii-

lard,l1l) N. Y. 519, 534. 18 N. E. Rep. 363;

Thermometer Co. v. Pool, (Sup.) 4 N. Y.

Supp. 861. The restriction under consider-

ation, however, was not unlimited as to

time.

The chief reliance of the defendant in

this court, where the pofnt seems to have

been raised for the ﬁrst time. is that the

covenant, so far as stipulated damages

are concerned, is conﬁned to the personal

acts of Mrs. Gross. and does not embrace

the acts of her agents. A careful reading

of the agreement, however, in the light of

the circumstances surrounding the parties

when it was made, shows that no such re-

suit was intended. What was the object

of the covenant? It was to keep secret,

at all hazards, the process upon which the

success of the business depended. On no

other basis could the plaintiffs safely buy,

orthe deiendantsell, for what her property

was worth. Who had the power to keep

the process secret? Clearly the defendant,

if any one, as she had conﬁded it to no one

except her trusted agents, who were near-

ly related to her by blood or marriage.

But could she covenant against the acts of

those over whom she had no control? She

had the right to so covenant, by assum-

ing the risk of their actions; and, unless

she had done so, presumptively she could

not have sold her factory for so largea

sum. It was safer for her to sell with

such a covenant than it was for the plain-

tiffs to buy without it. She could exercise

some power over her own husband and

her father and her husband's brother, all

of whom had been associated with her in

carrying on the business, and whose ac-

O<.'copled, to promise to divulge the secret

to them alone, an1l to keep it from e\"ery
one else. In no other way could she sell

what she bad, and get what it wa11 worth.
Ha Ying the right to make thiH pro111IHe,
she also had thfl right to make it gooc! to
Iler venclee11, and to prote<"t them by cove.
nants with proper safegu11rds aguinst the
consequences of any violation. 8uch a
contract simply Jert matters 1mbstantlally
as they were before the sale, except. that
the sellt•r of thf' secret had agreed that she
would not destroy its value after she h1ul
recdved full value for it. The cuYenent
wut1 nut In general restraint of trade, but
was a reasonnble measure of mutnal protr.ctiun to the parties, as It enabled the
one tn sell at the highest price, ftnd the
other to get what they paid for. Jt lmpoRed no restriction upon elthPr that was
not bcneHclal to the other, by enhunclng
the prke to the seller, or protecting the
purchasPr. Recent ceRe.fl make It Yery
clear that such an agreem~r1t is not oppm;ed to public policy. even if the restriction WRY unlimited as to both tinie and
territory. Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y.
473, 13 N. E. Hep. 41!); Hodge v. Sloan, 107
N. Y. 2~4, 17 N. E. RPp. 335; Leslie v. Lorillard, llO N. Y. li19, 0::14, 18 N. E. Rep. 363;
Thcrmometer Co. "'· Pool, (8up.) 4 N. Y.
Supp. 861. The restrlctlou under cout1ideratlun, however, was not unlimited as to
time.
The chief rellnnce of the derendant In
this court, where the potnt seems to hll\'e
been raised for the first time, Is that the
covenant, so far as stlpulatell damuges
are concerned, h1 confined to the personal
acts or Mrs. GrosY, anll does not emln·ace
the aets or ber agents. A careful rea1llng
of the agreement, howe\·er, In the light of
the cir<'umstances 1mrroundl11g the p11rtles
when It was made, HhowR that no such result was Intended. Whnt was the object
of the covenant? It was to keep secret,
at all hazards, the proceRs upon which the
success of the business depended. On no
other basis could the plaintiffs 11afely buy,
or the cJefendant sell, fm• what her property
was worth. Who had the power to keep
the procPss secret? Clearly the defendant,
If any one, as she hod con tided It tu no one
excPpt her trusted agents. who were nearly related to her hy blood or ma1·riage.
llu t coulll she covenant against the acts of
th011e ov~r whom 11he had no control? She
bad the right to so ruvennnt, l.Jy assuming the risk of their actions; anli, unless
sbe had done so, presumptively she could
not have sold her factory for so large a
sum. It was safer for her to sell with
such a covPnant thnn It was for the plnfn.
tifft1 to buy without it. She could exercise
some power over her own hnHl.Jnnd unrl
lll'r father and hPr husbanrl's l.Jrother, ell
or whom had bPen aRRoclntell with her In
currying on the huslness, and whose actions In certuln other respects she assumed
to control for a limited time, whereas the
plolntlffs were powerleRs. unleHY they bad
her promise to keep the process sccrt't at
the peril of paying heavily if she <lid not.
It Is not surprit!lng. thcrdore, to find thnt
the restrlctl\'e part of the covenant appliC's with the 11111111e force to her all;ents
tlJU t It d'.Jrs to herself; for she undc1·takee
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that neither she nor they wll1 disclose the
secret, or engage in muking or Bl'lllng ti·
tiler kind of cheese, or use the trade·marks
or names connectl'd with the l.JuRin<•Rs.
We do riot think thut n personal act or thP.
defendunt Is essential to a violation of tbi~
covcnnnt by her: for If sbtl permits, or
8\'en doe1:1 not prevent, her agents from
doing the prohillitc1l ucts, the promise Is.
broken. While It is her exclusive co\'e·
nan t, It rein tes to the action of others~
and, lf"they do what she agreed thnt they
would not do, It Is a breach by her. although not hPr own act. ::::ihe violated her
agreement, uot by selling hersl'lf, I.Jut by
not preventing others from sclling. Thie
construction of the restrictive part of the
covenant would hardly be open to question, were It not that In the same sentence
occ11rs the reparatlve or compensatory
part designed to make the plaintiffs whole
If the defendant either could not or did
not kee11 her agreemPnt. While this prof'ides that any violation invul ves the penalty of $5.000, it adds," which surn iY hereby named RH stipulated dumages to be·
paid" by the defendant In caso of a violation by her or the CO\'tmant In question.
What kind of violation Is thm1referred to?'
'l'he defend11nt say11 a personal violation
b.v her only, but we think, for the reasons
already a.tiven, thut the spirit of the agreement lnC:ucles l.Joth a \"iolntlon by herown act nod by the act of those whom
she did not prevent from selling, although
she had agreed that they wonld not sell.
As no one not a party tu a contr11ct can
violate it, every act of deftmilant's formerugents contrary to her co\·enant was a violation tlwreof by her, whethe1· she knew
of It or aHsented to It or not. Whenever
thnt was done which she agreed should
not b!l dune, It was a brt'ach uf a covenant
by her, even If the act was cont1·ary to her
wishes, and In spite of hPr effortR to prt'vent it. Her covenant was against acertain act by any one of folll" persons, lnclmllng herRelf. Two or those persons
sepurately did the act which she h3d
ngreed that neither of them should do,.
and thus there WWI a violation of the covenant hy her, the sume as If HIJC had clone
the act in person. Thr argument of the·
learned counsel for the defendant that the
contract ftxert a sum to be paid In case uf
ll viola lion by the defendant, but not In
case or 11 Ylolatlon "by the other parties,"
while pluuslblP, Is unsound, for there wiire·
no "other parties" who could break the
covenant. She was the sole co,·enantor,
nod unless shfl kept the cuvenantHhe l.Jroke
It: and she !lid not keep It. As the actual
damages for a l.Jreach of the rovenunt
would uecessarily he "wholly 1111certnln.
and incapable of being aRcerrnined except
l.Jy conjecture," we think thut the parties intended to llqulllate them when they provided that the 11um named should l.Je "as
stipulated demugee." TheuRe of the word
"penalty" undtr the clrcumRtances is not
controlling. Bagley v PeddiP, 16 N. Y.
41l!l; Dakin v. Williams. 17 Wend. 448,
affirmed 22 Wend. 201; Wooster v. Kisch,
26 Hnn, 61. As there is no other quei.;tion
that requires discussion, the juu~men t
should be altlrmed. with cuHtM. All concur, except IlnowN J., not sitting.
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CONDON v. KE.\-IPER.

(27 Pac. 829, 47 Kan. 126.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. Oct. 10, 1891.

Error from disiricf court. Lnbette coun-

'ty; Guonuu Ca.uvn1.s.n, Judge.

This was an action brought in the dis-

trict court of Labette county by L. H.

Kemper against C. M. Condon to recover

$500 as liquidated damages for the alleged

breach of the following written contract,

to-wit: "This agreement between‘ L. H.

Kcmper and (7. M. Condon witnesseth,

that whereas, the said Kemper has sold

to said Condon lot 7. block 38, in Oswego,

Kansas. said Condon, as a part ofthe con-

sideration therefor. agrees to erect thereon

a two-story stone or brick building. not

less than 100 feet deep. within six months,

-and to give use of the north wall thereo!
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to said Kemper; or else remove the house

now on lot 6, in said block 38, three feet

north of where it now stands, as said

Condon shall elect to do. and put said

building in as good condition asit is in its

present location. It is mutually agreed

between said parties that a failure on the

part of said ('ondon to perform these ob-

ligations shall entitle said Kemper to re-

-cover from him the sum ofﬁve hundred

dollars as liquidated" and ascertained

damages for the breach of this contract.

~C.i\1. CUNDON. Oswego, Kansas. March

11, 1887. " The defendant answered as fol-

lows: “Said defendant admits the execu-

tion and delivery of the writing marked

‘Exhibit A.' attached to and made part

-of plaintiff's petition. but he alleges the

fact to be that said writing was executed

and delivered under a misapprehension

and a mistake of the facts in reference to

the subject-matter of the transaction

therein referred to as they actually exist-

ed. and that but for such mistake such

writing would not have been executed.

Defendant alleges that plaintiff was the

owner of lots 6 and 7, in block 38, in the

city of Oswego, Kansas. That the frame

house mentioned in said writing belonged

to plaintiff. and was appurtenant to said

lot 6. That defendant negotiated for and

purchased from plaintiff said ioi. 7 with a

view of erecting thereon a stone or brick

building. That at the time of purchasing

said lot 7. and of executing and delivering

said writing, both plaintiff and defendant

understood and believed that said frame

house, mentioned in said writing, and

which belonged on and was appurtenant

to said lot li,stood on theline between

said lots 6 and 7; the main part of it be-

ing. as said parties supposed, on lot 6,

and about two or three feet in width of it

standing on said lot 7. Thai; to permit

defendant to build on his said lot 7 would

necessitate the removal of said house, as

said parties believed, some three feet to

the north. That plaintiff sold. and de-

fendant bought, said lot under such belief.

{27 Pac. 829, 47 Kan. 126.)
Supreme Court of Kansas. Oct. 10, 1891.
Error from dlslril't court, Labette coon·ty; GEORGE CHANDI.F.R, .Judge.
'l'h!s was an action brou11:ht In the die·
trict court or Lahette count.v by L. H.
Kemper UJrAln11t C. M. Condon to recover
$iiUO us lit1uiduted damas,teH for the alleged
oreaeh or the following written contract,
to-wit: "This aj,?reement between' JJ. H.
Kemper and C. M. Condon wltnesseth,
that wlll'rens, the said Kemper bas sold
to ;mid Condon lot 7, block~. tu Oswego,
Knnsas. Haid Condon, as a part of the cunsldt>ration therefor, agrees to erect thereon
a two-story stone or brlek building, not
lcfl8 thnn 100 feet deep, within six months,
.an<I to ~h·e use of the north wall thereo!
to suid Ki>mper; or ehte remove the house
now on lot fl, In said tJlock a~. three feet
north of where it now stnn<ls, as said
-(:ondou 11hall elect to (lo, und 1mt said
bulldtng In as good condition aslt Is in Its
present location. It is mutually agreed
between .,uld parties that a failure 011 the
part of said <'ondon to perform these obli~atlo11R shall entitle snid Kemper to re·con•r [ron1 him the HUlll of five hundred
<lollara afl llquldate11 · aud ascertained
dnmageH for the br,.ach uf this contract.
·C. :M. CuNDON. Oswego, Kan11as, .Murch
11. 11\8i." The defendant an11wered as follnwfl: "Said dl'ferulant 1Hlmltl! the execution and delive1·y uf the w1·itlng marked
· J<;xhlhit A.' attathed to and made part
-of 1ilulutiff's petition, but he allegc11 the
fnct to be the t said writing was excl'uted
-an1l deliY<'red under a mlsRpprehenslon
a1,1d a mistnke or the facts In reference to
the subject-matter of the transaction
therein referred to as they actually existed, und that but for sueh mi11tal.:e sncb
wrltlug would not have bi>en exet·uted.
Del<'ndant ulleges that pl!lintlff was the
<nvner of lots ti and 7, In block 38, in the
-city of Oswego, K1:1nsus. That the frame
hou~e mentioned In 11nld writing belonged
to phtintiff, and wafl nppurtennnt to said
lot 6. '!'hut 1lelendan t negotiated for and
purd111si>d fmm plaintiff snld Jol 7 with a
vh•w of erecting tbe1'eon a stQne or brick
building. 'l'hat at the time uf pm-chasing
tmid lot 7, and of executlnit nnd dell\·crlng
said writing, both plaintiff and defendun t
llnclerstood 1rnd belle\•ed that snid frame
house, mentioned In snicl writing, antl
which belon~ed on and was appurtenuut
to 11ald lot Ii, stood on the line between
said lots 6 and 7; the main part or It beiug, 1111 11aid partie11 suppo11ed, on lot 6,
.and about two or three feet In width or It
:l'ltuudin~ on snld lot 7. 'l'hat to permit
<lc!cndnnt to builtl on his eaid lot 7 woulrl
nec'.<'8fli tate tlrn removal of 1mld boui;e, ae
1rnid pnrtles helleved, Rorne threo feet to
the north. '!'hut plol11tlff Flold, nnd defen1hrnt bcrnght, H1tid lot under such belief.
'fhat plaintiff, In negotiating for the sale
of 1<11icl lot 7, object<•d to being put to the
rxprni;e of removing said house so that It
wollltl ull Rt11111l on blR own lot 6, orimiiste1l, It he were put to snch expenRe, he
.1<hould he com11ensated therefor: aucl tu
tloh'l llefendunt llHRl'JJtl'd, and egre•~•l that
Jic would, at hl11 own expense, remove

said frame house so that It should entirely
11tnncl on said Jut 6, and far enough across
the line between said lot11 6 and 7 not to
Interfere with the P.rectlon of a wall on
said line, nnd put It In eR good condition
as It ti.Jen wae, where it then stood; or If
he should so elect, h111ti>ud of removing
und repalrln1t said house 011 arore::iald, he
might erect on said lot 7 a hrlck or stone
huflcllng not leMs then 100 feet deep, and
~Ive plaintiff the Ut!e of tbe north wall
thereof as compensation for bis moving
and reptliring said house ns uforesaid.
That It was tu meet 1rnch contingency,
and secure snch end, that said writing
was executed and delivered. l'hat thereafter this delendnnt elected not to erf't:t
said 11tone or brick building on said lot 7,
and nut to furnish plnintltt the use flf the
north wall thereof. That, by agreement
between said plaintiff and defen1lunt, said
block wae afterwardH surveyed, end the
fuct wos then ai;certained tbnt 1-;nid frame
lJuih.llng did not stimtl, as both or Ha.Id
parties had suppm11>d it did, across the
line between suld lots 6 ·nnd 7,-n pnrt un
6 and a part on 7,-but that It all then
stood on sulcl lot 6, and so fnr from t11e
line between lots 6 and 7 a11 rwt to Interfere with the er~ction of a wall thereon,
and thererorea removalofHnld frame huildtng wns unneces1mry, und would ·ht! of nu
ad\·antuge whatever to pluintiff. DeJendunt ttllf'gl'R that the only pnr(Jose un
tf1(l part or plaintiff or defendant in the
execution and dell ve1·y or said writing
was to tnde111nlfy plaintiff agalnl!t cost
an(l expeni;e In th£! removal und repair of
snld hou8e as aforesaid, and thut, had
pluintlrr deHlred Its removal after the fact
In re!erence to Its true loc~tion wuM uscertuined, he could hnve had It removed
three feet north of where It tlwu Htood,
nud put in us good condition as It WllH,
where It then stood, ut a cost und expense
of not to exceed u11e hundred dollars.
'!'hat 11aid houHe could, at the time or the
execution or 11uld writing, or at uny time
since then, have been remo\•ed three fret
north of where It then stood and now
Htands, and put In as good condition as
It then was, In itH tlll'n location, at a emit
of not to exceed one hundred dollars.
'!'hat in no event could plolntlff's <lamuge, had he lleslred to bave hud said ho11t•e
removed, exceed one hundred dollars.
That to Indemnify agn1J1st such Jiliseible
1Inmage was the only object in giving 11aid
writln~. 1>1•fendant allegl·1:1 that plaintiff
hmt not removed said house, and has In
no way been to anycost orexpenHeon acl'ount of the remo\•al of Rnld house, or for
any other pnrposo referred to in any way
In said writing. J)efendnnt (}cnies that
plain tiff haR suffered any <lama~e on his
account, and denies uny liability to him
In auy respect. Wherefore dt•fem1nnt a~ks
that this cnuse be disrniRHed, nnd thnt he
recover lllH cof!ts herein." 'l'hc plalntlH
replied, denying every nllegution of the
anRwer ineonsiHtent with the allegations
of hhi petition. At the l.<'ebruar,\· te1·m,
18'\9, when the caHe was called for trial,
the pluin1irr move1J fur Juclgment upon the
pleR1ll11ge; nnd the court sustained the
motion, and ren1lere<I j111lirment nccordlngly in fnvnr of 1hP plnintHf all() ag111n:4
the defen<luul fur $jOU, with intere11t uod

LIQl'ID.\TED AXD
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costs; the defendant excepted, and alter-

wnrds, as plaintiff in error, brought the

case to this court for review.

Case & Glssse, for plaintiff in error. J.

H. Morrison, for defendant in error.

VALEN'l'INE,J. (after stating the facts

as above). The substantial question in-

volved in this controversy is whether the

plaintiff below, L. H. Kemper, ma,v re-

cover from the defendant below. 0. M.

Condon, the sum of $500 as agreed and liq-

uidated damages, or whether he can re-

cover only the amount of his actual loss

or damage resulting from the breach of

the contract sued on, which amount, ac-

cording to the facts of the case as pre-

sented to us, cannot exceed $100. The

contract upon which Kemper seeks to re-

cover contains the following among other
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stipulations: “It is mutually agreed be-

tween said parties that ainiinre on the

part of said Condon to periorm these ob-

ligations shall entitle said Kemper to re-

cover irom him the sum of live hundred

dollars as liquidated and

damages for the breach of this contract. "

it will be seen that the parties themselves

have used the words “liquidated and as-

certained damages;" but nearly all the

authorities agree that neither these

words, nor any other words of similar

import. are conclusive, but that the

amount named, notwithstanding the use

of such words, may nevertheless be noth-

ing more than a penalty. Some of such

authorities are the following: Lampman

v. Cochran. 16 N. Y. 275: Ayres v. Pease,

12 Wend. 393; Hoag v. McGinnis, 22 Wend.

163; Beale v. Hayes. 5 Sandi. 640; Gray v.

Crosby, 18 Johns. 219; Jackson v. Baker,

2 Edw. Ch. 47l: Shreve v. Brercton, 51 Pa.

St. I75: Fitzpatrick v. Cottingham, 14

Wis. 219; Fisk v Gray, 11 Allen, 132; Wal-

lis v. Cut-penter,l3 Allen, 19; Ex parte Pol-

lard, 2Low. 411; iiasyc v. Ambrose. 23

Mo. 89: Carter v. Strom, 41 Minn. 522, 43

.\'.'W. Rep. 394: Schrimpf v. Manufactur-

ing Co., $6 Tenn. 219. 6 S. W. Rep. 13];

Haldeman v. Jennings, 14 Ark. 329; Davis

v. Freeman, l0 Mich. 188; Hahn v. Horst-

man, 12 Bush, 249; Low v. Nolte, 16 Ill.

475; Kemble v. Furren, 6 Bing. l4l ; Davies

v. Pt'nton.6 Barn. & C. 216; Horner v.

Flintoﬂ, 9 Mees. & W. 678; Newman v.

Copper, 4 Ch. Div. 724. Of course. the

words of the parties with respect to dam-

ages, losses, penalties, foricitures, or any

sum of money to be paid, received, or re-

covered, must be gi\en due consideration,

and, in the absence of anythingto the con-

trary. must be held to have controlling

force; but when it may be seen from the

entire contract, and the circumstances un-

der which the contract was made. that

the parties did not have in contemplation

actual damages or actual compensation,

and did not attempt to stipulate with

reierence to the payment or recovery of

U~LIQt.:IDATF.D
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lowing text-hooks upon thl!! subject may
be exnmine1: with much profit: 1 Sedg.
Dam. (!;th E1I. J c. l:?, §§ 3"9-4:.'7; 1 !:'uth.
Dam. pp. 475-5:!0. c. 7. §ti; 13 Amt>r. &: Em:.
Enc. Luw, pp. 857-SliS; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur.
§~ 440-447; 3 Pars. Cont. pp. 156-lti,1, § 2.
'l'he text.books upon thi>1 sul.Jject unite In
YALESTJNE,J. (after Htatlng the furt!'I 1111.,·lng that the tendency and prt.>ferl'nce·
as nbove). Tue subetantinl question i11- of the law le to regard u statt-d Rum 111; a
\"'oh·ed in thiH controvcr"~· iH whetlwr tlw
pennlty, Instead of liquidnted rlumui.:rs,
plnintHr below, L. H. Kt'lll(ll'r, mn.v re- bt>CllUHe actual dnmngre can then be reco,·er from the deft>111lnnt hl'low, C. l\I. covl'retl, nod the recovery be lhnitl'd to ·
Con1lon, tht> sum of $::.oo ns ngrel'll und liq- such <lnmngee. 1 Suth. Dam.490: 13Amrr.
nhlnted dnmagl'R, or whethf'r he cnn re- & Eng. Enc·. I,aw, pp. 85:!, 8li0. 'l'he d1•di,1co,·er only the umount of hl11 ul'tunJ loss lons of this court nre also in this • .1111e
or dnmnge resulting from the br1!11ch of line. The ohly dt•cislons of this court upthe c·ontract sued on, which nmount, uc- on the subject of liquilloted rlnmnges ure
cor1ling to the facts of the case RI! 11re- the following: Kurtz v. 8ponnble, 6 Knn.
1;e11tt'd to U!!, cnnnot excet>d ~JOO. The 3£15; Foote v. Sprnguf', 13 Kun. 155; Ilnilcontrnct u11on which Kemper llt't>kH to reway Co. v. Shoemnker, 27 Kan. 677; Heatcover contai1111 the following among other
wole v. Gorrell, 35 Kun. 692, 12 l'uc. Hep.
1>tipulatlont1: "It Is mutually ni.:recll hc- 135. We are satil!lil•d with the furrgulng
twt>en enld parties that. a failure on the deci11io1111 of this court, but they do nut go
vart of euld Condon to pf'r!orm tlwi;e olJ- to the extent of controlling the tlechllon
lign tlons 11hnll entitle sal1I Kem11cr to re- In the pre1wnt cRMl'. The lust caHe clte1l
cover from him the sum of five hnndrell
le snppurterl by the following ad1titlonn.I
dollars as liquidated an1l n1;certained · coses: Davis v. flillt•tt. 5:! N. H. 126:
danJRges for the brench or thll'I contruct." Caswell v ..lohnsc;n, 5~ Me. Jr.4; Burrill
1t will be et>en that the parties them1wlves
v. Dngget t, 77 Me. 54:i, I A ti. Rrp. 6i7.
ha,·e ut1ed the wor1ls ''llqnldated and nl!In 1 Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed. l the ·
certalnetl damages;" but neurly all the followinll among other langung'e Is usecl:
authoritleR agree that neitht>r the11c ".From thti foregoing we derive the folword11, nor any other worcJR of similar lowing as a genf'ral rule governing thl'
Import, nre conclusive, bnt thnt the
whole subject: Whenever the claff,agf'H
amount nnmed, notwithstanding the use
were evldeutly the subject of calculation
of such wortle, mny nevertheless bP noth- and adj1111tment bPtween the pnrtbs, ar.•1·
ing more than a pP.nnlty. Somfl of such a certain sum was agreed upon antl In-·
authorities are the follow)Qg: Lampman
tP.n<led ascompen11ntlon, and is in fuct reuv. Cochran. 16 .N. Y. 275: Ayrt>s v. Pense, eonable In amount. It wlll be nllowed by
12 Wend. 3lJ3; Hoag v. McGinnis, 22 Wend. the court as liquidated damages " St.>ctlon 405. "Antl here well re brought bnl·k
163; Beale v. Hayes. 5 Sandf. ll40; Groy v.
Crosby, 18 .JohnR. 219; Jackson v. Bnker,
hy a somewhat circuitous path to the ·
2 Edw. Ch. 471: Shreve v. Brereton, 51 Pa. great fundamental principle which umlerSt. 175: Fltzpntrlck v. Cottingham, 14 lies our whole eystem,-thut of compensuWis. 219; Fl11k v Gray, 11Allen,132; Wal- tlon. 'fhe great object of this system Is.
lie v. Curpenter, 13 Allen, 19; Ex parte Pol- to place thll plaintiff In as good a position
lard, 2 Low. 411; Ba11.ve v. Ambrose, :es flt' he would have had If hie contract hud
Mo. 89: Carter'\", Strom, 41 Minn. 522, 43 not been broken. So long m~ partlt.'B themN. W. Rep. 394; Schrimpf v. Manufactur· selves keep thl11 11rlnclple in view, they will
Ing Co., ~6 Tenn. 219, 6 S. W. Rep. Jal ; be allowed to nllree upon SUl'h a rrnm us
Hnldt>man ,•..JcnnlngR, 14 Ark. 329; 1>11\•ls
wlll prohar1Iy be n fair equln1Ie11t or u
v . .Freemnn, 10 ~llrh. l&."; Hahn v. Hurst- breuch of contract. But when they go hemnn, 12 llnsh, :.!49; Low v . Nolte, 1li Ill. yonll thl11, and undertu.ke to 1>tlp11lute, not
475: Kt'mble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141: Du vies for compensation. hut for 11 sum out of all
v. Pl'nton, 6 Barn. & C. :!IG; Horner v.
proportion to the mensure of linhllity
which the law regards as compernm tor.v,
Flinton, 9 Mel's. & W. 678: New 1111111 v.
Cnpper, 4 Ch. Div. 7t4. Of courRe, the then the lnw wlll not allow thent:r"ement
wor1l11 of the pnrtles with rel!p<'ct to cJa111- tu stnnd. In all agreements, therefore.
11geH, lossei:., 1ie1111lticl!, rorfl•lturt>e, or any fixing upon a sum In advance ns the mcuseum of money to be paitl, received, or re- ure or limit of lla!Jlllty, the final <1uestion
covered, must be gi\·en due r.onsiderntion, Is whethei' the subject of the contrnet is
and . In tbe u bsence of rrnytbing to th~ 1·00- such that It vlolate11 this funilamental rule
trary, must he heltl to have controlling of compen11ation. If It d0eH so, the sum
force; but when it may be 11een from the ftxPcl 111 necesHarily a penalty. Ir It doe11
t>ntlre contract, and the circunn1tnnces un- not do so, the question arisl'H, ns in uny
dt>r which the con tract \YllB made. thnt other contract, as to what ngre1•111ent the
the pnrti~ did not haYe In conte11111Iution
purtlea have actually murle; an•I her·e, us
actuul llnmuges or actual l'Ompensation, in all. other cuscs, tht>lr Intention, us t1t1end did nut attempt to stlpulute with certai11ed from the lnngunge en;ployetl, Is
reference to the payment 01· recovery of a guille." :::lectlon 400. "W11ere the eti1mactual dumai;tes or actual compensatio::, la ted sum le wholly coJiu tern I to the ohjeet
thPn the nruuunt stipulated to be paid on
of thtl rontruct, being evidently inHerted
the one side, or t'l be recel\'ed or recoY- merely ae security for performance, It will
ered on the other sh.le, cannot he com1ld- not be allowed us liquitlatetl d11111a~t>s."
ered us liquidated dnmuges, but muHt be !Section 410. "Whenever nu amount stipconsidered in the nu tu re of a penalty; ·anrl
ulated is to be paid ou the non-pn.vthle, P.ven If the partlt>R 11hould name such ment of a less amount, or on 1lefault In tiea1Dount "llqulduted damagl'S." The fol- llverlng a. thing of lel!s vulue, the bUDl will
cost11; the dt'ft>nilnnt excer1ted, RncJ nftl'rW>trtlt', &ff plaintift in error, hrouJ:;ht the
cuse to this court !or review.
Cu11e & GIRi!Bl', for plninttrf in error. J.
H. Morril1on, for defeudan t in error.

206
206

LIQUIDATED AND UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES.

generally be treated as a penalty." Sec-

tion 4l1. “Whenever thestipulated sum is

to be paid on breach of a contract of such

»a nature that the loss maybe much grca t-

er or much les than the sum, it will not

he allowed as liquidated damages." Sec-

tion 4l2. “A sum ﬁxed as security for

the performance of a contract containing

a number of stipulations of widely differ-

ent importance, breaches ol' some of which

are capable of accurate valuation, for any

of which the stipulated sum is an excess-

ive compensation, is a penalty." Section

413. “ii the contract is one in which the

measure of damages for part performance

is ascertainable. and a sum is stipulated

for breach of it, this sum will not be al-

lowed as liquidated damages, in case of a

partial breach." Section 415.
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in 1 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence

the following language is used: “Where

an agreement contains provisions for the

‘ performance or non-performance of several

acts of diﬂerent degrees ofimportance, and

then a certain sum is stipulated to be paid

upon a violation of any or all of such pro-

visions, and the sum will be in somein-

tances too large, and in others too small,

a compensation for the injury thereby oc-

casioned, that sum is to be treated as a

penalty, and not as liquidated damages.

This rule has been laid down in a some-

what different form, as follows: Where

-the agreement contains provisions for the

performance or non-performance of acts

which are not measurable by any exact

pecuniary standard, and also of one or

more other acts in respect of which the

damages are easily ascertainable by a

jury, and a certain sum is stipulated to be

paid upon a violation of any or of all

these provisions. such sum must be taken

to be a penalty." Section 443. “ Whether

-an agreement provides for the performance

or non-performance of one single act, or of

several distinct and separate acts, if the

stipulation to pay a certain sum of money

upon a default is so framed, is of such a

nature and effect, that it necessarily ren-

ders thedefaulting party liable in the same

amount at all events, both when his fail-

ure to perform is complete and when it is

only partial, the sum must be regarded

as a penalty, and not as liquidated dam-

ages." Section 444.

In Sutherland on Damages the following

among other language is used: “ While no

onecan fail to discover a very great amount

of apparent conﬂict, still it will be found

on examination that most of the cases,

however conﬂicting in appearance. have

yet been decided according to the justice

and equity of the particular case." Page

478. “ To be potential and controlling

that a stated sum is liquidated damage,

that sum must be ﬂxed as the basis of

compensation, and substantially limited

to it; for just compensation is recognized

LIQUIDATED AND UNLIQUIDATED D ..UL\.GES.

generally be treRted a11 a penalty,• Section 411. "Whenever theetipu!Rted sum is
to be paid on breach of a contract of such
.a nature that the loss may be much greater or mnch lel:!B than the EIUlll, It will not
be allowed ae liquidated damages." 8ectiun 412. "A sum fixed ae 11ecurity for
the performance uf a contract cont:i.inlng
a number of stipulations of wltJely diHl!rent importance, breaches of some of which
are capable of accurate valuation, for any
of which the stipulated sum le en exceRS·
Ive compensation, le a penalty." Section
413. "JI the contract ilf one In which the
measure of damages fur part performance
.le ascertainable, and a sum Is etipula ted
for breach of it, this sum will not be al·
lowed at1 liquidated damages, In case of a
partial breach." Section 415.
In 1 Pomeroy on Equity .lurlaprmleuce
th" folio wing language IK used: "Where
~n agreement contains provisions for the
performance or nun.pe1·formance ohieveral
acts uf diHereut degrees oflmportuuce, und
then a certain sum le stlpulu ted to he paid
upon a violation of any or all or such proviRions, and the eu11J will be in some intance11 too !urge, and in others too Rmull,
a compensation for the injury therell,v oc..
·ca1<lo11ed, that sum is to be treated as ll
penalty, and not ns liqnil1ated damages.
This rule hHK been laid <lown In a Rumewhat different form, as follows: Where
the ugreenwut co11tui11s r>rovlsione fol' tile
performunce or non-performance of act1:1
which are not measurable by any exact
pecuniary standard, and ulso of one or
mon: other act11 in respect of which the
llanrnge1:1 are euRily ascertainat1le by a
jury, and a certain sum Is stipulat1>d to be
paid upon a ¥iolatioo of any or uf all
these provisions. l!UCll sum 11111t1t he tuken
to Lie a penalty." Section 4!3. "Whether
.an agreement providl'B for the pc·rformance
or non-performance of one single act, or of
several distinct and separate acts, if the
titipula lion to pay a certain 1111111 of money
upon a default ls so framed, is uf such a
nature and effect, that It net·esearily ren-ders thederuultlng party Ila ble In the same
Rmount at all events, both when his failure to perform ls complete and when It is
-only partial, the sum must he rt~garded
ue a penalty, and nut as liquidated damages." Section 444.
In 811therlaud on DamageRthe following
among other language h m;ed: "While no
onecu 11 fo.11 to discover a Yery gren t amount
-Of apparent confll<'t, still it will be Joun~
on examination thut moat of the caeet1,
howernr conflicting In appearance. have
.ret been decided ac·cordlng to the juRtlce
and equity of the particular cuRe." Pnge
4i8. "To l.Je potential and controlling
thut a stated sum 11:1 liquidated damage,
that Hum must be fixed as the bueie of
·corn1lensation, and euhstantlally limited
to it; for Just compen11atiou le recognized
as the unlverRul measure of damages not
pnnitory. Parties may liqnidute the
amount by previom1 agreement. But,
when a Rtipuluted sum Is evl!lently nut
bused on that principle, the intention to
liquidate dumu~es will either he round not
to exist, or will be dlsregarde<I, and the
tita ted sum treated 8S a p~nuity. Contracts are not made to he broken; and
beuce, when pnrtie11 p1·uvide lorcouaequen-

ces of a breach, they proceed with lees cao·
tiun than U that event was certain, and
they were fixing a sum absolutely to be
paid. The intention In all such cases ls
material; but, tu prevent a stated sum
from beln1t trented us a penalty, the Intention should be a11parent to liquidate
damages In the eenee of making ju1:1t compensation. It le not enough thut the parties express the Intention that the stated
sum shall be paid In cnse of a violation of
the contract. A penalty 111 not converted
Into liquidated dama11.es by the intention
that It be paid. It Is intrlnsicnlly a different thing, and theinteution tl11\tit he paid
cannot alter its nature. A bond, literally
com~trued, Imports an intention that the
penalty shall be paid if there be clefault in
the perrornurnce or the condition; and
formerly that was the lt>.ital effect. Courts
of law now, 1luwever,11drninister thesame
e11uity tu relie\'e from penalties In other
forms of contract as from those in bonds.
The evidence of an Intention to measure
the danrnge, therefore, le seldom eatlRfactory wlieu the amount stated varies
matel'iully from a juet estimate of the nt'tual loRs finally sustained.·· Puges 480, 481.
See al110. eMpecially, 3 ParHons on Contracts (16th Ed., p. 156 et seq.)
~Juny courts hold that tile Intention of
the parties must govern, but suy that If
the damages t1tipulu.ted to be l'aid, received, or recoverAd on the breach of the
coutritct are out of proportion to the actuul dumnges that might beeuetalued, then
the partie1:1 could uot in fact ha \"e in ten<led
llqulclated dumuges, bnt merely a penalty,
whatever their lttnguage might be. Other
courts hold that it makt>S no difft>rence
what the Intention of the parties might
be; that the nature or the con tract it11elf
must govern, and H the amountstipnlated
to be paid, recei vecl, or 1·ecovered b1 out of
all 1n·uportlon to the actual damages that
might be eustRlned; then that such 111110unt
mu1:1t be t1·puted us a penalty, whatever
mny ha \'e been the in ten ti on of the parties; that 111 fact, an1l In the very nature
of things, such ttmount would be a peualty, and could not be anything else: thut
the parties could not by misnnming the
amount, and r.aillnit it liquidated damugeR,
mnke it such. In this connection, the
following language or Judge CHRll!TIA:SCY,
who deJi\·err.tJ the opinion of the con rt In
the case of Jaquith v. HudMon,5 Mich. 12a,
lil6, 1=l7, ts Instructive: "Again, the attempt
to pluce this qneation upon the Intention
of the parties. and to make this the governing contiideration, uecessnrlly Implies
thnt, If the Intention to make the 1:1um
stipulated damages should clearly appear,
the court would enforce the coutract according to that Intention. To teat thiB,
let It be a11ked whether, In such a case, U
it were admitted that the parties actually
Intended the sum to be considered as 1:1tipulated damageM, and not ae u penalty,
would a court of law enforce it fur the
amount st.lpulated '? Clearly, they could
not, without going bock to the technical
end long-exploded doctrine which 11:ave
the whole penalty of the bond, without
reft•rence to the damageH actually eustuinecl. They would thus be simply chaDK'•
lt•u; the names of things, and enforcing,
under the name of stipulated dttmages,
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what in its own nature is but a penalty.

The real question in this class of cases will

befound to be, not what the parties in-

tended, but whether the sum is in fact in

the nature of a penalty; and this is to be

determined by the magnitude of the sum,

in connection with the subject-matter. and

not at all by the words or the understand-

ing of the part‘es. The intention of the

parties cannot alter it. While courts of

law gave the penalty of the bond.the par-

ties intended the payment of the penalty

as much as they now intend the payment

of stipulated damages. Itmust therefore,

we think, be very obvious that the actual

intention of the parties in this class of

cases, and relating to this point,is wholly

immaterial; and, though the courts have

very generally professed to base their de-

cisions upon the intention of the parties,
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that intentionis not,aud cannot be made,

the real basis of these decisions. In en-

deavoring to reconcile their decisions with

the actual intention of the parties, the

courts have sometimes been compelled to

use language wholly at war with any idea

of interpretation, and to say ‘that the

parties must beconsidered as notmeaning

exactly what they say.' Horner v. Flint-

oti, 9 Mees. & W. 678, per PARKI:. B. May

it not be said. with at least equal proprie-

ty, that the courts have sometimes said

what they did not exactly mean?" And

in the case of Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 517,

523, the supreme court of Michigan held as

follows: “Just compensation lor the in-

jury sustained is the principle at which

the law aims, and the parties will not be

permitted, by express stipulation, to set

this principle aside."

We might quote further from the text- 1

books and thereported cases, but we think ‘

the ioregoingis sufﬁcient; and from the ‘

foregoing it certainly follows that the

plaintiff below. Kempcr,cannot “recover"

“ the sum of $500 as liquidated and ascer-

tained damazes for the breach of this con-

tract,"notwithstanding such is the lan-

guage of the contract. If the defendant,

(‘ondon, had removed the building situat-

ed on lot 6 three feet north, and had then

put the same in as good condition as it

was before, he would have so completed

his contract that not one cent of damage

could be recovered from him: and to so

remove such building, and to put it in as

good condition as it was before, would

not have cost to exceed $100. But sup-

pose that Condou had removed the build-

ing, and then have failed to put the same

in as good condition as it was before; he

would have committed a breach of the

contract, but the actual damages might

not have been $25. Then, should the

plaintiff. Kemper, recover the said sum of

$500? Or suppose that Condou had re-

moved the house, and attempted to put it

in as good condition as it was before, but

have failed to repair a lock, or a small por-
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whnt In Its own nature la but a penalty.
The real question in this claea of ca11ei,i will
be found to be, not what the parties lntt'nded, but whether the aum le in fact In
the nature of a penalty; and tble le to be
determined by the mugoltude of the sum,
in C'onnectlon with thesnbject-matter, and
not at all by thewordH or the undert1ta11tling or the part'ee. The Intention or the
parties cannot alter it. While courts of
law gave the penalty of the born], the partieH lnten1Jel] the payment Of the penalty
ae much BR they now Intend tbe payment
or etlpulntP.d damages. It maMt therefore,
we think, be very oln·ioue that the actuul
Intention of the parties In this clast1 of
cases, and relating to this polo t, ls wh11lly
fmmatcrlul; ami, though the courts have
very generally professed to base their decisions upon the Intention of the parties,
that Intention Is not, and <"au not be made,
the real bards of these dechilons. In endeavoring to reconcile their dcclslon11 with
the nctuul Intention of the parties, the
-conrtM have sometimes been r.om pelled to
use language wholly at war with any Idea
-of lntt-rprctatlon, and to suy 'that the
parties most beconeldered RR not meaning
exactly what they say.' Horner v. l•'llntoff, 9 Mee11. & W. 678, pPr PAHK1.;, B. May
It not be suld. with at leitst equal propriety, tbat the courts have sometimes said
what they dltl uot exactly mean 'l" And
in the case of Myer v. Hurt, 40 Mich. ~17,
623, the supreme court ur :\lichlgan heltl as
followtt: "Just compcmmtlon for the injury irustained is the princlphi at which
the In w alms, and the partle1:1 will not be
permitted, by express stipulation, to 1:1et
this principle ashto."
We ml11:ht quote further from the textbooks and thereportedcaseR, but we think
the foregoing ls sulDclent; and from the ,
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forPgolng It ccrtnlnly follows that the
plaintiff below. Kemper, cannot "r!'cover"
"the sum or $500 as liquidated and ascet'talned dama11:ee for the breach of this con·
tract." notwitl111tandlng 11uch le the lan~unge of the contr1tct. If the defendant,
('oudon, hacl removed th~ builcling situated on lot 6 three feet north, aml had then
put the same In as good condition as It
was before, be would have MO completed
his contract that not one cent of damage
could be recovered from him; nod to so
remove such building, and to put it In as
guod condition ae It wa11 before, would
not h1tve cost to exceed $100. But suppose that Condon had removed the building, and then ha ,·e failed to put the same
in ae good condition as It was before; he
would have committed a breach or the
contract, bot the actual damages might
not have beeu $25. Then, should the
plaintiff, Kemper, recover the said snm of
$500? Or s11ppo<1e that Condon had removed the hoURP, and attempted to put It
In ae good cou11ltlon as It was before, but
have failed to 1·ep11lr u lock, or a small portion of the plastering, 01· a broken window, which repairing might not have cost
$1; then, should Kemper have the right
to recover the sn!fl sum of $500? All thle
shows that the µurtlee did not ha VI! In
contemplation the matter of actual r.omPl'llRatory damages when they stlµulnted
that Kemper might recover $500 from
Condon as llquhla ted and ascertained dumages, In case or a breach of the coo tract, but
show11 tba t In fact, though not in words,
tht>,v fixed the earn of $500 as a penal t,v to
cover all or any damages which might re11nlt from a breach or the contrllct. 'rhe
Judgment or the court below will be reversed, and cause remanded for further
pl'oceedlngs. All the justlceeconcurrlng.
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SMITH v. BERGENGREN.

(26 N. E. 690, 153 Mass. 236.)

(26 N. E. 690, 153 l\lnss. 236.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Essex. Feb. 24, 1891.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Essex. Feb. 24, 1891.

Exceptions from superior court, Essex

county; Evan: J. Surzmuss, Judge.

Action by J. Rank-ttt Smith against

Frederick W. A. Bergengren for breach of

an agreement not to practice medicine in

Gloucester. The court ruled that the

sum of $2.000, named in the agreement.

was liquidated damages, and defendant

Exceptions from superior court, F.ssex
county; EDGAR J. 81U:l!MAN, Judge.
Action by J. Ranlt'tt Smith ugulnst
Fn•derkk W. A. Rergengren for breuch of
an agreement not to l>ructlce mccllclne In
Gloucester. The court ruled thnt the
sum of $2,000, named In the agreement,
wnti liquidated dnmugcs, and deft>mlunt
excepts.
F. L. Ei•ans and H. P. Moulton, for
plnintiff. Ira B. Kletli and W. H. Niles,
for defendant.

excepts.

11‘. L. Evans and H. P. llloulton, for

plaintiff. Ira B. Kieth and W. H. Niles,

for defendant.

l-lOLl\iES,J. Thedefendnntcovennnted

never to practice his profession in Glou-

cester so long as the plaintiff should be
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in practice there, provided, however, that

he should have the right to do so at any

time after ﬁve years by paying the plain-

tiff $2,0il0, “but not otherwise. " This sum

of $2.000 was not liquidated damages;

still less was it a penalty. It was not a

sum to he paid in case thedefendant broke

his contract and did what he had agreed

not to do. It was a price ﬁxed for what

the contract permitted him to do if he

paid.

The defendant expressly covenanted

not to return to practice in Gloucester -

unless he paid this price. It would be

against common sense to say that he

could avofd the effect of time having

named the sum by simply returning to

practice without paying,end could escape

for a less sum if the jury thought the dam-

age done the plaintiff by his competition

was less than $2,000. The express cove-

nant imported theinrther agreement that

if the defendant did return to practice he

would pay the price. No technical words

are necessary if the intent is fairly to be

gathered from the instrmnent. St. Al-

hans v. Ellis, l6 East, 352; Stevinson‘s

Case. 1 Leon. 324; Burik v. Murshali,40 Ch.

Div. 112.

If the sum had been ﬂxed as liqui-

dated damuges, the defendant would have

been bound to pay it. Cashing v. Drew,

97 Mass. 445; Lynde v. Thompson, 2 Al-

len, 456: Hoibrook v. Tobey, 66 Me.

410. But this case falls within the lan-

guage of Lord 1\IANsFlF.l.D in Lowe v.

Peers, 4 Burrows, 2225, 2229, that if there

is a covenant notto plough, with a penal-

ty, in a lease, a court of equity will relieve

against the penalty; "but if it is worded

‘to pay £5 an acre for every acre ploughed

up,' there is no alternative; no room for

any relief against it; no compensation.

It is the substance of the agreement."

See, also, Ropes v. Upton, 125 Mass. 25“,

260. The ruling excepted to did the de-

fendant no wrong. In the opinion of a

majority of the court, the exceptions must

be overruled.

HOLMES. J. ThP liefenclnnt cov1>nnnt1>d
never to practice his profes!!lon In GlouceBter so long us the plnint!rf should be
In practice thet·e, provided, however, that
he tihould have the right to <lo so at any
time urter five yeurs by paying the plaintiff $2,flOO, "but not otherwise." '.rhlK sum
of :f:!,1100 wuH not liquidated danrnges;
still less was It a penalty. It was not a.
Alim to he pnld In c11se thedefPndant broke
Ills contract uud did what he had agreed
not to do. It was a price fixed for what
the contract permitted him to do tr he
pa Ill .
'J'ho defendant expressly covenanted
not to return to pructlce In Gloucester

I
1
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unless he paid this price. It would b«J
against common sense to sny that hecould a\•old the effect of thns having
nomt>d the sum by !limply retarninir to
practke without paying, end could e11capefor a lelils sum If the jury thought the dumage done the plaintiff by his competlfiou
wus Iese than ,2,000. The exprei-;s covenant Imported the further agreement that
if the defendant 11id return to practice he
would poy the price. No technkal words
are neeei,;1mry tr the Intent Is fnirly to be
gathered from the lnstrnment. St. Albuns v. Ellls, 16 Ea.it, 35:!; Htevinson's
CaKe, I Leon. 324; Burik > . .Murshull,40 Ch.
Div. 112.
If the sum hod bren fixed os liquidated clamAgeR, the defendant woulc1 have
been hound to PAY It. Cushing v. Drew,
97 MasH. 44il; Lynde v. Thompson, 2 Al)Pn, 45H: Holbrook \'. Tobey, 66 Me.
410. But this culle falls within t.he lnni;ruage or Lord MA~SFIF.l.D In Lowe v.
Peers, 4 Burrows, 2225, 22~9. tho t If thero
Is a covenant not to plough, with a penalty, in u lease, ll court of eq ul ty will reliern
ugalnst the penalty; "but if It is worded
'to pay £5 an acre for every acre ploughed
up,' there le no alternoth·e; no room for
nuy relief against It; no compensation.
It ls the sabstance of the agreement ...
See, ahm, nopes v. Upton, 125 Mass. 258.
260. The ruling except<.'ll to did the defendant no wrong. In the opinion o! a
majority of the court, the exceptions must
be overruled.

DA.\IAGES FOR NONPAYMENT OF MO.\liY—l.\"l‘l:Ilt1£S'l‘.

200

BI-YPHEL et ai. v. SALEM IMP. CO.

(25 S. E. 304, 03 Va. 3334.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. July 9,

1896.

Error to circuit court, Roanoke county;

Henry E. Blair, Judge.

Action by George W. Bethel 6: 0o. against

the Salem Improvement Company. 'l.‘here

was a judgment for plaintiffs, and they bring

error. Afﬁrmed. -

G. W. & L. O. Hansbrou".h and Scott &

Staples. for plaintiffs in error. R. H. Logan,

A. B. Pugh, and Phiegar & Johnson, for de-

fendant in error.

KEITH, P. On the 20th of January, 1891,

the Salem Improvement Company entered in-

to a contract. under seal, with George W.

Bethel & Co., by which the latter agreed to .

‘ pensive preparation to manufacture the resi-
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. due of the 1,500,000 aforesaid, and were pro-

make and burn for the former 1,500,000 bricks

during the summer of 1891; the Salem Im-

provement Company agreeing to pay $0.50

per 1,000 for the bricks in the kiin, provided

“the brick should not run less than two- ‘

thirds well-burned, hard bricks; that the

bricks are to be examined when the kiin is

burned, and, if approved by the Salem Im-

provement Company, it is to pay Geo. W.

Bethel & ()o. for three-fourths of their value,

at the price aforesaid, but it, upon opening

the kiin and hauling the bricks, they are

found to be imperfect, and not equal to the

standard above named, the Salem Improve-

ment Company shall have the power of re-

jecting them." George W. Bethel & Co.,

and received therefor $3,212.31. A disagree-

per thousand for 1,500,000 bricks above men-

tioned, nor any part of said sum, except the

sum of $3,212.31, whereby the l1laintiffs have

been damaged on account of the failure to

pay for the bricks actually manufactured as

aforesaid, by the outlay necessarily incurred

by them in the preparation for the manufac-

ture of the residue of the said bricks, and the

failure of the defendant to allow the plain-

tiffs to continue the manufacture of the resi-

due of the said 1,500,000 bricks, or to pay the

piaintiffs their reasonable proﬁt, to wit, the

sum of $3 per thousand for the same to be

manufactured." The second count, after set-

ting out the contract, states the breach as

follows: "In this: that the said defendant,

as soon as the said plaintiffs had manufac-

tured the 803,491 bricks mentioned in the ﬁrst

count, and when they had gone to the ex-

ceeding with the manufacturebf the same,

the said defendant notiﬁed the said plaintiffs

not to manufacture any more bricks than they

had already manufactured, and that it would

not purchase ,nor pay for any bricks there-

after manufactured; and the said defendant.

although the said plaintiffs had manufac-

tured and kiined the said 803,491 bricks.

which were not less than two-thirds well-

burned, hard bricks, and had in every way

complied with the said contract on their part

to be performed, except as aforesaid, hath not
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403.04, with legal interest thereon from Jan- '

nary 1, 1892, till paid, and their costs therein

expended. The plaintiffs again excepted, and

tendered their bill of exceptions, which was

allowed by the court, wherenpon the plain-

tiffs applied to one of the judges of this court

for a writ of error, which was granted.

The errors assigned here are—First, to the

action of the court in setting aside the ver-

dict rendered in behalf of the plaintiffs, their ‘

dontentlon being that there was no error in

the instructions given by the court, and that

it should have given judgment in their favor

upon the verdict as rendered by the jury;

and, secondly, that it was error in the court

to give its ﬁnal judgment for $1,403.04, but

that it should have been for the sum of $3,-

74(3.07, with interest from January 1, 1892,

till paid.
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The instruction given by the court, and

which it afterwards decided was erroneous,

is as follows: “The court instructs the jury

that if they believe from the evidence that

the plaintiffs, up to the time they stopped

the manufacture of bricks, had been manu- ‘

facturing them according to the requirement

of the contract, or that the bricks so manu-

factured had been accepted by the defendant,

and that the defendant refused and failed

to pay the plaintiffs the sums of money, if

any, due them under said contract, as the

said sums became due, and by reason of

such failure the plaintiffs were forced to

stop, and did stop, the manufacture of

bricks, then the plaintiffs are entitled to

recover for the price of the bricks manu-

factured by them, according to the said con-

tract, and for the proﬁt on the difference

between the number of the bricks so manu- ‘

fat-tured by them, and 1,500,000 bricks, man-

ufactured according to the terms of the con- |

tract; and in estimating such proﬁt the

jury shall place the bricks at the price ﬁxed

in the said contract, and deduct therefrom

the cost of said bricks, as they shall believe

such cost to be from the evidence." This ‘

instruction is predicated upon the perform-

ance on the part of the plaintiffs of the con-

ditions set out in their covenant, and upon

the failure of the defendant to pay to the

plaintiffs the sums of money due them un- |

der the contract, as the same became paya-

ble. It is claimed by the defendant in er- t

ror that this instruction was erroneous, for

two reasons: First,-that there was no such

issue presented by the pleadings; the breach

, is relied upon.

laid in the declaration being that the defend- ,

ant had failed to perform the covenants in L

the said contract on its part to be performed, 1

in this: “That the said defendant notiﬁed

the plaintiffs that it would not purchase any

more of the said bricks than had already ‘

been made, and to discontinue the manufac- ,

ture of the same." The theory upon which i,

this action was brought, as appears from the ‘

declaration. was that the plaintiffs were

entitled to recover because‘ the defendant
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403.04, with legal Interest thereon from January 1, 1892, till paid, and their costs therein
expended. Tbe plalnturs again excepted, and
tendered their bill of exceptions, which wu
allowed by the court, whereupon the plalntltrs applied to one of the judges of this court
for a writ of error, which was granted.
The errors assigned here are-First, to the
action of the court In setting aside the verdict rendered In behalf of the pla.lntltrs, thelr
oontenllon being that there was no error In
the instructions given by the court, and that
It should have given judgment In their favor
upon the verdict as rendered by the jury;
and, secondly, that It was error In the court
to give Its final judgment for $1,403.04, but
that it should have been for the sum (>f $.3,74tl.07, with Interest from JanulL1'1 1, 1892,
till paid.

The Instruction given by the court, and
which It aftei:wards decided was erroneous,
Is as follows: "The court Instructs the jury
that tr they believe from the evidence that
the plalnllft'e, up to the time they stopped
the manufacture of bricks, had been manufacturing them according to the requh·ement
ot the contract, or that the bricks so manufactured bad been accepted by the defendant,
and that the defendant refused and failed
to pay the plalntltrs the sums of money, If
any, due them under said contract, as the
llllld sums became due, and by reason of
sµch failure the plalntltrs were forced to
stop, and did stop, the manufacture of
bricks, then the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover for the price of the bricks manufactured by them, according to the said contract, and for the profit on the dltr.erence
between the number of the bricks so manufactured by them, and 1,500,000 bricks, manufactured according to the terms of the contract; and In estimating such profit the
jury shall place the bricks at the price llxed
In the said contract, and deduct therefrom
the cost of said bricks, as they shall believe
such cost to be from the evidence." This
Instruction le predicated upon the perform1mce on the part of the plalntUre of the conditions set out In their covenant, and upon
the failure of the defendant to pay to the
pl11lntlffo1:1 the sums of money due them under the l'Ontract, as the same bPeame payabl<'. It IR claiml'd by the defendant in error that this Instruction was erroneous, for
two rensons: First,. that there was no !o!UCh
l:<stw preflented by the pleadings; the breach
laid In the declaration being that the defendant hnd falll'd to perform the covenants In
the ;:aid contract on Its part to be performed.
In tbls: "That the said defendant notified
thl• plnlntltl's that It would not purchuKe any
more of thl' said bricks than had already
bt>en madt'. and to discontinue the manufacture of the same." The throry upon which
thh1 action was brought, as appears from the
df'<'lamtlon. was that th!! plalntltl'K were
entitled to recover because the defendant
had broken lts contract, not by failure to

pay for the bricks manufactured, but by its
notification to the plalntltrs that It would
not purchase ·a ny more ot the bricks than
had already been made, and to discontinue
the manufacture of the same. Had thls
breach been established by the evidence,
there Is abundant authority to warrant the
verdict and Judgment for the plalntltrs, upon
proper instructions; but, as has already been
observed, the Instruction under consideration
Is predicated solely upon the performance
by the plaintllrs of the covenants and conditions to be performed on their part, and
the refusal and failure of the defendant to
pay to the plalntitrs such sums of money
as were due them under the contract, as
the same became payable. · The failure to
pay the money Is the cause alleged ln the -.__.
Instruction, that forced the plalntltrs to stop
the manufacture of the bricks, and which
entitles the plalntltrs to recover, not only
for the bricks manufactured by them according to said contract, but for the profit on
the dlft'erence between the number of the ___,..
bricks so manufactured by them, and the
1,500,000 bricks manufactured according to
the terms of the contract, to be ascertaJned
by placing the bricks at the price fixed In
the contract, and deducting therefrom the
cost of the bricks as shown by the evidence.
For the breach of contract to pay money,l
no matter what the amount of Inconvenience
sustained by the plalntur~ the measure of
damages Is the Interest of the money only.
Wood's Mayne, Dam. (1st .Am. Ed.) p. 15.
That this Is the rule Is admitted. That there
are exceptions to It may also be conceded,
and It Is earnestly contended on behalf of
plalntitrs in error that the case before us
comes within the exception, and not within
the rule. In support of this contention the
case ot Masterton v. Mayor, etc., 7 Hill, 61,
Is relied upon. That was an action of covenant, on an agreement whereby the plalntltl's
undertook to furnish, cut, fit. and deliver all
the marble to build the city hall of Brooklyn,
to be of the best kind of white marble, from
Kain & Morgan's quarcy, for which the defendants agreed to pay a certain sum In Installments, payable at dift'ert>nt stages In the
erection of the building. The defendants
suspended work on the building, tor the
want of funds, and refused to receive or pay
for any more marble. This was the breach
complained of. Part of the marble had at
that time been delivered and paid for, another part was ready for delivery, but the great' er part had not yet been proc•ured and pre' pared for dellv1.>ry. The plaintllrs, as a part
· of their case, put In l'Vidence articles of
agreement between thc>m and Kain & :Morgan, made on the faith of the agreement between the plnlntilTs and the defendant,
wht>reby Kain & ~forgan covenanted to furnish, In blocks prepared for cutting, all the
marble required to fulfill the plalntlft's' contract, and tht> plalntltl's agreed to pay them
& certain sum therefor, out of the sum agreed
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to be paid by the defendants, and in similar

installments. but expressly stipulated that

the said Kain & Morgan should not look to

the plaintiffs. except to the funds as supplied

by the defendants. The circuit judge in-

structed the jury that the plaintiffs were en-

titled to recover the proﬁts which would have

accrued to them from the actual perform-

ance of the contract. and that, as the rough

marble was to be procured from Kain & \Ior-

gan's quarry, the contract was to be deemed

a lart of the performance of the plaintiffs'

contract, and the plaintiffs were entitled to

recover from the defendants the damages

for which they would be liable to Kain & Mor-

gan on that contract. There was a verdict

for the plaintiffs for a large amount, greatly

exceeding the loss of the marble actually

on hand. The defendants appealed. It is

obvious that the ground of complaint here
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was not the failure to pay for the marble

already cut and delivered, but the ground of

complaint, and the breach alleged, were that

the defendants refused to receive or pay for

any more marble, want of funds being al-

leged as the cause. The only item of dam-

age in which the failure on the part of the

defendants to pay money cuts any ﬁgure was

the damage growing out of the contract with

Kain & Morgan, with whom plaintiffs had

contracted, and whom they were to pay in

installments similar to the installments due

the plaintiffs from the defendants; but the

circuit court was reversed in the court of

appeals for having allowed this damage to

be computed in the verdict, Chief Justice

.\'elson <a_ving. "I am unable to comprehend

how these can be taken into the account,

or become the subject-matter of considera-

tion at all, in settling the amount of dam-

ages to be recovered for a breach of the

principal contract." So this may be laid out

of the case altogether. Said the chief jus-

tice: "The damages for the marble on hand,

ready to be delivered, was not a matter in

dispute on the argument. ' ' ' The con-

test arises out of the claim for damages in

respect to the remainder of the marble which

the plaintiffs had agreed to furnish, but

which they were prevented from furnishing

by the suspension of the work in July. 1837.

This portion was not ready to be delivered

at the time the defenda‘nts broke up the con-

tract, but the plaintiffs were then willing

and offered to perform, in all things, on

their part, and the case assumes that they

were possessed of suﬂicient means and abil-

ity to have done so." Not that the means

and ability were to be obtained from the de-

fendants in the form of the payment of the

installments as the work became due, as pro-

vided in the contract, but that the plaintiffs

were possessed of suﬂlcient means and abil-

ity, independent of what they were to re-

ceive from the defendants, to perform all

things on their part to be performed, had

they been permitted to do so, but they were

not allowed to perform the contract, the do ,

fendants refusing to receive or pay for any

DAMAGES ll'OR NONPAYMENT OF MONEY-INTERlllST.
212

DAMAGES FOR NONPAYMENT OF MONEY—INTERES'l‘.

be given, but we have seen no case which

will sustain the instruction under considera-

tion. It is the ordinary case of a failure to

comply with a contract to pay money at a

stipulated time. In such cases the measure

of damages for the Breach of me contract i_s_

t-hie principal sum due, and legal interest

‘tIieTéoii. To make a defendant responsible

for the proﬁts which might have accrued to

the plaintiff by the use of the money in ad-

dition to the interest would be harsh and 6p-

pressive, and should not be sanctioned by the

court, unless the plaintiff can bring his case

within some well-recognized exception to the

rule.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion

that the circuit court did not err in setting

aside the verdict and granting a new trial.

We are also of opinion that there was no er-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:10 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ror in the judgment rendered by the court,

which is fully supported by the facts shown

in evidence, and it is nﬂirmed.

be given, but we have seen no case which
will sustain the Instruction under consideration. It ts tile ordinary ease ot a failure to
comply with a contract to pay money at a
stipulated time. In such cases the measure
of damages !or the breach ol the coritr~ct ls
the principal sum due, - and le&al lnter~t
, tlJeieoii. - To make a defendant responsible
furthe profits which might have accrued to
t ht• lllalntlff by the use ot the money In addition to the Interest would be hazBh and dp-

presslve, and should not be sanctioned by the
court, unlel!S the plalntllr can bring his CMe
within some well-recognized exception to the
rule.
For the foregoing reasons, we are ot opinion
that the circuit court did not err In setting
aside the verdict and granting a new trial.
We are also of opinion that there was· no error In the judgment rendered by the court,
which Is fully supportc<l by the facts shown
In evidence, and it ls affirmed.
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LOWE v. TURPIE et al.t

(44 N. E. 25. 147 Ind. 652.)

Supreme Court of Ii1diann. \Iay 15. iSiiti.

Appeal from circuit court. Cass county; J.

S. Frazer. Special Judge.

Action by James H. 'l‘urpie and others .

against Hugh Lowe for breach of contract.

From the judgment rendered, defendant ap-

peals. Reversed.

lidwin P. Hammond. Charles B. Stuart. Wil- ‘

iiam V. Stuart. S. P. Thompson, and it. I‘.

Davidson, for appellant. Walker & McClintic,

.i. H. Gould, and Elliott & Elliott, for appel-

lees.

MONKS, J. On February 18, 1886, appel-

lees James H. and William Turpie com-

menced an action against appellant in the

“bite circuit court. The complaint was in
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three paragraphs, to each of which the court

sustained a demurrer for want of facts.

Judgment was therenpon rendered in favor

of this appellant, which on appeal in this

court was reversed, and the court below di-

rected to overrule the demurrer to the com-

plaint. Turpie v. Lowe, 114 Ind. 37, 15 N.

E. 834. After the return of said cause to the

court below the demurrer was overruled as

directed. About the time of the commence-

ment of said action by the Turpies in the

White circuit court, in February, 1886, two

other actions were commenced in the said

court against appellant, growing out of the

same alleged transactions set up in the ac-

tion of the Turpies,—one by appellce Cor-

nelins M. Horner, and one by appellees

Emma J. and Mary F. Turplc. wives of the

said James H. and William Turpie. These

three suits were pending in 1889, and were

sent, on change of venue. to the Cass circuit

court. In January, 1890, by agreement, the

three causes were consolidated, and the court

ordered that George T. Jones and others be

made parties defendant. Afterwards, in

April, 1890, James H. and William Turpie

ﬁlml an amended complaint, in live para-

graphs. The second paragraph wns stricken

out on motion. Appellant demurred to each

of the remaining paragraphs of the com-

plaint, for want of facts, which demurrer was

overruled. To this complaint appellant ﬂied

an answer. Appellees Emma J. and Mary F.

Tut-pie in July, 1890, ﬁled their amended

complaint, asking damages against appellant,

which he answered by general denial. George

T. Jones also ﬁled a counterclaim asking

judgment against appellant, on which issue

was joined. The cause was submitted to the

court, land at request of appellant a special

ﬁnding was made, and conclusions of law

stated thereon against appellant, to each of

which he at the time saved an exception.

Upon the ﬁndings and conclusions of law, the

court on February 5, 1891, rendered judg-

ment against appellant, in favor of James H.

t Rehearing denied.
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and William Turpie, for $19,775; in favor
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as necessary to the determination of this

cause, are as follows:

Appellces James H. and William Turpie

were on December 3, 1885, and still are, part-

ners in business as traders in real estate, and

were, as such partners, the owners, as ten-

ants in common, of real estate in the counties

of White. Jasper, and Starke, in Indiana, and

in the counties of Franklin, Union, and Dela-

ware, in the state of Ohio, all of which is

described in the ﬁnding, and the value of each

tract stated. A part of said real estate was

held by said Turpies in fee simple.

Astoa,

part, they held the equitable title, under con- 1

tracts of purchase. Part of said real estate

was held in the names of others, as trustees

for the Turpies. On said day there were ex-

isting and valid judgments against the Tur-
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pies, in favor of divers persons, rendered by

the White circuit court, the Carroll circuit

court, of Indiana, and other courts in said

state, taxes due and unpaid, ditch assess-

ments, and mortgages, amounting in the ag-

gregate to about $15,000. That on or before

December 3, 1885, the Turpies owned in fee

simple the undivided four-ﬁfths of a farm of

324 acres in Delaware county, Ohio, known

as the Starke or Wagner farm, which farm

was of the value of $17. 2 . That the other

one-ﬁfth of said farm was owned by George

T. Jones, one of the appellees. That there

were two mortgages on said farm,—one in

favor of the Michigan Mutual Insurance Com-

pany, upon 283 acres of said farm, for $10,-

000, and one upon the remaining 41 acres of

said farm, to one Starke, which, with accrued

interest, amounted at said date to about $1,-

160. That on the same day appellant was the

owner in fee of two one-acre lots in J. C.

Reynolds‘ Third addition to the town of Mon-

ticello, lnd., equivalent in size to 10 ordinary

town lots, and was also the owner in fee of

the N. E. t,4 of the N. W. 5'4, of section 16,

township 28 N., of range 4 W., in said county,

known as the “Nutter Forty Acres," which

said lots in Monticello were worth $500, and

which said 40-acre tract was worth $600.

That said Turpies were ﬁnancially embar-

rassed, and wholly unable to raise the money

to meet their matured and maturing liabili-

ties. That the property held by them as

aforesaid was of great ‘value, but so heavily

int-umbered by liens, some of which were

overdue. and others soon to mature, that all

said property was in great danger of being sac-

riﬁced for less than its real value. And said

appellant was a man of large ﬁnancial ability

and credit, and the owner of a large amount

of unincumhered real estate and personal

property. That he had a large amount of

ready money and other assets. and was abun-

dantly able to fullill the contract hereinafter

named. That on said 3d day of December,

1885, said Turpies, in the name of said Wil-

liam Turpie, entered into an agreement'wlth

said appellant, in writing, respecting the said

Starke farm, as follows:
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real estate of the Turpies in Indiana; and it I

was also agreed with the Turples and Horner ‘‘

to pay said Horner the amount of the Turples‘

indebtedness tohim.—about $1,:%35,—and topay

the John H. Miller note, upon which Horner

was sunety, amounting to about $1,000. In

consideration of which the Turples were to

execute to appellant their note for their indebt- '

edness to him, except the note of $580.91, and

from time to time. as the Turples‘ outstanding

obligations should be paid by appellant. to ex-

ecute to him other notes for amounts so paid,

all to hear interest at 8 per cent. per annum;

and to secure the amount they then owed ap-

pellant, and the advances so to be made by

him. t‘ “y were to convey, or cause to be con-

veyed, to him, their real estate in Indiana, in-

cluding the four lots in Monon held in the

name of Horner, and the undivided one-half
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of the Ohio real estate, except nine lots in R.

P. Woodruf f Agricultural College addition to

Columbus. Ohio, which they reserved for their

wives. The Turples, in consideration of the

sum of $20,000 to be paid by appellant upon

liens and incumbrances then upon the Ohio »

real estate, sold to appellant the other undi-

vided one-half of said Ohio real estate, which

they were to convey, or cause to be conveyed,

to hi1n, in fee simple, except that said nine

lots reserved for the Turples‘ wives were to be

conveyed by one Woodruff, who held the le-

gal title thereto, to appellant, and he was to

reconvey the same to the Turples‘ wives free

from all incumhrances. That, when the con-

veyance should be made to appellant for said

Ohio property so sold to him, the undivided

one-half thereof should be included in the con-

veyance, but to be held by appellant as se-

curity to him for the payment of said Indiana

debts, and security for any amount in excess

of said $20,000 which appellant might pay to

relieve said Ohio real estate from incum-

brances; all of which incumbrances on the

Ohio real estate appellant, in pursuance of the

agreement, was to pay. The Turples con-

veyed, or caused to be conveyed, all of said

Ohio real estate, except a tract known as the

"Mt. Vernon Hotel Property." That the full

cmt<‘aler.-ition was paid by the Turples and

their wives for the conveyance by appellant

to the Turpies‘ wives of said nine lots. and

that said lots were of the value of $10,000.

That the Turples‘ wives took immediate pos-

session about January 1, 1886, of said nine

lots, with appellant's consent, under his agree-

ment to convey the same to them. That in

December, 1885, the Turples conveyed, and

caused to be conveyed, to appellant, all the

said real estate in the counties of Jasper,

Starker, and White, in Indiana, except four

lots in Monon held by them in the name of

Homer; and on December 10, 1885, said

Horner and wife executed a deed to appellant

for said Monon lots held in Horner's name as

security for the Turples‘ indebtedness to

Horner, and to indemnify him from loss as

their surety, who accepted said deed, and

ler note. That on December 7, 1885, the Tur-
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real estate ot the Turpies In Indiana; and It
was also agreed with the Turples and Horner
to pay aald Horner the amount of the Turpies'
Indebtedness tohlm,-about ,t,:-i:lii,-and to pay
the John H. !\filler note, upon which Horner
was surety, amounting to about $1,000. In
consideration of which the Turples were to
execute to appellant their note for their lndebtl'dness to him, except the note of $5S0.91, and
from time to time, as the Turples' outstanding
obll1:ations should be paid by appellant, to f'Xecutc to him other notes tor awouuts :so puh.l,
all to lwor Interest at 8 per cent. per anmun;
and to secure the amount they theu owed appellant, and the advances so to be made by
him. t" •y were to convey, or e:1use to lle eonveyed, to him, their real estate in Indiana, including the tour lots In Monon held In the
name of Horner, and the undivided one-halt
of the Ohio real estate, except nine lots in R.
P. Woodrutr Agricultural College addition to
Columbus, Ohio, which they reserved for their
wives. The Turples, in consideration of the
mm of ,20,000 to be po.Id by appellant upon
UeDB and lncumbrances then upon the Ohio
real estate, sold to appellant the other undivided one-halt of said Ohio real estate, which
the~· wer1• to convey, or cause to be conveyed,
to hi111, In fee simple, except that said nlnl!
lots r<>i<en·ed for the Turples' wives were to be
con,·<>yt>d by one Woodrutr, who held the le1t11I title thereto, to appellant, and be wae to
reconvey the same to the Turples' wives free
trom all lncumbranees. That, when the conveyuce> should be made to appellant for said
Ohio property so sold to him, the undivided
one-half thereof should be Included In the conveyance, but to be held by appellant as security to him for the payment of said Indiana
debts, and security for any amount In excess
of said $20.000 which appellant might pay to
relieve 18.id Ohio real estate from lncumbrances; all of which lncumbrances on the
Ohio real estate appellant, In pursuance of the
agreement, was to pay. The Turpies conveyed, or caused to be conveyed, all of said
Ohio real estate, except a tract known as the
"Mt. Vernon Hotel Property." That the full
•·nn~ l.tPr:ttlon wa11 pitld by the 'l'urp!Ps and
their wives for the conveyance by appellant
to the Turpies' wives of said nine lots. and
that said lots were of the value of $10.000.
That tbe Turples' wives took Immediate possession about January 1, 1886, of said nine
lots, with appellant's consent, under his agreement to convey the same to them. That In
December, 1885, the Turples conveyed, and
caused to be conveyed, to appellant, all the
Mid real PBtate In the counties of Jasper,
Starke-, and ·w hite, In Indiana, except four
lots ln ~lonon lwld by thetu In the name or
Homer; and on December 10, 1885, said
Homer and wife executed a deed to appellant
for said Monon lots held In Homer's name as
aecurlty for the Turpies' Indebtedness to
Horner, and to Indemnify him from loss IUI
their surety, who accepted said d(•ed, and
promi!W'd Homer that he would pay ~hl :\Ill·
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ler note. That on December 1, 1885, the Turpies and appellant executed the following
agreement In writing: "Monon, Indiana, De·
('ember 7th, 1885. Thi;; memorandum Is to
show that all real estate in Indiana and Ohio
that James H. Turple and William 'l'urple and
wives ha>e conveyed to me, Hugh Lowe, in
the year 188a, is to be held In trust for them,
aml to be held by said Lowe ns security for
all claims coming to him from said Turpie8,
which Is evhlenced by promissory notes; and,
when said claims are paid by said Turples,
said Lowe Is to convey to the Tul'pleR, Ol' any
one thl'y suggest, except one-bal! (1h) Interest
In the Wagner farm, In Ohio, which Is e:s·
plained by another contract. [Signed] llui.:h
Lowe. James Turple. William Turpie."
That uhout the 1st day of March, 1886, said
Lowe took exclusive posRession of all live
stock and personal property on said Stm·ke
!arm belonging to himself and said plalntllT11,
and ronverted the same to his own use. 'l'he
same was of the value of ~.000. That, soon
after the def'dS for ail the property aforesaid
Wl're delivered to said uppt>llant, he, without
camic, refused to carry out or 1'11rthpr 11erturm
his coutrads aforesaid; and he reru.s~d to p:iy
any more of the debts, liens, or inC'uu1br11m.'t.'11
, on any of said p1·operty, and has tulll'(l to p:1y
bis said note given to Horner, or said Milin
note, which last note Horner bas been com·
pelled to pay, to wit, $975, on the 18th of Fch·
ruary, 1886. That, when said u1111ellant rPfnfY
ed, he was financially able to c·~mplele unJ
perform the same. '!'hat said Turpies bad
placed In his hands all their pro1>erty aud
means that could In any way be use<l lo pay
said debts, and were therefore wholly i;.m1ble
to pay or discharge the same, or auy p1trt
thereof, all of which was well known to a ppellant when he received the same, and whim he
made, and also when he refused .to perform,
the said contntcts. That, before the commencement ot this suit by the saltl 'l'urples,
they made demand of appellant thal he perform, all and singular, the said several contracts, and each specification thercut; and
said appellant refused, and has ever since refused and neglected, to perform the <;iame, or
any part thereof, except as herein state(l.
That before the commencement of th!;, suit
the said Emma J. Turple and .Mary F. 'l'urpie,
by their a~ent, James H. 'furple, demande1I
from appellant the conveyance to them of ~aid
lots Nos. 244 to 2;;2,. Inclusive, In 'Yoollrul'l"I!
Agricultural College addition to tl1e city of
Columbus, Ohio, free of lncumbrances, ll8
specified In the agreement aforesaid made
with appellant by said James ond William
'.l'urple; and said appellant refused to make
such conveyance, and has ever since neglected
and refused to perform said contract. but, in
violation of his agreement aforesaid to puy
lncurubrances thereon, has pe rmitted t:.1e i.ume
to be sold to pay the lncumbr:inces thnt h1!
agreed to re move therefrom, and tlie title to
sal<I lots has passed to lnnocP.nt purchaser~ al
sberill'.'s sale. That, before the comm1•ucP1
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meut or any proceedings against or tn favor horse, the property of the Turples. Tbat by
of said detendant George T. Jones. te demand- . reason of the failure of said appellant to p!.'1'ed of said appellant the performance of bis form his said ugreements, and the sale or
contract to convey to him the uudlvltled one- snltl real el:!tn te by \'lrtue of judicial 11roces>1
half of said two acres, equal to ten lots, In resulting in Con8equence thereof, there Wll:I
Reynolds' addition to Monticello, Ind., and to large loss and damage to said James H. and
c·onvey to him the undivided one-half of the William Turpie; that ls to say, their n>al esland described hel'ein as the "Nutter Forty tate, of the value of $32,095, satisfied only
Acres·•; ancl said appellant has refused and $13,765.07 of their Indebtedness. But the samP
whollv tailed to make such conveyunce, or salPs of said Lowe's undivided one-half of S<1nie
In any way to make compensation to said ot the snrue real estate, and of the nine Iota
Jones tor the execution by him and wife of to be conveyed to the wives of said Turplel'l,
the deed of the Starke farm, In Delaware realized a sum, which was applied In payment
county, Ohio, executed o.n the 22d day of De- of said debts, enough to make up the loss, excember, 1885. That Lowe tailed to pay, sat- Cl'pt the sum of $6,008.70. That the value or •
isfy, or discharge the liens upon the property said one-filth of said Starke farm, conve;>-.•tl
In Ohio deeded to him as hereinbefore found, by said Jones and wife to Lowe, subject to
except as otherwise stated herein, to wit, $4,- the lnC'Umbrnnce thereon, was at the time of
185.86. That after the 4th day of January, said conveyance, December 22, 1885, $~.
1880, the several holders of the liens upon 'l'hat the value of attorney·s services In the
said Ohio property brought suits in the courts collection ot said note from Lowe to Horner,
of said states having jurisdiction, and obtain- described In said Horner'& complaint, Is $300.
ed decrees and orders of sale tor the greater
"And the court now stuteH iti,; conclusions
part of said property In said Franklin and of law upon the foregoing facts to be as folUnion counties, and the same was sold upon lows: (1) • • • t2) That said Homer ls
execution, and at judlclnl sale, to s.1tlsty the entitled to recover from said Lowe, upon said
liens thereon which said appellant had agreed , p1·omissory note gl\'"ell by him to Horner, the
to pay, and thereupon the legal title to all of sum of two thousantl antl thirty-three ($2,said real estate in Ohio so sold was lost to 033) dollars, and, on account of the failure
the plnlntif'l's. That the real estate in the of said Lowe to pay said Miller note, the
state of Ohio conveyed to appellant, and held sum of twelve hundred and sixty-four ($1,lly him as security as aforesaid, to wit, the un- 26!) dollars. (3) Thnt said James H. Tul'd\\·ldffi one-half of alt the real estate In Ohio ple and William Turpie are eutltled to rebereinhefore described (except the certain cover from the said Lowe the sum of nine11peclfted tracts), sold at judicial sales, was so teen thousand seven hundred and sev<'ntysacrificed and consumed by costs and ex- five ($19,775) dollars, which is due to the'n
penses that It paid only the sum of $22,756.56 after deducting all set-offs. (4) 'l'hat said
ot the debts of said Turpies which said Lowe Mary F. Turpie and Emma J. Turple are t>nhad agreed to pay. That on the 3d of De- titled to recover from said appellant the l'Ulll
cember, 1885, the 283 acres of the Starke farm, of ten thousand ($10,000) dol\11.rs. (5) • * *
ln Delaware county, Ohio, under mortgage to (0) That said Lowe be required to convPy to
the Mlchiimn Mutual Insurance Company, was said James H. and William Turpie the maliot tile value of $15,505, and that since that vlded one-halt (%) of the northeast quuter
time, by reason of the failure of said Lowe (¥~ of the northwest quarter (I/~ of secto puy snld lncumbrance remaining unpaid tion sixteen (16), township twenty-eight (28)
ofter the 22d day of 'December, 1885, to wit, north, range four (4) west, and the uudl$10,300, the whole of said 283 acres has sln<'e vlded one-half (lf.i) of the two (2) one-acre
been sold on a decree of foreclosure to satisfy lots In J. C. Reynolds' addition to JriontiPt>llo,
said mortgnge, whereby the title to said r1>nl In said C'ounty of White, owned by Lowe ou
estate has been wholly lost to said Turples. the 3d day of December, 18'hl, and nlso the
1.'hat the Turples are Indebted to llllld appel- whole of the Bradford nnd Braxton landt4,
lant, on notes held by him, and for moneys and also said lands In Starke county aud In
paid by him for their use In pursuance of said Jn:sper county, Intllana, c·onve~·ed to said UJlcontracts, and on account, in the sum of $14,- pella nt, and also said lots In Monon, in find3:12. W. which Is a pl'oper set-ol'l against any ing numbered 60 specified, by proper deed.i
amount due said plaintiffs from him. That of release and quitclaim. (7) That said Jones
prior to the commencement of this suit said ls entitled to a judgment against said Lowe
'i'urples offered to deliver to the defendant for the sum of ~O."
The correctness of each of the conclusions
Lowe a deed, duly signed and acknowled~ed
of law ls called in question by the nRsignby their wives and themselves, conveying the
real e1<tate In Knox county, Ohio, known as ment of errors. It Is eurneRtly lm1istell by
the ".Mount Vernon Hotel Propl'rty," to him, appellant that the facts do not sustain the
and demandl'd of blm, then and there, to third conclusion of law,-that the Turples are
carry out and perform his several contracts. entitled to recover from appellant $19,775.
'l'bat the rental value of certain lands of the ·The correctnt>ss of thl11 conclusion of law de'1'urples In White county, of which appellant pends upon what is the proper mea1mre of
bad possession. was $1,1 ::?0. That appellant damages undc-r the fa<'tFI S<'t forth In th<' iopP.
received '35, the proceeds of the sale of one , clal llndln&". On the former appeal of this
1

meat ‘of any proceedings against or in favor I

of said defendant George T. Jones, he demand-

ed of said appellant the performance of his 1

contract to convey to him the undivided one-

half of said two acres, equal to ten lots, in

Reynolds' addition to Monticello, Ind., and to >

convey to him the undivided one-half of the

land described herein as the "Nutter Forty

Acres"; and said appellant has refused and

wholly failed to make such conveyance, or

in any way to make compensation to said -

Jones for the execution by him and wife of

the deed of the Starke farm, in Delaware

county, Ohio, executed on the 22d day of De-

cember, 1885. That Lowe failed to pay. sat-

isfy, or discharge the liens upon the property

in Ohio deeded to him as hereinbefore found,

except as otherwise stated herein, to wit, $4,-

185.86. That after the 4th day of January,
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1886, the several holders of the liens upon

said Ohio property brought suits in the courts

of said states having jurisdiction, and obtain-

ed decrees and orders of sale for the greater

part of said property in said Franklin and

Union counties, and the same was sold upon

execution, and at judicial sale, to satisfy the

liens thereon which said appellant had agreed

to pay, and therenpon the legal title to all of

said real estate in Ohio so sold was lost to

the plaintiffs. That the real estate in the

state of Ohio conveyed to appellant, and held

by him as security as aforesaid, to wit, the un-

divided one-half of all the real estate in Ohio

hereinbefore described (except the certain ,

speciﬁed tracts), sold at judicial sales, was so

sacriﬁced and consumed by costs and ex-

penses that it paid only the sum of $22,756.56

of the debts of said Turpies which said Lowe

had agreed to pay. That on the 3d of De-

cember, 1885, the 283 acres of the Starke farm,

in Delaware county, Ohio, under mortgage to

the Michigan Mutual Insurance Company, was

of the value of $15,565, and that since that

time, by reason of the failure of said Lowe

to pay said incumbrance remaining unpaid

after the 22d day of ‘December, 1883, to wit,

$10,300. the whole of said %3 acres has since

been sold on a decree of foreclosure to satisfy ‘

said mortgage, whereby the title to said real i

estate has been wholly lost to said Turpies. i

That the Turpies are indebted to said appel-

lant, on notes held by him. and for moneys

paid by him for their use in pursuance of said

contracts, and on account, in the sum of $14,-

332.75, which is al proper set-off against any

amount due said plaintiffs from him. That t

prior to the commencement of this suit said

Turpies offered to deliver to the defendant

Lowe a deed, duly signed and acknowledged ‘

by their wives and themselves, conveying the

real estate in Knox county, Ohio. known as

the “Mount Vernon Hotel Property," to him, i

and demanded of him, then and there, to

carry out and perform his several contracts.

That the rental value of certain lands of the

Turpies in White county, of which appellant

had possession, was $1,120. That appellant

received $35, the proceeds of the sale of one

1

!

I
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cause ('l‘urpie v. Lowe, supra), the deeds con-

veying to appellant the Indiana and Ohio real

estate to secure an existing indebtedness, and

future advances to pay liens set out in the

special ﬁnding, were held to be mortgages.

In that case the Turpies claimed that they

were entitled to recover either the full

amount which the appellant, Lowe, agreed to

advance as a loan in the way of discharging

liens and debts, or the value of the lands

conveyed by the deeds. In response to such

contention the court, on pages 53, 54, 114

Ind., and page 834. 15 N. E., said: "If we

are correct in our construction of the con-

tract set up in the complaint, Lowe's agree-

ment to pay liens, etc., was nothing more

than a contract to advance money for the

beneﬁt of appellant [the Turpies], and is the

same, in effect, as if he had agreed to ad-
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vance money direc( to them as a loan. What-

ever damages, therefore, they might recover

from Lowe for the refusal to make such a

direct loan after having taken security for

the same, they may recover here nothing

more." The covenant in a deed absolute on

its face, but intended as a mortgage, or I.

parol contract made at the time of the execu-

tion of the deed, whereby the grantee agrees ‘

to pay a debt of the grantor due another per-

son, cannot be enforced by such person

against the grantee. Such an agreement is

nothing more, in effect, than an agreement

to advance the amount of the debt or incum-

brance as a loan upon the security of the

land conveyed. Root v. Wright, 84 N. Y.

72; Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233; Pardee

v. Treat, 82 N. Y. 385. It is clear. we think,

V‘ that the measure of damages for the breach ‘

by appellant of his agreement to advance

money to pay liens, etc., set forth in the ﬁnd- ‘

ing, is the same as for breach of a contract

to loan money direct. This court also held

in that case that the complaint, so far as it

rested upon the agreement of this appellant ‘

to advance money, and the deeds to secure

the same, only made a case for nominal dam-

ages, as no special damages were shown.

When the case was returned to the court be-

low, the Turples ﬁled their amended and sup-

plemental complaint, in ﬁve paragraphs, as

heretofore state i. in which they declared up-

on the same oral contracts, and also, for the

ﬁrst time, brought in the written agreements ‘

set out in the special ﬁndings, they not hav-

ing been mentioned in the original complaint.

In the amended complaint which was ﬂied

in April. lRDO, it was alleged that the several

holders of the liens on said real estate, to

pay which appellant had agreed to advance

money. brought suit in the courts having ju-

risdiction, and procured decrees and orders ‘

of sale, upon which said real estatc was

in the year 1887, and the latter part of the

year 1886, sold at sheriff's sale. and the

money received applied on said liens, and

sought thereby to recover, as special dam-

ages, the difference between the value of

said real estate and the amount for which

218
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ble for the value of the land at the time it

was lost." See Fontaine v. Lumber Co. (Mo.

Sup.) 18 S. W. 1147. In Blood v. Wilkins, 43

Iowa, 565, Blood was the owner of certain

land in Jones county, and conveyed the same

to Wilkins as security for money advanced

and to be advanced by Wilkins, and applied

in payment of certain mortgages and tax

liens upon the property. Part of the money

was paid out directly by Wilkins in discharge

0! liens, and a part was retained by him. ' At

the time of the loan the land had been sold

for taxes, but the period for redemption had

not yet expired. The amount borrowed was

enough to discharge all liens, and to redeem

from said sales. Wilkins, after the execu-

tion_of said deed given as security, retained

in his hands the money necessary to redeem,

under an agreement with Blood that he would
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redeem. Wilkins failed to redeem, and tax

titles accrued against the land, whereby it

was lost to Blood, except 40 acres. The

court, in speaking of the measure of dam-

ages, said: “There only remains to be con-

_sidered what is the measure of liability.

When one person furnishes the money to an-

other to discharge an incnmbrance from the

land of the person furnishing the money, and

the person undertaking to discharge the in-

cumbrance neglects to do it, and the land is

lost to the owner by reason of the incum-

brance, the measure of damages may be the

money furnished, with interest, or the value

of the land lost, according to circumstances.

If the landowner has knowledge of his agent's

failure in time to redeem the land himself,

this damages will be the money furnished,

with interest. But if the landowner justly

relies upon his agent, to whom he has fur-

nished money to discharge the incumbrances,

and the land is lost without his knowledge.

and solely through the fault of the agent,

then the agent will be liable for the value of

the land lost." This language was adopted

by the author of Sutherland on Damages, in

stating the rule. See 1 Suth. Dam. p. 164, §

77. The cases of Bank v. Cook, 49 Law T.

(N. S.) 674, and Manahan v. Smith, 19 Ohio

St. 384, cited by appellees, are not in conﬂict

with Blood v. Wilkins, supra, but support the

rule therein adopted. In the case of Bank v.

Cook, supra, the bank made an agreement to

loan Cook a large sum of money to purchase

a vendor's lien upon the real estate of a cor-

poration, and 11 number of shares in said cor-

poration. Cook relied upon the bank to pro-

vide the money, and did not make, or at-

tempt to make, arrangements with any other

person or company to provide the money.

The bank did not provide the money, and

Cook was not informed that it would not do

so until too late to procure the money else-

where before the time expired within which

it was necessary to complete the purchase.

The court held that in case of breach of con-

tracts to lend money the damages usually

given were merely nominal, for the reason

that. usually, it a man could not get money
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than nominal damages for a breach of con- T

‘ is a mortgage, and conveys no title.

tract to loan money to pay incumbrances, it

is necessary not only to allege and prove the

contract to loan the money, and its breach,

and that the person who agreed to make the

loan knew the purpose for which it was to

be used, and the necessity therefor, but also ‘

‘ E. 944, and cases cited; Fletcher v. Holmes,

that the land was lost to the owner by reason

of such liens or incumbrances, and without

his knowledge, and solely through the fault

of the person who was to loan the money, or,

if the landowner had notice of the neglect or

refusal to loan the money, that it was at such

a time as to deprive him of the opportunity

to procure the money elsewhere, and pay said

liens or incumbrances, or redeem the land,

if sold. The facts found in the special ﬁnd-
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ing show that appellant had refused to pay

any more of said liens or incumbrances, or

carry out or further perform his contracts;

but they do not show that such knowledge

was acquired by the Turpies too late to give

them an opportunity to procure from other

parties the money, and pay said liens or in-

cumbrances. On the contrary, it appears

from the ﬁnding of facts that appellant, be-

tween January 4, 1886, and February 18, 1886,

refused to pay any more of the debts. liens,

or incumbrances on any of said property

which he had agreed to pay, and refused to

carry out or further perform his said con-

tracts, and said he would not further exe-

cute the same; that the real estate in Indi-

ana was sold in 1886 and 1887, the statute

giving one year from the date of each sale to

redeem the real estate. The suits to recover

the judgments and decrees upon which we

Ohio real estate was sold were not commen-

ced until after January 4, 1886. It is shown,

therefore, by the special ﬁnding, not that the

Turpies did not know of the refusal of appel-

lant to pay said liens and incumbrances in

time to give them an opportunity to procure

the money, but that they had such knowledge

in ample time to give them the opportunity

to procure the money and pay said liens and

incumbrances, and thus prevent the loss of

their land. Under this state of facts, only

nominal damages could be allowed the Tur-

pies on account of the loss of the lands held

by appellant as mortgagee.

it is insisted by the Turpies that the spe-

cial ﬁnding “that the Turpies had placed in

appellant's hands all of their property and

means that could in any way be used to pay

said debts, and were therefore wholly una-

ble to pay or discharge the same or any

part thereof/V' shows that it was impossible

for them to procure the money. in view of

the other ﬁnding that all the lndiana land,

and an undivided one-half of the Ohio land,

conveyed by deeds to appellant, were held I

by him as security for money advanced and t

to be advanced, the part of the special ﬁnd-

ing last quoted is a mere conclusion. These

conveyances, as to the real estate mentioned,
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determine whether or not the same are void

for uncertainty.

It is shown by the special ﬁnding that ap-

pellant, in consideration of the sale and con-

veyance to him of the undivided one-half of

the Starke farm, was to assume and pay $6,-

150 of the incumbrance on said farm, and

also that in consideration of the sale and

conveyance to him of the undivided one-half

of the remaining Ohio real estate, with the

exception of the nine lots to be conveyed to ‘

the Turpies‘ wives, he has to pay $20,000 on ‘

the liens and incumbrances on the Ohio real

estate. The law is settled in this state that,

for breaches of said agreements to pay said

purchase money when due, the Turpies were

entitled to sue and recover the amount

thereof unpaid, without ﬁrst having paid

said incumbrances, or any of them. W(-ddle
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v. Stone, 12 Ind. 625, and cases cited; John- ‘

son v. Britton, 23 Ind. 106; Devol v. McIn-

tosh, Id. 529; Scobey v. Finton, 39 Ind. 275:

Muiiendore v. Scott, 45 Ind. 115; Turpie Y.

Lowe, on page 60, 114 Ind., and page 834, 15

N. E. Two hundred and eighty-three acres ‘

of the Starke farm were afterwards sold

upon a decree of foreclosure to satisfy the

mortgage, part of which appellant had as-

sumed. The amount for which the same

was sold is not stated with absolute certain-

ty, but it is set forth that the same was sold

to satisfy the mortgage thereon, upon which

there was due $10,300. Appellant, if char-

ged with said $6,150, was entitled to a credit

of one-half of the amount said land paid of

said mortgage, in any accounting with the

Turpies, for the reason that the sale of his

half of said land paid that sum on the mort-

gage, a part of which he had assumed, as a

part of the purchase money therefor. Ap-

pellant was to pay $20,000 on liens and in-

cumbrances on the Ohio property. That

part of this real estate, the undivided one-

half of which was owned by the 'I\trples

subject to the mortgage of appellant, was

sold for such sum that, after deducting costs

and expenses, the Turpies‘ one-half of the

land paid $22,756.56 of the liens and incum-

brances thereon. Whatever amount appel-

lant's half of the land so sold paid, he is

entitled to credit for in an accounting with

the Turpies, if he is charged with the $20,-

000, or any part thereof. It should be re-

membered that the Turpies‘ wives were en-

titled to recover that part of the $20,000

which was to have been paid by appellant

on the incumbrances on the nine lots he

agreed to convey to them. The Turpies

therefore were only entitled to charge appel-

lant with the remainder of the $20,000 after

deducting that amount. Applying these

rules, it is evident that the Turpies were not,

upon the facts found, entitled to recover the

sum of $l9,775. The ﬁnding of facts is so

ambiguous, uncertain, and defective that the

amount which either the Turpies or appel-

lant are entitled to in an accounting one

against the other cannot be stated.

d!•lt>nuine whether or not the same nre void
for uncertainty.
It is shown by the speelal finding that appellant, In consideration of the sale and conveyance to him of the undivided one-half of
the Starke farm, was to assume and pay $6,·
lftO of the lncumbrnnce on said farm, and
also that In consideration of the sale and
conveyance to him of the undivided one-hnlr
of the remaining Ohio real estate, with the
exce1>tlon of the nine lots to be conveyed to
the Turpies' wives, he bas to pay $20,000 on
the lil•ns and lncumbrances on the Ohio real
estate. The law is settled in this state that,
for breaehes of said agreements to pay said
purchase money when due, the Turpies were
entitled to sue and recover the amount
thereof unpaid, without first having paid
said incmnbrances, or any of them. Weddle
T. Stone, 12 Ind. 625, and cases cited; Johnson v. Britton, 23 Ind. 105; De"'ol v. Mcintosh, Id. 529; Scobey v. l<'lnton, 39 Ind. 275:
Mullendore v. Scott, 45 Ind. 115; Turple v.
Lowe, on page 60, 114 Ind., and page 834, 15
N. E. Two hundred and eighty-three acre!'
<if the Starke farm were afterwards sold
upon a decree of foreclosure to satisfy the
mortgage, part of which appellant had asrrnmed. The amount for whkh the same
was sold is not stated with absolute certainty, but It is set forth that the same was sold
to satisfy the mortgage thereon, upon which
there was due $10,300. Appellant, If charged with said $6,150, was entitled to a credit
of one-halt of the amount said land paid of
said mortgage, In any accounting with the
Turples, for the reason that the sale of his
half of said land paid that sum on the mortgage, n part of which he bad assumed, as a
part of the purchase money therefor. Appellant wns to pay $20,000 on liens and lncurubrances on the Ohio property. That
part of this real estate, the undivided onehalf of which was owned by the Turples
suhject to the mortgage of appellant, was
sold for such sum that, after deducting costs
and expenses, the Turpies' one-half of the
land paid $22,756.56 of the liens and lncumbrances thereon. Whatever amount appellant's half of the land so sold paid, he Is
entitled to credit for In an accounting with
the Turpies, If he Is cbnrged with the $20,000, or any part there.if. It should be remernbl'red thnt the Turpies' wives were entitled to recover that part of the $20.000
which was to have been paid b~' appellant
on the lncumbrances on the nine lots he
agreed to convey to them. The Turpil's
therefore were only entitled to charge appellant with the remainder of the $20,000 after
deducting that amount. Applying these
rulPH, it is eviclent that the Turpies were not,
upon the fa cts found, entitled to recover the
sum of $L9,775. The finding of facts Is so
ambiguous, uncertain, and defective that the
amount which either the Turpies or appellant nre entitled t o ln an accounting one
against the other cannot be stated.

It is claimed that the pa1-t of the sixth conclusion of law which states that appellant
should be required to convey to the Turple11
the undivided one-halt of the N. E. % of the
N. E. % of section 16, township 28 N., range
4 W., and the undivided one-halt of the two
one-acre lots In J. C. Reynolds' Third addition to Monticello, White county, Ind., depends upon the written contract of December
a, 1885, between the Turpies and appellant.
which ls set out In the special finding, and
provides that appellant shall "deed. or cause
to be deeded, to William Turple, 10 lots in J.
C. Reynolds' addition to the town of Monticello, White county, Indiana; 40 acres, more
or less, known as the 'Nutter Land,' near the
town of Monon, White county, Indiana."
There Is nothing ln the speC'ial finding which
Identifies the real estate described In that
part of the sixth conclusion above set out as
being the same as that set out in the written
contract. It ls evident that the description
ot the lots In Reynolds' addition, both In the
written contract and In the sixth conclusion
of law, Is so Indefinite that the same could
not be l<lentified or located by a surveyor_
Sueh a ckscrlptlon In a deed would not convey title. Glgos v. Cochran, 54 Ind. 593;
Shoemaker v. McMonlgle, 86 Ind. 421; Armstrong v. Short, 95 Ind. 326, and cases cited;
Baker v. Pyatt, 108 Ind. 61, 9 N. E . 112. Besides, the contract provides !or the conveyance or 10 lots in J. C. Reynolds' addition,
while the sixth conclusion or law requires
the conveyance of the undlvl<led one-halt of
2 one-acre lots In J. C. Reynolds' Third addition, etc. The lots are not even In the same
addition. It ls true that It Is stated In the
finding that the 40 acres described in the
six.th conclusion of law are generally known
as the "Nutter ll'orty Acres," but the 40 acres
mentioned in the contract are described
therein as being known as the "Nutter Land."
This does not show that the 40 acres men·
tloned in the sixth conclusion of law are the
same as the 40 acres Intended by the contract. It will be observed that the contract
provides tor the conveyance of all the real
estatl!' described therein, while the conclusions or law only require the conveyance of
the undivided one-halt of the lots, and the
40 acres described In said conclusion or la'}'.
It this conduslon was predicated upon the
finding that said written contract had been
modified upon t he parol agreenwnt made between appell11nt and JoneR, with the consent
of the Turpies, that the undlvidC'!l one-ha.If of
tl1e real estate, as de11crihed In the contract,
should be conveyed by appellant to Jones, It
would seem that such modification woul!l
bring the contract, as modified, within th~
statute of frauds, and the contract, as modified, could not, therefore, be enforced. Carpenter v. Galloway, 73 Ind. 418 ; Browne, ::\L
Frauds, §§ 411, 414; Wood, St. Frauds, § 4()3_
It follows that the sixth conclusion of law Is
erroneous.
It Is urged by the appellant that the part of
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the second conclusion of law which states

that Horner is entitled to recover from ap- ,

pellant $1,204 on,account of his failure to pay f

the John H. Miller note is not sustained by

the facts found; that the promise was, in ef- <

feet, only to loan the Turples the money to l

pay said note; that, if the facts found show

a promise to pay said note, the same was a

promise to answer for the debt of another,

and, not being in writing, could not be en-

forced. It is shown by the special ﬁnding

that John H. Miller held the note of the Tur-

ples, upon which Horner was a surety, for

about $1.000; that this was one of the liabili-

ties of the Turples which appellant had on

December 7, 1885, agreed to advance the

money, by way of a loan, and pay, and to se- ‘

cure which the Turples conveyed. or caused

to be conveyed, to appellant, real estate in ‘
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Ohio and Indiana. The language of the spe-

cial ﬁnding concerning the agreement to pay

the note is: “Appellant agreed with said

Horner and Turples to pay said Horner the

amount due from them to Horner, to wit, ‘

thirteen hundred thirty-ﬁve dollars, and to

pay to John H. Miller a note of said Tur-

ples, upon which said Horner was surety, |

amounting to about one thousand dollars," i

etc. That “certain lots in Monon were own-

ed by the Turples, in the name of Horner, ‘

and these lots were a part of the real es-

tate to be conveyed to appellant as securi-

ty for money advanced and to be advanced i

by appellant to pay Turples‘ debts." That ‘

“when appellant received the deed for the .

Monon lots held in Horner's name as se- ‘

curlty for Turples‘ indebtedness to Horner, '

and to indemnify him from loss as their sure-

ty, he promised said Horner that he would

pay said Miller note." This conveyance from

Horner to appellant, made in pursuance to

the agreement with the Turples, was the only

one executed to appellant by any one for said

lots. The money so to be paid by appellant

was a loan to the Turples, as held by this

court on the former appeal, to secure which

they conveyed, and caused to be conveyed,

real estate. The facts found do not show

that appellant became the debtor of the Tur-

ples, or the debtor of Horner. He purchas-

ed nothing of them, and did not agree to pay

his own debt, but the debt of the Turples and

Horner, by promising to pay the Miller note. I

It was, in effect, a mere contract to advance

money by way of a loan to pay said note,

and Miller could not have maintained any ‘

action thereon against appellant. Root v. t

Wright, supra; Garnsey v. Rogers, supra;

Pardee v. Treat, supra. It is settled law in '

this state that a contract to answer for the

debt of another must not only be in writing,

but must be supported by a suﬂlcient consid- .

eration. Such a promise may have suﬂicient 1

onsideration to support it, and yet not fur- t

sh ground for action, unless reduced to ‘

writing. Berkshire v. Young, 45 Ind. 461;

Langford v. Freeman. (30 Ind. 46; Krutz v.

Stewart, 54 Ind. 178; Hassinger v. Newman.
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the promise must be made to, and the lien be

1 that appellant failed to pay the incumbrances

abandoned by, the creditor, and not by one of i on said lots, and permitted the same to be

the debtors. Luark v. Malone, 34 Ind. 444;

Browne, St. Frauds, § 201; Wood, St. Frauds,

in the interest of equity and fair dealing,

cffort to take the cases out of the statute re-

quiring a promise to pay the debt of another

to be in writing, and we do not think the

doctrines which are the result of such efforts

should be turther extended. That part of the

conclusion of law, therefore, that Horner

was entitled to recover from appellant $1,264

on account of his failure to pay the Miller

note, is not sustained by the facts found.

For the same reason the court erred in over-

ruling appellant's demurrer to the second

and third paragraphs of Horner's complaint.

It is earnestly insisted by appellant that the
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facts found do not sustain the fourth conclu-

sion of law,—that Mary F. and Emma J. Tur-

pie are entitled to recover $10,000. The spe-

cial ﬁnding upon this part of the case is of

much wider scope than the amended com-

plaint of the Turpies‘ wives, which contains

no averment that they took immediate pos'ses-

sion of said nine lots with appelinnt's consent,

under his agreement to convey the same to

them, or that said lots had been sold at sher-

iff's sale to satisfy the incumbrancc thereon, ‘

and conveyed to innocent purchasers. Nei-

ther is it alleged that there was any lien or

incumbrance on said real estate. It appears

from the special ﬁnding that appellant promis-

ed to pay all liens and incumbrances on the

Ohio real estate; that he was to pay $20,000,

in consideration for the conveyance to him of

the undivided one-half of a part of said Ohio

real estate, upon said liens and incumbrances.

and the excess, if any was required. was to

be advanced and paid by him as a loan to the

Turpies (this included the nine lots to be con-

veyed to the Turpies‘ wives, and any liens or

lncumbrances thereon were to be paid under

this agreement); that these lots were convey-

ed to appellant under the agreement that he

would convey them to the Tulpies' wivcs;

and that they took immediate possession

thereof, with appellant's consent, under his

agreement to convey the same to them. It

is not directly stated in the special ﬁnding

that there was any incumbrance on the nine

lots. The ﬁnding, however, sets out that ap-

pellant permitted said lots to be sold to pay

the incumbrances that he had agreed to re-

move therefrom; but the amount of these in-

cumbrances, or when they became due, is not

stated. Under the agreement, and the pos-

session taken therennder by the Turpies'

wives, as stated in the special ﬁnding, they

were the real owners of said nine lots. Ap-

pellant had no right of possession or control,

except to convey said real estate to the Tur-

pies‘ wives. His title was a naked or nominal

trust. Teague v. Fowler, 56 1nd. 569; Myers

v. Jackson, 135 Ind. 136. 34 N. E. 810, and

authorities cited. It is stated in the ﬁnding

1 sold to pay the incumbrances that he agreed

01!'
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the i)roml:,;e must be made to, and the lien be that appellant failed to pay the lncumbrances
abandonell by, the credlt1>r, and not by one of on said lots, and permitted the same to be
the debtors. Luark v. }falone, 34 Ind. 444; sold to pay the lncumbrances that he agreed
Browne, St. Frauds, § 201; ·wood, St. Frauds, i to remove therefrom, and that the title there§ 150. The courts, under the claim of acting ' to had passed to lnnocent purchasers at sherln the Interest of equity and fair dealing, Hf's sale. It Is not, however, found what
have already gone quite tar enough ln their part of said $2o,ooo was to have been paid on
effort to take the cases out of the statute re- the lncumbrances on the nine lots, nor that
quiring a promise to pay the debt of another such part would have satisfied the lncumbnrnto be In writing, and we do not think the ces thereon. The Turples' wives knew before
doctrines which are the result of such etrorts February 18, 1886, when they commenced
should be further extended. That part of the their action against appellant, that he had
conclusion of law, therefore, that Horner refused to comply with bis contract and pay
was entitled to recover from appellant $1,264 any more of the $20,000 on lncumbrances.
on account of his failure to pay the Miller The loss by the Turpies' wives of the nine
note, Is not sustained by the facts found. lots by sherlJJ's sale, as shown, was caused
For the same reason the court erred In over- by the lncumbrances not being paid, and not
ruling appellant's demurrer to the second by the refusal of appellant to convey the same
and third paragraphs of Horner's complaint. to them. The fact that appellant refused to
It Is i>amestly insisted by appellant that the
pay the said incumbrances,--0f which they
facts found do not sustain the fourth conclu- had knowledge,-and permitted the lots to be
slon of law,--that Mary F. and I<:mma .J. Tur· sold to pay the same, as stated In the finding,
pie are entitled to recover $10,000. The spe- did not give the Turples' wives the right to reclal finding upon this part of the case Is of cover of appellant the value of said lots, but
much wider scope than the amended com- only the amount he was to have paid thereplalnt of the Turples' wlTes, which contains on. The rule concerning the measure of damno nverment that they took Immediate polises· ages Is the same as It appellant had conveyed
slon of said nine lots with app!'llant's consent, the lots to them when they took possession,
under his agreement to convey the same to or the same had not been conveyed by Woodtbem, or that said lots bad been sold at sher- ruJJ to appellant, but had been conveyed dlilf's sale to satiety the lncumbrance ther('()u, rectly to them. They were the real owners
and conveyed to Innocent purchasers. Nel- of the nine lots, and could have paid otr the·
ther Is It alleged that there was any lien or lncumbrances thereon, thus protecting their tllncumbrance on said real estate. It appears tie, and, when the same became due, recover~
from the special finding that appellant promls- ed from appellant whatever part ot the $20,ed to pay all liens and lncumbrances on the 000 was to have been paid thereon under the
Ohio real estate; that be was to pay $20,000, agreement, or, whenever said lncumbrances
In conslderntlon for the conveyance to him of became due without paying the same, th<'
the undivided one-half of a part of said Otlo had a right to recover against appellant for
real estate, upon said liens and lncumbnmt-es, whatever part of said ~20.000 was to have
and the excess, lf any was required. was to been paid thereon. Turple v. Lowe, on page
be advanced and paid by him as a loan to the 60, 114 Ind., and page 834, 15 N. E., and
Turi>les (this Included the nine lots to be con- cases cited. The finding upon which the right
ve.ved to the Turples' wives, and any lieus or of the Turples' wives to recover Is predicated
lncumbrances thereon were to be paid wider Is very ambiguous, lndeftnlte, and uncertain,
"this agreement); that these lots were com·ey- and contains many conclusions. There Is
ed to appellant under the agreement th.'lt 111• nothing In the finding showing how it was
would eonvey them to the Tti1pies' w:vcs; possible for the nine lots to be sold and conand that they took lmmedlate possession veyed by the sherlJJ to Innocent purcha.'*1'rs.
thereof, with app!'llant's consent, under hl11 They, as shown by the finding, were ln p·s·
agreement to convey the same to them. It session of said lots, and were necessary paris not directly stated In the special finding ties to any action to enforce any lncumbrance
that there was any lncumbrance on the nine thereon. Their posses.'!ion was notice of their
lols. The finding, however, sets out that np- title. Under such circumstances, that part
p!'llnnt permitted said lots to be sold to pny of the ftndlng which sets out that the title of
the incumbranees that he had agreed to re· said lots had passed into the hands of Innocent
move therefrom; but the amount of these In- purchasers states only a coueluslon. The fac ·s,
cmubrances, or when they became due, Iii not If any, from which such conclusion Wllli
stated. Under the agreement, and the pos- drawn, should have been stated. For all that
Hession taken thereunder by the Turpl s' appears, the Turples' w!Ves are still in poswl\·es, as stated In the special finding, they session of said real estate. They could not
were the real owners of said nine lots. Ap- be deprived of their title unless made parties
pellant had no right ot possession or control, to the proceeding under which the same was
except to convey said real estate to the Tur· sold. There ls nothing set forth In the speples' wives. His title was a naked or nominal clal ftnding which would entitle them, under
tn1st. Teague v. Fowler, 56 Ind. 569; Myers the rule stated concerning the measure of
v. Jackson, 135 Ind. 136, 34 N. E. 810, and damages, to recover from appellant the value
:mthorltle1 cited. It ls stated ID tbe finding of said Iota. It follows that, under the facts
0

DAMAGES F'OR NONPAYMENT OF llONEY-INT.ErREST.
DAMAGES FOR NONPAYMENT OF MONEY—INTEREST.

223

found, the only amount which the Turpies‘

wives were entitled to recover was such part

of the $20000 as was to have been paid on the

incumbrances on said lots, with interest from

the time the same became due. This sum not

being shown by the special ﬁnding, there is

nothing upon which a conclusion of law show-

ing the amount they are entitled to recover

can be stated.

The seventh conclusion of law—that Jones

is entitled to recover $800 from appellant—is

based upon the theory that Jones, by his coun-

terclalm, sought to recover the value of the

undivided one-ﬁfth of the Starke farm con-

veyed by him to appellant. Appellant urges

that the conclusion of law is erroneous be-

cause the counterclaim of Jones, upon which

the ﬁnding in his favor and the seventh con-

clusion of law rest, does not state facts suﬂl-
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cient to constitute a cause of action, and for

the further reason that the counterclaim seeks

to recover damages for the breach by appel-

lant of a contract to convey real estate to

Jones, and not upon the quantum valebat for

the real estate conveyed by Jones to appel-

lant. It is alleged in the counterclaim of

Jones that he sold and conveyed the undivid-

ed one-ﬁfth of the Starke farm, containing

about 324 acres, in consideration of which

appellant agreed “to convey or cause to be

conveyed to him the undivided one-half of

ten lots in Reynolds‘ addition to Monticello,

White county, Indiana, which appellant rep-

resented to be worth two hundred dollars

each, and the undivided one-half of forty

acres of land near Monon, Indiana, by him

found, the only amount which the Turples' damages for a breach by a]lpellnnt of the
wives were entitled to rerover was such part contract to convey the undivided one-bait ot
ot the $20.000 as was to have been paid on the the 10 lots, and the undivided one-half of
lncumbrances on said lots, w.lth Interest from the 40 acres ot land near Monon, Ind., and
the time the illlme became due. This sum not that the measure of damages was the value
being shown by the special finding, there I• ot the real estate appellant had agreed to
nothing upon which a conclusion ot law show- convey. The agreement of appellant to coning the amount they are entitled to recover vey said real estate Is not alleged to be In
am be stn ted.
writing, and will therefore be presumed to
The seventh conclusion of law-that Jones have been by parol. Wollte,v. Fleming, 103
11!1 entitled to rerover $800 from appellant-ls
Ind. 105, 100. 2 N. E. 325; Jarboe v. Severin,
based upon the theory that Jones, by his coun- 85 Ind. 496, 408; Budd v. Kraus, 79 Ind.
terclaim, sought to recover the value of the 137. As the agreement was tor the conveyundivided one-fifth of the Starke farm con- ance of real estate of which Jones was not
veyed by him to appellant. Appellant urges put In possession, the same was within the
that the conclUlllon of law Is erroneous be- statute of frauds, and was Incapable ot being
cause the counterclaim of Jones, upon which enforced, or of supporting an action for damthe finding In his favor and the seventh con- ages for Its breach by appellant. Schoonclusion of law rest, does not state tacts suffi- over v. Vachon, 121 Ind. 3, 22 N.' E. 777;,
cient to constitute a cause of action, and for Roehl "'· Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311, 15 N. E.
the further reason that the counterclaim seek& 34a; Bums v. Fox, 113 Ind. 200, 14 N. E.
to recover damages for the breach by appel· 541; Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N. E.
lant of a contract to convey real estate to 666. Jones' action being to recover damages
.Tones, and not upon the quantum valebat for for the nonperformance of the contract, the
the real estate conveyed by Jones to appel· counterclaim did not state tacts sumclent to
lant. It Is alleged In the counterclaim of constitute a muse or action, and there Is
.Tones that he l!Old and ronveyed the undivid- nothing, therefore, tor the seventh conclusion
ed one-fifth of the Starke farm, containing ot law to rest upon. Besides, the special findabout ~-I acres, In consideration of which ing shows that the right of .Jones to recover
appellant agreed "to convey or cause to be was predicated upon the theory that the acconveyed to him the undivided one-half of tion was to recover the value ot one-fifth of
ten lots In Reynolds' addition to Montlt•ello, the Starke farm. So that, even It the tacts
White county, Indiana, which appellant l't'P- alleged In the counterclaim constituted a
resented to be worth two hundred dollars cause of action, the conclusions ot law would
each, and the undivided one-half of forty be erroneous, because the same rest upon
acl't's of land near Monon, Indiana, by him 1 a different theo1-y from the one !ff!t forth In
represented to be worth one thousand dollars; the couutert'lnlm. Judy v. Gilbert, 77 Ind.
that he relied upon the representut'ons of , 96; Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 00; Trentman v.
Yalue, and believed he was contrnctlng for i Neff, 124 Ind. 503, 24 N. E. 895. For the reaproperty Of the Ya]ue Of fifteen hundred dol· sons given the cause ls reversed, with InstrucJars." The counterrlalm proceeds upon the tions to the court below to sustain appel·
throry that Jones was entitled to recover lant's motion for a venlre de novo.

represented to be worth one thousand dollars:

that he relied upon the representat'ons of

value, and believed he was contracting for

property of the value of ﬁfteen hundred dol-

lars." The counterclaim proceeds upon the

theory that Jones was entitled to recover

damages for a breach by appellant of the

contract to convey the undivided one-half of

the 10 lots, and the undivided one-half of

the 40 acres of land near Monon, Ind., and

that the measure of damages was the value

of the real estate appellant had agreed to

convey. The agreement of appellant to con-

vey said real estate is not alleged to be in

writing, and will therefore be presumed to

have been by parol. Wolke v. Fleming, 103

Ind. 105, 106. 2 N. E. 325; Jarboe v. Severin,

85 Ind. 496, 498; Budd v. Kraus, 79 Ind.

137. As the agreement was for the convey-

ance of real estate of which Jones was not

put in possession, the same was within the

statute of frauds, and was incapable of being

enforced, or of supporting an action for dam-

ages for its breach by appellant. Schoon-

over v. Vachon, 121 Ind. 3, 22

Rochl v. Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311, 15 N. E.

345; Burns v. Fox, 113 Ind. 205, 14 N. E.

541; Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N. E.

666. Jones‘ action being to recover damages

for the nonperformance of the contract, the

counterclaim did not state facts suﬂiclent to

constitute a cause of action, and there is

•
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WHITE et al. v. l\IILLI‘ZR et al.

(78 N. Y. 393.)

Court of Appeals of New York. 1879.

Action by Lewis White and others against

Chauncy Miller and others for danmges for

breach of warranty of goods sold. From a

judgment of the general term afiirming 8.

judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

Judgment of general term reversed, and that

entered on the verdict modiﬁed.

R. W. Peckham. for appellants. Esek Cow-

en, for respondents.

EARL, J. This is an action to recover

damages for a breach of warranty in the

sale of cabbage seeds. The warranty. as

alleged and found, is that the seeds were

Bristol cabbage seeds; and it was found that

they were not, and that they did not pro-

duce Bristol cabbages. The rule of damages,
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as laid down by the trial judge in his charge

to the jury, was in conformity with the de-

cision of this court when the case was here

upon a prior appeal (71 N. Y. 118), the dif-

ference in value between the crop actually

raised from the seed sown and a crop of

Bristol cabbage, such as would ordinarily

ave been produced that year. The judge

also charged the jury that if they found for

the plaintiffs, they should also allow them

interest upon the amount of damage from

the commencement of the suit, April 15, 1869,

to the day of their verdict. May 30. 1878.,

The jury found the damage to be $2,000, and

the interest upon this sum to be $1,277.49, and

gave plaintiffs a verdict for the amount of the

two sums. The defendants excepted to the

charge as to interest. and this exception pre-

senls the only question for our consideration.

The law in this state as‘ to the allowance

of interest in common-law actions is in a,

very unsatisfactory condition. The decisions

upon the subject are so contradictory and

irreconcilable that no certain rule for guid-

ance in all cases can be deduced from them.

The common-law rule. as expounded in

England, allowed interest only upon mercan-

tile securities, or in those cases whcrc there '

had been an express promise to pay interest.

or where such promise was to be implied

from the usage of trade. Mayne, Dam. (2d

Ed.) 105'‘; Higgins v. Sargent, 2 Barn. & C.

349. in the absence of these conditions, in-

terest was not allowed in an action for money

lent, or for money had and received, or for

money paid, or on an account stated, or

for goods sold. even though to be paid for

on a particular day, or for work and labor.

(iordon v. Swan, 12 East, 419; Calton v.

Bragg. 15 East, 223; Walker v. Constable.

l Hos. & P. 306; Carr v. Edwards, 3 Starkic.

132; Nichol v. Thompson, 1 Camp. 52. note;

'l‘relawney v. Thomas. 1 H. Bl. 303.

Thus the law remained in England until

the statute of third and fourth William

IV., which provides that upon all debts or

sums certain, and in actions of trover and

trespass de bonls 3s1lort;ltlh;. and in actions

upon policies of insurance. the jury may in
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allowance was based upon the curious

ground that the debtor was in default for

not having taken the requisite steps to as-

certain the amount of the debt. in this

case, Judge Selden, speaking of the case of

Van Rensselaer v. Jewett, said that that case

went a step further in the allowance of in-

terest than the prior cases, “and allowed in-

terest upon an unliquidatcd demand. the

amount of which could be ascertained by

computation, together with a reference to

well-established market-values; because such

values in many cases are so nearly certain

that is would be possible for the debtor to ob-

tain some proximate knowledge of how much

he was to pay." In Adams v. Bank, 36 N. Y.

%, and Mygatt v. Wilcox, 45 N. Y. 306, it

was held that interest could be recovered in

an action by an attorney upon his account
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for services. The value of the services does

not seem in either case to have been disputed.

In the iirst case, it was held that interest

could be recovered from the time payment

for the services was due; and in the latter

case it was held that it could be recovered

from the time the account was rendered by

the attorney to his client. The right of re-

covery was based upon the theory that there

was default in paying money due. In both

cases the account appears to have been sub-

stantially liquidated, the liability to pay alone

being litigated. in Smith v. Velle, 60 N. Y.

10f‘. the action was to recover for services as

housekeeper for defendant's intestate during

many years. The plaintiff had from time to

time received money and goods to apply upon

her account. There was no agreement as to

the measure of compensation, and it was held

that the account was unliquidnted. and that

interest was not recoverable, even from the

death of the intestate, as there was not a

ﬁxed market-value by which the rate of wages

could be determined. In McCollum v. Sew-

ard. 62 X. Y. 316. the action was upon an un-

liquidated disputed claim for work and labor.

and the referee allowed interest from the com-

mencement of the action; and this upon the

appeal of the defendant, was held not to be

erroneous. In Mercer v. Vose, 67 N. Y. 56,

the action was to recover for services ren-

dered by the plaintiff to the defend.-tnt. The

claim was unliqnidated and contested. The

referee allowed interest upon the balance

found by him from the time plaintiff left de-

fendant's service and demanded his pay.

The action was commenced in about a month

after such demand was made. and it was

held that plaintlff was entitled to recover in-

terest at least from the conunencement of

the action, and that if there was any error

in allowing interest from an earlier date, it

was too tritiing to require correction. Upon

the prior trial of this action, interest was

allowed from the time a crop could have been

harvested and sold, if the seed had been as

warranted. This was held by this court to

have been erroneous. on the ground thnl "the

demand was nnll\lnl‘|alP(l and the anmunt
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and also it may be given as damages for the

detention of a debt after the time when due

by the terms of the agreement, or for neg-

lect to pay a debt after a special demand."

In Amee v. Wilson, 22 Me. 116, the action

was upon an account for goods sold and de-

livered; and it was held that the plaintiff

would be entitled to interest prior to the

commencement of the suit, “by proof of an

agreement to pay it, or by proof of a de-

mand of payment, anterior to the date of the

writ."

The cases last cited tend to show that

where an account for services, or for goods

sold and delivered, which has become due

and is payable in money, although not

strictly liquidated, is presented to the debtor

and payment demanded, the debtor is put

in default and interest is set running; and
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that if not demanded before, the commence-

ment of suit is a suﬂicient demand to set the

interest running from that date. But there

is no authority ‘for holding in a case like

this, where the claim sounds purely in dam-

ages, is unliquidated and contested, and the

amount so uncertain that a demand cannot

set the interest running, that it can be set

running by the commencement of the ac-

tion. Why should the commencement of

an action have such effect? The claim is

no less unliquidated, contested and uncer-

tain. The debtor is no more able to ascer-

tain how much he is to pay. No new ele-

ment is added. The conditions are not

changed, except that the disputed claim has

been put in suit; and there is no more rea-

son or equity in allowing interest from that

than from an earlier date. If interest as a

legal right can be allowed in this case from

the commencement of the action, then it must

be allowed from the same date in all actions

ex contractu, and logically it would be im-

possible to refuse it in actions ex deiicto.

Therefore when this court, upon the prior

appeal, decided that the nature of this claim

was such that interest could not be allowed

thereon from a time anterior to the com-

mencement of the action, it really decided the

question now presented.

The judgment of the general term must

therefore be reversed. and the judgment en-

tered upon the verdict must be modiﬁed

by striking therefrom the sum of $1,277.49:

and as thus modiﬁed it must be aﬂirmed.

without costs to either party as against the

other upon the appeal to the general term

and to this court. All concur.

Judgment accordingly.
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and also it may be given as damages for the
detention of a debt a!ter the tlme when due
by the terms of the agreement, or for neglect to pay a debt after a special demand."
In Amee v. Wilson, 22 Me. 116, the action
was upon an account for goods sold and delivered; and it was· held that the plaintllf
would be entitled to Interest prior to the
commencement of the suit, "by proof of an
agreement to pay It, or by proof of a demand of payment, anterior to the date of the
writ."
The cases last cited tend to show that
where an account for services, or for goods
sold and delivered, which has become due
and Is payable 1n money, although not
strictly liquidated, is presented to the debtor
and payment demanded, the debtor Is put
ln default and interest Is set running; and
that tr not demanded before, the commencement or suit Is a 1JUfllclent demand to set the
interest running from that date. But there
( Is no authority ·tor holding In a case like
this, where the claim sounds purely 1n damages, t. unllquldated and contested, and the
amount 10 uncertaln that a demand cannot
eet the Interest running, that It can be set
running by the commencement of the action. Wh;y should the commencement of

an action have such elfect?

The claim fa
no less unllquldated, contested and uncertain. The debtor 1.8 no more able to ascertaln how much he Is to pay. No new element ls added. The conditions are not
changed, except that the disputed claim has
been put In suit; and there Js no more reason or equity In allowing Interest from that
than from an earlier date. It Interest as a
legal right can be allowed In this case from
the commencement of the action, then It must
be allowed from the same date In all actions
ex contractu, and logically It would be Impossible to refuse It In actions ex dellcto.
Therefore when this court, upon the prior
appeal, decided that the nature of this claim
was such that Interest could not be allowed
thereon from a time anterior to the commencement or the actlon, It really decided the
question now presented.
The judgment of the general term must
therefore be reversed, and the Judgment entered upon the verdict must be modified
by striking therefrom the sum of $1,277.40:
and as thus modlfled it must be afllrmed,
without costs to either PB.117 as against the
other upon the appeal to the general term
and to this court. All concur.
Judgment accordlnglJ".

V

‘ -' DAMAGES FOR .\'().\'l'.\Y\Il-Z.\"l‘ OF MO.\'EY—lN'l'la‘Rl~1ST.

'1

\IA.\'SFIELD v. .\'EVt' YORK CENT. & H.

- B. R. CO.1

(21 N. E. 735, 114 N. Y. 331.)2

(‘onrt of Appeals of New York, Second Division.

June 4, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Second department.

Action for breach of contract by Luther

E. Mansﬁeld against the New York Central

& Hudson River Railroad Company. A judg-

ment for plaintiff was allirmed by the gen-

eral term of the supreme court and defend-

ant appeals.

John E. Barrows, for appellant.

JllcFa1-land, for respondent.

WW.

2237

after reviewing many prior cases on the sub-
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ject, the court, by EARL, J ., remarked that

. some of those cited “tend to show that where

l

BRADLEY, J. I think the defendant's ex- ‘

ception was well taken to the submission to

the jury of the question of interest upon the

amount of damages they should lind against

the defendant. The action was to recover

for breach of contract. In such cases,

whether interest is recoverable does not rest ‘

in the discretion of the jury, but is a ques-

tion of law for the court, while in actions

sounding in tort, when the recovery of in-

terest is permissible, it is with some excep-

tions a question for the jury. Duryee v. ,

Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 478. The rule upon the

subject may appear to have been involved in

some uncertainty, but now it seems to be

reasonably well detined iii this state. In

Mc.\laster v. State, 108 N. Y. 542. 15 N. E.

Rep. 417, the claim was for damages found-

ed upon a breach of contract for the supply

of materials for the services in the construc-

tion of a public building. The damages re-

sulted from the refusal of the state to permit

the contractor to proceed with the work to

its completion, as provided by the contract,

and such damages consisted of a loss of prof-

its, which would have been realized by per-

formance of the work at the contract price.

The court held that interest was not al-

lowable even from the time of the commence-

ment of the action or proceeding, because the

claim was unliquidated, and “there was no

possible way for the state to adjust the same

and ascertain the amount which it was liable

topay." And reference was made to White

v. Miller. 71 N. Y. 118, 78 N. Y. 393.

was an action to recover damages resulting

from breach of warranty upon sale of a

quantity of cabbage seed. The referee on the

lirst trial allowed interest upon the damages

from the time the crop would have been har-

vested. The court held that was an error,

for the reason that “the demand was unl'n|ui-

dated, and that the amount could not be de-

termined by computation simply or reference

to marltet values."

next trial the plaintiffs were allowed to re-

228
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tract, and it was no less nnliquidated for the

purpose of the question now under consider-

ation than it would have been if there had

been no stipulated pm-diem allowance pro-

vided by the contract for the diligence of the

contractors in doing the work. The amount

of such claim for damages was entirely un-

certain. and was closely contested by the de-

fendant; so much so that a verdict for the de-

fendant upon that branch of the case would

have been supported by the evidence. This

question of interest seems clearly to come

within the doctrine of the case before cited,

and should have been excluded from consid-

eration on the trial; and in view of the rea-

son for the rule, and the rule itself, so an-

nounced, the cases cited by the plaintiff's ‘

counsel do not support his proposition in this

respect. In Parrottyv. Ice Co., 46 N. Y. 361;
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Mairs v. Association, 89 N. Y. 498; Walrath

v. ltedlield, 18 N. Y. 457; Duryee v. Mayor,

etc., 96 N. Y. 477,—the actions were in tort,

and the question of interest was for the jury.

In Van liensselaer v. Jewett, 2 N. Y. 135,

the action was for rent payable in speciﬁed

articles with no sum mentioned, and Dana v.

Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 41, was brought to recover

damages for non-delivery of a quantity of

madder pursuant to contract.

cases the market values of the property at

the time stipulated for delivery the defend-

ants had the means of ascertaining, and there-

fore when in default and required to perform

they were able to ascertain by computation

the amounts to which the plaintiffs were en-

titled. l‘he'court~ held that they were enti-

lied to recover interest. In Mclilahon v.

Railroad Co., 20 N. Y. 463, the action was to

recover for work performed and materials

furnished"by the plaintiff in construction of

the del‘endant's road. The defendant had

refused,to have nieasurements made by its

engineer, which was a condition precedent

to payment. The court referred to the doc-

trine of Van Rensselaer v. Jewett, and by

In both these \

SELDEN, J ., said that the court there went

as far as was reasonable to go, and held that

interest was allowable upon the ground that

defendant was in default for not having taken

the requisite steps to ascertain the amount of

the debt. In McCollum v. Seward, 62 N. Y.

316, and Mercer v. Vose, 67 N. Y. 56, the

actions were to recover the amount due for

services upon the quantum meruit. The

claims were unliquidated, and the recovery

of interest from the time of the com mencc-

ment of the action was sustained. The for-

mer of the last two cases was decided upon

authorities there cited, and was followed by

the other. The doctrine of that line of cases

is that in actions for services rendered or

goods sold, etc., when the debtor is in default

for not paying pursuant to his contract, the

creditor is entitled to interest by way of dam-

ages. Nowell v. Wheeler, 36 N. Y. 244;

Mygatt v. Wilcox, 45 N. Y. 306. And that

‘ is upon the theory that the amount may be
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SULLIVAN et al. v. Mc.\IILLA.\' et I\l.

(19 South. 340, 37 Pin. 134.)

Supreme Court of Florida. Feb. l8. 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Escnmbia coun-

ty; W. D. Barnes, Judge.

Action by A. M. McMillan and C. L. Wig-

gins, copartners under the name of Mt'\Iiilan

& Wiggins, against M. H. Sullivan and Emily

S. Sullivan, executor and executrix of D. F.

Sullivan, deceased. Judgment for plaintiffs,

and defendants appeal. Aﬁirmed.

R. L. Campbell, for appellants. W. A.

Blount, for appellees.

LIDDON, J. This is the second appeal in

this case. On the ﬁrst appeal all questions of

law presented by the case have been settled,

except two matters now controverted be-

tween the parties. The nature of the case

will fully appear by reference to the report-
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ed opinion and the statements of fact accom-

panying the same. 26 Fla. 543, 8 South; 450. '

The suit was brought by appellees, hereafter

called the plaintiffs, against appellants, here-

after called the defendants, for the breach of ‘

a contract, whereby appellees agreed to de

liver to the testator of appellants all the logs

of certain speciﬁed dimensions, and free from

certain speciﬁed defects. growing upon cer-

tain described lands of said testator. The

breach alleged to have been made by the de- '

fendants after the death of said testator was

in refusing to receive the remainder of said

logs after a portion of the same had been de-

livered. From the evidence it appears that

it would have taken appellees two years, or

thereabouts, from the time the contract was

broken by appellants, to have completed the

contract on their part by delivery of the oth-

er logs embraced within the provisions of the

same. After the appellants broke the con-

tract by refusing to receive any more logs

under the same, the appellees, with some of

the same teams that had been engaged in

the work required for the performance of

such contract, engaged in other work of de-

livering logs under other contracts to other

parties. The appellants sought to prove what

gain and proﬁts were made by the appellees

by their own labor and the use of such teams

in such other work and contracts during the

time that it would have taken them to per-

form the contract with the appellants‘ testa-

tor, and for the breach of which the suit

was brought. The circuit court excluded such

evidence. The proof upon the trial did show

the value of the use of these teams, and what

other teams could have been engaged for, and

were taken into consideration in estimating

the plaintiffs' proﬁts upon which the verdict

was based. The appellants claim that such

evidence should have been admitted;

they were entitled to prove the amount of ‘

such gains and proﬁts; and that such amount

should have been deducted by the jury from

the amount found to be due the appellees, un-

der the rule for the measure of damages es-

that '

tablished by this court. 26 Fla. 343, 8 Soutln

DAM.\GI·;s FOH .\"O.\"P.\ nm.\"T OF

13‘)

proper opportunities to obtain another cargo;

and if he neglect to perform this duty the

owners cannot hold the charterer liable for

.the increased damages resulting from such

neglect." Murrell v. Whiting, 32 Ala. 54. A

very similar case, and a very similar holding,

is Shannon v. Comstock, 21 Wend. 457. In

Hodges v. Fries, 34 Flu. 63, 15 South. 682,-

a suit for violation of a contract for rent of

a store building by refusing to put plaintiff

in possession of same,—it was held to be the

duty of the plaintiff to mitigate the damages

by accepting another store in the same vicin-

ity, andequally well suited for her purposes,

which was tendered to her.

The contract which was broken in the pres-

ent case was not one for personal services, nor

one which the parties contemplated should be

performed with any special means or instru-

mentality. It was simply a contract for the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:10 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

delivery of certain logs at a certain place, and

might have been performed by the plaintiffs

with their own teams and personal labor. or

by any other means or agency to which they

might have seen ﬁt to intrust the performance

of the same. There is nothing in the contract

to show that the execution of the same re-

quired all or any great portion of the time or

vpersonal attention of both or either of the

‘.plaintiffs; or that it was impracticable for

plaintiffs to be engaged in other business and

the performance of other contracts contempo-

raneously with the performance of the contract

in controversy. We do not think the rule in-

voked as to mitigation of damages by subse-

quent earnings and proﬁts applies to this case.

A distinction is recognized between a case of

the character of that now before us, and those

to which we have alluded. 2 Greenl. Ev. §

261; Watson v. Brick Co., 3 Wash. 283, 28

Pac. 527; 1 Sedg. Dam. § 2%; Wolf v. Stude-

baker, 65 Pa. St. 459; Crescent Manuf'g Co. v.

N. O. Nelson Manufg Co., 100 Mo. 327, 13 S.

W. 503; Nilson v. Morse, 52 Wis. 240 (text,

255) 9 N. W. 1; Cameron v. White, 74 Wis.

425, 43 N. W. 155; Field, Dam. § 339.

There was no legal obligation upon the plain-

tiffs in this case to enter upon the perform-

ance of other contracts for the beneﬁt of the

defendants. The supreme court of Wisconsin,

in Cameron v. White, supra, where a conten-

tion like that of appellants in this case was

made, as we think properly said: “As the

plaintiffs could not enhance the damages

against the defendant by their neglect to make

the best of what they had on their hands, so

they are not bound to lessen the damages by

making other contracts, and performing them,

and giving the beneﬁt of the performance of

such contracts to the defendant." A very full

exposition of this subject, showing the differ-

ence in the rules applicable to contracts for

personal service and those for the doing of a

speciﬁc act, can be found in Watson v. Brick

Co., sup1a. This discussion is too lengthy to

insert entire in this opinion. The gist of the

whole matter, the conclusion of the court, cit-

ing Wolf v. Studebaker, 65 Pa. St. 459, is thus

I
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proper opportunities to obtain another cargo; stated: ..The duty to seek employment 18 deand if he neglect to perform this duty the pendent upon the original contract being one
owners cannot hold the charterer liable for of employment or hire. It is not applicable to
,the Increased damages resulting from such every ('ODtract. • • • Ordinary contracts of
neglect." Murrell v. Whiting, 32 Ala. M. A hire and contracts tor the performance of some
very similar case, and a very similar holding, spedtled undertHklng cannot be governed hy
Is Shannon v. Con111tock, 21 Wend. 457. In the same rule. That In one case the party cnn
Hodges v. 1•'1ies, 34 l"la. 63, 15 South. 68~. earn no more than the wages, and It he gets
n suit for viola ti on of o contl'8ct for rent of that his loss will be but nominal; whereas, In
n store building by refusing to put plaintiff . the other case, the loss of the party Is the loss-·
In possession of ~tme,-lt was l1eld to be the of the ~ ot the rontmct. The damagl•s
duty or the plaintiff to mitigate the damages may be said to be fixed by the law ot the conby accepting another store In the same vicin- tract the moment ft Is broken, and cannot be
ity, and equally well suited for her purposes, altered by collateral circumstances Independwhleh was tendered to her.
ent of and totall~· disconnected from It, and
The contract which was broken In the pres- from the party nC'C'm<ioning It. To plead the
ent case was not one for pel'l!Onal services, nor doctrine ot a\"olduhle t'Onsequences to such
one which the parties contemplated should be case, • • • 'would nPCessartly Involve proof
performed with any special means or lnstru- ot everything, great and smaJl, no matter how
mentallty. It was simply a contract for the various the Items done by the plalntll'r during
delivery of certain logs at a certain pince, and the period ot the contract might be, and how
might have been performed by the plaintiffs much be made In the meantime.' • • • It
with their own teams and pert!Onal labor, or the rule was to be observed that the damagE'S
by any other means or agency to which they , proven must be direct and approximate, the
might have seen fit to lntrust the performance same rule must be Invoked In the reduction ot
of the same. There Is nothing In the contract damagrs." lil Crescent Manuf'g Co. v. N. 0.
to show that the execution of the same re- Nelson Manuf'g Co., supra, where ,an attempt
quired all or any great portion of the time or was made to otre1 evidence similar to that excluded In the present case, It was said: "Where
~rsonal attention of both or either of the
'-plalntllfs; or that It was Impracticable for a servant Is wrongfully discharged during his
plaintllfs to be engaged In other business and term, and lays his damages at the contmct
the performance of other contracts contempo- wnges ror the balnnce of the term, tt ls generraneously with the performance of the contract ally held that evidence may be Introduced In
In controversy. We do not think the rule In- mitigation of damages ot what he might have
voked as to mitigation of damages by subse- earned in the Interim by using reasonable efquent earnings and profits applies to this case. forts to procure other employment. So, In genA distinction is reeognlzed between a case of eral, where a party bas been Injured or damthe character of that now before us, and those aged by a breach ot a contract, be should do
to which we have alluded. 2 Greenl. Ev. t whatever he can to lessen the Injury. .Many
261; Watson v. Brick Co., 3 Wash. 283, 28 cases asserting these prinrlples of law are citPac. 527; 1 Sedg. Dam. I 2ffl; Wolf v. Stude- ed by the defendant, but they have no applibaker, 65 Pa. St. 4.59; Crescent Manuf'g Co. v. cation to the case In hand. The plalntU'l' ownN. 0. Nelson Manut'g Co., 100 Mo. 3:!.'I, 13 S. ed Its factory and the machinery, and the ronW. 503; Nilson v • .Morse, 52 Wis. 240 (text, tract constituted no such relation as that of
25;";) 9 N. W. 1; Cameron v. White, 74 Wis.
master and servant. It hnd the right to make
42fi, 43 N. W. 155; l<'ield, Dam. § S::Jll.
as few or as many other contracts as It saw
There was no legal obligation upon the plain- fit while executing the contract with defendtiffs in this case to enter upon the perform- ant, and It Is entitled to the profits which it
ance of other contracts tor the benefit of the might hnve made on this particular contract.
defendants. The supreme court of \Vl!1<:onsln, The evidence offered In mitigation of damagPs
In Cameron v. White, supm, where a conten- was properly excluded."
tion like that of appellants lo this case was
From what has been said by us and quoted
made, as we think properly said: "AB the with approval ·rrom the decisions of other
plaintiffs could not enhance the damages courts it follows that we are of the opinion
against the defendant by their neglect to make that tbe circuit court did not err In excluding
the best of what they had on their hands, so the testimony olfered, and that the doctrillt'
they are not bound to lessen the damages by that one who bas been Injured by the breach
making other contracts, and performing them, of a contract must do all that le n.·asonnbly ·
and giving the brnetlt of the performance of within his power to mitigate the damageti
l!Ucb contracts to the defendant." A very full caused thereby does not prevail to the extent
exposition of this subject, showing the differ- that one who Is injured by a violation of an
ence In the rules applicable to contracts for ag1·eement to do a spedlic act not necessarily
personal service and those tor the doing of a Involving pe1·sonal services must seek and perllp<'<'lfie act, can be found In Watson v. Brick form other eontmets for the benefit of 0111·
Co., supm. This discussion Is too lengthy to who, by breaking faith with him, has eau11•~l
Insert entire In this opinion. The gist ot the the Injury.
whole matter, the conclusion of the court, citThe second matter, as already stated, '"
ing Wolf v. Studebaker, G:i Pa. St. 451), Is thua whether any Interest le recoverable upon the
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' as to the allowance of

1

amount of damages found by the jury I

against the defendants. The court instruct-

ed the jury that, if they found a verdict for

the plaintiffs, they should assess the dam-

ages. with 5 per cent. interest. from what-

ever date the evidence showed the contract

would have been completed. The jury, in ‘

its verdict, stated separately the amount of '

the damages assessed and the interest there-

on, and judgment was entered for the aggre-

gate amount. These proceedings are claim-

ed to be erroneous, for the reasons alleged:

(1) That no interest can be allowed in a re-

covery of unliquidated damages, and (2) that

the evidence does not show any date from

which the jury might calculate the interest.

It cannot be doubted that the ancient rule is

adverse to the assessment of Jntcrest upon
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unliquidated demands. More liberal ideas

interest prevail in

modern, especially in American, authorities;

and in the allowance of interest the distinﬁ

i

tion is practically obliterated between liqui- .

dated and unliquidated demands.

ard author upon the subject says: "The de-

termination of the question whether interest

can or canno( be allowed is by no means

free from diﬂiculty. The most general clas-

sitication of causes of action with reference

to interest is into liquidated and unliquidat-

ed demands. And it was formerly attempt-

ed to lay down the rule that interest could be

recovered only on liquidated demands. But

it will be perceived that, not only is the dis-

tinction itseif not by any means easy to keep

in view, but, besides this, there is no reason,

in the nature of things, why the fact of a

demand being unliquidated should debar the

plaintiff from receiving or exempt the de-

fendant from paying interest.

we do not ﬁnd as a matter of fact that the

A stand- 1

And, ﬁnally, ‘

line between cases in which interest is allow- .

ed and cases in which it is refused corre

sponds with the line between liquidated and

unliquidated demands. ' ' ' The objec-

tion to this classiﬁcation lies not only in its

difﬁculty of application, which might per- '

haps be surmounted; but in the fact of its

unfairness. There is no reason why a per-

son injured should have a smaller measure

of recovery in one case than the other. ' ' ' '

On general principles, once admit that inter-

est is the natural fruit of money, it would

seem that, wherever a verdict iiquidates a

claim. and ﬁxes it as of a prior date, interest

should follow from that date. ' ' ' There

are two tests which are constantly applied

by the courts, having been found by them

more useful than the attempted division into

liquidated and unliquidated demands. Of

these the ﬁrst is whether the demand is of

such a nature that its exact pecuniary

(amount was either ascertained or ascertain-

able by simple computation, or by reference

‘.232
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Without setting forth even a brief sum- -

mary of the evidence in the case, we think

it suiiicient to say that it was so exact and

deﬁnite as to the amount of damage sustain-

ed by the plaintiffs, and the elements of the

same, that it only required a simple compu-

tation by the jury to ﬁx the amount. We

think the case falls within the rule stated,

that the damages could be readily liquidated

and ascertained by the jury by simple com-

putation, and that the plaintiffs were enti-

tled to interest thereon.

We do not think the objection well taken

that the evidence shows no date from which

the jury could calculate the interest. The

evidence shows suﬂiciently a date within

which the plaintiffs could have completed

their contract, viz. two years from the time

the defendants made a breach of it. This
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time was long after the action was brought.

The amount of interest allowed shows that

it was calculated from such date. The court

told the jury to allow the interest “from

whatever date the evidence shows the con-

tract would have been completed," and we

think the proof suﬂiciently deﬁnite as to

such a date. There was no reversible error

in the instruction or the ﬁnding of the jury.

By this holding we do not intend to deter-

mine whether the interest could have been

calculated only from the date suﬂicient for

the completion of the contract, or whether

it should have been estimated from the

breach of the same, or from the ﬁling of the

writ in the suit. We only determine that

there was no prejudicial error to the defend-

ants in the record. If the rule varied at all

from the true! rule for calculation of interest.

such variance was in defendants' favor, and

lessened the amount of the recovery against

them.

Let the judgment of the circuit court be af-

ﬁrmed.

f.\'O'l‘E. Jacksonville, T. & K. VV. Ry. Co. v.

Peninsular Land, Transp. & Mfg. Co., post, 4-16.

D.\\I.\(ili.\‘ F()R NO.\'PAY\I1':.\"1' Oi-‘ \It).\'iC\'—IN'l‘EltES'l‘;

ILOUISVILLE & N. R. (‘U, r. ‘\‘i'.-\l.l..\(.‘lC.

(17 S. W. 882, 91 Tenn. 35.)

Supreme Court of Tennessee. Dec. 12, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Sumner cOun- -

ty; H. C. CARTER, .iudge.

Action by W. L. Wallace against the

Louisville & Nashville itailroad Company

for personal injuries. Judgment for plain- ,

tiff. and defendant appeals. Reversed.

J. J. Turner, for plaintiff. S. F. Wilson,

R. K. Gillespie, and Geo. W. Boddfe, for de-

fendant.

SNODGRASS,J. Tlmdefendantin error,

while in the service ofthe Louisvilie& Nash-

ville Railroad Company as brakemun, sus-

tained severe personal injury, resulting in

the loss of a leg, which he alleged was '

occasioned by the negligence of the com-

pany. 1-ie sued for $15,000 damages and

recovered judgment for $9,940. The rail-
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road company appealed, and assigned nu. ;

merous errors. It is not deemed mnte- l

rial tonoticebut one of them,as theothers 1

are not well taken, and involve nothing

new, so as to make their consideration in .

a written opinion necessary. The one ma-

terial to be considered relates to the ques-

tion of interest. The court told the jury

it couhi assess plaintiff's damages with or .

withoutinterest. as the jury should see

proper, in connection with instructions

as to the measure of damages not other- ‘

wise complained of. The verdict assessed

the damages at $7,000 with 7 years‘ inter- ,

est $2,940. aggegating $9,940. it is oh-

jected in the assignment of errors that the

charge on this question. and verdict. with

judgment thereon,are erroneous. This in- I

voives a consideration of the question, .

what is the true measure of damages for

such personal injury? The rule for deter. '

mining damages for injuries not resulting '

in death, (where the statute ﬁxes the

measure.) and not calling for exemplary

punishment, deducibie from the decisions

of this court since its organization in this

state, is that of compensation for mental

suffering and physical pain. loss of time,

and expenses incident to the injury, and,

if it be permanent, the loss resulting from

complete or partial disability in health,

mind, or person thereby occasioned. And

this is the rule most consonant to reason

adopted in other states. 3 Sedg. Dam.

(8th Ed.) 5 481 et seq.; 5Amer.& Eng. Enc.

Law, pp. 40-44, and notes; Railroad Co.

v. Read, 87 Amer. Dec. 260. As this sum

in gross includes all the compensation

which is requisite to cover pain, suffering,

and disability to date of judgment, and

prospectively beyond. it is intended to be

and is the full measure of recovery, and 1

cannot be supplemented by the new ele- l

ment of damages for the detention of this

sum from the date of the injury. The

measure of damages being thus ﬁxed, it is

expected that in determining it juries and

courts will make the sum given in gross a

fair and just compensation, and one in full
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and discussed those actions sounding in

tort in which interest may be given as

damages. The distinction is there taken,

as taken here, and actions for personal in-

juries excluded, because of the existence of

a wholly different measure of damages re-

specting them. In this connection we

quote section 320 in the volume and chap-

ter referred to: “It sufﬁciently appears,

from what has already been said, that

there is no general principle which pre-

vents the recovery of interest in actions of

tort. The fact that the demand is unliq-

uidated has been shown to be insufficient

to exclude interest, and there is nothing in

the mere form of the action which renders

it unreasonable that interest should be

given. Nevertheless it is in the region of

tort that we ﬁnd the clearest cases fordis-
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ailowance of interest. There are many

cases which are not brought to recover a

sum of money representing a property loss

of the plaintiff, and it is frequently said

broadly that interest is not allowed in

such actions. It is certainly not allowed

in such actions as assault and battery, or

for personal injury by negligence, libel,

slander. seduction," etc. The measure of

damage in such case seems nowhere to in-

clude thisor be based upon thisidea. Even

in respect to injury or destruction of prop-

erty, w here the supreme court Of the United

States has adopted fully the prevailing

rule ailo wing damages in the form of in-

terest on value of the property, the rule

hasbeen limited to such injury of property

‘or property right as had a ﬁxed or cer-

tain value; and it is accordingly held in

that court that indeﬁnite damages, as

that resulting from infringement of a pat-

ent, could not bear interest until after the

amount had been judicially ascertained.

'l‘ilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 161, 8 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 894.

The direct question we are considering

also came before the supreme judicial

court of Maine. and it was there held that

the rule permitting damages equal to in-

terest on value of property in cases of tres-

pass and trover did not apply, and that

interest could not be allowed upon a re-

covery for personal injury, and that, too,

under a statute authorizing a recovery

“to the amount of the damage sustained. "

(This is not material, however. as their

statute gave no morenorless right than ex-

ists here.) Sargent v. Humpden,38 Me.5Nl.

The cases cited by the editors of the last

edition of Sedgwick on Damages sustaining

the proposition that interest cannot be in-

cluded in a recovery of damages for per-

sonal injuries are from Georgia and Penn-

sylvania.

4 S. E. Rep. 054: Railroad Co. v. Young, 81

Ga. 397, 7 S. E. Rcp.912: Railway Uo. v.

Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306. These cases have

all been examined, and fully sustain the

text. One of the cases cited to the proposi-

and dlscuRRed those actions Roun111ng In
tort In which Interest may be giYen es
damu~et'!. The dlstlnctfoo la there taken,
ae taken here, end actlom1 for persunal InJuries exduded, because or the existence or
a wholly different meuaure or damages rel!(Jectlng them. In this connection we
quote Hectlon 320 lu the volume and chapter referred to: "It sufficiently appears,
from whut has already been s1tld, that
there i~ no genernl principle which pre,·en ts the recovery of Interest In actions of
tort. The fuct that the demand Is unllqul<lated hus been shown to be lneufhclent
to P.xclude Interest, and there la nothing In
the nwre form of the action which renders
ft unreaHonable that Interest shoulll be
glvc11. Nevertheless it lt1 in the region of
tort that we find the clearest casPB fordlsallowence of l!1terest. There are many
c8Hl'S which are not brought to recover a
Rum of money representing a propt:rty loHB
of the plaintlU, and It la frequently said
broadl.v that Interest le not allowed in
such actions. It le ct>rtolol,r not allowed
lo 1mch actions a8 asauult and battery, or
for personal lujury by neir;llgence, libel,
Blander, eedurtlou, n etc. The meaRure or
durnuice ln 1mch caRP. see111s nowhere to Include this or be based upon tbh1 !Ilea. Even
In respect to Injury or det1tructlou of propPrt.v, w uere the supreme rourt 01 the United
St11tt11 bee odoptoo fully the prevailing
rule allo .vlng damages In the form of interest on value or the propel'ty, the rule
baB hPen limited to such Injury or property
·or property right as had a fixed ur certain value; ancl It is accordingly held in
that court that tndeftnlte do mages, as
thut re1111ltlng from Infringement or a pet.
cut, could not bear lntere11t until after the
amount bad been Judicially ascertained.
Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 161, 8 Sup.
Ut. Rep. 894.
The direct question we are considering
also came before the supreme Judicial
court of Maine. and It was there held that
the rule permitting damage11 equal to in·
terest un value of property In ca11Ps of treepa11~ end trover did not apply, and that
lntere11t could not be allowed upon u recovery for per11onel Injury, uud the t, too,
under a statute authorizing a reco\'ery
"to the amount of the d11mage su11tetned. •
(This Is nut material, howe\"er. es thetr
statute gave no more nor less right tbeu exists here.) Sargent v. HanJpdeu,38 Me.5to!l.
The cases clterl by the editors of the Jaat
edition of Sedgwick on Damages sustaining
the proposition that lntereRt cannot be lnclnued lo a recovery of du mngeR for personlll lnJurles are from Georgia end Pcnn8ylvunla. Hatteree v . Chapman, 79Ga. 574.
4 S . E. Hep. 684: Railroad Co. v. Young, 81
Gu. 31!7, 7 S. E. Hep. 912: Railway Co. v.
Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306. Thesfl cases have
nil heen examined, end fully sustain tlm
text. One orthe ce11esclted to theproposi·
tlon In Amer. & Eng. Enc. Lu w wuH a
Penns.vlvanla case, enrller than either of
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those to which we have referred. The case
there cited, (Fa11holt v. Reed, 16 Serg. &
R. 266,) which we have not been able to
find In libraries here, was evidently not
one of personal Injury, or el8e not com1letent with later holdings or thut COUl't. Indeed, the Pennsylvania court seems hardly to have gone as far on that question In
J't>fereuce to allowance of Interest a8 dam·
age11 In other actions ex dt>licto as other
courts. In sulttt for the d~Rtructlon of
property that court bas held that, while
lapse of tlml' may he looked to, It le error
to Instruct the Jury that plelntlft Is entitled to Interest on such damage from the
time It occurred. Township or Plymouth
v. Gruver, 125 l'a. l:!t. 24, 17 Atl. Rep. ~;11;
Emerson v. Schoontoaker, 135 Pu. St. 437,
19 Atl. Rep. l02:i. Of the other cases cited
In Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, we have examined those ln 13 Wta. 31, (Hinckley v.
Beckwith,) a6 N. Y. 689, (Vandevoort v.
Gould,) and 30 Tex. 349, ( \V olfe v. Lal'y.)
They all eustuln the text ae It Is lnteude1l
to be understood, and as we have herein
explained, end doubtless the other casC8
do so. To the same effect are the cases of
Lincoln v. Cleftln, 7 Wall . Ill~ Dyer v.
Nu,·igntlon Cu., 118 C. S. 507, 6 Suri. ('t.
Re11. 1H4; ll. S. v . .North Carolina, 136 U.
8. 21l, 10 Sup. Ct. RPp. 920; C'IPment v.
Spear, 5G Vt. 'lul; and rases from A nwrlcnn
decisions and reportRclted In Rapulje's lllgest, volume 1, pp. 1039-1041, under headtJ
"Trover," an1l .. When Interest may u~
Added," and volume 2, p.1991, nnder bead or
"Interest." See, nlso, 1 Sedg. Dem. §§ 4324!\3, (8th Ed.) The eHf!Ct and me11nlnl[ of
stetement11 quoted from Amer. & Eng.
Enc. Law nnd Its reference to Sedg. Dem.
are made perfectly clenr when the11e cl\s1•1t
nnd authorities herein added are examined,
and the generality of expl'('811lons llmlte<l lo
the purpose of their u11e and the cl11se or
cases being considered. They were not
dealing at all, nor Intended to he unclei stood ns de11lln1r. with the questlun of recovery for personal injuries, which Is lteelr
a recovery or dllruegl!S puro and simple,
and measured by a rule which needs no
BUPf>lement that would add demngeK to
damages. The charge and verdict WPre
therefore erroneous on this point, unrl
prt1judfcial to defendant to .the extent Rllll
only to the extent of the Injury. The circuit Jndge might have rt>fused to receh•e
the verdict as to lntereEit, allfl tha same
eHect ml\y now follow a remitting of the
Interest by 1>lelnt1n, tr he elects to do so.
In that event tha plaintiff Is entitled to a
JudgmPnt for S7,000, with intere11t from
dnte of ltR rendition, and cost11, and with
tbls mudlfkation the Jud6tment wlll be
affirmed. This was the practice adopted
in the Maine case on this point, es well a11
In one of t11e Pennsyh·ania caHes, (1::15 P11.
St. 4:17, 19 AU. Rep. 10!!5,) citing eevernl
otht•rH, 11nd Is clearly the correct rule. In
de!uult of Ruch remlssluu, a new trial will
be granted.
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VVILSON v. CITY OF TROY.

(32 N. E. 44, 135 N. Y. 96.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 4, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

third department. ,

Action by Walter V. Wilson against the

city of Troy to recover damages for an in-

jury to a horse resulting from a defective

street. Plaintiff had judgment, which was

aﬂirmed at general term (14 N. Y. Supp. 721),

and defendant appeals. Aﬂlrmed.

WILSON "· CITY OF TROY.
(32 N. E. 44, 135 N. Y. 96.)
Court of Appeal• of New York. Oct. 4, 1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
third department.
Action by Walter V. Wilson· against the
city ot Troy to recover damages for an tnJury to a horse resulting from a detective
street. Plalutur had Judgment, which waa
attirmed at general term (14 N. Y. Supp. 721),
and defendant appeal8. Afilrmed.
Wm. J. Roche, for appellant. Chas. E.
Patterson, for respondent.

Wm. J. Roche, for appellant. Chas. E.

Patterson, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J. The record in this case pre-

sents two questions: First, whether the ﬁnd-

ing of the jury that the damage was the re-

sult of the defendant's negligence is sustained

by any evidence; and, secondly, whether in-

terest could legally be allowed by the jury in
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estimating the amount of the damages. On

the night of the 13th of November, 1879, a

valuable horse belonging to one Learned,

plaintiffs assignor, while being driven

through South street in the city of Troy, fell

into an open ditch or unguarded excavation.

made during that day. and was permanently

injured. There is little, if any, controversy

with respect to the value of the horse, the ex-

tent of the injury, or the amount of damages.

The night was dark, and it is not denied that

there was evidence for the jury suﬂicient to

sustain a ﬁnding of negligence on the part of

some one by reason of the failure to protect

a place of danger in a public street, by proper

guards and lights. It was not shown that the

city had any actual notice of the existence

of the excavation, if made by private parties

without its permission; and a suiiicient pe-

riod had not elapsed between the time of open-

ing it and the accident to render the city lia-

ble on the ground of implied notice. The ex-

cavation was made for the purpose of con-

ducting the water from the principal main in

the street, through lateral pipes, into a pri-

vate house. The owner of the house em-

played a ﬁrm of plumbers to do the work,

which included the digging of the trench as

well as laying and connecting the lateral

pipes with the main in the street. The ﬁrm

applied to the superintendent of the water-

works for men to open the trench in the

street, and that oﬂicer directed laborers in

the employ of the city to do so. The open-

ing in the street was made by them, and they

were paid for the work by the city, the plumb-

ers refunding to it the sum so paid. The

question is whether the men who dug the

ditch were under the control and direction of

the defendant, or subject to the orders of the

plumbers engaged in performing a piece of

work for the owner of the house.

The system of waterworks in Troy is the

property of the municipality, and is under the

management and control of a board of water

commissioners, which may be regarded as a

department of the city government. The

commissioners are by law required to nom-

inate, and the common council of the city to

O'BRIEN, J. The record In this case presents two questions: First, whether the ftnd·
Ing of the jury that the damage was the result of the defendant's negligence Is sustained
by any evidence; and, secondly, whether Interest could legally be allowed by the jury In
estimating tbe amount or the damages. On
the night of the 13tb of November, 1879, a
T"aluable horse belonging to one I.earned,
plalnt11l"s assignor, while being driven
through South street In the city of Troy, fell
Into an open ditch or unguarded excavn tlon,
made during that dny. and was permanently
injured. There ls little, tf any, controversy
with respect to the value of the horse, llle extent of the Injury, or the amount of damages.
The night was dark, and It Is not clenled that
there was evidence for the jury sufficient to
sustain a ftndlng of negligence on the part ot
some one by reason of the failure to protect
a place of danger In a public street, by proper
guards and lights. It was not shown that the
city had any actual notice ot the existence
of the excavation, If made by private parties
without Its permission; and a sutttclent period had not elapsed between the time of opening It and the accident to render the city liable on the ground ot Implied notice. The excavation was made for the purpose of conducting the water from the p11nclpal main In
the street, through lateral pipes, Into a private house. The owner of the house employed a ftrm of plumbers to do the work,
which Included the digging of the trencll 118
well as laying and connecting the lateral
pipes with the main In the street. The firm
applied to the superintendent of the waterworks for men to open the trench In the
liltrcet, nnd that officer directed laborers In
the employ of the city to do so. The openlD&' ln the sh"eet was made by them, and they
were paid for the work by the city, the plumbers refunding to It the sum so paid. The
question Is whethe1· the men who dug the
ditch were under the control and direction of
the defendant, or subject to the orders of the
plumbers engaged In performing a piece of
work for the owner of the house.
The system of waterworks In Troy Is the
prop<:?rty of the municipality, nnd is under the
management and control of a board of wuter
commissioners, which may be regarded as a
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department ot the city government. The
commissioners are by law required to nom·
lnate, and the common council of the city to
appoint, a superintendent of the waterworks,
who ls the executive officer ln that department, and who, in tllls case, directed the men
in the employ and pay of the city to mah.·~
the excavation ln the street. The boara 1s
autho1·lzed by law to extend the distributing
pipes of the waterworks wherever they mlgllt
think proper, aud to make such alterations
and improYements in the works, and ln the
management and preservation thereof, as
they might deem necessary and expedient,
and to employ such persons and assistunts u11.
they mlgllt require, to execute any of these
purposes, whi<:h employl!s were to be paid for
their scn·kes from the city treasury. The
commissioners were also empowered to enact
such by-laws, regulations, and ordinances as
they should deem necessary for the protection of hydrants and water pipes, and the
preservation, protection, and management ot
tbe waterworks. These by.Jaws, unless disapproved by a vote of two-thirds of all the
members of the common council of the city,
were to have all the force and clkct of law.
In pursunnce of the power thus conferred by
the statute, the board of water commissioners enacted by-laws and ordlnnnces on the
I subject which were in force at the time the
excavation In question was made. They, lu
effect, proll!blted any person except the super·
lntendent, and those employed by him or by
the commissioners, to tap or m1tke any connection with the main or distributing pipe,
or to permit the same to be done, unless by
the permission and under the direction of the
superintendent. The learned counsel for the
defendant contends that this regulation simply forbids the act of connecting the lateral
pipes from the house with the main, and did
not prohibit prlnte persons from digging
the necessary trenches and uncovering the
main or distributing pipe, and hence that
part of the wo1·k was done by the contractorR
who were employed by the owner of the
house to make the connection, and uot by
the city. But a prlnte Individual had no
right to dig In the street for this or any other
purpose without the permission ot the proper
municipal authorities, and the object, as well
as the language, of the ordinance indicates
that lt was Intended to prevent the uncovp1··
Ing of the main, or any Interference with the
street in which It was placed, by private parties. At all events, the water board and Its
chief executive officer, the superintendent, In
the discharge ot the duties Imposed upon
them by the statute, might very properly
give to It that construction, and act accord·
lngly. To hold that such a by-law did not
embrace within Its object nnd purview the
evils that might result from unguarded nn<l
unregulated interference with the bed of the
street by priv1tte parties In orller to reach the
main, would be giving to It a construction al-
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together too narrow. The evidence tends to

show that the water board gave to it the

broader and more comprehensive meaning,

as it was the custom and practice for years

before the accident in question to make appli-

cation to the superintendent for men to do the

digging, and they were always furnished, as

in this case. As between the owner of the

house and the plumbers employed by her to

introduce the water into her house, the dig-

ging was undoubtedly a part of the contract

or work of the latter. If no main had been

placed in the street at that time, they could

also have contracted with her to procure its

extension, but that part of the work would be

subject to the action and regulations of the

water board, and, while the contractors might

be obliged to pay the city for the whole or

some part of the expense, it would be none
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the less the work of the city. One of the

plumbers testiﬁed that while he agreed with

the owner of the house to do all the work,

yet he knew then that it was the practice and

custom to apply to the superintendent of the

waterworks for men to do the digging and to

make the connection, and acted upon the as-

sumption that he had no right to do it. He

also says that the men who made the exca-

vation were not employed by him, but by the

city. We think that, upon the proof, it

could not be held, as matter of law, that the

men who dug the trench and left it unguard-

ed ceased for the time being to be the serv-

ants of the city, and subject to the directions

of the superintendent, and became, while do-

ing this job of work, the servants of the par-

ty employed to put in the lateral pipes into

the house, as is urged by the learned counsel

for the defendant What party sustained the

relation of master to the men who dug the

trench, and had the control and direction of

them, and was charged with the duty of di-

recting them to properly guard the ditch,-

whether the plumbers on the one hand, or the

city, through the superintendent of the water-

works, on the other,—was the important ques-

tion to be determined, and the trial court sub-

mitted it to the jury. Under all the circum-

stances, the question became one of fact, and

this disposition of it was not error. Ward v.

Fibre Co., 154 Mass. 420, 28 N. E. Rep. 299.

This ﬁnding of the jury is conclusive upon

us, and imports that the city itself, through

one of its oﬂicers or departments, caused the

trench to be dug, and left it unguarded, re-

sulting in the damage complained of. In

such a case the negligent act is imputable

to the city, and the doctrine of actual or im-

plied notice has no application, or, at least,

is unnecessary, where one injured by the neg-

lect of the city to properly guard a place

made dangerous by its own act brings the ac-

tion. Pettenglll v. City of Yonkers, 116 N.

Y. 558, 22 N. E. 1005; Walsh v. Mayor, etc.,

107 N. Y. 220, 13 N. E. 911; Turner v. City

of Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301, 16 N. E. 344;

Brusso v. City of Buffalo, 90 N. Y. 679; Rus-

sell v. Village of Canastota, 98 N. Y. 496;
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sounding in tort and actions upon contract.

In the latter class of actions there is not

much diﬂiculty in ascertaining the rule as to

interest until we come to unliquidated de-

mands. The rule in such cases has quite re-

cently been examined in this court, and prin-

ciples stated that will furnish a guide in

most cases. White v. Miller, '78 N. Y. 393.

We are concerned now only with the rule

applicable in actions of tort. The right to

interest, as a part of the damages, in actions ‘

of trover and trespass de bonls asportatis,

was given ﬁrst in England by St. 3 & 4 Wm.

IT. The recovery was not, however, allow-

ed by that statute as matter of right, but in

the discretion of the jury. The earlier cases

in this state followed the rule thus establish-

ed in England, and permitted the jury, in

their discretion, to allow interest in such
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cases. Beais v. Guernsey, 8 Johns. 446; Hyde

v. Stone, 7 Wend. 354; Bissell v. Hopkins, 4

Cow. 53; Rowley v. Gibbs, 14 Johns. 385.

The principle that the right to interest in

such cases was in the discretion of the jury,

was, however, gradually abandoned, and now

the rule is that the plaintif f is entitled to in-

terest on the value of the property converted

or lost to the owner by a trespass as matter

of law. The reason given for this rule is

that interest is as necessary a part of a com-

plete indemnity to the owner of the property

as the value itself, and in ﬁxing the damages

is not any more in the discretion of the jury

than the value. Andrews v. Durant, 18 N.

Y. 496; McCormick v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y.

315; Turnpike Co. v. City of Buffalo, 58 N.

Y. 639; Parrott v. Ice Co., 46 N. Y. 369. It

is diﬂicult to perceive any sound distinction

between a case where the defendant converts

or carries away the plaintit‘.f's horse and a

case where, through negligence on his part,

the horse is injured so as to be vaineless.

There is no reason apparent for a different

rule of damages in the one case than in the

other. In an early case in this state the

principle was recognized that interest might

be allowed, by way of damages, upon the

sum lost by the plaintiff in consequence of

det'endant's negligence. Thomas v. Weed, 14

Johns. 255. We think the rule is now set-

tled in this state that, where the value of

property is diminished by an injury wrong-

fully inﬂicted, the jury may, in their discre-

tion, give interest on the amount by which

the value is diminished from the time of the

injury. That is the rule laid down in the

elementary books and sustained by the ad-

judged cases. 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) §§

317, 320; Walrath v. Redﬂeld, 18 N. Y. 457,

462; Mairs v. Association, 89 N. Y. 498; Dur-

yee v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 477, 499; Home

Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 11 Hun, 182,

188; Moore v. Railroad Co., 126 N. Y. 671, 27

N. E. 791; Railroad Co. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa.

St. 560, 17 Ati. 187.

There is a class of actions sounding in tort,

in which interest is not allowable at all, such

as assault and battery, slander, libel, seduc-
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must be remembered that the court was not

reviewing any question decided below in re-

gard to interest, but seeking to make up

for itself a new award from the items of the

claim appearing in the record, and whatever

was said by way of argument, and as the

reason for throwing out an item of interest

on a sum claimed to have been expended in

restoring or reclaiming the land, cannot be

considered as the judgment of the court on

the question now under consideration. That

question was not noticed in the argument,

and was not involved in the case, except, per-

haps, as a matter of discretion. For these

reasons the judgment should be aﬂirmed. All

concur, except EARL, C. J., and FINOH and

GRAY, JJ., dissenting.
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Judgment aﬂlrmed.

DAM.AGES l<'OH .NONPAYMENT OF

must be remembered that the court was not
reviewing any question decided below in regard to interest, but seeking to make up
for Itself a new award from the items of the
claim appearing In the record, and whatever
was said by way of argument, and a& the
reason for throwing out an Item of Interest
on a sum claimed to have been expended in
restoring or reclaiming the land, cannot be

MO~EY-1:\'Tl<}HEST.

considered as the judgment of the court on
the question now under consideration. That
question was not noticed in the argument.
and was not involved In the case, except, per-haps, as a matter of discretion. For these
reasons the judgment should be afllrmed. A.ll
concur, except EARL, C. 1., and FINCH and
GRAY, JJ., dissenting.
Judgment nfllrmed.
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TRIGG et al. v. CLAY et ai.

(13 S. E. 434, 88 Va. 330.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. July I

23, 1891.

Appeal from decree of circuit court of

Scott county rendered March 27, 1890, in a

suit wherein T. P. Tﬁgg, A. M(Bradley,

and H. Fuga te, snrvivingpariners of them-

selves and James C. Greenway, deceased,

partners dofng business in the ﬁrm name

Trigg, Fugate & Co., were complainants,

and H. B. Clay, Jr., and W. D. Kenner,

partners in the ﬁrm name of H. B. Clay,

Jr., & Co., were defendants. The decree

being adverse to the complainants, they

appealed. Opinion states the case.

Dani. 'l'rlgg, for appellants. Holdman

& Ewing and J..i. A.Powell, for appellecs.

LACY, J. 'l‘he suit is a foreign attach-
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ment in equity, brought to attach the

property situated within theinrisdicfion of

thecourt belonging to non-residentdefend-

ants, and to subject the same to the satis-

faction of the debt of the plaintiffs. The

case is brieﬂy as follows: The appellants,

a ﬁrm of lumber merchants resident at

Abingdon, in Virginia, made a contract by

which they agreed to buy, at a stated

price, lumber of agreed dimensions from

the appellees, a firm of lumber gettcrs,

resident at Rogersville, in the state of

Tennessee; the lumber to be delivered t

Ciinchport, in Scott county, in Virginﬁz.

from 500,000 feet to 709.000 feet thereof;

and the plaintiffs agreed to accept the

drafts of the said appeiiees to the amount

of $3,000. And on the 28th day of Novem-

. her, 1888, the date of the contract. the ap-

peilee H. B. (‘iay, Jr., of the said ﬁrm. rep-

resented to the appellants that 300.000 to

400,000 feet were already cut and dry or

drying: and that the residue, necessary to

compensate for the $3,000 in drafts to be

accepted at 60days, should he delivered

at Clinchport at the maturity of the

drafts. The drafts were all made in the

ﬁrst week in December, 1888, a few days

after the contract was made, which was

on the 28th day of November, as has been

stated. The lumber was not deiivered,—

not a foot of it,—and the drafts were neg-

lected and allowed to fall upon the hands

of the plaintiffs, when the lumber had not

yet been delivered, and the drafts had

been paid. So the plaintiffs, as had been

agreed between the pariiesin case the said

contingency should arise that the drafts

should have to be paid before the lumber ~

in sufﬂcient quantity had arrived, draft-

cd back upon the defendants for the money ;

thus paid out; but this action was treated

with derision by the appellee, and the

draft dishonored. Upon the hearing, the

circuit court decreed in favor of the plain-

tiffs for the $3,000 paid on the draft and

the costs of protest, etc., and referred it

to a commission to ascertain what dam-

ages the plaintiffs had sustained. It was
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'“ Where there is no market at the

honored their bank obligation, rather

than deliver this lumber at the agreed

price. which they declared had been bar-

gained at too low a price. In Wood's

Mayne on Damages. § 22, it is said: “But,

if they [thegoods] cannot be purchased for

want of a market, they must be estimated

in some other way. If there had been a

contract to resell them, the price at which

such contract was made will be evidence

of their value." In the American and En-

glish Encyclopaedia of Law it is said:

place O!

delivery,the price of thegoods in the near-

est market, with the cost of transporta-

tion added, determines their value. " Ice

Co. v. Webster, 68 Me. 463; Griiiin v. (‘ol-

ver, 16 N. Y. 489. In the case of Colin v.
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Glass-Works, 108 Pa. St. 220, it is said:

“Upon the breach of a contract to furnish

goods, when similar goods cannot be pur-

chased in the market,the measure of dam-

ages is the actual loss sustained by the

purchaser by reason of the non-delivery. "

A distinction is drawn in some of the cases

between a resale made at an advance sub-

sequent to a contract of purchase and a

resale made at an advance before the con-,

tract of purchase, which was known to

the seller of the goods. Carpenter v.

Bank, 119 Ill. 354,10 N. E. Rep. i8. This is

rather a iauciinl distinction. It is not in

accord with the ordinary usages of trade

that a dealer, a man buying to sell again,

should disclose his dealings with the same

goods at a profit to his vendor. But. ii

there were any sound principle upon which

this could rest, if the seller could be sup.

posed to enter into his contract upon the

basis of a resale in which he had no inter-

est, still, in this case, it is reasonable to

suppose that a inm bcrgetter selling 700,000

feet of lumber to adealcr in lumber should

know (1) that it was for a resale, (2) that

this resale was to be on a proﬁt, and (iii

thatheshould know that his vendee would

be damaged to the amount of his proﬁt, if

the vendor should prove iaithless. But

the true basis of the general rule is that

when there is a market, the vendee cannot

be damaged, except in the difference be-

tween what the lumber did actually cost

him and what he had purchased it at from

-the seller to him. But this rule can have,

upon reason, no application whatever to

a case where there is no market. (1) be-

cause the disappointed purchaser cannot

buy in that market when there is no mar-

ket to buy in, and (2) because the market

price cannot be ascertained when there is

no market.

Under the cirenmstancesof.' this case, the

commissioner ascertained the true and

just amount of the damages. It has been

often held that profits which are the direct

and immediate fruits of the contract are

recoverable. There are many cases in

BREACH OF AGREE:UENT TO SUPPLY GOODS.
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decree of the circuit court appealed from

here is therefore erroneous, and the same

decree of the clrc11lt court appealed from
here ts therefore erroneous, and the same
will be ret>ersed and annulled, and this
court will render such llecree ns the sa!d
circuit court ought to have rendered.

will he reversed and annulled, and this

HINTON, J., cllsaenta.
court will render such decree as the said

circuit court ought to have rendered.

HINTON, J., dlesents.

LEWIS, P., ((llssentingx) In this case I

dissent from the opinion of the court and

am tor aﬂlrming the decree of the circuit

court The case is narrowed down by the

exception to the commlssloner's report to

the slmplequestion of the measure of dnm-

ages. The rule adopted by this court is,

in my opinion, not only unjust, but con-

LAW DMI.2d Ed.—16

trary to the long.settled rule which gov-

erns in such cases. Here the measure of

damages is held to be the loss sustained

by the appellants by reason of their ina-
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bility, on account of the default of the ap-

pcllees, to fulﬁll certain contracts made by

them for the sale and delivery of lumber

to other parties. But those contracts

were c‘-llateral to the contract between

the parties to this appeal, and were. in

point of time, subsequent thereto. They

could not, therefore, have been in the con—

templation of the parties when the con-

tract was made, the breach oi which is

the subject of this controversy.

Decree reversed.

LEWJS, P., (illeeenttng.) In this case I
dissect from the opinion of the court and
am for affirming the decree or the circuit
court The case Is narrowed down by the
exception to the commli.sloner'e report to
the slmpleque11tlon of the measure of dnmages. The role adopted by this court ie,
in my opinion, not only unjust, but conLAW DAM.2d Ed.-16
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trary to the lonJt-settled rule which go\"eme in such cases. Here the measure or
damages le held to be the lose emitalnecl
by tbu appellants by reueon or their luablll ty, on account of the lle!uult of the appelleee, to fullill certain contracts made by
them fur the sale and dell very of I um ller
to other parties. But those contracts
were cullnterul to the contract between
the parties to this appeal, ancl were. In
point of time, subsequent thereto. They
could not, therefore, have bet-n In thti conte11111lation of the parties when the contract wa11 ma:le, the breaC'h uf wblch 18
the subject of this controve1·sy.
Decree reversed.
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JORDAN et al. v. PATTERSON et al.

(35 Atl. 521, 67 Conn. 473.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

15, 18,96.

Appeal from superior court, Falrﬂeld coun-

ty; Robinson, Judge.

Action by Jordan, Marsh & O0. against

James T. Patterson and others, doing busi-

ness as the Patterson Bros. Knitting Com-

pany. Judgment for_ plaintiffs, and they ap-

peal. Reversed. '

John H. Perry and George E. Hill. for ap-

pellants. Morris W. Seymour, John C. Cham-

berlain, and Howard H. Knapp, for appel-

lees.

April

ANDREWS, O. J. This action was brought

, to recover damages for the nonperformance

of a contract. The plaintiffs are large deal-
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ers in dry goods at wholesale and by retail.

The defendants are manufacturers of knit

underwear. The complaint alleged general-

ly that on the 16th day of March, 1892, the

defendants agreed to manufacture for the

plaintiffs a large number of knit undergar-

ments, of various styles and at agreed prices,

amounting in the whole to nearly 12,000 doz-

en, and to deliver the same at various times,

but all before the 1st day of December, 1592,

for which the plaintiffs were to pay; that

the plaintiffs contracted for these goods with

the intent, as the defendants knew, to resell

the same to other parties; that at the date

of said contract they had bargained to sell a

part of said garments to other persons at a

proﬁt; that afterwards, and before the time

when said goods were to be delivered, they

bargained to sell the balance of the same to

certain other persons at a proﬁt; that the

defendants delivered to the plaintiffs, in pur-

suance of the said agreement, 160 dozen of

the said goods, but neglected and refused to

deliver the remaining part,—and claimed

damages to the amount of $10,000. The de-

fendants‘ answer denied the making of the

said contract alleged by the plaintiffs, and

set up a different one,—a conditional one;

and they said. that in performance of the

contract so alleged by them, they furnished

the said 160 dozen of said garments, but that

the plaintiffs neglected to perform the condi-

tions of said last-mentioned contract on their

part to be performed, and therefore they (the

defendants) did not furnish any more of said

goods. The answer also demanded pay for

the goods the defendants had so furnished,

and damages for the nonperformance by the

plaintiffs.

The ﬁnding of the court shows that there

was evidence that the parties had bad deal-

ings with each other prior to the 10th day of

February, 1892; that the plaintiffs had phr-

chased of the defendants garments of their

manufacture, some of which were then man-

ufactured, and some of which were to be

thereafter manufactured and delivered, and

which were in fact so manufactured and de-

livered, but that on said day there was no

BRE.!.CH OF AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY GOODS.
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be the facts), could fairly be said to have f would have been in if the contract had been

had no intention to speak the language of

acceptance and promise in that paper, or

had no intention, by the language used, to

accept, and promise to ﬁll, the orders he

named. These are matters for you to deter-

mine after a careful and serious examina-

tion of the evidence and claims on both

sides." The substance of this instruction

was repeated by the judge twice or three

times in the course of his charge, and at one

time with language which apparently im-

plied that the jury might select one of the

separate orders, and, if that was broken,

render a verdict for damages only as to such

particular contract. This was error. There

was no ambiguity or doubt as to the terms

of the orders, or of the letter of March 16th,

and there was no suggestion of any fraud.
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Under such circumstances, it was for the

judge, and not for the jury, to say what

these writings meant. It was a question of

law, and not of fact. Gibbs v. Society, 38

Conn. 153, 167; Ilotchkiss v. Higgins, 52

Conn. 205, 213; 1 Starkie, Ev. 429; 1 Greenl.

Ev. § 277.- The orders and the letter were

offered as proof of a contract between the

parties. If a contract at all, it was a con-

tract in writing. As such, its interpretation

—its legal eftcct—was a question of law, for

the judge. Nor was such interpretation the

less a question of law because the construc-

tion might have been aided by the use of ~

extrinsic evidence, such as the business of

the parties, their knowledge each of the

business of the other, and their previous

dealings. including as well what may be

called the practical construction put upon

the contract by the conduct and acts of the I,

parties. The judge, by the aid of all the

undisputed facts in the case, could put him-

self into the situation of the parties, and

look at the contract from their standpoint.

But, from whatever source light was thrown

upon the contract, what its meaning was,

what promises it made, what duties or obli-

gations it imposed, was a question of law,

for the judge. It was, after all, the legal

reading and interpretation of what was writ-

ten. See Smith v. Faulkner, 12 Gray, 251,

25-i; Brady v. Cassldy, 104 N. Y. 147, 155,

10 N. E. 131; Nellson v. Harford, 8 Mees. &

/W. 805, 823. In the light ofthe undisputed

‘facts in this case, the trial judge should

‘ have instructed the jury that the letter of

' March 16, 1892, was an acceptance of all the

orders named in it. And, as there was but

' one contract claimed to exist between these

parties, such instruction would, in effect,

have directed them to exclude from their

‘consideration the conditional contract claim-

ed by the defendants.

The general intention of the law giving

damages in an action for the breach of a con-

tract like the one here in question is to put

the injured party, so far as it can be done

by money, in the same position that he

performed. In carrying out this general in-

be the tacts), could fairly be said to have
bad no Intention to speak the language of
.acceptance and promise In that paper, or
bad no Intention, by the language used, to
accept, and promise to flll, the 01·ders he
named. These are matters for you to determine after a careful and serious examination of the evidence and claims on both
sides." The substance of this instruction
was repeated by the judge twice or three
times In the course of his charge, and at one
time with language which apparently implied that the jury might select one of the
separate orders, and, if thnt was broken,
render a verdict for damages only as to such
particular contract. This was error. There
was no ambiguity or doubt as to the terms
of the orders, or of the letter of ~larch ltith,
and there was no suggestion of any fraud.
Unrler such circumstances, it wns for the
judge, and not for the jury, to say what
these writings meant. It was a qul•stlon of
law, and not of fact. Giuhs v. 81)('iety, 38
Conn. 153, 107; Hotchkiss v. Higgius, 52
Conn. 20.>, 21a; 1 Starkie, Ev. 42rl; 1 Greenl.
E\•. § 277. • 'l'he 01·ders and the letter were
otrerro as proof ot a contract between the
parties. It a contract at all, It was a contract ln writing. As such, Its lnte1·111·etntlon
-its legal eft't>et-wns a question of law, for
the judge. Nor was such lntet·pretutlon the
less a qui>Rtlon of law be<'nuse the construction mi;.tht have been nlded by the use of
extrinsic eY.ldeuce, such as the business of
the parties, their knowledge ench of the
business of the other, and their previous
dealings. lndudlng as well what may be
called the practical construction put upon
the contmet by the conduct and acts of the
parties. The judge, by the aid ot all the
undlRputed facts In the case, could put hlmsdt Into the situation ot the parties. nnd
look at the coutrnct from their standpoint.
But, from whatever source light was thrown
upon the contract, what Its meaning was,
what promises It made, what duties or obUgatlons It lmpos!>tl, was a question of law,
for the judge. It was, after all, the legal
reading and interpretation of what was written. See Smith v. Faulkner, 12 Gray, 2:51,
2:H; B1·ady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 147, 15;;,
10 N. E. 131; Neilson v. Hnrford, 8 Mees. &
f W. 805, 823. In the light ot. the undisputed
1 tacts In this case, the trial judge should
: have Instructed the Jury that the letter of
\ March 16, 1892, was an acceptance ot all the
orders named In It. And, as there was but
· one contract claimed to exist between these
. parties, such Instruction would, In effect,
1have directed them to exclude from their
-consideration the conditional contract claimed by the defendants.
The general Intention ot the law giving
damages In an action tor the breach of a contract like the one here in question ls to put
the Injured party, so tnr as it can be done
b7 money, ID the same position that he

I
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would have been ID it the contract bad been
performed. In carrying out this general intention In any given case, It must be remembered that the altered position to be redressed must be one directly resulting from
the breach. Any act or omission of the complaining party subsequent to the breach or
the contract, and not directly attributable to
it, although it Is an act or an omission which,
except for the breach, would not have taken
place, Is not a ground for damages. In an
action like the present one, to recover damages agnlnst the vendo1· ot goods for their
nondelivery to the vendee, the general rule
ls that the plaintltr is entitled to recover in\
damages the ditre1·ence at the time and place
of delivery between the price he had ngreed
to pay, aud the market price, If greater than
the agreed price. Such ditrerence Is the normal damage which a vendee sut'fers in such
a case. And, If there are no special circumstances In the case, a plalntlt'I'. would, by the
recovery or such difference, be pnt In the
same position that he would have been in
It the contract had bl'en perfom1ed. This, ot
course, Implies that there IR a mnrkr>t for
such goods, where the plnlntlfl' could lluve
supplied himself. It the1·e Is no 1mch market, then the plalutlfl' should recover thP actual 'damages which he has sulT!'l·cd. '!'here
may be, and often there nre, special clr('UJUstances, other thnn the want of a market,
surrounding a contract for the Rale and purC'hm~e or goods, l>y reason of which, in case
of a brPa<'h, the loss to a vendee fo1· thl'lr
nondelivl'ry Is increased. In such a C'ase
the d1u1111J:eS to the vendee which he may
recover must, speaking generally, be confined to sueh as result from those circumstances which may renRonably be suppose<l
to have been in the contemplation of the parties nt the time they made the contract. It
must be remembered, also, In nttemptlng to
carry out this general Intention ot the law
In any gln~n cnse. that any clamages whlcb
the plaintiff by reasonable diligence on his
part might have avoided are not to be regarded as the proximate result of the defendant's acts. In the present case the plalntllfs claimed that at the time or delivery
there was no market In which they could
procure such goods as the defendants were
to deliver to them. This was a fact which
might be proved by the testimony of any
person who had knowledge on the subject.
And It it was true the plaintiffs could not,
by any diligence on their part, have relieved themselves by such purchase from any
portion or the damages which they sutrered.
There were various specinl circumstances by
reason of which the plalntit'fs claimed to recover damages. One was that they contract-\
ed for the said goods for the purpose of reselling them. It Is averred In the complalntand there appears to have been evidence on
the trial tending to prove ·such avermeutsthat at the time the goods were contracted tor

2&4
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the plaintiffs had bargained to sell a portion

of the said garments to other parties at a

proﬁt, and that the defendants had knowl-

edge of the subcontracts. As to the proﬁts

on these subsales, the judge charged the jury

that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover

these as a part of their damages, because, as

the judge correctly said, the existence of these

subsales was known to the defendants at the

time they contracted to furnish the goods, and

the proﬁts that were to be made must be con-

sidered as having been contemplated by them

at that time.

It is also averred in the complaint that,

soon after the time the contract was made,

the plaintiffs, relying on the same, began to

sell the balance of said garments to other par-

ties at a proﬁt, of which subcontracts they

gave notice to the defendants a reasonable
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time before the date at which the goods were

to be delivered. The judge charged the jury

that these proﬁts should not be allowed, be-

cause, as he said, these sales cannot be con-

sidered to have been in the contemplation

of the parties at the time they made their

contract. As the judge stated it, this ruling

was correct. Notice to the defendants after

their contract was entered into would not in-

crease their liability. If these subsales could

not reasonably be considered to have been in

the contemplation of the parties at the time

they made the contract, then the defendants

could not be made liable for the special prof-

its to be derived therefrom.

But there is an aspect of the question of the

proﬁts on these latter subsales—which seems

not to have been very clearly presented—up-

on which the evidence of their terms might

have been admissible. The defendants had

knowledge that the plaintiffs contracted for

these garments in order to resell them to oth-

ers. They were chargeable with knowledge

that the plaintiffs would make such proﬁts as

the market price of such goods would give

them. If proof of the terms of these last-

mentioned subsales was offered for the pur-

pose of showing what the market price of

such goods wa‘s at the time they were to be

delivered, then the evidence should have been

received. The market value of any goods

may be shown by actual sales in the way of

ordinary business.

It was alleged in the complaint that by rea-

son of the default of the defendants the plain-

tiffs hnd been obliged to pay large damages to

their vendees for their failure to deliver to

them the goods so bargained to them, and

they offered evidence to prove such a pay-

ment to one of their vendees, which evidence

was, on objection by the defendants, exclud-

ed. In respect to this item of damage, the

rule above stated furnished the proper tet.

In restoring an injured party to the same po-

sition he would have been in if the contract

had not been broken, it is necessary to take

into the account losses suffered, as much as

proﬁts prevented. And whenever the loss

suffered, or the gain prevented, results direct-
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the goods which the defendants had contract-

ed to deliver to the plaintiffs, “At what price

would these have been retailed?" On ob-

jection, he was not permitted to answer. As-

suming that Deland had knowledy:e of the

market price at which such goods would have

been sold, it is very obvious that his answer

would have been relevant, and should have

been received.

The other questions made in the case, so

far as they are material, would not be likely

to arise on another trial. There is error, and

a new trial is granted. The other judges con-
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curred.

would these hav6 been retailed?" On objection, he was not permitted to answer. Assuming that Deland had knowledge ot the
market price at which such goods would have
been sold, It ls very obvloua that h.ls answer
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would have been relevant, and should have
been received.
The other questions made In the case, so
tar as they are material, would not be likely
to arise on another trial. There ts error, and
a new trial la granted. The other judges concurred.

246

- BREACH OF C1ONTRA‘C'l‘S RESPECTING PERSONAL PROPERTY.

LAWRE.\'CE et al. v. PORTER et al.

(11 C. O. A. 27, 63 Fed. 62, and 22 U. S. App.

483.)

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

28, 189.1.

No. 122.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Western district of Michigan.

This was an action by Ida A. Lawrence

and Frank Lawrence, administrators of the

estate of Lorenzo J. Bovee, deceased, against

William T. Porter, Charles L. Ames, and

Abel H. Frost. At the trial the court di-

rected the jury to ﬁnd for defendants. Judg-

ment for defendants was entered on the ver-

dict. Plaintiffs brought error.

Bundy & Travis, for plaintiffs in error.

May

Walpole Wood and Taggart, Knappen & '
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Denison, for defendants in error.

Before TAFT and LURTON, Circuit

Judges.

LURTON, Circuit Judge. This is an action

for breach of a contract of sale brought by

the buyers against the sellers for failure to

deliver a large quantity of lumber according

to the terms of the agreement. The lum-

ber was to be delivered by the defendants

at their mill, on vessels to be furnished by

the plaintiffs, during the shipping season of

18i10. As each cargo was received, the buy-

er was to give acceptances, payable in 90

days.

defendants refused, for no suﬂicient reason,

to deliver the remainder upon the terms of

the bargain, but offered to supply the lum-

ber needed to complete the bill at a reduc-

tion of 50 cents on each 1,000 feet, for cash

on delivery over the rail of plaintiffs' vessels

and at the time when delivery was required ‘

‘ tiffs‘ declaration contains the usual common-

by the broken agreement. The buyers stood

upon their contract, and demanded delivery

upon the credit therein stipulated, and re-

fued to take the lumber offcred by the de- '

linquent sellers on any other terms than

those contained in the agreement. There

was evidence tending to show that the quan-

tity and quality of lumber contracted for,

and of the dimensionsdesignated, could not

be procured at the place of delivery from

others than the defendants, or at any other

available market in time for shipment ac-

cording to the terms of the contract; that

the lumber was intended for resale at Tona-

wanda, N. Y.; that defendants were so in-

formed; and that the market value of such

lumber at Tonawanda, after deducting

freight and hauling, was considerably above

the contract price.

The evidence of the plaintiffs established

that the defendants were able to comply with

their proposal to deliver the lumber required

by the agreement during the period ﬁxed

for delivery in the agreement. 'l‘hi< makes

it unnecessary to consider the plaintiffs' us-

After the delivery of one cargo, the ,

signment of error to the ruling of the court
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izes any special damages sustained by plain-

tiffs. They are therefore limited to “gen-

eral damages," which, for such a breach as

the one declared on, are measured by the

difference between what they had agreed

to pay and the sum for which they could.

have supplied themselves with lumber of the

same character at the place of delivery, or,

if not obtainable there, then at the nearest

available market, plus any additional freight

resulting from the breach. In case of such

breach, the plaintiffs are entitled only to

indemnity in a sum equal to the loss they

have sustained as a consequence. Hence it

results that if the plaintiffs are able to re-

place the goods by others. bought at a less

or equal price at the place of dellverv. or

other near and available market, they have

sustained no loss, and are entitled at best

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

to nothing more than nominal damages.

Neither the declaration nor bill of particul-

ars alleges any inability to pay cash, as de-

manded by the defendants. We do not,

therefore, consider whether special damages

might not, under some circumstances, be re-

covered, which were sustained by reason of

the inability of plaintiffs to pay cash for lum-

ber to replace that which defendants had

contracted to sell them on credit. It fol-

lows that if plaintiffs were able to buy, and

did not, they cannot throw upon the defend-

ants any special losses incident to their own

failure to mitigate the injury as far as they

reasonably could. Sedg. Meas. Dam. (8th

ICd.) § 741; Marsh v. McPherson, 105 U. S.

709; Warren v. Stoddart, Id. 224.

The ground upon which the defendants re-

fused to carry out the sale was ostensibly

their unwillingness to extend to the plain-

tiffs the credit of 90 days provided for in

the agreement of sale. They have not en-

deavored to show that there were any cir-

cumstances which justiﬁed this breach of

the agreement. Credit is often a material

element in a contract of sale, whereby the

buyer is enabled to operate upon the cap-

ital of the seller. Credit extended without

interest is. in effect, a sale at the stipulated

price less the interest for the period of credit.

The damage for a breach of contract to pay

money at a particular date is the lawful rate

of interest for the period of default, unless

some other penalty is imposed by the agree- ‘

ment. So it would seem that if the buyer,

in order to supply himself with the articles

which the seller was obligated to sell, is

compelled to buy from another, and to pay

cash, one element of rccovery for the breach

would be interest upon his purchase for the

period of credit. It is the well-settled duty

of the buyer, when the sclier refuses to de-

liver the goods contracted for, to do nothing

to aggravate his injury. Indeed, he must

do all that be reasonably can to mitigate

the loss. If the buyer could have supplied

himself with goods of like kind. at the place

of delivery or other available market, at the

time the contract was broken, and neglected

izes any special daruages sustaine<l by plalntltrs. They are thl•rdure liruited to "general damages," which, for such a breach as
the one declared on, are measured by the
difference between what they had agreeil
to pay and the sum for which thl'Y could
have supplied themseln•s with lurnlwr of the
same character at the pince of dl•livery, or,
If not obtainable tlwre, then at the 1wart·~t
aYallable market, plus any additional freight
resulting from the breach. In case of such
breach, the plalntilis are entltlt>d only to
Indemnity In a sum eqnnl to the loss tliey
haYe sustnlnetl as a consequence. lfrnce It
results that If the plaintiffs are able to replace the gootls by otlwrs, bought at a less
or equal price at the pl:we of tll'Il\·en·. or
other nenr and n\·nilahll· market. they have
l'ltstalnetl no loss, und nre entitletl at hest
to nothing mon· than nominal 1la111:1;..:es.
XeithPr the deelaration nor bill of pnrtlculars alleges any Inability to pay eash, as Ile·
manded by the defendants. We do not,
therefore, consider whl•lher special damages
might not, under some circumstancf's, be •:e<.'O\·ered, which were sustained hy r.-nson of
the Inability of plaintiffs to pay rash for lumber to replace that which deft>ndants hat!
eontrnctetl to sell them on credit It follows that If plalntltfs were able to buy, anrl
did not, tht•y cannot throw upon the defendants any special losses lnl'itleut to their own
failure to mitigate the Injury as far as th,•y
reasonably could. Sedg. :\leas. Dam. (8th
Etl.) § i41: ~Iar~h v. Mel'hcrson, hKi U. ~.
700; Warren v. :o;toddart, Id. 2'.!4.
The ground upon which the defendants refusro to carry out the snle was ostl'nsihly
their unwilllni:nP~s to extend to the pbtlntlffs the credit of 90 dap; provided tor In
the agreement of sale. 'J'hey have not endeavored to show that there were any clrcun1stances which justltled this breach of
the agn•ewent. Credit Is often a material
element In a contrnet of s1tle, whereby the
buyer Is enabled to operate upon the cap\ ital of the seller. Credit extended without
int1>re1;t Is. In effect, a sale at the stipulated
price less the Interest for the period of c1·edlt.
The damage for a breach of contract to pity
money at a psrtlcnlnr date Is the lawful rate
ot Interest for the lll'riud of default, unless
some other }l('Bllity is Imposed by the agreement. So It would Rt>t>lll that If the buyer,
Jn order to supply hlmsdf with the nrti<:ll's
which the selle r was ohllgated to !!I'll, is
compelled to buy from another, and to pay
cash, one element of r1·1·0\·ny for the hrNwh
would be lnte1·est upon his pm·clmse for the
period of credit. It Is tlw well-iwttll•d duty
of the buyer, when the seller refuses to deliver the goods contrncted for, to do nothing
to a~l{ravate his Injury. Iude<'tl, he must
do nil that be rPasonahly Pan to mltignte
the los~. If thf' hny.•r 1·nul1I havr !<uppliNl
himself with ~ooils of likP ld11d, at the )lla ce
of <ll'll\·pr~· m «1th1•r a Yallahh• nrnl'kPt. at tlw
time the contrac t wa~ uroken, anti lll·glt'<:ted
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to <lo so, whereby he suffered spPeial damag!'s by l't'•tson of the b1·each, he will not
be sutfe1·ed to recompense hlruselt for SU('ll
spedal tlamnge, for the renson that to tllat
extt·nt he has needl(•ssly aggraYated the loss.
The contention of the plaintilis Is that they
could not supply themselves at the time the
contract was broken with luml.Jer of the quulltles and sizes mentioned lu their contract,
either at the place of delivery or at any other
available market; that they we1·e not required to buy from the defendants, who
were already in default; that to have bought
from them would operate both to encounige
breaches of contracts, llnd would have been
a waiver of all other right of recovery for
the breach of tbt-lr agreement; that to ha\·e
accepkd the proposal of the defernlants to
sup)lly tllem fo1· cash at the reduced p1·1ce
would simply ha \'C! beell to substitute one
contract for another, thereby enabling de·
fentlants to escape all llab.dty for a delil.Jerate and Indefensible violation of the bar·
gain. They therefore Insist that the measure of damage was ti.le difference between
the contract price and the market value at
Tonawanda, N. Y., less fl'C'lghts to that point:
the evltlence showing that the lumber was
bought for resale at Tonawuntla, and that
defl'ndants were Informed of that purpose.
. For a breach of contract of sail', the law'
lr11posf~S no damages hy way of p1111h!l1ml'nt.
The Innocent party Is simply entitlPtl to recover bis real loss. If the mnrket vn.lue is
le~s than the contract 11rh'e, the l.Ju~·l·r has
sustained no loss. This Is axlomntic, and
needs uo citation of authority. If the plaintiffs could have bonght at East Jordan, or
at any other convenient and available market, at the time of the breach, lumber of
like kinds, at the same price or a less price,
It would be clear that they would have sustained no general damages. If they refused
to avail tbemselyes of such opportunity, and
thereby sustained special and unusual loss,
by reason of not having lumber of the kinds
called for by the contract, or by being de·
prlwd of a profit resulting from a resale at
Tonawanda, they could not recover sm·h
s1wdnl damage, for such damage might ha\'e
heen a voided by r<'Jlladng the unileih·erelt
lumber by other of like kinds. The fa<•t
that they could only buy from the def emlauts does not affec t the duty of plaintiffs
to minimize tbt>ir loss as far as they r easona hly could. The offl'r to se ll fur cash at a
reduc<>d price more than eqnnlize<l the i11ter1>!<t for UO days, whil·h was th<' \'nine of
credit. Tlwre s1·<•111s to he no IJ1;,1111·111011nt.·
able ohjPdlon In thus (H•rmittlng a dt'linqueut contrac tor to mlnimi:;-.e his loss. The
obligation on the bu~·pr to mitign te his loss,
by reason of the SPih•r's r<'fusal to earry out
SU<'h n sale, is n ot rl'iaxl'd hl'1·:111se the dPlinquent seller affc nls the only opportnnit~·
for such reduction of the h11yp1"s tlH mag!'.
Vi'arren v. Sto1!1!11rt, 10j U. S. 2:.!4; Dee!'e
v. Lewis, 51 Ill. :0:54.

.
I
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In Warren v. Stoddart, above cited, the

essential facts were these: Stoddart & Co.

were publishers of an edition of the En-

cyclop(bdia Britannica. It was a book sold

only by subscription. Certain territory was

assigned to the plaintiff, in which he was

to have the exclusive right to sell the book

on subscription. He was to have the book

on a credit of 30 days, thus enabling him to

deliver it to his subscribers, and obtain the

means to make his own payments. Warren

obtained a large number of subscriptions to

Stoddart‘s publication. After delivering a

few numbers, he ceased to canvass for the

Stoddart publication, and became a can-

vasser for a rival edition. Therenpon Stod-

dart refused to extend further credit to

Warren, and demanded cash on all his or-

ders to supply his subscribers for the Stod-
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dart edition. Warren demanded credit, and

refused to pay cash. Being unable to get

the Stoddart edition from any other ource,

he, at great expense to himself, substituted

the Scotch, or rival edition, with which be

furnished his subscribers for Stoddart's edi-

tion. For the loss thus sustained be sued.

After discussing the effect upon Warren's

contract, because of his ceasing to canvass

for Stoddart and taking up a rival work, the

court proceeded to decide the case upon the

second ground of defense presented, saying:

“But, even conceding that the provision re-

ferred to remained in force after Warren

had declined to go on under the contract, it

does not follow that, upon the refusal of

Stoddart to give Warren a credit of thirty

days upon. the books, the latter could obtain

a cancellation of the orders he had taken

for Stoddartis reprint, and substitute orders-

for the Scotch edition, and charge the ex-

pense of so doing to Stoddart. The claim

that, upon a simple refusal of Stoddart to

allow him a thirty-days credit upon the books

as he ordered them, he could go on and sub-

stitute other orders for another book, and

charge Stoddart with the expense of substi-

tution, amounting to $30,000, is, to say the

least, a remarkable one. The damage sus-

tained by Warren because he did not get the

thirty-days credit which he thinks he was

entitled to is not to be measured in that

way. The rule is that where a party is

entitled to the beneﬁt of a contract, and

can save himself from a loss arising from

a breach of it at a triﬂing expense or with

reasonable exertions, it is his duty to do it,

and he can charge the delinquent with such

damages only as with reasonable endeavors

and expense he could not prevent. Wicker

v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 9-i; Miller v. Mariner's

Church, 7 Mo. 51; Russell v. Butteriield, 21

Wend. 300; U. S. v. Burnham, 1 Mason. 57,

Fed. Cas. .\o. 1-i,ll9il; Taylor v. Read, 4

Paige, 561. The course pursued by Warren

was not necessary to his own protection.

He might have paid Stoddart cash for the

books required to ﬁll his oi'd|‘rs, or have al-

lowed Stoddart to ﬁll the orders and divide
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Y. Stoddart is controlling. The offer after

the breach by the defendants to sell the

lumber necessary to complete tlfe contract

was not coupled with any condition operat-

v. Stoddart ls controlling. The oft'er after
the breach by the defendants to sell the
lumber necessary to complete tlfe contract
was not coupled with any condition operating as an abandonment of the contract, nor
as a waiver of any right of action for damages for the breach.

ing as an abandonment of the contract, nor

as a waiver of any right of action for dam-

ages for the breach.

The question as to whether there was er-

ror in not directing a verdict for nominal

damages was not presented by any excep-

tion in the circuit court, nor raised by any

assignment of error here. We do not, there-

fore, consider it.

Judgment aﬂirmed.
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The question as to whether there was error in not directing a verdict for nominal
damages was not presented by any exception In the circuit court, nor raised by any
assignment of error here. We do not, therefore, consider it.
Judgment amrmed.
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HOFFMAN v. CHAMBERLAIN.

(5 Atl. 150, 40 N. J. Eq. 663.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

November Term, 1885.

On appeal from a decree of the chancellor,

whose opinion is reported in Chamberlain v.

Hoffman, 68 N. J. Eq. 40.

P. S. Scovel, for appellant.

O. A. Bergen, for respondent.

REED, J. Sarah Chamberlain, the com-

plainant below, together with one Amelia B.

Ellis, sold to Mary W. Miller, now Hoffman,

certain household furniture for the sum of

$1,800. A part of the property sold belonged

to Mrs. Chamberlain, and a part to Mrs. El-

lis. It was paid for in the following manner:

$500 in cash were paid to 'Mrs. Ellis, and to

her were given, also, two notes of $150 each,
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and one note of $100; to Mrs. Chamberlain

were given nine $100 notes. All of Mrs. El-

lis' notes are paid. Three of the Chamber-

lain notes are paid, leaving still unpaid six

of the notes given to her. At the time these

notes were given a chattel mortgage was exe-

cuted to Mrs. Chamberlairi, to secure all

these notes, to the amount of $1,300. Mrs.

Chamberlain ﬁled her bill to foreclose this

mortgage. The defense to it is that some of

the articles sold did not belong to either Mrs.

Ellis or Mrs. Chamberlain. All the articles

to which title is alleged to have failed were

sold as the property of Mrs. Ellis, and all

the notes given to her have been paid. Only

the remaining six notes given to Mrs. Cham-

berlain are outstanding, and it is as security

for the payment of these that the chattel

mortgage is being foreclosed. If this trans-

action is to be treated as involving two sales,

with a distinct consideration for each, then

there is no defense to the present suit.

The failure of title to Mrs. Ellis' goods

could not affect the consideration paid to

Mrs. Chamberlain under a distinct contract.

Upon a consideration of all the circumstan-

ces surrounding the sale, I think the affair

was understood to be a single transaction, in

which all these household goods were sold

for a single price. The two ladies who sold

were relatives, and had been intimately con-

nected in business. They desired to sell all

the furniture in the house to one person.

The values which they'ﬁxed to the separate

articles were for the purpose of determining

their separate interests in the consideration.

The notes were made in part to one and in

part to the other vendor, for the purpose of

convenience. The chattel mortgage was giv-

en to secure all the notes, without regard to

whom they were payable. So far as the pur-

chaser felt concerned in the affair, all she

wished was to get all the furniture as it

stood in the house. She was not concerned

in the proportion of interest in the entire

stock, so long as she got the title to it all.

The price was agreed upon, not in view of

any part, but of the whole lot. The consid-

eration was single, in which both vendors
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v. Posey, 1 Head, 311; Ellis v. Gosney, 7 J. J.

Marsh. 111; Arthur v. Moss, 1 Or. 193; Goss

v. Dysant, 31 Tex. 186.

A perusal of the opinions in those cases,

and the reasons given for the adoption of this

rule in the sale of chattels, is not calculated

to vindicate the wisdom of the rule. The

doctrine, so far as it is applicable to breaches

of the covenants in real conveyances, rests

upon grounds which appertain to the charne-

ter of real estate. The reason for the adop-

tion of this rule in this class of actions is set

forth at length by Kent, in the leading case

of Staats v. Ten Eyck, 3 Caines, Cas. 111.

The rule is an exception to the general prin-

ciple which underlies the measure of dam-

ages for breaches of contract; namely, the

standard of compensation. This latter rule

applies to actions for breaches of warranties
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of quality in the sale of chattels to its full

extent. In what respect the loss resulting

from a breach of the warranty of title differs

from that resulting from a breach of the war-

ranty of quality in dealing with personal

property is diiiicult to conceive. Outside of

the vice of extending an exception to a gen-

eral rule in any event, there appears to be

no reason why the rule of recovery should

not be uniform in actions upon both kinds

of warranties. Nor do the cases in which

the exceptional rule applicable to damages

for breaches of real covenants has been ex-

tended to warranties of title to chattels, in

my judgment, present any reaon for such

prejudicial action. In nearly all of these

cases the question arose in states when and

where slavery prevailed, and was in respect

to breaches of a warranty of title to slaves.

The reason stated in many of the cases for

the adoption oi! the rule was the precarious

and ﬂuctuating character of that kind of

property. In other cases the court is con-

tent with the citation oi.' the early case of

Armstrong v. Percy, 5 Wend. 536, as the au-

thority for the rule.

In regard to the latter case. it may be re-

marked that the rule is drawn from a remark

of the judge who delivered the opinion in

that case, in a single sentence, unsupported

by authority or reason. And this remark

was made in the face of the result in the pre-

vious case of Blasdale v. Babcock, 1_Johns.

517, in which there was a recovery of the

value of a horse, and costs, upon a warranty

of title. The matter actually decided in the

case of Armstrong v. Percy was that, where

an action had been brought against the pur-

chaser by the real owner, who was not the

vendor, the purchaser could recover from the

vendor the money paid, besides the costs of‘

the suit which he was obliged to defend.

There was no suggestion that the rule con-

trolling, in this respect, an action for breach

of this kind of warranty, differed from the

rule in actions upon other kinds of warran-

ties. The cases cited—namely, Curtis v. Han-

nay, 3 Esp. 82; Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt.

566; Lewis v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153—were all
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v. Posey, 1 Head, 311; E111s v. Gosney, 7 J. J.
Marsh. 111; Arthur v. :\Joss, 1 Or. 1D3; Goss
v. Dysnnt, 31 Tex. 186.
A perusal of the opinions In these cases,
and the reasons given for tbe adoption of this
rule In the sale of chattels, ls not calculated
to vindicate the wisdom of the rule. The
doctrine, so far as it ls applicable to breaches
of the covenants in real conveyances, rests
upon grounds which appertain to the character of real estate. The reason for the adoption of this rule In this clne.s of actions l.!i set
forth at length by Kent, In the learllng case
of Staats v. Ten Eyck, 3 Caines, Cas. 111.
The rule ls an exception to the general principle which underlies the measure of damages for breaches of contract; namely, the
etaudard of compensation. This latter rule
applies to actions for breaches of warranties
of quality In the sale of chattels to Its full
extent. In what respect the loss resulting
from a breach of the warranty of title differs
from that resulting from a breach of the warranty of quality In dealing with personal
property ls difficult to conceive. Outside of
the vice of extending an exception to a general rule In any event, there appears to be
no reason why the rule of recovery should
not be uniform In actions upon both kinds
of wa1TRnties. Nor do the cases In which
the exceptional rule applicable to damages
for breaches of real covenants has been extended to warranties of title to chattels, In
my judgment, present any reason for such
prejudldal action. In nearly all of these
cases the question arose In states when and
wbe~ slavery prevailed, and was In respect
to breaches of a warranty of title to slaves.
The reason stated In many of the cases for
the adoption of the rule was the precarious
and fluctuating character of that kind of
prope1iy. In other cases the court ls content with the citation of the early case of
Armstrong v. Percy, 5 Wend. 536, as the authority for the rule.
In regard to the latter case, It may be remarked that the rule ls drawn from a remark
of the judge who delivered the opinion In
that case, In a. single sentence, unsupported
by authority or reason. And this remark
was made In the face of the result In the previous cru!e of Blasdale v. Babcock, 1 Johns.
517, In which there wns a recovery· of the
value of a horse, and costs, upon a warranty
of title. The matter actually decided In the
case of Armstrong v. Percy was that, where
an a ction bad been brought against the purchaser by the real owner, who was not the
vendor, the purchaser could recover from the
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vendor the money paid, besides the costs of
the suit which be was obliged to defend.
There was no suggestion that the rule controlling, In this respect, an action for b1·ench
of this kind of warranty, dltrered from the
rule In actions upon other kinds of warranties. The cases cited-namely, Curtis v. Hannay, 3 Esp. 82; Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt.
566; Lewie v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153-were all
actions for breach of wan'8.nty of quality,
and the measure of damages In these cases
was shown to have been dependent upon the
pleadings. In the first two of these cases no
special damages were set out In the declaration, and there was nothing but the amount
of the consideration to show what was lost,
so that was ruled to be the measure of damages. In the Inst case, the claim for damages having been broader, It was permitted
to the plalnti.lf to-recover, In addition to this,
the costs of a suit against him by his vendee,
to whom he had sold with a similar warranty.
There Is nothing in the matters decided in
the case of Armstrong v. Percy which fixes,
as a rule, that for the present kind of warranties the measure of damages Is limited to
the consideration paid, and Interest. The
rule, I think, In all actions of this kind, le
compensation. Where no special damages
are set forth, the measure of the loss Is the
value of the property purchased; and, where
there ls no evidence of value but the consideration paid, that will be taken as the standard of value. Where there Is a failure of \
title to a part, or an Inferior title only ls sold,
the loss Is the difference between the p1·operty as conveyed and Its value had the title
been as warranted,
In support of the view that this general
rule, applicable to damages, appertains to actions upon breaches of warranties of title to
chattels, are the cases of Grose v. Hennessey, 13 Allen, 38fl; Howland v. Shelton, 25
Ala. 217; and the text of Mr. Sedgwick, on
Mensure of Damages, 294. My opinion ls
that there should be a deduction, In this case,
of the difference between the value of the
entire lot of chattels sold and the value of
the lot without the beaters. The only evidence of the value of the entire lot Is what
It was sold for, namely, $1,800. The evidence
In regard to the value of the beaters fixes
their value at about $200. Adopting these
values, there should be a deduction for the
latter sum from the notes, as of the date of
the sale, leaving due $400 and Interest.
The decree should be reve1·sed.
Decree unanimously reversed.
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BERKEY & GAY FURNITURE CO. v. HAS-

CALL.

(24 N. E. 336, 123 Ind. 502.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. May 1, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court. Elkhart coun-

ty; JAMEs D. Osnosss, Judge.

Action by the Berkey & Gay Furniture

Company against Milo S. Hascall. Judg-

ment was rendered for defendant, and

plaintiff appealed.

J. M. Vanﬂeet, W. H. Vesey, and C. W.

Miller, for appellant. H. D. Wilson and W.

J. Davis, for appellee.

OLDS, J. This was an action by lheap-

pellant against the appellee to recover a

balance of $374.62iorgoods sold and deliv-

cred. The answer is in three paragraphs,

setting up acounter-claim. It is alleged in
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the ﬁrst paragraph that on August 26,

1881, the appellee had just completed his

hotel, with 50 rooms, and was in need of

new furniture therefor, without which he

could not carry on his business, as appel-

lant well knew; that on said day, for the

purpose of furnishing said hotel in all its

parts with suitable furniture, the appel-

lant agreed with him to furnish said fur-

niture and every part thereof complete,

and setitup inpropershape and condition

in his hotel rooms, ready for use, by Sep-

tember i5, 1881; that said rooms were ir-

regular and different in size. dimensions.

and construction, and for the purpose of

making said furniture suitable for said

rooms, appellant measured said rooms,

and a list of goods was agreed upon, and

at the foot thereof appellant executed a '

memorandum in writing as follows: “ We

agreeto putthese goods all in good order,

(set up in hotel, without charge, except

freight and cartage,) castored, with brack-

et wood-wheels on all beds. All bureaus and

washstands to have good wood-wheels

on rubber castors. Goods to be ready the

15th of September. Any goods not accord-

ing to order, or not satisfactory, may be

returned free of charge. Goshen, Aug. 26th,

1881. BERKEY & GAY FUR.\‘l'i‘UItE 00. T.

M. Mosaucv. " The paragraph then al-

leges that he was ready, able, and willing

to comply with his part of said contract,

but that appellant, with full knowledge of

all the facts, violated said agreement, in

this, to-wit: It failed to deliver any of

said goods prior to September 30, 1881,

whereby he lost the daily use of 29 rooms,

of the rental value of $2 per day for each

room from September 15th to September

30th; that appellant failed to deliver said

goods prior to January 18, 1852, except as

set forth in the complaint; that said fur-

niture was purchased to be delivered in

sets and suits forspeciﬁc rooms and places,

as set forth in said foregoing memoran-

dum, but the articles so delivered were not

in sets or suits, but in disjofnted and mis-

matched pieces, and were not and could
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and built his hotel building in the city of

Goshen, lnd.. at a cost of $40,000, and de-

fendant was proprietor and manager there-

of, and had within said hotel thirty (30)

rooms that were unfurnished, and when

so unfurnished were of no use or value to

thedefendant;that allsaid rooms remained

vacant, and of no use or value to de-

fendant, from the 15th day of September,

1&1, to the 30th day of September, 1881,

on account and by reason of the failure of

plaintiff to comply with its agreement

aforesaid; that twenty-three (23) of said

rooms remained vacant. and of no use to

defendant, from the 30th day of Septem-

ber, lﬁﬂl, until the 19th day of October,

1881, because of the failure of plaintiff to

comply with said contract; that seven (7)

of said rooms remained vacant and of no
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use from the 19th day of October, 1»-til, to

the 5th day of November, 1581, because of

the failure of plaintiff to comply with said

contract; thatfrom the 5th day of Novem-

ber, 1881, until December 15, 1s~\l, six (6)

rooms of said hotel remained vacant, and

of no use to defendant, because of the non-

fuliiiimentof said contract by the plaintiff;

that the use of each one of said rooms to

the defendant was nothim:. when unfur-

nished. (5) We further ﬁnd that the rent-

al value and use of each of said rooms,

when furnished with the furniture desig-

nated for same in said contract, would

have been to the defendant 75-100 dollars

per day during said time. (6) If, upon the

foregoing facts. the law be with the plain-

tiff, then we ﬁnd for the plaintiff; but, if

the law be with the defendant, then we

ﬁnd for the defendant. Jons A. isarra,

Foreman." The appellant moved for

judgment on the special verdict, which

motion was overruled,-and an exception

reserved. The appellee moved for judg-

ment on the special verdict, and the court

su'stained said motion, to which the ap-

pellant excepted. Final judgment was then

entered in favor of appeilee for $554.63,

and costs.

Appellant ﬁled a motion for new trial,

which was overruled, and exceptions re-

served. The appellant assigns as error:

(1) That the court erred in overruling ap-

pellant's motion for judgment in its favor

upon the special verdict. (2) That the

court erred in sustaining appellee's mo-

tlon for judgment in hisfavor on the spe-

cial verdict. (3) That the court erred in

oven-ulingappellant's motion ioranew tri-

al. It is'contended that. under the facts

found, the appellce is only entitled to com-

pensatory or generaldamages, and not for

the special damages set up as a counter

claim.

We think the facts found in the special

verdict entitled the appcllee to recover the

special damages claimed. In Vickery v.

Mc(‘ormick, 117 Ind. 594-597, 20 N. E. liep.

495, the court says: “The general rule is

n1hi built bis hotel building In the city uf
Goshen, Ind .. at a cOBt of $40.000, and de-fende.nt was proprietor a.orl mannger thereof, aml hnd ''' lthln said hotel thirty (:30)
rooms that were unfnrnlshed, und whPn
so unfurnished were of no use or value to
thedefendnn t; that nil 1111.hl rnoms remained
vacant, and of no use or value to defcntlant, from the 15th day of SPptemhPr,
lS..,l, to the 30th day of September, 1881,
on a~count and by reason or the failure or
plalnt!H to comply with ltR ag1·eemeot
afor~'!'lnld: that twenty-thrl.'0 (2:3J of sahl
roomR remained vacant. and or no use to
defendant, from the 30th day of Sl•ptember, ls~l. until tlle 19th dny of October,
11\~l. because of the failure or plnlntlff to
eom11ly with snlll contract; that Hl'\'en (7)
of said roomR renrnlned vncnnt nn1l of no
use from the 19th day of October, lx.'.'11, tn
the 5th day of November, lbSl, bt-cn1111e of
the failure of plaintiff to comply with 11aid
contract; thatfrom the 5th day of .November, 18.."l], until December 15, 1~...1. RIX (6)
rooms of 11ald hotel remained vacant, and
of no use to defendant, because of the nonfulflllmentor snld contract by the plaintiff;
that the use of each one of said rooms tu
the defendant was nothing, when unfurnished . (5) We further find that the rental value nnrl use or each of Raid rooms,
when furnished with the furniture dt'81gnated for same In sahl contruct, wouhl
have been to the defendant 75-100 dollars
per day during said time. (6) If, upon the
foregoing fucts. the law he with the plaintiff, then we ftnd for the plaintiff; but, If
the law be with the defl'ndaut, then we
find for the defendant. Jom1 A. 8:0.ttTR,
Foreman." The appellant moved for
_ judgment on tbe special verdict, which
motion we~ overruled,. and au exception
l't!l!erved. The appellee moved for judgment on the sperlal verdict, and the court
su.Rtnlued said motion, to which the appellantexcepted. Final Jmlgment wns then
entered In favor of appellee for $5M.63,
and cost11.
Appellant tiled a motion for new trial,
which was overruled, a.n<l e:11.ceptlons reeened. The appellant a.se1gns aB error:
{1) That the court erred In owrrullng appellant'11 motion fur judgment In Its Javor
upon the special verdict. (2) That the
court err11d lo sustaining; appellM's motion for Judgment in his favor on the special \"'er•lict. (31 'fhnt tlw t:011rt erred In
overrultn.,;appellant'e motion fora new trial. It lH-contcnderl tbat, under the facts
found, the appellee is only 1:ntltl<'d to compemmtory or general damages, and not for
the 11pccial damlilges set up as a counter
claim.
We think the facts fonnd in the 11pPclal
verdict entitled the appellee to r<'cover the
special dnmogee claimed. In Vickery v.
McCormick, 117 Ind. 594-597, 20 N. E. Hep.
495, the court soys: "The genernl rull• Is
that a party who fal111 to cum11l.v with his
contract to furnish goodR Is linl>le for the
value of the good11 in the open market at
the time of the failure. But, when similar
goods cannot be pm"Cha11ed in the market,
the meu11ure of d11mages 111 the actual lose
flURt.alned by the purchttserln nut reccivln11:
the goods arco1·dl11~ to the contract."
See Hahm,.. Deig.:!:; :-<. E. Rep. 141, nnd a11tho1itiee there cited. In Hadley v. Baxen-
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dale, 9 Exch. 341, Sedg. Len1l. Cas. 1~136,
the court statE.'8 what we deem to be the
true rule governing the Bflllefl>Jruent of damages In snch ca.RPS as this. 111 that case It
Is said: " W Jwre two parties have mttrle n.
contract, which one of them hue bruktm,
the damages which thr. other party uught
to receive In rt•Rpect to such breach of contract should be snch as may fairly and
1-ea11onahly be considered cith11r arii,iing
naturully-1. e., according to the u1;1111J
coul'8e of things-from such breach of contract lt11elf, or such as may reaimuabl.v lie
suppo11ed to have been In the contemplation of both parties nt the time they made
the contract us the probable re1111lt of the
breach of It." 'rhe facts found hy the jury
show that the 1tppellee, at an1l jm1t prior·
to A ngust 26, 18S1. had reconstructed and
built hl11 hotel building In the city of Goshen, Ind., at a cost of $40.000, and that
n11pcllee waH proprietor and manager tllereol, anrl hud within said hotel 30 roums
that were unfurnl11hed, und when so unfurniHhed W<'re of no m1e or value to the
appellee; that upon snld day he contracted with the appellant to sell and dellvertohim the seventl item11 of property mentlone1t In the uppellnnt's complaint, which
conRIHted of the necessary furniture to furnl11h suld rooms, at and for the price of
each article me stated in the cumplaint,
and agreed to dPllverthr. sa.me and set the.
same np In oppellee's hotel, and hnve the
same ready fur use ln 11nld hotel by ur on
the 15th doy of September, 1881; that the
appella11t, at the time of the making of 11ai1l
contract, knew the pur11ose for which saitl
furniture wae to be used. The contract
wa11 to furnish the furniture for 30 rooms
In an hotel, and set It up In the rooms, aml
have It ready for use and occupa.ney by a.
dny named. Frum thesefacts it necessari-·
ly follows, ae a conclusion, that the part,\.contractlnJr to furnish the same knew that
the rooms were valueless as hott•I apartments when unfurnished; that the furniture was necessary to enable the purchaser
to use and cx·cupy the same, a.ml operate
his hotel; and that the Rppelh~e would be
deprived or the use of such rooms for Knch
purposeuntll ltcomplled with Its contract.
'!'he facts found further sh OW thu t the appellRnt commPnced furnishing the fnrniture soon after the date when It was all to·
have been fumi11hed and put up int he rou111>1,
furnishing part at onetime and purt at an
other. The facts show the appellee bull
reconstructed and rebuilt a valuable hotel,
and was operating it hlmHelf, dlld the
damng<'M nuturally r<'RUlting from the
brench of the contract, accor1llng to the
fnct11 found, wPre what the ruornR would
have been worth to appellee furnished according to the contraet more than thc.v
were worth to~1l111 unfurniRhecl, during the
delay in complying with the contrnct. Appellce built the house for a particular purPORl'. and was having lt furniHhe1l for such
purpose. He wus not bunnd to rent out
the rooms for another purpose, even If he
cou1'1 hn \'e done so. If there had h<'en n
brench nnrl a total failure of the appellant
to have furnished the whole or any part
of the fnruiturt', and tht> appPllee had IH'Cll
qotitlcd tlrnt he wa11 not l11te111Jlng to furnh1h It, th<'n the npriellant wonhl hu \'e b een
llahle for the difference in value Ill the fur.
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nlture between its price in the open mar-

ket and the contract price, as wfll as the

loss of the use of the rooms for the time

necessary to have procured the furniture

elsewhere; but in this case the appellant

furnished the furniture, and appeilee ac-

cepted it, so that the damage was the loss

sustained by reason of the delay. We think

the loss of the use of the rooms as they

were to be furnished might fairly be con-

sidered to have been contemplated by the

parties at the time of the making of the

con tract. In Richardson v. L‘hynOweth,

26 Wis. 656, it was held that a defendant

failing to deliver an article, knowing the

purpose for which it was purchased, was

liable for the proﬁts the purchaser would

have made. See 1 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.)

218-239; Field, Dam.§ 250; City of Terre

686.
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Haute v. Hudnut. 112 Ind. 542, 13 N. E. Rep.

It is contended that the facts found do

not state the damages correctly; that, if

the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the

amount he is entitled to recover would be

the difference between the rental value of

the rooms, unfurnished and furnished.

This objection we do not think available

for a reversal of the judgment. When spe-

cial damages of this character are recover-

able, it is the damagethe party himself has

sustained that heis entitled to recover. If

A. purchase grain of B., and at thetimeA.

has a previous contract to sell and deliver

grain to C., and A. purchases the grain of

B. with a view of ﬁlling his previous con-

tract with 0.. and C. is advised ofthat fact,

and the contract is such that on failure

to deliver B. becomes liable to A. for the

proﬁt he would have made, thedamage re-

coverable is the proﬁt A. would have

made; and that amount might be deter-

mined byaﬁndingof the facts showing the

amount A. was to pay B.for the grain, and

the amount he would have received from

' (Liorthesame. So,inthisca-se.theamount

of damage that the appellee was entitled

to recover was the difference in value to

the appellee in the rooms, furnished and

unfurnished, for the time they remained

unfurnished by reason of appellant's fail-

ure to furnish the furniture; and that

umount is determined by ﬁnding what

the rooms were worth to the appellee un-

furnished, and what they were worth fur-

nished, for the time he was deprived of the

use of them for the purpose for which they

were to be used. The jury has found as

facts that the use of the rooms unfurnished

was worth nothing to the appellee during

that time. and furnished they would have

been worth 75 cents per day, and the num-

ber of days each room was unfurnished

from the date appellant contracted to set

up the furniturein therooms is also stated

and found in the verdict, and the gross

amount maybe determined by a merecom-

putation. The facts found in the special
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more than one hundred additional shares of
the stock of said c<>mpany shall be issued
(29 N. E. 760, 130 N. Y. 372.)
until the said payment be made and stock
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi- delivered without the consent of the said
Barnes, and that so much of said one hunsion. Jan. 20, 1892.
dred shares as shall be Issued shall be traueAppeal from supreme court, general term, ferred to the said Barnes, If we do not exfirst department.
ercise our option of paying said twenty-sevAction by Olin~r W. Bnrnes against George en thousand five hundred dollars, and deliver
H. Brown, and James Seligman, Jesse Helig- Ing said two thousand shares on the failure
man, and Dav.Id Seligman, ns executors of of the said alDendments to become a lr.w
Joseph Seligman. The genernl term dismiss- at the present session. And we further ato. :ee
ed the complalnt ns to the executors, and re- that no· contract for the construction oi the
versed the referee's decision, which awarded railway of the company shall be entered lnto
only nominal damages against Brown. Pluin- without the eonsent of the said Barnes until
tUr and Brown appeal. Affirmed as to the the said money sbnll be paid and the stock
executors, and reversed as to Brown.
delivc1·ed. In witness whereof we have hereThe other facts fully appear In the follow- unto set our bands and seals this twentying statement by Bradley, J.:
sixth day of March, In the year one thousand
The action was brought to recover dam- eight hundred and seventy-two. George H.
ages for the alleged breach of contract of Brown. [L. S.J Joseph Seligman. [L~ S.J"
which the following le a copy, to-wit: "Oll- 'Vhen, In 1882, this action was commenced,
ver ,V. Barnes having, by Instruments bear- Joseph Seligman had dled, and executors of
ing even date herewith, assigned and trans- his will were joined as defendants with
ferred to us, George H. Brown and Joseph Brown. The alleged default was In the failSelii;mnn, nil claims and demands against the ure or refusal to dellver to tae plaintiff the
1'ew York City Central Underground Rall- 2,000 shares of the stock or the railway comway Company, and hie title to certain sub- pany, as Brown and Sellgman bad underscrlptbns to the capital stock of said com- taken by the contract. The plaintiff sought
pany, and also any Interest he may have In to recover i zoo,ooo and Interest. The ref' certain alleged contract made with tlle e1·ee found that the stock bad no value, and
said company by Francis P. Byrne, anu hav- directed judgment against Brown for nomiing also transferred sixty shares of stock In nal or six cents damages; and as to the desaid company: Now, we, George H. Brown fendants (executo1·s) tbe referee directed judgand Joseph Seligman, do hereby, In consid- ment or dismissal of complaint. JudgmenU.
eration of the premises and of one dollar to wtre entered accordingly. The general tern.
us paid by the said Oliver W. Barnes, agree affirmed the latter, and reversed thr judgthat we will, upon certain amendments to the ment for nominal damages, and as to \be decharter of the said New York City Central fendant Brown granted a new trial.
Undergrnund Railway Company, now pendEdward C. James and Ira Leo Bamberger,
ing before the legislature of the state of New
York, becoming a law, pay, or cause to be for plnlntifT. Hamilton Odell and John E.
paid, to the said Ollver W. Bames, hie rep- Parsons, for defendants.
r($entatlves and assigns, tbe sum of twenBRADLEY, J., (after stating the facts.)
ty-seven thou..~nd five hundred dollars In currency of the United States, being the amount The main controversy has relation to the
of certain advances made and services ren- rule or measure of damages applicable to the
dered by the said Barnes to the said railway breach of the contract upon which this accompany; and also that we will cause to be tion was founded. While the plalntltr claim!!
delivered to the said Barnes or his assigns that dnmag-es cannot be less than $200,000
at the time of the payment of the said mon- and interest, it ls Insisted on the part of the
ey two thousand shares of the capital stock defense that they were only nominal. Before
of the said railwll'Y company, which said proceeding to the consideration of the quesstock ls to be full-paid stock. And we fur- tion in that respect, reference may properly
ther agree with the said Oliver W. Barnes, be made to the facts out of which the albis representatives anil assigns, that, In the leged clnlm arose. The New York City Cenevent of the said amendments not becoming tral Underground Railway Company was ora law at the present session of the legislature, ganized under an act Incorporating it, and
we will either cause said money to be paid, authorizing the company to construct and
and said two thousand shares of stock deliv- operate an underground railway In the city
ered to the said Bames or his assigns, or of New York, passed In 1868, and amended
have reassigned to the !laid Barnes or his as- In 1869. The authorized .capital stock of the
signs the claims, demands, and rights so as- company was $10,000,000. At the time the
signed to us, and transfer to him or hie as- contract of March 26, 1872. was made, the
signs the said sixty shares of stock so trans- plalntitr was president of the company. He
ferred to us the next day after the close then had some claims against it, and only
or the pre!'lent Sel'i<ion of the legislature of 117 shares of capital stock bad been Issued,
New York. And we further agree that not of which he held 63 sha1·es. By the transBARNES v. BROWN et aL
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BARNES v. BROWN et al.

(29 N. E. 760, 130 N. Y. 372.)

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi-

sion. Jan. 20, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

ﬁrst department.

Action by Oliver W. Barnes against George

H. Brown, and James Seligman, Jesse Selig-

man, and David Seligman, as executors of

Joseph Seligman. The general term dismiss-

ed the complaint as to the executors, and re-

versed the referee's decision, which awarded

only nominal damages against Brown. Plain-

tif! and Brown appeal. Aﬂirmed as to the

executors, and reversed as to Brown.

The other facts fully appear in the follow-

ing statement by Bradley, J.:

The action was brought to recover dam-

ages for the alleged breach of contract of
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which the following is a copy, to-wit: “Oli-

ver W. Barnes having, by instruments bear-

ing even date herewith, assigned and trans-

ferred to as, George H. Brown and Joseph

Seligman, all claims and demands against the

New York City Central Underground Rail-

way Company, and his title to certain sub-

scriptions to the capital stock of said com-

pany, and also any interest he may have in

I certain alleged contract made with the

said company by Francis P. Byrne, and hav-

ing also transferred ixty shares of stock in

said company: Now, we, George H. Brown

and Joseph Seligman, do hereby, in consid-

eration of the premises and of one dollar to

us paid by the said Oliver W. Barnes, agree

that we will. upon certain amendments to the

charter of the said New York City Central

Underground Railway Company, now pend-

ing before the legislature of the state of New

York, becoming a law, pay. or cause to be

paid. to the said Oliver W. Barnes, his rep-

resentatives and assigns, the sum of twen-

ty-seven thousand ﬁve hundred dollars in cur-

rency of the United States, being the amount

of certain advances made and services ren-

dered by the said Barnes to the said railway

company; and also that we will cause to be

delivered to the said Barnes or his assigns

at the time of the payment of the said mon-

ey two thousand shares of the capital stock

of the said railway company, which said

stock is to be full-paid stock. And we fur-

ther agree with the said Oliver W. Barnes,

his representatives and assigns, that, in the

event of the said amendments not becoming

a law at the present session of the legislature,

we will either cause said money to be paid,

and said two thousand shares of stock deliv-

ered to the said Barnes or his assigns. or

have reassigned to the said Barnes or his as-

signs the claims, demands, and rights so as-

signed to us, and transfer to him or his as-

signs the said sixty shares of stock so trans-

ferred to us the next day after the close

of the present session of the legislature of

New York. And we further agree that not

more than one hundred additional shares of

the stock of said company shall be issued
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fer of the 60 shares to Brown and Seligman,

they took the control of the organization of

the company. The amendments to the char-

ter then pending in the legislature did not

become a law, and consequently it was op-

tional with them to either retain their pur-

chase and pay, or surrender what they had

received, and put an end to the contract.

They, however. concluded to treat it as ef-

fectual, and assumed the undertaking to per-

form, and afterwards did pay to the plain-

tiff the $27,500, and did deliver to the plain-

tiff certiﬁcates of 2,000 shares of the capital

stock of the company. This was apparently

full performance. but in fact was not, be-

cause that so delivered was not paid stock;

and when this was discovered by the plaintiff

he offered to return the certiﬁcates, and de-

manded such as he was entitled to. Further
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performance was refused, and this action fol-

lowed. The only question as against the

defendant Brown was one of damages; and

the referee found that at the time when he

and Seligman undertook to deliver the stock

to plaintiff it had no actual or market value,

and determined that he was entitled to re-

cover nominal damages only. The stock cer-

tainly had no market value. None was in

the market. This ﬁnding and conclusion

were challenged by the plaintiff's exceptions.

By reference to the condition of the company,

it is seen that the total amount of money re-

ceived by it on account of subscriptions to its

stock was $5,700, and that was received in

1860 and 1871. , The other credits to the cap-

ital stock account were in demand loans and

special services rendered the company. The

various efforts prior to 1872 were unsucces-

fully made to raise money for the purpose of

construction of the railway, and the reason

why the bonds of the company could not be

negotiated was that it had been unable to

obtain subscriptions to its capital stock to

pay for right of way. The land and conse-

quential damages incident to the construction

of the railway were estimated at 5,000,000;

and the expenditures by the company for

work done towards construction and for land ,

and land damagm did not exceed $4,000.

The indebtedness of the company was about

$350,000. This was, in general terms, the

situation of the company when the contract

of March 26, 1872, was made; and it was

known as well to Brown and Seligman as

to the plaintiff. Whatever of value they took

by the contract was in the franchise of the

company, and was dependent upon the use

which could be made of it by way of the

construction and operation of an underground

railway. While the futility of the enter-

prise tended to show that it never had any

actual value, there evidently was hope and

expectation of success entertained by Brown

and Seligman when they elected to retain the

beneﬁt of the contract, and it is in that view

insisted by the plaintiff that the stock then

had a value which to him may at that time

have been available, although later it turn-
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vance in the market price of the stock from

the time of the sale up to a reasonable time

to replace it after the plaintiff received no-

tice of the sale would afford a complete

indemnity." The principle upon which the

determination of Baker v. Drake rested was

that the measure of the plaintiff' damages

was governed by the opportunity which was

afforded by the market for him within _a

reasonable time to replace the stock or the

refusal of the defendant to do so. 66 N. Y.

518; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368. And in

“'right v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 237. 18 N. E.

70, the same rule was held in like manner

applicable where stock fully paid for by the

owner is, through the honest mistake of the

pledgee. converted by him, and he refuses

to replace it. Therenpon the owner may do

so within a reasonable time, and the highest

market price within that time is the proper
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measure of damages. This is the recognized

rule in this state, and it is applicable alike

to actions upon contract as in tort.

In the present case there was no market

to resort to for the plaintiff to supply him-

self with the stock, nor any market value to

furnish the measure of damages. The rule

applied in the cases last cited was not, there-

fore, in that sense applicable to the situa-

tion in the case at bar. A subscription, how-

ever, to 2,000 shares of the capital stock of

the railway company, and payment of the

full amount to the company, would have

produced the stock, and it may be assumed

that it could not otherwise have been pro-

cured. It is upon that ground that the

plaintif f insists that the liability of the de-

fendant is measured by that amount. This

would have been so if the agreement of

Brown and Seligman had been to pay the

plaintiff $200,000 in the stock of the company.

Then their indebtedness or liability would

not have been controlled by the value of the

stock, but would have been ﬁxed by the con-

tract; but when the speciﬁc quantum of the

stock was made the consideration in that re-

spect for the plaintiffs sale to them, on

their failure to deliver it he was entitled in

daniages to the equivalent of that which they

had undertaken to render. In the absence

of special circumstances, in an action for

conversion of personal property, as well as

one for failure to deliver it in performance

of a contract, where consideration has been

received, the value of the property at the

time of such conversion or default, with in-

terest, is the measure of compensation.

Ormsby v. Mining Co., 56 N. Y. 623; Parsons

v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92. No special circum-

stances were alleged in the-complaint to take

this case out of the general rule. Nor was

there any ﬂuctuation in the value of the stock

succeeding the time for its delivery, under

' the contract to qualify the application of such

rule.

The damages which a party ordinarily may

recover for breach of contract are those which

naturally ﬂow from the default; and, if the

LAW DAM.2d Ed.—17

Tance 1n the market price of the stock from
the Ume of the Bllle up to a reasonable time
to replace It n!ter the plaintiff received notlce of the sale would afford a complete
Indemnity." The principle upon which the
deterruiuatlon of Baker v. Drake rested was
that the mensure or the plnintilf's damag-es
was governed by the opportunity which was
afforded by the market for him within a
1-easonablc time to replace the stock or tlie
refusal of the detendnnt to do so. liG N. Y.
518; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. a68. And In
"'right v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 237. 18 N . E.
79, the !'Hill<! rule was held In like manner
applicable where stock fully paid for by tbe
owner Is, through the honest mistake or the
pledgee, converted by him, and he refuses
to replace It. Thereupon the owner may do
so within a reasonable time, and the highest
market price within that Um<! Is the proper
measure or damage8. Th:s Is the recognized
rule In this state, and It ls nppllcable alike
to actions upon contract as In tort.
In the present case there was no market
to resort to for the plaintiff to supply himselt with the stock, nor any market value to
furnlsh the measure of damages. The rule
applied In the cases last cited was not, therefore, ln that sense applicable to the sltuatlon In the case at bar. A subscrlptlon, however, to 2.000 shnres of the capital stock of
the railw:iy company, and payment of the
full amount to the company, would have
prolluced the stock, nnd It may be assumed
that It could not otherwise have been procured. It Is upon thnt ground that the
plalntilf Insists that the liability of the defendant Is measured by that amount. This
would have been so It the agreement of
Brown and Seligman had been to pay the
plaintiff $200,000 In the stock or the compnny.
Then th<>ir Indebtedness or liability would
not have been controlled by the value or the
stock, but would have been fixed by the contract; but when the specific quantum or the
stock was made the consideration In that respect for the plaintiff's sale to them, on
their failure to deliver lt he was entitled In
dan\ages to the equivalent of thnt which they
had undertaken to render. In the absence
ot special circumstances, In an action for
conversion of personal property, as well as
one for failure to lleliver It In performance
of a contract, whNe consideration has been
recelvcd, the value of the property at the
tlme of such conversion or default, with Interest, is tl!o mt•asnre of compensation.
Ormshy v. :\lining Co., GG N. Y. G:.!3; Parsons
v. Sutton, GG N. Y. n~. No special clrcumstances were alleged In the·complaint to take
this cnse out of the general rule. Nor was
there any flurhmtlon In the value of the stock
succeeding the time for its delivery, under
the contract to qualify the application of such
rule.
The damages which a party ordinarily may
reco...-er for brPach of <'Ontroct nre those which
natumlly fiow from the default; and, if the
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contrnct Is mnde In reference to speclnl circumstances affecting the mensure ot compen·
satton, such clrcumstnnces may be treated a~
within the contemplation of the parties, and
constitute a basis for the assessment of damages. Booth v. Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 487. They
come within the meaning of spe<'ial damages,
and must be the subject of allegation In
pleading to entitle the pnrty to make proof
of them, unless objection in that i·espect be
waived. In the present caee, no fncts of
sp<!dal character relating to damnges were
alleged, nor were any <!Slahlished by the
evidence further than the mere fact thnt the
stock or the compan~ hnd no market value.
It, notwithstunding that fact, the stock may
have had an aetnal n1lue a different question
would have been presented; for the plalntilf
could not be subjeded to loss, nor could the
defendant be permitted to profit, by the fact
that the stock had no market value at the
stipulated time for dellYery. 'l'hcn other
means than those afforded by the market
would be resorted to unde1· the contract, as·
within the contemplation of the parties tonscertaln the amount requisite to run lndemnity to the plaintiff. Stcrntels T. Clark. 2
Hun, 122, 70 N. Y. 608. There may be cases
In which damages have no support In market
values, where the value ls peculiar to the
party entitled to performance, and relier wlll
be given accordingly. Scattergood v. Wood,
14 Hun, 269, 79 N. Y. 2Ga; Parsons T. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92. And when the remedy at
law for compensation ls Inadequate or Impracticable, It may be found In equity by
way of specific performance. Porn. Eq. Jur.
t 1401. Those are supposed cases to which
the principles of law adapt remedies when
they arise. But In the case at bar the stock
not only had no market value; It also bad no
actual vulue. Noc does It appear that lt
would have been or any value to the plalntlf!, or of any substantial benefit to him, for
any purpose, If he had received It. The defendant Brown, and his associate, Seligman,
did not, by the contract, undertake to do
anything to give any future value to the
stock of the company. Thus we have the
simple cnse or a contract to dell>er 11. ccrtlticate for a certain quantity of capital stock
then haying no existence, and when due nnd
thereafter having no value. The claim that,
because the creation or Issue of this worthless stock would cost Its par value, the pluintitr Is entitled to recover that sum, does not
seem to have the support of nny well·dcflnecl
principle of lnw. But It ls snid that, with
knowledge of the situation, Brown and his
associate absolutely agreed to deliver the
stock, and therefore they were bound to pay
the amount requisite to accompllsh it without regard to the value of the stock, or o!
Its beneficial use to the plnlntift'. In an actiou at law to recover damages for brealh
of contrnct, the question of damages Is one
of indemnity; and In thnt respect the remedy founded upon this contract does not dll'l'er

\..~
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from that upon any other contract for de-

fault in the delivery of property which a

party has unqualiﬂedly undertaken to deliv-

er for a consideration received. In Dana v.

Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40, the measure of dam-

ages for failure to deliver madder pursuant

to contract was founded upon the market

value at the time of the default. The ques-

tion there arose upon the exclusion of evi-

dence speculative in character, and which

for that reason was held inadmissible upon

the question of such value. Nor does Scat-

tergood v. Wood have any essential applica-

tion in principle to the case at bar. In that

case there was an element of exemplary dam-

ages against the defendhnt, who had willful-

ly deprived the plaintif f of the use of a test

machine designed by him for a special pur-

pose, in consequence of which he was put

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

to the expense of constructing another for

such purpose. Of this intended use the de-

fendant was advised when he appropriated

and withheld the machine from the plaintiff.

The recovery of the expense of constructing

the second one as damage for the detention

of the other was sustained, although, by rea-

son (as it turned out) of its insufﬁciency,

the value of the latter was much less than

such cost.

founded solely upon the failure to deliver to

the plaintiff the stock without any supported

claim of special circumstances for any dam-

ages other than such as ﬂow naturally and

reasonably from such default of Brown and

Seligman. While the performance of their

contract in that respect may have required

them to pay to the company $200,000, the en-

tire value of its performance to the plain-

tiff was in the stock which they undertook

to deliver to him, and this was the only ben-

eﬁt he was entitled to take under that pro-

vision of the contract. The value of the

stock or its pecuniary equivalent was the

measure of his injury by the default; and,

as it had no value, the plaintiff was award-

ed complete indemnity by the conclusion of

the referee that he was entitled to recover

nominal damages only.

'l‘here was no error in the ruling of the

referee by which evidence of value of the

stock was received. The complaint alleg-

ed that on January 22, 1873. when the plain-

tiff accepted the certiﬁcate before mentioned

of stock in performance of the contract, the

stock of the company was worth and salable

in the market at its full par or face value,

and demanded judgment for that amount and

interest from January 23, 1873. This was

the situation of the complaint when the evi-

dence upon the question of value was given;

In the present case the action is .

and the plaintiff, upon a state of facts em-

braced in an hypothetical question, called up-

on the witnesses to state the value of the

stock in January, 1873. This was the time

when, by the issue tendered in the complaint

and taken by the answer, the value of the

stock wa by the pleadings brought in ques-
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BEEMAN v. BANTA.

(23 N. E. 887, 118 N. Y. 538.)

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi-

sion. Feb. 25, 1800.

Appeal from supreme court, general

term, fourth department.

Action by Marcus M. Beeman against

George A. Bantu. There was a verdict and

judgment for plaintiff, which was afﬁrmed

by the general term, and defendant again

appeals.

Rhodes, Coons & Higgins and John H.

Baldwin & Ken-

Parsons, for appellant.

nedy, for respondent.

PARKER,J. The recovery in fhisaction

was for damages claimed to have been sus-

tained because of a breach of an express

warranty on the part of the defendant to
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so construct a freezer for the plaintiff as

that chickens could be kept therein in per-

fect condition. The jury have found the

making ofthe warranty,its brcach.and the

amount of damages resulting therefrom.

The general term have afﬁrmed these ﬁnd-

ings, and. as there is some evidence to sup-

port each proposition, we have butto con-

sider the exceptions taken.

excepted to the charge of thecou rt respect-

ing the measure of damages. Upon the

trial he insisted, and still urges, that the

proper measure of damages is the cost of

so changing the freezer as to obviate the

defect, and make it conform to the war-

ranty. And Milk Pan Co. v. Remington,

109 N. Y. 143, 16 N. E. Rep. 48. is cited in

support of such contention. That decision

was not intended to, nor does it, modify

the rule as recognized and enforced in Pas-

singer v. Thorburn, 34 N. Y. 634; White v.

Miller,71 N. YJ33; Wakcman v. Manufact-

uring Co., 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. Rep. 264;

Reed v. McConnell,101 N.Y. 276,4 N. E.Rep.

718; and kindred cases. In that case the

argument of the court demonstrates-

Firsf, that improper evidence was received ;

and, second, that the ﬁnding of the referee

was without evidence to support it. No

other proposition was decided, and the

BEEYAN v. BANTA.
(23 !ii. E. 887, 118 N. Y. 538.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Dlvl·
11ion. Feb. ~. 1890.

Appeal from supreme court, general
term, fourth department.
Action by Marcus M. Beeman against
George A. Banta. 'l'ht-re was a verdict and
Judgment for plaintiff, which was affirmed
by the general term, and defenda.nt again
llppeuls.
Rhodf'I!, Coons & HIA"glnM and John H.
Parsons, for a11pl'llunt. Baldwin & Kennedy, for re11ponuen t.
PARKER,J. The rl'Coveryln th!Ractlon

was fordamagesclalme<l to have been sus-

tained because of a breach of an exprl'l!s
warranty on the part of t.he defl•ndnnt to
so construct a freezer for the plaintiff as
that chickens could be kept therein in perfect condition. The jury have fo1141<1 the
making of the wnrranty. its brend1. anrl tho
.amount of clumngee resulting there!l'Om .
The general term have affirmerl tlwse tlndinge, and.as there Is some eyiuenceto support each proposition, we have hut to consider the exceptions takE>n. The appellant
excepted to the charge of tbecourt l'(·tipecting the measure or datnnll;es. Upon the
tl'ial he Insisted, and still urges, that the
proper mPasure or damage!! li,i the cost of
so changing the freezer BS to ob date the
defect, and make it conform to the warranty. And Milk Pan Co. v. Remington,
109 N. Y. U3, 16 N. E. Rep. 48, Is cited in
support of such contention. That decif1lon
was not Intended to, nor does it, modify
theruleas recognlzE>d anrl enforced In Paitsinger v. Thorburn, 34 N. Y. 6'.14; White v.
Mlller,71 N. Y.133; Wakeman v.l\Ianufn.ctlJrlng Co., 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. Rep. 2G4;
Reed v. McConnell, 101 N. Y. 276,4 N. E.Uep.
718; and kindred cases. In that case the
argumE>nt of the court demom1tratesl''irst, that lmproperevldencew8.H recel ved;
and, second, that the finding of the i·eferee
was without evidence to support it. No
-0ther proposition was decided, and the
discussion Is not applicable to the facts hefore us. The plaintiff was largely engaged
In preparing poultry for market. which he
bad either raised or purchased. Before
meeting the defendant. he had attempted
to keep chickens for the early spring market fn a freezeror cooler which he had constructed fortbepurpose. Tbeattemptwae
unsucceSBful, and resulted In a loss. The
Jury have found, In effect, that the defend!l.nt, with knowledge of this Intention of
the plaintiff to at once make use of It in
the freezln~ and prest>rYation of chickens
.for the May market following, expre88ly

reprE>sc-nted nnd warranted that for about
$r.OO he woulcl constn1ct a freE>zer which
should ke<'p thE>m. In perfect condition for
such market; that he fulled to keep hie
cuntrnct In such respect, resulting In a loss
to the plaintlH of muny hundred puumls of
chickens. Tbecourtcharged the jury that,
1f they should find for the plain tiff, he was
entitled to recover us one of the elemE>nts
of damage the rlifference between the value
of the refrlgerntor as constructed, and its
l"'aluens it would have been if madeaccordlng to contract. The correctness of thlea
ln11truction due11 not aclmltof questioning.
Had the defendant made no \lie of the
freezer, such rule woulcl have embrncerl all
the dnmag<'srecoverable. Buthl'diclmuke
URe of it, und such u11e as was cont<'lnplatecl by the contrnct of the parties. '.fht>
reRult was the total loRs of hnn<lreds or
pounclR of chickens. The fact that the defendant well knew the mm to which the
freezer was to be Immediately put, and bis
represen tat.ton and warranty that It would
keep chickens in perfect condition, burden
him with tht> damage HURtalnf\C:l because of
his failure to make good the warranty.
Upon that 111wstion the court lnRtructed
the jury that the plalntiH waR entitled to
recover the volue of the chickens, leHB cost
of getting them to market, lncludlugfl'elJ1;ht
ancl fE>eH of commisslou merchant. 'fbe
qucl!tion of value was left to the jury, but
they were permitted to conslllcr the evidence tending to show that frozen chickens
were worth 40 centsa pound in the market
during the month of May. Such instruction we consider authorized. 'fhe object
or the freezer was to preserve chickens for
the May market. The expense of construction and trouble. as well as expense of <>Peru tlon, was Incurred and undertaken in
order to secure the enhanced prices of the
month of May. It was the extra. profit
which the plaintiff was contracting to secure, and, In so far as the profits contemplatecl by the parties can be proven, they
may be conHidered. G_piJl!l._j}rernnted,
well nR lol!Hl'S sustained, a:re proper elerifonts of damnge. Wakeman\•. Manufacturiig Co., 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. Rep. 264. We
have carefully examined the other exceptlomi to the charge as made, and to the
refusals to charge as requested, and also
the exl'eptions taken to the admissibility
of testimony, hut find no error justifying
a rewrsal. The insistence of the appellant thnt the judgment be reve~ed, because against the weight of evidence, may
ha'Ve b~n entitled to some consirleration
by the general term, but It cannot be regarded her('. 'l'he ludgment Rhoulrl hP afftrme11. All concur, except FOLLETT, l1.
J., and VANN. J., not slttlnlf.
Judgment affirmed.

ati(

discussion is not applicable to the facts be-

)

fore us. The plaintiff was largely engaged

in preparing poultry for market. which he

had either raised or purchased. Before

meeting the defendant. he had attempted

to keep chickens for the early spring mar-

ket in a freezer or cooler which he had con-

structed for the purpose. The attempt was

unsuccessful, and resulted in a loss. The

jury have found. in effect, that the defend-

ant. with knowledge of this intention of

the plaintiff to at once make use of it in

the freezing and preservation of chickens

for the May market following, expressly

The appellant

represented and warranted that for about

$500 he would construct a freezer which

should keep them. in perfect condition for

such market: that he failed to keep his
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PERSONAL PROPERTY.

(25 Pac. 886, 887, 45 Kan. 834.)
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Supreme Court of Kansas. Feb. 7, 189L

SHATV et al. v. SMITH et al.

SHAW v. JONES.

(25 Pac. 886, 887, 45 Kan. 334.)

Supreme Court of Kansas. Feb. 7, 1891.

Error from district court, Cowley coun-

ty; M. G. TuoUP, Judge.

Samuel Dalton and Samuel J. Day. for

plaintiffs in error. S. E. Fink, for defend-

ants in error.

VALEN'l‘INE. J. This was an action

brought before a justice of the peace of

Cowley county on January 31, 1887, by G.

B. Shaw & Co. against Yates Smith and

James W. McClellen, for the recovery of

$12. and interest, upon the following in-

strument in writing, to-wit: “Cambridge,

April 30. 1886. On or before the ﬁrst day
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of October, 1886, we promise to pay to the

order of G. B. Shaw & Co., at their oﬁice

in Cambridge. twelve dollars. for value re-

ceived. with interest after maturity,at the

rate of ten per cent. per annum until paid.

This note is given in part consideration of

the sale to Y. Smith of eight bushels ﬂax-

seed, by said G. B. Shaw & Co.; and, as a

further consideration therefor, we agree to

plant 14 acres with said seed. to cultivate,

harvest. and clean the same in proper and

careful manner. and deliver to G. B. Shaw

& Co. at Cambridge, Kansas. on or before

the 1st day of December. 1886. the whole

crop raised therefrom. at a price men-

tioned below, per bushel of 56 lbs.. for

pure and primeﬁaxseed; ﬂaxseed notpure

and prime to beinspected and graded sub-

ject to the rules of the St. Louis Merchants'

Exchange. And should we sell or trade,

or attempt to offer to sell or trade. such

crop to any other person or persons than

said G. B. Shaw & Co., or order. then the

note hereto attached shall immediately

become due and payable; and the said G.

B. Shaw & Co., or their assigns, are here-

by authorized to enter any buildi,g or

premises without any legal process what-

ever, aud seize and remove such crop

whatsoever (and in whosesoever posses-

sion the same may be found), and to pay

me the balance on demand, after the

amount due upon said note has been de-

ducted, together with all costs and ex-

pense incurred. where seizure is necessary;

price tobe paid perbushel,on basis of pure,

to be 35 cents less than St. Louis market

price on day of delivery. Yarns Smrru.

JAMl-ZR W. .\l(tCl.ELL|-..\'." Afterwards the

case was taken on appeal to the district

court. where the case was tried before the

court and a jury. with the result hereafter

stated. The plaiutiﬁ's‘ bill of particulars

simply set up the foregoing instrument.

and asked judgment thereon for $12. and

interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per an-

nnm from October 1, 18:.‘6. The deiend-

ants' amended answer thereto and cross-

petition alleged that the ﬁaxsced for which

Error from district court, Cowley coun·
ty; M. G. TuouP, Judge.
S11m11PI Dnlton anl1 Samuel J. Day, for
plain tiff" In error. S. E. Fink, for defendant11 In error.
V ALEN'l'IN·E, ,J.

This wne an action
hl'fore a JuHtice ol the p<.>ace of
Cowley county on Jnnuary ill, 1&.7, by G.
B. Shu w & Co. ugaini;t Yates Hmitb and
Jamee W. McClellen, for the recornry ol
$1:.1. and interest, upon the folio wing instrument In wrltln~, to-wit: "Cambridge,
April 80, 1HS6. On or before the first day
of Octoher, ltl86, we promise to pay to the
order or G. B. Shaw & Co., at their office
In Cambridge, tweh·e dollars, for value received, with intere11t after maturlty,at the
rate of ten per cent. per annum until pa.Id.
'£his note Is given In purt consideration of
the sale to Y. Smith of el1Ch t bushels flaxseed, by said G. B. ~haw & Co.; and, a11 a
furthei· conslderit tlon therefor, we n~ree to
plant 14 ac1·es .vlth sal<l seed. to cultivate,
harveP.t, and clean the ~ame In proper and
careful rmmner, and deliver to G. B. Shuw
& Co. at Cambridge, Kan1:1a1:1, on or b•~lore
the let day of Dt>cember, 181'!6, the whole
l'rop raised therefrom. at n price mentione<l below. per bui;hel or 56 lbs., for
pure n nrl prime tlaxsee1J; flau1t>cd not pure
and prime to be Inspected and graded subject to the rules of the St. Louis Merchants'
Exchange. And 11h1Juld we· Hell or tru<le,
or attempt to offer to sell or trade, Huch
crop to any other person or pl'rsons than
Btlid G. B. 811BW & Co., or order, then the
note hereto attached 11hell hnmedlately
become due nnd payul>le; and the sulcl U.
B. 8haw & Co., or their assigns, are hereby authorl:ic1l to enter any bulldlug or
premises without an·y legal procpss w·hatever, und seize and reruoYe fHJch crop
whatRoe\·er (nnd in whosesoe,·er po11sesF>ion the snme may be found), and to pay
me the bulum·e on clemunll, afte1· the
nmount due upon said note has been deducted, tog:l'ther with all costs and PXJlense incu rre<l, wht.-re seizure Is nece1o1sary;
priee to be paid pe1· bushel, on basis of pure,
to he 3:J cents le1-1s than St. LoulH market
price on day of deli~·ery. YATF:H SMITH.
J Allll·:R \V . ~1c:Cu:1.L~.N." Afterwards the
CllMC wns tnken on appeal to the district
court, where the l"a1<e waH trit>!l before the
court und a jury. with the result hereafter
titated. 'I'he phlintlffH' bill of particulars
simply set up the foregoing instrument,
111111 ttske(J Judgment thereon for fl2, an<I
interest ut the rute of JO per cent. per 1\11·
mun from October 1, 18tlli. 'l'he defenduntH' lllll<'IHlPtl m1swer thereto and <"rose·
Jll•tition ullegPd th11 t the t:lnxseed for which
the instruml•ut 1mell on wns gi\'f'n was
purchused by Smith, for the 11u1·rose of
sowing it and raising a crop; that It was
wurrunh•..:J by the plaintiffH to be good,
hut that It wnR worthl<.>ss: tba t he
(Smith) so\HIJ It, hut thnt It did not ger111i11utl'; and thu the lust hi11 time, Juuur,
brou~ht

I

end use of his ground; and that he was·
<tamnJi:ed thereby In the 1mm of $150. And
he asked judgment fur that amount, and
costs of suit. The trial resulted In a verdict In favor of the defendants and egainet
the plaintiffs for the sum of $90, end Judgment was rendered accordingly: and th&
plaintiffs. as plaintiffs In error, bring th&
case to this court for review.
It n11pear11 from the evhlence that thefects of the case are substantially as follows: The plaintiffs, G. B. -Sh11w & Co .•
were dealers in fl11x11ee<l at Cambridge, In
said Cowley county. l::\mith went to their
place of bu11lness nbout April 20, 1886, aml
found Joseph :Fraley, their agent. In
charge. Shaw & C'o. did not ha rn uuy flaxseed on hand, but thP.y were about to order some. Smith told Fruley to order
eight bm1bels for him, for the purpose of
sowing It aud raising a crop. Fraley told
:-:lmltil that they would furnish the flaxseed upon the conditions substantially as.
set forth In the foregoing Instrument.
Afterwords t11e flaxseed arrived, an<l I<'rale_y gave notice to Smith. 8mltb then. on
April 30, 1886, went to Cambridge and recei\•ecl theeeP<l,abo11t8 buRhels in amount,
inclm1ed in sul·ks, rrom Fraley, and took
it home an<l sowed It upon ahout 12 acres
of ground . 'J'be seed appeared to be good,
and Fraley nnd :Smith believed it to be
good, but In fact It was not good, and It
did not germinate; and Smith lost all his
time and labor in prot"uring It, and in preparing the ground for sowing It, nnd In
flowing it, and he got no crop, nnd lost
the use of his ground. And upon these·
facts the jury found In fu.vor of the defendants and against tne plaintiffs, and as.
Keseed the <lefendants' dumal(es at $90, as.
:iforesuill. The only questions now invol'l"eil--in the case are as follows: (1)
llnder the con tract hetwl>en the purtll's.
and under the circumRtanccs of the case, .-' 1
was there any such hnplled wurrunty on
the part of Shaw &c., .. respecting the1mffidency of the Oaxseed for the purposes of
tiowlug It and raising u crop, that the
plaintiffs muy be defeated In their action
•Ill the aforet!11id written lnfltrument? (2}
Ir eo, then under such contract anJ warranty and circumt!tanceK, may the clefendants, Rmlth and McClellen, or rather
Smith, recoverdamageH for Smith's 1011ses,
necessarily ocl·nslonPd by n-nson of the
worthlessnel'S of the tiaxAeed? (3) Aud,
If tiO, then what le the measure of Smith'11
damages'? The maxim of the rommon
luw, ('J1Ve11t em{Jtor, is the general rule ap·
plicable to purchaeeri; and sales of personal property so fur as the quality or the
property is coucunecl: and, undPr BUl'h
maxim, the buyer, in the absence of fraud,
purchaeilS at bis own risk:, unles11 the Reller-...
gives him en express warranty, or unless,
from the l'11·cum11t11nccs of the sale, 11 warranty may be implic1l . Jn the pr<.>f;ent 1•aHe
no exprei;t! warranty wa!'I gh'ell, and the
question then arb;cs, w~ tlU'D! HllX tm..
plied warmnty 'l At the time wntrl th<:
contruct for the purchnsa a.ud 1mle of the
flax8eed was entered in to, such isef'!J WEIR
not present HO thnt It coulcl be ln,.pl'Cted
by the pnrdrnser, and, when It arrived
and was <lell\'Pred to him, thf'I clefloct In
thf" seed WRB not apparent, and wmqirob·
ably not discoverable by any u1·lh11~r.r·

BUEACH OF WARRANTY OF QUALITY.
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means of inspection, and it was not dis-

covered until after it was sOwed.and when

it iailed to germinate. When the original

contract for the purchase and sale of the

ﬂaxseed was made, the ﬂaxseed was pur-

chased and sold for the particular pur-

pose, known to both the buyer and the

seller, of sowing it in a ﬂeld, and of rais-

ing a crop from it; and therefore this pur-

pose was a part of the contract, and de-

- manded that the seed should be suﬂicient

for such purpose. It, in effect, constitut-

ed awarranty on the part of the seller

that the seed should be the kind of seed

had in contemplation by -both the parties

when the contract was made. The pur-

chaser had to rely upon the seiler's inr-

nishing to him the kind ol seed agreed up-

on, and the seller.in efiect.asreed that the
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seed furnished should be the kind of seed

agreed upon. The entire contract when

made was exeeu tory. and it was to be ex-

ecuted and performed aiterwards, and to

be performed in parts and at different

times. The seller was ﬁrst to furnish the

seed, and he did so in about 10 days after

the contract was made, and of course the

seed was to be a kind of seed that would

grow. The purchaser was afterwards to

sow it and to raise a crop,and afterwards

the purchaser was to sellI and the seller

was to buy. the crop. upon certain terms

and conditions expressed in the contract.

We think there was an implied warranty

on the part of the seller that the seed

A1

should be suﬂicient for the purpose for

which it was bought and sold. Wolcott

v. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262, 38 N. J. Law,

496; Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. Y.61; White

v. Miller, 7 Hun. 427, 71 N. Y. 118: Whit-

aker v. McCormick, 6 Mo. App. 114. We

also think that the purchaser may re-

cover damages from the seller for all the

losses necessarily sustained by the pur-

chaser, by reason of the worthlessuess of

the ﬂaxseed inrnished by the seller. See

the authorities above cited. and also the

following: Passinger v. Thorburn, 34 N.

Y. 634; Flick v. Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 3913;

Ferris v. Comstock, 33 Conn. 513; Randall

v. Raper, El., Bl. & El. 84. And it is not

claimed that the purchaser in the pres-

ent case recovered for more than the fore-

going losses. The claim is that the pur-

chaser had no rlght to recover at all, and

that the seller had the right to recover on

the instrument sued on. No other ques-

tions are presented. We think no materi-

al error was committed in the case, and.

the judgment ol' the court below will be

aiiirmed. All the justices concurring.

PER CURIAM. It is understood that

the same questions of law and fact are in-

volved in the case of G. B. Shaw & Co. v.

T. L. Jones, irom Cowley district court,

that are involved in the case of Shaw v.

Smith, just decided, and the judgment of

means of Inspection, and It was not dleeoven>d until after It was sowed. and when
tt failed to germinate. When the orl~inal
eontract for the purchuse and sale of the
flaxseed was made, the fiax11eert was pur-chased and sold for the partkular purpose, known to both the buyer and the
~l'ller, of sowing It In a tleld, nnd of r1tlsing a crop from it; and therefore this p11rpo11e was a part of the cont.rnct, and de. mantled that. the see•l Rhould be sufficient
for Huch purpose. It, In effl'ct, constitut\ 9<1 a Wltl"ranty on the part of the seller
that the seed should be the kind or set>cl
had In contemplation by both tile parties
when the contract was made. The pill"·
-c!haser had to rely upon the aeller'e furnishing to him the kind of ered agreed upon, and the seller, in ettect, air reed that the
.seed furnh;ihed 11hould be the kiud or seed
agr._>ect upon. 'fhe entire contract when
made wus exccutory. aud It was to hf' ex«uted and performed afterwards, aud to
be performed in 1>arts and at different
tlm~s. The seller waH flrst to furnish the
seed, and he did so In about lO days ufter
the contract was made, nod of courHe the
seed was to be a kind or seed that would
grow. 'The purchaser was afterwords to
sow It and to raise u crop, and afterwnrds
the purt'hascr w1111 to sen, and the ee11er
was to bny, tlle crop, upon certain terms
.and conditions expl"t.'tlsed In thll contract.
We think there wa.s an implied warranty
<>u the part of the seller that the seed
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should be sufficlPnt for the purpose for
which It was bon~ht anci sold. Wolcott
\'.Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262, 38 N. J. Law,
491i; Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. 'i.61; White
v. Miller, 7 Hun, 427, 71 N. Y. 118: Whltake1· v. McCormick, 6 !\Jo. App. 114. We
also think that the purchaser may recover damages from the seller for all the
losses necessurlly sustained hy the purchaser, by reason of the worthlcs1mess or
the flaxAeerl furnished by the epllcr. Hee
thf'! authorities above cited, and also the
following: Pns1d11p;er v. 'rhorburn, 34 N.
Y. 6:J4; .Flick v. Wet11erL>ee, ~o Wis. 392;
Ferrie v. Comstock, 33 Conn. iila; Hnndull
v. Rn per, EI., Bl. & El. 84. Aud it is not
claimed that the purchaser In the present case recovered for more than the foregoing lusses. 'l'be clulm Is that the purchaser had no right to recover at all, and
thnt the seller bud the right to recover on
the Instrument sued on. No other questions are J>l'Priented. \Ve think no material error wns committed In the case, and.
the judgment of the court below will be
affirmed. All the justices concurring.
PER CURIAM. It fs understood that
the .. nme q neHtl<>nl! of law And fact are Invol \"ed In the 1·111<e of G. D. Shaw & Co. v.
T. L. Jones, from CowlPy district court,
that are Involved In thecnse of ~hew v .
Smith, Ju11t decided, and the Jud11:ment of
the court below In thbt C88e will be affirmed upon the authority of that case.
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BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING PERSONAL PROPERTY.

-and the actual

SHAWHAN v. VAN NEST.

(25 onto St. 400.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. December Term. 1874.

Motion for leave to ﬁle a petition in

error.

Action by Peter Van Nestagainst Reasin

W. Nhawhan to recover on a contract by

which he agreed to make for Shawhan a

carriage in accordance with his directions

for $700, and have the same ready for da-

livery at his shop October 1, lsfi. in con-

sideration whereof Shawhan agreed to ac-

cept the carriage at the shop and pay the

agreed price. He alleged the tender of the

carria;i;e October 1st, and the refusal of

Shawhau to accept or pay for it. The ev-

idence established the allcgations of the-

complaint. The court instructed the jury
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that. if they found the issues for the

plaintiff, they should give him a verdict

for the contract price of the carriage, with

interest from the time the money should

have been paid. Shawhan requested the

court to give to the jury the following

special instructions: (1) “If, in this case,

the evidence shows that the defendant or-

dered the plaintiff to make for him a car-

riage, and agreed to take or receive it,

when ﬁnished. at the plaintiff's shop, and

to pay a reasonable price therefor, and

the plaintiff did, in pursuance of such or-

der and agreement, make such carriage, of

the value of seven hundred dollars, and

have the same in readiness for delivery at

his shop. of which the defendant had no-

tice, and the defendant then failed. neg-

lected, and refused to take. receive, or pay

for said ca rriage. though requested so to

do by the plaintiff, these will not author-

ize you to render a verdict for the plain-

tiff for the price or value of the carriage. "

(2) “if the plaintiff has proved the mak-

ing of the carriage for the defendant, and

the refusal of the latter to receive and pay

for it, as alleged in the petition, then he

can only recover for the damages or

losses he has actually sustained by reason

of this refusal of the defendant, which is

the difference between the agreed price

value.“ These instruc-

tions the court refused to give. and Shaw-

hnn excepted. ‘l‘he jury found for Van

Nest, and gave him the contract price of

the carriage, with interest.

W. P. Noble, for plaintiff in error.

Seney. for defendant in error.

G. E.

GILMORE, J. The only question to be

determined in this case is: Did the court

err in refusing to give to the jury the spe-

cial instructions reqnested by the defend-

ant on the trial below? The authorities

cited by counsel for the parties respective-

ly. are not in harmony with each other on

this question. Some of those cited by the

plaintiff in error (defendant below) show

clearly that under the pleadings and prac-

BnEACII OF AGREE:MENT TO TAKE OR BUY GOODS.
BREACH OF AGREEMENT TO TAKE OR BUY GOODS.
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carriage was substantially a fulﬁllment of

the contract on the part of the plaintiff,

and that he was entitled to sustain his

action for the price agreed upon between

the parties. The defendant's counsel re-

quested the court to charge the jury that

the measure of damages was not the

sulky, but only the expense of taking it to

the residence of the defendant, delay, loss

of sale, etc. The judge declined to so

charge,and reiterated the instruction that

the value of the article was the measure of

damages. The jury found for the plain-

tiff, with eighty-three dollars and twenty-

six cents damages, being the contract

price with interest. The charge to the

jury was sustained by the supreme court

of New York.

In Balientine et al. v. Robinson et al.,
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46 Penn. St. 177, an agreement was made

between the plaintiffs and defendants,

whereby the plaintiffs were to provide

materials, and construct for the defend-

ants a six-inch steam-engine, with boiler

and Gifford injector and heater. in consid-

eration whereof the defendants were to

pay plaintiffs ﬁve hundred and thirty-ﬁve

dollars in cash on the completion thereof.

'The plaintiffs complied with and complet-

ed the contract in all respects on their

part, but the defendants refused to pay

according to contract. On the trial, the

plaintiffs proved the contract,and the per-

formance of it on their part, and that the

engine was still in their hands.

The defendants' counsel asked the court

to instructthe jury "that the proper meas-

ure of damages in this case is thedifference

between the price contracted to be paid

for the engine and the market price at the

time the contract was broken." 'll‘he

court declined to charge as requested, and

instructed the jury that the measure of

damages was the contract price of the

engine, with interest. There was a ver-

diet ‘for the plaintiffs for the contract

price. The case was taken to the supreme

court, and the error assigned was the re-

fusal of the court to give the instructions

requested by the defendant.

The supreme court afﬁrmed the judg-

ment in the case below. it will be seen

that these cases are very similar, and pre-

sented the same question, and in the same

manner that the question is presented in

this case. Graham v. Jackson, 14 East,

498, decides the point in the same way.

Mr. Sedgwick,in his work on Damages.

side page 280, in speaking on this subject,

says: "Where a vendee is sued for non-

performance of the contract on his part,

in not paying the contract price. if the

goods have been‘delivered. the measure of

damages is of course the price named in

the agreement; but if their possession has

not been changed,it has been doubted

whether the rule of damages is the price

itself, or only the difference between the

263'

carrini:e was subatanttall.f a fulfillment of to 11how that th!" propC'1·ty v.-es solu for n
the contract on the pnrt of tht> plulntif!, fair priCl•. But If che v1•n<lor doei; not purancJ the t he w1111 entitled to sustain big sne thir; course, nnd, without reselling the
nctlon for thP- price ugreed upon lletween goods, i;upi; the veuilee for hb1 ht·eut•h of
the parties. 'l'he defentlant's counsr:l re- contruct, the question arh;es which \V<l
que!lted th? court to charge the jury that have nlready stuteu, whether the n•1ul11r
the measure or dunu1gc;,i was not the cun recover the contract price, 1n· only
sulky, but only the expense of taking It to the difference betw1~en that priee and the
the residence or the defendnut, deluy, loss value of the- goodf'l whkh remalu In the
of selP, etc. The Judi:P declined to so vendor's hnnrls; and the rule appPnrR to
charge, nurl reltera tc1l thr Instruction rho t he thut the vendor c1111 reciwer the cont he value or the urtklewns the mNurnr~ of tract price In full."
damuge11. 'l'htl jur.v to1111cl ror the plnlnJn lh11lly v. Pugh et ul., Wright, 554, the
tin, with ei,irhty-threc uollarR Rod twenty- 8('tfon wtis" al'lsumpsit 011 n wri tte1111gr~11ix centH 1hH11ag..11, being the contract ment between the parth•H, for the defendprice with intert-... t. The charge to the antR to tnke all the Halt the plaintiff manjury WllR sm1talned by the suprl.'mc court nfacturecl \Jetwet•11 the 2d of .JunP, lSlll,
of New York.
and the 1st of Jnnuar:v, 1832, to be dellvIn Ballentine et al. v. Robinson et al., cred at the lnntJlng 111 Cincinnati, from
46 Penn. St. 177, an a,i;?reement waR made time to time, ar; the navil(ution of the
betwt'l•n the pl11!11tiffs oud defendants, Muskiup;um nnll Ohio should 11ermlt, end
whereby the plnlntlffs were to provide to pay fort,y-ttve ci:nts a bni;;hel." The
ma terlalH, and constrnct for the dden1f. plain tiff pro\'cd the agretimeu t, ond the
ants n six-inch ste1t1n-e11µ;lne, with boiler , offt•r to deliver to the dl'fendants three
ttnd Gifford injector and heater. in consid - . hun1lred anti fifty b>1nels of salt, which
eratlun whereof the 1lefendnnts were to the clefen•lontR refu11ccl to receivr.. There
pay plalntiff11 fi\•e huuclrt>cl and thirty-five wns an Issue in thec'f.11r,as to whether the
dollars In CRi<h on the completion thereof. , contrttct hud been prevlou11Iy fulfilled an<l
·The plaintiffs complle1I with and compll't- abandoned by the parties. Tao court
ed the contract In all respPcts on their (Lttne, J.) charged the Jury that If the
part, lrnt the delenclants refused to poy contract hacl not been .. fulHllerl or abunacl'otding to contract. On the trlal, the doned, and the plaintiff tendered the salt
plalutlfrs proved the contrnct, and the per- undl't' the contract, wblclt wttR refused, he
forruance of it on their part, encl that the hud a right to leave it for thl' defendants
engine was still In their ha111ts.
and recover the value. "
1·he dr.ren1lants' counsel a11kell the court
'!'he only r11ile I have ~xamined ln which
to Instruct the Jury .. the t the propt-r mPas- the outlwrltles on this point ure r<>vicwed,
ure of damageH In this cnsA is the<liffer"nce is that of Gordon v. ~orrh1, 4!) N. H . 37li.
betwoer. the price contracted to be l'Rld The case Is too len~tby and compllrnted
for the engine and thl' mnrket price at the to attAmpt to give un nhAtrat·t of It here,
time the con.truct was broken." 'l'he but the point under consideration was incourt declined to charge as re11ueste1l , nnil vulvccl; and although the learner! judge
instructed the Jury that the meusure of critklsc11 the law as laid down h,\· Mr.
d11mages wo11 the contract price of thu ' Hedgwlck, und even show.- that the auen~lne, with lntl'reMt. 'fhere wo11 a ver- thorities ho quote11 in 11up1mrt of his posl·
diet "'for !he plulnt.lffH for the contract tlun do not sustain him, for the rea11on
price. Tilt> cnse waA tnken to the supreme pointed out, yet hP BHYH that there le a
court, anti the error a11signed was the re- distinction between the case of Bement
fusul of the court to give the l11structlo1111 v. Smith, und the ordinary caseA of goods
reqne<Jted hy the tlt-fP.ndant.
sold 11nd delivered-viz., "the distinction
The 11upreme court affirmed th~ judg- bet ween e contract to Bl'll goods then in
ment lo the case below. It will be set•n t•xistence, and no agreement to furnish
that these cases a1·e very similar, and pre- materials ond munufftcture an artide In a
seated the 1rnme questiun, unrl In the 1mme partil'ular way und according to order,
1111rnner that thP question is presented In which is not yet In existence." He recogthl11 case. Graham v. Jackl'lon, 14 East, nizes llement'srase 01111 others of thesanie
498, ilP.<'lrles the point In the H11mn way . clas11 a11 exceptions to the general rule
Mr. Hedicwlck, in his work on DamRl(l's. which Is to he 11pplied In the sale of ordistde pal(e 280, In spPRklng on this RubjP.ct. nury goodR and merchandise which have
says: .. Where a venclee Is 1111NI for non- a Hxed market value; nnd In the syllabm1
performance of the contract •Ill hltt part, of the ca11e, the diHtlnctlon Is kept up and
In not paying thP. rontrnct pricP, if the stute(f as follows:
~oods hnve been' dt•livered, the mensnre of
"Wheu the vendee refuRcR to receive and
damages ls of cour11e th1• price named In pny for orclinnry goods, warPA, 01111 merthe agreement; but If their por11wssio11 hus chundlse, which he hnH contrnc te1I to purnot been chanµ:ed, It has he<·n doohted chnHe. the me>iHure of cl1111111µ;r R whkh the
whether the rull• of 1lanrn11;l'R Is the price vendor 111 entitle<) to r1•con•r h1 not orclllt11elf, or only the difference between the nurily tho c1111trnd 11rkc for the µ;ouclt<.
contract price and the value of thf' tirtlcle but the difference hetwecn th e cuutruct
at the time fixed for Its rlellvery. It 11eeml:l price and the ma1·ket pril·e or vulue of the
to be well settle1I In such case11 that the 11ame goods at the time when the contract
VPnrlor can resell them. if he sees tit, ancl was broken.
charge the venilee with the clifferenee be"But when an artiRt prepares a Htatue
tween tlw contrnct pril'e aull thut realized or picture of a partlculor person to order,
nt the sole. 'fhon~h perh>tr>s more pru~ or a mechanic makefl n speclHc article In
dent It 111 not rwceHl'lnry that the <1ale his line to ortler, and after a 11ttrtlculur
should be at a111'tion; it Is ouly requil!ite measure, pattern, or style, or for a partlc'i
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ular use or purpose—when he has fully

performed his part of the contract, and

tendered or offered 0 deliver the article

thus manufactured according to contract,

and the vendee refuses to receive and pay

for the same, he may recover as dama;xes.

in an action against the vendee for breach

of the contract, the full contract price of

the manufactured article. "

As has been said, we are not called upon

now to determine whether the distinction

as drawn in the clauses quoted, is sound

on principleor not: but bethat as it may,

we recognize the law applicable to the

case before us as being correctly stated in

the clause last quoted.

Judge Swan, in his excellent “Trea tise,“

(10th ed. 780), in speaking of the effects of

a tender upon the ri;.:hts of the buyer and

seller, and of the damages in such case.
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says . “The general rule in relation to the

rights of a seller, under a contract of sale,

where he has tendered the property, and

the buyer refuses to receive it, is this: The

seller may leave the property at some se-

cure place, at or near the place where the

tender ought to be and is made. and re-

cover the contract price: or he may keep

it at the buyer's risk, using reasonable dil-

fgence to preserve it. and recover the con-

tract price and expenses of preserving and

keeping it; or he may sell it, and recover

from the buyer the difference between the

contract price and the price at which it

fairly sold." The rule as thus laid down

was ﬁrst published in N36. two years after

the decision in Hadly's Case, above re-

ferred to, which was substantially fol-

lowed by Judge Swan in laying it down.

It does not appear that either the decision

or the rule as laid down has ever been

questioned in Ohio. It will be perceived

that Judge Swan lays down the rule gen-

erally as applicable to all sales of chattels

in the ordinary course of trade, without

intimating any such distinction as that

drawn in Gordon \'. Norris. We sanction

and apply the rule in the determination of

the partfcularrasc before us. When the

plaintiff below had completed and ten-

dered the carriage in strict performance of

the con tract on his part, if the defendant

below had accepted it, as he agreed to do,

there is no question but that he would

have been liable to pay the full contract

price forit, and he can not be permitted

to place the plaintiff in a worse condition

by breaking than by performing the con-

tract accordinp; to its terms on his part.

\\ hen the plaintiff had completed and ten-

dered the carriage in full performance of

the contract on his part, and the defend-

ant refused to accept it, he had the right

to keep it at the defendant's risk, using

reasonable diligence to preserve it. and

recover the contract price, with interest,

as damages for the breach of the contract

by the defendant. Or, at his election, he

could have sold the carriage for what it
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KADISH ct al. v. YOUNG et all

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 20, 1883.

(108 Ill. 170.)

Nov. 20, 1883.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

This was an action of assumpsit, by A. N.

Young and George Bnllen against L. J. Ka-

dish and Charles Fleischman. Judgment for

Appeal from appellate court, First district.
This was nn action of assumpslt, by A. N.
Young nnd George BullE>n against L. J. Ka·
-dish and Charil's l•'IE'lsclm11111. Judgment for
plalntift's for ~:.W,000. Defendants appeal.
.Affirmed.
·

plaintiffs for $20,000. Defendants appeal.

Afﬁrmed. '

John Woodbrldge and Mr. Francis Lackner,

for appellant Kn1llsll. Hoadley, Johnson &

(Jolson, for appellant Fieischman. “'illiam

John Woodhrhlge and Mr. Francis Lackner,
for appellant limlish. Hoadley, Jolmsuu &
Colson, fo1· ap1wllant Flt·i~ehmun. 'Vllliaw
A. Montgomery, for appellees.

A. Montgomery, for appellees.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

SCHOLFIELD, J. This was assumpsit,

by appellees, against appellants. to recover

damages sustained by the breach of an al-

leged contract, whereby, on the 15th of De-

cember, 1880, appellees sold to appellants 100,-
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000 bushels of No. 2 barley, at one dollar and

twenty cents per bushel, to be delivered to ap-

pellants, and paid for by them, at such time

during the month of January, 1881, as appel-

lees should elect. Appellees tendered to ap-

pellants warehouse receipts for 100,000 bush-

els of No. 2 baricy on the 12th of January,

1881, but appellants refused to receive the

receipts and pay for the barley. Within a

reasonable time thereafter appellees sold the

barley upon the market, and having credited

appellants with the proceeds thereof, they

brought this suit, and on the trial in the cir-

cuit court they recovered the difference be-

tween the contract price and the value of the

barley in the market on the day it was to

Ihave been delivered by the terms of the con-

tract. Upon the trial. appellants denied the

aklng of the alleged contract, that they were

partners. or that any purchase of the barley

was made for their joint account; and they

also contended, if a contract was shown, then

that on the next day after it was made they

gave notice to appellees that they did not

consider themselves bound by the contract,

and they would not comply with its terms,

and evidence was given tending to sustain

this contention.

00000000

The questions of law to which our attention

has been directed by the arguments of coun-

sel, arise upon the rulings of the circuit judge

in giving and refusing instructions. He thus

ruled, among other things, that appellants,

by giving notice to appellees on the next day

after the making of the contract that they

would not receive the barley and comply with

the terms of the contract, did not create a

breach of such contract which appellees were

SCHOLFIELD, J. 'fills wns assumpslt,
by appellees, against appellnnts. t.o recoYer
damagt>s sustalnE>d by the breach ot an alleged contract, whereby, on the UJth of De-cember, 1880, appellees sold to appellants 100,000 bushels of No. 2 barley, at one dollar and
twenty cents per bushel, to be delivered to appellants, and palJ for by them, at such time
-during the month of January, 18Sl, as appellees shoulu elect. Appellecs knupn•d to appellants warehouse receipts tor 100,000 bush-els of No. 2 barll•y on the 12th of Janunl'y,
1881, but appellants refused to reet>lve the
receipts and pay for the barley. Within a
reasonable time thereafter appellees sold tile
barley upon the market, and having credited
appellants with the proceeds tilereof, they
brought this suit, and on tile trlnt in the circuit court they reco,·ered the difference betwet>n the contract price and the value of the
jbarley lo the market on the day it was to
1 have be-en delivered by the terms of the con·
\t~act. Upon the trial. appellants denied the
~aklng of the alleged contract, tilnt they were
partners, or that any purchase of the barley
was made tor their joint account: and they
.also contended, It a contract was shown, then
that on the next day after It was made they
gave notice to nppellees that they did not
~onslder themselves bound by the contrnct,
and tiley would not comply with Its terms,
.and evidence was given tending to sustain
.this contention.

1

•

•

•

•

•

bound to regard, or impose upon them the

'legal obligation to resell the barley on the

market, or make a- forward contract for the

purchase of other barley of like amount and

time of delivery, within a reasonable time

1 Portion of opinion omitted.

thereafter, and credit appellants with the

amount of such sale, or give them the beneﬁt

of such forward contract, but that appellees

had the legal right, notwithstanding such no-

•

•

•

The questions ot law to which our attention
bas be-en directed by the arguments of counsel, arise upon the rulings of the circuit judge
in giving and refusing Instructions. He thus
ruled, among other things, that appellants,
by giving notice to nppellees on the next day
.after the making of the contract that they
would not recel\"e the barley and comply with
the terms of the contract, did not create a
breach of such contract which appellees were
bound to regard, or lmtlOKe upon them the
• legal obligation to resell the barley on the
market, or make a· forwarLl contract for the
purchase of other barley of llkP amount and
time of delivery, within n reasonable time
1

Portion of opinion omitted,
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tilerentter, and credit appellants with the
amount of such sale, or give them the benefit
of such forward contract, but that appellees
had the legal right, notwithstanding such notice, to wait until the day for the deli\"ery of
the barlPy by the terms of the coutract,
and then, upon appellants' failure t.o recel\"e
and pay for It on its being tendered, to reEwil
It on the market, and recm·er from appellants
the difference between the contract price of
the bal'ley and Its market \"alue on the Llny
It was to lune been delivered.
That In ordinary cusps of contract of sale
of personal property for future dellYery, and
failure to i·eceive and pay for It at the stipnlatrd time, the lll('asure of damages Is the
diffprence between the contract price and the
market or current value of the property at
the time and place of dellYery, has l.x~en settled by previous decisions of this court (see
McXnnght v. Do>lson, 49 Ill. 446; Larrabee
v. Ba!lgPr, 4:; Ill. 440, and Salntlln v. Mitchell, Id. 71)), and Is not cuntPstetl by appellant's
counsPI. But their contention Is, that lo case
of such contract of sale for future delivery,
where, before the time of delivery, the buyer
gl"es the seller notice that he will not rel'eive
the property a.nd comply with the terms of
the contract, this, whether the seller assents
thereto or not, creates a bren<'h or the contract, or, at all events, Imposes the legal
duty on the seller t.o thereafter take such
steps with reference to the subject or tile contract, as, by at once reselling the property
on the market on account ot the buyer, or
making a forward contract tor the purchase
of other property of like amount and time ot
delivery, shall most effectually mitigate the
damages to be paid by the buyer In consequence of the breach, without imposing loss
upon the seller. It the buyer may thus create
a breaeh of the contract without the consent
ot the seller, we doubt not the duty to sell,
{where the property Is In the l'!ossesslon of the
seller at the tiwe,) at least within a reason..
able time after such breach, will result n.s a
necessary consequence or the breach. When
the breach occurs by a failure to accept and
pay for property tendered pursuant to the
terms of a contract at the day specified for Its
delivery, this Is doubtless the duty of the
seller, and no reason Is now perceived why It
should not equally result from any breach of
the contract upon which the seller ls legally
bound to act.
But the well settled doctrine of the English
courts is, that a buyer can not thus create a
breach of contract upon which the seller Is
bound to net. In Leigh v. Paterson, 8 'fount.
540, Phlllpotts v. Evans, 5 Mees. & W. 475,
Ripley v. )lcClure, 4 Exch. mm. and, It may
be, also In other early cases, It was held a
party to a contract to be performed In the
future can not, by merely giving notice to
the opposite party that he will not perform
his part of the contract. create a breach of
the contract. Subsequently, however, In
Cort v. Railway Co., 6 Eng. Law & Eq. 230,
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and more explicitly in Hochster v. De Latour,

20 Eng. Law & Eq. 157, the doctrine was an-

nounced as not in conﬂict with previous de-

cisions, that the party to whom notice is giv-

en in such cases will be justiﬁed in acting

upon the notice, provided it is not withdrawn

before he acts. Lord Campbell, C. J., in de-

livering his opinion in the latter case, and

speaking for the court, used this language:

"The man who wrongfully renounces a con-

tract into which he has deliberately entered,

can not justly complain if he is immediately

sued for a compensation in damages by the

man whom he has injured, and it seems rea-

sonable to allow an option to the injured

party either to sue immediately or to wait till

the time when the act was to be done, still

holding it as prospectively binding for the

exercise of this option, which may be adran.‘
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tageous to the innocent party, and can not be

prejudicial to the wrong-doer."

The leading text-writers who treat of this

question follow the authority of these cases,

and the rule they announce is thus expressed

in Sedg. Meas. Dam. (6th Ed.) 340, ‘284:

“An effort has been made in many cases by

the purchaser to relieve himself from the

contract of sale before the time ﬁxed for per-

formance by giving notice that he would not

be ready to complete the agreement, and in

these cases it has been insisted that the dam-

ages should be estimated as at the time of

giving notice; but the English courts have

justly denied the right of either party to re-

scind the agreement, and have adhered to the

day of the breach as the period for estimat-

ing damages." To like effect, see Chit. Cont.

(11th Am. Ed.) 1079; 2 Pars. Cont. (6th Ed.)

676; Ben]. Sales (1st Ed.) 559; Id. (4th Am.

Ed.) 973; Add. Cont. "952; Wood, Mayne,

Dam. 250, "150.

The question came before this court in Fox

v. Kitton, 19 I11. 519, whether, when a party

agrees to do an act at a future day, and be-

fore the day arrives he declares he will not

keep his contract or do the act, the other

party may act on such declaration, and bring

an action before the day arrives; and it was

held, on the authority of Phillpotts v. Evans,

and Hochster v. De Latour, supra. that he

may; and in that case it is said, in the opin-

ion of the court, that there is no conﬂict in

the cases referred to by counsel in the dis-

cussion thereof, and to prove it. this language

from the opinion of Parke, Baron. in Phili-

potts v. Evans, is quoted: “The notice (that

he will not receive the wheat) amounts to

nothing until the time when the buyer ought

to receive the goods. unless the seller acts on

it in the meantime, and resrimls the con-

tract." And it is then added: “This is in

strict accordance with the principles recog-

nized in the leading case relied on by the

piaintiff.—Hm-hster v. De Latour."

In \Icl'herson v. Waiker, 40 Ill. 371, the

question before the court was. whether it was

error to say in an instruction that where there

is a contract for the sale of property to be
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before us. In the other case, Trustees v.

Shaffer, the time for the performance of the

contract had arrived. There was no ques-

tion in that respect. If the plaintiff was im-

properly discharged, there was a clear breach

of the contract. There was no controversy

in regard to the question whether one party

to a contract to be performed in the future,

can, by a mere notice in advance of the time

of performance that he does not intend to

perform. create a breach of the contract; nor

was there any question as to what acts a

party may be required to do in advance of a

breach of contract to mitigate the damages

of the adverse party, because of notice that

there would be a breach by him. After

breach of a contract, as before herein inti-

mated, we do not, at present. question that it

is the duty of the party entitled to damages

to do what he reasonably may, without prej-
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udice to his rights. to lighten the burden fall-

ing on his adrersary.

There is nothing in the more recent English

cases, as we understand them, repugnant to

those to which we have referred upon this

question.

In Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 EX('il. 111, 1

Moak, Eng. R. 218, decided in the exchequer

chamber in February, 1972. the suit was for

breach of a marriage contract, whereby the

defendant had promised to marry the plain-

tiff upon the death of his father, but the

father still living. the defendant had an-

nounced his intention of not fulﬁlling his

promise on his father's death, and broke off

the engagement. Cockburn, C. J., in deliv-

ering the opinion of the court, thus states

the law, after referring to the previous deci-

sions: “The promisce. if he pleases, may

treat the notice of intention [i. e., not to per-

form the contract] as inoperative, and await

the time when the contract is to be executed,

and then hold the other party responsible for

ail the consequences of non-performance; but

in that case he keeps the contract alive for

the beneﬁt of the other party as well as his

own. He remains subject to all his own ob-

ligations and liabilities under it, and enables

the other party not only to complete the con-

tract, if so advised, notwithstanding his pre-

vious repudiation of it, but also to take ad-

vantage of any supervening circumstances

which would justify him in declining to com-

plete it. On the other hand, the promisce

may, if he thinks proper,trcat the repudiation

of the other party as a wrongful putting an

end to the contract. and may at once bring

his action as on a breach of it. and in such

action he will be entitled to such damages

as would have arisen from the non-perform-

ance of the contract at the proper time, sub-

ject, however, to abatement in respect of any

circumstance which may have afforded him

the means of mitigating his loss." This was

followed, and its doctrine reiterated, in

Brown v. Muller. L. R. 7 Exch. 319, 3 Monk,

Eng. R. 429, decided in the court of excheqner,

in June, 1872, and itoper v. Johnson, L. R. 8

C. P. 167, 4 Moak, Eng. R. 397, decided in

before us. In the other case, Trnstees v.
Shatter, the time tor the performance of the
contract had arrl\"ed. There was no question In that n•spect. H the plulnt!IT was Improperly discharged, th,·re was a clear breach
of the contract. '!'here was no controversy
In regard to the qurstion wh<·ther one party
to a contract to be performed In the future,
can, by a mere uoti<:e In allrnnce or the time
of pcr!ormaucc that he does uot Intend to
perform. crr nte a b1·enrh of the coutrnct; nor
was thL•re any 111wstio11 as to what nets a
party may be requit'ed to do In ad\"auce of n
breaeh of contmct to miti~ate the dama~es
of the nth·rrse party, lweanse of notice that
there would be a bn•aeh hy him. After
breach of a contrud, as lwfore herein lutlmatl•d, we uo not, at prpsP11t. 1111..stion that It
Is the duty of the party entitlP1\ to damages
to do what ht> rt-asunahl~· may, without prejnclir•,, to his ri!!hls. to li!!hkn the burden !all111~ on his a1ln•rsary.
There Is nothing In the more rel'ent F.nglisll
cnsrs. as we unrler~tnml them, rPpug-nant to
tl1ose to which we haYe refened upon tills
qut-stlon.
In Frost v. !{night. L. R. i Jo:xd1. 111, 1
Monk, Eng, R. 21~. t!Pcirl<'rl In the exc·hrquer
ch:unhPl' In Fehruary, 1~72. the snit wns for
bn•nd1 of a marriage contrad, wll e reh~· the
defendant hnd promisPrt to marr)' thP plnintlt'l' upon the death of his fatlwr, !mt the
father still llYing, the dt>fton11:rnt hail nn·
nounced bis lntL'ntlon of not tulftJ\lng his
promise on his father's dentb, nnd liroke off
the en1rngt-111ent. Cockburn , C..J .. In d elivering the opinion of the court, thus states
the law, after referring to the previous declelons: "ThP promise!'. If he pleas!'s, may
treat the notire of Intention [I. e., not to perform the eontract] as lnoperntlve, and await
the time when the contract Is to be exN·ntl'd,
and thPn hold the other pnrty n•svonslhle for
all the consP!JUPnees of non-verform:111ce; but
In that case h e keeps the contract nllve for
the beuellt or the other party as well as his
own. Ile remnlns snhject to nil bis own ohll1rntlons and liahllitif' ~ 1mder It, and ennbles
the otlwr part~· not ouly to completl' the coutraet, if so 111h·b1•<l. unt\\'ithst:1111\ln~ his previous rPpudlntlon of It . l:nt also to tnkt• ndnmtage of any supervening clr<'ums tances
whirb would justify him In decllulug to complt•te It. Ou the otlwr hnnd, the promlsee
mn~-. if he thinks proper, treat the repudiation
of the other party as a wrongful 1mttlng an
l'Tlll to the contrnC't. nnrt mny at Oil<'!' hring
bis aC'tion as on a brt>aeh or It. and In sucll
actlou he will he entith>tl to such damages
as would ha,·e :irlsen from th!' non-p1•rfor111ance of the contmd at the 1wop!'l' time, snlJject, however, to ahatcment In l'l' H(l l'et of any
circumstance which may have nffortlt•d him
the means of mltlg-atlng his loss." This was
followed, and its doctrine reiti>rnted, In
Rrown v. ;\(uller. L . R. 7 Exeh. :no, 3 Moak,
Eng-. R. 429, dec·ldPd In the court of exdiequer
in June, 1~72, nud Hope1· v. Jul111~011, L . It 8

C. P. 167, 4 Monk, Eng, R. 39i, decided in
the common pleas In February, 1873.
Couns(') for appellante refer to the fact that
Kentlug, .J., In Hoper v. Johnsou, says: " If
then' hail heen any fall In the market, or nny
otlwr cireumstances calculated to dlmini~h
the loss, It would be for defendant to show
lt,"-and then cites with apprornl from the
oplulon of Cockhum, C. J., In Frost Y. Kl'llght,
supra, to the elfPct thnt "the dam:1g1·s are
suhje<'t to abatement in rCf>J.> Pet of any circumstanl'PS which would entitle llim to a
mlthrntion," etc., and ln!"ist th<>y recognize
the duty, here, of appPltees, upon recel\·ing
notk<', ete., to have solrl rpon the market or
have ent('red Into another contract for January delivery, etc. It Is enough to obsl•rve
In answer to this, that In hoth F1·ost v.
l(nli,.:ht ancl Hoper v_ .Johnson. supra, the no..
tlce that dt>fendunt woul<I not comply with
the Pontraet was nccrptPcl and acted upon
by the plaintiff as a breach of the contract;
and so wllnt was said In resvect of the duty
of the plalntit'l' to mitigate rtamnges was said
with rPfPrence to a ('ase wherein be recognlzC'1l th(' contract as having heen brok!'n hy
the notice of the adnnw party, and with
rPfr ren<:'e to what wns to he done by him
upon and after the recoi;:-nition of that brea<'h,
and hence can have no an1lkation here. If
a party Is not compPllerl to ncc<>pt the dcclara·
tlons of the other party ton <·ontract that he
will not pPrform It, as a hrcaeb, It m11><t
logleally follow that he IR mulPl' no ohllgatlon
to 1·cga1·d that decla1·ntlon fo1• any purpose,
for, as we haYe S<'f'll. the thPory In such case,
as laid down by Coekhurn, C. J .. In Frost \'.
Knight. supra, Is: "lit> keep; the coutrnct
alive for the b<>nefit of thP other party as
well as his own. Ile remalnR suhject to nil
his own oblli:ations and liabilities under It.
and ennhlcs the other party not only to eomplete the contract, If so a1lvlsed, notwlthstarnllng his previous repudiation of It, hut
also to take ndvnntngr of any superYening
clrcumstunee wh ieh 1\'oultl justify him In declining to complete it."
Nothing would seem to be plainer than that
while the contract Is still subsisting and unhrokrn, the parties can only he compt>lled to
do that whkh Its terms require. This contract Imposed no duty upon appellees to
make other contracts for January delivery,
or to sell barlr ~· Jn DeePmber, to prokc·t opJlPllnnts frbm loss. It did not evPn contl'111pla te that appellel'S should have the llarh•y
rPady for df'liHr~· until SU<'h time in .T:muary as the~· should elect. It aprrllePs had
then the harlPy on hand, nnd hail nctPd upou
ap1wlla11ts' 110ti<-e, nnct a ccPptecl nnd tn•ated
the contract as the n brolwn. it would, !louhtlP""· then have l.Jpen tlwir duty to have rcsoicl
the lmrll')" upon the lllark<>t. 1H"1•1·ist>ly ns they
did in .Tanuary, and n:ive given appellants
credit for the proceeds of the sale; hut It is
obviously absurd to nssume that It <'OUld
have h<'en nppellees' !lnt~· to ha\·p snld harley
In Ht•(•Pmher to othe1· pa•·ties wllil'h It was
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their duty to deliver to appellants, and which

appellants had a legal right to accept in Jan-

uary.

We have been referred to Dillon v. Ander-

son, 43 N. Y. 232, Danforth v. Walker, 37

Vt. 240, and same case again in 40 Vt. 357,

and Collins v. Delaporte, 115 Mass. 159, as

recognizing the right of either party to a con-

tract to create a breach of it obligatory upon

the other party, by giving notice, in advance

of the time for the commencement of the per-

formance of the contract, that he will not

comply with its terms. An examination of

the cases will disclose that they do not go so

far, but that they are entirely in harmony

with what we have heretofore indicated is

-our opinion in respect of the law applicable

to the present question.

In Dillon v. Anderson, the action was for a
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breach of contract for the construction of a

pair of boilers for a steamboat. After work

had been commenced under the contract, and

a certain amount of material had been pur-

chased therefor by the plaintiff, notice was

given by the defendant to stop work, that the

contract was rescinded by the defendant, and

that he would make the plaintiff whole for

any loss he might suffer. The court held

that it was the duty of the plaintiff, as soon

as he received the notice, to have so acted as

to save the defendant from further damage,

so far as it was in his power.‘

In Danforth v. Walker, 37 and 40 Vt., the

-defendant made a contract with the plain-

tiffs to purchase of them ﬁve car loads of

potatoes, being ﬁfteen hundred bushels, to be

delivered at a designated place as soon as the

defendant should call for them, and as soon

. as he could get them away, some time dur-

ing the winter. Soon after the ﬁrst car load

was taken, potatoes fell in the market, and

the defendant therenpon wrote the plaintiffs

not to purchase any more potatoes until they

should hear from him. The court held this

created a breach of the contract, and that

plaintiffs were not authorized to purchase

-any more potatoes on account of the defend-

ant after they received the notice. The court,

in the case in 37 Vt., on page 244, use this

language: “While a contract is executory a

party has the power to stop performance on

the other side by an explicit direction to that

effect, by subjecting himself to such dam-

ages as will compensate the other party for

being stopped in the performance on his part

at that point or stage in the execution of the

contract. The party thus forbidden can not

afterwards go on, and thereby increase the

damages, and then recover such increased

damages of the other party." And this same

rule, upox?t‘he authority of these cases, is

laid down in 2 Suth. Dam. 361.

The points in issue in Collins v. Deiaporte,

are not pertinent to the present question, but

in the opinion the court quotes the rule as

above laid down, upon the authority of Dan-

forth v. Walker, and other cases.

It will be observed that in each of these
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HOSMER et nl. v. WILSON.

(7 Mich. 294.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Oct. 17, 1859.

Assumpsit by John B. Wilson against,

Rufus Hosmer and another “for work and ;

labour done, and services rendered, and.

materials furnished, by plaintiff and his

servants for defendants, all at request of

said defendants. " Judgment for plaintiff,

and defendants bring error. Reversed.

It appeared that one of defendants had

called at plaintiff's foundry, and there

signed a witten order for an engine, to be

paid for when taken out of the shop, and

that plaintiff's clerk accepted the order;.

that plaintiff then proceeded to make such

engine, and only stopped when he received

a letter from defendants countermanding

the order.
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Jerome & Swift_for plaintiffs in error.

Towle, Hunt & l\'ewberry, for defendant.

in error.

(IHRISTIANCY, J. Whether the writ-

ten memorandnm signed by the defend-

ants helow, when taken in connection

with the whole transaction between the

parties, was understood by all of them as

a contract, might have been a fair ques-

tion of fact for thejnry. lint admitting

the contract to have been proved in all re-

spects as claimed by the plaintiff,and that

defendants below wrongfully counter-I

manded the order for the engine. after the

plaintiff had, in good faith, made most of

the castings, and done a large part of the

work; the ﬁrst question which arises is,

whether the plaintiff was entitled tore-

cover upon the common counts for work

and labor, as upon a quantum meruit?

As to the materials it is admitted he could

not, though contained in the same count;

as they still belonged to plaintiff, and

were never delivered to defendants.

in the case of a contract for a certain

amount of labor, or for work fora speciﬁed

period—when the labor is to be performed

on the materials or property, orin carrying

on the business. of the defendant, or when

the defendant has otherwise accepted or1

appropriated the labor performed, if the de-

iendant prevent the plaintiff from per-

forming the whole, or wrongfully dis-

charge him from his employment,or order

him to stop the work, or refuse to pay

as he has agreed (when payments become

due in the progress of the work), or disa-

ble himself from performing, or unquali-

ﬁcdly refuse to perform his part of the

contract, the plaintiff may, without fur-

ther performance, elect to sue upon the

contract and recover damages for the

breach, or treat the contract as at an

end, and sue in general assumpsit for the

work and labor actually performed: Hall

v. Ruplcy. i0 Barr, :.'Ill; Moulton v.'ll‘rask,

9 Metc., 579; llerhy v. Johrson, 2i \'t., 2i;

(‘anada v. Canada. 6 (‘nsh., I5; lirnper v.

Randolph, 4 Harrington, 454; Webster v.

WILSO~.

2G!)

whether It can be 110 apportioned or not.
he may under the quautnua merult recover
whHt It 111 reasonably worth. Hut In 1;111
Sll<'h <'Hses, the defrn1lnnt, hB\' ln!? appropriated nnd received the heneHt of the
As1mmpslt by John B. Wilson ogaln"t . l11hor (or, what is equivalent, having loRufus Hosmer and another "for work nn'1 : duced the plaintiff to exptmd his lutiur for
labour done, ff.lid servicei! rendered, uod him, and, if properly performe1l accordlug
muterlals furnb1hed, hy plaintiff un<I his to nlM 1leslre, the defendant being esto11pe1I
servant11 for defendnntM, all at request of to deny thA henPHt), a dut.v 111 impoHt-«J
sal<I def..ndants." Judu;mi>nt for plulntlff, n11on the defendant to pay fur the lahur
and defendunts bring error. Reverse•!.
thus performed. This duty the law enIt appeare•I that, on11 of defendants hail forces under the fiction of an ln1plit>d concollecl at plaintiff e foundry, and tht>re truct, ~rowing out of the recl'ptlon or U1J11igoe1I a wltteu order !or an AllU:lne, !u l>e , pr.. prla lion of the plaintiff's labor.
paid fm· whe~ taken out or the 11hojJ, anll
Jt 111 therefore e\'ldent, lilt, thut In all
that plalutlH s clerk 11cci>pte<i the order; · the ca Mes supposed an Implied eon tract
that plaintiff tht>n proccPded to make ~uch ! would hu ve arlHt:D, ~ud the plain tiff might
eosclne, and only 11toppell when he recetvPd 1 have recovered u11on u qu11ntum nt!'rnlt, tr
n letter from defendunts cuuntermomJlng · no s 11ec111l contract hail ever llt'en rna1lti;
the ordt'r.
[' 2d, thut In the like ra11e11 ( wllerP thP v11l110
.lerome & 1::-lwlft. for plaintiffs In error. of the work done could not,a11 It probably
Towle, Hunt & ~ewbt>rry, for defendant. coul«I not In the ca11e hefore UR, he apportn error.
I tiont-d by tlrn co11tr11ct price) th" value or
·
, hllr price of f he wurk done, would lll'Ct'l!CH RISTIANCY, J. Whether tht' writ-' sorily ron11tltute the true measure of dumti>n memor11ndum Hhrned by the tlefen•I· au;t•s. A111l In all such ca1c1e11, RB first supants helow. when taken In connection poHed, t-lther the 1•ontruct 11rlt•c, or the
with the w nole tranimctlou bet w~n tne reusonu hie worth of the labor du nu, won Id
parties, was un.derst()od by all of them as mea1mre the d1un11gee.
ft eontrart, might bnve ht'l'n u fnlr QUt'SSimilar conslderath>nM nnd Ilk., rult'11
tlon of fP.ct for the Jury. llut 11dmlttlng would, cloubtlt'Htl, equnlly apply to con.
the coo tract to have been pro\'e1! In 1tll re. traclH fur furnlHblng m1ttl'rh1l11, and for the
Mt1ectR a11 clalmi>d by the plulntlff, and that sale an1I dPJlvery uf perPonal 11rojierty,
t1e!en1ln11t11 below wrongfully eounter- when, nflf!r part or the mnterl11l11 or prop
maul.led the order for the engine, after the erty has heen re1•elved nnd AfJpropriale<I
plaintiff hacl, in u:ood faith, made moet of by, or ,·eHtP<l In the defend1111t, he hus 11ri>the C'HlltlnJLll, and done a large part of the veutPd tht' plaintiff from pt'rforming, or
work; tht. Hret question which nrlsee 111, authorizing him to treut the contract us
whethi>r the plulnttrr waH entitled to re. nt an eo•I, on auy or the groundH above
cover upon the common count11 for work mentioned.
and lntlor, as upon a quantum mPrult?
Out the cnHe before us st11nilH upon
As to thematt'rlals it ill e1lmltted he could very different azrounds.
Here the conD•Jt, thongh contahtl'd In the Home count; tract, aH rlulmed to ba ve Leen proved,
aH they 11till l.Jelonged to plnlntlff, and wn11 In nu just senl!le ft contract for work
wer~ neVPr delivered to dcfi>nllantM.
onrl lolwr, nor could the pl11lntiff, while
In the case of a contraet for a certain nt work upon the emi:tne, he properly said
amount of l111Jor, or for work for1t Hperltll-rl to he engaged In the hu ..tnei.11 of the rleperlm1-when the l1thor is to be performi>d fend11nte. It woH suhstautinlly 11 contruc•t
on themuterlnl;i urproperty,orlnl·arrylug for the snle of tlll en11.lm', to IJe m11dP nnrt
on the huHilll'SH, uf tile dt'fendunt, or when furnhihed hy th~ plaintiff, to the <IE"fP1Hlthe defendunt h1111 otht>rwiHe aecepted or nnt11, from thl'I shop, and, of conrKe, fru111
approprla tNl 1ht' lo hor pe1·formPll, If the <le- tilt' mn tPrlalFI of the rlulntiff. 'J'ltl' defe11<1rend1111t 11revent the plalritlff from per- ants hail no lntPrPHt In the muteriolH, nor
formiug the whol!', or wrongfully cJIM- uny concern with the amount uf tlwlahor.
charge him from hi11 employment. or order Tht•y werP to pa,Y' a certitln price for the
him to 1tto11 the work, or rel1111e to pay t'llJ.dne when completed. En11.inPI', it 111
aA he hitH 11gret>ll (wheu pa,vnunts hl'come true, arl• nut conMtructed without lnbor:
due In the proj.!rPl-IH of the work I, or dleH- tlw lul:ur, tlwrefore, conMtltutPH pnrt c.f
hie hlm,.elf from J!Prforml11g, or unqunll· the vnlul' of the engine. Hut thlt! would
fiedly rt>[UMe to pn!urm hl11 port or the : huve heen eouully true H the runtrnt't in
euntract, the 11loi11tiff mRJ, without fur- · thlH rni;c h111I h"en for an engine nlre111l.v
tiler Jll'l·f11r11111m·e, eli>1°t to RUt' upon the conqilf'ted.
contrll"t 1111.t recooter 1lnmnges for tht' · 1'1w lnhur of the plnlntiff was upon hill
hrt>nrh, ur trt>ut the i:ontrnl·l llH at 1111 ·.own 11111tl'1·i11lfl, to im·rt'IJHe thl'ir \'nluP. for
end, nnrl MllP 111 general ltHHUlllJIMlt ror the : the 11u1·r.o"e of t'fft•cilnu; h Hlllt' to dd,.1111work und l11hor11etu11lly 1•nformt>d: llall ' 11ntH whl'n t'omplrtNI. No tit Ir in 1111.\·
v, Rnpl('y. 10 Borr, :t.ll; Moulton v . 'frai,;k, ' part of the n.ntnlalfol wu11 to vpi;t in d1•9 l\1Ptc ., fii!); JlE-rhy v. ,Joh1~11011, :!1 Vt., 21; . frntlnntH tlll the \~hole Hhonlcl lie comC'anml11 v. C1u111d11, 6 C'm11J., 15; llrn1wr '" ' pleted hy plnlntiff.and clPlivi>rt>il to dcfendHnn1iol11h. 4 H11rrln~to11, 4ii-l; Weli11tl·r v . . 1111tH. Tlw pl11intlff mip;ht have 1o;old uuy
Eutlelll. 5 Gilm., 2!1X.
: of the rnnterlulH, ofter the wurk '''""' J>t'rAnd in Much cuHc11 he 11111.v, It woulcl Heern, I formed, or tire wholP i>uglnc wlwn com1
un1ler the com111on lnrlebltatns l'Ollllt, re- pleteo, ut any time lJPfore delivery to, or
co\•er the contract pric", where the caHP IH 1 lll'CPJ1ton1~e hy rlt>fendt111tr<.
eucb that the lah<n done con be 1Ut'111mred . Whpfher, thf'rt>fore, thl' lnhor ortunlly
or apportioned IJy the contract rate; or 1performed 110 tbetie materlul11, when ti.le
(7 ll" h "'-!)
• •c · ~" ·
Supreme Court of Michh:an. Oct. 17, 1859.
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defendants refused to go on with the con-

tract, or prevented the further perform-

ance, had enhanced or diminished the

value of the materials. and how much,

would be a necessary question of fact, in

arriving at an_y proper measure of dam-

ages. The value of the work and labor

does not, therefore, in such a case. consti-

tute the proper criterion or measure of

) damages. If the value of the materials

has been enhanced by the labor. the plain-

tiff,still owning the materials, has already

received compensation to the extent of

the increased value; and to give him dam-

ages to the full value of the labor, would

give him more than a compensation. if

the value of the materials has been dimin-

ished, the value of the labor would not

make the comp..'nsation adequate to the
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loss. it would be only in the single case

where the materials have neither been in-

creased nor diminished by the labor, that

the value of the labor would measure the

damages. Such a case could seldom oc-

cur, and whether it could or not, it must

always bea question of fact in the case,

whether the value of the materials does

remain the same, or whether it has been

increased, or diminished, and to what ex-

tent.

Again, as the defendants never received

the engine, nor any of the materials, the

title and possession still remained in the

plaintiff, and the defendants never having

received or appropriated the labor of the

plaintiff, if the same work had been per-

formed under the like circumstances. with-

out any actual or special contract, the

law would have imposed no duty upon

the defendants, and therefore implies no

contract on their part to pay for the

work done: 1 Chit. Pl., 3\‘2; Atkinson v.

Bell,8 B. &C., 277; Allen v. Jarvis,20 (‘onn.,

38.

The only contract, therefore, upon which

,the plaintiff can rely to pay him for the

' labor, is the special contract.

than by this. This contract, therefore,

must form the basis of theplaintiff‘s ac-

tion. He must declare upon it, and claim

his damages. for the breach ofit, or for

being wrongfully prevented from perform-

ing it. His damages will then be the ac-

tual damages which he has suffered from

the refusal of the defendants to accept the

articles, or in consequence of being pre-

vented from its performance; and these

damages may he more or less than the

value of the labor. This case, therefore,

in this respect, comes directly within the

principle recognized in the case of Atkin-

son v. Bell, above cited.and in Allen v.

Jarvis, 20 Conn.. 38 (a well reasoned case,

which we entirely approve). And see

Moody v. Brown,31 liie., I07, where the

same principle is recognized.

But it was claimed by plaintiff's counsel

that no action could have been main-
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Bing., 14, upon which much reliance was

placed by the counsel for the defendant in

error, there was a special count upon the

contract. as well as the common counts,

and it may be inferred from the opinion

Blog., 14, opon which moch r1illance was
placed by the co1111ael for the defemlant lo
error, there was a 11pel'lal count opon the
contrdct, AB well es the common counts,
und It may bf' inferred from the opln!on
that the plalntlft was allow1id to retain
hi!' verdict upon the special count. Ano
we hove the hlgl, authority of Lurd Camphell that such wa11 the c11se. :See Hoch·
Bterv. De Latour, 20 E. I •. & Eq. 163, above

that the plaintiff was allowed to retain

his verdict upon the special count. And

we hovethe high authority of Lord Camp-

hell that such was the case. See Hoch-

sterv. De Latour, 20 EL. & Eq. 163,above

cited. As the conclusion at which we

have arrived upon this pofnt disposes of

the whole case, it becomes unnecessary,

and even improper to discuss the other

questions raised in the case.

And, as we do not conceive that under

a writ of error we have any power to

amend the declaration in this respect, the

judgment must be reversed.
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The other iustices concurred.

•
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cited. As the conclu11loo at which we
have arrived upon this point disposes or
the whole case, It bC'Comes nunecessury,
and even improper to dl11cuss the other
queHtlune raised In the ca11e.
And, as we do not conceive that under
a writ of error we have any power to
amend the declaration In this respect, the
Judgment mu.it be reversed.
The other Justices concurred.
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HINCKLEY v. PITTSBURGH’ BESSE.\IER.

STEEL CO., Limited.1

(7 Sup. Ct. 875, 121 U. S. 264.)

Supreme Court of the United States. April 18,

1887.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the Northern district of Illinois.

Thos. S. McClelland, for plaintiff in error.

John N. Jewett, for defendant in error.

BLATCHFORD, J. This is an action at

law, brought in the circuit court of the Unit-

ed States for the Northern district of Illinois.

by the Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company,

Limited, a Pennsylvania corporation, again-st

Francis E. Hincklcy, to recover damages for

the breach by Hinckley of a written contract

for the purchase by him from the company

of 6,000 tons of steel rails. The contract was

as follows:
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“Memorandum of Sale.

“The Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company,

Limited, have sold and hereby agree to make

and deliver to the order of F. E. Hinckley,

Esq., 204 Dearborn St., Chicago, 1lls., and the

said Hinckley has purchased and agrees to

pay for, six thousand gross tons of ﬁrst-qual-

ity steel rails, to weigh ﬁfty-two (52) pounds

to the yard, and to be rolled true and smooth

to the pattern to be furnished by the said

Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company, Lim-

ited, pattern No. 5. Said rails are to be made

of the best quality of Bessemer steel, and to

be subject to inspection as made and ship-

ped. and to be well straightened and free

from ﬁaws, and to be drilled as may be di-

rected. At least ninety per cent. shall be in

thirty (30) feet lengths, with not over ten

(10) per cent. of shorter lengths, diminishing

by one foot differences, none to be less than

twenty-four (24) feet. All second-quality

rails, or excess of'shorts which may be made.

not exceeding ﬁve (5) per cent. of each

month's shipments to be taken at the usual

reduction of ten (10) per cent. in price, and to

be piled and shipped separately, (painted

white on both ends,) as may be ordered by

the inspector. Deliveries to begin in May,

1882, in which month one thousand tons shall

be delivered, and to continue at the rate of

twenty-ﬁve hundred tons per month after

July 1, 1882, until ﬁnished, strikes and acci-

dents beyond ordinary control of said steel

company, and acts of Providence,-preventing

or suspending deliveries, alone excepted, in

which case deliveries are to be delayed for a

corresponding length of time only. Price to

be ﬁfty-eight dollars net, per ton of 2.240

pounds of ﬁnished steel rails, ex. ship or

f. o. b. cars at Chicago, Ills., selier's option.

Terms of payment, cash on delivery of in-

spector's certiﬁcate for each ﬁve hundred

tons as fast as delivered. If shipment is de-

t Aiiirming 17 Fed. 584.

-__4-~

layed without fault of said steel company,

payment is to be made in cash upon comple-

tion and delivery ot‘ each ﬁve hundred tons

at Chicago and inspector's certiﬁcate. Rails
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not only neglected to comply with such re-

quest and furnish such directions, but de-

fendant aiso notiﬁed plaintiff, in reply to such

request, that he, defendant, was not then pre-

pared to receive the rails which were to be

delivered under said contract in the month of

May. Again, about the ﬁfteenth of June, de-

fendant informed plaintiff that he was be-

coming discouraged about being able to take

the rails. That, about June 23d, plaintiff

notiﬁed defendant that it was ready to com-

mence rolling the rails for the July deliveries,

as well as to cover the thousand tons speci-

ﬁed in the contract for delivery in May, of

which plaintiff had postponed delivery at de-

fendant's request, and asked for drilling di-

rections from the defendant; but defendant

wholly neglected to give such drilling direc-

tions. That about the twenty-si.\'th of July,
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defendant. in substance. informed plaintiffs

agents that his ﬁnancial arrangements for

money to pay for said rails. pursuant to said

contract, had failed, and that he could not

take said rails unless plaintiff would sell them

to him on six and twelve months‘ credit, for

which the notes of the railroad company for

which defendant was acting would be given,

which defendant would indorse, and also fur-

ther secure with ﬁrst-mortgage bonds. as col-

lateral, at ﬁfty cents on the dollar, but, un-

less he could secure the rails on such terms,

he could not take them, and that plaintlf f de-

clined to accept said proposition for the pur-

chase of said rails on credit; and I further

ﬁnd that, on the thirtieth of August, 1882,

plaintiff notiﬁed defendant that the time for

the completion of his contract for the pur-

chase of said rails had expired, and request-

ed defendant to advise it whether he would

accept the rails or not. To this request de-

fendant made no reply.

“I further ﬁnd that. while plaintiff did not

expressly agree with defendant to postpone

the time for the delivery of the rails to be

made and delivered under said contract, yet

plaintif f did in fact delay the rolling and de-

livery of the rail to be delivered in May,

and that, by reason of the repeated state-

ments of defendant that he was not ready to

give drilling directions, not ready to use said

rails. and not ready to accept them, plaintiff

did postpone rolling said rails, and in fact

never rolled any rails to be delivered on said

contract. but that plaintiff was at all times

during the months of May, July, and August

ready and able, in all respects, to fulﬁll said

contract and make said rails, and the same

would have been ready for delivery, as call-

ed for by said contract, if defendant had fur-

nished drilling directions, and had not stated

to plaintiff's agents that he was not ready

to furnish said drilling directions, and not

ready to accept said rails. I further ﬁnd

that on or about the ﬂftcenth day of Septem-

ber. 1882. defendant was formally requested

to furnish drilling directions and to accept

said rails, and that he replied to such request

that he should decline to take any rails un-

AGREI~'.\IENT

not only neglected to comply with such request and furnish sueh directlunR, but defendnnt nl~o notltted plnlntlft', In n•1)Jy to such
request, that he, defl>udant, was not then prepared to receive the rails which were to be
dell'"ered under said contract in the month of
May. Again, about the fifteenth of .Tune, Ilefendnnt informed plaintiff that he was becoming discouraged ahout being ahle to take
the rnll,:. Thnt, about .Tune :!:lrl. plniutitr
notified defendant that it was rendy to corumenee roll!ng the rails for the July delin•rll'S,
as well as to cover the thousand tons speC'ltled In the contract for delivery in '.\lay, of
which phtlntifl' hacl postponed delivery at defend:rnt's request, and ttsked for drilllng di·
rectlons from the dt'fendunt; but rtefendant
wholly neglected to give such drilling direction~.
That uhuut the twent~·-,.ixth of July,
defendant. In suhsh1ncP. Informed plalntltrs
ugt•nts that his finandnl arruugemeuts for
money to pay for said rnlls. pursuant to snld
contrnct, httd fulled. nnd that he eould not
take said rails unless plaintiff would sell them
to him on six and tw1·h·e months' credit, for
which the note!I of the railroad company for
which dt>fE'n1lnut was acting would he gi\'ell,
which dt'fendant would lndorse. ancl also further secure with fin•t-wortgnge bonds, as col·
lateral, at fifty cents on the dollar, but, unless he could secure the rails on sueh terws,
be could not tnke them. nnd that plaintiff declined to accept said proposition for the pur<~hast' of !mid rails on crf'dlt; and I further
find that, on the thirtieth or August, 1882,
plalntltf notified defendant that the time for
the completion of his contract for the purcha11e of said rails had expired, and requested defendant to 1ul\'lse It whether he would
accept the rails or not. To this request defendant mnde no reply.
"I !urthPr fincl that. while plalntltr did not
expressly agree with defendant to postpone
tbe time for the dC'llvery of the rails to be
made nod dPllvered under said contract, yet
plaintiff did fn tuet delay the rolling and uell"ery of the rails to be dellvl'l·ed In May,
and that, by reason of the repenteu stah~
ments of defendant thnt he was not ready to
give drilling directions, not ready to use said
rails. nml not rettdy to accept them, plalntltr
did postpone rolllng said rails, and In faet
never rolled any rails to be dell'"ered on said
contract, but that plaintiff was at all times
during the months of May, July, nml August
ready and able, In all respects, to fulfill said
contract and make said rails, and the same
would hnYe hePn rC'ady tor cleli'"ery. as called for by snld contract, If defendant had furnl,..becl drilling din••·t ions, nml hnd nut stated
to plaintlff"s ai,:Pnts thnt he was not ready
to furnish sn!d drilling directions, nod not
rP:Hly to aeeept sahl rails. I furtlH'r find
that on or nhont the ftftr<'nth clay of 8eptcmbc•r. 1882. defcmdant was formally requested
to furnish rlrilling «lin·l'llons and to accept
llaid rRlls, and that he rep!IC>1l to such request
that he ~houhl tit"din<' to take any mils unLAW

l>A~I.2d

Erl.-18

TO TAKE OR BUY GOODS.

273

I
,

I

I

I
,

'

der said contrnct, and that he bad made ar- .
rangPml•nts to purchnse ra!ls of others at a
good deal lower prlee. I therefore find, from
the testimony In this case. that defendant, by
requeRting plnlntllf to postpone the deliYeQ'
of !'nid rails, And by notifying the pluiuti!f
that he wns not ready to acrept and pay fur
said rails, excused tbe plaintllf from the
actual manufacture of said rails and a tendPr
thC'rc•of to clefendant. Aud I furth1>r tinrl
that defendant's stntement to plaintiff. ou
the twenty-:,;ixth or Jul~·. that he could not
pay cash for snicl .rails, as called for by the
contract, and that be wished to buy them on
credit, was In fact a notice that he woulcl
not be able to pny for said rails If rolled and
tendered to him hy plaintiff. I therefore conclude, ancl so find ns a matter of fact, from
the evidence In the cni;e, that said plalntltr
In apt time requested defendant to furnish
directions for the drilling or snlcl mils, uml
that defendant neglected and rc>fused to do
so. aml that, although plalutill' was ready nnd
able to fully perform said contract, and make
and dellvet· sn Id rails to defP111lant as required by said contra<;t. defendant refused to ·
ae1°l•pt and pay for said rnlls.
"(;;1 That plnlntllf manutnetured arnl snlcl
to other persons 4,000 tons of steel rails, ft'om
the materials so purchased, with wltleh t0>
perform said contract with defendant, for
whil-h snld rails plaintiff' re1·eh·e1l $54.HO per
ton. delivered at a port on Luke Huron, and
thnt plaintiff mnde a profit or $Ui0 1wr ton
on said 4,000 tons; that, by reason of <left>ndant's refusal to accept said rails, the plaintiff had no employment for Its mlll for a time.
and was obllgecl to stop Its mill for about
tbr<'e weeks In the month of August, 1882.
"IU) 'l'hat it would huve cost plaintiff $ii0
per ton to have manufartured ancl dellve1·ed
the rails called for by said eontract to deflomlnnt, ll<'<"Orcllng to the ternu1 of said contr:ll't; so that pla!ntil!'s profits, I! It had
not been prt>wnterl from fultllling said contruet hy the conduct of defendant, woulcl
haYe been $8 per ton on each ton of rails .
«·allecl for by snid contract. And, because of
i<airl fnC'tS, I find that defendant was guilty
uf a breaeb of said coutraet. and that i1Ialntiff hath sustained damage. hy rcnson of
sueh b1·eaeh, In the sum of :t'·l:!.-HIO."
On the;;e findings, n judgment was entere1I
for the plalutifl' for $-12,400 damages, and for
costs. 17 Fell. 58-l. 'l'o review that judgment the defendant has brnught this writ of"
error. Afte1· tue reco1·d was filed iu this courtp
it bPing diseovered that there was an error la
computation in entering tlie judgment fol"
$-12,400, ln::itead of Hl.tiOO, the elrcuit court
allowed the plalntlfl' to remit the clifl'ereo('P,
~SUO, and an order was entered aceordiugly, us ·
of the elate of the judgment.
On the specinl findings, the only question
01ien for review Is whether the fucts fouucl
are sufficient to support the judgment. There·
cnn be no question that. on those facts, the
defcmlaut Is liable In d:1111a:;cs for a breach.

•
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of the contract. It is provided in the contract

that the rails are “to be drilled as may be

directed." The circuit court ﬁnds that it ap-

pears from the proof, aside from the provision

in the written contract in regard to drilling

directions. "that it was usual and customary

for the purchaser of steel rails to give direc- .

tlons as to the drilling thereof ;" that each rail-

road has its own special rules for drilling;

that the drilling of the rails is considered in

the trade as a part of the work of manufac-

ture, and a part of the duty of the manufac-

turer, in order to fully complete the rails for

use; that. by four letters, written in April.

1882. by the agents of the plaintiff to the de-

fendant, and which letters were duly received

by the defendant before May, 1882, he was

requested to furnish drilling directions for the

1,000 tons of rails to be delivered in May, un-
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der the contract; that he neglected to comply

with that request, and also notiﬁed the plain-

tif f that he was not then prepared to receive

the rails which, by the contract, were to be

delivered in May; that in June the plaintiff

again asked for drilling directions from the

defendant, in respect both to the 1,000 tons,

and to the 2.500 tons to be delivered in July,

but the defendant neglected to give such drill-

ing directions; and that, in the latter part of

July, he notiﬁed the plaintiff, in substance,

that he would not perform the contract. The

curcuit court further ﬁnds that, by reason of

the repeated statements of the defendant that

he was not ready to give drilling directions,

not ready to use the rails, and not ready to

accept them, the plaintiff postponed the roll-

ing of them, and never rolled any rails to be

delivered on the contract, but was at all times

during May, July, and August, 1882. ready and

able to fulﬁll the contract and make the rails,

and the same would have been ready for de-

livery as called for by the contract, if the de

fendant had furnished drilling directions, and

had not stated to the agents of the plaintiff

that he was not ready to furnish the drilling

directions, and not ready to accept the rails;

and that, on or about the ﬁfteenth of Septem-

ber, 1882. he was formally requested to fur-

nish drilling directions and to accept the rails,

and replied to such request that he should

decline to take any rails under the contract,

and had made arrangements to purchase rails

of others at a lower price. The circuit court

also ﬁnds that the defendant, by requesting

the plaintiff to postpone the delivery of the

rails, and by notifying the plaintiff that he

was not ready to accept and pay for them,

excused the plaintiff from actually manufac-

turing them and tendering them to the de-

fendant. This conclusion is entirely warrant-

ed by the facts found, and, on those facts,

the defendant must be held liable in damages.

The only other question open on the ﬁndings

is as to the proper rule of damages.

The circuit court ﬁnds that it would have

cost the plaintiff $50 per ton to have manu-

factured and delivered the rails called for by

the contract, according to its terms; that the
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'down by this court in Railroad Co. v. Howard,

13 How. 307. In that case a contractor for

the building of a railroad sued the company

for its breach. On the question of damages

this court said, (page 344:) “It must be ad-

mitted that actual damages were all that

could lawfully be given in an action of cove-

nant, even if the company had been guilty of

fraud. But it by no means follows that the

proﬁts are not to be allowed, understanding,

as we must, the term ‘proﬁts.' in this instruc-

tion. as meaning the gain which the plaintiff

would have made if he had been permitted

to complete his contract. Actual damages

clearly mclude the direct and actual loss which

the plaintiff sustains propter rem ipsam non

habitam. And, in case of a contract like

this, that loss is, among other things, the dif-

kference between the cost of doing the work
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and the price to be paid for it. This dif-

ference is the inducement and real considera-

tion which causes the contractor to enter into

the contract. For this he expends his time,

exerts his skill. uses his capital, and assumes

the risks which attend the enterprise. And

to deprive him of it. when the party has

broken the contract and unlawfully put an

end to the work, would be unjust. There is

no rule of law which requires us to indict this

injustice. Wherever proﬁts are spoken of as

not a subject of damages, it will be found that

something contingent upon future bargains or

speculations or states of the market are re-

ferred to, and not the difference between the

agreed price of something contracted for and

its ascertainable value or cost. See Masterton

v. Mayor, etc., 7 Hill, 61, and cases there re-

ferred to. We hold it to be a clear rule that

the gain or proﬁt of which the contractor was

deprived by the refusal of the company to

allow him to proceed with and complete the

work. was a proper subject of damages."

In U. S. v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77, where the

defendant agreed to pack a speciﬁed number

of hogs for the plaintiff, and made all his

preparations to do so, and was ready to do

so, but the defendant refused to furnish the

hogs to be packed, this court, citing with ap-

proval \Iastcrton v. Mayor, etc., held that

the measure of damages was the difference

between the cost of doing the work and the

price agreed to be paid for it, “making rea-

sonable deduction for the less time engaged,

and for release from the care, trouble, risk,

and responsibility attending a full execution

of the contract." These views were again

approved by this court in U. S. v. Bchan,

110 U. S. 338. 4 Sup. Ct. 81.

In the present case the ability of the plain-

tiff to fulﬁll the contradt at all times is found

as a fact by the circuit court. as also the

fact that, by reason of the defendant's re-

fnsal to accept the rails. the plaintiff was

obliged to stop its mill for about three weeks,

in August, 1882. The defendant received

the beneﬁt of all the mitigation of damages

which, upon the facts found. he was entitled

to claim, and the beneﬁt of all the proﬁts

by this court in Railroad Co. v. Howard,
13 How. 307. In that cue a contractor for
·the building of a railroad sued the company
tor Its breach. On the question of damages
-this court said, (page 344:) "It must be admitted that actual damages were all that
could lawfully be given in an action of covenant, en•n if the company had been guilty of
fraud. Hut It by no means follows that the
profits are not to be allowed, unde1·standlng,
as we must, the term 'profitii.' In this lnstructinu. as ml"1min11: the ~nlu which the plaint!!!
would have made It be had been permitted
to complete his conU-act. Actual damages
l'ieal'ly mclmle me direct null actual loss which
the plaintiff sustains propter rem lpsam non
habirnm. And, In case of a contra.ct like
this, that loss Is, among other things, the dlf1 ference between the cost of doing the work
land the price to be paid for It. This difference Is the Inducement and real consideration which ca uses the contractor to enter Into
the contract. I•'or this he expends bis time,
exerts his skill, uses his capital, and assumes
the risks which attend the enterprise. And
w dcpri\·e him of it, when the party has
broken the contract and unlawfully put an
end to the work, would be unjust. 'l'h<'re Is
no rule of law which requires us to Inflict this
Injustice. 'Wherever pronts are spoken of as
not a subject of damages, It wlll be found that
something contingent upon future bargains or
speculations or states ol'. the market are referred to, and not the ditTerence between the
agreed price of something contracted for and
Its nscertnlnable 'value or cost. See Masterton
v. :Mayor, etc., 7 Hill, 61, and cases there referred to. 'Ve hold It to be a clenr rnle that
the gain or profit of which the contractor wns
deprived by the relusal of the company to
allow him to proceed with and complete the
work. was a proper subject of damages."
In U. S. v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77, where the
defendant agreed to pack a specified number
of hogs !or the plaintiff, and ma.de all his
prPparntlons to do so, and was ready to do
so, but the defendant refused to furnish the
hogs to be packed, this court, citing with appro\·111 :\lasterton v. l\Iayor, etc., hC'l1l that
the measure of damages was the difference
between the cost of doing the work aud the
price agreed to be paid for It. "making reasonable deduction for the less time engaged,
and tor release from the care, trouble, risk,
and responsibility attending a full execution
ot the contract." These views were again
appro'l"ed by this court In U. S. v. Il<'han,
110 U. S. 3.'38, 4 Sup. Ct. 81.
Iu the present l'll~ the ability of the plain·
tit!' to fulfill the contra!t nt nil times Is found
as a fact by the circuit l'onrt. ns also the
fact that, by reason of the dPfendant's refusal to accept the mils. the plaintitr was
-obliged to stop Its mill tor about three weeks,
in August, 1882. The defendant received
the benefit of all the mitigation of damages
which, upon the facts found. he was entltled
to claim, and the benefit of all the prottts
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made by the plainti1f which could properly
be regarded as a substitute for the profits It
would have received had Its contract with
the defendant been carried out. The defendant objects that, within the statement of the
rule In U. S. v. Speed, there was no deduction made In this case for the time saved,
and the care, trouble, risk, and responsiblllty
avoided by the plalntltr by not fuily executing the contract; but there are no findings
of fact which raise any such question. The
finding Is that It would have cost the plaintiff :j;50 per ton to have manufactured and
delh·ered the rails called for by the contract,
according to Its terms. Under this finding,
It must be held that every proper element
of cost entered Into the $fiO; and it was for
the defendant to have requested findings
which would authorize an Increase of that
sum as cost.
'!'here Is a bill of exceptions In the case,
on which two questions are ralsccl by the
defendant as to the admission of testimony.
The contract between the parties was negotiated by C. H. Odell. who signed It as
broker, between whom and the defendant the
correspondence thereafter, down to and . Including the first of May, 1882. was carried
on, Odell acting for the plaintiff. He made
the contract under special Instructions, bis ·
authority being llmlted to that of a sales
agent. On bis examination ns a witness nt
the trial, he testified that all of his communications with the plalntltr In regard to the
business with the defendant wl're in writing
or by telegram. He also t<'stilied, without
ohjectlon, that be kept the plaintiff fully advlsl'd of his correspondence with the defendant concerning the rails. H. I'. Smith, the
huslnPss manager of the plnintllT, was then
called as a witness for the plaintlJ!', and was
asked If the plaintll'f was ndvlsed of the correspon<lt>n<'C between OclC'll and the defendant, which had !wen rf'nd In evidence, and
If Odell's actions were a(lproved by the witness as manager of the plaintiff. 'l'o this
the defendant objected, on the ground that
the communications between Odell and the
plaintiff consisted of letters and telegrams,
which were the only competent evidence of
the contents thereof. '.l'he court overruled
the objection, and the witness stated that the
company was advised of the correspondence
and actions of Odell, and fully approved and
ratified the same. The defendant excepted
to the decision admitting the evidence. We
see no objection to the admission of this
evidence, Independently of the tact that Odell
had, without objection, testified to subatantlally the same thing. The defendant, In bis
correspondence with Ode1', all of which Is
set forth ln the bill of exceptions, treaterl
Odell as representing the plaintiJ!', and cannot now be heard to question his authority
to do so, or to demand further evidence of
such an authority, or of the adoption by the
plalntltr of what Odell was doing, saying,
and asking on behalf of the plalntil!'. The
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question asked of Smith, as to whether he,

as manager of the plaintiff, approved of

Odeil‘s actions, and the answer he made,

were therefore, unnecessary, and could not

affect the merits of the case.

Smith was further asked to state in detail

the elements of the cost of rolling the rails

in question. He produced a memorandum

showing items taken from the plaintiff's

books, which, added together, exhibited the

cost, in August, 1882, of manufacturing one

ton of such rails as those described in the

contract; and, on being asked by the plain-

tilfs attorney to testify to those items, the

court, under the defendant's objection, al-

lowed him to read the items from the memo-

randum. He further testiﬁed, under an ob-

jection and exception by the defendant, that

the actual cost to the plaintiff of making and
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delivering the rails in Chicago would have

been $48.25; that he stated the elements of

such cost from a memorandum prepared by

himself, the elements being taken from the

books of the plaintiff; that he knew the pur-

chase price of all material which went into

the manufacture, because he purchased all

of it himself; that the statement was pre-

pared by him from his personal knowledge

of the cost; that he called off the items from

a penciled memorandum to the book-keeper,

who wrote them down; that he (the witness)

knew the items to be correctly stated; and

that the information as to the items was

made up from records running through a

series of four or ﬁve months, and represent-

ing an average as to the cost per ton. The

defendant contends that this evidence was

inadmissible, in the absence of an oppor-

tunity for him to examine the plaintiffs

books, with a view to a cross-examination

of the witness as to the mode of computation

adopted by him, the memorandum being, as

contended, the result of the conclusions of

the witness from the examination of a large

number of entries in the books of the plain-

tiff. It is a suﬂicient answer to this ob-

jection, that the cost of the rails was not

taken by the court at the sum of $48.25, the

sum ﬁxed by Smith, but the bill of excep-

tions shows that the cost was taken at $50

a ton. from the testimony of Richard C.

Hannah, another witness; so that, even if

the testimony was erroneously admitted,

(which it is not necessary to decide,) the de-

fendant suffered no prejudice from its ad-

mission.

The judgment of the circuit court is af-

ﬁrmed.

BREAOH OF
BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING REAL ESTATE.

CO~TRACTS

HOGAN v. KYLE.

HOGAN v. KYLE.

(35 Pac. 399, 7 Wash. 595.)

Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 6, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, King county;

Mason Irwin, Judge.

Action by F. V. Hogan against George F.

Kyle for breach of contract to buy real

estate. From a judgment for plaintiff, de-

fendant appeals. Reversed.

Preston, Albertson & Donworth, for appel-

lant. H. B. Slauson, for respondent.

DUNBAR, O. J. On the 27th day of Feb-

ruary, 1890, respondent and appellant entered

into a written contract wherein respondent

agreed to sell the appellant certain real estate

for the sum of $2,500, one-third of which was

paid at the time of the execution of the con-

tract; appellant to pay the balance of the pur- I

chase price in two equal installments, the ﬁrst
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of which was to be paid on the 27th day of

May, 1890, and the second on the 27th day

)of August, 1890. Time was expressly made

the essence of the contract. The appellant

paid no part of the purchase price, except the

sum which was paid at the time the con-

tract was executed. It does not appear that

defendant entered into possession of the

property, or exercised any control over it.

On November 14, 1892, suit was commenced

by the respondent to recover a money judg-

ment ngainst the appellant for the amount

of the two unpaid installments, with in-

terest. The complaint simply alleged the

making of the contract, failure to pay, the

ownership of the property, and the tender

of a good and suﬂicient deed prior to the

commencenu'nt of the action. A demurrer

was interposed to the complaint on the

ground that it did not state facts suﬂlcient

to constitute a cause of action. The de-

murrer was overruled, -and the defendant

answered, alleging possession in the re-

spondent, but denying his power to give

good title. Allcging that respondent had

never demanded of appellant the contract

price of the land at any time prior to Novem-

ber 14, 1892, the date of the commencement of

the action, and never tendered to appellant

any deed or conveyance purporting to con-

vey said land until said 14th day of Novem-

ber, 1892, and never at any time conveyed

said premises; that, long prior to said last-

named date, appellant had informed and

notiﬁed respondent that he did not have or

claim any further interest in said property.

and that he would not pay any further in-

stallment provided for by said contract, and

that the plaintiff did not, up to said Novem-

ber 14, 1892, assert any further right to the

balance of said contract price, nor dissent

to nor deny said claim of defendant that he

was no longer bound by said contract; and

that long prior to said last-named date the

plaintiff had exercised said option reserved

to him under said contract, and had elected

to rescind said contract, and to retain as a

forfeit the ﬁrst payment that had been

made to him by the defendant thereunder,
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forfeit the first pnymf'Ilt that had been
made to him by the dPfcndant thereunder,
aforesaid At the outset of the trial, apSupreme Court of Washington. Jan. 6, 1894.
pellant objected to the introdurtlon of any
Appeal from 1rnperlor court, King county; testimony In behalf of the plalntitr on the
Mason Irwin, Judge.
ground that no cause of action was stated
Action by F. V. Hogan agnlnst George b'. In the complaint. This objection was overKyle for: breach of contract to buy real ruled. At the conclusion of respondent's
estate. From a jud~ent for plnlntil't, de- testimony, appellnnt moved for a nonsuit,
fendant appeals. Re'\"ersed.
which motion was overruled. '!'hereupon,
Preston, Albertson & Donworth, for appel- he rested upon bis motion, and did not otrcr
any testimony; and the judge Instructed the
lant. H. B. Slauson, for respondent.
jury to bring In a verdict against the appelDUNBAR, 0. J. On the 27th dny of Feb- lant tor the balance of the contract price.
ruary, 18UO, respondent and appellant entered with interest; which being done, judgment
into a written contract wherein respondent was entered thereon, from which judgment
v.greed to sell tbe appellant certain real estate appellant hns appealed. At the commencefor tbe sum of $2,500, one-third of which was ment of the action the appellant moved to
pni<l at the time of the execution of tbe con- have the case transferred to the equity calentract; appellant to pay the balance of the pur- , dar, which motion was denied. The demurehase price in two equal Installments, the first ' rer and the motion for a nonsuit raised sub-0f whl~h was to be paid on the 27th day of stantially the same questions.
l\Iay, 1800, and the second on the 27th day
The judgment in this case will·have to be
) of August, l&JO. Time wns expressly made rEversed, In any event, for under Its tcrn:ts the
the essence of the contract. The appcllnnt respondent recovers the full purchase price,
paid no part of the purchase price, except the and ls allowed to retain the land which repsum which was pnld at the time the con· resented the purchase price. In this case
tract was executed. It does not appear thnt these are dependent obligations upon which
-Oefenrumt entered into possC'sslon of th<.? the respondent Is suing. When the first inproperty, or exerclsl'd any control over it. stallment became due, he could have· recovOn November 14, 1892, suit was commenceo ered the amount then due as upon an lode-by the respondent to recover n. money judg- pendent contract; but having elected to wnit
ment ago.inst the appellant for the amount until the Inst installment became due, and
-0f the two unpaid Installments, with In- upon the payment of which defendant would
terest. The complaint simply alleged thQ be entitled to a deed, the obligations become
making of the contract, failure to pay, the dependent. They all relate bnck to the con-0wnershlp of the property, and the tender tmct, and respondent cannot sustain an action
<>f a good nnd sufficient deed prior to the for elther installment without proof of per-commenccm!'nt of the action. A demurrer formance or readiness to perform on his part.
was interposed to the complnint on the Mccroskey v. Ladd, (Cal.) 31 Pac. 558, and
1:round tbat It did not state facts sutllclcnt cases cited. In that case the court said:
to constitute a cause of action. The d~ "There Is but one single cnuse of action.murrer was overruled, .and the dcf<>ndant one and Indivisible. The defendant, If he
answered, alleging possession In the re- would maintain his deed, must pay all; and
-epondent, but d<>nylng his power to give the plnlntllT, If he would recover, must show
good title. Alk•glng thnt respondent had such a pe1·formance on his part as would ennever demanded of appellant the contract title him to all the unpaid consideration." It
price of the lund at any time prior to Novem- is not enough that the deed wns tendered
ber 14, 1892, the date of the commencement of at any particular time, but the tender must
the action, and never tendered to nppellnnt be kept good so that it mny be taken into conany deed or conveyance purporting to con- sideration In the entI·y of ·the judgment.
Tey said land until said 14th day of Novem· Plaintitr here simply shows tbat the tender
ber, 1892, and never at any time conveyed hnd been made prior to the commencement
snld premises; that, long prior to said last- of the act!on, and It Is therefore insufficient
named date, appellant had informed and excepting on the th!'ory that the judgment
notified respondent that he did not have or could be rendered independently of the perelalm any further interest in said property, formance ot his part of the cont,.act by the
and that he would not pay any further In. vendor, which would result in nllowlng the
smllment provided for by said contract, and VPndor to keep both the money nnd the land.
thnt the plnlntltr did not, up to said Novem- On that proposition we quote from \Va1·wlle
ber 14, 1892, assert any further right to the on Vendors, (page 001:) '"l'h!.'re are cnscs,
balance of snld contract price, nor dissent both in England and the United Stntes,
to nor deny said claim of defendant that he where, on the vendee's clefnult, the vendor,
was no longer bound by said contract; and having olTered to perform, has been permitthat long prior to said last-named date the ted to recover as damages the whole purchase
plalntitr bad exer<'is<'<l said option reR<>rved price. The Injustice of sucb a measure, howto him under said contract, and hnc1 elected ever, Is apparent on Its tac!', tor It gh•es the
to rescind said contract, and to retain as a
vendor his land, as well as its value, and ls
(35 Pac. 899, 7 Wash. 595.)
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not now regarded as a correct rule in either

country." The rule in such cases is that the

vendor has a right to the fruits of his bar-

gain, and is entitled to compensation for any

less he may suffer by reason of its noncon-

smnmation. What his damages are, in such

circumstances, must be alleged and proven,

like am; other fact in the case. Under one

set of circumstances, the measure of dam-

ages might be one thing, and under other cir-

cumstances the measure might be governed

by an entirely different rule. The land may

have deteriorated in value, and his damages ,

-would be great, or it might have increased in

value, and the damages would be nominal.

As is well argued by the appellant in this

case, so far as the complaint reveals, the land

may be worth as much or more than it was

when the agreement was executed; and the
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respondent, having received an advance pay-

ment, which is forfeited, may actually be

beneﬁted. The cases cited in VVarvel1e fully

sustain the announcement in the text, both as

to the unfairness of allowing the vendor to

retain the land and the money, and as to the

measure of damages. In Railroad Co. v.

Evans, 6 Gray, 25, it was held that, in an

action at law by the vendor to recover dam-

ages for the breach of a contract for the sale

of land, the measure of damages is not the

contract price, but the diﬂerence between

that price and the price for which the land

could have been sold at the time of the

breach., Under this rule, which seems to us

to be an equitable one, and one which is

adopted by many courts, the complaint is

plainly deﬁcient. The case last above cited

also holds that a vendor may enforce in equi-

ty the speciﬁc performance of a written con-

tract for the sale of land. In fact, the pre-

vailing modern authority is that in a case

of this kind the vendor can either sue at law

for damages, or resort to equity for speciﬁc

performance. Mr. Pomcroy, in his work on

Contracts, (page 6,) bases his adherence to this

doctrine on the ground of mutuality. The

remedy which is enjoyed by one party to a

contract must be enjoyed by the other, and

as an example he gives the simplest form of

contract for the sale of land, when the vendor

agrees to convey, and the purchaser merely

promises to pay a certain sum as the price.

Since the latter may, by a suit at equity, cm»-

pel the execution and delivery of the deed,

the former may also, by a similar suit, en-

force the undertaking of the vendee, although

the substantial part of his relief is the re-

covery of money. “A suit in equity against

the vendee, to compel a speciﬁc execution of

0. contract of sale, while in effect an actio'n

for the purchase money, has nevertheless al-

ways been sustained as a part of the appro-

priate and acknowledged jurisdiction of such

court, although the vendor has in most cases

another remedy by an action at law upon the

agreement." Warv. Vend. pp. 779, 780, and

cases cited. So that, considering it either

as u legal or equitable action, and consider-
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are the averments of the complaint strength-

ened by the proofs, for the proofs show that

no demand, of any kind whatever, had been

made, on the part of respondent, until the

day the suit was brought. The respondent

should not be allowed to speculate in values,

so far as this contract is concerned; to wait

and see whether the value of the land would

enhance or depreciate before he made his

election either to enforce the performance

or accept the forfeiture. We think the pro-

vision of this contract, th\t, “if the said

party of the second part, his heirs, adminis-

trators, or assigns, shall fail to pay the full

amount of either of the abovespeciﬁed in-

stallments and interest when the same shall

become due, as above speciiied, the said party

of the ﬁrst part shall have the right, at their

option, to rescind and cancel this agreement,
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and in case of such rescission and cancellation

all rights of the said party of the second part.

his heirs and assigns, shall be terminated,

and all payments heretofore inade on this

contract shall be forfeited," fairly construed,

guaranties to the respondent a right which

it must exercise at the maturity of the con-

tract,—the time when he would have a right

to make the election; and, as he did not pro-

ceed to enforce the contract, the appellant had

a right to presume that, inasmuch as he had

taken no afﬁrmative action, by tendering the

deed, he had elected the remedy which was

consistent with silence, namely, the accept-

ance of the forfeiture; and, considering the

rapid changes in value of the real estate in

this country, we think an unexplained delay

of two and a quarter years ought to prevent-

the respondent from asserting his claim in a

court of equity.

The complaint, therefore, being insuﬂlcient,

either at law or equity, appellant's demurrer

should have been sustained. This conclusion

renders unnecessary the discussion of the oth-

er errors assigned. For the reasons given,

the judgment will ‘be reversed, with instruc-

tions to sustain appellant's demurrer to the

complaint.

STILES, HOYT, SCOTT, and ANDERS,

JJ., concur.

are the aTermPnts of the complaint strengthened by the proofs, for the proofs show that
no demand, of any kind whatever, bad been
mil.de, on the part of respondent, until the
day the suit was brought. The respondent
shonld not be allowed to !ipeculate In values,
so f.1r as this contract Is concerned; to wait
and see whether the value of the land would
enhance or depreciate before he made his
election either to enforce the performance
or accept the forfeiture. We think the proTlslon of this contract, ~t, "if the sald
party of the second part, his heirs, admlnlstr.ltors, or assigns, shall fall to pay the full
amount of either of the above-specified Installments and Interest when the same shall
become due, as above specified, the said party
of the ftrst part shall have the right, at their
option, to rescind and cancel this agreement,
and In case of such rescission and cancellatlon
all rights of the said party of the second part,
his heirs and assigns, shall be terminated,
and all payments heretofore inade on this
contract shall be forfeited," fairly construed,
suarantles to the respondent a right which
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It mllSt exercise at the maturity of the contract,-the time when be would have a right
to make the election; and, as he did not proceed to enforce the contract, the appellant had
a right to presume that, Inasmuch as he had
taken no affirmative action, by tendering the
deed, he had elected the remedy which was
consistent with silence, namely, the aecc>ptance of the forfeiture; and, considering the
rapid changes In value of the real estate lu
this country, we think an unexplained delay
of two and a quarter years ought to prevent·
the respondent from asserting his claim In a
court of equity.
The complalnt, therefore, being Insufficient,
either at law or equity, appellant's demurrer
should have been sustained. This conclusion
renders unnecessary the discussion of the oth·
er errors asslped. For the reasons given,
the judgment will ·be reversed, with IDStructlona to sustain appellant's demurrer to the
eomplalnt.
STILES, HOYT, SCOTT, and ANDERS,

1J., concur.
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McGUIN.\ESS v. WHALEN.

(18 Atl. 158, 16 R. I. 558.)

Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 13, 1889.

Assumpsit. On demurrer to the declara-

tion.

Edwin D. McGuinness and John D01-an.

for plaintiff. Edward D. Bassett, for de-

fendant.

DURFEE, C. J . The declaration sets forth

_that at an administrator's sale at auction, held

February 28, A. D. 1885, by William W.

Nichols, administrator de bonis non on the

estate of John Charlton, deceased, all the

right, title, and interest of the decedent in

certain land described was struck off to the

defendant for $3,100 bid by him, said sum

being the highest bid therefor; that the de-

fendant paid $150 down as earnest money;

that afterwards, at a time appointed. the ad-
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ministrator was ready with his deed to con-

vey the land in pursuance of the sale, but the

defendant refused to accept it, and pay over

the residue of sahl$3,100; that subs--quently,

on May 26, A. D. 1885, the property was

again put up at auction by said administra-

tor, and struck ol! to William H. Washburn

for $2,150, the highest bid therefor, and con-

veyed to him for that sum. The declaration

then proceeds as follows, to-wit: “And the

plaintiff avers that on the 21st day of Novem-

ber, 1887, he was appointed administrator

do bonis non of the estate of John Charl-

ton, deceased, in the place and stead of said

Nichols, removed, whereby the defendant

became liable and promised to pay to the

plaintiff the difference between said sum of

$3,100 and the costs of said second auction

sale, viz., $40.17, and the sum of 32,150,

amounting to the sum of $990.17." The

declaration also contains the common money

count. The defendant has demurred to the

declaration generally, but both parties have

.treated the demurrer as if it were simply a de-

murrer to the special count. We will so treat

.it. The question, as it has been argued to us,

is whether the count is good as a count upon

.a promise to be implied from the facts alleged.

We think not. The contract which the de

fendant entered into when he made his bid

was a contract to pay the price bid by him for

the premises upon receiving a deed thereof,

and, if on tender of the deed he refused

to complete the payment, he committed a

breach of said contract, and laid himself

liable to an action upon it. for damages.

In such action the measure of damage is

the loss to the vendor from the default

of the vendee, and it may be that the

jury, upon proof of the second sale, would

ﬁnd the damages to be the difference between

the two bids and the expense of the second

sale; but the question would be purely one of

damages, and they would not be shut up to

thatamount. Mc(‘ombs v. Mv.-Kennan. 2 Watts

& S. 216. In order to make the vendee liable

in as.>umpsit for such difference and expense,

in case of his default, it should be made a

condition of the sale that in such case the
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McGUINNESS v. WHALEN.
(18 At!. 158, 16 R . I. 558.)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 13, 1889.

As.mmpsit. On demurrer to the declaration.
Edwin D. McGuinness and John Do1·an,
for plaintilf. Edward D. Bassett, for defemhmt.
I>UBFEE, C. J. Thelleclaratlon sets forth
• that Mt an administrator's sale at auction, ht>ld
February 28, A. D. 188', by William W.
Nichols, administrator de bonis no11 on the
.estate of John Charlton, deceased, all the
right, title, and interest of the deeedent in
certain land described was strnc:k off to the
defondant for $3,100 bid bv him, said sum
being the highest bid therefor; that the defendant paid $150 down as earnest money;
that afterwal'ds, at a time appointt>d, the administrator was ready with his deed to convey the land in pu!'suance of the sale, but the
defl'ndant refused to a•·cept it, and pay over
the residue ofsai«l~':J.100; thatsubs ..quently,
<ln May 26, A. D. 1885, the property wtts
•1gain put up at auction by eaid administrator, and st!'uck off to William H. Washburn
for $2,150, the highest bid therefor, 1md conveyed to him for that sum. The declaration
then prnceeds as follows, to-wit: "And the
plaintiff avns that on the 21st day of November, 1887, he was appointed administrator
de bouis nun of the estate of John Chariton, deceased, in the place llnd stead of said
Nichols, removed, whereby the defendant
lJeca111e liable and promised to pay to tbe
plaintiff the difference between said sum of
$::1,100 and the costl! of said second auction
sale, viz., 840.17, and the sum of $2,156,
amounting to the sum of $990.17." The
declaration also contains the common money
<'onnt. The defendant has dernurrerl to the
declaration generally, but both parties have
.treated thedemul'rer as ifitweresimplyademurrer to the special count. We will so treat
jt, The question, a., it has been argued to us,
js whether the count is good as a count upon
a promise to be implied from the facts alleged.
We think not. The contract which the defendant entered into when he made his bid
was a contrart to pay the price bid by him for
the premises upon receiving a deed thereof,
and, if on tender of the deed he refused
to complete the payment, he committed a
brl'ach of said contract, and laid himself
liable to an action upon it. for damages.
In such action the measure of damage is

the J9ss to the vendor from the rlefault
of the vendee, and it may be that I he
jury, upon proof of the second sale, would
find the damHges to be the difference bt>tween
the two bids and the expense of the second
sale; but the question wot.Id be purely one ot
damages, and they would not be shut up to
thatamount. Mccombs v. :\kKennan, 2 Watts
& 8. 216. In order to make Lhe vendee liable
in assumpsit for such difference am! expense,
in case of his default, it should be made a
condition of the sale that in such case the
properlyshouhl be resold, and the vendee held
to pay such difference and expense. Adams
v. l\lcMillan, 7 Po1-t. (Ala.) 7;), was a case of
real estate solcl at auction, and aftPl'war(ls resold on default by the nndee. The declaration contained a count like the s11ecial count
1 here. The con rt held that whPre a declara' tion does not. ave!', a~ part or the contract of
£ale, a condition that the land shall be resold in case of such default, but only alleg1>s the clilference in price of the twu ~all's,
and as a consequence of the vl'lndee's breach
of his ronlract a liability on his part to pay
that dit'ference, being frameJ on the supposi·
tion that the clitforence is recoveraLile as on a
contract, and not as unliquid11ted damages,
the . declaration will be liad on demurrer.
Hobinson v. Garth, 6 Ala. 2ll4, The plaintiff
contends that the motle of declaring here
used is proper, because the sale was judicial.
and In such sales the defaulting vendee is liable for the deficifmcv on resale, whether the
terms of sale so provide or not. An adminlstrator's sale, however, under our statutes, is
not a judicial sale, as was decided by Judge
STOUY in Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 414. 420.
It has been held in Al~bama that purchasers at
official sales who make default are liaule by
imolied contract for tha deficit on resale.
Lainkin v. Crawford, 8 Ala. lf13; Hutton v.
Williams, 35 Ala. 503. 513. We do not find
the doctrine rooognize<l elsewhere, (2 Freem•
Ex'ns, 2d Ed.,§ 31!:!;) nor, in our opinion,
can an administrator's sale be regarded as an
official sale. In some states the defaulting
purchaser is liable for "the deficiency arising
on resale" by statute. Alexandt>r v. Herriug,
54 Oa. 200. We have no such statute. ThA
subject of the sale under which the question
he1·e arises was real estate, the title to which
could not pass to the purchai1er without dePd.
Whether, if the subject had been goods and
chattels, the same mode of declaring would
have been bad, is a question on which we express no opinion. Demurrer, regarded as a
demurrnr to the special count, sustained.
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ALLEN v. MOHN.

(49 N. W. 52, 86 Mich. 328.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. June 5, 1891.

Error to circuit court, Branch county;

No as P. Lovsmnou, Judge.

Supreme Court of Michigan. June 5, 1891.
Error to circuit com·t, Branch county;
P. LoVERIDGJ•:, Judge.
F. A. Lyon, for appelhmt. ll'. 11. Lockf!rby, for ll ppellce.
No\B

F. A. Lyon, ior appellant. W. H.Lock-

erby, ior appeilee.

GRANT, J. Plaintiff and defendant

made a contract. by which piaintiifiagreed

to sell to defendant certain real estate.

The contract was made in November, I886.

In September, 1890, delendant informed

plaintlii that he could not go on with the

contract, refused to pay the interest

which was then due. and said that he

would give up the contract. While the tes-

timony is not clear as to the circum-

stances under which piaintiii took posses-.

slon of the land, it appears to be conced-
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ed by both parties that deiendant aban-

doned the premises, and plaintlii there-

upon took possession. The contract con-

tained the ioliowing clause: “it is mutu-

ally agreed between the parties that the

said party of the second part shall have

possession of said premises on and alter

date hereof, and he shall keep the same in

as good condition as they are at the date

hereol, until the said sum shall be paid as

aioresaid; and, if said party of the second

part shall iail to perform this contract.

or any part of the same, said party of the

ﬁrst part shall, immediately after such fail-

ure, have a right to declare thesame void,

and retain whatever may have been paid

on such contract, and all improvements

that may have been made on said prem-

ises,and may consider and treat the party

of the second part as his tenant holding

over without permission. and may take

lm mediate possession of the premises, and

remove the party of the second part there-

from." Upon the abandonment of the

contract and of the premises by deiend-

ant plaintiff had his choice of three reme-

dies: (1) Bill ior speciﬁc performance; (2)

suit at law to recover the purchase price;_

and (3) a repossession of the premises

and a suit to recover damagesiora breach

of the contract. The latter remedy is sup-

ported by theioliowing authorities: Rail-

road v. Evaus,6 Gray, 25; Griswold v.Sa-

bin, 51 N. H. 170: Meason v. Kaine.67 Pa.

St. 126, 63 Pa. St. 335; Porter v. Travis,

40 Ind. 556; Wasson v. Palmer, 17 Neb.

330. 22 N. W. Rep. 773. In such case the

measure of dama,':,es is the diiicrence be-

tween the contract price and the ,vaine

oi the land at the time ‘of abandonment

and re-entry, less what has been paid.

This rule is jIT§t, and places vendor and

vendee upon a footing of equality and

mutuality. In order to deprive the ven-

dor of this remedy it must either be ex-

cluded by the terms of the contract, or

waived by his acts and conduct. In this

case the contract does not exclude it, nor'

has the plaintiii waived it. The circuit

GRANT, J.

PlalntlH and

defenrtant

made a contract, by whll'h plalntiffaga·eed

to sell to delenl111nt certain real e1o1tnte.
'.l'h" contract waH mat.le lu No\·emher,

l~ll.

In Septemher, 1:-\90, dc>fcn<lunt lnlormcll
plalntiH that he coulct not gu on with the
contract, refnHl'cl to pn~· tlrn lntercHt
which w11s then clue, uncl Rnicl that he
woulclgl\•e u1> the contrttct. While the testimony Is not cll'>1r nR to tho cirrumstances under which plulntlrt took 11osscs-.
sloo or the Jaiul, It uppears to he conce1led by both partieH that defenrlunt allandoned the premises, an!l plain tiff the1-eupon took poRl!t'HHion. The contrnct contnlned the followi1111. cluuse: "It is mutually aJ:reed lletwecn the parties that the
snl<l party of the i,1econd part shall have
poRSCHslon of said premises on nod after
date hereof, ancl he Rhall keep the Ra me In
as good co11111tloo as they are at tho <late
hereof, until the said 11um 11hall bf' 11111<1 aH
aforesaid; and, if said party of the 11econcl
part sbull fail to perform this con tr1u:t.
or any part of the same. saicJ part~· of the
first part shall, Immediately after such full·
ure, have a right to dt..-clure the same vol•J,
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and retain whatever may ba\•e been paid
011 such contract, and all improvements
that may hn ve been made on said premises. and may com1lcler and tree t the party
of tile stoeond part a11 his tenant holding
over without per111IRHion. and mny take
lmme<liate po118el!slon of the premll!cH, aml
rPmo\•e the party of the RPCond pnrt therefrom." Upon the abandonment of the
contract and of the premises by defendant pl11intlff had his choice of three remedle11: (1) Bill for specific periormunce; ( 2)
suit at Jaw to rel•over tue purchase price;_
and (3) a reposHesslon of the premises
un<l a suit to reco,•er damap:esfora hrcacb
of the con trart. The latter remedy Is Rupported by the following ttnthorltles: Rnilroad v. Enuui,6 Hrny, 25; Gri11wl•ld \'.~u
bln, 51 N. H. 170; ~lea1mn v. Kalne,67 Pu.
St. 126, 63 Pa. St. 33\J; Porter v. Tr11vis,
40 Ind. f>fi6; Wns1m11 v. Palmer, 17 N~·b.
3:10. 22 N. W. Hep. 773. In such c1111e the
mea11ure of dnmugeH Is the diff<'rl'nce be·
tween the contract 11rlce and the _Taine
o} the )1111(] ut the time of abllll(]OUlllPllt
nncl re-l'utry, )pi-;s what hnH lu·l'n 11aid.
This rulti is jffi!t; uncl phices ven1lor and
veu<iei> upon a footing of equality and
mutuality. In order to deprive the \'endor of this l'enwdy It mnst either be exrlniletl by thfl tl'rms of the contrnct. or
waived by his actM and comlnct. In this
cnRe the contr1tct 1loeR not exclude it, nor
hns the plajntift waived it. The clrc•uit.
court wns In error In dlrectlnp: a verdict
for the dt>fenclunt. Judgment Is reverRed,
wl th costH, and a new trial ordered, The
other justices concurred.
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BREAQH OF CONTRACTS RESPEUDING REAL ESTATE.

(2 W. Bl. 1078.)

FLUREAU v. THORNIIILL.

(2 w. B1. 1078.)

Easter Term, 16 Geo. III. C. P.

The plaintif f bought at an auction a rent

of £26 1s. per ann. for a term of thirty-two

years, issuing out of a leasehold house, which

let for £31 6s. Thesale was on the 10th of

October, 1775. The price at which it was

knocked down to him was £270, and he paid a

deposit of 20 per cent., or £54. On looking

into the title, the defendant could not make

it out; but offered the plaintiff his election,

either to take the title with all its faults, or

to receive back his deposit with interest and

costs. But the plaintiff insisted on a farther

sum for damages in the loss of so good a

bargain; and his attorney swore, he believed

the plaintiff had been a loser by selling out

of the stocks to pay the purchase money, and
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their subsequent rise between the 3d and the

10th of November; but named no particular

sum. Evidence was given by the defendant,

that the bargain was by no means advanta-

geous, all circumstances considered; and the

auctioneer proved that he had orders to let

the lot go for £250. The defendant had paid

the deposit and interest, being £54 155. 6d.

into court: But the jury gave a verdict, con-

trary to the directions of DE GREY, C. J., for

£74 15s. 6d., allowing £20 for damages.

Davy moved for a new trial, against which

Glyn shewed cause; and by—

DE GREY, C. J. I think the verdict wrong

in point of law. Upon a contract for a pur-

chase, if the title proves bad, and the vendor

is (without fraud) incapable of making a good

one, I do not think that the purchaser can

be entitled to any damages for the fancied

goodness of the bargain, which he supposes

he has lost. '

GOULD, J., of the same opinion.

BLACKSTONE, J., of the same opinion.

These contracts are merely upon condition,

frequently expressed, but always implied, that

the vendor has a good title. If he has not,

the return of the deposit, with interest and

costs, is all that can be expected. For curios-

ity, I have examined the prints for the price

of stock on the last 3d of November, when

three per cent.'s sold for 87%. About £310

must therefore have been sold to raise £270.

And if it costs £20 to replacethis stock a

week afterwards (as the verdict supposes),

the stocks must have risen near seven-per

cent. in that period, whereas in fact there

was no difference in the price. Not that it is

material; for the plaintiff had a chance of

gaining as well as losing by a ﬂuctuation of

the price.

NARES, J., hesitated at granting a new

trial; but next morning declared that he con-

curred with the other judges.

Rule absolute for a new trial, paying the

costs.

Eaeter Term, 16 Geo. Ill.· C. P.

DE GREY, C. J. I think the verdict wrong
Upon a contract for a purchase, If the title proves bad. and the vendor
is (without fraud) incapable of making a good·
one, I -do not think that the purchaser can
be entitled to any damages for the fancied
goodness of the bargain, wbi,ch he supposes
he has lost.
·

in point of law.

The plaintiff bought a.t an auction a rent
of £26 ls. per ann. for a term of thirty-two
years, issulng out of a leasehold house, which
let tor £31 6s. The .sale was on the 10th of
GOULD, J., of the same opinion.
October, 1775. The price at which It was
knocked down to him was £270, and he paid a
BLACKSTONE, J., of the same opinion.
deposit of 20 per cent., or £54. On looking These contracts are merely upon condition,
into the title, the defendant could not make !requently expressed, but always Implied, that
it out; but offered tbe plaintltr his election, the vendor has a good title. It be has not,
either to take the title with all its faults, or the return of the deposit, wlth Interest and
to receive back bis deposit with interest and costs, ls all that can be expected. For curioscosts. But the plalntltf Insisted on a farther ity, I have examined the prints for the price
sum for damages in the loss of so good a of stock on the last 3d of November, when
bargain; and his attorney swore, he believed three per cent.'s sold for 87¥.i. About £31<>
the plalntur had been a loser by selling out must therefore have been sold to raise £270.
of the stocks to pay the purchase money, and And if it costs £20 to replace. this stock a
their subsequent rise between the 3d and the week afterwards (as the verdict supposes),
lOtb of November; but named no particular the stocks must have risen near seven · per
.sum. Evidence was given by the defendant, ·cent. in that period, whereas In fact there
that the bargain was by no means advanta- was no difference In the price. Not that lt ls
geous, all circumstances considered; and the material; for the plalntUr had a chance or
auctioneer proved that he had orders to let gaining as well as losing by a fluctuation ot
the lot go tor £250. The detendant had paid the price.
the deposit and Interest, being £M 15&. 6d.
NARES, J., hesitated at granting a new
Into court: But the jury gave a verdict, con·
trary to the directions of DE GREY, C. J., for trial; but next morning declared that he concurred with the other judges.
£74 15s. 6d., allowing £20 for damages.
Davy moved tor a new trial, against which
Rule absolute tor a new trial, paying th&
Glyn shewed cause; and bycosts.
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if - HOPKINS v. gas.

I

0 (6 Wheat./109.)

Supreme Court of the United States. Feb.

Term, 1821.

Error to the circuit court for the District

of Columbia.

This was an action of covenant, brought by

the defendant in error Lee against the plain-

tif f in error, Ho kins, to t‘t'cover dam_ages_fo_r_

not conveyinf certain tracts 6? m ary ands,

which tTi'c‘[ﬂ.nn t rror . t 'agi1-c‘1 to con-

vey, upon the (l'efl7ﬂdant in error relieving a

certain incumbrance held by one Rawleigh

Colston, upon an estate called Hill and Dale,

and which Lee had previously granted and

sold to Hopkins, and for which the military
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lands in question were to be received in part

payment: The declaration set forth the cove-

nant, and averred that Lee had completely

removed the incumbrance from Hill and Dale.

The defendant below pleaded: (1) That he‘

had not completely removed the incumbrance;

and (2) that he (the defendant below) had

never been required by Lee to convey the

military lands to him; and on these pleas is-

sues were joined. Upon the trial, Lee, in or-

der to prove the incumbrance in question was

removed, offered in evidence to the jury a

record of the proceeding tn chancery, on a

bill ﬁled against him in the circuit court, by

Hopkins. The bill stated that on the 23d

of January, 1807, the date of the agreement

on which the present action at law was

brought, Hopkins purchased of Lee the estate

of Hill and Dale, for which he agreed to pay

$18,000, namely, $10,000 in military lands, at

settled prices, and to give his bond for the

residue, payable in April, 1800. That Lee, in

pursuance of this agreement, selected certain

military lands in the bill mentioned. That at

the time of the purchase of Hill and Dale, it

was mortgaged to Colston for a large sum,

which Lee had promised to discharge, but

had failed so to do, in consequence of which

Hopkins had paid off the mortgage himself.

The bill then claimed a large sum of money

from Lee, for having removed this incum-

brance, and prayed that the defendant might

be decreed to pay it, or in default thereof that

the claimant might be authorized, by a de-

cree of chancery, to sell the military lands,

which he considered as a pledge remaining in

his hands, and out of the proceeds thereof

to pay himself. On the coming in of Lee's

answer, denying several of the allegations of

the bill, the cause was referred to a master,

who made a report, stating a balance of,

$427.77, due from Hopkins to Lee. This re-

port was not excepted to, and the court, after

referring to it, proceeded to decree the pay-

ment of the balance. To this testimony the

defendant in the present action objected, so

far as respected the reading of the master's

'report, and the decretal order thereon; but the

objection was overruled by the court below,
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tion of covenant, was precisely the same, if

not exclusively so, (although that was not

necessary.) as the one which had already been

directly decided by the court ,of chancery.

The bill, which was ﬂied by the present plain-

tiff in error, states that on the 23d of Jan-

uary, 1807, which is the date of the agree-

ment on which the action at law is brought,

Iiopkins purchased of Lee the estate of Hill

and Dale, for which he was to pay $18,000;

that is, $10,000 in military lands, at settled

prices. and the remainder in bonds, payable

in April, ISU9. That Lee, in pursuance of

this agreement, selected certain military lands

in the bill mentioned. That at the time of

the purchase of Hill and Dale, it was mort-

gaged to ltawieigh Coiston for a large sum,

which Lee had promised to discharge, but

that he had failed so to do, in consequence of
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which Hopkins had paid the mortgage himself.

The complainant then claims a large sum from

Lee, for having removed this incumbrance,

and prays that the defendant may be decreed

to pay it, or in default thereof that the com-

plainant may be authorized,by a decree of the

court, to sell the military lands. which he con-

sidered as a pledge in his hands, and out of

the proceeds to pay himself. Not a single de-

mand is stated in the bill. except the one aris-

ing out of the complainant's extinguislnnent

of the incumbrancc, which Lee had taken

upon himself to remove.

On Lee's answer coming in. denying several

of the allegations of the bill. the cause is

referred to a master commissioner, who, after

a long investigation, in the presence of both

parties, and the examination of many wit-

nesses, makes a report by which Hopkins is

made a debtor of Lee in the sum of $427.77.

On inspection of this report, it will be seen

that the chief if not the only controversy be-

tween the parties was, whether Hill and Dale

had been relieved from its incumbrance to

Colston, by funds furnished by Lee to Hop-

kins for that purpose. and that. unless that

fact had been found afﬁrmatively, a report

could not have been made in Lee's favor.

The court, after referring to this report, and

stating that it had not been excepted to, pro-

ceeds to decree the payment of this balance

by the complainant to the defendant.

this summary review of the proceedings in

chancery, the conclusion seems inevitable

that the chief if not sole matter in litigation

in that suit. was whether Hill and Dale had

been freed of the incumbrance to Colston, by

Lee or by Hopkins. and that the report and

subsequent decree proceeded on the ground

and established the fact that Lee had dis- .

charged it, which was also the only point

put in issue by the ﬁrst plea of the defendant,

in the action of covenant. No rule of evi-

dence, thercfore, is violated in saying that

this decree was properly admitted by the cir-

cuit court. But if the decree were admissible,

it is supposed that the report of the master

ought not to have been submitted to the jury.

— __._._. ___. __..- .-,____—-——_.
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tlon of covenant, was precisely the same, If The court entertains a dlfl'erent opinion. No
not exclusively so, (although that was not reason has been assigned why a decision by a
ne<:essary,) ns the one which had already been proper and sworn otticer of a court ot chandirectly decided by the court ,of chancery. cery, In the presence and hearing of both
The bill, which wns fllt>d by the preseut plain- parties. according to the acknowledged practiff in error, states that on the 2:ld of .Jan- tice and usage of the court on the very mntuary, 1807, which ls the date of the agree- ters In controversy, not excepted to by either
ment on which the action at law Is brought, pa 1·ty and eonftrmed by: the court, sllould not
Hopkins purchased of Lee the estate of Hill be as satisfactory evidence of any fact found
arnl Dale, for which he was to pay $18,000; by It, as the verdict of a jury on which a
that is, lj:l0,000 lu military lands, at settled judgment is afterwards rendered. The adprices. :md the remainder In bonds, payable vantage which a verdict may be supposed to
Ju April. 18U9. That Lee, in pursuance of posi-:pss oYer a report. from Its IJeiug the dethis agreement, selected certain military lands cision of twelve Instead of tile op!uion of a
in the hill mentioned. '.rhnt at the time of s1ngle man, ls perhaps more than countcrbalthe purehnse of Hill and Dale, it wns mort- ancl'd by the time which Is allowed to a masgaged to Hnwlelgh Colston for a large sum, ter for dellberntlon and u more thorough Inveswhich Lee had promised to dls<"harge, but tigation of the matters in controversy. But a
thnt he had foiled so to do, ln conset1uence of better and more satisfactory answer is, that It
which Hopkins ilnd paitl tlle mortgagP himself. ls the usual, known, nnd upprovea pmct!ce of
The complainant then dalms a large snm from the court to whose jurisdiction the parties had
Lee, for ha\·ing ri>moved this ilwumbrance, submitted themselves. But If this document
and 1ways that the tlefPu<lnnt ma~· be decreed ·he withheld from a jury, how are tlley or the
to pa~· it, or in default thereof that the com- eonrt to arrive at the grouuds of the decree
plainant may be authorized. by a decree of the or a knowlt•dge of the points or mattPrs which
<·omt. to Sl'll tlw military lauds. whk-h he con- have ht>Pll <h,dded In the cause? \Yithout it,
sidered as a pledge in his hnnds, and out of the decree may be lntellfglble; but the
the proceeds to pay himself. ~ot a single de- grounds on whleh It proceeds, or the facts
mand is statl'<I in the bill. except the one aris- whh•h It mPnns to decide, mny be liable to
ing out of the complainant's extinguislunent much uncPrtainty and conjecture. '.rhe re·
of tile lncumbrnnee, which Lee had taken port. therefore, as well ns the deeree was
upon himself to remo\·c.
proper evidenee, not only of the fact that
On Lee's answer coming In. den)·ing several such report nnll deeree had been made, but ot
of the a llega tlons of the bill. tlw 1·a use Is the matte1· which they professed directly to
refern'<l to a master con1111lssloner, who, after dPd<le. ·we are not now called upon to say
a long luvestl1wtlon, in the presence of IJoth whether, In those respects, they were concluparties, and the examination of mnny wit- si\·e, as they tlo not appear to have been ofnesses, makes a report by which Hopkins ls fered with that view; but without meaning
mm.I<! ll debtor of Lee In the sum of $-!:?7.77. to dt>ny to them such eft'ect, we only say,
On Inspection of this report, it will be seen which is all that the prei,;ent case requires,
that the chief If not the only controversy be- that they were competent and proper. in the
tween the parties wns, whether H!ll and Dale absence of other testimony, to estnblish the
had been rel!e,·ed from Its !ncumbrance to fact of the r<>moval of the lncumbrance by the
Colston, by funds furnished by Lee to Hop- d<>ft>ndant Lee, from the estate or Hill and
kins for that purpose. and that, unless that Dale.
fact had been found attirmath·ely, a report
In the assessment of damages, the counsel
"<'OUld not llave been made In Lee's favor. for the plnintift' In error prayed the court to
'l'he court, after referring to this report, and instruct the jury that they should take the
slating that It hnd not been excepted to, pro- price of tlle Janel, as agreed upon by the par<·Peds to decree the payment of this balance ties In the articles of agreement upon which
lJ~' the com11la lnant to the defendant.
From the suit was brought, for their government.
this snmmnry review of the proceedings In Hut the court refused to give this instruction.
l"irnneery, the conclusion seems inevitable and directt>d the jury to tnke the_E_t:!c~. ()f
that the ehiPf if not sole matter in litigation the lumls. nt the time tlwy ought to have
in thnt snit. was wlwthPr Hill nml Dale hnd T>t>(>ii eonYt'Yr d. ·iis flli· 1m-.:1,<\1~c~-.0Ld1.1.mal:'eS::
hP('Il freed of the iucumbranee to Colston, by To this Tris frlidiori tlw plalutitf in error exLee or IJy Hopkins. and that the n·port and cepted. The rule is setthHI In this court. that
snh!'rquent decree proce1•1h•d on the ground In un aetlon b~· the n•ndee for a breaeh ot
nm! C'!'tabllshed the fact that Lee had dls- coutrnet, on the part of the vendor, for not
d1arge<l It, whlcll was also the only point 11Pllvering tht• nrtide. tht> measure ot dampnt in issue hy the first plea of the dPCemlnut, ag-es ~-.its price at thr time ot the hreaeh.
in the fiction of covennnt. Xo rule of evi- The pt·ic·e heing sPttlPll hy the contract, wiiich
dence, therefore, Is violated in saying thnt is generally the case. makes no di1Ie1·ence, nor
this clPerPe was properly r..dmitted h~· the c!r- ought It to makP any: otherwise the vendor,
~.·nit court.
Rut If the de<'rri> were admissible, if the article have ri~Pn In value. would alit is supposed that the ri>po1t of thl' master ways have It in his power to discharge him•Jllght not to Lia ,.e been submitted to tlle jury. self fl"om his contract, aw.l put the enhanced
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value in his own pocket. Nor can it make

any difference in principle whether the con-

tract be for the sale of real or personal prop-

erty, if the lands, as is the case here, have

not been improved or built on. In both cases

the vendee is entitled to have the thing agreed

for at the contract price, and to sell it himself

at its increased value. If it be withheld, the

vendor ought to make good to him the differ-

ence. This is not an action for eviction, nor

is the court now prescribing the proper rule of
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damages in such a case. Judgment aﬂirmed.

286

BREAOH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING REAL ESTATE.
PUMPELLY v. PHELPS.
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(40 N. Y. 64.)
BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING REAL ESTATE.

PUMPELLY v. PHELPS.

(40 N. Y. 64.)

Court of Appeals of New York. March, 1869.

Action for speciﬁc performance of a con-

tract to convey land, or in the alternative,

damages for the breach. The plaintiff had

judgment below for damages, and defend-

ant appeals.

Court of Appeals of New York. March, 1869.
Action for specific performance of a. contract to convey land, or In the alternative,
damages for the breach. The plalntltr had
judgment below for damages, a.nd defendant appeals.
John H. Reynolds, tor appellant. Samuel
Hand, for respondents.

John H. Reynolds, for appellant.

Hand, for respondents.

Samuel

MASON, J. There has never seemed to

me to have been any very good foundation

for the rule, which excused a party from the

performance of his contract, to sell and con-

vey lands, because he had not the title which

he had agreed to convey. There seems to

have been considerable diversity of opinion

in the courts as to the grounds upon which
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the rule itself is based.

In England, the rule seems to have been

sustained upon the ground of an implied

outstanding of the parties, that the parties

must have contemplated the diﬂienltles at-

tendant upon the conveyance. In the lead-

ing case on this subject, of Flureau v. Thorn-

hill, 2 W. Bl. 1078, Blackstone, J., said:

“These contracts are merely upon condition,

frequently expressed, but always implied,

that the vendor has a good title."

While in this country the rule is based up-

-on the analogy between this class of cases

and actions for breach of covenant of war-

ranty of title. Baldwin v. Mann, 2 Wend.

399; Peters v. Mclieon, 4 Denio, 546. The

rule of damages, in an action for a breach

of covenant of warranty of title, is settled to

be the consideration paid, and the interest;

and yet this is an arbitrary rule, and works

great injustice many times; and the courts

met with the greatest embarrassment in set-

tling it. These diﬂiculties were considered,

and well expressed, in the leading case in

this state, of Staats v. Ten Eyck‘s Ex'rs, 3

Caines, 115, in which the court said: "To

ﬁnd a rule of damages, in a case like this, is

a work of diﬁienlty; none will be entirely

free from objection, or will not, at times,

work injustice.

“To refund the consideration, even with the

interest, may be a very inadequate compen-

sation, when the property is greatly enhan-

ced in value, and when the money might

have been laid out to equal advantage else-

where. Yet to make this increased value the

criterion, where there has been no fraud,

may also be attended with injustice, if not

ruin.

“A piece of land is bought solely for the

purpose of agriculture, and by some unfore-

seen turn of fortune, it becomes the site of

a populous city; after which an eviction

takes place. Every one must perceive the

injustice of calling on a bona ﬁde vendor to

refund its value, and that few fortunes could

bear the demand. Who for the sake of one

hundred pounds would assume the hazard

of repaying as many thousands, to which

MASON, J. There has never seemed to
me to have been any very good foundation
for the rule, which excused a party from the
performance of his contract, to sell and con·
vey lands, because he had not the title which
he had agreed to conl"ey. There seems to
have been considerable diversity of opinion
In the courts as to the grounds upon which
the rule Itself Is based.
In England, the rule seems to have been
sustained upon the ground of an Implied
outstanding of the parties, that the parties
must have contemplated the difficulties attendant upon the conveyance. In the leading case on this subject, of Flureau v. Thornhill, 2 W. BI. 1078,. Blackstone, J., said:
"These contracts are merely upon condition,
frequently expressed, but always implled,
that the vendor has a good title."
While In this country the rule ls based up·on the analogy between this class of cases
and actions for breach of covenant of warrnnty of title. Baldwin v. Munn, 2 Wend.
8tl9; Peters v. McKeon, 4 Denio, 540. The
rule of damages, In an a.ctlon for a breach
-Of covenant of warranty of title, Is settled to
be the consideration paid, and the Interest;
and yet this ls an arbitrary rule, :md works
great Injustice many times; and the courts
met with the greatest embarrassment ln set·
tling it. These difficulties were considered,
.and well expressed, In the leading case In
this state, of Staats v. Ten Eyck"s Ex'rs, 3
Caines, 115, In which the court said: "To
find a rule of damages, In a case like this, Is
a work of difficulty; none wlll be entirely
fr~ from objection, or will not, at times,
work Injustice.
"To refund the consideration, even with the
Interest, may be a very Inadequate compen·
sation, when the property ls greatly enhanced In value, and when the money might
have been laid out to equal advantage else·
where. Yet to make this Increased value the
criterion, where there has been no fraud,
may also be attended with Injustice, It not
ruin.
"A piece ot land ls bought solely for the
purpose of agriculture, and by some unforeseen turn of fortune, It becomes the site of
a populous city; after which an eviction
takes place. Every one must perceive the
Injustice of calling on a bona fide vendor to
refund Its l"alue, and that few fortunes could
bear thl' <]emand. Wllo for the sake ot one

hundred pounds would assuQle the hazard
of repaying as many thousands, to which
value the property might rise, by causes
unforeseen by either party, and which In·
crease ln worth would confer no right on the
grantor to demand a further sum of the
grantee?" There is st111 another class of
cases where the rule of simply refunding
the purchase-money a.nd the Interest operates with great hardship and Injustice upon
tl1e purchaser. A. purchases of B. a city lot
for the purpose of building himself a dwelling or bulldings upon It, and takes from B.
a full covenant deed of the premises, covenanting to assure, warrant and defend the
title. The buildings are constructed at the
cost ot thousands of dollars, and then B. is
evicted by a paramount title ascertained to
be ln some one else. The recovery of the
money and six years' lntel"t'St ls not a very
just or reasonable return In damages for the
law to give to one who holds a covenant to
make good a.nd defend the title.
The reasons assigned for this rule In actions for a breach of covenant of warranty
of title can scnrcely apply to these prellmiIiOry contracts to sell and convey title at a
future time. • In the latter ca.se the vendee
knows he bas not got the title, a.nd that per·
haps he may never get It; and It he wlll go
on and make expenditures under such cir·
cumstances It Is his own fault; and besides,
these preliminary contracts to convey generally bal"e but a short time to run, a.nd
there ls seldom any such opportunity for the
growth of towns, or a large Increase In the
value of the property as there ls In these
covenants In deeds, which run with the land
through all time.
The supreme court of the United States
bas refused to yield Its S:J.nctlon to this
rule when applied to cont1'1lcts for the sale
of lands, and affirms the doctrine that the
reason of the rule ns to contructs fo1· the sale
of goods and chattels applles with equal
force to these e:x:ecutory contrncts for the
sale of lands. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 100.
That rule ls where a party sustains a loss by
reason of a breach of contract, he ls, so far
as money can do lt, to be placed ln the same
situation with respect to damages as If the
contract had been performed. Roblm1on v.
Harman, 1 Exch. 850. This case of Hopkins
v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, ls cited with approbation ln some of the American cases, a.nd the
rule there laid down a.fflrmed.
These views are not presented to induce
the court to overrule or repudiate the adjudged cases In our own courts upon this
subject. They reach back over a period of
more than forty years, and have been too
long sanctioned to be now repudiated.
I have referred to this matter simply as
furnishing an argument against In any degree extending the rule, and as a reason for
llmltlng It strictly where the already ad·
judged cases In our own courts have placed
lt. It becomes Important In this connection

BREACH BY VENDOR OF AGREEMENT TO SELL AND UU.\' VEY.

287

’_,,____

to inquire what that limit is. The general

Y rule certainly is that where the vendor has

i

L

the title and for any reason refuses to con-

vey it, as required by the contract, he shall

respond in law for the damages in which he

shall make good to the plaintiff, whom he

has lost by his bargain not being lived up to.

This gives the-_v,endee the diﬁerence between

the contract? price and the value at the time

of th'e"‘DrezTch, as prolit'§"6xTadvantages whi_cla

a_ne*_the.di_r_ect1a_nd_’imItt'e'(IlE‘_re_' fruits of the

contr_act. Gritiin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489;

Dﬁrkee v. Mott, 8 Barb. 423; Underhill v.

Gas-light Co., 31 How. 37; Masterson v.

Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61, 69.

Where however the vendor contracts to sell
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and convey in good faith, believing he has

good title, and afterward discovers his title

is defective, and for that reason without any

fraud on his part, refuses to fulﬁll his con-

tract, he is only liable to nominal damages

for a breach of his contract. Baldwin v.

Mann, 2 Wend. 309; Peters v. McKeon, 4

Denio, 546; Conger v. Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140.

The rule is otherwise however where a par.\

ty contracts to sell lands which he knows at

the time he has not the power to sell and

convey; and if he violates his contract in‘;

the latter case, he should be held to make;

good to the vendee the loss of his bargain,;\

and it does not excuse the vendor, that he

may have acted in good faith and believed,‘

when he entered into the contract, that hei

should be able to procure a good title for hili

purchaser. 2 Pars. Cont. 503, 504, 505; Hop-

kins v. Grazebrook, 6 Barn. & O. 31; Driggs ,

7. Dwight, 17 Wend. 74; Bush v. Cole, 28 N.

Y. 261; Lock v. Furze, L. R. 1 C. P. 441;

Robinson v. Harman, 1 Exch. 849; Hill v.

Hobart, 16 Me. 164; Fletcher v. Button, 6

Barb. 650; Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115;

Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109; Burwell v.

Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535; White v. Madison, 26

N. Y. 124; Lewis v. Lee, 15 Ind. 499; Dean

v. Raseler, 1 Hilt. 420; Bitner v. Brough, 11

Pa. St. 127; MeNair v. Crompton, 35 Pa. St.

23; Wilson v. Spencer, 11 Leigh, 261; Gra-

ham v. Hackwlth, 1 A. K. Marsh. 429; Dart,

Vendors, 447. This rule, applied to the case

at bar, sustains the judgment of the supreme

court.

The defendant must be held personally lia-

ble on this contract. It is essentially his

contract. In order to exempt the contract-

ing party from personal liability, he must so

contract as to bind those he claims to repre-

sent. Moss v. Livingston, 4 N. Y. 208; De-

witt v. Walton, 9 N. Y. 571; Bay v. Gunn, 1

Denio, 108; Bush v. Cole, supra.

The fact that the party describes himself

as trustee, without stating for whom, does

not relieve him from personal liability, or

change the effect of his engagement. Taft

v. Brewster, 9 Johns. 334; White v. Skinner,

13 Johns. 307; Dewitt v. Walton, supra;
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Supreme Court of New York. Feb. Term, 1809.
Mr. Foot, for plaintiff.
defendanL
~

Yr. Slosson, for

Mr. Foot, for plaintiff. .\Ir.

defendant . 4

Slosson, for

VAN NESS, J. Although it is not express-

ly stated in the case, I shall assume the fact

to be, that the declaration contains an aver-

ment that the plaintiff had been evicted, in

consequence of a total failure of the title de-

rived to him under the deed from the defend-

ant. This fact being assumed, there is no

difference between the present case and that

of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex‘rs, 3 Caines, lllf,

except, that,' in this case. beneﬁcial improve-

ments have been made by the plaintiff upon

the property, the value of which he contends

he is entitled to recover. The case just men-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

tioned is among the most important and inter-

esting, of any that have ever been brought

before this court for decision; and. accord-

ingly. it appears to have received the most

deliberate consideration. I not only submit

to the authority of that case. but I take this

occasion to express my perfect acquiescence

in the reasons, upon which the determination

of it appears to have proceeded. The cove-

nants upon which the breaches were assign-

ed in that case, were the same as in the pres-

ent. viz. the covenant of seisin, and for quiet

enjoyment. The court decided, that the dam-

ages. which the plaintiff was entitled to re-

cover, were to be limited to the consideration

expressed in the deed, with the interest there-

on, and the costs of suit7att,ending the evic-

tion. But in addition to the sum which the

plaintiff, according to this rule. would recov-

er, he contends that the defendant is bound

to indemnify him for the loss of his im-

provements. These are estimated at 925 doi-

lars; and the only point left open to discus-

sion. is. whether he has a legal right to de-

mand this sum?

In Ftaats v. Ten Eyck's Ex‘rs, the court de-

termined that the plaintif f was not entitled

to recover any damages on account of any

increased value of the land. Here a distinc-

tion is attempted to be made between an ap-

preciation of the land itself. and that appre-

ciation of it which is produced by the erec-

tion of buildings. or the labour bestowed up-

on it in clearing and cultivating: a very

son, why the increased value of the land

itself cannot be recovered; is because the cov-

enant cannot be construed to extend to any

thing beyond the subject matter -of it, that

is, the land, and not to the increased value of "

it, subsequently arising from causes not ex-

isting when the covenant was entered into.

For the same reason, the covenantor ought

not to recover for the improvements; fort

these are no more the subject matter of the‘

contract between the parties, than the in-

creased value of the land. The doctrine con-

tended for by the plaintiff's counsel, is. that

the damages sustained by the covenantee at

the time of the eviction, ought to be the meas-

VAX XESS, J. .Although It Is not expressly stated· In the case. I shall assume the fact
to be, that the declaration contains an averwent that the plalnti!'r bad been evicted, in
consequence of a total failure of the title derived to him under the deed from the defendant. This fact being assumed, there is no
difference between the present case and that
of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs. 3 Caines, llH,
except, that,' in this case. beuelieinl Improvements have been made by the pluintifi' upon
the property, the value of which he contends
he Is entitled to recover. The case just mentioned Is among the most Important and interesting, of any that have ever been brought
before this court for decision; and. accordingly. It appears to have received the most
delilwrate cousider11tion. I not ouly submit
to the authority of that case, but I take this
occuslon to express my perfect acquiescence
In the rt~asons, upon which the determluatlou
of it a1>pe1irs to have proceeded. The co-renauts upon which the breaches were assigned in that case, were the same as in the present. viz. the covenant of seisin, and for quiet
enjoyment. The court decldPd, that the damages. which the plaintiff was entitled to recon'r, we1·e to be limited to the consideration
t'X!'l"l'i'lSt'll in the deed, with the Interest thereon, and the costs of suit attt>rnllng tbe e.vlctlou. Ent In addition to the sum whkh the
plnintilf, nccordlng to this rule. would recov·
er, he contends that the defendant Is bound
to Indemnify him for the loss of his Im·
pr0Yementi1. Thc8e are cf<tlmnte1l at 925 doll:ll's; nrnl the on!~· point left open to discussion. Is. whether be has a legal right to tle·
m:md this sum?
In io:tants '" Ten E~·ck's Ex'rs, the court dett'rmined thut the plnlntil'f was not entitled
to l'l'l'over any dn11111ges on account of auy
ilwreased value of the land. Here a distinction is nttemptl'd to be made betwef'11 an apprPl'iatiou of the land ltst•lf. and that appr1•·
dntion of it whil'h is pro1luced by the erection of hul111ings. or the labour hestowt•d upon it in e!Pal'illl! aml cultivating: a very
niee. and. as I appr1'11eml. n spPeulative distinl'!il)ll, to whieh It wonhl l.Je dittleult, If not.
in most c11st's, lmpossihk. to J?IYe any praC'tical <'lfeet, without dauger of the most ftai;trant
lnjnslic-l'. The reasoning of the judgci<.
whof<t' opinions are reported In the case allmlrd to, goes Yl'ry far, if not conclusi-rl'ly,
to prove, that such a distinction Is uttl'rly
without foundlltion. The ndmisl'ion that It
might possibly exist. has prohahl~· gl-ren rise
to this aetion, which, othPrwise, I believe,
would not. 11rte1· that 1lel'islou, ha-re been
brought. One, and perhaps the principal rea-

son, why the Increased value of the Jami
Itself cannot be recovered; is because the covenant cannot be construed to extend to any
thing beyond the subject matter ·of It, that ·
is, the land, and not to the Increased value of
it, subsequently arising f1·om causes not existing when the covenant was entered Into.
Fo1· the same reason, the eovenantor ough~
not to recover for the lmpro¥ements; tot1
these are no more the subject matter of the'
contract between the pnrtles, thnn the Increased value of the land. The doctrine contended for by the plaintiff's counsel, Is, that
the dnmages sustained by the covenantee at
the time of the eviction, ought to be the measure of compensation. l\Iost clearly, tllen, the
increased value of the land Is ns much within the reason of this rule, as the improvements; and upon the same 1>rinciple that the
covenantee is entitled to the one, he le to the
other.
But If the value at the time of eviction is
to be the mensure of d11n111ges, upon what
principle Is the consideration and Interest, as
suei1, recoverable in addition to the Improvements'! These must be laid out or view;
and the then value he ascertnlned without
reference to them. Besides. If, In determining the rule of damages, the Increase of valm'
Is to be taken Into view, by parity of reason·
Ing, It would be proper. and what would be
required by a just reciprocity, to take Into
consideration any contingent diminution of
value. E.'rsk. Inst. 206. But this has never
been heard of nor pretended. No such principle Is to be found In the common law, notwithstanding these covenants have been In
use upwards of two hundred years. I think
this circumstance aO'ords au argument
against the measure of damages Insisted UP·
on by the plalntift', and which, of itself. Is
nearly decisive. that the rule Is without legal
founda tlou,
In lllustratlon of my opinion on this part or
the at•gurnent, I will state a case. A. gives
11 conveyance, containing covenants of seisin
anti for quiet enjoyment, of a house and lot.
The hnuse constitutes two-thirds of the whole
v11lue. 'l'he house Is afterwards l.JurnL Then
;,
the grantee is evicted for a failure of the 0 ,
grantor's title. Ile then resorts to both his \ '!.
euveuants, whid1, of t'om·se. are l.Jroken, for{)..,~
Indemnity. What would be the mensure of \ ~"
dam11ges? the value of the lot, nt the time of
/'
e\·iet1011, being one-third of what the whole 1_ ,1. 1fi
cost him; or the valuP. as as1·Prt11ined and f"' J'
agrPPd upon hy the dPPd ltsl'lf'! !'\o doubt,
,,~
thP. l11t1Pr. " . hPllPVl'l' tl11' g1·antee's title ha'!"
pron•d to llP 1-•ntin•ly defective, nod there is ·
an eYil'liou cuuspquent thereon, the grantee
has a right to rPseind the contract, and thPn.
as In other cases 11Pprndlng on the same principle. he recovC'rf! haek. upon his covennut~.
what he has pnlli, with the Interest. J<'iel<ler
v. l'!tarkin, 1 H. Bl. 17; Flureau v. Thoruhlll. 2 W. BI. 1078.
la the casr ju!'t put, I ha,·e supposed. that
both the covenants of seisin and for quiet
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i for quiet enjoyment;

enjoyment were broken, and that breaches

for both were duly assigned; and I have

shown that, if the value of the property at

the time of eviction is to be the measure of

damages, it necessarily follows, that such ,

diminished value is all which ought to be re-

covered. It is conceded, that, upon the cove-

nant of seisin only, the recovery is to be con-

ﬁned to the consideration and interest. On

the covenant for quiet cujoyment, therefore,

the plaintiff must rely, to recover compensa-

tion for his improvements. Let us then ex-

amine whether, consistently with certain

ﬁxed legal principles, the covenantee can re-

cover a greater sum of damages in any case

under the covenant for quiet enjoyment, than

under the covenant of seisin?
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An eviction must be shown before a suit

can be maintained on the former covenant.

Not so, however. as to the latter; for that is

broken, if the grantor has no title. the mo-

ment the deed is delivered; and the grantee

has an immediate right of action. Whenever

the eviction is occasioned by a total want of

title in the grantor, then both the covenants

of seisin and for quiet enjoyment are equally

broken; and the grantee has his remedy on

both. if he proceeds upon the ﬁrst, he shall

recover the consideration expressed in the

deed, and the interest. But if he proceeds

upon the last, it is said he shall recover ac-

cording to the value at the time of eviction;

and, as I have before remarked, he must be

content to recover according to the then

value, even though it amounts to one half

only of the consideration expressed in the

deed.

The case would then stand thus. When the

deed contains both these' covenants, if the

property at the time of eviction be worth

one hallI of the consideration and interest,

the grantee may, notwithstanding, upon the

covenant of seisin, recover the whole con-

sideration and interest. But if the property

happen to be worth double the consideration

money and interest, by reason of the im-

provements made thereon, he may ‘waive the

covenant of seisin, and resort to the covenant

and thus recover the

whole amount. Can this be possible? It

appears to me, that to give such an effect to

these covenants, is not reconcilable with any

principle of law or justice.

My understanding of the nature of these

covenants. when both are contained in the

same deed, is this: That the covenant of

seisin, which relates to the title, is the prin-

cipal and superior covenant, to which the

covenant for quiet enjoyment, which goes to

the possession, is inferior and subordinate.

And I am not aware that a case can possibly

occur, where the grantor can recover a great-

er amount in damages for the breach of the

latter than of the former; though there are

many cases where he may recover less. The

suit here is brought upon both covenants;

enjoyment were broken, and that breaches
tor both were duly nsic:l(rnPll; and I have
shown that, It the value of the property at
the time ot eviction Is to Ut:- the measure or
dan111gl'S, It neccssarlly tollo\vs, that such
dlmiui11hed n1lue Is all which ought to ~e recon•rt'fl. It Is eoncetll'tl, that, upon the covenant ot seisin only, thP rrcovery Is to be confined to the conshlt>rnllon and Interest. On
the co,·enant for quiet cujo~·ment. therefore,
the plnlntlll' must rely, to rt•covt>r compensation tor his Improvemt>nts. Let us thcn examine whether, consh1trntly with cPrtaln
fixed legal principles, the covenantee can l'l'cover a greater sum or damages In any case
undr.r the coyenant tor quiet enjoyment, than
under the covenant ot seisin?
An eviction must be shown before a suit
c11n be maintained on the former covenant.
:"iot llO, however. all to the latter; ror that .s
brokl'D, tr the gmntor bas no title. the moml·nt the deed Is delivered; and the grantee
has aii Immediate right or action. Whenen~r
the eviction Is occasioned by a total want of
title In the grantor, then beth the covenants
of selslr. and ror quiet enjoyment. nre equally
brokPn; and the grantee has his remedy on
hotll. If he procePds upon the first, he shall
recover the conslclemtlon expressed In the
deed, and the Interest But It he proceeds
upon the last, It Is said he shall recover according to the value at the time or eviction;
Rnd, as I have before remarked, he must be
contPnt to rPCover according to the then
value. el"en thou11:h It amounts to one half
only or the conshleratlon expressed In the
(}Ped.
The case would then stand thus. When the
deed contains both these· covenants, 11' the
property at the time ot eviction be worth
one half of the consideration and Interest,
the granteP may, notwithstanding, upon the
cm·enant or seisin. recover the \Vhole conl'lderatlon and Interest. But It the property
happen to be worth double the conslllPrntlon
money and Interest, by reason or the Improvements made thereon, he may ·waive the
covenant or seisin, and resort to the co,·Pnnnt
: tor quiet enjoyment; and thus recover the
whole amount Can this be poslillhle? It
appears to me, that to gl7e such an ell'ect to
these covenants, le not reconcilable with any
principle or law or justice.
:!\ly understanding or the nature of these
covenants. when both are contalnPd In the
Mme deed, Is this: That the covenant or
l!elsln, which relates to the title, Is the principal and superior covenant, to which the
covenont for quiet enjoyment, which goes to
the posse1<slon, ls Interior and subordinate.
And I am not aware tbot a cnst> can possibly
occur, where the grantor can rPcover a greatPr amount In damages for the breach or the
latter lhan or the former; though there are
many cases where he may recover less. The
suit here Is brought upon both covenants;
and both, In consequence of the total failure
of the rlpfendant's title and the eviction,
I ••\"" D.Df.:!11 F.d.-19
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haYe bePn hroken. The plalntltr, accordingly, has a right to recovPr on both; but as tht•
amount of the recovery would, aecol'<llug to
m~· h!Pa!', l.Je the same on cn('h, he must t•lt>1·t
on whll'f.1 of them he means to rely, and t11k1•
nomi1:al llnmoges on the other. The plalntl!T
ls entlt!P1l to but one satisfaction, 11n1l be hai;
hls remedy on either of the CO\'Pnants. at his
election, to obtain It. It will banlly be 11nid.
that he can hn,·e judgment for the same sum
OD hoth the CO\'l!llants.
The covrm1nt against lncumbrances stnmls
upon n different foo ting, and Is goYerned by
dlfferrnt prlnelples. That 11 strictly a con'·
nant or Indemnity; and the grantee may rPcover to the full extent ot any lncumbrances
upon the land, which he shall have been compelled to discharge. But even there It will
be t'ound. that the same rule prevails, In fix·
Ing the amount or damage!!, u In actions upon the covenants or seisin and tor quiet enjoyment: that ls, the party recovers what be
has paid, w!th the Interest. and no more.
But I consider the question arising In this
cause as settled by authority; and that, accorlllug to established rules of law, the plalntllf Is not entitled to any thing more than
the value or the land, as settled by the conaldcra tlon In the deed.
In suits upon the ancient covenant or warranty, beyond nil dispute, the reeovery was
restricted to the vahw or the land at the time
ot making the covenant. Cases have oceurred, in which the value or the land bas been
enhanced by subspquent beneficial Improvements; but the rule as to the extent ot satisfaction, has continued Inflexibly the same,
without regard to the Increased value, by
whatever cause It may have been .prodnel'd.
A personal action will not lie, on the covenant
ot "·arranty, upon the eviction of the freehold (Bae. Abr. tit. Cov. C.); and tor which
reason, upon the Introduction ot allenatlon11
by bargain and sale, new covenants .were devised, but solely tor the purpose or securln~
to the bargalnee the pcrson!ll responslbllit;\·
ot the bargalnor, In C8!1P of a !allure of hli;
title. I think I am warrantPd In saying, that
It never was designed, by the Insertion of
these covenants, to establish any other rul<•
or damages than what previously exlstpd;
because there Is nothing In the terms or thP
eovenants, from which an Intention to ex!ellfl
the liability or the covenontor can be ln!Pr·
red; but the contrary ls to be presumed, as
not a single case Is to be found wherP sueh
n construction or these col'enants, which werP
In a great measure substituted tor the cov1•·
nant or warranty, has ever obtained. Thi·
covenant tor quiet enjoyment, as I have bPfore remarked, le ·that upon which ·compensation tor the lmprovemPnts Is to be recovered, If at all. This covenant bas a mon•
strict analogy to the ancient covenant of
warranty, than any or the other modern covenants. It, then, on the covenant of warranty, the satisfaction rf'(OVPrrd In land wni;
to be equivalent to the vnlnr or the lu111ls.
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granted, as it existed at the time when the

covenant was made, I do conceive, that we

are bound to adopt a correspondent rule,

when satisfaction is sought to be recovered

in money, in a personal action, on the cove-

nant for quiet enjoyment.

Such a rule, moreover, 1 consider to be con-

formable to the intention of the parties. I

question if one grantor out of ten thousand

enters into these covenants with the remotest

belief, that he is exposing himself and his

posterity to the ruinous consequences, which

would result from the doctrine contended for

by the counsel for the plaintiff. By giving

this doctrine our sanction. we should. in my

apprehension, create a most unexpected and

oppressive responsibility, never contemplated

by the parties, and inﬂict an equally unmer-

ited punishment upon grantors acting with

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

good faith. and having a perfect conﬁdence

in the validity of their title to the land, which

they have transferred for what it is reason-

ably worth.

If any imposition is practiced by the gran-

tor, by the fraudulent suppression of truth,

or suggestion of falsehood, in relation to his

title, the grantee may have an action on the

case, in the nature of a writ of deceit; and

in such action he would recover to the full

extent of his loss. Har. & But. Notes to Co.

Litt. 38-ta, tit. "Warranty"; 1 Fonb. Eq. 366;

1 Com. Dig. 236, A, 8.

I am aware that it is diﬂlcult to lay down

any general rule on this subject, wholly free

from objection. This is a diﬂlculty which

has been felt by the profoundest jurists in

all ages. I think, however, that the rule of

the common law, which obliges the grantor,

when he believes he has a valid title, and

acts without fraud, to refund what he has

received, with the interest, is as equitable as

any that has ever been established; and that

this is all which, upon principles of the most

BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING REAL ES'l'..\TE.

gra.nletl, as it existed at the time when the
co'\"enant was made, I do concel"'e, that we
are bound to adopt a. correspondent rule,
when satisfaction Is sought to be recovered
in money, In a personal action, on the covenn nt for quiet enjoyment.
8ueh a rule, moreo"'er, I consider tO be conforma hie to the Intention of the parties. I
qttestion If one gra.ntor out of ten tpousapd
enters Into these covenants with the remotest
belief, that he Is exposing himself and his
Ilosterlty to the ruinous consequences, which
would re1mlt from the doctrine contended for
by the counsel for the plaintiff. By giving
.this doctrine our sanction, we should. In my
apprehension, create a Dlost unexpected and
oppressive responsibility, never contemplnted
hy the parties, and inflict an equally unmerited punishment upon grantors acting with
good faith. and having a perfect confidence
In the validity of their title to the land, which
they have transferred for what It Is reasonably worth.
It any Imposition ls practiced by the grantor, by the fraudulent suppression of truth,
or suggestion of falsehood, In r<>latlon to his
tftle, the grantee may have an action on the
<>ase, In the nature of a writ of deceit; and
In such action he would recover to the full
extent of his loss. Har. & But. :Notes to Co.
Litt. 384a, tit. "Warranty"; 1 Fonb. Eq. 366;
1 Com. Dig. 236, A, 8.
I am aware that It is difficult to lay down
uny gene1·al rule on this subj<>ct, wholly free
from objection. This Is a difflculty which
hns been felt by the profoundest jurists In
all ages. I think, however, that the rule of
the common law, which obliges the grantor,
when he believes he bas a valid title, and
acts without fraud, to refund whnt he has
received, with the Interest, ls as equitable as
nny that has ever been estahllsbed; and that
this Is all which, upon principles of the most
rigorous justice, ought to be exacted from
him.
My opinion, therefore, Is, that, In this case,
the plaintiff Is entitled to recover the conslderntion money expressed In the deed, with
the Interest, and the costs of suit following
the eviction, and no more.

rigorous justice, ought to be exacted from

him.

My opinion, therefore, is, that, in this case,

the plaintiff is entitled to recover the consid-

eration money expressed in the deed, with

the interest, and the costs of suit following

the eviction, and no more.

SPENCER, J. It is submitted to the court,

by the case made and argued in this cause,

what is the correct rule of damages, upon

covenants of seisin and for quiet enjoyment,

contained in a deed conveying lands. in a

case where the grantee has made improve-

ments, and where the value of the land has

appreciated. It is also made a question,

\\-hether the plaintiff is entitled to recover in-

ten'st on the consideration money paid for

the lands.

It is to be regretted, that the case is so loose

in several respects. It is fair, however, to

infer, from the case as it stands, and as it

was argued, that. in point of fact, both cove-

nants were broken; that the plaintiff was

evicted for defect of title in the defendant,

I

8PE!\CI<;R, J. It Is submitted to the court,
hy the case made and nrgued In this cause,
what Is th<> correct rule of damn~es, upon
cov enants of seisin and for quiet enjoyment,
contained In a deed conve.ving lands. In a
ense where the grantee bas made lmprovem<>nts, nnd where the value of the land has
ap1m'<·l:1t1•d. It Is also made a question,
wlH'ther the plaJntlff Is entitled to recoYer lnten·st on the conslderatl6>n money paid for
the lands.
It Is to he re!{rettcd, that the case ls so loose
In several res1>ects. It Is fair, however, to
Infer, from the case as It stands, nnd as It
was argued, that. In point of fact, hoth covenants w ere broken; that the plaintiff was
evicted for defect of title In the defendant,

l and

that the plaintiff had made lmprove-

I ments, In the usual cours<' of agriculture, on
the lands conveyed by the defendant to him,
of a substantial kind, to the vnlne of $92r>.
The case of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs. 3
Caines, 112, decides two of the questions
which arise out of this case. In that case,
though the value of the land bad Increased
by extrinsic causes, the plalntift' was allowed
to rec°'·er only the consideration paid, with
the Interest, costs. and coansel fees. 'l'he lnterl'st was allowed, because the purchaser
was subject to an action for tl1e mesne
profits; and In the pres<>nt case It is to be (
Intended, that the plalntltT Is liable to pn)'
th<>m to the person who has the title, and
consequently It Is to be allowed. It will be
seen, that these two questions have received
a similar determination In the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts. Marston v.
Hobhs, 2 ~lass. 433. In the case, before
cited, of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex' rs, the court
expressly reserved Its opinion. upon a case
like the present, where beneficial lmpro"'ements have been made on the premises after
the purchase. It was then considered, that
there might be a difference between the C'nse
of the rise In value by the natural apprcd11tlon of lnnds, depending In a great mensure
on ideal worth, and the case of Improvements
of a beneficial kind.
This question I do not think has been settled In the English courts. It has never been
decided In our own, and consequently It n11pears to me, that we are at full liberty to fix
a rule, which shall bear analogy to othl'r
cases, and attain complete justice between
the parties. I cannot pretend to say, that
the rule which I shall lay down wlll be free
'rom objection, when applied to all cn11es:
and I all} not sensible that any general rul!'.
In almost any given case, will Invariably be
free from exception. It ts the very natur<'
of general rules, sometimes to operate harshly; but the necessity of a fixed standar<l of
justice is of more lmportauce to the intPrt>i,;t;;;
of men, than one that Is capricious nn<l lhll'·
tuatlng.
It has I think been erroneously said, that
the defect of title ls a case of mutual error;
on the contrary, from my obser"'atlon and
knowledge of the sole of lands, I think the
defect of title Is a mattel" generally and almost unlversnlly In the peculiar knowledg<> t
of the Yendor. It Is a rare cnsP for a purchaser to investigate the seller's title; an<l in
most cases, It Is Impossible. The buyer relies on the allegations of the vendor, on bis
apparent responslhlllty to reln1burse ln case
of .evlcUon, upon bis possession of the property, and emphatiC'a lly on bis covenants or
title and for quiet enjoyment. These con•nants, whenever they occur In a deed, seem
to me to Indicate. beyond all question, thnt
the purchaser did not mean to rel~· on th<>
title of the vendor alone. but that he meant
to have his personnl llahfllty, as bis guaranty.
The language of the venllor corresponds with

j
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that of the purchaser, and holds out the idea

that he had sold the land at his own peril,

and that he would warrant it to be his. Ex-

travagant cases have been put hypothetical-

ly, to shew the enormous injustice of the rule,

that the vendor must be answerable for im-

provements. It has been asked, if a piece

of land thus sold, with covenants, should be-

come the site of a ﬂourishing city, what for-

tune could, under a rule allowing for im-

provements, withstand ruin? It may be re-

torted to such a question, what is to become

of the industrious citizen or mechanic, who

has spent his hard earnings in erecting his

little house or workshop, relying on the cove-

nant in his deed, if he can only get back his

purchase-money and interest? It is not fair,

however, to test a rule by extreme cases.

To settle a general rule wisely and equitably,
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we should have an eye to cases which gen-

erally occur, and not be startled, on the one

hand or the othtr, by those occurrences which

are rare and t'ew. In general, the defect of

title happens in sales between man and man,

where the improvements are of the ordinary

and beneﬁcial kind. If the improvements are

merely to gratify the eye of the individual,

and to pamper his vanity and pride, a jury

would be warranted to take those things into

consideration in their assessment of damages.

I lay it down as a rule, which cannot re-

quire much illustration to enforce it, on the

core of analogy and justice, that in actions

for a breach of covenant, the damages are to

be estimated according to the value of the

thing, when the covenant was broken. Thus,

in a covenant for the delivery of speciﬁc prop-

erty at a given day, in case of a failure, the

rule invariably is, to allow in damages the

value of the thing on the day it ought to

have been delivered, and when the covenant

was broken. So, also, on contracts for the

delivery of stock, the value at the time it

ought to have been delivered, and even at the

time of trial, has been the criterion of dam-

ages. 2 Burrows, 1010; 1 Strange, 406; 2

East, 211. In the present case, the defendant

(.'ovenanted that the plaintiff should quietly

enjoy the land sold. This covenant was vio-

lated, when the piaintiff was evicted; and he

has lost, by the breach of the covenant, not

only the quiet enjoyment of the land, but the

usufruct of those erections and improvements,

without which, it is fair to say, that the

land itself could not have been enjoyed, agree-

ably to the intention of the parties. It neces-

sarily follows, that had the defendant kept

his covenant and allowed the plaintiff to en-

joy the premises old, he would not have been

deprived of those improvements made on the

ti1ing itself, the making of which was an

inducement to the purchase. How it can be

called a severe doctrine to compel the vendor

to respond in damages for ordinary and neces-

sary improvements, I confess myself incapa-

ble of perceiving, when he has undertaken,

for a price paid, to assure to the vendee the

validity of his title. Very often, and perhaps

that of the purchaser, and holds out the idea
that he had sold the Jand at his own peril,
and that he would warrant It to be his. Extravagant cases have beai put hypothetically, to shew the enormous Injustice of the rule,
that the vendor must be answerable for lmprol"ements. It has been asked, If a piece
ot land thus sold, with covenants, should beaime the slte of a fiourlshlng city, what fortune could, under a rule allowing tor Improvements, withstand ruin'/ It may be retorted to such a question, what Is to become
-0t the Industrious citizen or mechanic, who
has spent his hard earnings In erecting his
little house or workshop, relying on the cove\ nant In his de€Cl, If he can only get back his
pur<:lrnse-money and Interest? It Is not fair,
howeYer, to test a rule by extreme cases.
To settle a general rule wisely and equitably,
we should hal"e an eye to cases which generally occur, and not be startled, on the one
hand or the other, by those occurrences which
are rare and few. In general, the defect ot
tltle happens In sales between man and man,
where the Improvements are of the ordinary
and beneficial kind. U the Improvements are
merely to gratify the eye of the Individual,
and to pamper his vanity and pride, a jury
would be warranted to take those things Into
-<!Onslderatlon In their assessment of damages.
I lay It down as a rule, which cannot require much lllustratlou to enforce It, on the
core of analogy and justice, that In actions
or a breach of covenant, the damages arc to
be estimated according to the value of the
bing, when the covenant was broken. Thus,
u a covenant for the dell\"ery of specific property at a given day, In case of a failure, the
rule invariably ls, to allow In damages the
value of the thing on the day It ought to
have been dellYered, and when the covenant
was broken. So, also, on contracts for the
delivery of stock, the value at the time it
ought to have been deliYel'ed, and even at the
time of trial, has been the criterion of damages. 2 Burrows, 1010; 1 Strnnge, 406; 2
East, 211. In the present case, the defendant
~~o,·euauted that the plaintiff should quietly
l"11joy the land sold. This covenant was violated, when the plnintlf'l' was evicted; and be
bas lost, by the br<!acb of the co\·enant, not
-only the qulet enjoyment of the laud, but the
usufruct of those erections and Improvements,
without which, It ls fair to say, that the
land itself could not ha\'e been enjoyed, agreeably to the intention of the parties. It necessarily follows, that ha<l the defendant kept
bis covenant nod nllowe(I the plaintiff to enjoy the premises sold, he would not h:we been
deprived of those lmpro•eml'nts made on the
thing Itself, the making of which was an
Inducement to the purchase. How It can be
<·ailed a severe doctrine to compel the vendor
to respond In damages for ordinary and necessary lmpro\"ements, I confess myself lncapahle of perceiving, when he has undertaken,
for a price pnlJ, to assure to the l"endt•e the
,·alldlty of his title. Very often, and perhaps
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generally, there ts a want ot due caution on
the part of a vendor, who sells without title;
and not unfrequently there is a mixture of
fraud, which sets detection at defiance. The
rule I have advanced, wbllst It will restore
to the innocent vendee no more than he has
actually lost, will Induce greater caution In
sellers, who, If respauslble only for the principal and Interest, will find the selling of
land without title an easy and excellent method of rnlslng money, Instead of resorting to
bon-owlng.
It follows, from tile view I have taken of
this question, that the plaintiff, under the
covenant for quiet enjoyment, may recover
the Improvements; and that under the co,·e11ant of selsin be could not, unless the grantt•e
wrui seised by ,·Irtue of the deed, and bad
~<'n evicted under a title paramount. I bnvu
not entered Into any examination of the ancient method of proceeding under the warrnntla chartie, and the rule which obtained
in such case, under the writ of cape ad valentlam; beeause the covenants of warranty
were then considered as real covenants binding only on the grantor and his heirs. It
has, however, been urged that the introduction of the covenants of seisin and for quiet
enjoyment, were substitutes for the covenant
of warranty, and that the same rule ought
to follow the substituted covenants. It appears to me much more proper to consider the
Introduction of personal covenants In the
alienation of real property, as Immediately
asslmllatlng themselves to other personal
covenants and contracts, and as subject to th<!
same rules of construction, and the same rule
of damages, whenever they are broken. If
so, the covenant for quiet enjoyment was not
broken untll the eviction, and the rule of dnruages would be the property lost at that time,
whlch would Include the prlee paid for the
land, and the value of those erections and Improvements which bad been added at the
plalntltl'.'s expense. It Is supposed, that
though the covenants of seisin and for quiet
enjoyment are dlstlnct, and regard din'el'ent
objects, yet that where the first falls, the Int·
ter ls merged in It. This prlnelple strikes
me as llloglcal, and unfounded In authority.
There are authorities (Frcem. 450, pl. U12:
6 Vin. Abr. 426, pl. 20; Id. 476, pl. 4) which
show, that where, In a de!'d, a man covenants
that he bath a good right to conny, &c. anti
that the party shall quietly enjoy, one covenant goes to the title and the other to the possession. And why a person who has brol>2n
two distinct agreements. should protect himself from a rel"ponslblllty on both, and be
liable only on the least extensive one, sm·pnsses my powers of comprPhension. A cnse
bas been mentioned as decided In the supreme
court of Pennsylvania (Benller v. Fromherger,
4 Dall. 436), as bearing on the present; lt wlll
be found to have been on the mere covennnt
of seisin, and power, &c. to convey in fee.
The rule I have adoptl'Cl me<'ls that case. and
ls reconcilable with it, for there the covenant
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was broken as soon us 1t was made, aud the
damages then sustained were the consideration money and Interest.
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was broken as soon as it was made, and the

damages then sustained were the considera-

tion money and interest. ,

KENT, C. J. The declaration in this case

is upon two distinct covenants in the deed,

to wit, the covenant of seisin,‘ and the cove-

nant for quiet enjoyment; and the verdict

was taken for the piaintiii, subject to the

opinion of the court, as to the rule of dam-

ages. We must take it for granted upon this

case, and so it seems to have been understood

and admitted upon the,argnment, that both

covenants were broken, and the question,

then, is, what is the measure of damages,

when the two covenants are the subject of

one action, and a breach of each has been

duly assigned and proved?

The case of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs goes

very far towards a decision of this question.
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That was a suit upon the same covenants,

and a breach of both was admitted. The

point submitted was the rule of damages,

“under the covenants mentioned in the deed."

The court adjudged that the rule of damages

was the consideration money and interest;

and I observed, in giving my opinion in that

case, that the covenant for quiet enjoyment

could have no greater operation, as to dam-

ages, than the covenant of seisin. Mr. Justice

Livingston, who also gave his opinion, was

silent upon that point; but it was a neces-

sary consequence of the judgment of the court,

that the increased value of the land could not

be recovered under either of those covenants.

The doctrine that the measure of damages,

under the covenant for quiet enjoyment, is to

be computed from the time of eviction, and to

include the then value, even when the title

has totally failed, and the covenant of seisin

broken, cannot possibly be reconciled with

that decision. I do not wish, however, to

rest my opinion in this case solely upon that

authority. As the question is of great im-

portance, I am content to re-examine it at

large.

What would be the rule of damages under

a covenant for quiet enjoyment, if a breach

of that covenant was shown which did not

amount to a breach of the covenant of seisin,

or if that covenant stood alone in a deed, un-

accompanied with the covenant of seisin, is

not a point at present before us.‘ If, how-

ever, it stood alone in a deed, I should think,

as at present advised, that upon a total fail-

ure of title, the damages would be the same

as in the covenant of seisin, and no more, for

the analogy is very close between that cove-

nant and the ancient warranty. But when

the covenant for quiet enjoyment follows a

covenant of seisin in the same deed, the in-

tent of the instrument. taken together, ap-

pears manifestly to be, that the one covenant

is merely auxiliary to the other, as the one

covenant relates to the title, and the other

refers to the future enjoyment of that title.

The covenant for quiet enjoyment respects

the possession merely, and it would seem to

be unreasonable and very inconsistent, for the
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KENT, C. J. '.rhe declaration In this case
is upon two distinct covenants in the deed,
to wit, the covenant of sl'isin. and the covenant for quiet enjoyment; and the verdict
was taken fo1· the plaintitl', subject to the
opinion of the court, as to the rule of damages. We must take It for granted upon this
case, and so It seems to have been understood
and admitted upon the, argument, that both
covenants were broken, and the question,
then, Is, what ls the measure of damages,
when the two covenants are the subject of
one action, and a breach of each has been
duly assigned and proved?
The case of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs goes
very far towards a decision of this question.
That was a suit upon the same covenants,
and a breach of both was admitted. The
point submitted was the rule of damages,
"under the covenants mentioned In the deed."
The court adjudged that the rule of damages
was the consideration money and Interest;
and I observed, in giving my opinion In that
case, that the covenant for quiet enjoyment
could have no greater operation, as to daml\ges, than the covenant or seisin. Mr. Justice
Uvlngston, who also gave bis opinion, was
silent upon that point; but, It was a necessary consequence or the judgment of the court,
that the Increased value of the land could not
be recovered under either of those covenants.
The doctrine that the measure of damages,
under the covenant for quiet enjoyment, Is to
be computed from the time of eviction, and to
include the then vaiue, ewn when the title
has totally failed, and the covenant or seisin
broken, cannot possibly be reconciled with
that decision. I do not wish, however, to
rest my opinion In this case i.-olely upon that
authority. As the question Is of great Importance, I am content to re-examine ft at
large.
What would be the rule or damages under
a covenant :t'or quiet enjoyment, if a breach
or that covenant was shown which did not
nmount to a breach of the covenant of seisin,
or If that covenant stood alone In a deed, unnccompanled with the covenant of seisin, Is
not a point at present before us.• It, however, It stood alone In a deed, I should think,
us llt present advised, that upon a total failure or title, the damages would be the same
:t!'C In the coveoont of sPlsln, and no more, for
1he nnnlogy is very close between that co'\"e11ant nnd the ancient warranty. But when
1hl' eovcnant tor quiet enjoyment follows a
wvenant of seisin in the same deed, the intent of the Instrument. taken together, apP<•ars mnnlfostly to be, that the one covennnt
is merely auxiliary to the other, as the one
1•0\'ennnt relates to the title, and the other
refers to the future enjoyment of that title.
The covenant tor qult>t enjoyment rP~pects
1l1e possl'sslon mer1•ly, and It would seem to

be um·easonable nnd very inconsistent, for the
plaintiff to recover under one covenant the
whole vaiue of the estate, as It was lntendetl
to be conveyed, and under another covenant
in the same deed, distinct and Increased damages, beeause he was not permitted to enjoy
that cstnte. These covenants must be taken
in connection, to ascertaJn their Import. The
covenant tor further assurance Is one of these
secondary co'\"enants, and It the grantor had
no title, and the value of the land was recovered back by the grantee, he could not be
called upon In damages for further assumnce.
This would be very idle when It bad been ascertained by the recovery under the principal
covenant that he bad nothing to assure. · If
the grantee recovers what Is to be deemed,
upon established principles, the value of the
lnnd, under the covenant of title, it amounts,
in etrect, to a sntlstactlon and extlngulshment
of the covenants relative to the possession,
and the grantee cannot receive anything more ,
than nominal damages under those covenants.
There Is no precedent to authorize any greater
recovery, under the covenant for quiet enjoyment than under the covenant of seisin; and
the universal silence in the books on a point
which so frequently gives occasion for litigation, ls a strong argument to prove that
no such rule exists as that contended for by
the plaJntlft'. I believe it bas never been the
received opinion with us, that In a deed containing the usual covenants, viz. the covenant or title or seisin, and the covenant rel11t1ve to the possession, the latter covenants,
In a case of no title, and consequently of 11
breach of the covenant of title, would become
paramount covenants and afl'ord a larger
claim for damages. The latter construction
would not only Introduce a rule hitherto undiscovered In the common law of England,
but a rule or great moment In Its immediate
consequences to the community; and I must
be thoroughly persuaded or the soundness or
the construction, either upon authority or
principle, before I can consent to adopt It.
When, therefore, there ls no authorlt~· for
such a construction to be met with tu thr rlrclslons at Westminster-Hall. and It nppi>nrs
to be repngnnnt to the natural and reasonnblr
Interpretation of the covenants, as round In
connection In the same dred, I must adhert>
to the opinion which I gave In the case of
St:rnts v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs, nnll which must.
from a view of that case, have been also the
un:mlmous opinion of the court.
·
The case before us. then, resolves itself
Into this question, What Is the extent of the
rule of damages on a breach of the covenant of seisin?
Three points are submitted by the case:
(1) Whether the plaintiff can recover Interest on the consideration prud? (2) '1.rhrtber
he can recover for the Increased value of
the land? And (3) whether he rnn recover
tor his beneficial Improvements?
'
1'h€> two first points wPrr si>tt!Pcl In the
case o! Staats '" 'Jl'n Ey1·k's Ex'rs, and need
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not again be examined.’ Nothing has been

shown which affects the accuracy of that de-

cision on those points, and it deserves no-

tiee as being of great weight in support of

that decision, that in the states of Massa-

chusetts and Pennsylvania, the same rule

of damages is established in an action for

the breach of the covenant of eisin. The

third point was reserved in the considera-

tion of the former case, and no opinion ex-

pressed upon it. It, therefore, remains open

for discussion.

I must own that I never perceived any

ground for a distinction as to the damages,

between the rise in the value of the land,

and the improvements. There is no reason

for such a distinction. deducible from the

nature of the covenant of selsin. improve-

ments made upon the land were never the
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subject-matter of the contract of sale, any

more than its gradual increase or diminution

ID value. The subject ot‘ the contract was

the land as it existed. and was worth when

the contract was made. The purchaser may

have made the purchase under the expecta-

tion of a great rise in the value of the land,

or of great improvements to be made by

the application of his wealth, or his labor.

But such expectations must have been con-

ﬁned to one party only, and not have en-

tered as an ingredient into the bargain. It

was the land and its price; at the time of

the sale, which the parties had in view,

and to that subject the operation of the con-

tract ought to be coniined. The argument

in favor of the value of the land, and the

improvements as they exist at the time of

eviction. has generally excepted cases of ex-

traordinary increase, and of very expensive

improve,ments. It seems to have been ad-

mitted. that, without such a limitation to

the doctrine, it could not be endured. But

this destroys every thing like a ﬁxed rule

on the subject, and places the question of

damages in a most inconvenient and danger-

ous uncertainty. We have a striking illus-

tration of this in the French law. The rule

in France, upon bona tide sales, according

to Pothler, Traite du Contrat de Vente, No.

132 to No. 141, is to make the seller, on

eviction of the buyer, refund not only the

original price, but the increased value of the

land, and the expense of the mellorations

made. He admits, however, that the in-

tention of the parties is to be the rule in the

assessment of damages, and that, in the

case of an immense augmentation in the

price of the land, or in the value of the im-

provements, the seller is to answer only for

the moderate damages which the parties

could be supposed to have anticipated when

the contract was made. it is plainly to be

perceived, that there is no certainty in such

a loose application of the rule. and that it

leaves the damages to an arbitrary and un-

deﬁned discretion, and so it appears to have

been understood; for in the "institution an

Droit Francois," by M. Argon (livre 3. c. 23),

\"EXDOH'~
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not agnln he examined.· Nothing bas been It ls laid down, that "the qtwstlon of damshown whkh alfects the accuracy of that de- ages, beyond the price paid, Is with them
elslon on those points, and It deserves no- very arbitrary." Thls ls not consonant to
tice as being of great weight In support of the genius or our law, nor does It recomthat declBlon, that In the states of .Massa- mend itself well for our adoption. On a
ehusetts and Pennsylvnnla. the same rule subject of such general concern, and of such
momentous Interest, as the usual covenants
~f damages Is established In an action for
the breach of the covenant of seisin. The In a conveyance of land, the standard for
third point was reserved In the considera- the computation of damages, upon a failure
tion of the former case, and no opinion ex- of title (whatever that standard mny he},
pressed upon It. It, therefore, remains open ought, at least, to be certain and notu1·ious.
' The seller and the purchaser are equally
for d Iscusslon.
I must own that I never perceived any Interested In ho.vlng the rule fixed. I agree,
ground for a distinction as to the damages, that the contract ls to be constnied, acbetween the rise In the value of the land, cording to the Intention of the partlE>s; but
and the lmprovenwnte. There Is no reason I consider, that the Intention of the <'OVe·
for such a dlstinetlnn, <lcclnC"lble from the nant of seisin, as uniformly cx11011111!Pd In
nature of the coYenant of s1•l1d11. I wpro·Ye· the English law, Is only to lndt>mnify the
UJE>nts m:t<ll' upon the lnml Wl're never the grantee for the consideration paid. This
subjt>d-matter of the contmct of salt., nny was the settled rule at common law, upon the
mo1·e than Its gr11du:tl incrt>a!'e or diminution ancient warranty, of which this covenant
m value. The suhj1•c·t of tlw contract was of seisin ls one of the substitutes; nntl all
the land as It exlstlc'd, nud was wort!:\ when the reasons of policy which prevent the exthe contract was ma<le. The purchaser may tension of the covenant to the Increasl'd valha;e made tne purchns1• under the expectn· ue of the land, apply equally, lf not more
tion of a great rise In the value of the land, strongly, to prevent its <>xtenslon to lmprove01· of gn•at lmprovem1'lll!! to be made by nwnts made by the purehuser. A sl'lh~r 11111y
the application of his wealth, or hie labor. be presumed, at all tlml's, able to retm·u
But such expectations must have been con- the consideration which he actually received;
tinl'd to one party only, and not have en- but to <'ompel him to pay for expensive Imtered as an lngn•dlent Into the bnrgnln. It provements, of the extent of which he
was the land nnd its price; at the time of could have made no calculation, and for
the sale, whlc•h the parties had In view, whl<'h he received no consideration, may
.and to that suhjl'ct the op<'ratlon of the con- Rud<lenly overwhelm him and his family lu
tract ought to be c.iullued. 'l'he urg111UPllt Irretrievable ruin. Tlw common l1tw nevt>r
ln favor of the value of the land, and the left the vendor In such a state of uncertainImprovements as they <'Xl!!t nt the time of ty; and It mo.de no distinction between the
t•Ylction. has generally excepted cuses of ex- natural rise of the land, and Its Increased
traor1llna1·y Increase, und of very expensive value, by buildings, or other Improvements.
i11111ron:mPnts. It seems to ha\•e been ad- The feoffor was stlll to answer only for
mittl'd, that, without such a limitation to the value of the land, as It was worth when
the doctrine, It could not be endured. But the feotl'rnent was made. This was the
this desti·oys every thing like a fixed rule amount of the decision In Yearbook 30 Ed.
on the subject, and places the question of III. p. 14b. A man had a warship, and
damages In a most Inconvenient and danger- granted It over, with warranty, and, after·ons uncertainty. We have a striking lllus- wards, the grantee was lmpleaded, and
trntlon of this In the French law. The rule vouched the grantor. Now the wardship
In France, upon bona fide sales, according was of more value at the time of the vouchto Pothier, Trnlt~ du Contrat de Vente, No. er, than It was at the time of the grant,
132 to No. Hl, Ia to make the seller, on wlth warranty, by reason of other lands
-eviction of the buyer, refund not only the descending, afterwards, or by buildings or
.original price, but the Increased \•alue of the otherwise, and It was held, that the Youchee
land, and the expPnse of the meliorations could take protestation of this mattl'r when
made. He admits, however, that the In- he entered lnto the warranty; I. e. when h1•
tention of the parties la to be the rule In the was admitted to defend, Instead of the origassessment of damages, and that, In the inal tenant. And Burton laid this dowu
case of an Immense augmentation In the for law, that If land be better after the
price of the land, or In the value of the lm- feotrment made by buildings or otherwlsP.
1>rovements, the seller Is to answer only for he who receives In value, receives but ac·the moderate damages which the parties cordlng as the land was worth at the time
eould be supposed to have anticipated when of the feotrment, and not more. The same
the contract was made. It Is plainly to be rule was laid down for law by Newton, J.,
perceived, that there Is no certainty In such In Yearbook 19 H. VI. p. 46a; and again, In
a loose application of the rule, and that It 6la. and he says that It had been so adleaves the damages to an arbitrary and un- judged, and he refers to the decision In 30
defined discretion, and so lt appears to have Ed. III. which he said was not controverted.
heen unden1tood; for In the •·1nstltutlon au This rule, upon the snn<'tlon of these authorDrolt l<'ran!,!ols," by M. Argon (llvre 3. c. 23), ities, has been lncorpomte<l, as good law,

294
294

BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESl'ECTI.\'G REAL ESTATE.

‘

into the Abridgments of Fitzherbert, Brooke,

and Rolle. But the case of Ballet v. Ballet,

Godb. 151, in the time of Jae. 1., is a much

more modern determination upon the same

point. That was a case of a writ of war-

mntia chartrc, and, upon demurrer, the

court held, that if there be new buildings,

of which the warranty was demanded, which

were not at the time of the warranty made,

and the deed is shown, the defendant ought

not to demur, but to show the special matter,

and enter into the warranty for so much as

was at the time of the making of the deed,

and not for the residue. Indeed, the point

is too clear to admit of doubt, that the in-

creased value of the land by buildings or

other improvements, made no alteration, at

I.—-————- — M 1-.--.-5--1-n-__,’ -___‘ __-m
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common law, in the rule of damages; and.

for the reasons given in the-former case

of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs, it can make

no alteration in the covenant of seisin,

which, as to the rule of compensation, is

commensurate only with the ancient war-

ranty.

I am, therefore, of opinion, in this case.

that the sum allowed for the increased value

of the land, and the sum allowed for im-

provements, be deducted from the verdict,

and that judgment be entered for the resi-

due only.

THOMPSON and YATES, JJ., concurred,

Judgment accordingly.
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Into the Abridgments of Fitzherbert, Brooke,
and Rolle. But the case of Ballet v. Ballet,
Godb. 151, In the time of Jae. I., Is a much
more modern determination upon the same
point. That was a case of a writ of war;:autla chartre, nnd, upon demurrer, the
court held, that If there be new buildings,
of which the warranty was demanded, which
were not at the time of the warranty made,
and the deed Is shown, the defendant ought
not to demur, but to show the special matter,
nnd eLter Into the warmnty for so much as
was at the time of the making of .the deed,
and not for the residue. Indeed, the point
Is too clear to admit of doubt, that the Increased value of the land by buildings or
other Improvements, made no alteration, at

common law, In the' rule of damages; and.
for the reasons given In the· former case
of Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs, It can make
no alteration In the covenant of seisin,
which, as to the rule of compensation, Is
commensurate only with the ancient warranty.
I am, therefore, of opinion, In this caiw,
that the sum allowed for the Increased value
of the land, and the sum allowed for Improvements, be deducted from the verdict,
and that judgment be entered for the resldue only.

I

THOMPSON and YATES, JJ., concurred.
Judgment accordingly.
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BROOKS v. BLACK.

(8 South. 332, 68 Miss. 161.)

Supreme Court of Mississippi. Nov. 10, 1890. ‘

Appeal irom chancery court, Noxubee .

county; T. B. GRAHAM, Chancellor.

G. A. Evans and Brame & Alexander, ior‘

appellant. Bogle & Bogle, ior appellee.

attachment in chancery by the appellee,

Black. against his remote vendor, Brooks,

{to recover damages ior the breach of war-

anty of title to certain lands. In ING9,

Brooks conveyed the land, with covenants

of warranty. to one Spencer. the consider-

ation bemg the sum of$6,2‘.)6. Spencer exe-

cuted a deed of trust, with power of sale,

to one Smith, to secure the payment of a

debt of $400 to Graham. Black & Co. in

September,1878,the debt secured being un-

paid, the land was sold, as provided by
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the trust-deed. and at such sale Black, the

appeliee, became the purchaser. at the

price of $1,000. After his purchase, Black

conveyed to Mrs. Spencer on undivided

one-haii interest in the land. Aiterwards.

the heirs at law of Mrs. Caroline Daves

and Mrs. Neilson recovered in ejectment

from Black and Mrs.Spencer the undivided

one-haii interest in the land, claiming un-

der title paramount to that of Brooks.

Brooks was not notiﬁed of the pendency

of this action of eiectment. Black, by the

result of that suit, having lost the one-

haii of his half interest in the land, (the

one-iourth of the whole.) seeks by the

present proceeding to recover irom Brooks

one-iourth of the consideration paid him

by Spenrer, and interest thereon, and the

costs of deiending the action of electment

against the heirs of Daves & Neilson, in-

cluding attorney's iees. The chancellor

iound as iacts that the title of the heirs of

Mrs. Da ves and Mrs. Nellson was para-

mount to that of Brooks; that the value

of the land at the time of eviction was

$6,000; and that Black. in good iaith, and

in discharge of a legal duty, had deiended

the action of ejectment, and in so doing

had expended in court costs the sum of

$249.91, and the inrther sum of $200 ior at-

,torney's iees, which were reasonable. Up-

, on these iacts, he decreed that Brooks

i should pay to Black the sum of $1,500, the

, same being the actual value of the land

1\ lost by Black, and less than one-iourth of

. the

' Spencer, with interest at 6 per cent. irom

January 1‘ 1888, the date of Black's evic-

tion,and also the said sums of $249.91 and

$200, the court costs and attorney's ices.

with interest thereon from the commence-

ment of this suit. Brooks appeals and as-

signs ior error (1) that the court should

have not made any decree against him,

because the facts proved show that the

debt secured by the deed of trust irom

Spencer to Smith, trustee. had been paid

at and beiore the sale under said deed; (2)

that the measure of damages should be the
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should not have allowed attorney's fee
paid In defending ea.Id action.
It le sufficient to say, In reference to the
first assignment of error, that the factH do
support appl'llant's contention.
Appl:'nl from chuncel"y coul"t, Noxubee not
The 1:1econd asHigument of P.rror preHent>1
county; 1.'. B. GRAHAM, Chancellor.
G. A. Enws and Brame & Alex11nder, for · an interesting question which haH ne\·er
before been consirlered h.\' this court, anti,
ap1it!llaut. Bogle & Bogle, for uppellee.
so far us our researeheR have led, has not
COOPER, J. Thl11 le a pro1!eedlnll" by : often nri1-1en In other i;tates. That queE!·
nttuchment In chunrery by the appellee, 1 tlon IH, wbnt le the mea1mre of damages, In
luck. against his remote ven<lor, Brooks, I a suit b.v un evicted vendee, upon the covo re1·0\·er damages for the hreacb of wor- enant of wnrranty of a remote vendor,
anty of title tu certain hrnds. In 1S69, running with land? Ma.v he 1·ecove1· the
Brooks conveyell the land, with coveuunts purchase price recei\'ed by the remote venof wu1Tanty, to one 8pencer, the consider- dor, or iR be limited by the consideration
ation being the sum off6,:!'J6. 8pl'nce1· exe- he himself bas paid? It Is supposed by
cuted a. deed of trust, with power of 1:1ale, counsel for the appellant that the sum paid
by the evicted party-the value of the land
to one 8mlth, to secure the pnyment of a
deht of $400 to Gruham, Black & Co. In at the time of his purchase-ls fixed as the
September, 1878, the debt secured being un- measure of d11ma~es In this state by the
paid, the land was sold, as provided by case of White v. Presl;v, 54 Miss. 313. But
the trust-deed, and at such sule Black, the the question was not rallied by the l'ecord
appellee, hecume the purcba11er, at the ln that cm1e; and although CHALl\IF:RB, J.,
price of $1,000. After bht purchase, Black ln delivering the opinion of the court, deconveyed to Mrs. Spencer an undlYided clares that the sum pairl by the evicted parone-he.If Interest In the lend. Afterwardff, ty, with Interest, the same being Jess than
the hell'M nt law of Mr~. CarollnA Da,·e11 the sum received by the remote vendor, Is
and Mrs. Nell~on reco,·ered In ejectnaent a correct measure of dumages, the dedafrom Bluckand Mre.svencer the undlvldt-d ratlon does not tht>rehy bPcome decbli\"'e,
one-half lntert.'Bt In the lanrl, clulming nn- In that ca11e, HuntluJ!,ton hao sold Jund
der title paramount to thut of Brooks. to one Jones, from whom the title hud
Brooks was not notified of the peodency paRsed urHler execution sale to Pres1dy.
of this action of ejedmeot. Black, by the Pres11lylost the land byreUBonof title parresult or that suit, having lost the one- amount to that of Huntington, and sued
half of his half Interest in the land, (the Huntlngton'aadmlnlstrator on the 1~ove
one-fourth of the whole,) seeks by the oe.nte of warranty, and recovered In the
preisent prucee1llngto l'f'Co\·er from Brooks court below the sum he had paid at exeone-fourth of the consideration imld him cution sale, and Interest thereon, tho same
by Spen.,er, and Interest thereon, and the being less than Huntlng;ton had received.
coRte of defending the uctlon of eJectment The administrator appealed. He, as ap•Jralnet the heirs of DaveR cl NPUson, ln- pellant, could not assign ae error the fact
eludlng attorney's fees. 'l'he chancellor that: damages less thao should bu ve been
found as facts that the tltlfl of the heirs of a warded had been given; nor could the
Mrs. Daves and Mre. Neilson was para- appellee raise the point here, that the Judgwuunt to that of llrooks; that thfl \'aloe ment he sought to maintain should hanl
of the land at the time of eviction wu been for a greater sum. 'J'he observation
of the judge wRB not upon any question
$6,000; and that Black. in 11:ood faith, and
In discharge of a legal duty, had deft>nded sought to be raised, or whlcb could have
the action of ejectment, and in so doing been decided, and therefore le not the debad expended In court costtl the sum of ch!lon of the court. Among the first ca11es
$249.91. 11nd the further sum of $200 for at- In which the liability of a vendor to his
, torney's fees, which were rewmnuhle. l'p.. vendee for breach of the warranty for
, on these facts, be aecreed that Brooks quiet possession was considered were
, should pay to Black the sum of $1,500, the Staats v. Ten Ey1·k, 3 Caines, 112, and
Plkher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. 1. It was
1 same being the actual value of the lnnd
contended for the plaintiffs In these easel!
1 lmt by Black, and less than one-fourth or
that the covenant was onfl of lnrlemnlty,
1.. the purehWle price paid to Brooks by
Spencer, with Interest at 6 per cent. from and tllerefore that the measure of damages
.Junuary 1, 1888, the date of Black's evic- Hhuuld be the value of the land at thetlnw
tion, and also the said sums of $24!1.91 and of the breael1. In Steat11 v. Ten Eyck, recovery wus sought for the appreciation In
$200, the court costs and attorney's fees.
with Interest thereon from the commence- the value of the land above the price pa.ill
ment of this suit. Brooks appeals anrl as- by natural causes, unll In Pltl.'her v. Lh·signs for error (1) that tht- conrt should lng11ton to recover abo,•e the purchase prlc1•
have not made any decree against him, the value of permanent Improvements 1rnt
because the facts proved show that the upon tht' lnnd by the vendee. The argu.
debt 1:4ecured by the dl•ed of tru>1t from nrnnt for the plaintiffs was rested upon
Spencer to Smith, trustee, had been paid the rule of damages in breaches of personat anrl before the sale undP.r said dPed; (:!) al co\·enunt11 In other Instances, but the
that the measure of damages shoul<I be the court rejected the contention, and adoptone-fourth of the purchase price paid by ed, by anulogy, the measure of damages
Black, and not the one-fom·th of the value applied In the common-law action of warof the land at the time of eviction, nor the rantia cbartre, and In suits for the breach
one-fourth of purchase ruone.v recPlved by of the covennnt of seisin, viz., the value
\ Brooks; l3) the court shoulll not have al- of the land,detern1lnuhle by the price paid
\ lowed the court coiHH expe11tle1l In defentl- the ,·end or; and, since the vendee was
llaule to the reul owner fur mesne protiti<,
'ing the action of ejt-ctmcnt; (4) tho court
BHOOKS v. BLACK.
(8 South. 332, 68 Miss. 161.)
Supreme Court of Mississippi. Nov. 10. 1890.

1
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he was also entitled to interest on the pur-

chase money for the time ior which such

mesne proﬁts might be recovered against

him. The measureof damages established

in these cases has been so generally adopt-

ed in other states as to have become al-

most universal. and it would be superﬂuous

to cite authorities in its support. It has

been announced as the rule in this state.

Phipps v. Tarpley. 31 Miss. 433. We refer

to the cases above not for the purpose of

announcing the rule which applies as be-

tween vendor and vendee, for that is too

well settled to admit of controversy. and

is conceded by counsel ior appellant; we

note them to show that the suggestion

now made that the covenant is one of in-

demnity was rejected by the court in the

earliest case.
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enants" are lor indemnity; but the sense

in which the word is now used, in argu-

ment of counsel. that redress is to be ai-

forded to the extent, and within the limit,

of the actual loss sustained by the vendee,

in anuction against his immediate vendor,

it may be conﬁdently asserted, is against

the overwhelming current of authority.

In these cases. at least, the decisions are

practically uniform that, regardless of the

value of the land at the time of eviction,

the recovery is measured by the value of

the land at the time of the conveyance,

which value is conclusively ﬁxed by the

price paid by the vendee or received by the

vendor. Another proposition may be

coniidently stated as supported by an

equally uniform current of authority, that

the covenant for quiet enjoyment runs

with the land, and passes to all subse-

quent owners claiming in the chain of

title. The purchaser of land gets, by oper-

ation of law, not only the land, but also

the covenant of the ﬁrst vendor, and that

as well where the covenant is by its words

to the vendee only, as where it is with

him and his assigns. When we come how-

ever to the precise question now presented,

which is whether a remote vendee may

recover from the remote vendor the pur-

chase money paid by the ﬁrst vendee. or is

limited to the amount paid by himself to

his vendee. we ﬁnd direct conﬂict in the

decisions. and,so far as we have found the

cases, they are nearly equal in number on

each side. In North Carolina, (Williams

v. Beeman, 2 Dev. 483.) Minnesota.

(Moore v. Frankenﬁcld, 25 Minn. :Twil),)

Tennessee, (Mctte v. Dow, 9 Lea. H3:

Whitzman v. Hirsh. 87 Tenn. 513. 11 S. W.

Rep. 421,) and Maryland. (Crisﬁeld v.

Storr, 36 Md. 129,) it is held that such re-

mote vendee can only recover what he

has paid to his own vendor. On the other

hand, it is held in South Carolina, (Low-

rance v. Robertson, 10 S. C. 8,) Iowa,

(Mischkc v. Baughn. 52 Iowa, 528, 3 N. W.

Rep. 543.) and Kentucky. (Dougherty v.

Duvall, 9 B. Mon. 57,) that such vendee
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he was also entitled to Interest on the purchase money for the time for which such
mesne profits might be recovered against
him. The measure of damages established
lo these cases bas been eo generally adopted In other states as to ha.ve become almost universal, and it would besuperflnous
to cite authorities In Its support. It bas
been announced as the rnle in this state.
Phipps Y. Tarpley. 31 Miss. 433. We refer
to tbe cases abovt• not for the purpo11e of
nnnounclnit the rule which applies as between vendor and vendee, for that Is tuo
well settled to admit of controversy, and
Is conceded by counsel for appellunt; we
note them to show that the sugge11tion
now made that the covenant Is one of Indemnity was rejected by the court In the
earliest cases. In a certain sense, all "covenants" nre for indemnity; but the sense
In which the word is now used, in argument of counsel, that redl'ess is to be afforded to the extent, and within the limit,
of the actual loss susbtlned by the vendee,
in an 11ctio11 agaim1t bis Immediate vendor,
It may be confirlently asserted, is against
the overwhelming current of authority.
In these cases, at least, the deciHions are
prnctlcu.lly uniform that, rei:tardless of the
\•al ue of the land at the time of eviction,
the reco,·e1·y Is measured by the vu Jue of
the lnnd at the time or the conveyance,
which valne is conclusively fixed by the
price paid by the vendee orrecr.ived by the
venrlor. Another proposition may be
confl<lently stated aH supported by an
eqnnlly uniform current of antborlty, that
tlrn covenant for quiet enjoyment runs
with the land, and pusses to all eubsequent owners claiming in the chnln of
title. 'l'he purchn.serof land gets, by operution or law, not only the hrnd, but alHo
tbf' covenant of the first vendor, 11.nd that
as well where the covenant is by its words
to the vendee only, as where it is with
him and his asll!igns. When we come bow.
ever to thep1·eclHequestion nowpreHentP.d,
which Is whether a rem•>te vendee may
recover from the remote vendor the purchase money paid by the first vend~. or Is
limited to the amount palcl by himself to
his venclee, we find direct contllct In the
decisions, aml,so fur us we ha\·e round the
cnKes, they are neal'ly t'<}nal In number on
each side. In North Carolina, (Williams
v. Beeman, 2 Dev. 483.) Minnesota,
(Moore v. Frankenflelcl, 2a Minn. 540,)
Tennessl'e, (Mette v. Dow, 9 Leu. !):~;
Whltzman v. Hirsh, 87 Tenn. 513, 11 S. W.
Rep. 4~1.) and Maryland, (Crisfield v.
Storr, 36 Md. 129,) It ls held that such remote vendee can only recover what he
has pnld to his own vendor. On the other
hancl, It is held in South Carolina, (Lowrance v. Hobertson, 10 S. C. 8,) Iowa,
ll\ll1<chke v. Baughn. 52 Iowa, 52/l, 3 N. W.
Rep. rrt:l.) and Kentucky. (Dougherty v.
Duvall, 9 B. Mon. 57,) that such vendee
!!Duy recover the full conKideratlon recelrnd
J~ the defendant, the remote vendor.
Wllllu.ms v. Beeman was decided by a divided court, RUFFIN, J., disRenting, and
l\fette \'. Dow (followed by Whltzman v.
Hirsh) overruled Hopkins v. Lane,9 Yerg.
79. In Crisfield \'. Storr, 36 Md. 129, the
court declares that It hud carerully examined many authorities upon the point, and
that the decided weight of authority was

l

l

I

that the plaintiff could not recover on thei
warranty of n remote vendor more than
be bad himReU paid to his lmmedi11te vendor, and In 1mpport of this declaration cites
the following cases: Booker v. Bell's Ex 'rs,
3 Blhb, 175; Kelly v. Dutch Church, 2 Hill,
116; Bennet v. J enklns, 13 Johns. 51; Han.
son v. Buckner, 4 Dana, 253; Wyman v.
BalJard,12 Mas~. 804; Stewart v. Drake, 9
N.J.Law,142: Wllsonv.Forbes,2 Dev.39;
Pitcher v. Livlngston,4 Johns. 1. We have
exu mined these cases, and find all of them,
except KelJy v. Dutch Church, to bei suits
by thei immediate vendee, or his heirs at
law, against the hnmedlate vendor, or his
personal representative. Kelly v. Dutch
Church was a suit by the UB!'!ignee of the
lessee against the leRsors of his nsHignor.
The tt·ial court had a.warded, as damages,
the rent reserved In the lease; thns, as It
seems to us, making the sum paid to the
lessors. and not that pa.id for the assignment, the measure or damages. But the
facts are not very clearly stated, and the
case Nrnnot be held to decide anything upon the point.. The question seems to have
been more fully examined upon principle
In the cm1es of Williams v. Beemnn, 2 Dev.
483: Mette\'.Dow,9 Lea,93,anclLowrance
v. Robertson, 10 S. C. 8, than In any others. In Wl11iums v. Beeman, then111jorlty of
the court tlwup;ht that the remote venrlee
was suiug to recover biR own dama~efl.
and not -those of the first venclee, and
therE>fore should be restricted to the actual clamages he had sustained. Ju Mette
v. Dow, the court comparer! the cove11Rnt
to a penal bond. the recovery on which
would be limited to the actual damages
suHtalned by the party suing. The dissenting- opinion of RTTFFIN, J., In Williams
v. Beeman. Is, In our opinion, a complete
reply to this position. H~ says: "The
value at the time of the sale by the flrl'lt
vendorls themeasureprescl'ibed. Itonght
to operate both we.vs. If the vendor be
not lb1ble for more, be ought not to be for
less. I unclerstnnd It to beadmittl•d that,
If his Immediate vend<:'e be ~vlcted. he is
still llnhle for that. I do not eee why he
11houhl not Lie FquallyRotu the aHslgnPe us
his vendee. Does the atislJ,~nment change
his covenant? It runs with the land, and
be who bnys the land buys the coventmt.
He gets the whole of It. Bnt It ls said that
the assignor In such case cannot recover
from the ft1·st vemlor mo1-e than the evicted vendee gave for the Janel, becautie this
ls all the asshrnor would be obli1&ed to pny
the assignee, and therefore he has complete
Indemnity. 'l'hl!1 la changing the rule etisentlally. It puts It upon the amount of
the Jose, not the price paid. It would
seem to me that whoever buys lancl with
a covenant adhering to it takes it with all
the a.ch•antages It conferred on his assignor. It Is 110 In peraonal contracts, for
we do not Inquire what the assignee or
a bond gave fur It. 'l'he ohltgor must pa.y
him the whole." Thifl argument seems to
us unanswerable. It at leuHt never luis
been an11wcred In ariy case we have seen
\Vben It Is conceded that, by his covenant,
a vendor binds himself to return the purchase price he recei\•es ln the contlni;:ency
of a failure of the title conveyed, nnrl that
this obligation Is assigned, by operation
of law, to who~ver muv succloell to thtt
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title. it would seem to iollow, as a corol-

lary, that the recovery, by whomsoever

had, ought to be equal to the obligation.

But. under the rule announced in Mary-

land. Minnesota, Tennessee, and North Car-

olina, the obligation of the covenantor is

variable, and dependent upon transactions

with which he is not connected. in these

states, a man selling an estate to A. ior

$5.(i(iO would be liable to pay A. that sum

if he should be evicted. But ii A. sells the

same land to B. ior $500. the liability of

the ﬁrst vendor is reduced to that sum.

and thus B., the purchaser irom A.. gets

less than the obligation A. held. But it

A B. sells to C. ior $5,000. the original obliga-

' tion revives,and the absurdity is presented

of B.‘s iailing to get, and thereiore to have,

what A. owned, and still transierring to C.
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that which he never had. The rule an-

nounced in Kentucky, Iowa, and South

Carolina is not only commended by its

justice, and by analogy to other well-sob

tied principles, but possesses the advan-

tage of stability and uniformity. As we

have said, it is quite generally held that,

by the covenant ior quiet enjoyment. the

grantor binds himself to pay, in event of

iailure of title, the then value of the land,

which value is determined by the price

paid. Appreciation by natural causes. or

by improvements put upon the property

by the vendee, does not enlarge his liabil-

ity; nor is it decreased by depreciation in

value irom any cause. By legal intend-

ment the obligation is as though the cov-

enantor should say to the covenantce:

“You, or the person succeeding to the

title Iconvey,shall hold the land, or ii you

' cannot, by reason of title in another, the

\ money l have received shall be restored in

lien of the land." We are unable to per-

lceive any principle upon which this obliga-

, tion shall be diminished because of the

' price. in consideration of which it may be

assigned. We thereiore conclude that the

obligation of the covenantor is the same

to the assignee that ‘it was to the cove-

nantee, and. being such, is governed by the

same measure of damages.

The third and iourth assignments of er-

ror present the question whether taxed

costs and attorney's lees in excess of the

purchase price, and interest thereon, may

be recovered on the covenant. We are

unable to discover any just principle upon

which costs, whether taxed or otherwise,

have been allowed to plaintiffs over and

above the purchase price received by the

covculmtor. and interest thereon. We

readily perceive the justice of the rule by

which the value of the land at the time of

the sale by him is accepted as the measure

of the liability O1 the covenautor, and also

that the price paid shall be taken as con-

clusive evidence of that value. We also

appreciate thefairness of allowing interest

on the purchase money as compensation

OF VENDOR'S OWF::'.'ANTS.

-title. It would seem to follow. ae a corollary, that the recovery, by whomsoev~r
bad, ought to be e<1ual to the obligation.
But, under the rule announced In Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, anti North Carolina, the obligation of the covAnantor la
variable, and dependent upon transuctlona
with which be ls not connected. In these
eta tee, a man eelllng an e11tate to A. for
$5,000 would be liable to pay A. that eum
tr he should be e\'icted. But 1f A. 11ells the
same land to B. for trioo. the liability of
the ftrst vendor le reduced to that eum,
dDd thus B., the purchttser from A .• Kets
Iese than the obllgtitlon A. held. But If
. B. sells to C. for $5,00tl. the original oulig111 tlnn rev Ives, and the nbsur!ll ty 18 presented
of B. 'e falling to get, and therefore to have,
what A. owned, aud still tram1fPrrlng- to C.
that which he never bud. The rule nnnoonced In Kentucky, Iowa, arnl 8outb
Carolina le not only commended by Its
justice, and hy analogy to other well-settled principles, but poHseHses the nil vnntage of 11tability and uniformity. As we
have sal<l, It le quite generally held that,
by th!' covenant for quiet enjoyment. the
grantor bln<111 himself to pay, In e'<"ent of
failure of title, tbA then value of the land,
which value Is determined by the price
pnld. Appreciation by natural cuuscK, or
by Improvements put upon the propPrty
by the vendee, does not enlarg" hh~ liability; nor Is lt decreased by dt•rn·eciation In
value rrnm any caoRe. By IPJi:nl lntendment the nbllgutlon Is 1111 though the cuvennntor should eay tu the covenantl'o:
"You, or tbe per11on euccerdlnJI; to the
title I convey, shall hold the la ml, or if you
'\ cannot, by rea110.n of title In another, the
money 1 have received sbull be re11tored in
lieu of the land." We are unable to per\ eel\'e any principle upon which this obligation shall be dlmlnb1he<J bt'<'1rnse of the
1 price, In cuml!deratlon of which It mny be
a11sjgned. We therefore .:oncludr that the
oblhi:atlon of the covenantor ls the same
to the a11slgnee that ·tt wa11 to the covenantee, and, beln~ such, Is go\·erne<l by the
~ame memmre of damnges.
The third and fourth assignments of error present the question whether tn.:i::ed
coRts and attorney's fees In exceHs of the
purchase prlct', anrl lntarest thereon, may
be reeovered on the co\"enant. We are
unable to cliscover any jm1t principle upon
ivhlch eosts, whether taxed or otherwise,
have been allowed to plaintiffs over and
•boYe the porcbaeo price rt.'Celved by the

l

r

co,·enantor. aud interest thereon. We
readily perceive the justice of the rule by
which the value of the land at the time of
the sale by him ls accepted as the measure
of the llablllty of the covenantor, und also
that the price paid shall be taken as conclusive evidence of that value. We also
appreciate thefalrneesof allowing lntereHt
on the purchalle money as compensation
to the covenantee for eo lung n. time 1111 he
has been held liable tu theownerfor mesne
profits. But wby coats In esce11s of the
purchaf!e money and lnterf'st ha\·eeverheen
allowoo we cannot conjecture. In 4 K~ut,
Comm. p. 476, It ts said: "The mes1rnre of
damages on a totalfallure of title, even on
the covenant of warranty, le the \aloe of
the land at the execution of the deed; and
the evidence of that vnlue la the con11iclerntlon money, with Interest and costs. n
How costR. which are uucertnln In amount.
\"arylng with referem·P. to the character of
the t1ult, the number of wltn-eMses, and the
nature of the l11e11es presented In a proceeding, could e\'er hnve bt>t>n supposed to
furnish any light upon the pn11t vnlue of
lands. pas;;es 11ur comprelwnslon. Uut HO
It le thnt. hy prncticnliy an unbrok<'n current of uuthnrity, the rule hns hC'en estahllRhP.d that they mny be recovererI In addition to the purchase price and tnterP.st. Rnwle, Cov. c. 9; Huth. Dam. 302; 4
Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 666. BelieYlng
that the rule allowing nny costi-1 11huuld
never lutve been eRtalill11hrd, we decline to
extend It beyond the llmtt11 of the taxed
costs or thl' case. Attornt>y's fees hnve
been allowed In some states, and dlrrn.1lowed In others. The conttlrt In theRe dt•-.
ch1lons will b<• found In the cnsPB cited by
the text writers, and the Enc,vrlopPilia,
nbo\'e referrprJ to. Constrained liy 1rn thority to allow the taxed costM, we return to
corrPCt prtnclplP11 at the tlrHt point at
which we may do so, and holrl that the
attorney's ft'('s pai<l by the covenantee are
not recoverable on the covenant of the
grantor. In this cuuRe, the court allowed
tile defendant an atturne.v's fefl which,
added to the taxC'd cosb1 and othn !lamages, exceeded the value of thP land at the
time of the sole. and Interest thereon, and
taxed costs. But, since the court nl'lo
erred In fixing thA value of the land at $6,000, tte value a the time or eviction, instead of $8.296, the price pa.Id to the d.,_
feudant, both errors must be corrPrterl to
make a prupl'r result. The decree is reversed, and decree here.
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V GUTHRIE v. RUSSELL et ux.

(46 Iowa, 269.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. June 14, 1877.

Appeal from district court, Jasper county?

Suit in equity by one Guthrie against

James H. Russell and wife to recover the

amount plaintiff had been compelled to pay

to satisfy mortgage on lands conveyed to

plaintiff by defendants, with covenant of war-

ranty against incumbrances. Judgment for

piaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

J. N. Lindley and R. A. Sankey, for appel-

lants. Ryan Bros., for appellee.

ADAMS, J.

taining the covenant sued on conveyed an

interest which was paramount to the incum-

brance. That interest, it appears, was of the

value of $1,481.57. The amount necessary

to be paid by the junior incumbrancer to re-

deem was $1,681.57, but that covered im-
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provements made by the plaintiff. What the

plaintiff bought of the defendants was worth,

according to the evidence, about $200 less.

The plaintiff then paid $1,200, and acquired

an interest paramount to all others, worth

$1,481.57. To extinguish an incumbrance

junior to it, he paid, as we will assume, $378,

or gave property of that value, and he now

claims to recover that amount from his cov-

enantors.

Where real estate is conveyed with cove-

nants of warranty, it has been held in actions

for breach of covenant that the price paid

by the purchaser and received by the seller

should be taken, as between them, to be the

value of the property. In Baxter v. Brad-

bury, 20 Me. 260, the court said: “It the

covenant of seisin is broken, as thereby the

title wholly fails, the law restores to the

purchaser the consideration paid, which is

the agreed value of the land, and interest."

In Brandt v. Foster, 5 Iowa, 295, it was said:

“The measure of damages for breach of this

covenant is the consideration money and in-

terest, upon the ground that this is the actual

loss." In Field on Damages (section 461)

the author says: “In an action for the breach

of the modern covenant of warranty, the

general rule of damages in this country, in

the absence of fraud, is the value of the land

at the time of the execution of the deed, of

which the actual consideration is conclusive

evidence."

In the state where this rule prevails. it is

held in actions for breach of covenants

against incumbrances that the damages must

be limited to the amount of purchase money

and interest, although the amount paid to

remove the inenmbrance might be much

greater, the value of the property as between

the parties being taken to be the considera-

tion paid for it.

But, in Knadler v. Sharp, 36 Iowa, 232,

this court ignored the doctrine that the con-

,'__.._._._ _..__=,. -,4 ..a-.—_- _.______.i ,

In this case the deed con- ‘

sideration paid is to be taken as the value

of the property as between the parties. In

that case, the court aimed to give full com-

BREACH OF VEXDOH'S COVEXAXTS.
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4-ssary to redeem had come to be nearly $2,-

000. The amount paid by plaintiff to the

defendant was $1.200. As between the par-

ties. we think that the consideration paid

should be taken to be at least prima facie

evidence of the value. If the plaintiff claims

to recover upon the ground that they were

worth, not only more than that, but more

than the amount which he would have re-

ceived upon redemption, he should have

shown it in evidence. We are not satisﬁed

that the amount paid was fairly paid. If

the premises were really not worth redeem-

ing, in other words if the incumbrance paid

off was really of no value, there is ground

for suspecting that there wa collusion be-

tween the plaintiff and incumbrancer. Pos-

sibly the plaintiff would have been justiﬁed

in paying something for the extinguishment
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of the incumbrance, even if it had no value,

but in such case it would be incumbent upon

him to show that the amount paid was rea-

sonable. We cannot regard the defendants‘

covenant as extending further than that.

It may be said that this rule does not at-

ford the plaintif f complete protection,—that

possibly the incumbrancer was unreasonable‘,

but it should be borne in mind that the plain-

tiff bought with constructive notice of the

inenmbrance. If he was unaware of its ex-

istence it was his own fault. Perhaps it

would be fair to presume that he bought with

reference to it. At all events, it seems clear

to us that while holding an interest under

his deed of greater value than he paid for it,

he cannot properly claim the right to pay

an unreasonable amount to remove the in-

cumbrance and to recover the amount thus

paid of the defendants.

In Knadler v. Sharp, it seems to have been

taken for granted that the amount paid was

reasonable. There is, therefore, nothing in

the decision in that case which necessarily

conﬂicts with this. Reversed.

essary to redeem had come to be nearly $2,000. The amount paid by plalntur to the
defendant was $1.200. As between tbe parties, we thJnk that the consideration paid
should be taken to be at least prlma tacle
evidence of the value. It the plaintiff claims
to recover upon the ground that they were
worth, not only more than that, but more
than the amount which he would have received upon redemption, he should have
shown It ln evidence. We are not satlsfted
that the amount paid was fairly paid. It
the premises were really not worth redeeming, In other words If the lncumbrance paid
off was really of no value, there Is ground
for suspecting that there was collusion between the plaintiff and lncumbrancer. Possibly the plaintiff would have been justifled
In paying something for the extlngulshment
or the lncumbrance, even-If It had no value,
but In such case It would be Incumbent upon
him to show that the amount paid was rea-

sonalJle. We cannot regard the defendants'
covennnt aa extending further than that.
It may be said that this rule does not afford the plaintiff complete protectlon,-that
possibly the lncumbrancer was unreasonable;
but It should be borne In mind that the plalntilr bought with constructl"\""e notice of the
lncumbranre. It be was unaware of Its existence it was his own fault. Perhaps It
would be fair to presume that he bought with
reference to It. At all events, It seems clearto us that whJle holding an Interest under
his deed of greater value than he paid tor It,
he cannot properly claim the right to pay
an unreusonable amount to remove the lncumbrance nnd to recover the amount thus
paid of the defendants.
In Knadler v. Sharp, It seems to have been
taken tor granted that the amount paid was
reasonable. There Is, therefore, nothing In
the decision In that case which necessarily
conflicts with this. Reversed.
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POPOSKEY v. MUNKWITZ.
al value of the leased store tor the term ot
the lease ls at least $2,000 more than the rent
(32 N. W. 31'.1, 08 Wla. 322.)
thereof reserved ln the lease. The closing
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. March 1, 1887. paragraph of the . complaint ls as follows:
Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun- "Thn.t. by reason of the premises, plaintiff's
ty.
said business has been broken up and deThe action ls by a lessee against hie lessor stroyed, and his trade and custom gone, and
for failure of the latter to give the lessee his stock of goods purchased to carry on hls
possession of the leased premises according business at said store so leased has become
to the covenants In the lease. Under date of greatly depreciated and destroyed in value,
October 22, 18S1, the parties executed an in- and plalntllr has lost the profits which he
denture of lease in and by which the de- would and could haYe made in continuing
fendant leased to the plalntltr his store, No. and can·ying on bis aforesaid business at
411 Broadway, In the· city of Milwaukee, said leased premises since said fifteenth day
from November 15, ls:s-1, to May 1, 1800, at of November, l.8S1, had said lensed premises
a yearly rent therein reserved, and therein been surrendered and delivered up to him as
covenanted that, on paying such rent, and agreed by defendant, and hls said leasehold
performing the conditions contained in such Interest in said premises been lost and delease to be performed by hlm, the plaintiff stroyed, to the damage of plaintiff In the sum
should ha°\"e the Quiet and peaceful posses- of five thousand dollars." Judgment for $5,sion of the leased prewlsee during such term. 000 and costs ls demanded. The answer deThe defendant was unable to give the plain- nies In detail each of the above avermenta,
tiff the possession of the leased store be- except that the defend~t owned the store
cause he hac:l theretofore leased the same to No. 411 Broadway, and executed a lease
Wilde & Uhlig for three years, commencing thereof to the plaintl1r as alleged in the com:\lay 1, 1883, and Uhlig was lawfully in pos- plaint.
The controversy on the trial was confined
session thereof under such lease when the
plalntl.II's term under his lease cowwencec:l, to the (1Uestion of damages. The plalntltf
and so continued in possession thereafter. offered testimony for the purpose of proving
The plnlntl.ff paid the defendant rent until the special damages stated ln the complaint;
Dcce1uber 1, 1884, at the execution of the but the same was rejected, and the judge
lease, being ,U.U7, as stipulated in the lease, held that the measure of the plalntltr·s damund performed all his covenants therein con- ages is the difference between the rent retained. '!'he plalntllr also put some goods in served ln the lease and the actual rental
the store with the consent of the defendant, value of the store, together with the expense
but was. required by Uhlig to take them of remoTlng the plaintllr's goods (before menaway. 'l'hls involved an expenditure by the tioned) from the store after the term of the
plaintiff of $14.40. It ls averred in the com- lease commenced, and confined the testimoplaint that, for 12 years . before the making ny to those elements of damages. Only a
of the lease first above mentioned, the plain- single question was submitted to the jury,
tiff had carried on, in the city of Milwau- whfoh ls as follows: "What was the actual
kee, and for the last five years in the vicinity value per annum of the premises 411 Broadof the leased store, a. wholesale and retail way, Milwaukee, described in the lease from
business in pictures, plctur&-frames, and ar- defendant to plnlntltr, from nnd arter Notist's materials, and In manufacturinir plc- vember 15, 18S1 ?" The jury answered $1,ture-frtlllles, and had a. very large and lucra- 200. The rent reserved in the lease until
tive custom and patronage established In May 1, 1887, ls $1,000, and $1,200 thereafter.
said business; that he leased the store No. On April 5, 1886, the court gave judgment
411 B1·oa.dway for the purpose of carrying e>n tor the plaintiff for $272.14 damages, and for
and continuing the same business therein, e>f costs of suit. It Is recited in the order for
which the defendant had notice; that such "judgment that the plaintltr admitted he went
store was especially well located, and adapt- Into possession of the leased store March 1,
ed to the requirements of pla.lntlff'e said 1886. It ls understood that the judgment ls
business; that, relying upon having posses- made up of $200 per annum (being the exsion of the leased store at the stipulated tlme cess In the value of the rent as found by the
in which to carry on his business, he pur- jury, over and above the rent stipulated In
chased a large stock of goods adapted to the the lease) from November 15, 1884, to Marcu
holiday trade, in December, which ls the 1, 1886, and the item of $14.40 above menmost profitable trade during the year; and tioned. The ltem of $41.67 pa.Id defendant
thnt he lost this t.rade by reason of hls fail- 'on account of rent was disallowed for tbe
ure to obtain possession of the store. Al.so reason (as stated by the court) that the lease
that, upon the refusal of the defendant to to plaintltr "assigned, by operation of Jaw,
give him possession of the store, the plain- the premises during Uhllg's term to Mr. Potiff dlligently endeavored, but without auc- poskey, and he has the right to recover the
cC's!!, to obtain another store, suited to the re- rent from Mr. Uhlig." The plaintiff appeals
quirements of his buslness,and tha.t the rent- from the judgment.
/
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. to the covenants in the lease.

/ POPOSKEY v. MUNKWITZ.

(32 N. W. 35, 68 Wis. 322.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. March 1, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun-

ty.

The action is by a lessee against his lessor

for failure of the latter to give the lessee

possession of the leased premises according

Under date of

October 22, 1884, the parties executed an in-

denture of lease in and by which the de-

fendant leased to the plaintif f his store, No.

411 Broadway, in the'city of Milwaukee,

from November 15, 1884, to May 1, 1800, at

a yearly rent therein reserved, and therein

covenanted that, on paying such rent, and

performing the conditions contained in such

lease to be performed by him, the plaintiff
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should have the quiet and peaceful posses-

sion of the leased premises during such term.

The defendant was unable to give the plain-

tiff the possession of the leased store be-

cause he had theretofore leased the same to

Wilde & Uhlig for three years, commencing

May 1, 1883, and Uhlig was lawfully in pus-

session thereof under such lease when the

plaintiffs term under his lease commenced,

and so continued in possession thereafter.

The plaintiff paid the defendant rent until

December 1, 1884, at the execution of the

lease, being $41.67, as stipulated in the lease,

and performed all his covenants therein con-

tained. The plaintiff also put some goods in

the store with the consent of the defendant,

but was. required by Uhlig to take them

away. This involved an expenditure by the

plaintiff of $14.40. It is averred in the com-

plaint that, for 12 years.before the making

of the lease ﬁrst above mentioned, the plain-

tif f had carried on, in the city of Milwau-

kee, and for the last ﬁve years in the vicinity

of the leased store, a wholesale and retail

business in pictures, pictureframes, and ar-

tist's materials, and in manufacturing pic-

ture-frames, and had a very large and lucra-

tive custom and patronage established in

said business; that be leased the store No.

411 Broadway for the purpose of carrying on

and continuing the same business therein, of

which the defendant had notice; that such

store was especially well located, and adapt-

ed to the requirements of plaintiff's said

business; that, relying upon having posses-

sion of the leased store at the stipulated time

in which to carry on his business, he pur-

chased a large stock of goods adapted to the

holiday trade, in December, which is the

most proﬁtable trade during the year; and

that he lost this trade by reason of his fail-

ure to obtain possession of the store. Also

that, upon the refusal of the defendant to

give him possession of the store, the plain-

tilf diligently endeavored, but without suc-

cess, to obtain another store, suited to the re-

quirements of his business,and that the rent-

al value of the leased store for the term of

the lease is at least $2,000 more than the rent

BREAOH OF OONTRACTS RESPJ<XJTING REAL ESTATE.

BREACH OF LANDLORD'S COVENANTS.
BREACH OF LANDLORD'S COVENANTS. 3'11

Dey & Friend, for appellant. Jenkins,

Winkler, Fish & Smith, for respondent.

LYON, J. This action was brought to re-

cover damages for the failure of the defend-

ant to put the plaintiff in possession of the

store No. 411 Broadway, Milwaukee, leased

by the former to the latter, at the time stipu-

lated in the lease as the commencement of

the term. It is substantially an action for a ‘

breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment

contained in the lease. 1 Tayl. Landl. & Ten.

§ 309. This appeal presents for determina-

tion the question, what is the true rule of

damages for a breach of that covenant hr

that case, in view of the facts proved and of-

fered to be proved therein? The rule is un-

doubtedly the same as in an action for a

breach of covenants for title in an absolute

conveyance; that is to say, had the plaintiff

purchased the store No. 411 Broadway of the
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defendant, and taken an absolute convey-

ance thereof, instead of a lease for ﬁve or

more years, under the same circumstances

which existed when the lease was executed,

the measure of his damages for a breach of

the covenants for title in such conveyance

would be the same that it is for a breach of

the covenant for quiet enjoyment in the

lease. 3 Suth. Dam. 147; Blossom v. Knox,

3 Pin. 262. Indeed, the covenant for quiet

enjoyment is one of the covenants for title in

a conveyance. Rawle, Cov. 17. It is also

said to be “an assurance consequent upon a

defective title." Id. 125.

The general rule of damages which ob-

tains in England and many of our sister

states for a breach of covenant for title was

ﬁrst authoritatively laid down in 1775, in the

case of the common pleas of Flureau v.

Thornhiil, 2 W. Bl. 1078. The defendant

covenanted to sell the plaintiff a rent for a

term of years issuing out of leasehold prem-

ises, but. without fault on his part, the de-

fendant was unable to make good title there-

to. The plaintiff claimed damages for the

loss of his bargain, but it was held that he

was not entitled thereto. De Grey, C. J.,

said: “Upon a contract for a purchase, if the

title proves bad, and the vendor is (without

fraud) incapable of making a good one, I do

not think the purchaser can be entitled to

any damages for the fancied goodness of the

bargain which he supposes he has lost."

Blackstone, J., said: "These contracts are

merely upon condition, frequently expressed,

but always implied, that the vendor has a

good title." The rule of the above case

has been much considered in both England

and this country; and while its scope has

been more clearly deﬁned, and its applica-

tion somewhat limited by later adjudica-

tions, the rule itself. as applied to cases in

which the vendor honestly believed he had a

good title, but the title failed for some de-

fect not known to him, and of which he was

not chargeable with notice, is now ﬁrmly es-

tablished in the jurisprudence of England by

the judgment of the house of lords in Bain

v. Fothergiil, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. 158.

Dey & Friend, tor appellnnt. Jenkins,
Winkler, Fish & Smith, tor resp0ndent.

3·11

not chargeable with notice, ls now firmly e::;tabllshed in the jurisprudence of England by
the judgment of the house of lords ln Bain
LYO~. J.
This action was brought to re- v. Fothergill, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. l;:iS.
cover damages for the !allure of the defend- As all'eady observed, the rule prevails in sevant to put the plaintiff In possession of the eral of the United States, Including this
store :So. 411 Broadway, Milwaukee, leased state, under the limitations just mentioned, of
by the former to the latter, at the time stipu- good faith and ex.C'usable Ignorance of the
lated In the lease as the commencement ot vendor of defects in his title. Indeed. these
the term. lt ls substantially an action tor a are scarcely limitations, but rather an Interbreach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment pretation of the qualification " without
contained In the lease. 1 Tayl. Lnndl. & Ten. fraud," In the opinion by De Grey, C. J., in
f 309. Thie appeal presents tor determina- the principal case. The rule as it now stands
tion the question, what ls the true rule of has been applied In this state in H.icb ''·
damages tor a breach ot that covenant hr Johnson, 2 Pin. 88; Blossom v. Knox, 8 Pin.
that case, In Tiew ot the facts proved and of- 262; Nichol v. Alexander, 28 Wis. 118; llesfered to be proved therein? The rule ls un- i;er v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684, 10 N. W. 6, and
doubtedly the mme as In an action for a In other cases.
Under thle or any other rule, the plaintiff
breach of covenants for title In an absolute
conveyance; that ls to say, had the plaintiff Is entitled to recover the consideration paid
purchased the store No. 411 Broadway of the by him on account of the purchase. Hence,
defendant, and taken an absolute convey- In the present case, whatever may be the
ance thereof, Instead of a lease for five or measure of damages, the plaintiff should
more years, under the same circumstances have recovered the amount he advanced for
which existed when the lease was executed, rent, and Interest thereon. The reason gh·the measure of his damages tor a breach of. en by the circuit judge for excluding this
the covenants tor title In such conveyance amount from the plalntllf's recovery, t<>-wlt,
would be the same that It ls for a breach of that he could recover the rent from Uhlig,
the covenant for quiet enjoyment In the the tenant under the paramount lease, ls conlease. 8 Buth. Dam. 147; Blossom v. Knox, ceived to be unsound. The plalntltr did not
8 Pin. 262. Indeed, the covenant for quiet purchase a term subject to the lease of Uhenjoyment ls one of the covenants for title In lig, but an absolute term; and while he
a conveyance. Rawle, Cov. 17. It ls also might, perhaps, have treated his lease as an
said to be ''an a88Ul'llnce consequent upon a assignment of the rents accruing under the
defective title." Id. 125.
prior leo.se, and collected the same from UhThe general rule of damages which ob- lig, there is no rule of Jaw which compels
ta.Ins In England and many of our sister him to do so. Indeed, had be done ilo, it posstates for a breach of covenant for title was sibly might have operated as a waiver ot
first authoritatively laid down In 1775, In the any claim tor damages for the breach of the
case of the common pleas of Flureau v. covenant sued upon.
Thornhill, 2 W. Bl. 1078. ThP. defendant
The llmltatlons of the rule of Fluren.u v.
covenanted to sell the plaintiff a rent for a Thornhill, or rather the exceptions thereto,
term of years lsmlng out of leasehold prem- are well stated In 8 Suth. Dam. 149, as folises, but, without fault on his part, the de- lows: "Where a lessor knows, or ls chargefendant was unable to make good title there- able with notice, of such defect of his title
to. The plaintiff claimed damages tor the that he cannot assure• to his lessee quiet enloss of his bargain, but It was held that he joyment for the term which such lessor aswas not entitled thereto. De Grey, C. J ., sumes to grant; where he refuses, In v iolasaid: "Upon a contract for a purchase, It the tion of hie agreement, to give a lease, or postitle proves bad, and the vendor ls (without session pursuant to a lease, having the ablllty
fraud) Incapable of making a good one, I do to fulfill, as well as where the lessor evicts
not think the purchaser can be entitled to his tenant,-he ls chargeable with full damany damages for the fancied goodne88 of the ages for compensation, and the doctrine of
bargain which he supposes he has lost." Flureau v. Thornhill has no application. On
Blackstone, J., said: "These contracts are this general proposition the authorities agree.
merely upon condition, frequently expressed, In such cases the difference between the rent
but always implied, that the vendor bas a to be paid and the actual value of the premgood title." The rule of the above case ises at the time of the breach for the unexhas been much considered In both England pired term ls considered the natural and
and thls country; and while Its scope has proximate damages. Where the lessee ls debeen more clearly defined, and Its applica- prived of the possession and enjoyment untion somewhat limited by later adjudica- der such circumstances, the lessor ls either
tions, the rule Itself, as applied to cases in guilty of Intentional wrong, or he has made
which the vendor honestly believed he had a the lease, and assumed the obligation to asgood title, but the title failed for some de- sure the lessee's quiet enjoyment, with a
fect not known to hlm, and of which he was culpable Ignorance of detects In hie title, or
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'on the chance of afterwards acquiring one.

In neither case has he any claim to favorable

consideration; and he is not excused, on the

doctrine of Flureau v. Thornhiil, from mak-

ing good any loss which the lessee may suf-

fer from being deprived of the demised prem-

ises for the whole or any part of the stipu-

lated term." This quotation doubtless con-

tains a correct statement of the law acted

upon in all the states, as well in those which

have adopted the rule in Flureau v. Thorn-

hill as in those which have not.

We are clear that this case comes within

the exceptions. When the defendant leased

the store to the plaintiff, he knew that there

was a valid paramount lease upon the prem-

ises, executed by himself to Wilde & Uhlig,

having 17 or 18 months to run after the com-

mencement of the plaintiff's term. There is

no claim that the former lessees had for-
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feited their lease. Indeed, the defendant aft-

erwards made an unsuccessful attempt to

evict them by legal proceedings for an al-

leged breach of the covenants of their lease,

occurring after the execution of the plaintiff's

lease. But it was held there was no breach.

Munkwitz v. Uhlig, 64 Wis. 380. 25 N. W.

424. These proceedings are in evidence.

Hence the defendant knew, when he leased

the store to the plaintiff, of a defect in his

title which prevented him from assuring to

the plaintiff the quiet enjoyment of the leas-

ed premises. He thus entered into the con-

tract on the chance of being able afterwards

to avoid, in some way, his lease to Wilde &

Uhlig, but having no legal cause for avoiding

it. These facts deprive him of the protec-

tion of the rule in Flureau v. Thornhill, and

bring the lease within the rule above quoted

from Sutherland. In other words, the case

is thus brought within the general rule

which prevails in actions for breaches of con-

tracts, that the plaintiff shall recover the loss

he has proximately sustained by reason of

the breach.

But, in order to determine what elements

of loss come within the general rule, it is

necessary to apply other rules of law to the

particular case. In the present case (per-

haps in most cases) the rules laid down in

the leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9

Exch. 341, 26 Eng. Law & Eq. 398. which

have many times been approved by this court,

are sufﬁcient. Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas-

light Co., 15 Wis. 318; Hibbard v. W. U.

Tel. C0.. 33 Wis. 558; Candee v. W. U. Tel.

Co., 84 Wis. 471; Walsh v. Chicago, M. &

St. P. R. Co., 42 Wis. 30; Hammer v. Schoen-

felder, 47 Wis. 455, 2 N. W. 1129; Brown v.

Chicago. M. & St. P. R. Co., 54.Wis. 342. 11

N. W. 356. 911; Cockburn v. Ashland Lum-

ber Co., 54 Wis. 619. 12 N. W. 49; McNa-

umra v. Clintonviile. 62 Wis. 207, 22 N. W.

472: Thomas, B. & W. Manuf'g Co. v. Wa-

bash. St. L. & P. R. Co.. 62 Wis. 642. 22

N. W. 827: see. also. Richardson v. Chyno-

wcth, 20 Wis. 6513. See, also, a very learned

1ind elaborate note on the rule in the princi-

pal case, in which a great number of cases
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be lawfully required to take another store

out of the vicinityln which he was doing

businss when he took the lease from the de-

fendant. By removing to a remote part of the

city, he might, and probably would, to some

extent at least, have lost the good-will of

his business, which it is alleged he had car-

ried on successfully for a series of years in

the vicinity of the store No. 411 Broadway.

Neither was he required to take another

store not reasonably well adapted to his busi-

ness.

From the foregoing rules, and the partial

application of them already suggested. we

think the following propositions are estab-

lished: (1) The plaintiff is entitled to recov-

er the sum he paid as rent when the lease

was executed, and interest thereon; and also

the necessary expense of removing some of
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his goods to the store, with defendant‘s con-

sent, and taking them therefrom after he

failed to get possession of the store. (2) If

the defendant did not know, when he exe-

cuted the lease, the purposes for which the

plaintif f hired the store, or the uses to which

he intended to put it, the measure of the

plaintiff's damages for breach of the cove-

nant for quiet enjoyment (in addition to the

special damages just mentioned) would be

that adopted by the trial judge; that is, the

difference between the rent reserved in the

lease and the actual rental value of the store,

without regard to what it is used for, which

the jury found to be $200 per nnnum. All

these are natural and proximate damages re-

sulting from the breach. (3) If the defend-

ant, then, knew that the plaintiff was carry-

ing on the business stated in the complaint,

and hired the store No, 411 Broadway for

the purpose of continuing the same business

therein, and if, in the exercise of reasonable

diligence, the plaintiff might have procured

another store, reasonably well adapted to his

business and in the same vicinity, that is, in

a location in which he could have preserved

and retained substantially the good-will of

his former business, the rule of damages, in

addition to the special items ﬁrst above men-

tioned, will be the difference between the rent

reserved in the lease and the actual rental

value of the leased store for the purpose of

carrying on such business therein. In such

case the actual rental value would ordinarily

be measured by the amount of rent the plain-

tiff would be compelled to pay for another

store equally well adapted to his business.

If he could obtain another store for the same

rent he was to pay the defendant, or less, of

course he would suffer no general damages

for the defendant's breach of covenant, and

his recovery in that behalf would be con-

ﬁned to nominal damages, in addition to the

special damages ﬁrst above mentioned. If,

however, the expenses of removing to an-

other store would have been greater than

they would have been in removing to the

store No. 411 Broadway, such excess would

/'

be lawfully required to take another store
out ot the vicinity .In which he was doing
bustnesa wbe11 be t.ook the lease from the defendant. By removing to a remote part of the
etty, be might, and probably would, to some
extent at least, have lost the good-will of
his business, which It Is alleged be had carried on successfully tor a series ot years In
the \""lclnlt;r ot the store No. 411 Broadway.
Neither was be required to take another
atore not reasonably well adapted to bis business.
1''rom the foregoing rules, and the partial
appllcn.tlon of them already suggested, we
think the following propositions a.re established: (1) The plalntllf ls entitled to recover the sum be paid as rent when the lease
was executed, nnd Interest thereon; and also
the necessary expense of removing some ot
his goods to the store, with defendant's consent, and taking them therefrom after he
tailed to get possession of the store. (2) It
the defendant did not know, when he exeeuted the lease, the purposes tor which the
plalntllf hired the store, or the uses to which
he Intended to put It, the men.sure of the
plaintiff's damages for breach ot the covenant tor quiet enjoyment (In addition to the
special damages just mentioned) would be
that adopted by the trial judge; that Is, the
difference between the rent reserved In the
lease and the actual rental value of the store,
without regard to what It Is used tor, which
the jury found to be $200 per annum. All
these are natural and proximate damages rewltlng from the breach. (3) It the defend·
ant, then, knew that tbe plaintiff was carrying on the business stated In the complaint,
and hired the store No1 411 Broodwn.y tor
the purpose of continuing the same business
therein, and If, in the exercise ot reasonable
d1llgence, the plaintiff might have procured
another store, reasonably well adapted to bis
business and In the same vicinity, that Is, In
a location In which be could have preserved
and retained substantially the good-will ot
his former business, the rule of damages, In
addition to the special Items first above mentioned, will be the difference between the rent
reserved In the lease and the actual rental
value ot the leased store tor the purpose of
earrylng on such business therein. In strch
ease the actual rental value would ordinarily
be measured by the a.mount of rent the plalntllf would be compelled to pay tor another
store equally well adapted to ills business.
It he could obtain another store for the same
rent he was to pay the defendant, or less, of
eourse be would suffer no general damages
tor the defendant's breach of covenant, and
Ills recovery In that behalf would be confined to nominal damages, In addition to the
special damages first above mentioned. It,
however, the expenses of removing to another store would buve been greater than
they would have been in removing to the
store No. 411 Broadway, such extess would
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damngcs. (4)

also be a proper Item ot
It
the plaintiff could reasonably have procured
another suitable store tor his business, he
cannot recover tor damages to bis buslnesa,
because by leasing, and continuing his business In, such other store, he might have
avoided such damages. (5) But knowing that
the plalntilf hired the store tor the purpose
ot rontlnulng his former business therein, (It
he did know it,) and having executed the
lease with knowledge that he could not put
the plalntl1f In possession ot the store at the
stipulated time because ot his prior outstnndlng lease, the defendant took the risk of the
plnlntllf being able to procure another suitable store tor his busln~s. the Inability of
the latter to do so would render the defendant liable for the damages resulting to plnlntllf's business by reason of the brenl'h of
covenant complained of. This Is plainly
within the rule ot Hadley v. Baxendale, supra, because, under such circumstances. thA
parties may fairly be considered to have contemplated that the breach of covenant would
necessarily destroy or greatly Impair the
value of plalntllf's business. It should be
observed that, It the plaintiff recovers tor
damages to his bu11lness, he cannot also recover the value of his lease under the nbove v
second or third proposition, because such
value Is necessarily a factor In estimating
the damages to the business. Smith v. Wunderlich, 70 Ill. 426, (433.) He may, however,
In that case, recover the special damages
mentioned In the first proposition, tor these
are not such factors.
It follows that the testimony which wns offered by the plaintiff to show that the defendant knew, when be executed the lense to
the plalntllf, that the latter was carrying on
the business before mentioned In the same
vicinity, and took the lease of the store tor
the purpose and with the Intention or continuing such business the1·ein, anu thnt he was
unable, In the exercise or due diligence, to J
find another store sultal>le for his bm1iness,
was competent, and should have been received. Further, after the plaintiff makes n.
prlma tacle ca111e entitling him to recover tor
damages to his business, pl'ol'f should he received, under the plea.dings, to show the
value ot such business.
We agree with with Mr. Justice Paine. In
Shepard v. Gas-light Co., 15 Wis. 318, that
to ascertain the value of a business an Inquiry as to the profits thereof Is necessary.
Probable "value" and "net profits" are convertible terms as applied to a business. Yet
the la'v In many cases gives dan1n~es for
breaches of contracts, based on prospel'tive
profits, when they are fairly within the contemplation of the pa111es. ore not too remote
and conjectural, nnd are susceptlhle of bcini:
ascertained with reasonable certainty. If
the plaintiff shows himself entitled to reco\·er for damages to his businei>s. the character, eJ.:tent, and value of his estuullshed

v
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business when the lease was executed, and

before, will furnish a guide to the jury in as-

sessing the prospective and probable value

thereof, had the plaintiff been permitted to

transfer it to the store No. 411 Broadway.

Carried on in the immediate vicinity of the

old stand, and by the same person, presum-

ably the business would have been equally

prosperous. This presumption may be re-

butted by proof of facts and circumstances

tending to, show that the business would

probably have been less remunerative had it

been so continued.

It was said in argument that no case can be

found which gives damages for the loss of

anticipated proﬁts, because a landlord fails

to give possession at the time agreed upon.

This is scarcely a correct statement. The

case of Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19, cited
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by Mr. Justice Paine in Shepard v. Gas-light

Co., supra, seems to be just such a case. It'

is conceded that if the plaintiff had not a

business already built up and established in

the same vicinity, which, with its good-will,

could have been transferred to the store No.

411 Broadway, there would be no basis upon

which to estimate the prospective value of

the business which the plaintiff would have

done there had he obtained possession, and

carried on the brsiness therein. In such case,

proﬁts would probably be too conjectural and

uncertain to be the basis of a recovery.

Some of the cases refer to this distinction.

In Chapman v. Kirby, 49 Ill. 211, the court,

in speaking of the case of Green v. \Villiams,

45 Ill. 206, say: “In that case the lessee had

not entered upon the term, had not built up

or established a business, and had not suf-

fered such a loss. There was not in that

case any basis upon which to determine

whether there ever would be any proﬁts, or

upon which to estimate them." In the pres‘

ent case the offer was to prove facts which

would have shown a suﬂicient basis to de-

termine whether there would be proﬁts, and

upon which they might be estimated.

For the errors above indicated, the judg-

ment of the circuit court must be reversed,

and the cause will be remanded for a new

trial.

. BUEACH OF LANDLOUD'S
BREACH OF LANDLORD‘S COVENANTS.

/
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COHN v. NORTON. ‘/

(18 Atl. 595, 57 Conn. 480.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Sept. 13, 1889.

Appeal from court of common pleas, New

Haven county; Di-ziuNo, Judge.

Action by Louis (John against Samuel L.

Norton, for damages for breach of contract

to deliver possession of premises leased to

plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff. Defend-

ant appeals. -

G. A. Fay, for appellant.

forappellee.

CARPENTER, J. On the 18th day of Au-

gust,1885, the defendant leased to the plaintiff

R. S. Pickett,

a store and dwelling-house, for one year from -
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the lst day of 5(-ptember, with the privilege

of renewing the lease for three years, at a

monthly rent of $50, payable in advance.

One month's rent was paid. The defendant

failed to put the plaintiff in possession. It

appears that when the lease was executed the

property was in the possession of one Alex-

ander. under a prior lease, with the right to ‘

hold the same until February 1, 1690. He

refused to surrender the possession. In an

action to recover damages the piluniid

claimed to recover the sum of $80, amount

paid to clerks for release from contracts. and

the sum of 8586.35, amount paid merchants

to take back goods bought, and for deprecia-

tion on the goods. The defendant objected ‘

to the introduction of all evidence upon either

of these claims. 'l‘he court admitted the evi-

dence, and allowed both items as damages.

Assuming that the plaintiff is correct in

his claim that these were, or might have been,

legitimate items of damage, still we think the

testimony was objectionable, unless it further

appeared that the sums paid were reasonable,

and that the obligation to pay was entered

into in good faith. The mere fact that the

plaintiff paid them is not of itself suﬂicient

to establish either proposition; and it does

not appear that there was any other evidence

tending to establish them, or either of them.

If the clerks employed by the plaintiff had

sustained no damage, or damage to a less

amount, or if the plaintiff was under no legal

obligation to pay, then the payment was un-

reasonable. The same is true of the money

paid to the merchants. If these clerks were

hired after he knew of the lease to Ale\':\nder.

it can hardly be claimed that the plaintiff

acted in good faith. How that was, we are

not told. It appears that he had full knowl. ‘

edge of that lease on the 23d of August; and

it is consistent with every fact found that all

the clerks were subsequently hired. So. too,

with respect to the purchase of the goods.

Four days after the plaintiff had actual

knowledge that Alexander could legally re-

tain the possession. August 27th, he wrote

the defendant as follows: “As i am now sit-

uated, I am on the fence, it being high time

.,/
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lees received the defendant's letter informtn11 him that the prior lease had a year a'nd
D.ve months longer to run. The evidence is
strong, if not conclusive, that he purehased
his goods after that. If so, in no event hllS
Appeal from court of common pleas, New be any legal or moral claim on lhedefendant.
But the great question is, what is the rule
Haven county; DEMING, Judge.
of damages in cases like this? Before considAction by Lonie Cohn against Samuel L
Norton, for damages for breach of contract ering that question we will brieliy notice anto deliver posseseion o( premiaes leased to other claim that the dt'fendant st>ts up, and
plnintilJ. Judgment for plaintiff. Defend- that is, that it was the duty of the plaintiff,
at. his own expense, to take meRSures lo gain
ant appeals.
possession of the property. Whatever may
(} . .&. Fay, for appellant. R. S. Pickett,
be the rule when a stranger wrongfully takes
forappellee.
and holds possession, the principle contended
CAHPENTER, J. On the 18th day of Au- for can have no application where a person
gust,ll:!85, thedefend1mt leased to the J!lai ntlff holding rightfully under the lessor retains the
a store and dwelling-house, for one year from possession. Nor i&re we prepared to sanction
the lst day of Srpte111ber, with the privilt>ge the claim that in this case the defendant is
of renewing the lease for three years, at a only liable for nominal damages. We can
monthly rent of $50, payable in advance. hardly say that a landlord who knows, or who
One month's rent waa paid. The defendant has the means of knowing, that his property
failt>d to put the plaintiff' in posse&tlion. It is incumbered with an outstanding lease,
appears that when the lease was executed the which may prevent his giving possession,
property was in the possession of one Alex- acts in good faith in leasing unconditionally
ander. untler a prior lease, with the right to to another. We come back lhen to the quesbold the same until ~'ebruary 1, ltiOO. He tion, what is the rule of damages'! In Hadrefused to surrender the possession. In an ley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, the rule is laid
action to recover damages the plaintiff down thus: "\Vht>re two parties have ma1le
claimed to reco\·er the sum of 880, amount a contract which one of them has broken, the
paid to clerks for release from contracts, and damages which the other p1lrty ought to rethe sum or 8586.35, amount paid merchants ceive in respect of such breach of contraC"t
to take back goods bought, and for deprecia- should be either surh as may, fairly and rea.
tion on the goods. The defendant objected sonably, be considl'red a.q arising naturallyt.o the introduction of all evidtmce upon either that is, according to the usual coul'se of
of these claims. The court admitted the evi- thing11-from such breach of contract itself,
dence, and allowed both itemit u damages.
or such as may reasonably be supposed to
Assuming thnt the plaintill Is correct in have bt>en in the contemplation of bo.t h parhis claim tlmt these were, or might have been, ties at the time they made the contract, as
legitimate items of damage, still we think the the probable result of the breach of it."
testimony was objectionable, unless it further
This rule hns been criticised somewhat, as
appe11red thRt the sums paid were reasonable, not being sulHciently definite; but we appreand that the obligation to pay was entered hend that any difficulty of that sort has necinto in good faith. The mere fact that the essarily arisen from the difficulty in applying
plaintiff paid t!1em iB not of itself sufficient the rule in given cases. It is not an ea.'ly
to establish either proposition; and •t. does m11lter, in many cases, to determine whether
not appear that there was any other evidence a given result is the natural consequence of
tending to establish them, or either of them. a breach of a contract, or whether it arose
U the clerks employed by the plaintiff had from a matter which may reasonably be supsustained no damage, or damage to a less posed to have been contemplated when the
amount, or if the plain till WRS under no legal parties entered into the contract. Oftentime:i
obligation to pay, then the payment was un- it is a quest.ion on which men's minds may
reasonable. The same ls true of the money well ditfer. Io that case the plaintiff was the
paid to the merchant.a. It these clerks wl're owner of a steam-mill. He sent the parts of
hired after he knew of the lease to Alexander, a broken shaft by the defendant, a carrier, to
it can hardly be claimed that the plaintiff a mechanic, to serve as a model for making
acted in good faith. How that was, we are a new one. '.rhe carrier did not deliver th ..
not told. It appears that he had full knowl- · article within a 1·easonable time, by reason of
t'dge of that lease on the 23d of Aug11sl; and which the plaintiff's mill stood still several
days. In an action to recover damages the
it is oonsistent with every fact found thi.t all
the clerks were sub>4equently hired. So. too, defendant pleaded by paying £25 into court.
with respect to the purchase of the goods. The case went to trial, and the plaintiff had
!<'our days afte1· the plaintiff had actual a verdict for £25 more. A rule to show cause
knowledge that Alexander could legally re- was argued, and the court promulgated the
tain the poeaession, August 27th, be wrote rule we have quoted. In that case It wa11
the dPfendant as follows: "As 1 am now sit- contended that the loss of profits was tha diuated, I am on the fence, it heing high ti me rect and natural consequt>llCI' of the defl'ndfor me to buy goods, and 1 don't know what ant's neglect. 'fhecourt did not accept that
io do about it." On the same day be doubt- view, but placed U;e decision on somewhat
COHN "'· NORTON.
(18 A.ti. 595, 57 Conn. 480.)
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
Sept. 13, 1889.
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‘ and communicated.

different grounds. The court says: “Now,

if the special circumstances underwhich the

contract was actuallv made were communi-

cated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and

thus known to both parties, the damages re-

sulting from the breach of such a contract

which they would reasonably contemplate

would be the amount of injury which would

ordinarily follow from a breach of contract

under these special circumstances, so known

But, on the other hand,

if those special circumstances were wholly

unknown to the party breakmg the contract,

he, at the must, could only be supposed to

have had in his contemplation the amount of

injury which would arise generally, and, in

the great multitude of cases, not affected by

any special circumstances from such a breach
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of contract; for, had the special circumstances

been known, the parties might have especially

provided for the breach of contract by special

terms as to the damages in that case, and of

this advantage it would be very unjust to de-

prive them." Thus the loss was attributed

to the failure of the plaintiff to inform the

defendant of the special circumstances, by

reason of which he contributed to the loss;

for, if the defendant had been fully informed,

it may be assumed that there would have been

a prompt delivery, and consequently no un-

necessary loss, and because he was not so in-

formed the court held that he was not liable

for special damages. The essence of the rule

seems to be that the defendant must, in some

measure, have contemplated the injury for

which damages are claimed. If it was the

direct and natural result of the breach of

contract itself, he did contemplate it; but if

the injury did not ﬂow naturally from the

breach, but the breach combined with special

circumstances to produce it, then the defend-

ant did not contemplate it, and consequently

is not liable, unless he had knowledge of the

special circumstances. There may, however,

be cases, growing out of the present methods

of business, in which a promise may be im-

plied, from the nature of the transaction, or

the character of the business in which the

party is engaged, to be prompt, and to use

the utmost diligence in the perf'ormance of

the duty undertaken. In such cases the law

will not require the party to be specially in-

formed, but will deem him to have contem-

plated the importance of the business, and

hold him responsible accordingly.

Apply these principles to this case. The

store was hired for a clothing store. That

seems to be all that the defendant knew

about it. He did not request the plaintiff to

hire clerks and purchase goods, nor was he ‘

While ‘

he may have supposed that the plaintiff '

advised that the plaintiff would do so.

would make suitable preparations to oc-

cupy the store, yet he could not know what t

preparations were necessary. He may have

needed no clerks, or they may have been pre-
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diffe1·ent grt>unds. The court says: "Now,
if the special circnmstancl'S undt'r .which the
contract WRS al't1u11lv made Wtore communicate<l by the plaintiff to the derendant, and
tl111s known to l.Joth partks, the d11magt•s resulting from the breach of such a contract
whieh tlwy would reasonably contemplate
would be the amount of injury which would
ordinarily follow from a breach of contract
under these special circumstances, so known
·and communkated. Hut, on the other han1l,
if those special circumstances \Yere wholly
11 nknown to the party l.Jreakmg the contract,
he, at the most, could only be supposed to
have had in his contemplation the amount of
injury which would arise generally, and, in
the great multitude of casPs, not affected by
any special circumstancPS from sm·h a breach
of contract; for, had the special circumstances
teen known, the parties might have e~pecially
provided for the breach of contract by special
tPrms as to the damages in that case, and of
this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them." Thus the loss was attributed
to the failure of the plaintiff to inform the
defendant of the special circumstances, by
reason of which he <'Ontributed to the loss;
for, if the dt'fendant had been fully informed,
it may be assumed that there would have been
a prompt delivery, and consequently no unneeessary loss, and because he was not so informed the court held that he was not liable
for special damages. The essenee of the rule
seems to be that the defendant must, in some
measure, have contemplated the injury for
which damages a1·e claimed. If it was the
direct and natund result of the bl'each of
contract itself, he did contemplate it; bnt if
the injury did not flow naturally from the
breach, but the breach combined with special
circumstances to produce it, then th'! defendant did not contemplate it, and consequently
is not liable, unle.ss he had knowledge of the
special circumstances. There may, however,
be cases, growinit out of the pl'esent methods
of business, in which a promise may be implied, from the nature of the transaction, or
the chRracter of the business in which the
party is engaged, to be prompt, and to use
the utmost diligence in the pert'ormance of
the duty undertaken. In such cases the law
will not require the party to he specially infor111ed, but will deem him to have contemplated the importance of the business, and
hold him responsil.Jle accordingly.
Apply these prindples to this case. The
store was hired for a clothing store. That
see1ns to be all that the defendant knew
about it. He did not reqne8t the plaintiff to
hire clel"ka and purchase goods, nor was he
advised that tbeplaintiffwoulddoso. While
he may have supposed that the plaintitl
would make suitable preparations to occupy the store, yet he could not know what
preparations were necessary. He may have
nteded no clerks, or they may have been previously engaged, and the necessary goods
mny have been then in his possession. As a
matter of law, it cannot be said that the de-

fenrlant contemplatPd that tlle plaintiff would
hire clerks and purchase goot.ls under such
circum!ltances as to incur heavy liabilities in
case of failure for any cause. In no roper)
sense, therPfore, was the defenda a parfy
to those arrangements, had no i
.rest therl,'in, and had no ri~ht to int fere; consti
1,1uently he cannot be held resp, nsible• .Again~
Jff these liabilities were i tirred aftel' the
plaintiff knew that it was,, doubtful whether
he could have the store, as they prohalil.v
were, then, as suggested in a former part of
this opinion, they were incurred in bad faith,
and he assumed the entire risk. The .English ml<', then, as we understand it, will not
justify the measure of damagPs applied by
the court l.Jelow. The rule we have been
considering pl'evails generally in this co11nt1·y.
Clo!!ely allied to it is another principle, which
has some application to this case, and that is,
that profits which are in their nature doulJtful or uncertain cannot be recovered as damuges in such cases. But this p1·inciple does
not exclude profits as such, but only those of
a contingent nature. If they aredetinite and
certain, and are lost by reason of the defendant's breach of his contract, thPy are in some
cases recovemble. An iustance of this is the
c11se of Booth v. Rolling-Mill Co., tiO N. Y.
4~7.
The plaintiff had contracted to deliver
to a railroad company 400 steel-eapped rails
at a given price. The defendant engaged
with the plaintiff to manufacture them, but
failed to do so. The plaintiff was allowed to
recover the profits he would have mHde had
he been able to dt>liver the rails. It a loss of
profits may tbua be compensated, we see no
reason why a direct lo!ls of money may not
be compensated. In either event, howevt1r,
the- lose must be certain, not only as to its
nature and extent, but also as to the cause
which produced lt, and must be capable or
being definitely ascertained. In GrilHn v.
Colver, 16 N. Y. 489, the rule is thus stated:
"The broad, general rule in suc·h cases is
that the party injured is entitled to recover
all his d'amages, including gains preve11te1l al'
well as losses sustained, and this rule is 1rnbject to but two conditions: The damages
must be such as may fairly be supposed to
have entered into tb11 contemplation of the
parties when they made the contract,-that
is, must be such as might naturally be ex·
peeled to follow its violation; and they must
be certain, both in their nature and in respect to the cause from whkh they proceed."
Here we may concede that the loss sustained
was s111liciently definite and certain as to the
amount, but not so as to the cause from
which it proceeded. As we have already seen,
. it is not prob!lble that the violation of the
contract caused these losses: but, on the other
hand, the plaintiff himself needlessly subjected himself to them.
' In an Illinois case cited by the plaintitl,
(Green v. Williams. 45 Ill. 206,) it was held
that nPcessary losses sustaint>d might be recoverl'tl. The plaintiff's case will hardly
stand that test. The failure is twofold,-in
1
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respect to the necessity for hiring clerks, and

purchasing goods, in the ﬁrst instance, and

also in respect to the payment of the sums

paid. There is no ﬁnding, and the facts do

not suﬂiciently indicate. that there was any

necessity for either.

Thus far we have assumed that the dam-

ages recoverable in this case are the same as

in ordinary cases of breaches of contract.

The defendant, however, contends that the

rule in actions on covenants in leases, ex-

press or implied, is that, where the plaintiff

has paid no rent or other expense, only

nominal damages can be recovered. Such a

rule once prevailed. It was adopted in anal-

ogy to actions on covenants in deeds of real

estate. and it now prevails to a limited ex-

tent in the state of New York. Conger v.

Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140. In that case Dr:NIO,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

J., not regarding the rule with favor, with

apparent reluctance considered that it was

too ﬁrmly established in that state to be dis-

turbed. In Mack v. Patchin. 42 N. Y. 167,

SMITH. J., says: "But this rule has not been

very satisfactory to the courts in this country,

and it has been relaxed or modiﬁed more

or less, to meet the injustice done to les-

sees in particular cases.” In Pnmpelly v.

Phelps. 40 N. Y. 59, it is declared that the

rule should not be extended, but limited

strictly to those cases coming wholly and ex-

actly within it. - In both those cases the cir-

cumstances are enumerated whichwill take

cases out of the operation of the rule. They

are so numerous as to well nigh abrogate the

rule itself. In England the rule has been re-

pudiated, and such actions are plau-ed upon

the same footing with other actions on con-

tracts. Williams v. Barrell, 1 Man., G. 80 S.

402; Look v. Furze, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 96.

In this state the rule has not been adopted.

and we are not disposed to adopt it. We

think it better to discard the rule, so as to be

in a position to determine all such cases upon

the general principles applicable to other con-

tracts. In that way we think we shall be

the better prepared to do justice in each case

as it arises.

We suppose the correct rule to be that the

plaintiff is entitled to recover the rent paul.

and the difference between the rent agreed

to be paid and the value of the term, together

with such special damages as the circum-

stances may show him to be entitled to.

Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. The theory

upon which the court below assessed dam-

ages being inconsistent with these prin-

ciples, the judgment must be revelsed. and a

new trial ordered. The other judges con-

curred.
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respect to the necessity for hiring clerks, and strictly to those cases coming wholly and expurchasing goods, in t.he first instance, and actly within it. ' In both those C11Ses the ciralso 111 re11peet to the payment of Uie sums cumstances are enumerated which· will take
paid. There is no finding, and the facts do cases out of the operation of the rule. They
not sumciently indicate, that there waa any are so numerous as to well nigh abrogate tbe
neef'ssity for either.
rule itself. In England the rule has ut-tm reThus far we have assumed that the dam- pudiated, and 11uc1J acLions are placed upon
ages recoverable In this case arc the same as the same footing with other actions on conin ordinary cases of breaches of contract. tracts. Williams v. Burrell, 1 Man., G. & S.
The defendant., however, contends that the 402; Lock v. Furzf', 19 C. B. (N. 8.) 96.
rule in actions on covenants In leases, ex- In this state the rule has not bet>n srloptell.
press or implied, Is that, where the plaintllT and we ·are not disposed to adopt it. We
hRS paid no rent or other expenBE!, only think it better to discard thP rule, so as to be
nominal damages can be recovered. Such a In a position todetl'rmine all such caRPS upon
rule once prevailed. It was adopted in anal- the general principles applicable to other con·
ogy to actions on covenants in deeds of real tracts. In that way we think we shall be
eslaw. and it now prevails to a limited ex- the better prepared to do justice in each case
tent in the state of New York. Conger v. as it arises.
Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140. In that case DENIO,
We supi>oee the correct rule to he that the
J., not regarding the rule with favor, with plaintiff Is entitled to recover the rt-nt pH11I,
apparent reluctance considered that it was and the difference betwePn the rent aizreed
too firmly established in that state to be dis- to be paid and the valuP of the term, tngt>t.her
turbed. In Mack v. Patchin, 42 N. Y. 167,
with such special damages as the drcumSMITH, J., says: "Bnt this rule hl\S not been
stances may show him to be entitled to.
Vf"ry satisfactory to the courts in this country,
Trnll v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. 'fhe thPory
and it has been relaxed or modifted more upon which the court below assPased Jamor less, to meet the Injustice done to lt-s- ages being lnconsistf"nt with th98e prineeee in particular CMt-11," In Pnmpt-lly v. ciplt-s, the judgm..nt must be reve1 s ..11, and a
Phelps, 40 N. Y. 59, it is declared that the new trlHl ord.,red. The other j uugdll cunrule should not be extended, but limited curred.
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V KNOWLES v. STEELE.

(61 N. W. 557.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Dec. 21, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin coun-

ty; Henry G. Hicks, Judge.

Action by Alfred B. Knowles against

Franklin Steele, Jr., for damages for breach

of contract. Judgment was rendered for de-

fendant, and plaintiff appeals. Aﬂirmed.

KNOWLES T. STEEIJD.
(61 N. W. MT.)
Supreme Court of MiD.IU!llOta. Dec. 21, 1894.
Appeal from district court, Hennepin count;r; Henry G. Hicks, Judge.
Action by Alfred B. Knowles against
Franklin Steele, Jr., for damages for breach
of contract. Judgment was rendered for defendant. and plaintiff appeals. A.11lrmed.
George R. Robinson, for appellant. Kitchel, Cohen & Shaw, for respondent.

George R. Robinson, for appellant. Kit-

chel, Cohen & Shaw, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J. The following condensed

statement of the facts will be suilicient for

the purposes of this appeal: In 1881, the

defendant, being the owner of the premises

described in the complaint, executed a lease

(in which his wife joined) to plaintiff for

the term of 10 years at an agreed annual

rent. This lease contained a covenant that
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if the lessee should desire to continue the

lease for another 10 years he should have

'the privilege of doing so in the manner fol-

lowing. Not less than three months before

the expiration of the original term the lessee

should give to the lessors notice in writing

of his election to continue the lease for an ad-

ditional term, and in such notice name and

appoint an appraiser on his part. There-

upon the lessors should appoint an appraiser

on their part, and notify the lessee of such

appointment. The two appraisers thus ap-

pointed were to appoint a third, and the

three so chosen were to appraise the leased

premises at their then fair market value.

“and therenpon. without any further act.

this lease shall therenpon be extended for

the further term of ten years, upon the

same terms and conditions as before, except

that the annual rent for such second term

shall be such sum as is equal to six per

centum of such appraised valuation." In

1891 plaintif f seasonably gave defendant

written notice of. his election to continue to

lease for a second term, and in such notice

nominated an appraiser on his part to ap-

praise the property for the purpose of ﬁxing

the amount of the rent for the additional

term. On receipt of this notice defendant

sent plaintiff a written communication, by

which, in order to avoid the necessity of ap-

pointing appraisers, he proposed to ﬁx the

rent for the extended term at 6 per cent. on

the then present assessed valuation of the

property, $31,000. Immediately on reeeipt

of this proposition the plaintiff wrote to de-

fendant, notifying him of his acceptance of

it. The fact was, although unknown to

plaintiff, that soon after the execution of the

lease in 1881 the defendant had conveyed

the premises, through the medinm of a third

party, to his wife, from whom he had no au-

thority to make or accept the proposition re-

ferred to, and shortly afterwards she wrote

plaintiff, notifying him that she declined to

be bound by the act of her husband, and sug-

gesting that, if they could not agree on the

amount of the rent, they should resort to an-

appraisal of the property in accordance with

MITCHELL, ;r. The following condensed
statement of the :tacta will be suftlclent for
the purposes of this appeal: In 1881, the
defendant. being the owner of the premises
described In the complaint, executed a lease
(In which his wite joined) to plaintUf for
the term of 10 years at an agreed annual
rent This lease ·contained a covenant that
If the lesaee should desire to continue the
lease for another 10 years be should have
· the privilege of doing so in the manner following. Not less than three months before
the expiration of the original term the lessee
should gi\"e to the lessors notice In writing
of his election to continue the lease for an additional term, and In such notice name and
appoint an appraiser on his part. Thereupon the lessors should appoint an appraiser
on their part, and notify the- lessee of such
appointment. The two appraisers thus appointed were to appoint a third, and the
three so chosen were to appraise tl1e leased
premises at their then fali- market value,
"and thereupon, without any further act,
this lease shall thereupon be extended for
the further term of ten years, upon the
same terms and rondltlons as before, except
that the annual rent for such seco11d term
shall be such sum as ls equal to 11lx per
centum of such appraised valuntlon." In
181>1 plaintur seasonably gave defendant
written notice of. his elrctlon to contluue to
len.se for a second term, and In such notice
nominated an appi-aisei- on his part to appraise the property for the purpose of fixing
the amount ot the rent tor the additional
term. On receipt of this notice defendant
sent plalntllf a written communlcatlon, by
which, in order to avoid the necessity ot appointing appraisers, be proposed to fix the
1·ent tor the extended term at 6 per cent. on
the then present assessed valuation of the
property, $31,000. Immedfately on re ~elpt
ut this proposition the plaintiff wrote to defendant, notifying him ot his ace<·ptance or
it. 'The fact was, although unknown to
plalntltT, that soon after the execution of the
lease ln 1881 the defendant had con\"eyed
the premises, through the medium ot a third
party, to his wire, from whom he had no authority to make or accept the proposition referred to, and short17 afterwards she wrote
plaintUr, notifying him that she declined to
be bound by the act of her husband, and sug-

gestlng that, If they could not agree on the
amount of the rent, they should resort to an .
appraisal of the property in accordance with
the terms of the lease. Plalntur having refused to accede to the proposition, Jrlrs.
Steele brought an action against blm to recover possession of the property, ln which
the court decided that the notice served on
her husbirnd was suftlclent to bind Mrs.
Steele, but that she was not bound by the
proposition made by him 11.xlng the rent:
and in accordance with the atlpulu.tlon ot the
parties to the action the court gave Mrs.
Steele further time in which to appoint an
appraiser on her part, which she did. The
two thus appointed by her and the present
plalntt.tr, respectively, selected a third, and
the three appraised the market value of the
premises at $35,000, on which basis the rent
tor the second term was tlxed at $2,100 per
annum, at which rate the plalntltr has since
paid, whereas the rent, according to the
proposition of the defendant and accepted
by plalntltr, would have been only $1,914 per
annum. This action was brought to recover
damages for defendant's breach of bis contract tlxlng the rent on the basis of the assessed value of the property. No evidence was
Introduced as to the actual rental value ot th!.' .
premises, and, the ejectment suit between
plaintiff and Mrs. Steele being res Inter allos
acta, nothing done or determined In that a<'tlon Is evidence against the defendant on
that question.
The plalntU! contends that this ls ln the
nature of an action tor the breach of the
covenant In the lease for the quiet enjoyment
of the leased premise11; that plalntltr had a
right to purchase his right of possession
from the true owner,. and that his damages
!l.'"e what It cost him to secure this right,
over and above the rent agreed on between
him and defendant. The rule as to themensure of damages attempted to be Invoked has no application to the case. Plalntitr's quiet enjoyment under the lease has
not been dlstui-bed. He has secured a second term on the exact terms upon which he
was entitled to It under the terms of the
lease. What he complains of ls that, If defendant had been able to perform and had
performed a certain other contract, he would
have obtained the extension on better terms.
than he was entitled to under the original
lease. He was not l.'ompelled to take a
second term at all, still less to take It at a
rent greater than the actual rental value of'
the premises. Therefore the measure of hlti
damages, if he Is entitled to any, ls the loss
of his bargain, viz. the dltrerence between
the rent agreed In the accepted proposition of'
the defendant and the actual market rental
value ot the premises at the time this agreement was made. Therefore, assuming that.
the proposition or the defendant and the acceptance ot It by plaintiff constituted a binding contract, still the plaintiff was at most
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only entitled, under the evidence, to nominal

damages: and a new trial will not be grant-

ed for a failure to assess nominal damages

where no question of permanent right is in-

volved. Harris v. Kerr, 37 Minn. 537, 35 N.

W. 379; Hill. New Trials. p. 572. This ren-

ders it unnecessary to consider any of the

other questions discussed by counsel. Judg-

ment aﬂirmed.

GILFILLAN, 0. 1., absent, on account of
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809

only entltle4, uncler the evt4ence, to nominal
damages; and a new trial wm not be granted for a fall1D'e to &88e88 nominal d&mqee

den lt unnecessary to consider any or the
other queatlona dlacWllled b7 counaeL .Tudsment a1llrmed.
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MYERS v.. BURNS.

-' -(35 N. Y. 269.)

Court of Appeals of New York. 1866.

' John H. -R‘ey-nolds,“ for ‘appellant. -James

Emott, for respondent. ‘

HUNT, J. This is an action for rent on 8-

lcase dated May 28, 1856, brought by the

grantee of the reversion against the assignee

of the term. The present defendant went

into possession of the premises September

20, 1856.

The defense is a counter-claim, under a

covenant of the landlord to keep the prem-

ises in repair. There is also connected with

the covenant to repair. an agreement that

if the premises were damaged by ﬁre, so as

to be unﬁt for a ﬁrst-class hotel, the rent

should abate. The counter-claim set up in
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the answer is, ﬁrst, for $908, expended by

the defendant in repairs, and second, for

$700 damages occasioned by the loss of the

use of four rooms, alleged to be untenant-

able for the want of repairs.

The rent due was $1,000, with interest from

August 1, 1858.

The jury found specially $752.57, amount

of repairs made by the defendant, and $300

damages for the loss of the use of the rooms.

These amounts left a balance of $9.45 due

to the defendant, for which he had a verdict.

The most important questions in the case

were questions of fact, which were carefully ‘

and correctly submitted to the jury upon the

trial, and in relation to which their decision

is ﬁnal.

A question arose upon the charge for paint-

ing, on which an exception was taken by

the plaintiﬁl. Certain portions of the wood-

work of the hotel were repainted by the de-

fendant with zinc paint, which was about

iifteeen per cent. more expensive than com-

mon lead paint, which was the original style

of painting. and was more durable and more

ornamental.

defendant was entitled to recover the full

expense of the zinc paint, although it was

more expensive than the description of paint .

originally employed, it appearing that it was ‘

more desirable and a better material than

white lead." This charge was correct. The

plaintiff had the option of making these re-

pairs by his own mechanies, and with such

suitable materials as he should select. His

omission to do so gave the defendant the

right to make them by his mechanies, and

with such suitable materials as he should

select. He was bound to be reasonable and

judicious in his repairs; but he was not com-

pelled to select precisely the same kind of

paper or paint, or to be precise that the ex-

pense was not a farthing greater than had

before been expended upon the same spot.

He was at liberty to repair according to the

modern style. and adopt modern improve-

ments. The testimony showed that the re-

The court charged, that “the -

pair for the purpose in question was a -useful
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lures of an original character are required.

It is only required that those in the building

should be made to perform their proper duty.

The party agrees to “keep“ in repair, and

if. to keep in repair. it is necessary that the

roooms should ﬁrst he put in repair, the les-

sor is bound to perform that duty. Mayne,

Dam. 133, 92 Law Llb.; Payne v. Haine, 16

Mees. & W. 541. There is no covenant that

the rooms be kept in their then condition of

repair, and no exception of natural wear and

natural decay; but good repair and good

condition at all times is the fair intent of the

agreement . The requirements of a ﬁrst-class

hotel in Brooklyn demand all the comforts

and conveniences, and many of the luxuries

of civilised life. Different standards of com-

fort and civilization prevail in different parts

of the world. The location in question was
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that of the second city of the state, immedi-

ately adjoining the city of New York, and

the general standard of that latitude must

be assumed. A hotel of the ﬁrst class in

such a location without the means of heat-

ing its rooms would not be tolerated. It

would not indeed be a hotel of that character.

if the rooms had been rendered untenantable,

by water from the roof. would it have hecn

an answer to the request to repair, that the

leak existed when the lease was entered

into? If the ceilings had fallen, or the rooms

were ﬁlthy from dirt and want of paint. it

certainly would have been no answer. that

they were ‘in that condition when the lease

was made. The condition of the covenant,

to keep in repair, as already stated, can only

be performed by ﬁrst putting in repair, when

that is necessary. Beach v. Crain, 2 N. Y.

86, and cases supra.

The second proposition involved the extent

of the damages; the plaintiff claiming that

the defendant was entitled to no larger sum

than it would have cost if the defendant had

himself repaired the defect. and the defend-

ant claiming that he was entitled to recover

as damages the loss that he actually sus-

tained, from being deprived of the use of the

rooms.

The defendant had two different remedies.

of either of which he could have availed him-

self, in the event of the plaintiff's failure

to repair, after due notice. He could have

made the repair himself, and have called

upon the plaintiff to refund the expense, as

he actually did, in we case of the painting; ,

or he could have called upon the plaintitl‘ to

take the ordinary responsibility of a party

failing to perform his contract, to wit, to pay

the damages caused by such failure, as he did

in regard to the item in question. In the

ﬁrst case, the rule conﬁnes the damages to

the actual expense, if no special damage is

shown; but in the other, the cost of the re-

pair is not an element in the case. It is as

if there was no such right to repair on the

part of the lessee, but the claim rested solely

in damages. in Griﬂin v. Colver, 16 N. Y.

489, it was held that in the case of a failure
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The defendant had two different remedies.
of either of which be could have availed him·
should be made to perform their proper duty. self, In the event ot the plalntlll's tallu1·e
'l'be party agrees to "keep" In repair, end to repair, after due notice. He could have
It, to keep In repair, It Is necessary that the made the repair himself, and have called
rooorus ;should first be put In repair, the les- upon the plalntllf to refund the expense, ai>
11or ls bound to perform that duty. Mayne, be actually did, In uie case of the painting;
Dam. 133, 92 Law Lib.; Payne v. Haine, 16 , or be could have called upon the plalntllT to
Mees. & \V. Ml. There Is no covenant that take the ordinary responsibility of a party
the rooms be kept In their then condition of ' falllng to perform his contract, to wit, to pay
repair, and no eiceptlon of natural wear and the damages caused by such failure, aa be did
natnrnl decay; but good repair and good In regard to the Item In qul-stlon. In the
<'Ondltlon at all times le the fair Intent of the first case, the rule confines the damages to
agreement. The requirements of a first-class the actual expense, It no special damage Is
hot1•l In Brooklyn demand all the comforts shown; bot In the other, tbe cost of the reand eonvenlences. end many of the luxuries pair Is not an element In the case. It Is as
of cMllsed Ute. Dlft'erent standards of com- If there was no such right to repair on the
fort and civilization pre¥oll In ~ltrerent parts part or the lessee, but the claim rested solely
()f the world.
The location In que11tlon Wai! In damages. In Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y.
that of the second city of the state, Immedi- 489, It was held that In the case of a fallnre
ately adjolnlni: the city of !'\ew York, and to deliver a steam engine at the time conthe g1•11Prnl standard of that latitude must tractL>d, the party Injured could recover all
be a1111umed. A hotel of the first class In bis d111nai.res, Including gains prevented a"
SU<'h 11 location without the means of beat- ' well as losses sustnlned, provided they were
Ing Its rooms would not be tolerated. It certain, and such as might naturally be exwould not Indeed be a hotel of that character. pected to follow the breach. According to
It the rooms bad been rendered untenantable, the reasoning of the learned judge In that
by watrr from the roof, would It have ht>l'll 1·11!le, the damages for tne lose ot the use of
an answl'r to tbe request to repair, that the th1• rooms as here claimed, are both certain
leak l'Xisted when the lease wa>1 entl'red arid proximate. See. also, Freeman v. Clute,
Into? If the ceilings bad fallen, or the rooms 3 Barb. 424. as explained by Judge Seldt>n;
were filthy from dirt and want of palnt, It and Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115; and Doe
certainly would have been no answer. that v. Rowlands, 9 Car. & P. 734, 88 E. C. L. 42r..
they were In that condition when the lease
The judgment should be affirmP<l. All
was made. The condition of the covenant, concur, except DA VIES, O. J., and MOUto keep In repair, as already stated, can only GAN, J., dissenting.
be performed by first putting In repair, when
NOTE. In Cook v. Soule, !'i6 N. Y. 420. the
tbat Is neceHsary. Bt>ach v. Crain, 2 N. Y.
court, referring to the rule luid down in Myers
86, and cases supra.
v. Burn11, 11upra, said. i;ier t:rover, J.: ''There
The second proposition Involved the extent may be eXl'eptions to th111 rule. In cases where
of the damages; the plalntUf claiming that the requiRite rl'pairs are tritling, and the dam·
the defendant was entltled to no larger awn ages hy not making them are large, l think It is
the duty ot the tenunt to make them, and
than tt would have cost If the defendant bad <·barge the landlord with the cost. Miller v. l\larhimself repaired the defect, and the defend· lner's Church, 7 Green). 51; Loker v. Damon,
ant claiming that be wae entitled to recover 17 Pict. 284. The tenant, atter giving reasonable notice and opportunity to the landlord to
aa damages the 1088 that he actually sus- make
the repairs, it he neglects, may himself
tained, from being deprived of the use of the make them. and charge the landlord with the
rooms.
ei:pen11e."
It ls only required that those In the butldlng

1
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(40 Mo. 475.)
BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING REAL ESTATE.

FISHER v. GOEBEL.

(40 Mo. 475.)

Supreme Court of Missouri. March Term, 1867.

Error to St. Louis court of common pleas.

Glover & Shepley, for plaintiff in error.

:o;upreme Court of Missouri. March Term, 1867.
1'.lrror to St Louis court of common pleas.
Glover & Shepley, for plaintiff In error.
Krum, Decker & Krum, for defendant In
Prror.

Krum, Decker & Krum, for defendant in

error.

IIOIAIES, J . The plaintiff had leased from

the defendant the premises called the “Flora

Garden," situated on the corner of Seventh

street and Geyer avenue, in 18551 There was

a cut some 15 or 20 feet deep on Geyer ave-

nue, and the lessor covenanted in the lease

that he would build at his own expense a rock

wall and fence on that side; and the lessee

covenanted to keep the leased property in a

state of repair. Some two years after this

wall was erected, it fell down by parts by

the action of the elements. The defendant
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was called upon to rebuild it, but before this

was done the plaintiff abandoned the prem-

ises and surrendered his lease.

The plaintif f proceeds on the assumption that

the covenant of the lessor had been broken by

the falling down of this wall, and that it be-

longed to the lessor and not to himself to re-

build it. The case appears to have been tried

on this theory, and the principal matters sub-

mitted for decision concern the instructions of

the court on the measure of damages.

The jury were instructed for the plaintiff

upon the basis that the proper measure of

damages was the difference between the rent

and value of the leasehold premises with a

good and permanent wall standing, and their

value in the condition in which they were left

without such wall.

The defendant's instructions were predicated

upon the rule that only the actual damages

resulting directly from the defendant's default

in relation to the stone wall. to be measured

by what it would cost to rebuild the wall, to-

gether with any loss that may have been sus-

tained as the direct and immediate conse-

quence of the insufﬁciency of the wall and

the breach of the covenant, could be recovered.

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff

for $4.750 damages, and upon a remittitur of

$2,375 the defendant's motion for a new

trial was overruled, and judgment rendered

for the balance.

Under these covenants, it might admit of

serious question whether the plaintiff, after

he had accepted the wall without remon-

strance, and safely occupied the premises for

two years, was not bound under the covenant

for repairs to rebuild the wall himself, or at

least to put and keep it in a state of repair,

charging the defendant with damages only for

the original deﬁciency of structure.

appears to have been left to the jury under

the instructions to say whether the covenant

for the building of a wall had been complied

with. and whether the plaintiff had sustained

damage in consequence of a breach thereof;

and the case will be considered here only on

the matter of the damages.

Upon the facts of the case, we think the

HOLMES, J. The plalntltr had leased from
the defendant the premls~s called the "l<'lora
Garden," situated on the corner of Seventh
street and Geyer avenue, In 1855< There was
a cut some 15 or 20 feet deep on Geyer avenue, and the lessor covenanted in the lease
that he would buHd at his own expense a rock
wall and fence on that side; and the lessee
c-ovewmted to keep the leased property In a
state of repair. Some two years after this
wall was erected, 1t fell down by parts \>Y
the action of the elements. The defendant
was called upon to rebuild it, but before this
was done the plaintiff abandoned the premises and surrendered his lease.
T'he plaintiff proceeds on the assumption that
the covenant of the lessor had been broken by
the falllng down of this wall, and that It belonged to the lessor and not t.o himself to rebuild It. The case appears to have been tried
on this theory, and the principal matters submitted for decision concern the instructions of
the court on the measure of damages.
The jury were instructed for the plaintiff
upon the basis that the proper measure of
damages was the difference between the rent
nnd value of the leasehold premises with a
good and permanent wall standing, and their
value In the condition In which they were left
without such wall.
The defendant's Instructions were predicated
upon the rule that only the actual damages
resulting directly from the defendant's default
In relation to the stone wall. t.o be measured
by what It would cost to rebuild the wall, together with any loss that may have been sustained as the direct a.nd Immediate' consequence of the lnsumclency of the wall and
the breach of the covenant, could be recovered.
'l'he jury found a verdict for the plalntlft'.
tor $4.760 damages, and upon a remlttltur ot
$2,375 the defendant's motion for a new
trial was overruled, and judgment rendered
tor the balance.
Umler thPse covenants, It might admit of
serious question whether the plalntlft'., after
he had accC'pted the wall without remonstrance, and safely occupied the premises for
two years, was not bound under the co'"enant
for repairs to rebuild the wall himself, or at
least to put and keep It In a state of rl'palr,
charging the defendant with damages only tor
the original deficiency of structure. But 1t

appears to have been left t.o the jury under
the instructions to say whether the covenant
tor the building ot a wall had been complied
with. and whether the 1>lalntUf had suRtalned
damage In consequence of a breach tlwreof;
and the case wlll be considered here only on
the matter of the damages.
Upon the facts of the case, we think thl'
Instruction given for the plalntlft'. allowed ll
lar~er latitude and measure of damages than
the justice or the law of the case will warrant.
and that the rule given In the defendant's Instructions should have been adopted.
In Vivian v. Champion, 2 Ld. Raym. 1125,
it was said that the proper measure of damages In a breach of such covenants was what
It would cost to put the premises In repair.
This rule appears to have been slightly modified In some modern cases on covenan~ by
tenants tor repaJrs, but, as we concelvl', not
to the extent Implied In this Instruction for
the plalntlft'.. Smith v. Peat, 9 Exch. 160;
Penley v. Watts, 7 Mees. & W. 601; City of
Worcester v. Rowlands, 9 Cor. & P. 739;
Walker 11. Swayzee, 3 Abb. Prac. 136. It has
been said to cover such damages as are direct
and Immediate, but not remote, speculative or
contingent damages, or such as might have
been avoided by the other party. Loker v.
Damon, 17 Pick. 288. It has been allowed to
Include such losses In addition to the actual
cost of repair as were necessarily sustained
during the periods required for making repairs, and some compensation for any loss ot
the use of the premises whilst they were undergoing repairs. Middlekauff v. Smith, 1
l\Id. 327. But we find no satlsfnctory authority for the position that the tenant In
such case mo.y wholly neglect to make the
necessary repairs himself, allow his leasehold
to depreciate In v~Iue, or bis business to be
broken up and abandon his lease, and then
claim for his damages the whole loss so In- ·
curred. The greater part of such dam11ges Ill!
these might have been avoided, and are to be
attributed to his own fault; and for that he
must be content to bear the loss himself.
Thompson v. Shattuck, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 615.
As a general rule, we think It may be said
that the recovery must be confined to the actual damages, which are the direct, immedl:tte, or proxJmate, and unavoidable conse·
quence of tbe breach of the covenant. Sedg.
lleas. Dam. 195-199.
The evidence shows tllat this wall might
have been rebuilt at a cost of some six or
eight.hundred dollars, and we are Inclined to
think that the plaintiff has recovered a larger
amount than he was justly entitled t.o claim.
notwithstanding the remlttltur.
For these reasons the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded. The other
judges concur.

- -- - - ··
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WATRISS v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF

CAMBRIDGE.

(130 Mass. 343.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

dlesex. Feb. 21, 1881.

Action by Sarah W. Watriss against the

First National Bank of Cambridge. Defend-

ant was plaintiffs tenant, and, at the termi-

nation of its lease. removed ﬁxtures from the

leased premises. This action is for breach of

the covenant to surrender the premises in

good condition. Judgment for plaintiff.

S. H. Dudley. for plaintiff. J. W. Ham-

mond. for defendant.

Mid-

GRAY, O. J. As a general rule, the meas-

ure of damages for the breach of a lessee's

covenant to keep in repair, and to surrender
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the demised premises at the end of the term

in as good order and condition as they are in

at the beginning of it. is the sum it would

cost to repair the premises and put them in

the condition they ought to be in. In the

time of Lord Holt, this was the rule even in

an action brought before the expiration of the

lease. Shortridge v. Lamplugh, 2 Ld. Raym.

798, 803, 7 Mod. 71, 77; Vivian v. Champion,

2 Id. Raym. 1125, 1 Salk. 141. In Vivian v.

Champion, that great judge said: “In these

actions there ought to be very good damages;

and it has always been practised so before

me, and everybody else that I ever knew.

We always inquire, in these cases, what it

will cost to put the premises in repair, and

give so much damages, and the plaintiff

ought in justice to apply the damages to the

repair of the premises"

According to later cases, when the lessor

sues on the covenant to repair, pending the

lease, and so before he is entitled to posses-

sion of the premises, the damages may per-

haps be limited to the diminution in the mar-

ket value of his estate. See Nixon v. Den-

ham, 1 Ir. Imw it. 100, 1 Jebb & S. 416: Smith

v. Peat, 9 Exch. 161; Macnamara v. Vincent,

2 Ir. Ch. 481; Davies v. Underwood, 2 Hurl.

& N. 570; Bell v. Hayden, 9 Ir. C. L. 301;

Mills v. Guardians of Poor, L. R. 8 C. P. 79:

Mayne, Dam. (3d Ed.) 229. But when the

action is brought after the end of the term,

the measure of damages is still held to be

such a sum as will put the premises in the

condition in which the tenant is bound to

leave them. Elliott v. Watkins, 1 Jones,

Exch. 308: Burdett v. Withers. 7 Adol. & E.

136, 2 Nev. & P. 122; Penlcy v. Watts, 7

Mees. & W. (‘D1, 610, 611; Payne v. Heine,

16 .\Iees. & W. 541; Yates v. Dunster, 11

Exch. 15; Rawlings v. \Iorgan, 18 C. B. (N.

S.) 776; Mayne, Dam. 232. 233. In Yates v.

Dunster, Baron Parke quoted the statement

of Lord Holt, above cited. and referred to

.\'ewcastle v. Broxtowe, 4 Barn. & Adol. 273.

.1 Nev. & Man. 598, in which, in an action

against the hundred for the demolition of a

house by rioters, it was held that the owner

of the house was entitled to recover that sum
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Xt>wl.'astle v. Broxtowe, 4 Barn. & Adol. 27a.
.1 Xe,-. & :Man. 598, In which, In an action
against the hundred tor the demolition ot a
(130 :Ma88. 343.)
hou11e by rioters, It was held that the owner
Supreme Judicial Court of llaBSachwietta. Mid· of the house was entitled to recover that sum
dlesex. Feb. 21, 1881.
of money which would replace the house. as
Action by Sarah W. Watrlss against the nearly as practicable, In the situation and
I•'lrst :"atlonRI Bank of Cambridge. Defend- state It was at the time ot tht> outrage com.ant was plalntlfr'~ tf'nant, and, at the termi- mitted, Rlthough the Injury to Its rental valm~
nation of Its lense. removed tl~tures from the was only one fourth as much.
Without undertaking to lay down an In·
h"8800 premises. 'fhls aC'tlon Is for brea<'h of
rule, applicable to all cases, WP are
flexible
the rovenant to surrf'nder the preml!les In
ot
opinion
that In the present case the degood condition. Judgmt>nt for plRlntltr.
fendant Is not aggrieved by the ruling at the
S. H. Dudley, for plRlntltr. J. W. Ham- trial. The action Is brought after the termimond, for deft>ndant.
nation ot the lease, and the surrender of the
premlaes by the defendant to the J)lalntlll'.
GRAY, O. J. As a general rule, the meas- The wrong complained ot Is not mere dllaplure of damages for the breach of a lessee's dn tlon or sull'erlng to go to decay: hut It ls
<:ovennnt to keep In repair, and to surrender the voluntary removal of fixtures that had
the demised premises at the end of the term been 1rnnexed to the freehold. and were pJirt
In as good order and comlltlon as they are In of the plalntltr's real estatP. at the l:wglnnlng
at the beginning of It. Is the sum It would ot the lease sued on. \\'atrls!'I v. Bank. 124
C'08t to repair the premises and put them In Mass. 571. In SU<'h a case, the measure of
the condition they ought to be In. In the damages must be the sum which will put the•
time of Lord Holt. this was the rule even In premises In the condition In which the dean action brought before the expiration of the fendant was bound to leave them. allowing
lease. Shortridge v. Lamplugh, 2 Ld. Raym. for reasonable use and wear. \\"hl•n that
W8. 803. i :Mod. 71, 77; Vivian v. Champion, sum Is less than the diminution In the mar2 Ld. Raym. 112l), 1 Salk. 141. In Vivian v. ket value of the premises by the removal of
Champion, that great judge said: "In these the structures. neither party sull'er"' hy this
actions there ought to be very good damages; rule; because the plalntltr, by applying that
and It has always been practised so before sum to the rl!Btora tlon of the prem lseK. obme, and every.body else that I ever knew. tains a full Indemnity. When, as In this
We always Inquire, In these cases, what It case, that sum exceeds the amount of thE' Inwill ro1tt to put the premlse11 In repair, and jury to the market value of the premlsefl, the
give so murh damages, and the plaintiff plaintiff Is entitled to It: otherwise, a tenant
ought In jm1tlce to apply the damages to the who, without the consent of his landlord. had
l't~palr of the premises."
altered the nature or the arrangement of the
According to later caee11, when the lessor buildings demised, might escape all llahlllty
sues on the covenant to repair, pending the tor more than nominal damages for the
lease, and so before he la entitled to posses· breach of his covt>nant, by proving that his
slon of the premises, the damages may per- alterations had lnrreased the market value
haps be llmltro t'J the diminution In the mar- ot the estate. Elliott v. Watkins, above citket value ot his estate. See Nixon v. Den- ed. Maddock v. Mallet, 12 Ir. c. L. 17:-1.
h11m, l Ir. LRw R. 100, 1 Jebb & 8. 416: Smith
This ca11e Is not distinguishable In principle
v. Peat, 9 Exch. 161; Macnamara v. Vincent, from LRwton v. Railroad Co., 8 Cush. 230,
which was an action tor breach of an agree'2 Ir. Cb. 481; Davies v. Underwood, 2 Hurl.
ment to build fences between the lands ot
& N. 570; Rell v. Hayden, 9 Ir. C. L. 301;
Mills v. GWlrdlans of Poor, L. R. 8 C. P. 79; the plalnt!lf and of the defendant; the deMayne, Dam. (3d Ed.) 229. But when the fendant contended that the plaintiff could
action Is brought after the end of the term, only recover damage11 for the Injury to his
the measure of damage11 Is still held to be land by Its being unfenced; but It was held
such a sum as will put the premises In the that he was entitled to the sum which It
·condition In which the tenant Is bound to would fairly cost to put up the fences accord_f leave them. Elliott v. Watkins, 1 Jones,
ing to the agreement.
Whether the defendant Is legally entltlerl to
Exch. 308; Burdett v. Withers, 1 Adol. & E.
136, 2 Nev. & P. 122; Penley v. Watts, 7 an allowance for the Increase of value by subMees. & W. 601, 610, 611; Payne v. Haine, 11tltutlng new material for old need not be
16 Mees. It W. 541; Yates v. Dunster, 11 considered, because In this case such an alExch. 15; Rawlings v. :Morgan, 18 C. B. (N. lowance baa been made with the plalntttr•s
8.) 776; llayne, Dam. 232, 233. In Yates v.
assent.
Judgment tor the plaintiff for the larger
Dunster, Baron Parke quoted the statement
of Lord Holt, above C'lted. and referred to sum.
WATRISS v. FIRST NAT. BA:SK 01''
CAMBRIDGE.
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SUTHERLAND v. WYER et al.

(67 Me. 64.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

1877.

April 9,

Exceptions from superior court, Cumber-

land county.

Assumpsit by John Sutherland against 1. T.

Wyer and others to recover for breach of

contract. On December 27th following, the

company of which the plaintiff was one were

addressed by one of the defendants as fol-

lows: “Ladies and gentlemen, I ﬁnd it nec-

essary to reduce your salaries one-third; any

one not willing to accept these terms will get

their full salary this week and be dischar-

zed-u

The following correspondence was also in-

troduced:
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"Portland, December 29, 1875. Mr. J. Suth-

erland: Your salary, from this date, will be

twenty-four dollars per week. Per order,

I. T. Wyer, Wm. Weeks, Treasurer."

“Portland, December 31, 1875. I. T. Wyer,

Esq. Dear Sir: Your note intimating your

determination to reduce my salary from the

‘ith instant. duly received. I most respect-

fully refuse to assent to any such proposition,

and will expect my full salary every week, in

fulﬁllment of the terms of our contract. Re-

spectfully yours. J. Sutherland."

“Portland. January 3, 1876. Mr. Suther-

land: Your services will not be required at

the Portland Musenm after January 8, 1876.

I. T. Wyer."

The jury were instructed as follows:

“If, on the other hand, you ﬁnd for the

plaintiff upon both branches of the case, you

will come to the question of damages, which

in this case assumes a somewhat peculiar

phase. The writ is dated January 11th.

When the writ was brought, according to the

contract nothing whatever was due to the

plaintiff. The plaintiff had been paid in full

up to January 8th. And this writ was

brought on Tuesday, the 11th, before another

week had elapsed. So, according to the terms

of the contract, when this action was brought

nothing whatever was due to the plaintiff.

“The general rule is—and it is almost an in-

variable rule, with the exception of some

classes where prospective damages are al-

lowed resulting from injury—that the damage

to be allowed is the damage that had ac-

crued when the writ was brought. The or-

dinary rule is that a man can only recover

what was due him at the time when he sued.

But I apprehend there is a rule which will

guide as correctly in determining the dam-

ages here. The damage to be allowed is ‘what

had been sustained by the plaintiff at the

time this writ was brought. Now what is

that damage he had sustained then? It is

conceded that he had been discharged. He

had lost then the prospect of earning his

wages in accordance with the terms of the

contract; that is to say, when he brought

this writ he had been discharged, and of
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suggestion of incompetency, and to receive

the stipulated weekly salary, until the end of

the eighteenth week; when he was dischar-

ged by the defendants, as they contended be-

fore the jury, for incompetency under the

rule; but, as the plaintiff there contended, for

the reason that he declined to accept twenty-

four dollars per week during the remainder

of his term of service.

Three days after his discharge and before

the expiration of the nineteenth week, the

plaintiff commenced this action to recover

damages for the defendants‘ breach of the

contract. ‘The action was not premature.

The contract was entire and indivisible. The

performance of it had been commenced, and

the plaintiff been discharged and thereby

been prevented from the further execution of

it; and the action was not brought until

after the discharge and consequent breach.
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Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362. and cases;

Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567, and cases.

The doctrine of Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass.

530, is not opposed to this. Neither do the

defendants insist that the action was prema-

turely commenced; but they contend that the

verdict should be set aside as being against

the weight of evidence.

The verdict was for the plaintiff. The jury

must therefore have found the real cause of

his discharge to be his refusal to consent to

the proposed reduction of his salary. The

evidence upon this point was quite conﬂict-

ing. Considering that all the company were

notiﬁed, at the same time. that their respec-

tive salaries would be reduced one-third,

without assigning any such cause as incom-

petency; that no suggestion of the plaintiffs

ineompetency was ever made to him, prior

to his discharge; and that his written dis-

charge was equally silent upon that subject,

—we fail to tind suiiicient reason for disturb-

ing the verdict upon this ground of the mo-

tion, especially since the jury might well ﬁnd

as they did on this branch of the case, pro-

vided they believed the testimony in behalf

of the plaintiff.

There are several classes of cases founded

both in tort and in contract, wherein the

plaintiff is entitled to recover, not only the

damages actually sustained when the action

was commenced, or at the time of the trial,

but also whatever the evidence proves he

will be likely to suffer thereafter from the

same cause. Among the torts coming within

this rule, are personal injuries caused by the

wrongful acts or negligence of others. The

injury continuing beyond the time of trial,

the future as well as the past is to be consid-

ered, since no other action can be maintain-

ed. So in cases of contract the performance

of which is to extend through a period of

time which has not elapsed when the breach

is made and the action brought therefor and

the trial had. Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582.

Among these are actions on bonds or unseal-

ed contracts stipulating for the support of

persons during their natural life. Sibley v.

Rider, 54 Me. 463; Philbrook v. Burgess, 52

Sl:J

. suggestion of Incompetency, and to reeell"e ed contracts stipulating for the support of
the stipulated weekly salary, until the end of persons during their natural life. Sibley v.
tbe elcbteentb week; when he was dlsebar- ,ltlder, 54 Me. 463; Philbrook v. Burgess, 52
ged by the defendants, as they contended be- Me. 271.
The contract In controversy falls within th\•
fore tbe jury, for Incompetency under the
rule; but, as the plaintiff there contended, for same rule. Although, as practically construthe reason that be decllned to accept twenty- ed by the parties, the salary was payable
four dollars per week during the remainder weekly, still, when tbe plaintiff was peremptorily discharged from all further service
uf bis term of service.
Three days after his discharge and before during the remainder of the senson, such 11lsthe expiration of the nineteenth week, the charge conferred upon him the right to treat
plalntlft'. commenced tbJs action to recover the contract as entirely at an end, and to
damages tor tbe defendants' breach of the bring his aetlon to recover damages for the
contract. "The action was not premature. breaeh. In such action be la entitled to a
The contract was entire and Indivisible. The just recompense for the actual Injury s1111-/
performance of It bad been commenced, and tslned by the Illegal discharge. Prima fadt-,,
the plaintiff been discharged and thereby such ·recompense would be the stipulated
heen prevented from the further exeeutlon of wages for the remaining eighteen we!'ks.
It; and the action was not brought until This, however, would not necessarily be the
after the discharge and consequent breach. sum which he would be entitled to; for lb
Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362. and caMt>s; cases of contract as well as of tort, 1t Is genDugan v. Ander11on, 36 Md. 007, and cat1e:!. erally Incumbent upon an Injured party to
Tbe doctrine of Daniels v. Newton, 114 llass. do whatever be reasonably can, and to Imr).10, Is not opposed to this. Neither do the prove all rt•asonable and proper opportunities
defendants Insist that tbe action was prema- to less<'n the Injury. Miller v. ~larlners'
turely commenced; but they contend that the Church, 7 Me. 51, 5fi; .Tones v. Jones, 2 Swan.
verdict should be set aside as being against 600; 2 Greenl. Ev. A 201, and notes; Chamberlin v. Morgan. 4i8 Pa. St. l4l8; i;ipdg. Mens.
the weight of evidence.
The verdict was tor the plaintiff. The jury Dam. (flth F..d.) 4lti, 417, <'asetl supra. 'l'he
must therefore have found the real eause of plaintiff c'Ould not be justlflt-d In lying Idle
his discharge to be his refusal to con11e11t to after the breach; but he was bound to 11111•
the proposed reduction of bis salary. The ordinary diligence In securing employment
evidence upon this point was quite contllct- elsewhere, during the remainder of the tt'rm:
lng. Conslderlng that all the company were and whatever sum be actually earned or
notified, at tbe same time, that their reMpec- might hal"e earned by the use of reasonable
tlve salaries would be reduced one-third, dlllgence, should be deducted from tht>
without assigning any such cause as lncmn- amount of the unpaid stipulated wages. Ami
petency; that no suggestion of the plalntUl"s I this balance with Interest thereon should ht•
lneompetency was ever made to him, prior I the amount of the verdict. Applying the mle
to bis discharge; and that his written dis- mentioned, the verdict will he found too larg<'.
charge was equally silent upon that subject,
By the plaintiff's own testimony. he rect>h'-we fall to find suttlclent reason for disturb- ed only $00, from all sourct>ti nfter his di11ing the verdict upon this ground of the mo- charge,-$2G In February, and $35 from the
tion, especially since the jury might well tlnd 10th to the 20th of April, at Hooth"s. HI!!
as they did on this branch of the case, pro- last engagement was for eight weeks, come
vided they belleved the testimony In behalf menclng April 10th, which he abandoned on
the 20th, thus voluntarily omitting an opporof the plaintiff.
There are several classes of cases founded tunity to earn $57, prior to the expiration or
both In tort and In contract, wherein the bis engagement with the llefenllant8, when
plaintiff is entitled to recover, not only tbe the law required him to Improve such an opdauiages actually sustained when the action portunity, If reasonable and proper. We
was commenced, or at the time ot the trial, think he should have continued the last enbut also whatever the evidence proves be gagement until May 6th, Instead of abandonwill be likely to suffer thereafter from the ing It and urging a trial In April, especially
im·me cause. Among the torts coming within Inasmuch as be could have obtained ·ll trial
this rule, are personal Injuries caused by the In May just as well. The Instructions taken·
wrongful acts or negligence ot others. The together were as favorable to the defendants
Injury continuing beyond the time ot trial, as they were entitled to.
the future as well as the past Is to be consldIf, therefore, the plaintiff will remit $u7,
t-red, since no other action can be malntnln- be may have judgment !or the bnlnnce of the
ed. So In cases of contract the performance verdict; otherwise the entry must be verdict
or which Is to extend through a period or set aside anti a new trial granted.
time which has not elapsed when the breach
is wade and the actlo~ brought therefor and
APPLETON, C. J ., and DICKERSOX,
the trial bad. Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582. BARROWS, DANFORTH, and LIBBEY,
Among these are actlone on bonds or unseal- JJ., concurred.
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BREACH OF CONTRACTS BESPECTING PERSONAL SERVICE.

'L1D1)ELL v. CHIDESTER.

(4 South. 426, 84 Ala. 508.)

Supreme Court of Alabama. June 14, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Montgomery

county; John P. Hubbard, Judge.

This was an action brought by the appellee,‘

Thomas H. Chidester, against the appellant,‘

Forbes Liddell, for the recovery of a balance_

alleged to be due the plaintiff from the de-

fendant for services rendered, and by contract

entered into by plaintiff and defendant. The

defendant pleaded the general issue, payment,‘

and res adjudicata. The plaintiff demurred

to the defendant's plea of res adjudicata. The

court overruled the demurrer. There was

then a replication, and the pleadings were

very full. The court charged the jury, at the

written request of the plaintiff, as follows:

(1) “If the jury believe all the evidence, they
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must ﬁnd a verdict for the plaintiff." (2) “If

the jury believe the evidence, the plaintiff

would be entitled to recover the balance due

under said contract for each month, or part

of a month thereof, from the 1st day of Au-

gust, 1885, at the contract price, until the end

of the contract year, which was February 26,

1886, with interest thereon from this last

date." The defendant objected to the giving

of each of these charges by the court, and

duly excepted to the court's overruling his

objection. The rulings of the court on the

demurrer, and the giving of the ﬁrst and sec-

ond charges requested by the plaintiff, were

here assigned as error.

Arrington & Graham, for appellant. Troy,

'l‘ompkins & London, for appellee.

STONE, C. J. The most important inquiry

in this case, alike of law and of fact, was

whether Chidester was employed by Liddell

to perform a year's service for $1,000, to be

paid in gross, or to be paid in monthly install-

ments. If the former, then the recovery and

enforcement of the judgment for a part of the

demand in June, 1886, is a complete defense

and bar to this action, and nothing should be

recovered. This, under the well-known prin-

ciple that a plaintltl! cannot split up a single

cause of action into two or more suits; and

if he does so, and recovers a part of his de-

mand, this is a waiver of and a bar to the

residue of his claim, be it much or little.

Oliver v. Holt. 11 Ala. 574; O'Neal v. Brown,

21 Ala. 482; Railroad Co. v. Henlein, 56 Ala.

368; Wharton v. King, 09 Ala. 365. If, on

the other hand. the wages were due and de-

mandable at the end of each month. then the

recovery of one installment, unreversed,/is a

complete answer to and preclusion of all de-

fenses to the merits which were or could he

pleaded to such second suit. Rake v. Pope,

7 Ala. 161; 3 Brick. Ala. Dig. p. 580, § 75 et

seq.; 1 Whart. Ev. § 758; Gardner v. Buck-

ier, 3 Cow. 120. The contract in this case was

by telegraphic correspondence. Liddell's offer

was: "If one thousand dollars a year is an

inducement, come immediately. Answer."

Chldester's acceptance was: “Will accept one

thousand dollars a year." These communica-
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option of one of three remedies if the dis

-

charge was wrongful: (1) He could have

elected to treat the contract as rescinded, and

sue on a quantum meruit for any labor he

may have performed; (2) he could have sued

at once for an entire breach of the contract

by the defendant. in which event he would

have been entitled to recover all damages he

suffered up to the trial, not exceeding the en-

tire wages he could have earned under the

contract; or (3) he could have waited until

his wages wouldnnature under the terms of

the contract, and sue and recover as upon

performance on his part. Each of these

alternate rights. as we have seen, was depend-

ent on his ﬁxing on Liddell the fault of his

discharge. Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299;

Davis v. Ayres, 9 Ala. 292; Ramey v. Hoi-
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combe, 21 Ala. 567; Fowler v. Armour, 24

Ala. 194; Holloway v. Talbot. 70 Ala. 389:

Wilkinson v. Black, &) Ala. 329; 3 Wait. Act.

& Def. 606. And, when wages are payable

in instalhaents, suits may be brought on the

several installments as they mature.- Davis

v. Preston, 6 Ala. 83. It is manifest that the

former suit was not brought on the ﬁrst of

the alternate grounds stated above. There is

nothing to show that it relied on the rescis-

sion or abandonment of the contract: and.

if it had. there were no past services actually

rendered, and unpaid for, on which to found

a recovery. The

salary for July which had not_heen paid.

Nor was~ th‘éWui1rb1%ught on"the second of

the gronuds.—nn entire breach of the con-

tract. On the contrary, it treated the con-

tract as continuing through the month of

July, and sued for the wages alleged to have

been constructively earned in July, after the

discharge. The former suit was, then.

brought on the third of the grounds, treating

the contract as still binding on Liddell, and

claiming wages according to its terms. It

was brought July 27, 1885, the ﬁrst day after

the completion of one of the months of the

wage year. If the contract was for the pay-

ment of $1,000 in gross at the end of the year,

February 26, 1886. that suit was premature-

ly brought, and there could have been no re-

covery. It was indispensable to plaintiff's

right of recovery to show that, by the terms

of the contract, his wages were due in month-

ly installments, one installment of which had

matured. This was “essential to the ﬁnding

of the former verdict." The foregoing facts

are placed beyond dispute in the record be

fore us. They estop Liddell from denying

that, by the terms of his contract with Chi-

dester, he was to pay him wages in monthly

installments, and that he discharged plaintiff

without cause; and the same inevitable result

would follow, no matter what proof he might

offer that the contract was for the payment

of Chidester's salary in gross, and that he

had good grounds for discharging him. We

have not deemed it necessary to consider the

rulings on demurrer. Whether right or
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option of one of three remedies if the dla<"harge was wrongful: (1) He could have
elected to treat tbe contract as rescinded, and
sue on a quantum merult for any labor be
may have performed; (2) be could have sued
at once for an entire breaeb of the contract
by the defendant. In which event he would
have been entitled to rerover all damagt>s be
suffered op to the trlal, not exceeding the entire wages he could have earned under the
('outract; or (3) be could have waited unW
his wages would 'mature under the tel'lllll of
the contract, and sue and recover u upou
IK!rformance on his part. Each of these
itlternate rlgbtll. as we have aeen, was dt•pendent on his fixing on Liddell the fault ot his
tlll\che.rge. Strauss v. Mt>ertlef, 64 Ala. 200;
Davis v. Ayres, 9 Ala. 202; Ramey v. Holt•ombe, 21 Ala. M7; i.·owler v. Armour. 24
Ala. 194; Holloway v. Talbot. 70 Ala. :i89;
Wllkllll!OD v. Black, 80 Ala. 329; 3 Walt, Act.
& Def. 606. And, when wages are 1>ayahle
In lnstatlments. suits may be brought on the
sevrntl ln!!tallmenta aa they mature.· Davta
v. Preston, O Ala. 83. It la manifest that the
former suit was not brought on the tlrst of
the alternate grounds stated abo\"e. There la
nothing to show that It rellPd on the resd11slon or abandonment of the ('()Otrft<'t: and.
If It bad. there were no past sen1ces actmtlly
rendered, and unpaid for, on which to found
a recovery. Th_c suit was fAr that part o' &aa
salary for July which had not _.been paid.
Sor was· th"e-imtt-br<night.. on.The second of
th<' gro1111rl11,-an 1.• ntlre breach of the ron-
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tract. On the contrary, It treated the <•on.tract as continuing through the month of
July, and sued for the w11ges alleged to haw
been constructively earned In July, after ti.it>
discharge. The former suit was, tlwn.
brought on the third or the grounds, treatlni:
the contract as still binding on J,tddell, and
claiming wages &(.'cording to Its terms. It
was brought July 27, 1885, the tlrst day aft«>r
the completion of one ot the months of the
wage year. It the contract was for the 1111~·
ment of $1,000 In gross at the end of the year.
February 26, 188H, that suit was prematurely brought, and there could have been no rPcovery. It was Indispensable to plnlntlll"s
right of recovery to show that, by the terms
or the contract, bis wages were due In monthly Installments, one Installment of which hnd
matured. This was "essential to the tlnrUng
ot the former verdict." The foregoing fu<"t11
are placed bPyond dl111mte In the reeo1·11 before us. They estop Liddell from denying
that, by the terms of bis contract with Chidester, he was to pay him wages In monthly
Installments, and that he dlsc~harged plalntltT
wltbout cause; and the same Inevitable re!!nlt
would follow, no matter what proof he might
ofter that the contract was tor the paymt•nt
of Chldester'11 salary In 1tross, and that he
had good grounds for dlseharglng him. We
have not deemed It necessary to con11lder th1•
rulings on demurrer. Whether right or
wrong, they could not have ull'ected the 111'fendant Injuriously. There was no error In
the charges of the court. Aftlrmed.

3l8

BREACH OF COUTRAC"S RESPECTING PERSONAL SERVICE.

L3

McMULLEN v. DICKINSON CO.

(62 N. W. 120, 60 Minn. 156.)

Jan. 30, 1895.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin coun-

ty; Seagrave Smith, Judge.

Action by William McMinllen against the

Dickinson Company. From an order sustain-

ing a demurrer to the answer, defendant ap-

peals. Aﬂlrmed.

Penney. Welch 8:, Hayne and H. J. Horn,

for appellant. W. H. Donahue, for respond-

(BBL

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

CANTY, J. On the 25th of February, 1892,

the plaintiff entered into a written agrccment

with the defendant corporation, whereby it

agreed to employ him as its assistant mana-

ger, from and after that date, as long as he

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

should own in his own name 50 shares of the

capital stock of said corporation, fully paid

up, and the business of said corporation shall

be continued, not exceeding the term of the

existence of said corporation, and pay him

for such services the sum of $1,500 per an-

num, payable monthly during that time, and

whereby he agreed to perform said services '

during that time. He has ever since owned,

as provided, the 50 shares of said stock, and

performed said service ever since that time

until the 28th of October, 1893, when he was

discharged and dismissed by the defendant

without cause. He alleges these facts in his

complaint in this action. and also alleges that

he has been ever since he was so dismissed,

and is now. ready and willing to perform

said services as so agreed upon. and that

there is now due him the sum of $125 for each

of the months of March and April, 1894, and

prays judgment for the sum of $250. The

defendant in its answer, for a second defense,

alleges that on March 2, 1894, plaintiff com-

menced a similar action to this for the recovery

of the sum of $512,forthe period of time from

his said discharge to the 1st of March, 1894,

alleging the same facts and the same breach,

and that on April 16, 1894, he recovered judg-

ment in that action against this defendant

for that sum and costs, and this is pleaded in

bar of the present action. The plaintiff de-

murred to this defense, and from an order

sustaining the demurrer the defendant ap-

peals. -

The plaintiff brought each action for install-

ments of wages claimed to be due, on the

theory of constructive service. The doctrine

of constructive service was ﬁrst laid down by

Lord Elienborongh in Gandell v. Pontigny, 4

Camp.375, and this case was followed in Eng-

land and this country for a long time (Wood,

Mast. & Serv. 254), and is still upheld by sev-

eral courts (Isaaes v. Davies, 68 Ga. 169;

Armﬂeld v. Nash, 31 Miss. 36l;~Strauss v.

Meertief, 64 Ala. 299). It has been repudiat-

ed by the courts of England (Goodman v. Po-

cock, 15 Adol. & E. [N. 8.] 574; Wood, Mast.

& Serv. 254), and by many of the courts in

this country (Id.; and notes to Decamp v.

DAMAGES IN ACTIO:-IS AGAINST E}IPLOYER.
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Armour, 24 Ala. 194; Wright v. Falkner, 37 '

Ala. 274; Colbnrn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. ,

385. Then, if the discharged servant can ‘

have but one action, it is necessary for him 1

to starve and wait as long as possible before ‘

commencing it. If he waits longer than six ‘

years after the breach. the statute of limita- '

il0l\s will have run. and he will lose his whole

claim. If he brings his action within the six

years, he will lose his claim for the balance

of the time after the day of trial. Under this

rule, the measure of damages for the'breach

of a 30 year contract is no greater than for

the breach of a 6 or 7 year contract. Such a

remedy is a travesty on justice. Although the

servant has stipulated for a weekly, monthly,

or quarterly income, it assumes that he can

live for years without any income, after which

time he will cease to live or need income.
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The fallacy lies in assuming that, on the

breach of the contract, loss of wages is anal-

ogous to loss of proﬁts, and that the s:nne,

rule of damages applies. while in fact the

cases are wholly dissimilar, and there is

scarcely a parallel between them. In the one

case the liability is absolute; in the other it

is contingent. If the rule of damages were

the same, then, in the case of the breach of

the contract for service, the discharged serv-

ant should be allowed only the amount which

the stipulated wages exceed the market value

of the service to be performed, without re- ‘

gard to whether he could obtain other employ-

ment or not. If the stipulated wages did

not exceed the market value of the service, ‘

he would be entitled to only nominal dam-

ages; and in no case could his failure to ﬁnd

other employment vary the measure of dam-

ages. Clearly. this is not the rule. In the

one case the liability is a contingent liability

for loss of wages; in the other case it is an

absolute liability for loss of proﬁts. Such

contingent liability cannot be ascertained in

advance of the happening of the contingency,

and that is why prospective damages for loss

of wages are too contingent and are too

speculative and uncertain to be allowed, while

retrospective damages for such loss are ot

the most certain character. On the other

hand, if damages for loss of proiits are too

speculative and uncertain to be allowed, they

are equally so, whether prospective or retro- 1

spective. “The pecuniary advantages which

would have been realized but for the defend-

ant's act must _be ascertained without the aid

which their actual existence would afford.

The plaintiffs right to recover for such a loss

depends on his proving with sufﬂcient cer-

tainty that such advantages would have re-

sulted, and, therefore, that the act complained

of prevented them." 1 Suth. Dam. (1st Ed.)

107.

It is our opinion that the servant wrongfully

discharged is entitled to indemnity for loss oi‘

wages, and for the full measure of this in-

demnity the master is clearly liable. This

liability accrues by installments on successive

contingencies. Each contingency consists in

819 '-l-

Armour, 24 Ala. 1~; Wright T. Jl'alkner, 87 1 suited, and, thet'efore, that the act complained
Ala. 274; Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. I ot prevented them." 1 Suth. Dam. (1st Ed.)
:185. Then, If the discharged servant can ! 107.
It ls our opinion that the servant wrongfully
have but one action, It ls necessary for him
to starve and wait 118 long 118 po88!ble before I discharged ls entitled to Indemnity for loss of
commencing It. If he waits longer than six wages, and for the full measure of this Inyears a.t'ter the breach. the statute of limita- demnity the master ls clearly liable. This
tions will have run, and he will lose his whole liability accrues by Installments on successivl'
dalm. If he brings his action within the six contingencies. Each contingency consists In
)·ears, he will lose bis claim for the balance the failure of the servant without his fault
of the time after the day of trial. Under thle to earn, during the lnstalhm>nt period named
rule, the measure of damages for the· breach in the contract, the amount of wages which
of a 30 year contract ls no greater than for he would have earned It the contract had
the breach of a 6 or 7 year contract. Such a been performed, and the master Is liable for
remedy Is a travesty on justice. Although the the dellclency. 'nils rule of damages Is not
i<ernrnt has stipulated for a weekly, monthly, consl:;tent with the doctrine of constructive
or quarterly Income, It assumes that be can service, but It Is the mle which has usuallf
live for years without any lncoml', aft(•r which been applied by the courts which adopted
tlmo he wlll cease to live or ueec.1 Income. that doctrine. Und<:!r that doctrine the masThe fallacy lies In assuming that, on the ter should be held liable to the discharged
breach of the contract, loss of wages Is anal- servant for wages as If earned, while In fact
ogous to lol!S of profits, 1wd that the "nme. he Is held only for Indemnity tor loss or
rule of damages applies. while In fnet the wages. The fiction of constructive service ls
cues are wholly dissimilar, and there la false and Illogical, but the measure of damscarcely a parallel between them. In the one ages given under that ftctlon Is correct and
case the liability ls absolute; In the other It logical. It Is elmply a case of a wrong reals contingent. If the rule of damages were son gh·en tor a correct rule. Instead of rethe same, then, lo the case of the breach of jecting the false reason and retaining the
the contract tor service, the discharged serv- correct rule, many courts have rejected both
ant should be allowed only the amount which the rule and the reason. In our opinion, thl~
the stipulated wages exceed the market value rule of damages should be retained; but the
of the service to be performed, without re- true ground on which It ls based Is not that
gard to whether he could obtain other employ- of constructive service, but the liability of
ment or not. It the stipulated wages did the master to indemnity the discharged servnot exceed the market value of the service, ant, not to pay him wages, and thle Indemnity
be would be entitled to only nominal dam- accrues by Installments. The original breach
ages; and In no case could his failure to find la not total, but the fallure to pay the successother employment vary the measure of dam- ive Installments constitutes successive breachages. Clearly. this ls not the rule. In the es. Since the days of Lord Ellenborougb thh1
one case the llabll: ~Y Is a contingent llablllty claes of cases has been In some courts an ex·
for loss of wages; In the other cue lt ls an ceptlon to the rule that there· can be butoneacabsolute llablllty for 1088 of proftte. Such tlon for damages for the breach.of a contract,
contingent liability cannot be aacertalned In and there are strong reru.ons why It should
advance of the happening of the contingency, be an exception. Because the discharged
and that Is why prospective damages for 1088 servant may, tr be so elects, bring successive
ot wagee are too contingent and are too actions for the installments of Indemnity all
speculative and uncertain to be allowed, while they accrue, It does not follow that he canretrospective damages tor such loss are 01 not elect to consider the breach total, and
the mOl!t certain character. On the other bring one action tor all his damages, and reband, It damages tor lose of profttH are too cover all of the same accruing up to the time
spe<."ulath·e and uncertain to be allowud, they of trial. Fowler & rroutt v. Armour, 24 Ala.
nre equally so, whetbt'r prospective or retro- 194; StrauSB v. Meertlet, 64 Ala. 200. But
11pectlve. ''The pecuniary advantages which the wrongdoer can have no such election. He
would have been reall7..ed but tor the defend- should not be allowed to take advantage of
ant's act must be 88Certalned without the aid his own wrong, and, for the purpose of prewhich their actual existence would atrord. venting the use of an7 adequate remedy and
The plalntllr's right to recover for such a lost< defeating any adequate recovery, to lns;st that
depends on his proving with sutnclent cer- hie own breach ls total. The order appealed
talnty that eucb advantages would have re- from sboultl be afttrmed. So ordered.

I
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BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPEOTING PERSONAL Sl:Iit\'ICE.

OL\ISTl‘l.-'\D v. BACH et al.

(27 Atl. 501, 78 Md. 182.)

Court of Appeals of Maryland. Oct. 5, 1893.

Appeal from Baltimore city court.

Action by Charles B. Olmstead against

Henry Bach, .lr., and others. for breach of

contract of employment. A demurrer to the

replication was sustained, and plaintiff ap-

peals. Afﬂrmed.

Argued before ALVEY, C. J., and ROBIN-

SON, BKYAN, IRVING. l\fcSHEltitY, FOW-

LER, PAGE, and llOBl£ltTS, JJ.

Charles Marshall and Wm. L. Hodge, for

appellant. Thos. M. Lanahan and Frank

Gosnell, for appellees.

McSHERRY,J. The declaration in this

case alleges that the plaintiff and defend-

ants entered into a written contract under

seal, whereby the latter agreed to pay to
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the former a salary of $50 per week, paya-

ble weekly, as compensation for the services

of the plaintiff as cutter in the business of

the defendants, and that the plaintiff agreed,

in consideration of said salary, to devote his

time and attention to the business of the de-

fendants, as is usual in conducting a mer-

chant tailoring business. The agreement

further provided that the contract should

of the peace upon the identical contract and

cause of action sued on in the case at bar.

and that thereafter the plaintiff recovered

judgment in that suit for the sum of $50 and

costs, which judgment was fully paid and

satisﬁed by the defendants before the pend-

ing action was brought. To this plea the

1 plaintiff replied that after the pretended dis-

missal of him by the defendants he, not-

withstanding the dismissal, presented and

offered himself to the defendants as ready

and willing to perform his part of the con-

‘ tract set forth in the declaration, and did

in fact continuously so offer to perform the

same, and that the suit mentioned in said

plea was a suit for his salary for one week

under said contract. This replication was

demurred to. The Baltimore city court sus-

tained the demurrer, and entered judgment

thereon for the defendants The plaintiff

- therenpon took this appeal from that judg-

. but had not been allowed, to perform.

continue in full force for one year from Fe - .

runry 1, 1892, to February 1, 1893. The

declaration also avers that the plaintiff en-

tcred into the service of the defendants un-

der the above contract, and performed his

duty therennder until April 5, 1892, when

the defendants refused to permit,him to per-

form his part of said contract, or to pay him

the salary to which he was entitled there-

under. after April 9. 1892. It further al-

leges that the plaintiff has always been ready

and willing to perform his part of the con-

tract, and to render the services which he .

agreed thereby to perform, and has always

held himself in readiness and offered to per- .

form said services according to said con-

tract. but that the defendants have refused ‘

to permit him to perform the contract on

-
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tention of the parties that the hiring should

be for a week, determinable by notice, or

else merely a hiring at will, as it un-

doubtedly would have been had there been

no stipulation as to its duration. Iron Co.

v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 All. Rep.

176. The good sense and reasonableness

of the particular case must always guide

and govern courts in determining wheth-

er a contract is divisible or entire. Du-

gan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 585; Jones v.

Dunn. 3 Watts & S. 101); Robinson v. Green,

3 liletc. (Mass.) 159. Whether a contract

must be sued on as an entirety or is divisi-

ble and can become the foundation of sep-

arate suits for the infraction of independent

stipulations depends on its terms; and. in

order to arrive at a correct construction,

due regard must be had to the intention of
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the contracting parties as revealed by the

language which they have employed, and the

subject-matter to which it has reference.

Broumel v. Rayner, 68 \Id. 47, 11 Atl. Rep.

833; Brewster v. Frazier, 32 Md. 3%;

Brantly, Cont. 216. LObviously the appel-

lant expected and contracted for continuous

employment for a year, and not for a week-

ly or still more precarious hiring at will, and

the appellees contemplated securing a per-

manent cutter in their tailoring business.)

Certainty in the duration of the employment,

a well as exemption from the annoyance

incident to frequent changes in such an em-

ploy, were manifestly within the contempla-

tion of both of the parties to the contract

when it was entered into, and with these

considerations before them it seems to us

clear that the appellant never supposed him-

sell only hired by the week or at will, and

equally clear that the a'ppellees never under-

stood 1that their employe was at liberty to

terminate the engagement upon a week's

notice. The hiring was for a year and the

wages were payable in weekly installments

of $50 each. The subsidiary provision as

to the payment of the wages each week does

not split up the contract into as many agree-

ments as there were payments or periods

named for payments to be made, (Norrington

v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 6 Sup. Ct. liep.

12;) nor is it inconsistent with a yearly hir-

ing. (Norton v. Cowell, 65 Md. 362. 4 Atl.

Rep. 408; Fawcett v. Cash, 5 Barn. & Adol.

908;) for, as said by Lord Kenyon in King

v. Birdbrooke, 4 Term R. 245: “Whether the

wages be to be paid by the week or the year

can make no alteration in the duration of

the service if the contract were for a year."

The contract is, then, an entire. and not

a divisible, one. It does not consist of dis-

tinct and independent subjects which admit

of being separately executed and closed. A

dismissal during the year was consequently

a breach of the contract as an entirety, and

furnished the party not in default with a

good cause of action. The contract being

entire, and having created the relation of

master and servant, and the latter having

•
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tentlon of the partieis that the hlrlng should
be for a week, dPtPrmlunhle by notice, or
1•lse merely a hiring at will, as It undouht, .. Uy would have t~·u had the1·e bet•u
no stipulatiou as to its duratL•n. Iron Co.
v. Car1wnter, 67 Mtl. 5i>4, 11 Atl. Hep.
176. The gootl sense and reasonahl1'11es11
of the particular case must alway,; J.."lt:1le
:mtl govern courts In detcrrnlnin~ whNh·
er a contract Is divisil>le or entire. Dui;an v. Anderson, 36 lid. G85; Jo1ws v.
Ounn. 3 'VuU:i & S. 10!.l; Hobiw;ou v. On•en,
3 l\letc. (Mass.) 159. Wlwther a contmct
must be sued on as an entin•ty or is dlY1sible nntl can be::-orne the fouuda tlon of i;ep1trate suits for the lnfrnctlou of indepl'111IPnt
11tlpnlnUons depends on Its terms; :uuJ. in
order to arrive at a correct constn(('tlou,
due regard must be hnd to ille int('l)tiou ot
the contmrtlng pnrtil"'S ns rf'Yt>lllt'1l by the
language which th1•y have employe1l, and the
i;ubject-rua.tter to whkh It bas refen•nce.
Rroumcl v. Unyn<'r, 68 '.\fd. 47, 11 AU. Rep.
S.13; Ilrewster v. Fmzler, 32 Md. 300;
Brantly, Cont. 216. LObviously the appel·
Iant expected and contracted for continuous
employment for a year, and not for a weekly or still wore precarious hiring at will, and
the appellees contemplated securing a permanent cutter in thar tllllo1ing buslnrus.)
Certainty In the duration or the employment,
as well as exemption from the aw1oyance
incident to frequent changes In such an employ, were manifestly within the contemplation of both of the parties to the contract
when lt was entered into, and with th<.-se
1:onsid('r:t lions beforn them it seems to us
clear that the nppellnnt never supposed himself only hired by the week or at will, and
equally clear thnt the a·ppellees never -untlerstood •that their employe was at liberty to
term(na te th<• engai;l'ment upon a week's
notice. The hl1'iug was for a year and the
wages w ere payable In weekly lustallmen-ts
nf ~50 each. The subsidiary provision as
to the payment of the wng.:is each week does
not spUt up the contract into as many n~'l'ee
ments as there were payments or periods
named for payments to be made, (:'1101Tington
v. Wright. 115 U. S. 188, 6 Sup. Ct. HeJ>.
12;) nor Is lt lnconsllitent with a y1•11.rly hlr·
ing. (Norton v. C:owell, r.:; Md. 3H::!. 4 Ad.
Rep. 408; Fawcett v. Cnsh, 5 Barn. & A<lol.
008;) tor, as said by Lord ~\:enyon In King
v. Blrdbrooke, 4 Term R . 2-l:i: "Whether the
wages be to be pnld by the week or the year
can make no alterntlon In the duration of
the service It the contract were for 11 ye111·."
The coutract Is, then, an entire. nn<l n<>t
) a divisible, one. It does not consist of distinct and indl'pt•ndent subj<>cts which admit
of being sepnrntPly exl'cnted and clcJ:1ed. A
dismissal during the yoor was consequently
a breach of the contract mi an l'ntirety, and
furnished the party not lu dl'fault with a
good cause of aelion. The conu·act being
entire, and having eren.teil the relation of
master and seryaut, nod the I.utter h11vlug
LAW D.Ul.2tl Ed.- 21

--

- ------------

AGAIJ\S'l' EllPLUYER.

321

been, as averred In the plendiogs, dismissed before the cxplrntlon of the term fur
whit'h he hatl been engaged, wont retll'ess

was OlH'll to him? Obviously but one reuu_·dy tor the recovery of the whole dnmngt•
sust:1i11l'd by him. In Keedy v. Long, 71
'.\ltl. 3SU, 18 Atl. Rep. 704, tbi.-1 court said:
"A servant '\\Tongfullr dls•'h:ll'ged has only
two remedies open to him at law, ciihcr of
whlcb he may pnl'sue Immediately on his clischarge. First, he mn;v tnmt the contraet as
continuing, and bring a special action ni,'llinst
the master fo1· brl'aking It by disch:u·ging
Wm, and tl1ls r•'mcdy he may J•m·sue whctlll'r his wages arc paltl up to the time of hit>
dlschnrge or not; or, sPcondly, It bis wages
are not pnld up to the tim.~ of his disch:1rgo, he mny 11·cat the contract of hiring
as rcsdrnlc<l, awl tHH.• hls master on a qu:mhun weruit for the services helms actlllllh
rendered. These two alternative remedle'.s
are the only ones open to him. :\layne, Dam.
1fi!I. Upon n •1u:111tum merult he can onJ~·
recover for tl1e se1Tices actually rendl'rcd.
Archnrd v. Hornor, 3 Car. & P. 349; Smith v.
Haywarcl, 7 Adol. & E. 54t. In an acl.iun
fClr damages fol' a breach ot the contrnct
be will be entHlcd to recover tlll' actual damages he has sustnim·d, lu nll•lition to tl11·
wages earned; n.nd in case he bus by diligence been unable to i<ecur•~ otlwr <"11ploy111eut dttrln~ th:! Pntlre t('rm, be "an rPcon•r
the entire wn~el!, lesi< the ai11011nt he h111<
actually earned during the interim, or thl~
amount ·he might have earned by the ex·
er<'ise of proper diligence In Rl'l·klng for employment In the same or similar businPl!S.
Wood, l\last. & S. 249; Mayne, Dam. l:i~:
Elderton v. Emmens, H C. B. 160; Goodn111n
v. Pocock, 15 Q. B . 576." Jall'rny v. rung-,
34 Md. 217. In the case at bar the ple11tlings show that ull wnges earneJ by the a11·
pellant had been pald to him In full up to
the end of tlie week during which he wnto
dismissed. When ht• brought suit llefore thlc'
justice of tl1e peace he bad earned no wage;
which had not Ileen pnld him, for be had
rendered no servlces after his cli~missal. HP
wns, therefore, nt thu t time In no position
to sue upon a quantum men1lt for the vnh11·
of services actually performed, and he could
ouiy rec°'·er In tl1a.t suit dnmngPs for n
breach of the entire contract, uuh•s.<; th(' rontmct was divisible into 52 lndPpt•ntlent
n~n·ernPnt><. ench capable of bl'in~ st>1~aratP
ly executed and closf'd. His wn~..s h:1'in~
he•m paid lu full up to th~ time of his di1<miio;snl, he had no option aR to the rcm ..1lh•.,
which he mli;ht pur1<11P. Jfo wnA confhlC'tl
to nn action for the reconil'y of damng""
which he had s11Stnined by a breach of the
contract, he1•a11se succl'1<>1in• a<'llon:<, Instituted for tile recovery of fmdluns of tllc
same ag-~regate damages, cannot be support('(]. Hi1::1 suit before the wagistmte wai<.
whate\·e1· It purported to bE', a sult for ti!"
breach of the contract ot hiring. It co11l1l
huve bccu tor nothing else, except t.or se1'1··

‘
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ices never rendered, the value of which was

measured by the price agreed to be paid for

them when actually performed. There was

but one dismissal and but one breach, and

the plaintiff could not split up his cause of

action, recovering a part of his damages in

one suit and the remainder afterwards in

other suits for that single breach. It is

an ancient and familiar rule of law that

only one action can be maintained for the

breach of an entire contract, and the judg-

ment obtained by the plnintitf in one suit

may he pleaded in bar of any second pro-

ceeding. Sedg. Dam. 224; Dugan v. An-

derson, 36 Md. 58-1. It was the appellant's

plain duty to incltlde‘a1l that belong_-ed to

that cause of action—that one breach—in the

ﬁrst suit, so that one proceeding and one
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recovery should settle the rights of the par-

ties. It would be at his own risk and peril

if he negligently or ignorantly omitted a

part of what might properly have been em-

braoed in the cause of action in the ﬁrst

suit. Or, as expressed by Lord Campbell

in Clossman v. Lacoste, 28 Eng. Law & Eq.

140, “if the contract is entirely broken, and

the relation of employer and employed put

an end to, I agree that the party suing ought

to allege in his declaration the whole grave.-

men that he suffers by such breach of con-

tract, and that he may recover therein all

the damages that may ensue to him in conse-

quence." Again, as clearly put by the su-

preme court of Ohio in James v. Allen Co.,

44 Ohio St. 226. 6 N. E. Rep. 246: “As a

result of the authorities, as well as upon

principle, we are satisﬁed that in such a

contract as the one in the case at bar, where

the employe is wrongfully dismissed. but all

wages actually earned up to that time are ,

paid, the only action the employe has,

whether he brings it at once or waits until

the entire period of time has expired, is an

action for damages for the breach of con-

tract; and the measure of damages will

be the loss or injury occasioned by that

breach, and one recovery upon such claim,

whether the damages be denominated ‘loss

of wages' or ‘damages for breach,' is a bar

to a future recovery." Wood, Mast. & S.

246.

it is to be observed that the case at bar is

distinguishable from a class of cases alluded

to in Ciossmau v. Lacoste, supra, where,

there having been no dismissal of the serv-

ant. the only breach of the contract con-

sisted in the failure of the master to pay,

when due, the wages or installments of

wages actually earned. In those instances,

the contract not having been broken by the

dismissal of the servant, and he not having

been prevented from performing his pork,

and the relation of master and servant still

continuing, an action on the contract could

be maintained to recover the salary or wages

due for a past stated period. Keedy v. Long,

71 .\Id. 392, 18 All. Rep. 70L But a dismiss-
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sued for, the ground of the actions, though

the forms and the allegations of the plead-

ings are widely different. That which is

sought to be recovered in both cases is the

same thing. viz. wages as wages. though in

the one case it is under the allegation of

work and labor done, which allegation is at-

tempted to be supported by the proof of a

readiness and willingness to perform; and in

the other it is under an allegation of a re-

fusal to allow that work to be done which

the plaintiff had agreed to do. and continued

ready and willing to do. Salary as salary,

deiinitely ﬁxed and agreed to. and not a sum -

of money as unliquidated damages for a

broken contract of hiring, is what is sued

for under the declaration in the case at bar.

It is a suit to recover wa;:cs, though no serv-

ices hnve been rendered at all, and. if main-
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tainable in that form, would preclude the '

defendants from showing by evidence that

the plaintiff could have secured other sim'lar

employment during the time covered by the

contract; because, if wages, distinctively as

wages, can be recovered under such condi-

tions, instend of damages for a wrongful

discharge or dismissal, they must be re-

covered as speciﬁc, ascertained debts, the

amount of which is ﬁxed by the contract,

and is in no way subject to abatement by

circumstances which would reduce the dam-

ages in a suit founded on a refusal by the

defendant to allow the plaintiff to perform

his part of an indivisible contract of hiring.

In other words. if under such a contract the

plaintiff is entitled to recover wages as

wages upon a mere offer to perform. he must

be entitled to recover just precisely the

wages named in the contract, even though

he might have obtained other work of the

same kind, at the same price, during the

period for which he claims his wages under

the contract. This would be recovering for

constructive services. That doctrine has

been altogether repudiated. both in England

and in this country. Kcedy v. Long, 71 Md.

389, 18 Atl. Rep. 704. “The doctrine of con-

structive scrvice has, in England, where it

had its origin, been repudiated, and the law

there established that a servant wrongfully

discharged has not an action for wages, unless

something is due for past services actually

rendered; and as to any other claim on the

contract it is for the breach of it, and for

his damages resulting therefrom, being the

ordinary action for damages, and not the

common-law action of indebitatus assump-

sit." James v. Allen Co., supra; Howard v.

Daly, 61 N. Y. 362.—where Gandell v. Pon-

tigny, 4 Camp. 375, Thompson v. Wood, 1

Hilt. 96, and the cases in Alabama, .\Iissis-

sippi. and “'lri('()n>‘iil are distinctly tli<‘t‘ii|'niml,

and the doctrine of constructive service de-

cinred to be “so opposed to principle, so

clearly hostile to the great mass of author-

ities ‘ ‘ ' that" it could not be accepted.

Wt - hold, then, that the contract declared on

is entire and indivisible; that for the breach

sued for, the 1,'Tound of the nctlons, though
the forms nnd thf' 11llP1:atlon11 of the plead·
tngs ore whh-ly <1ift'••r1>nt. Thnt which Is
sought to be recovt>rL>d In both cnsc>s Is the
AAllH! thing, viz. wngc>s 1111 wngc>s. though In
the one cnsf' It Is un1lf'r the nllt<gatlon of
work nnd labor llom>, whkh nllPgation Is nt·
tempi('(} to h<> snpportPd hy thf' proor of a
rendinc>ss nn1l willin~nPss to 1wrform; nrnl In
the otht•r It Is mHkr llll nlli•gatlon of n rl'·
fnsnl to nllow thnt work to bP done whieh 1
the plaintiff had ngrl'e<l to do. aud contl1111e1l '
rt>a<I>· nnd willing to do. Ralary as safary,
dPtlnitC'ly fixe1l and a1~reP1l to. and not n snm
of mon1•y as unliq11idafl·<l darnn;.:<'s for a
hrokPn eontmet of blrin;.:, Is what is s1wd 1
for undPr the 1lPdarati11n in t11P c>:l~f' at h:1r.
It Is n suit to l'<'<'O\'\'l' wa.:.:1•s, thon;.:h 110 Sl'n··
lees have be<>n remh•red at all, mul. If m :1!11tnlnnble In that form, wonhl prt·t·lwh• the
dt>fen,lnnts from showing by evi<h•nce that
tlw plalntilT co11l1l have sr1·nr•·d oth1·r sini'lar
~mp'oynwnt during the time cov<'r••d by the
contract; becam<P, If wngPs, rlistltwtin•lr as
wages, can be rPcovrrP1l un<l<'I' s11d1 cornlltlous, lnstend ot damngrs for a wrong-fnl
dlschargt! or llismlssal, tl1<•y nm«t lw rPcovered as spr<'illc. nscPrtalnPd <l1•hts, the
amount ot which Is fh<'tl by thr eontrad,
and is In no wny subjPct to abatPmPnt hy
clr1·11mstnnN·s whid1 wonl<l r<'th1:·1· tlw 1l:1111ag1•R In a suit fouml('(J on a rPtusal hy the
dPfrnrlnnt to allow thr plalntlt'l' to p1•11'orm
his part of nn ludlvl:<lblc contract of hiring.
In othl'r words, If undrr such a contract the
plalntlfT is t•ntltl<'tl to reeovl'r wngPs n11
wng<>s npon n m<'rl' ot'I'er to perform, he must
bP t-ntitled to reeov<>r jnRt prPl'lsely the
wagl'R naml'rl In thr contract, evl'n though
he might hnv<> ohtalnf'rl other work of the
same kind, at tllP samP price, during the
period tor which hi.' claims his wni.:1•11 untlrr
the contract. This wonl:I he l'l'CO\'l'r'. 11g for
constn1ctive servicrs. That rloctrine has
bP<'ll nltogt'th••r rrp111llnt1•tl. both In F.ni,:1and
and In this country. Kt>Pdy v. Long. 71 :\Id.
:l.~!l. 18 A ti. Rrp. 704. ''1'h1• 1loctrinf' ot constrnetlve spn·iee has, In England, wlwre It
had Its origin, bren repndinted, anrl tbf' law
th<>r<' estahlisl11•d that n servant wronJ.,rf'nlly
dlsch:lrg-c>d has not an action for wagrs, un!Pss
something ls due for past s r rvicl•s actually
rentl<•red; and as to nny othrr cla im on the

contract It ts for the breach of It, and for
his damages resulting therl'from, b1•ing the
ordinary nctloo for damngl's, nn<l not tl.ic
common-law action of ln<l<'bltatus a.~sump
sit." .Jumrs v. AllPn Co., supra; Howarll v.
Daly, 61 N. Y. 362.-where Gandell v. Pontiguy, 4 Camp. 375. Thompson v. ""0011, 1
Hilt. 00, and the cast's in .-\labama, :\lississippi. anil \\' i><1·0 11 ~i 11 an• 1listinf'tl~· di~·1 'lir1111·1l.
anll the doetrlne of constructive srrvlee declnrt.'ll to be "so oppo>iPtl to prlneiplf>, so
elt•arly hos tile to the J..'l"(•at mass of :1nth•H"ities • • • that" It eould not be ncr·t•pt1·d.
"'e hold. tlH'u, that the contract declart>1I 011
ls Pntirc aml indivisible; that for the breach
of it by thP defend:mts In discharging the•
p!aintiff h•·forc the expirntion or the )'\':11'.
or In rl'fusiug to allow him to work. a right
or aetlun arose, not fo1· 11n<'arne1l w ag Ps 01·
i::alary, ns such, hut for damai..:cs for a hr. n h
of the contrac t, thl' m<'asurPof whl h •Jam:>gc '
would b(~ the sti1mlakd salary fut· the st11mlated pt•rlod of one year, le.is the nmount
the plai11t!IT aetually earnPd, or mig'1t, by
due nnd rl'asonable dil'g<'nce, have (•:u·ue1l,
aftrr his dismissal, (.Taft'rny v. Klnir. ~4 1\111.
:!:!:!;) that, as thPre wns hut one brl':l<'h, but
one netlon could be mnintalncd thPr1•for;
that, having recon•red bPf,1re tbc mag!;1!t·at..
In a snit foundPd on that breach,- for h1•
eoultl have lawfully recon·r·pd upon no ot 1 1t•r
thl'ory,-hc Is barrPd, upon the satisfac-tion
of that jmlgmrnt, from n~mln suing on th••
same eontr11ct, lwcause he coul:.l have rt'·
co,·1•rrd In one action an the dama;.:e~ he sustalnPd, lnelmllng that tor whic h lw now
SUPS; and that, If the penrling ne1ion b e
trratl'd ns a 1mlt to rrcovf'r for ins!:illm .. nls
of salary under the eontr:iet, no ~e ·v ct>s ha vlng been rendf'red by hlm. it must f:iil, h<'cause the sen•lc!'s WP'.'C ncvrr l'l'IH!Pn·d, but
were con11trurtlve. The p'alntlt'l' elt>rtc:.l to
sue bf'fore a justice or thr• 1wncP for n P"l'tion of the amount he m'ght lnve rerover r d
hn!I he clainwtl mor<' nl'd s1wd In n <li:l'PrP11t
forum, and he must nblde the result of that
eleetion. H1• Is not nt lilwrty to BJ'l't up h "s
cause of net Ion Into frngmPnts, nnd succ1•sslvely sue for Pach, when tlwre h:i ~ bl'i.' 11 hut
one brracb of an entlrr nml In ii\<..:ni·!' contrnct. As we agree with th<! c1·1urt tw·ow, lt11
judgment will be ntllrmf':I. .Ju·lgment affirmed, with costs In both courts.
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BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESPEOTING PERSONAL SERVICE.

BOLAN/D v. GLENDALE QUARRY O0.

(30 S. W. 151, 127 Mo. 520.)

Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2.

March 18, 1895.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; D. D.

Fisher, Judge.

Action by James Boland against the Glen-

dale Quarry Company to recover damages

for wrongful discharge. From a judgment

for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Afﬁrmed.

Chester H. Krum and Carl Otto, for appel- ‘

lant.

GANTT, P. J. The plaintiff, on the 18th

of January, 1890, entered into a written

agreement with the defendant, whereby he

was employed by defendant as superintend-

ent of its quarries and stone business for a

period of three years, beginning April 1,

1800, and ending March 31, 1893, at a salary
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of $2,000 for the ﬁrst year, payable in month-

ly installments of $166.66; and at a salary

of $2,250 for the second year, payable in

monthly installments of $187.50; and at a

salary of $2,500 for the third year, at $208.33

per month,—in consideration of which he

was to devote his time, labor, and exclusive

attention to the business of defendant, and

advance its interest. Plaintiff entered upon

his duties lmder the contract. and served un-

til May 9, 1891, when he was discharged.

He tendered his services, but defendant re-

fused to accept them after his dismissal.

lie commenced this action on the 10th day of

W. B. Homer, for respondent.

September, 1892, and prayed for $5,000 dam- ‘

ages for breach of his contract . Defendant, '

in its answer, admits the contract, and denies

eachand every other allegation in the petition.

It then pleads for further defense that plain-

tiff did not faithfully perform his duties,

caused defendant much less, and was dis-

charged for failure to properly perform his

duties; and further, that since his discharge

he has obtained other employment, for which

he has received more than he claimed from

defendant. A reply was duly ﬁled. The

cause was tried January 9 and 10, 1894, and

plaintiff obtained a verdict for $2,984.25, and

judgment therefor, with costs. Defendant

appeals.

1. The court, of its own motion, gave the fol-

lowing instruction on the measureof damages:

' “The court instructs the jury that, if they

ﬁnd their verdict for the plaintiff, they will

ﬁx their verdict for the whole amount that

would have been due the plaintiff if he had

(-onllnned work for the defendant under the 1

contract sued upon from the date of his dis-

vharge until the expirationof the contract,

after allowing credit for anything which the

evidence shows plaintiff may have earned

from services rendered to others, and after

allowing a further credit of an amount equal

to what the jury may believe, from the evi-

dence, he will be able to earn between now

and the 31st day of March, 1893." To which

said action of the court defendant then and

i

DAMAGES I:"\ A(.'TIO:"\S AU.\.l:'\l'<T
DAMAGES l.\' ACTIONS AG.\l.\'S'l‘ EMPLOYER.

~·0111rnct

prke agr<"l'<l upon for his services.

malle for the time that would probably be
lost before similar employment could be obblo etrorts to find other similar employment, 1 tained. In some pursuits It may be almost
It he caD; but that he has obtnlned such
certain that the dismissal of a person at a
employment, or that, by reasonable etrorts, particular se1won wlll throw him entirely out
he might have obtained It, It Is Incumbent of employment for the residue of the year,
upon the defendant to show In mitigation of whilst In other pursuits similar employment
dnmages. Wood, "Mast. & S. pp. 2-t:>, 2-16; could readily be obtained elsewhere on betKoenlgkraemer v. Gla88 Co.,24 Mo. App. 124. ter terms; and therefore the amount ·or the
In this case the trial took place more than damages Is a question for the jury under all
six months after the discharge, and within ch"t·umstnnces. Lnrubert v. llartshorne, 65
one and one-halt months prior to the expira- Mo. 5:>1. • • • But It ls suggested that
tion of the contract time of service. The the plalntltr could only recover such damplalntltr had glYen eYldence In full of his ef· ages as liad resulted at the time or the comforts to obtain similar employment, aft('l' his mencement of the suit This ls an error.
-discharge, and prior to the trial, In St Louis, 'l'he plaintiff was entitled to such damai:es
Bloomington, Chicago, Iloeht•st!•r, and Cln· as accrued up to the expiration of his term
<>innatl, all of which efforts proved unnvnll· of service In a case like thl11, where the dnmIng. He wns thoroughly compt-teut to juilge ages were ot a continuing character. Lnlly
of the prohnbllltles as to whPthPr shullar pf. T. Cantwell, 4-0 Mo. App. riO; Mlller v. 8hoe
torts In the month and a half yet remnlnlng Co., 26 Mo. App. 61; Heam v. Watkins, suwouhl mel't with any sutT!'SS. That he as- pra; Lambert v. Hartshorne, supra. \Ye
sunwtl the burden "ot proof on this subjel"t is must indulge every presumption In 1m11port
a ma 1t1>r of whl<'h the defl'n<lnnt Is In no
ot the judgment" Both of the appdlnte
p~itlon to complain." And the doctrine has
courts have followed the decisions of this
ht•<'n Y<'ry fully gone over In the recent cn.se court, and a rule so long established should
In the KanMs f'lty court of appeals of Hal· not be disturbed save tor the most cogent
l!eY v. Melnrnth, 54 Mo. App. 341, ln the reasons. No error was committed In the Infollowing language: "The suit was brought struction, upon the facts In eYldencc. It
be!ore the expiration of the term of the con· gave the jury full latitude to allow defendtract for whkh plalntltl' alleges he was em- ant every deduction to which It could be en·
ployed. A 11en·ant wrongfully discharged titled under the law. The plnintil'l's evimay treat the contract or hiring and service dence of his effort to obtain othl'r employll.8 <'ontlnulni:. and bring a special action
ment was uncontradlcted, and the Jury cr1~<1·
a,:mlnst the master for breaklni: It by dis· ' lted defendant not only with what be hntl
~barging him; and this remedy he may purreceived, but what he would likely receive to
Bue whether his wages are paid up to the the end of the term of service.
period of bis discharge or not. Heam v.
2. The competency of plalntll'l was concedWatkins, 27 Mo. 516. And the general rule ed on the trial, and there was no error In
In cases ot this kind Is that the measure of assuming a fact that defendant did not con<lamages cannot exceed the contract price; trovert In his pleadings. Defendant nowhere
neither la It neeessnrlly the full contract In Its Instructions questioned the competency
price, tor It may be that the plalntltr, after of plalntltr. It tendered the sole Issue that
bis dismissal, may sue and recover a judg- he bad not faithfully performed his duties.
a. Appellant has not pointed out any error
ment, and then obtain elsewhere employ·
ment, and receive tor the residue of the term In the admission or exclusion of evidence.
much more than by the contract he would The verdict ls not excessive, and la evldentl;r
have been entitled to It be had served out for the right party. '.fbe Judgment ls afbis term. The damages must depend upon firmed.
the kind of aervlcee to be performed and the
wases to be paid, and allowance 1hould be
BURGESS and SHERWOOD, JJ., concur.
It Is unquestlonabl)· Ws duty to use reasons·
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,-oniract price agreed upon for his services.

It is unquestionably his duty to use reasona-

ble efforts to ﬁnd other similar employment,

if he can; but that he has obtained such

employment, or that, by reasonable efforts,

he might have obtained it, it is incumbent

upon the defendant to show in mitigation of

damages. Wood, Mast. & S. pp. 245, 246;

Koenigkraemer v.Glass Co.,24 Mo. App. 124.

in this case the trial took place more than

six months after the discharge, and within

one and one-half months prior to the expira-

tion of the contract time of service. The

plaintiff had given evidence in full of his ef-

forts to obtain similar employment, after his

discharge, and prior to the trial, in St. Louis.

Bloomington, Chicago, Rochester, and Cin-

cinnati, all of which efforts proved unavail- i

ing. He was thoroughly competent to judge
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of the probabilities as to whether similar ef-

forts in the month and a half yet remaining

would meet with any success. That he as-

sumed the burden 'of proof on this subject is

. pra;

a matter of which the defendant is in no ‘

position to complain." And the doctrine has

been very fully gone over in the recent case

in the Kansas (‘ity court of appeals of Hal-

sey v. Meinrath, 54 Mo. App. 341, in the

following language: “The suit was brought

before the expiration of the term of the con-

tract for which plaintiff alleges he was em-

ployed. A servant wrongfully discharged

may treat the contract of hiring and service

as continuing, and bring a special action

against the master for breaking it by dis-

charging him; and this remedy he may pur-

sue whether his wages are paid up to the '

period of his discharge or not. Ream v.

Watkins, 27 Mo. 516. And the general rule

damages cannot exceed the contract price;

neither is it necessarily the full contract

price, for it may be that the plaintiff, after

his dismissal, may sue and recover a judg-

ment, and then obtain elsewhere employ-

ment, and receive for the residue of the term

much more than by the contract he would

have been entitled to if he had served out

his term. The damages must depend upon

the kind of services to be performed and the

wages to be paid, and allowance should be

made for the time that would probably be

lost before similar employment could be ob-

tained. In some pursuits it may be almost

certain that the dismissal of a person at a

particular season will throw him entirely out

of employment for the residue of the year,

whilst in other pursuits similar employment

could readily be obtained elsewhere on bet-

ter terms; and therefore the amount 'of the

damages is a question for the jury under all

circumstances. Lambert v. Ilartshorne, 65

Mo. 551. ' ' ' But it is suggested that

the plaintiff could only recover such dam-

ages as had resulted at the time of the com-

mencement of the suit. This is an error.

The plaintiff was entitled to such damages

as accrued up to the expiration of his term

E~ll'LOYER.

/

1
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BREACH OF CONTRACTS RESI'EOTI.\G PERSONAL SERVICE.

STARK v. PARKER.

(2 Pick. 26?.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suffolk and .\antucket. March

Term, 1824.

Exceptions from court of common pleas,

Suffolk and Nantucket counties; Strong,

Judge.

Assmnpsit by John Stark against Thomas

Parker for labour performed on defendant‘s

farm. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant

brings exceptions. Reversed.

H. H. Fuller, for plaintiff. B. Sumner,

for defendant.

LINCOLN, J. This case comes before u

upon exceptions ﬁled, pursuant to the stat-

ute, to the opinion in matter of law of a

judge of the court of common pleas before

whom the action was tried by a jury; and-
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we are thus called upon to revise the judg-

ment which was there rendered. The ex-

ceptions present a precise abstract question

of law for consideration, namely, whether

upon an entire contract for a term of serv-

ice for a stipulated sum, and apart perform-

ance, without any excuse for neglect of its

completion, the party guilty of the neglect

can maintain an action against the party

contracted with, for an apportionment of

the price, or a quantum mcruit, for the serv-

ices actually performed.

the view properly taken of the contract be-

tween the parties in the case at bar, the point

upon which it was ruled in the court below

embraced but this single proposition. The

direction to the jury was, “that although

proved to them, that the plaintiff agreed to

serve the defendant for an agreed price for

a year, and had voluntarily left his service

before the expiration of that time, and with-

out the fault of the defendant, and against

his consent, still the plaintiff would be en-

titled to recover of the defendant, in this

action, a sum in proportion to the time he

had served, deducting therefrom such sum

(if any) as the jury might think the defend-

ant had suffered by having his service de-

serted." If this direction was wrong, the

judgment must be reversed, and the case sent

to a new trial, in which the diversity of con-

struction given to the character and terms

of the contract by the counsel for the re-

spective parties may be a subject for dis-

tinct consideration.

It cannot but seem strange to those who

are in any degree familiar -with the funda-

mental principles of law. that doubts should

ever have been entertained upon a question

of this nature. Courts of justice are emi-

nently characterized by their obligation and ‘

oﬂice to enforce the performance of con-

tracts, and to withhold aid and countenance

from those who seek, through their instru-

mentality, impunity or excuse for the viola-

tion of them. And it is no less repugnant

Whatever may be'

to the well established rules of civil juris-

prudence, than to the dictates of moral sense,

DAll.\UE:o;
DAM.\(lli-\‘ l.\' .\CTi().\'S AGAl.\'ST EMPLOYER.
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was considered as still subsisting. because

the loss sustained by the defendant in the

breach of it was to be estimated in the as-

sessment of damages to the plaintiff. A

proposition apparently more objectionable in

terms can hardly be stated, and if supported

at all it must rest upon the most explicit au-

thority. The plaintiff.sues in indebitatus as-

sumpsit as though there was no special con-

tract, and yet admits the existence of the

contract to affect the amount he shall recover.

The defendant objects to the recovery of

the plaintiff the express contract which has

been broken, and is himself charged with

damages for the breach of an implied one

which he never entered into. The rule that

expressum facit cessare tacitum is as appli-

cable to this, as to every other case.

contract is entire and executory. it is to be
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declared upon. Where it is executed and a

mere duty to pay the stipulated compensa-

tion remains, a general count for the money

is sufﬁcient. Numerous instances are indeed

to be found in the books of actions being

maintained where the speciﬁc contract has

not been executed by the party suing for

compensation, but in every case it will be

seen that the precise terms of the contract

have been ﬁrst held, either to have been ex-

pressly or impliedly waived. or the non-exe-

cution excused upon some known and settled

principle of law. Such was the case in

Burn v. Miller, 4 Taunt. 745, Thorpe v. White,

13 Johns. 53. and in most of the cases cited

by the plaintiff's counsel in which the de-

cision was had upon considering the obliga-

tion of the party to execute the contract,

and not upon the construction of the con-

tract itself. Nothing can be more unreason-

able than that a man who deliberately and

wantonly violates an engagement, should be

permitted to seek in a court of justice an

indemnity from the consequences of his

voluntary act, and we are satisﬁed that the

law will not allow it.

That such a contract as is supposed in the

exceptions before us expresses a condition to

be performed by the plaintiff precedent to

his right of action against the defendant,

we cannot doubt. The plaintif f was to labour

one year for an agreed price. The money

was to be paid in compensation for the serv-

ice. and not as a consideration for an engage-

ment to serve. Otherwise, as no precise time

was ﬁxed for payment, it tnight as well be

recovered before the commencement of the

labour or during its progress, as at any sub-

sequent period. While the contract was ex-

e(-utory and in the course of execution and the

plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant,

it would never have been thought an action

could be maintained for the precise sum of

compensation agreed upon for the year. The

agreement of the defendant was as entire on

his part to pay, as that of the plaintiff to

serve. The latter was to serve one year, the

former to pay one hundred and twenty dol-

lars. Upon the construction contended for by

l~ .\l'TlO~S AGAI~ST

EMPLOYER.
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was considered 118 still 1mhslstlng, because the plalntltr's counsel, that the defendant was
the loss 1:1ustalned by the defendant In the to p:1~· for any portion or the time In whi<'h th.•
breaC'h ot It was to be estimated In the 11s- plnlntltr should labour, In the same 11t·o111.H"St.":;snwm of d11nmg1•s to tht• plnlntUf. A tlou to the whole sum which the time of lapropo1:1ition ap111u1•utly more ohjectlouable in bour done should bear to the time agreed for.
wrms can hardly be stated. am! If supported there Is no rule by ·wblcb the defemlnnt's
ut lill It must rest upon the most explicit au- liability can be determined. 'Ille plaintll'f
thority. The plalntltr.sues In lndebltatus as- might as well clnlru his wages by the month
sumpslt as though there was no special con- as by the year, by the week as by the mouth.
tract, and yet admits the exlstf.'nce or the and by the day or hour as by either. The
1·1mtract to street the amount he shall recover. respousiblllty of the defendant could thus he
The dl'frndant objects to the reconry or atiel'tecl In the mannt•r tot.ally lnconsl>'tent
the plalntltr the expn•i;s contract which has with the terms of his ai:rPement to pay for a
been broken, and Is hi111st>lr charged with year's sen·fl'e In one ct>rtnln Ruel entire
damages tor the bn•aeh or an Implied one amount. Hl'shles a construction to this efwhich he never eillert>d Into. The rule that frct Is utterly repugnant to the general uuderexprt>!'lsum faelt epssare tacltum Is as appli- st:mdlug of the nature of such eng.1gC'ments.
cable to this, as to every other cnse. It the · The u,,:ages of the country and common opineontract Is entire nnd executory. It Is to be ion upon suhjccts of this description are e11declared upon. Where It Is l'Xeeuted and a pedally to be regar1led, and we are hound
mere duty to pay the stipulated com~nsa j111llehtlly to tnke notl1·e of that of \Vhlch no
tlon remains, a general t•ouut for the mnney one Is in fact ti..'llorant. It may be safe to
Is sumdent. ::'\umerous lwsta111·1·8 are indeed atttrw, that In no cnsP bas a <'untraet In the
to be found In the books of al'tious i>elug terms of tile one uudt>r t•onshlnation, been
maintained whrre -the spr"llk euntract has construPcl hy pr:wllt-nl mrn to glYe a rii,:ht to
not been ex1•e11tPd by tlw 11art y sulni: for tlt•n1:1111l tilt• n,:rt•Pd rompPll"n t ion, lwfore the
compensation, hut In e\"ery cm•P It will be performancP of the lal·or, and tilat the employseen that the pre<"ise terms of the contract er and employt•d alike unh"Prsally so underhave ht>PD first hdcl, eltht>r to han• bePn ex- st:rntl It. The rule of law Is In entire at·1·onlpressly or lm1>lledly walvrd, or the non-exe- ance with this se11tl111eut, and It would be a
cution excused upon sollll' known nnd sPttled tlagrant violation of the fil'llt prlnelples of
prlnclplP of law. SuC'h wns the case In jm1tice to bold It otherwise.
Hurn v. ~lllh•r, 4 Taunt. 7-Hi, Thorpe v. \Vhlte,
The performance or n. year's service was
13 Johns. r1a, and In most or the cases cited In this ease a condition preretleut to the oblib)· the plaintiff's counsPI In which the de- gation of payment. The plnintll'f must percision was hnd upon consldPring the ohlign- form the eondition, before he Is 'entltle1! to
tlon of the party to execute the contract, recover anything undrr the contraet, and he
and not upon the eom•tructlon of the con- llas no right to renounce his ngrPemrnt 111111
trad ltsrlt. ::'\othlng can be more unrpason- recover upon a qunntum menllt. The cnses
nblr than thnt a man who delihl'rately and of ~Ir:\Iillnn v. Yau1!Prllp, l!! Johns. lf;:J, Jenwnntonly violates an engngement, should be nlni:s v. C:tmp, Ia Johns. 94, and Henb v.
1wrmitted to seek In a Ponrt of justice an Moor, 19 .Tohmi. 3:H, are analogous In their
lntll'mnlty from the co11s••q11e1J<•es of his l'irenmRtane1·" to the case at bar, and are dlYoluntary act, and we Rrt• satisfied that the reetly and strongly In point. The de<'l,;lons
In the I<~nglish <·nsPs expr1•ss the Ramp doclaw will not allow It.
That such a contrnct aR Is supposed In the trine (Wa1ldlngto11 v. Oll~r. 2 Bos. & P. [X.
1•xceptlons hefore us exprri<><PS a collllitlon to R.] 61; Eltl<:1 v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52\; nn<l
he performed by the plalutltr prP<'t'tlPnt to the principle Is fully supported by all thP. f.'lehis right of action 11guln11t the dPfPn1lant, mentary writers.
we cannot doubt. Till' pblntltf was to labour
But It hns been urged, that whatever may
one year for an ngr•'P•I prlC'P. ThP money be tiH• prlnelple of the eommon law, and tlw
was to be pultl 111 1·0111p<•ns;1tlon tor tht> sPrY- cleelslons In the courts In New York on this
lce. and not us a 1•onsi1!1·rntlon for nn Pngaire- suhj1•et. a <lllfereut rule of construction has
rnent to SC'f\'1', OthPrwlst>, as no lll'l'l'i><P time !wen adoptl'd In tills comruonwe11lth, nrnl we
wns fixed for paymC'nt, It might as Wl'll he are bouud to hPlleve that Rtteb has sometimes
n •em·prell hl'fo1·p th•• 1·0111m1•11n•mpnt of the ht•Pn th<' fnl"t, from the opinion of th!' learned
Ltbour or tlurlug It>< proi.:n·""· as at any sub- nrul r1•1<pPd:ihle judge who trier! this causP,
:;Pqnt>nt pPrlncl. \\"hile the l'ulltr:wt was ex- and from i11st;1111·1•s of similar decisions cited
Pc·utory nrnl In thP C"oursl' of t•xe1·utlon and the at thC' bar. hut 111tt rl'portl'tl. 'Dw 01·1·asion of
plnlutiO' wns In tht• employ of the ch•flomlant, so grl';1t n dP11arture from :rnelent an<! wellit would nt•\' t•r have ht>en thought nu a1·1ion estahli,;lwtl print:iph•s 1·1111not well he uml!'rcoultl ht> maintalnetl for the !'lri>dse sum of stood. It has n•ct•in•d no sanetion at any
l'OlllpPnsat ion ai.:n·1·tl upon for the ~·par. Tile time from the judJ,!mPnt of this eourt within
agn•t>Ull'nt of the 1!PfP11eb11t W;ts :ts entire on the p!'rlotls of our HPport,;. Afl Parly as the
his part to )Jay, lll! that or the plnintllT to speontl volume of :\Llssad111,;ctls Reports,
st•rn•. Thi' latll•r was to sern• Oil!' ~·r:u. tile p11ge 147, In the l'a"I" of l•'axon '" ~Iansti!'l<I,
forwt•r Io pn~· one h1m1lrP1! and twt>nty tlol- tilt' l'Olllmon-lnw dol'trim• 111 rl'latlon to dt>lars. L'pon ti.le co11strtll'tion contentled for by lJl:'lltlent covenants was rel'ognlzed aml np-
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plied, and in several subsequent cases it has

been repeated and uniformly adhered to.

The law indeed is most reasonable in itself.

It denies only to a party an advantage from

his own wrong. It requires him to act justly

by a faithful performance of his own engage-

ments, before he exacts the fulﬁlment of de-

pendent obligations on the part of others. It

will not admit of the monstrous absurdity.

that a man may voluntarily and without cause

violate his agreement, and make the very

breach of that agreement the foundation of

an action which he could not maintain under

it. Any apprehension that this rule may be

abused to the purposes of oppression, by hold-

ing out an inducement to the employer, by

unkind treatment near the close of a term of

service, to'drlve the labourer from his en-

gagement, to the sacriﬁce of his wages, is
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wholly groundless. It is only in cases where

the desertion is voluntary and without cause

on the part of the labourer, or fault or con-

sent on the part of the employer that the

principle applies. Wherever there is a rea-

sonable excuse, the law allows a recovery. To

say that this is not sufﬁcient protection. that

an excuse may in fact exist in countless

secret and indescribable circumstances,

which from their very nature are not sus-

ceptible of proof, or which, it proved, the law

does not recognize as adequate, is to require

no less than that the law would presume what

can never legally be established, or should

admit that as competent, which by positive

rules is held to be wholly immaterial. We

think well established principles are not thus

to be shaken, and that in this commonwealth

more especially, where the important business

of husbandry leads to multiplied engagements

of precisely this description, it should least of

all be questioned, that the labourer is worthy

of his hire, only upon the performance of his

contract, and as the reward of ﬁdelity.

The judgment of the court of common pleas

is reversed, and a new trial granted at the

bar of this court.
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(6 N. H. 481.)
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BRITTON v. TURNER.

(6 N. H. 481.)

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Cheshire.

July Term, 1834.

Exceptions from Cheshire county.

Supreme Court of New Hompi;hire. Cheshire.
July 1'em1, 1834.
Exceptions from Cheshire county.
:Ur. Wilson, for plaintiff. llr. Handerson,
for defendant.

Mr. Wilson, for plaintiff. \Ir. Handerson,

for defendant.

PARKER, J. It may be assumed that the

labor performed by the plaintiff, and for

which he seeks to recover a compensation in

this action, was commenced under a special

contract to labor for the defendant the term

of one year, for the sum of one hundred and

twenty dollars, and that the plaintiff has in-

bored bnt a portion of that time, and has

voluntarily failed to complete the entire con-

tract.

It is clear, then, that he is not entitled to

recover upon the contract itself, because the
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service, which was to entitle him to the sum

agreed upon, has never been performed.

But the question arises, can the plaintiff,

under these circumstances, recover a reason-

able sum for the service he has actually per-

formed, under the count in quantum meruit?

Upon this, and questions of a similar nature,

the decisions to be found in the books are not

easily reconciled.

It has been held, upon contracts of this kind

for labor to be performed at a speciﬁed price,

that the party who voluntarily fails to fulﬁll

the contract by performing the whole labor

contracted for, is not entitled to recover any

thing for the labor actually performed, how-

ever much he may have done towards the

performance, and this has been considered

the settled rule of law upon this subject.

Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267; Faxon v. Mans-

ﬁeld. 2 Mass. 147; McMillan v. Vanderilp, 12

Johns. 165; Jennings v. Camp, 13 Johns. 94;

lteab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337: Lantry v. Parks,

8 Cowen, 63; Sinclair v. Bowles, 9 Barn. &

C. 92; Spain v. Arnott, 2 Starkle, 256. That

such a rule in its operation may be very un-

equal, not to say unjust, is apparent.

A party who contracts to perform certain

speciﬁed labor. and who breaks his contract

in the ﬁrst instance, without any attempt to

perform it, can only be made liable to pay

the damages which the other party has sus-

tained by reason of such non performance,

which in many instances may be triﬂing;

whereas a party who in good faith has en-

tered upon the performance of his contract,

and nearly completed it, and then abandoned

the further performance,—although the other

party has had the full beneﬁt of all that has

been done. and has perhaps sustained no

actual damage,—ls in fact subjected to a loss

of all which has been performed. in the na-

ture of damages for the non fulﬁllment of the

remainder, upon the technical rule, that the

contract must be fully performed in order

to a recovery of any part of the compensation.

By the operation of this rule, then, the

party who attempts performance may be

placed in a much worse situation than he

who wholly disregards his contract, and the

PARKER. J. It may be assumed that the
labor performed by the plalntltr, and for
which he seeks to recoYer a com1lensatlon In
this action, wns comm<'nced umler a special
contract to labor for the defendant the term
of one year, for the sum of one lnmclred autl
twenty dollars, and that the plaintltT bas labored but a portion of thn t tlnw, 111111 has
voluntarily failed to complete the entire contract.
It Is clear, then, that he le not entitled to
reco\"er upon the contract Itself, becam,ie the
sen!ce, which was to entitle him to the sum
agreed upon, has never been performed.
But the question arises, can the plalntltT,
under these circumstances, recover a reasonable sum for the service he has actually performed, under the count In quantum merult?
Upon this, and questions of a similar nature,
the decisions to be found In the books are not
easily reconciled.
It has been held, upon contracts of this kind
for labor to be performed at a specified price,
that the party who voluntarily falls to fulfill
the contract by performing the whole labor
contracted for, ls not entitled to recover any
thing for the labor actually performed, however much he may have done towards the
performance, and this has been considered
the settled rule of law upon this subject.
Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267; Faxon v. Mansfield, 2 Maes. 147; Mclflllan v. Vanderlip, 12
Johns. 165; Jennings v. Camp, 13 Johns. 94;
Reab v. lfoor, 19 Johns. 331; Lantry v. Parks,
8 Cowen, 63; Sinclair v. Bowles, 9 Barn. &
C. 92; Spain v. Arnott, 2 Starkie, 256. That
such a rule In Its operation may be very unequal, not to say unjust, ls apparent.
A. party who contracts to perform certain
speclfted labor, and who breaks his contract
In the tlrst Instance, without any attempt to
perform It, can only be made liable to pay
the damages wblcb the other party has sustained by reason of such non performance,
which ln many Instances may be trifling;
whereas a psrty who In good faith has entered upon the performance of his contract,
and nearly completed tt, and then abandoned
the further performance,--ftlthough the other
party has had the full benefit of all that has
been done, and baa perhaps sustained no
actual damage,-ls In fact subjected to a lose
of all which has been performed, In the nature of damages for the non fulfillment of the
remainder, upon the technical rule, fhat the
contract must be fully performed In order
to a recovery of any part of the compensallon.
By the operation of this rule, then, the
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party who attempts performance may b<'
placl•d In a much worse situation than he
who wholly dlsregnl'(ls his contract, anrl the
other party may i·ecelve much more, by tltt~
breach of the contract, than the Injury which
he has sustained by such brcnch, and more
than he could be entitled to were he seeking
to recover damages by an action.
The case before us presents an Illustration.
Had the plnlntlll' ln this case nevl'r enterPcl
upon the perforJllance of his contrnct, the
damage could not probably have been grenter than some small expense and trouble incurred In procuring another to do the labor
which he had contracted to perform. But
having entered upon the performance, and
lnhort'd nine and a half months, the value of
whleh labor to the defendant as found by the
jury Is $!15, if the defendant can succeed In
this defence. he ln fact ree!'lves nearly tlve
sixths of the value of a whole year's labor,
by reason of the bn•ach of c·ontrnct by the
plalntitT, 11. sum not only utterly disproportionate to any probable, not to say po$slble tlamage which could have resulted from the nt>glect of the plaintiff to continue the remaining. two and a half months, but altogether
beyond any damage which could have been
recovered by the defendant, had the plaintlll'
done nothing towards the fulfilment o~ his
contract.
Another Illustration Is furrushed in Lantry
v. Parks, 8 Cow. 83. There the defendant
hired the plalntlll' for a year, at ten doll:trs
per month. The plaintiff worked ten and a
halt months, and then left saying he woulcl
work no more for him. This was on Saturday. On lfonday the plaintiff returned and
oll'ered to resume his work, but the defendant
said he would employ him no longer. The
court held that the refusal of the defendant
on Saturday was a violation of bis contract.
and that he could recover nothing for the labor performed.
There are other cases, however, In which
principles have been adopted leading to a different result. It ls said, that where a party
contracts to perform certain work, and to
furnish materials, as, for Instance, to build a
house, and the work Is done, but with .some
variations from the mode prescribed by the
contract, yet If the other party has the benetlt of the labor and materials he should be
bound to pay so much as they are reasonably worth. 2 Starkie, Ev. 97, 98; Hayward
v. Leonai-d, 7 Pick. 181; Smith v. First Cong.
Meeting House In Lowell, 8 Pick. 178; Jeweli
v. Schroeppel, 4 Cow. 5M; Hayden v. Inhabitants of Madison, 7 Greenl. 78; Bull. N. P.
139; 4 Bos. & P. 355; Llnnlngdale v. Livingston, 10 Johns. 36; Jennings v. Camp, UJ
Johns. 97; 7 East, 479.
A dlll'erent doctrine seems to have been
holden In Ellis v. Hnmlen, 3 Taunt. 52, and
It Is apparent, ln such cases, that If the house
has not been built In the manner specified lD
the contract, the work has not been done.
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The party has no more performed what he

contracted to perform, than he who has con-

tracted to labor for a certain period, and

failed to complete the time.

It is in truth virtually conceded in such

cases that the work has not been done, for if

it had been. the party performing it would

be entitled to recover upon the contract itself,

which it is held he cannot do.

Those cases are not to be distinguished, in

principle, from the present, unless it be in

the circumstance that where the party has

contracted to furnish materials. and do cer-

tain iahor. as to build a house in a speciﬁed

manner, it it is not done according to the con-

tract, the party for whom it is built may re-

fuse to receive it,—clect to take no beneﬁt

from what has been performed; and there-

fore if he does receive, he shall be bound to
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pay the value. whereas in a contract for la-

bor. merely, from day to day, the party is

continually receiving the beneﬁt of the con-

tract under an expectation, that it will be

fulﬁlled. and cannot, upon the breach of it,

have an election to refuse to receive what has

been done, and thus discharge himself from

payment. '

But we think this difference in the nature of

the contracts does not justify the application

of a different rule in relation to them. The

party who contracts for labor merely, for a

certain period does so with full knowledge

that he must, from the nature of the case,

be accepting part performance from day to

day, if the other party commences the per-

formance. and with knowledge also that the

other may eventually fall of completing the

entire term.

If under such circumstances he actually re-

ceives a beneﬁt from the labor performed,

over and above the damage occasioned by the

failure to complete, there is as much reason

why he should pay the reasonable worth of

what has been done for his beneﬁt, as there

is when he enters and occupies the house

which has been built for him, but not accord-

ing to the stipulations of the contract, and

which he perhaps enters, not because he is

satisﬁed with what has been done, but be-

cause circumstances compel him to accept it

such as it is, that he should pay for the value

of the house.

Where goods are sold upon a special con-

tract as to their nature. quality. and price,

and have been used before their inferiority

has been discovered. or other circumstances

have occurred which have rendered it im-

practicable or inconvenient for the vendee to

rt‘.\t'ln(i the contract in toto, it seems to have

been the practice formerly to allow the ven-

dor to recover the stipulated price, and the

vendee recovered by a cross action damages

for the breach of the contract. “But accord-

ing to the later and more convenient prac-

tice. the vendee in such case is allowed, in

an aciion for the price. to give evidence of

the inferiority of the goods in reduction of

damages, and the plaintiff who has broken

DAMAGES
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS

AGAINST EMPLOYER. ‘33ll

sustained, instead of subjecting him to an '

entire loss for a partial failure, and thus

mak‘ the amount received in many cases I

wholly disproportionate to the injury. 1|

Sannd. 3200; 2 Starkie, Ev. 643.

it is as "hard upon the plaintiff to pre-

clude him from recovering at all. because he

has failed as to part of his entire undertak-

ing." where his contract is to labor for a {

certain period, as it can be in any other de- |

scription of contract, provided the defendant 1

has received a beneﬁt and value from the i

labour actually performed. 1

“'e hold then, that where a party under-

takes to pay upon a special contract for the ,

performan'ce of labor, or the furnishing of i

materials, he is not to be charged upon such ‘

special agreement until the money is earned 3

according to the terms of it; and where the
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parties have made an express contract the

law will not imply and raise a contract dif-

ferent from that which the parties have en-

tered into, except upon some further trans-

action between the parties.

In case of a failure to perform such special

contract, by the default of the party con-

tracting to do the service, if the money is

not due by the terms of the special agrcementt

he is not entitled to recover for his labour,

or for the materials furnished. unless the

other party receives what has been done, or

furnished, and upon the whole case derives a 1

beneﬁt from it. Taft v. Inhabitants of Mon-

tague, 14 Mass. 282; 2 Starkle, Ev. 644.

But if, where a contract is made of such

a c aracter, a arty actuall receives labor

or ma cna s a beneﬁt

f§_T1______,_ii.Dﬂ.JIll0¥.E,lhﬂ-dﬂ-U‘1““"“l;‘5‘“"9"

‘\,‘E1_l__El_§-—LQSl11LBl1_I.Bﬂm-1-118—5808-El\_ﬂ£_I.he f

contract b ' the ot a u-

i

all ' done ceivedI furnish a

ne c eration and the w

raises a romise to a to he ext nt e ,

reasonable worth of such excess -This may

b‘e"cﬁt's,_i?i_ta_tHl_—:1E_1§a_l<iTg__i_t’__-‘ttee\v'('ase. one not

within the original agreement. and the party

is entitled to “recoyer on s new case, for

t e work done not a d,..l.u.1-L_1el__ac;

Dane, Abr. 224.

on such failure to perform the whole, the

nature of the contract be such that the em-

ployer can reject what has been done. and

refuse to receive any beneﬁt from the part

performance. he is entitled so to do. and in

such case is not liable to be charged, unless

he has before assented to and accepted of

what has been done. however much the other

party may have done tmvards the perform- ;

ance. He has in such case received nothing, ;

and having contracted to receive nuthing but i

the entire matter contracted for. he is not ,

bound to pay.becausc his express promise was

only to pay on receiving the whole. and hav-

ing actually received nothing the law can-

not and ought not to raise an implied prom-

ise to pay. But where the party receives

value, takes and uses the materials. or has

I~ ACTIO~S
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snstaint>d, lnst<>ad of subjecting him to an advantage from the labor, he Is liable to pay
<>ntlre loss for a partial failure, and thus the reasonable worth of what he has rem~ the amount rt'<'l•h·ed In many cases celved. Farnsworth v. Garrard, 1 Camp. 38.
wholly dlsproportlonah• to the Injury. 1 And the rule Is the same whether It w:u1
Saund. 320c; 2 Starkie. Ev. IH:J.
received and accepted by the nss1'nt of thl'
It Is as "lrnrd upon the plnlntll'I' to pre- party prior to the brPnch, uud1•r n 1·011tr:l<'t by
elude him trom rc<·O'l"cring at all, because be which, trorn lts nature, be was to l'P<'l'iv"
has failed as to pnrt of his Putirt> mulertnk- labor, from time to time until tlw ,.,nuplPtlou
ing," where bis t'Ontral'I Is to labor for a of tbe whole contm<'t: or whl'th1•r it wn1:1
certain period, a11 It t•an be In any otlwr tlc- n•t·l'h·p1J and ac<'t'Jltcd by an as>'l'nt sullst>i;icrlption ot contract, provided the def('J)('tant quent to th<' P<'rformnnel' of nil which wns l!I
has received a b<'nf'ftt aml vahw from the , fact llnne. If be rl'<'l'lved It undl'r suel1 elrlnbour actually perforuwd.
<·umstunces us precludt'Cl him from rejt>dlng
\Ve holll then, that wlwre n party umll'r- It 11ftPrw11rds, th11t does not altt>r the cuse;
takes to p11y upon a spt>dal eontr:wt for the It hns still !wen received by his assent.
performance of labor, or tilt.' f11rnh1hlng o!
In tnct, we think the techuleal n•ai-;oning.
materials, he Is not to be charged u11on Hnch thut the performance of the whole lahor Is
s1wd11l agreement until the money Is earne<l(i a eondltlon prPcedent, and the right to ren<·<·or<llng to the terms of It; nod wht•re the 1 cover nnytblug <11>pe11tfont llll<>n It; that, tht•
parties ha\'e madt> an express contruct the contrn<'t belug entire, there can be no aplaw will not Imply und rulsP 11 eontrnct dlf- portlonmeut; und thut. tlwre being an cxferent from that which the partiei< ban~ en- press <·ontract, no other cnn be Implied, eveu
tered Into, except upon some farthl'J' trans- upon the snbsequPnt per!ormance of ser·
action hetwPen the partlei<.
YiCP,-is not properly applleable to this speIn cai;e of a fallurP to perform sueh special clt'ti of coutrnet. whl're a benefi<'lnl sen·lee
cor.trnct. hy thci def1rnlt of thl' pnrty eon· hns hprn af'. ltrnlly JlPrform('d: for we have
tractlng to do the se-rvlce. If the mo1u•y Is abnndnnt rt>n11vn to hl'iieve, that tllll g'l'lll'rnl
not due by the tPrms of tlw spt>clal ngT1>t•1111•11t( 11111IPrstn111ling of till' eommunlty Ii<, that till'
he Is not entitled to recover for bis labour, hired laborer shall be entltll•<l to compl•nR.11or !or the materials furnished. unless tbe tlon tor the sen·ice actually 1wrfornwcl,
other party receives what bas bPC'D done, or though he do not continue thr entlrP IPrm
furnished, and upon tbe whole <·nse derives a contra.cte<l for, and such contmets mm:t 111•
heneftt from It. Taft \'. Inbahlt11nts of :\Ion· presunwd to be mnde with rcft>rp111·p tu llu1t
unllerstundlng, unless an express stipulation
tai:ue, 14 :\lass. 282: 2 Starkie, E\'. H44.
Rut If whe
t Is mnd
shows tlle contrary.
\\'here a beneftclal service has been performed aud reeelved, therefore, under connn advantngt>, over agd o!Klxe the dnmo" tracts of this kind, the mutual agn•cments
'i\·blch bus rPgn!tcr) 'from the brooch of tbe cannot be considered as going to the whole
contract by the other Dorty the lahor actu- of the consideration, so as to mnke tht>m
:illy done. 11nd the yo!ne recclve1l, furnlf1h a mutua.l conditions the one precPdPnt to thP
~JV consideration, and the law thereupon other, without a specific pro,·lso to that efmli;es a promli:e to pay to the t•xtent of t11e ft>ct. Boone Y. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 2i:l, note;
rP11so11ahle worth of such excPss, ·This may Campbell v. ,Jones, 6 Term R. 570; Ritd1ie
ue conshlered as making a new case. oue not v. Atkinson. 10 East, 295; Burn v. Miller,
within the orlglnul agrPement. und thepjitli' 4 Taunt. 745.
Is entitled to "recoyer on lils DPW case. for
It Is easy, tr parties so choose, to provide
tht> work tlon1>, not ns ggrercl, hut yet ac:. by an expres11 agreement thut nothing shall
eepted hy thP dc(endput." 1 Dane, Abr. 224. be earned, It the laborer leaves his l'lllployff on sud1 fnlhm• to prrform the whole, the er without having pcrfnrnwll the whoh! st•rnnture of the contrnl't he s1wh that the em- Ylce contemplated, and then tlwre can he no
plo~·t·r can n•jpet what has ht>l'n clone>. and
pretence for a reeovery If be volutnrlly tlt•r1•fmw to rec•pj,·p any lwtwftt from the part serts the service before the explrntlon of till'
111·rforman1·e. he is Pntitlr1l so to do. and In time .
.-11d1 ea"" is trnt l!ahlt• to hP l'l1Rrg1~ll. unless
The amount, however, for whif'h the rm·
be hns befor1• nssPntPrl to aml ncceptell of ployer ought to be charged, where tlw - Jnwhnt Juts hPl'll clo111·. ho\,... ,.Pr much the other horer ahantlons his contract, Is only till' rPa1mrty may have clnnp towanh~ the perform- sonahle wol'th or the amount of arlvn11t:1g-P
llllt'I'. lie hns ln i;ud1 1-;tsP n•c·1·h·1·d nothing, lw receives upoii the· whole trnnsal'liuu
null hnvlni: t•ontr11<·tPd to n •epin tl'lthiug hut (\Yadleii:h ' ' · Sutton, G :'\. H. 1:-,); nnd. In
tb•~ 1·11tlr!' 11111tt1•r 1·011t1·ut"t"ll for, ltl' Is not , l'Rtimating the YalnP of the laboi·, tlw conhounll to pay. lwca u:w hii< expre!is promb1• wns tract pr lee for thl' s1·rvi!'e 1·nnnot be exouly to pny on r1•1·ph·ing the wholl'. nml hav- <'PP!lell (Haydpn v. Inhuhltants of i\In11ison.
lug ndnnll~· r1•<•ph·cl) nothing tile' h1\\' 1•:111- 7 (;r1•rnl. 78; Duhois ' " l'111ml Co., 4 \Vt•ml.
not and ought not to rulse 110 Implied prom- 28:i; Koon v. Grt'<>nman, 7 W e nd. 121).
lse to puy. But where thl' part)· rel'<'in•s
It a person malws 11 <·011trnl't fairly he Is
value, takes nod uses the mntt>rinls, or hns t•ntltle<l to have It fully 1Jl'l'for111i>1l; and if

•
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this is not done he is entitled to damages.

He may maintain a suit to recover the

amount of damage sustained by the non

performance.

The beneﬁt and advantage which the par-_

ty takes by the labor, therefore, is the

amount of value which he receives, if any,

after deducting the amount of damage; and

if he elects to put this in defence he is

entitled so to do, and the implied promise

which the law will raise, in such case, is

to pay such amount of the stipulated price

for the whole labor, as remains after de-

ducting what it would cost to procure a

completion of the residue of the service, and

also any damage which has been sustained

by reason of the non fulﬁlment of the con-

tract.

If in such case it be found that the dam-
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ages are equal to or greater than the amount

of the labor performed, so that the employer,

having a right to the full performance of

the contract, has not upon the whole case

received a beneﬁcial service, the plaintiff

cannot recover.

This rule, by binding the employer to

pay the value oif the service he actually re-

‘ceives, and the laborer to answer in dam-

ages where he does not complete the entire

contract, will leave no temptation to the

former to drive the laborer from his service,

near the close of his term, by ill treatment,

in order to escape from payment; nor to

the latter to desert his service before the

stipulated time, without a snﬂicient reason;

and it will in most instances settle the whole

controversy in one action, and prevent a mul-

tiplicity of suits and cross actions.

There may be instances, however, where

the damage occasioned is much greater than

the value of the labor performed, and if the

party elects to permit himself to be charged

for the value of the labor, without interpos-

ing the damages in defence, he is entitled

to do so, and may have an action to recover

-

his damages for the non-performance what-

ever, they may be. Orowninshield v. Rob-

inson, 1 Mason, 93, Fed. Cas. No. 3, .

And he may commence such action any

time after the contract is broken, no ,,vith-

standing no suit has been instituted a iinst

him; but if he elects to have the da ges

considered in the action against hi he

must be understood as conceding that they

are not to be extended beyond the amount

of what he has received, and he cannot at-

terwards sustain an action for farther dam-

ages.

.~\pplying the principles thus laid down, to

this case, the plaintiff is entitled to judg-

ment on the verdict. The defendant sets

up a mere breach of the contract in defence

of the action, but this cannot avail him.

He does not appear to have offered evidence

to show that he was damniﬁed by such

breach, or to have asked that a deduction

should be made upon that account. The
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(30 Vt. 607.)

,.

SWIFT v. HARRIMAN.

(30 Vt. 607.)

Supreme Court of Vermont. Ornni.:<'Term, 1858.

!'>lnr<'h

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Term, 1858.

Orange. March

Aaaumpait for the breach of a contract by the

defendant, to carry on the plaintiff's saw mill.

The defendant ﬁled a plea in offset, but this

plea was not ﬁled so early as was required by

the rules of the court where the cause was tried.

After this plea was ﬁled. and before any objec-

tions had been made to it by the plaintiff, the

cause was referred by the consent of the par-

ties, and tried by the referees. and at the hear-

ing before them the plaintiff objected to the

defendant's demand in offset, among other

reasons, upon the ground that the plea in offset

was not ﬁled in season. The referees, however,

considered the defendant's claim in offset,
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which was for his labor and earnings durin

the time he carried on the mill, and reportc

the facts in the case, which are sufﬁciently set

forth in the opinion of the court. They found

that the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the

defendant ﬁfteen dollars for the breach of the

contract declared on, and that the defendant

was entitled to recover of the plaintiff. u on

his claim in offset, the sum of thirty-two dol ar

and ninety-two cents, and they accordingly re-

ported that the defendant recover of the plain-

Auumpait for the breach of a contract by tbe
defendant. to carry on the plaintiff"& saw mill.
The defendant tiled a plea in offset, but this
plea was not filed so early as was required by
the rules of the court where the cause wus tried.
After this plea was filed. and before any ohjec·
tiona had been m11dc to it by the plaintiff, the
rause woe referred by the consent of the par·
ties. and tried by the referees. and at the henr·
ing before them the plaintiff objected to the
defendant's demand in offset, amon.11: other
reesous. upon the ground that the pleu fu offset
was not filed in season. The referees, howe,·er,
considered the defendant's claim in offset,
which was fof' his labor and earnings during
the time he carried on the mill, and reported
the facts in the case, which are sntli<-iently set
forth in the opinion of the court. They found
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the
defendant fifteen dollars for the breech of the
contract declare1l on. and that the defendant
was entitled to recover of the plaintiff. upon
bis claim in offset, the sum of thirty-two dollars
and ninety-two cents. and they accordingly re·
ported that the defendant recover of the plnin·
till seventeen dollars and ninety-two cents (be·
ing the difference between the defendant"s claim above stated, *and the plain- "608
tiff's damages by reason of the breach of
the contract). and costs. The county court
rendered judgment for the defendant upon the
report, to which the plaintiff excepted.
.A. M. Dickey, for the plaintiff.
- - - - , for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by

tiff seventeen dollars and ninety-twp cents (be-

ing the difference between the defend-

ant's claim above stated, “and the plain- ‘B08

tiffs damages by reason of the breach oi.

the contract). and costs. The county court

rendered judgment for the defendant upon the

report, to which the Elaintiff excepted.

A. M. Dickey, fort e plaintiff.

, for the defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Al.l)l>‘, J. The question whether the plea in

offset was ﬁled within the time prescribed by

the rules of court, can not properly be raised

after a reference of the case. and a hearing be-

fore the referees. Even if out of time, the

court might have suspended the rule and ad-

mitted the plea. The objection must be held

as waived by the reference.

The contract between the plaintiff and the

defendant, as stated in the report, was this: a

verbal contract by which the defendant was to

carry on the plaintiff's saw mill for one year,

make all repairs costing one dollar or less at

any one time, run the mill all the time from the

1st of March to the 1st of May, and from the

fall till the 1st of March, 1854, and between the

ﬁrst of May and fall, when there was water

enough, and do all the work in a good work-

manlike manner, and to receive ﬁfty cents per

thousand for soft lumber sawed, and onethird

of the hard lumber for sawing the same. and

to take his pay out of the money received for

sawing, and out of the hard lumber. .

In September. 1853, the plaintiff dismissed

the defendant from the charge of the mill. on

the ground that he did not do the work in a .

ood workmanlike manner, and the defendant

eft. The referees ﬁnd that the defendant did

ALDI:', .I. 'fhe 1p1cstion whether the plea in
offset was filed withiu the time prciwribe1l by
the rules of court, can not properly be mised
after a reference of the case. anti 11 hearing before the referees. Even if out of time. the
court might have suspended the rule and ad·
milted the plea. The objection must be held
as Wl\ived bv the reference.
The contract between the plaintltf and the
defendant, as state<l in the report, was this: a
verbal contract by which the defcnd11nt was to
cllrry on the plaintiff"s saw mill for one year,
m11ke all repairs costing one dollar or less at
11nv one time. run the mill all the time from the
1st of l'tlarch to the 1st of Mav, and from the
fall till the 1st of March, 1854, and between the
first of Mav and fall. when there was water
enough, and do all the work in a good workmanlike mnnner, and to receive fifty ceuts per
thousand for soft lumber sawed, and one-third
of the hnrd lumber for sawing the same. and
to take his pay out of the money received for
sawing, and out of the h11rd lumber.
In :-ieptembcr. 18ii3. the plaintiff dismi ssed
the defendant from the charge of the mill. on
ihe ground \hat he did not do the work in a

AGAI~ST

EMPLOYE.

good workmanlike manner, and the clefcud:1!1t
left. The referees find that the defendant ditl
not do bis work in a good workmanlike manner, and as this suit iii brought to recover the
damages occasioned to the plaintilf by such
brea('h of the contract, the referees assess such
da11111ges at the sum of fifteen dollars.
The 1lefendant pleads in offset his claim for
the b11lance due him for his labor and earnings
during the time he carried on the mill.
The plaintiff objects to any allow11nce to the
defenclaut for snch e11rnings. upon the ground
that the contrnct wns the mere hiring of a servant for a specific period of time. and that he
was dischnr!!'ed for good cause.
*609
*The contract in this case we can not
deem the mere hirin~ of a servant. It was
an agreement of a different ehnracter, in
which the defend11nt as9umed linbllities for repairs of the mill, bad a share in its profits. and
m fact. was put ln possession of, and had. to
some extent, an interest in real estate. He was
not to receive an~· tlxed sum as wages. but was
to have a proportion of the prolits of the business he carried on. It was a contract for the
control and carrying on of a mill for a year.
~imilar contracts are frequentlv made as to
the carrying on of farms on shares. In such
cases. the contracts have never been held mere
agreements by the tennntsto labor as hired servants.
Neither does it belong to that class of contracts where the stipulations are intendjld to be
a condition precedent. and there can be no recovery without a complete performance. The
agreement on the part of tll.c defendant wns not
for such an entire thing that the whole must be
done before he would be entitled to recover: 011
the contrnry. the terms of the contract. show
that both parties intended the defendant shun Id
take his pny out of the earnings of the mill as
they RCcrued.
This c11se seems to come within the reason of
those cases, of which there are many in our reports, where upon equitable considerations
1tT6wing· out of the contract and its part performance, a recoverv for the r eal beneficiru
value of the labor hes been allowed.
The defendRnt's labor was beneficial to the
plaiutill. Compensation to the plaintiff for
what he suffered from the breach of contr11ct
by the defendant wns easilv to be ascertainC'd,
has been a~sessc<l . and ca~ be declut'led from
the benetlcial value to the plaintiff of the deant's labor.
It would be bi h
· ·
tn e a vnn a e of the

e ec1s1onsm yer v. • ones, 8 Vt. 205; Gilman v. Hall, 11 Vt. 510; Bracket v. Moore. 2:f
Vt. 554; and Morrison v. Cummings, 26 Vt. ~l'.lU.
establish the right of the party to- recover on 11
qu1111tum 11u-r1ti l, in cases where a compensation
c1tn be made, and the stinulations are not in tended as a condition precedent.
The judgment of the county court is affirmed.
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talned by the plaintiff In error. In his cou11·
terclalm, the defendant alleged the breach of
(44 Pnc. 087. :! Knn. App. 575.)
the contrnct, and that the defendant was unable to get help to tn.ke the place of Glodfelty,
Court of Appeals of Kansas, ~orthcrn Deport- and could not, therefore. get his work done,
ment, C. D. April 3, 18flti.
wheat harvested, nor corn properly tilled, nor
Error from dh;triet court, Osborne county. stock properly cared for. whereby he was
Action b~· C. 'i\'. l'each against .J. C. Macy damaged In the sum of $:100. The def<>ndant
in a justice court. Judgment for plaintift', In error claims tbat, as this action was origa.nd defemluut ap1wals to the district court. inally brought before a justice of the Jl('ace,
Judgment for plnintlft', and defrndant brings the district court, 011 appeal, had no jurisdiction of this connterclnim, It exceeding the
error. Affirmed.
sum of ~00. Had this ohj<'Ctlon been h1terUobinson & l\l_cBride, for plaintift' In error.
posed in the trial court, the cases of Rall v.
Isrnd l\loore tllld "'· N. l\loore, for defendant Bkimm, 43 Kan. 327. 23 Pac. fifi::i, and Waglo error.
sta ft' v. Challlss, 31 Kan. 212, 1 Puc. G.31,
wonl<l be authorit!Ps supporting such contPnCLARK, J. About the 1st of l\farch, 1801, tlon; !Jut, as no objeetlon wus there made,
a n·rhal contrnct was enkre<l Into between ' the defen<lnnt In error cannot bP. 1wrmlttcd, In
one lleury Glodfelty and the ·plnlutitr In er- this court, for the first thnP, to ohjt'Ct to the
ror, ,J. C. Macy, whereby the foruwr agreed jurh~rllction of the trial court to ilear and deto work for the latter, on his farm In Os- termine such counterclaim. Gregg v. Garverborne county, for a term of nine months at ick, 33 Kan. 100, 5 Pac. 751.
the stipulated wages of $17 per month. GlodDid the court err in refusing to allow the
felty went to W<'l'k under this contract on def<'ndant d1mmges under his countPrl'inim?
March 4th and rt>mained with Mr. Macy un- In Walrath v. Whltteklnd, 20 Kan. 4~2. ~t Is
til July 8th, and then, without any sumclent said that "damages recoverable upon brPach
rt>asou therdo1·, and over Macy's objection, of contract are only those damages wl!lch
quit and 1·pfnsed furthc>r to comply with the are the dTrect and proximate result of the
terms of bis contract. Glodfelty was a minor wrong complained of. Damages which are
stepson of C. ·w. Peach, the defendant In remote and speculative cannot be recovc>red."
error, and the latter brought an action before 'Vhile the defendant may have suft'ered loss
a justlee of the peace to recover the balnnce by reason of Glodfelty's misconduct, still It
of the wages claimed to be due his stepson. must be remembered that the law does not
'l'he ease was subsequently taken to the dls- hold one liable for 1111 the consequences that
triet court., where amended bills of particulars may follow the breaeh of his contraet It lt
were tiled by both parties, and a trial wae were so, his liability would be witlrout a limit.
duly had before the court, a jury being for It would ..:ootinue as far as the consewaived, resulting In a finding In favor of quences of his act could be traced. The law
fhe plaintiff for the amount claimed by him wisely limits liability to the direct and im·
"lf>ss the damages sustained by the defend- mediate effects of the breach of a contract.
ant In the sum of $18.69, to wit, that plalntlft' The losses set up In defendant's counterclaim
Should reeover of the defcmlnnt the sum o! are not of this character. They may have
$45.2U; the daruag-es allowed being the dif- resulted remotely from the fact that Glodfelty
ference between the per diem paid the em- failed to remain with the plalntlft' In e rror
plo~·e, Glodfelty, and ~2 p!>r day, the amount
as a "farm hand" for the full period of nine
per diem the court comddered a proper com- months, but they cannot be said to be the
pensation for whieh additional help could be natural and proximate consequence of Lhe
e·m ployed, as ne<'dc>d, to talce the pla<'e of breach of the contrnct of employment. Fulsaid employ(• during harn~,;t." The defend- ler v. Curtis, 100 Ind. 237; Jackson v. Hall.
ant P.\e<•ptl'd to the finding of the court ; flied 84 N. C. 489; MeDaniel v. Crabti·ee, 21 Ark.
his motion for a new tri11I, setting forth all 4:n; .Johnson v. Mathews, 5 Kan. 118. In
the statutory grounds therefor, which was support of the contention of plaintlft' In error
o\·en·11IC'd, the de frudant duly excepting; and that the court er1·ed In assessing his damages,
j11t!g111Pnt was rendt-red In favor of till' plain- , our attention has been called to the case of
till' for $-!;J.26. 'l'he dt•fendant BePks a re- Houser v. P earce, 13 Kan. 10-1, In which the
plniutift' 1·ecovered a judgment for !lumages
\">r:ml of thi8 judgment.
The only assignme nt of error to which par- for !Jr!'aeh of a specific contract to cut, bind,
tlc·ulnr attention 1:::. ralkd by c·ounsel Is that and stack certain oats, and the supreme court
the court erred In Its tinding as to the dnm - held that If the plaintiff, after using all r<'nagr s which the d<•femla nt below sustained sonable precaution, lost his crop !Jy reason,
through the bre~ch 01' the contl'U<~t by Glod- solely, of the failure of the defen1lnnts to perfelty, and It ls dalnwd that, under the evl- from the ir contract, he was clearly e ntitled to
d<'nce, the plaintiff in error was entitled to r1>cover the amount of sud1 loss; nml, as the
diuuagP!l nndl'r hb count1>rclalm. and that rPeord did not mclude the evlde11<'e, the court
there w:1s no e \·idl'llC<' In the C'aSl' to war- held that the presumvtion was that the lnrant the fimling of the damages that were ae- strnetio n g iven of which complahit was wad•'
ses:;ed by the trial court as having been sus- was wa1·r:rnt<.>d by tile evidence.
l\IACY \", PEACH.
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MAC! v. PE.\(‘I'I. |

(-14 Pac. 687. 2 Kan. App. 575.)

Court of Appeals of Kansas, Northern Depart-

ment, C. D. April 3, 1896.

Error from district court, Osborne county. ‘

Action by C. W. Peach against J. C. Macy i

in a justice court. Judgment for plaintiff, j

and defendant appeals to the district court.

Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings I

error. Aﬂirmed.

Robinson & .\I,cBride, for plaintiff in error.

Israel “core and W. N. Moore, for defendant l

in error.

CLARK, J. About the 1st of March, 1891,

a verbal contract was entered into between i

one Ilenry Glodfelty and the-plaintiff in er-

ror, J. C. Macy, whereby the former agreed

to work for the latter, on his farm in Os-

borne county, for a term of nine months at

the stipulated wages of $17 per month. Glod-
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felty went to work under this contract on

March 4th and remained with Mr. Macy un-

til July 8th, and then, without any sutﬁcient

reason therefor, and over Macy's objection,

quit and refused further to comply with the

terms of his contract. Glodfelty was a minor

stepson of C. W. Peach, the defendant in

error, and the latter brought an action before

a justice of the peace to recover the balance

of the wages claimed to be due his stepson.

The case was subsequently taken to the dis-

trict court, where amended bills of particulars

were tiled by both parties, and a trial was

duly had before the court, a jury being

waived, resulting in a ﬁnding in favor of

the plaintiff for the amount claimed by him

“less the damages sustained by the defend-

ant in the sum of $18.69, to wit, that plaintiff

should recover of the defendant the sum of

$45.26; the damages allowed being the dif-

ference between the per diem paid the em-

ploye, Glodfelty, and $2 per day, the amount

per diem the court considered a proper com-

pensation for which additional help could be

einployed, as needed, to take the place of ‘

said employe during harvest." The defend-

ant c.vccpted to the ﬁnding of the court; ﬂied

his motion for a new trial, setting forth all

the statutory grounds therefor, which was

overruled, the defeudant duly excepting; and

judgment was rendered in favor of the plain- I

tiff for $45.26. The defendant seeks a re-

versal of this judgment.

The only assignment of error to which par-

ticular attention is called by counsel is that

the court erred in its ﬁnding as to the dam-

ages which the defendant below sustained

through the breach of the contract by Glod-

felty, and it is claimed that, under the evi-

dence, the plaintiff in error was entitled to

damages under his counterclaim, and that

there was no evidence in the case to war-

rant the ﬁnding of the damages that were as-

sessed by the trial court as having been sus-

Bitl£.\(‘H Oi“ i‘lL\"l‘li.\L"[S I{ESl"EC'l‘l.\'G PEI{SO.\'AL SERVICE.

tained by the plaintiff in error. In his coun~

terclaim, the defendant alleged the breach of

the contract, and that the defendant was un-

able to get help to take the place of Glodfelty,

D.\\I.\(ll~l.\‘ I.\' .\("I‘I()NS .\(i.\l.\'.\"l‘ E‘..\H‘L()YE.

There is, however, quite a noticeable distinc-

tion between that case and this one. Here,

the contract between the parties was not

made with any special reference to the har-

vesting of the dei.endant's wheat crop, nor to

the cultivation of any particular ﬁeld of

growing corn; but, on the contrary, it is fair

to presume that the work expected to be per-

formed by him was general tn its nature,

such as is usually required of a “farm hand,"

and it cannot fairly be supposed that the

damages alleged in the counterclaim were

within the contemplation of the parties to

this contract when it was executed, nor could

such damages naturally be expected to fol-

low a violation of the contract. The evidence

in support of the damages sustained by the

defendant below, as alleged in his bill of

particulars, is very unsatisfactory. instead

of being recitals of fact, the testimony of the
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several witnesses amounts only to expressions

of opinion as to the damages which the de-

fendant sustained, and was clearly incompe-

tent. But we do not think the defendant be-

low was entitled to recover the damages al-

leged by him in his couitterciahn. In Peters

v. “'hitney, 23 Barb. 2-l, this identical ques-

tion was before the court, and it was there

held that “in an action for the breach of a

contract for work and labor to be done upon

a farm, evidence of damage occurring to the

plaintiff's crops in consequence of the defend-

ant's leaving his service is ina.dmissible. The

legal measure of damages in such cases is

the difference between the wages agreed to

be paid to the defendant, and the price the

plaintiff was obliged to pay for labor to sup-

ply his place." In Riech v. Bolch, 68 Iowa,

526, 27 N. W. 507, it is said that, “where one

employed by a farmer, for a given term,

abandons his employer before the end of the

term, in the midst of haying. the damages

sustained by the employer in the loss of hay

are too remote to be recovered in an action

for a violation of the contract." In that case,

the defendant offered to prove that, when

plaintiff left his service, he had a large quan-

tity of hay in the shock, and that he had a

quantity of uncut hay in the ﬁeld, and that

he was unable to employ other help to save

such hay, and that it was lost in consequence

of plaintiffs refusal tocontinue in his service

during the remainder of the term of his em-

ployment; and also offered to prmc the value.

of the hay at the time the plaintiff quit his

services. This evidence was excluded by the

district court, on the ground that it did not

afford the proper measure of damages. The

supreme court, in sustaining this runng. -held

that “it cannot be said that the injury com-

plained of is the natural and proximate con-

sequence of plaintiff's breach ‘of the contract."

In the case of Iiouser v. Pearce, supra. the

trial court refused an instmction to the jury

that the measure of damages was the differ-

ence between the contract price and what it

would have cost to have had the work done

by others; and the supreme court. speaking

through Mr. Justice Brewer, says that “th's
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DAMAGES 11*‘: ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

HARVEY v. CONNECTICUT & P. R. R. CO.

(124 Mass. 421.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suffolk. May 25, 1878.

Report from supreme judicial court, Suf-

folk county; Colt, Judge.

R. D. Smith, for plaintiff. C. T. Russell

and C. T. Russell, Jr., for defendant.

ICNIHCOTT, J. The defendant agreed in

writing with the plaintiff to transport lum-

her from certain' stations on the Grand Trunk

Railway, in Canada, to Boston, at a certain

rate of freight, for a period of twelve months

from August 31, 1871. This agreement con-

stituted a continuing offer, on the part of the

defendant, to transport such lumber as the

plaintiff should furnish at the speciﬁed points

during the period named, and was binding

on the defendant whenever, during that time,
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the plaintiff tendered lumber for transporta-

tion according to its te1ms; and failure to

transport the lumber afterwards offered by

the plaintiff was a breach of the contract.

Bornstein v. Lans, 104 Mass. 214.

It also appeared that the plaintiff informed

the company. at the time, that he desired to

make this contract, because he wished to

make contracts with other persons to sell

and deliver railroad ties in Boston. He aft-

erwards made contracts with two railroads

for the delivery of ties in Boston. He noti-

ﬁed the defendant for the ﬁrst time in May

or June, 1872, that he had made such con-

tracts. and demanded transportation for a

portion of these ties to Boston, under his con-

tract. This the defendant failed to do. As

the plaintiff had made no contracts for the

delivery of ties in Boston at the time when

the defendant entered into the agreement to

transport, and no notice was or could then

have been given of the character and terms

of those contracts, we are of opinion that the

defendant cannot be held liable in damages

for the proﬁts which would have accrued to

the plaintiff under such subsequent contracts.

Such damages could not have been in the con-

templation of the parties when they made

their contract, as a probable result of a

breach of it.

When a carrier receives goods for trans-

portation, and fails to deliver them, the own-

er is entitled to recover the market value of

the goods at the time and place at which they

should have been delivered. Spring v. Has-

kell, 4 Allen, 112. And where the carrier

negligently delays the delivery of goods, he

is liable for loss in their market value during

the delay. Cutting v. Railway Co., 13 Allen,

381. It is said in that case that this "is the

most simple and just rule, as well as the

easiest to be applied; for it depends on the

general market value of the goods, and in-

volves no question of contingent or specu-

lative proﬁts, and no consideration of any

other contracts made or omitted to be made

by the plaintiff in view of his contract with

I

i

DAMAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIEUS.

IIARYEY v. CONXEC1.'ICUT & P. R. R. CO.
(124: Mass. 421.)
Supreme Judiciul Court of ~Ines11chusetts.
Suffolk. May 25, 1878.
Report from supreme judicial court, Suffolk county; Colt, Judge.
R. D. Smith, for plaintiff. C. T. Russell
and C. T. Russell, Jr., for defendant.

the defendant. To refer to sud.I other contracts, or the profits which might have resulted from them, not within the knowledgeor contemplation of the detemiant, would be
to hold him liable for the consequences, or allow him the benefit, not of bis own contract
with the plaintiff, but of dealings between
the latter and third persons, with which the
defendant had nothing to do."
It, therefore, the rlefendant had received
NNIHCOTT, J. The defendant agreed In the ties tor transportation accorulng to Its
writing with the plaint!!? to transport lum- contract, and failed to deliver them at .all,
ber from certain· stations on the Grand Trunk It would have been liable tor their marRailway, In Canada, to Boston, at a certain ket value In Roston at tltl' time when they
rate of freight, for a period of twelve months should have been delivered; or if it had negfrom August 31, 1871. This agreement con- ligently delayed the delivery, It would hal"e
stituted a continuing olfer, on the part of the hren liable t o r . diminution In their mardefrmlnnt. to transport such lumber as the ket value during the delay. It would not,
lJlulntllT should furnish at the specified points In <>lther event, have been llahle In damages
during the period named, and was binding for loss of profits sustained by the plaintiff
on the defendant whenever, during that time, under his subsequent contracts with other
the plaintiff tendered lumber for transporta- parties; unless It can be said that, by reason
tion according to Its te1 ms; and failure to of the plaintll'f's announcement that be Intransport the lumber afterwards otrered by tended to make such contracts, It was necesthe plaintiff was a breach of the contract. sarlly within the contemplation of the parties
Bornstein v. Lens, 104 Mass. 214.
when they mnde the contract of transportaIt also appeared that the plaintiff Informed tion, and as the probable consequence of Its
the company, at the time, that he desired to breach, that the defendant might be llable
make this contract, because he wished to for damages resulting to the plalntilf from
mnke contracts with other persons to sell his inability to fulfill such contracts, the
and deliver rnllroad tl~s In Boston. He att- terms of which we1·e not and could not then
erwa1·ds made contracts with two railroads be disclosed.
for the delivery of ties In Boston. He notl·
The damages, for which a C81Tier is liable'
fled the defendant for the first time In ~fay upon failure to perform bts contract, are
or Junl', 1872, that he had made such con- those which result from the natural and ortracts. and demanded transportation for a dinary consequences contemplated at the time
portion of these ties to Boston, under bis con- of mal{ing the contract of transportation;
tract. This the defendant failed to do. As and a larger liability can be Imposed upon
the plaint!!? bad made no contracts for the him, only when It ls in the contemplation of.
tlelh·ery of ties In Boston at the time when the parties that the carrier ls to respond, In
the defendant entered Into the agreement to case of breach, for special and exce11tlonal
transport, and no notice was 01· could then damagcit. In such a case, the extent and
have been given of the character and terms character of the obligation be nssume~uld
of those contracts, we are of opinion that the be known to the C81Tler, which In
ee
defendant cannot be held Hable In damages was Impossible, as the contracts we
not
for the profits which would have accrued to then made. The mere knowledge on the pa.rt
the 11lnlntifT under such subsequent contracts. of the defendant, that the Jllalntll'f Intended
Such damages could not have been in the con- to make contracts for the sale of the ties to
temr1latlon of the parties when they made be transported, cannot Impose a liability uptheir contract, as a probable result of a on the defendant for loss of profits on suc!J
hrt>ach of It.
contracts. Whether there would be a loss of
Wht>n a carrier receives goods for trans- profits, It was ot course then Impossible to
portation. and fails to deliver them, the own- determine, and probable profits would be Iner Is entitled to recover the market value ot capable of estimation. 11' the de.fendant Is
the iroocls at the time n.nd place at which they liable In this case for such possible or probshould have been delivered. Spring v. Has-1 able profits, then every carrier who Is InkC'll, 4 Allen, 112. And where the carrier formed, when be takes goods for transportanej?llgentlr delays the delivery of goods, he l tion, that the shipper Intends to sell thC>m.
Is liable for loss In their market Yalue during Is llable, upon failure t<, perform his contra('!.
the delay. Cutting v. Railway Co., 13 .<\lleD, for loss to the shipper In his dealings with
381. It ls said In that case that this "Is the other parties, with which the carrier has
most simple and just rule, as well as the nothing to do, and the result of which 1t Is
easiest to be applied; for It depends on the Impossible for him to anticipate. Scott v.
general market value of the goods, and in- Steamship Co., 106 )lass. 468. This would
volves no question of contingent or specu- be to introduce a new and uncertain element
lative profttfl, and no consideration of any of llablllty Into the contract, and we are not
other contracts made or omitted to be made aware of any authority which 1oea to that
by the plalntll! In view of his conti·act with extent.

C.AURIEUS Oli' GOODS.
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In Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341. the

owners of a mill sent a broken shaft by a

carrier, as a pattern to_ a manufacturer, to

make a new shaft, and at the time informed

the carrier that the mill was stopped, and the

shaft must be delivered immediately. The

carried delayed its delivery for an unreason-

able time, in consequence of which the own-

ers did not receive the new shaft until some

days after they should have received it, and

were unable to work their mill for want of

it, and thereby incurred a loss of proﬁts. But

it was held that such loss could not be re-

covered, on the ground that it could not rea-

sonably be supposed to have been in the con-

templation of the parties t the time they

made the contract, as a pr le result of a

breach of it, that there would be necessarily

a loss of proﬁts.
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In Horne v. Railway Co., L. R. 7 C. I‘. 583,

the plaintiffs were under a contract to sup-

ply a quantity of military shoes at a cer-

tain day, in London, at an unusually high

price. They were delivered to the defendant,

with notice that the plaintiffs were under

a contract to deliver the shoes on that day,

and unless they were so delivered, they would

he thro\vn upon their hands; but no notice

was given of the terms of the contract. The

defendant, a common carrier, failed to deliv-

er them within the time. The plaintiﬂ claim-

In Hauley v. BaxPutlalt'. 9 Exeh. 341. the
uwm•rs or a mill sent a broken shaft by a
carrle1', as a pattern to. n mauu!acture1·, to
make a new shaft, and at the time Informed
the carrier that the mill was stopped, and the
shaft must be delivered Immediately. The
carriPd delayed Its delivery for an unl'easona ble time, In consequence of which the ownPrs did not receiw the new shaft until some
days after they shoul<l have received It, and
were unable to work their mill tor want ot
It, and thereby Incurred a iol!l! of proftts. But
It was held that such los11 eould not be recovered, on the ground that It could not reasonably be supposed to bave been In the contemplation of the parties .1.t . the time they
made the contract, as a pr~le result of a
breach or It, that there would be neces>111rlly
a loss of proftts.
In Horne v. Railway Co., L. R. 7 C. P. ;:;83,
the plulntUfs were under a contract to supply a quantity of mllltary shoes at a <'t'r·
tain day, In London, at an unusually high
price. They were delivered to the defendant,
with notice that the plalntl!Ts were under
a contract to deliver the shoes on that day,
and unless they were so delivered, they would
he thrown upon their hands; but no notice
was given of the terms of the contract. The
defendant, a common carrier, failed to deliver them within the time. The plalntl!T claimed as damages the dUference between the
price at which they had contracted to sell the
shoes, and the price which they ultimately
brought. But It was held that they were
LAW DAM.2d llld.-22

ed as damages the difference between the

price at which they had contracted to sell the

shoes. and the price which they ultimately

brought. But it was held that they were I

LAW DAM.2d Ed.—22

O

not entitled to recover that sum, the daniage

not being the natural consequence of the de-

fendant‘s failure to perform its contract, and

the defendant not having had notice that the

sale was at an exceptional price.

This question has been considered in nu-

merous cases, and it is suﬂicient to say that

the principle upon which Hadley v. Baxen-

dale was decided is now well established.

though some of the dicta of Baron Alderson,

in delivering the judg,ment, have been the

subject of criticism. Horne v. Railway Co.,

L. R. 8 C. P. 131, 133, 141; Gee v. Railway

Co., 6 Hurl. & N. 211; Borries v. Hutchinson.

18 C. B. (N. S.) 4-i5', Railway Co. v. Red-

mayne, L. R. 1 C. P. 329; Wilson v. Dock

Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 177 184, 186; Woodger v.

Railway Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 318; Sawmill Co.

v. Nettleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499; Cory v.

Ironworks Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 181. See. also.

Waters v. Towers. 8 Exch. 401, and Baron

Parke's observation thereon in Hadley v.

Baxendale, 9 Exch. 349.

We are therefore of opinion there was error

in instructing the jury that the pimntif f could

recover damages for loss of proﬁts on his

subsequent contracts. As the ties were not

sent to Boston, the true measure of damages

is the dlfference between the market price in

Boston and the market price in Canada at

the time when the defendant should have

•
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not entitled to recover thnt sum, the dniungt>
not being the natural rousequeuce of the llt>fendnnt's failure to perform Its contraet, mu\
the tlefemlant not having had notice thut tlw
suit! was at nn exceptional price.
This question has been considered In numerous cases, and it Is sufficient to say thn t
the principle upon which Hadley v. BnXl'll·
dale was decided Is now well establlslll'd.
though some of the dicta of Baron Alilerson,
ln dellnrlng the ju<li;ment, have been the
subject of criticism. Horne v. Hallway Co.•
L. R. 8 C. P . 131, 133, 141; Gee v. Railway
Co., 6 Hurl. & N. 211; Borries v. Hutchinson,
18 C. B. (~. S.) 445~ Railway Co. v. Red·
mayne, L. R 1 C. P. 329; Wilson v. Dock
Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 177 184, 186; Wootlger v.
Railway Co., L. H. 2 C. P. 318; Sawmill Co.
v. Nettleshlp, L. R. 3 C. P. 400; Cory v.
Ironworks Co., L . H. 3 Q. B. 181. See, also,
\Vaters v. Towers, 8 Exl'h. 401, and Baron
Parke"s observation thereon In Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Exch. 349.
We are therefore of opinion there wns error
In Instructing the jury that the pl:.. otUf could
recover damages for loss of profits on hl11
subsequent rontrncts. As the ties were not
sent to Roston, the true measure of damage11
ls the dl!Terence between the market price lo
Boston and the IDBrkct price In Canada at
the time when the defendant should have
transported the ties according to Its contract,
deducting therefrom t:ie price stipulated In
the contract for transportation.
Verdict set aside.
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WARD'S CENTHAL & PACIFIC LAKE 00.
v. ELKINS.

DAMAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

WARD'S CE.\"l'RAL & PACIFIC LAKE 0O.

v. ELKINS.

(34 Mich. 439.)

Supreme Court of Michigan.

1876.

Error to superior court of Detroit.

(34 Mich. 439.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. October Term,
1876.
Error to superior court of Detroit.
Moore, Caufield & Warner, for plaintiff In
error. Alfred Russell, for defendant In error.

Moore, Canﬁeld & Warner, for plaintiff in

error. Alfred Russell, for defendant in error.

October Term,

CAMPBELL, J. Elkins recovered dam-

ages against the plaintif f in error for failure

to carry certain salt from Bay City to Chi-

cago in November, 1874. Elkins was a salt

dealer in Chicago, and sued upon an alleged

contract whereby the plaintiff in error was to

carry three cargoes of salt, of about seven-

teen thousand bushels in all, only one of

which was taken. The cargoes were to be

called for from the 15th to the 20th of No-
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vember. The regular business of plaintiff m

error was between Buffalo and Duluth, with

power, as was claimed, to do business else-

where on the lakes.

Elkins gave evidence tending to show that

he could not get vessels to carry the salt

after plaintiffs default. He had it taken by

rail to Chicago in lots as he wanted it, from

January to some time in April, 1875, and

was allowed to recover the difference be-

tween the price agreed on with plaintiff and

what he paid for the transportation by rail.

This is the chief error complained of.

We do not see upon what rule this recov-

ery can be justiﬂed. The damage to which

Elkins was entitled, if any, would be such

as would have placed him in the position he

, would have occupied had the salt been taken

to Chicago by vessel as agreed. It was not

an article of speciﬁc utility for preservation,

but an article of merchandise, and only valu-

able as such. The only advantage he could

have gained by a timely shipment according

to contract would have been the excess of

the value of salt in the Chicago market at '

the date when it should have arrived, be-

yond what it was worth in Bay City and the

expenses of loading, shipment and delivery at

his warehouse in Chicago. If there was no

such excess in value at that time, then he

was not damaged. If there was such an ex-

cess, then he was entitled to that and noth-

ing more.

He would not have been justiﬁed in procur-

ing shipment by rail, if the railroad process

would have rendered it unproﬁtable. There

are, no doubt, cases where property is of

such a nature, or where the necessity of hav-

ing it at a certain point is so imperative. that

the circumstances may justify employing any

transportation which is accessible, and may

render the difference in cost of transporta-

tion a proper measure of damages. But this

can never be proper in regard to ordinary

articles of consumption, always to be found

in the market, and only valuable to the own-

er for their merchantable qualities. A per-

son has no right to put others to an expense

of such a nature as he would not as a rea-

CAMPBELL, J. Elkins recovered damages against the plaintilf ln error for fallure
to carry certain salt from Bay City to Chleago In November, 1874. Elkins was a salt
dealer ln Chicago, and sued upon an alleged
contract whereby the plaintiff In error .was to
earry three cargoes of salt, of about seventeen thousand bushels In all, only one of
which was taken. The cargoes were to be
called for from the 15th to the 20th of November. The regular business of plaintllf m
error was between Buffalo and Duluth, with
power, as was claimed, to do business elsewhere on the lakes.
Elk.lns gave evidence tending to show that
he could not get vessels to carry the salt
after plaintiff's default. He had It taken by
rail to Chicago In lots as he wanted it, from
January to some time In April, 1875, and
was allowed to recover the dlfl'erence between the price agreed on with plaintiff and
what he paid for the transportation by rail.
This ls the chief error complained of.
We do not see upon what rule this recovery can be justified. The damage to which
Elkins was entitled, lf any, would be such
as would have placed him in the position he
would have occupied had the salt been taken
· to Chicago by vessel as agreed. It was not
an a&tlcle ot' specific utility tor preservation,
but an article of merchandise, and only valuable as such. The only advantage he could
have gained by a timely shipment according
to contract would have been the excess of
the value of salt in the Chicago market at
the date when It should have arrived, beyond what lt was worth ln Bay City and the
expenses of loading, shipment and delivery at
his war('house In Chicago. It there was no
such excess ln value at that time, then he
was not damaged. If there w11s such an excesR, then he was entlth•cl to that and nothing more.
He would not have been justified ln procuring shipment by. rall, lf the railroad process
would have rendered it unprofitable. There
arE>, no doubt, cases where property 111 of
such a nature, or where the necessity of hav-

Ing lt at a certain point ls so lmperath·e, that
the circumstances may justify employing any
transportation which le accessible, and may
render the difference In cost of transporta·
tlon a proper measure of damages. But this
can never be proper in regard to ordinary
articles of consumption, always to be found
in the market, and only valuable to the owner for their merchantable qualities. A person has no right to put others to an expense
of such a nature as he would not as a reasonable man Incur on his own account. Le
Ianche v. Railway Co., 1 C. P. Div. 286.
When such a necessity exists, It ls maintained only as a necessity, and allowed becaus(' of Its urgency. It such a rule Is ever
appllcahle. It ca.nnot be satisfied by allowing
a party, instead ot' seeking other means of
car1·lage immediately at band, to await" his
leisure and speculate on future chances and
make shipments piecemeal, as was done here.
It le altogether llkely that after the close
ot navigation, and as the winter goes on,
prices may rise so as to warrant/shipments
by rail, when this would not have been profitable earlier; and It may be possible, after
paying railroad rates, to make as much profit
as lf the salt had been received by steam on
the lakes and put In -market ln the fall at
fall rates. It would be absmd to say that
these deliberate winter shipments were n<'cessltated or justified by a failure to get shipping facilities during the season, or near the
close ot' navigation In November. It would
be equally unjust to allow the owner of th.~
salt to speculate on the chances of a ma1·ket
without risk to himself.
The rule of damages should have been as
previously lndlC'ated, and should ln no case
exceed the damages actually incurred. A
party who has lost nothing by a breach of
contract, ls not entitled to damages of a substantial character.
A
We think there was also error ln "l'ilowing
the statements of a steamboat clerk, who
was not shown to occupy any position of gl'lleral agency, to be received In evidence to
bind the company; and that lmp1·oper qul'stions were allowed, which called for the inferences of a witness rather than the actual
terms of the contract In suit.
But we do not enlarge upon these, as they
arc not likely to arise again. and the main
issue Is upon the question of damages, and
the r('nl terms of the agreement, as nbsolut..
or conditional.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs,
and a new trial granted. The other justices
concurred.

O.AURIEH~
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DEVEREUX v. BUCI§l'.EY et al.

(34 Ohio St. 16.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1877.

Action by J. P. Buckley & C0. against Dev-

ereux, receiver of the Atlantic & Great West-

ern Railroad. A judgment for plaintiff in

the common pleas was atllrmed in the district

court, and defendant moves for leave to ﬂle

a petition in error. Motion overruled.

Durbin Ward, for the motion. Wm. E.

Imes, opposed.

GILMORE, J. The action in the court of

common pleas was not brought upon any ex-

press or special contract, but to recover dam-

ages for a breach of an implied agreement to

carry, and deliver at the place of consign-

ment, a large lot of eggs, within a reasonable

time, by a common carrier.

By falling to answer, the defendant (plain-
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tiff in error) admitted the breach as alleged.

On an inquiry of damages, the court,

against the objection of the defendant, per-

mitted testimony to go to the jury tending

to prove the market value of eggs at the place

of consignment on the day they ought to have

been delivered. and their value at that place

on the day they were actually delivered, and

that their value was less on the latter than

on the former day.

Counsel for the plaintiff in error contends

that the court erred-in admitting this testi-

mony to go to the jury, on the ground that

the defendant "is only bound to make good

the loss which is the natural and legitimate

result of his failure to comply with his con-

tract"; and that a loss arising from a depre-

ciation in the market value of eggs at the

place of delivery, in consequence of his

breach of the contract, is not a natural or

legitimate result of such breach.

In support of this proposition, counsel relies

very much upon the leading English case of

Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341. The rule

laid down in that case for the ascertainmen

of damages in cases of breach of contract i

divided into two alternative heads. Undeii

the ﬁrst of these. damages are to be allowedi

which would arise naturally, or according to‘

the usual course of things from the breach

of the contract; and, under the second, those

which may fairly be supposed to have been

contemplated by the parties as the probable

result of such breach.

The case before that court fell under the

ﬁrst of these heads, as will appear from the

following language, taken from the opinion:

“Now, in the present case, if we are to apply

the principles above laid down, we ﬁnd that

the only circumstances here communicated 1

by the plaintiffs to the defendants, at the .

time the contract was made. were that the ar-

ticie to be carried was the broken shaft of a

mill, and that the plaintlffs were the miiiers

of that mill. But how do these circumstan-

ces show reasonably that the proﬁts of the

mill must be stopped by an unreasonable de-

lay in the delivery of the broken shaft by the

carrier to the third person?"
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ces show reasonably that the profits of the
mill must be stopped by an unreasonable de(34 Ohio St. 16.)
lay In the delivery ot the broken· shaft by the
Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1877.
carrier to the third person?"
And the rourt was ot the opinion that, unAction by J. P. Buckley & Co. against Devder
those circumstances, the profl.ts or the
a'eUX. receiver of the Atlantic & Great Westmill, which were lost In consequence of the
~m Ra.llroad. A judgment for plaintiff In
the common pleas was aJDrmed In the district breach of the contract to deliver the broken
court. and defendant mo\·es for leave to file shaft, which was to be used as a pattern tor
a new one, within a reasonable time, did not
a petition In error. :Motion overruled.
constitute such damnges as would arise nat·
Durbin Ward, for the motion. Wm. E. urally, or according to the usual course of
Imes, opposed.
things, from the breach of the contract.
But we do not think that the facts and cir·
GILMORE, J. The action In the court ot cumstnnces of the case before us bring It
rommon pleas was not brought upon any e."{- under the first. but on the contrary, for reapress or special contract, but to recover dam- sons that will be stated below, we think It
ages for a breach of an Implied agret>ment to clearly falls under the second, of the alteruacarry, and deliver at the pince of consign- th-e heads In Hadley v. Baxendale, null that
ment, a large lot of eggs, within a reasonable the plalntllls were entitled to reco\'er such
time, by a common carrier.
damages as may reasonably be supposed to
By falling to answer, the defendant (plnln- have been In the contemplation of the parties
tltr In error) admitted the breach as alleged. at the time they made the contract, n.s the
On an Inquiry of damages, the court, probable result of the breach or It.
Jtgalnst the objection or the defendant, perThe proposition, as thus stated, Is fully
mitted testimony to go to the jury tending sustained by an abundance of authority.
to prove the market value of eggs at the place Ward v. Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 29; Scott v.
-of consignment on the day they ought to have Steamship Co., 106 Mass. 468; Sedg. D!lm.
been delivered, and their value at that place !6th Ed.) iD; Id. note, 81; Field, Dam. § 3;;;;
on the day they were actually delivered, nod Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 480; Cutting v.
that their value was less on the latter than Railway Co., 13 Allen, 381.
on the former day.
In view of the doctrine as settled by these
Counsel tor the plaintiff In error contends authorities, It may be safely said that if a
that the court erred -In admitting this testi- common <>arrier Is chnrgeaule with knowledge
mony to go to the jury, on the ground that that the article carried Is Intended for the
the defendant "ls 011ly bound to make good market, and unreal\()nably delnys_lts delivery,
the loss which Is the natural and legitimate and there Is a depreciation In the market valresult of his failure to comply with his con- ue of the article at the place of consignment,
tract"; and that a loss arising from a depre- between the time It ought to have been delivciation In the market value of eggs at the ered anct the time It was In fact delivered,
place of delivery, In consequence of his such clepreclatlon will, In the absence of any
breach of the coqtract, Is not a natural or special contract, constitute the measure of
legitimate result of such breach.
damages.
In support or this proposition, counsel relies
Was the carrier chargeable with such novery much upon the leading F:ngllsb case of tice In this case? We think he was. The
Hadley v. Ba..xendale, 9 Exch. 341. The rule anxiety of the plalntUrs to obtain quick time
laid down In that case for the ascertalnmen~ on their shipments of eggs, which was comof damages In cases of breach of contract 14 municated to the defendants' agent, shows
dlvldecl Into two alternative bends. Unde!\ that, for some reason, they regarded "time"
the first of these, damages are to be allowed\ as an Important element In the shipments.
which would arise naturally, or according to· The agrnt, for some reason, apprecl:lll'<l th~
the usual course of things from the breach necl.'sslty tor quick time In the contf.'rnplnte<i
of the contract; and, undt>r the second, those shipments; numed a time within which ht•
which may fairly be supJ>OS!'d to have been could carry the eggs over bis part· of the
contemplated by the parties ns the prohnble route, and requested to be k!'pt ath•lsed by
result of such brench.
telegraph, so that he mil!:ht give the eggs his
The case before that court fell under the special attention when tlwy 1·e1whed the point
first of these headi<, ns will nppC'ar from the at which he was tci recein• tlwm. Why this
following languagt•, taken from th(' opinion: preconcN·tt·<l nrr:111i::rml•nt? With the lmowl··xow, In the present case, It we are to npply edgl' of uusl11n•s. whl<·h their n\'o('ntlo11>< mn~t
the prln<>lples above laid down, we find that have put them In po!!s~ssion of. both partlt>s
the only clrcmnstHnces here <>ommunlcated knPw that when large quantities of eggs
hy U1e plaintiffs to the defendnnts, at the were b!'lng shipped to a great city. tht•y
time the contract was ma<lr, were that the ar- were usually, If not always, inten<IP<l for the
ticle to be carried was the broken shaft of a market at such city. And the rc•nson wily
mill, and that the plnintlfTs were the m!llers both pnrtl<'s reeognliwd th<' 111•c·N•slty of' quiclt
of that mlll. But how do the11e clrcumstan- time In tht:l trnnsportntiou of. the article, was
DEVEREUX

CARRIERS OF GOODS.

OJ.<' Goons.

T.

BUCKLEY et al
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that they undoubtedly knew that in this

country the market value of eggs was liable

to decline at the season of the year in which

the shipment was made in this case, and the

damages consequent upon such a decline

must have been in the contemplation of both

parties at the time the contract was made.
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Motion overruled.

DA1UGI<JS IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

that they undoubtedly knew that ln this
country the. market value of eggs was liable
to decline at the season of the year In which
the shipment was made lD this case, and the

damages consequent upon such a decline
must have been In the contemplation of both
parties at the time the contract was made.
Motion overruled.

CAHHIEHl".I 01'' t:OOIJS.
CARRIE RS OF GOODS.

llcGRJ<..'GOR et al.

1'.

KILGORE.

(6 Ohio, :w9.)
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McGREGOR et al. v. KILGORE.

(6 Ohio, 37t9.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1834.

This cause was adjourned in Hamilton

county. It came before the court upon a

special verdict. The action was case upon

a bill of iading, dated July 5, 1832, for cer-

tain parcels of merchandise consigned to the

plaintiffs, shipped on board the steamboat

Chesapeake, to be delivered at Cincinnati in

good order (the danger of the river alone

excepted); “but in case of the water not

admitting the boat to proceed to Louisville,

the owners of the goods to pay the expense

of reshipping to that place from the point

where they are reshipped, and the captain

agrees they shall be forwarded without any

delay." Breach, that through the careless-

ness and negligence of the defendant, the
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goods were lost.

Plea, not guilty; notice that the low water

would not permit the boat to go up to Louis-

ville, and, therefore, the goods were landed

at Trinity, near the mouth of the Ohio, and

were injured after they were so landed. The

jury returned a special verdict, ﬁnding:

(1) The execution of the bill of lading, the

shipment of a cask of cutlery to be delivered

in Cincinnati according to the bill of lading,

and the delivery of the cask in an injured

state at Cincinnati.

(2) That the amount of the injury upon the

sterling cost and insurance is $419.24: the

amount exclusive of insurance, $389.24; the

amount, adding sixty per cent. to the ster-

ling cost, $622.78; the amount, predicated on

the value at Cincinnati, and the proceeds of

sale, $789.58.

(3) That the said cask of cutlery was land-

ed at Trinity, at the mouth of the Ohio. and

left in charge of the defendant,—the boat

having returned to New Orleans,—was pla-

ced under a temporary hed erected for the

purpose, near the river, and several days

afterward, while the boat hands were at-

tempting to remove it to another place of de-

posit adjoining, the cask, being large and

heavy, slipped away from the workmen, and

rolled into the Ohio river, and damaged the

goods by the wetting.

And if upon these facts the court is of

opinion the law arising is with the plaintiffs,

they ﬁnd the defendant guilty, and assess

the plaintiffs‘ damages to the amount of

either of the sums returned, which in law

is the true rule of damages, with interest to

be counted and added as in law is right. But

if the court shall be of the opinion that, upon

the facts there is no legal right in the plain-

tiff to recover, then the jury ﬁnd the defend-

ant not guilty.

It was a conceded matter at the trial that

the goods were landed because the water in

the Ohio river was too low for the Chesa-

peake to ascend to Louisville.

After the goods were landed at Trinity, the

defendant wrote to the plaintiffs notifying

them of the fact, and asking advice as to

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. Term, 1834.

This cause was adjourned In Hamilton
eounty. It came before the court upon a
special verdict. The action was case upon
a bill of lading, dated July 5, 1832, for certain parcels of merchandise consigned to the
plaintiffs, shipped on board the steamboat
Chesapeake, to be dellvered at Cincinnati In
good order (the danger of the river alone
excepted); "but In case of the water not
admitting the boat to proceed to Louisville,
the owners or the goods to pay the expense
or reshipping to that place from the point
where they are reshipped, and the captain
agrees they shall be forwarded without any
delay." Breach, that through tlw earelp,;suess and nPgllgeoce or the drft>ndant, the
goods were lost.
Plea. not guilty; notke that the low water
would not permit the boat to :.:o up to Louisvllle, and, therefore, the guutls were landed
at Trinity, near the mouth of the Ohio, and
were Injured after they were so landed. The
jury returned a special verdict, finding:
(1) The execution or the blll of lading, the
$hlpwent of a cask of cutlery to be delivered
In Cincinnati according to the bill of lading,
and the delivery of the cask In an Injured
state at Cincinnati.
(2) That the amount of the Injury upon the
sterllng cost and Insurance ls $4HJ.24: the
amount exclusive or Insurance, $38!).2-l; the
Jlmount, adding sixty per cent. to the sterling cost, $622.iS; the amount, predicated on
the value at Cincinnati, and the proceeds or
sale, $i89.58.
(3) That the said cask of cutlery was landffi at Trinity, at the mouth of the Ohio, and
left In charge of the defendant,-the boat
having returned to New Orleans,-was pla<:ed under a temporary shed erected for the
purpose, near the river, and several days
afterward, while the boat hands were attempting to remove It to another place of deposit adjoining, the cask, being large and
heavy, sllpped away from the workmen, and
rolled Into the Ohio river, and damaged the
goods by the wetting.
And It upon these rncts the court Is or
-opinion the law arising Is with the plaintiffs,
they flnd the defendant guilty, aml assl'ss
1he plaintiffs' damages to the amount or
either or the sums returned, which In law
Is the true rule of damages, with Interest to
be counted and added as In law is right. But
It the court shall be of the opinion that, upon
the facts there Is no legal right In the plaintiff to recover, then the jury find the defendant not gullty.
It wns a eonceded matter at the trial that
the goods were landed hecause the water In
the Ohio rh·er was too low for the Chesapf'ake to ascend to Louisville.
Arter the goods were lauded at Trinity, the
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defendant wrote to the plaintiffs notifying
them of the fact, and asking advice as to
the shipment up. The following answer was
sent to the letter:
"Cincinnati, August 14, 1832.
"Capt. Kiigore-Dear Sir: Your favor of
the - - Instant, came duly to hand. You
wish to know if you shall forward our
freight to Louisville at fifty cents per one
hundred pounds.
"We do not wish It sent at euch a high
freight. There ls now a rise of water which
will enable any of the common boats to get
to Loulsvllle with considerable freight on
board. Our loading ls of such a heavy nature as wlll not allow the present high rates
of freight. You wlll plrnse to send It up as
soon as you think tl1e frdght ls at as low
a rate as It will be at before the fall risesay, twenty or twenty-five cents per one hundred pounds to Louisville. We are not very
much In want of It. We hope there Is no
additional expense accrued at Trinity on the
goods.
""·e understand there was some of our
freight sent to Loulsvllle some tlmt~ ago; s:ty,
when the Chesapeake arrived last. We have
not yet received It, nor have we heard from
It. We hope, however, that the present rise
or water wlll ~nable you to forward all the
freight at fair prices. You will please engage It all the way to Cincinnati If you can.
"Respectfully, your most obedient servants.
"J. McGregor & Co."
B. Storer, tor plaintiffs.
defendant.

E. S. Haines, for

WRIGHT, J . It was not contended on the
trial before the jury, nor Is It now Insisted,
but the water In the Ohio river was so low
when the Chesapeake arrived at Its mouth
as nat to admit or her proceeding to Louisville. There was no dispute then, nor Is
there any now, that the letter In evidence
was written by the plaintiffs to the defendant, and received by him at Trinity after
the goods were landed there. I therefore
take these two tacts as a part or this case,
though not Included In the finding or the
jury.
The bill of lading was a contract to carry
from New Orleans to Cincinnati, and deliver
to the plaintiffs there In good order, with prlvllege to the carrier In the case of low water to
reship for Louisville In some other craft. aml
charge the lncrensed · expense or such reshipment to the consignee. The first point presented, It appears to us, Is, did the lanrllng of
these goods at Trinity In order for their reshipment, put an end to the defendant's connection with them as carrier under the contract, and convert him Into a warehouse keeper and forwarder? There seems no necessity
for Inquiring Into the custom of the river
when goods are tran~shipped, to land and
11roteet them by temporary warehouses, If
none other can be hnu, until a suitable craft
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arrive to take the lading up the river. The

bill of luding gave the carrier the privilege of

forwarding the goods on other craft than that

in which they were shipped in one event, and

it seems to us the right to land may be con-

ceded as incident to the shipment without at

all affecting the questions before the court.

It was but a privilege to the carrier, in the

execution of his contract to convey and de-

liver, inserted for his own beneﬁt, to secure

him the advantage of as great a portion of the

freight as he could earn, and to throw upon

the owner any increase of expense. The re-

lation of carrier continues from the shipment

of the goods until their arrival at their des-

tined port and delivery, unless that relation

has been interrupted by some act of the owner

or consignee. In that possible view of the

case the letter alluded to was read in evi-
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dence. It is now claimed that that letter con-

stituted the defendant the agent of the plain-

tiffs, and put an end to his duties as carrier.

There is nothing in the case, and there was no

evidence on the trial, to show that this letter

was received by the defendant before the

accident to the goods. If, therefore, the re-

ceipt of the letter was admitted to affect what

the defendant urges, a state of things is not

shown in this case in which the letter can

bear upon the injury. The utmost that could

he claimed for this letter, if received before

the jury, would be to exonerate the carrier

from injury while the goods were detained,

under the letter, for lower rates of freight.

It cannot reach back to inﬂuence an injury

which the goods received immediately after

they were landed, and before the letter was

received, or perhaps written. The defendant

had these goods, as carrier, when they were

injured, and is subject to the law of carriers.

“A common carrier warrants the safe de-

livery of goods in all but the excepted cases

of the act of God and public enemies." Ei-

liott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 7. A carrier, in

-taking freight, is bound to use sound and

proper hands and machinery for lading and

unlading. and the safe handling and removing

the goods; and if loss ensue from the failure

in any particular, the carrier must bear it.

Abb. Shipp. 259; 1 Wiis. 282: 1 Doug. 278.

The injury in this case resulted from the want

of machinery to remove heavy articles, or the

he hands employed.

It remains, then, only to inquire into the

proper rule of damages in the case. The goods

carelessness, inattention, or want of strengtl.i{:vith interest.

were delivered at Cincinnati in an injured con- i

, bash,

dition. The carrier earned full freight for their

transportation. It would seem to be the die-

tate of natural justice that the person liable

for their safe delivery should make good to

the owner the injury they sustained while

under his care and control. The owner was

entitled to the goods at Cincinnati in their

perfect state. But for the act of the de-

fendant he would have had them in that con-

dition. The carrier, in case he deliver the
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arrive to take the lading up the river. The
hill of lulling gave the carrier the privilege of
forwarding the goods on other craft than that
In which they were shipped In one event, and
1t seems to us the right to land may be conceded as Incident to the shipment without at
all all'ectlng the questions before the court.
It was but a privilege to the carrier, In the
execution of his contract to convey and deliver, Inserted for his own benefit, to secure
him the advantage of as great a portion of the
freight as he could earn, and to throw upon
the owner any Increase of expense. The relation of carrier continues from the shipment
of the goods untll their arrival at their destined port and delivery, unless that relation
has been Interrupted by some act of the owner
or consignee. In that possible view of the
case the letter alluded to was read In evl·
dence. It Is now claimed that that letter constituted the defendant the agent of the plaintiffs, and put an end to his duties as carrier.
There Is nothing In the case, and there was no
evidence on the trial, to show that this letter
was received by the defendant before the
accident to the goods. It, therefore, the receipt of the letter was admitted to atrect what
the defendant urges, a state of things Is not
shown In this case In which the letter can
bear upon the Injury. The utmost that could
be claimed for this letter, If received before
the jury, would be to exonerate the carrier
from Injury while the goods were detained,
under the letter, for lower rates of freight.
It caunot reach back to lufiuence an Injury
which the goods received Immediately after
they were landed, and before the letter was
receh·ed, or perhaps written. The defendant
had these goods, as carrier, when they were
Injured, and Is subject to the law of carriers.
"A common carrier. warrants the s:1te delivery of goods in all but the excepted cases
of the act of God and public enawles." Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 7. A carrier, In
·taking freight, Is bound to use sound aud
proper hands and machinery for lading and
unladlng, and the safe handling and removing
the goods; and I! loss ensue from the failure
In any particular, the carrier must bear It.
.Abb. Shipp. 200; 1 Wlls. 282; 1 Doug. 278.
The Injury In this case resulted from the want
of machinery to remove heavy articles, or the
carelessness, Inattention, or want of strength
1W"'tbe hands employC>d.
/It remains, then, only to Inquire Into the
proper rule of damages In the case. The goods
were delivered at Clnc-lnnatl In an Injured con-

dltlon. The carrier earned full freight for thell"'
transportation. It would seem to be the dictate of natural justice that the person liable
for their safe delivery should make good to
the owner the Injury they sustained while
under bis care and control. The owner waK
entitled to the goods at Olnclnnatl In thelrpertect state. But for the act of the defendant be would have bad them In that condition. The carrier, In case he deliver the
goods at the port of delivery, earns, and Is entitled to demand full freights, notwithstanding they have been partially Injured, and the
consignee must look to his bill of lading forlndemnlty. In New York the rule Is established that the measure of damage Is the
value of the goods at the· port of delivery.
Amory v. McGregor, 15 Johns. 38; Bracket
v. McNalr, 14 Johns. 171. 'l'he supreme court
of Pennsylvania, upon full eXll.Illlnatlon, held
It best to remove from the carrier all temptations to fraud, and that was best done by
making blm liable for the value of goods lost
at the place of delivery, and established that
as the rule of damages In such cases. founded
upon authority, general convenlenc.-e, ancl good
policy. Gillingham v. D<'mpst>y, 12 Serg. &
R. 186. These authorities are not shaken by
those· cited by the defendant. We think this
Is obviously the rule of law sud justice. The
jury have returned two valuations looking to
this point:
(1) The value, adding sixty per cent. to the
sterling cost, as the u1mal mercantile estlmat~
In Cincinnati, to cover the charges, freight.
and Insurance from Liverpool.
•(2) The actual value of the gooda In Cincinnati, deducting therefrom the proceeds of
the goods, sold In their Injured condition.
Which of these furnishes the rule of damages ls the question? The first Is the usual
mode of ascertaining the net cost of such
goods In Cincinnati. In the absence of other evidence, that w.ould be taken as the ¥alu<'
of the goods. Bnt when the actual value Is
found, the supposed or presumed value
yields. That Is the case here, the jury have
assessed the damages, as predicated on the
actual, as well as the supposed value, the
actual value measures the real Injury, and i~
the rule of damage.
Judgment for the plalntltr for that sum.
with Interest.
XOTE.

See, also, Hadley ,.. Baxendale, ank,

Bagley & \V. Mfg. Co. v. Wabn;;h, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 1111h>. 149; anti
Mather v. F..xpress Oo., ante, 135.
ltl: '11H>mas,

!
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BUOWX et me. v. CHICAGO, ll. & ST. P.
.
It\". co.
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(11 N. W. 366. 911, 54 Wis. 342.)
BROVVN et ux. v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P.

RY. CO.

(11 N. W. 356. 911, 54 Wis. 342.)

Jan. 10, 1882.

Appeal from circuit court. Juneau county.

l"u1m·me Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 10, 1882.

Appeal from circuit court. Juneau county.
D.S. Wegg, for appellant. J. W. Lusk, for
respouden ts.

D. S. Wegg, for appellant. J. W. Lusk, for

respondents.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

TAYLOR, J. The cause of action in this

case will be best stated by giving a copy of

the complaint, which sets forth fully the

facts upon which a recovery is sought. After

tating the incorporation of the defendant,

and alleging that it was a common carrier of

passengers in this state, it proceeds as fol-

lows: “That said plaintiffs, on or about the

second day of October, 1879, desired to go to

Mauston, aforesaid, from the said village of

Kiibourn City, and for that purpose bought
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and paid about $2.30 for tickets at Kiibourn

City, from the agent of said defendant. to

convey said plaintiffs to Mauston and return

to Kiibourn City, whereby it became the duty

of said defendants. as carriers of passengers,

to carry the said plaintiffs from Kiibourn

City to Mauston in their passenger train

which left Kiibourn City to go to .\Iauston

at about 6:20 p. m. of said day, and to treat

said plaintiffs in a respectful manner, and

carry them to the proper and usual landing

place at Mauston, to wit, the depot of said

defendant at said place. That the said de-

fendant wholly disregarded its said duty in

the premises, and its contract and obliga-

tions to and with said plaintiffs, and, when

about three miles east of the depot of the de-

fendant at the said village of Mauston, in-

formed said plaintiffs. by its proper agents

and servants, that they had arrived at Maus-

ton, aforesaid, and stopped the train for

them to get off. That said plaintiffs, sup-

posing and believing they had arrived at

Maustaon, as they were informed they had by

the defendant‘s servants, as aforesaid, alight-

ed from the defendant's train, and the said

train passed on. That after said train had

left them they perceived that they were not

at the Mansion depot, and did not know

where they were. That it was quite dark.

That they supposed and believed that they

were near the Mauston depot, and proceeded

up the track in the direction of Mauston. as

they supposed, expecting in a few moments

to arrive at the .\Iauston depot. That, in-

stead of being near the \Iauston depot, they

found afterwards they were not, but, on the

contrary, had been carelessly and negligently

put off the defendant's train by its servants

about three miles east of said depot, appar-

ently in the country; and the plaintiffs knew

not otherwise, but supposed and believed that

they had got to walk west on the track of the

defendant until they came to some station.

After walking on the track of the defendant

about three miles they came to the said vil-

lage of Mauston; the said plaintiff .\Iary A.

Brown being, by reason of said long walk,

very tired and exhausted, sick and prostrated,

TAYLOR, J. The cause of action In this
cttse will be best stated by glYlng a copy of
the complaint, which sets forth fully tile
facts upon which a recovery Is sought. After
stating the Incorporation of the defenuunt,
and allt>glng that It was a common carrier of
passengers In this state, It proceeds as folloV1'1!: "That said. plaintiffs, on or about the
second day of Octooor, 1879, desired to go to
Mauston, aforesaid, from the said vlllage of
Kilbourn City, and for that purpose bought
and paid about ,2.30 for tickets at Kilbourn
City, from the agent of said defendant, to
convey said plalntUrs to Mauston and return
to Kilbourn City, whereby It became the duty
of said defendants, as carriers or passengers,
to carry the said plalntllfs from Kilbourn
City to Mauston In their passenger train
which left Kilbourn City to go to Mauston
at about 6:20 p. m. of said day, and to treat
ll&ld plaintiffs In a respectful manner, and
carry them to the proper and usual landing
place at Mauston, to wit, the depot of said
defendant at said place. That the said defendant wholly disregarded Its said duty In
the premises, and Its contract and obligations to and with said plalnWfs, and, when
about three miles east of the depot of the defendant at the said village of Mauston, Informed said plalntUTs, by Its proper agents
and servants, that they had arrived at Mauston. aforesaid, and stopped the train for
them to get otr. That said plaintiffs, supposing and believing they had arrived at
llauston. as they were Informed they had by
the defendant's servants, as aforesaid, alig... ted from the defendant's train, and the said
train passed on. That after said train had
left them they perceived that they were not
at the Mauston depot, and did not know
where they were. That It wu quite dark.
That they supposed and believed that they
were near the Mauston depot, and proceeded
up the track In the direction of Mauston, as
they supposed, expecting In a few moments
to arrive at the Mauston depot. That, Instead of being near the Mauston depot, they
found afterwards they were not, but, on the
contrary, had been carelessly and negligently
put otr the defendant's train by Its servants
about three miles east of said depot, apparently In the country; and the plaintiffs knew
not otherwise, but supposed and believed that
they bad got to walk west on the tra<'k of the
defendant untll they came to some station.
After walking on the track of the defendant
about three miles they came to the said "11lage of Mauston; the said plalntltr Mary A.

P.A~SENGEHS.

Brown being, by reason of said long walk,
very tired and exhausted, sick and prostrated,
1m!!11lng the balance of the night In a very
reMtlt'SS, uneasy, and feverish condition.
That previous to the said second day of Ut·tooor, 1879, and leaving Kilbourn City, as
aforesaid, the said plaintiff Mary A. Brown
had been a healthy, well, and robust person,
and at the time of taking said walk was
pregnant with child. That In conset1uence
of being carelessly and negligently put on: tha
cars of the defendant. as aforesuld, and her
said walk, she became sick, ailing, and very
much enfeebled, and continued getting worse,
although using the best of care and medical
attendance, until about December 20, 1879,
when she lost her child. That for a long
time the said plaintiff l\lary A. Brown was
seriously and dangerously 111, so much so that
her llfe WRB greatly endangered and despaired of, and she suffered, had suffered,
continued to suffer, great pain In body and
mind; and the said plaintiff Orange Brown,
her husband, sutrered personally great anxiety of mind, and w11s put to great expense
and trouble In care, mm1lng, help, and medical atternlnnce nnd mi>ll.lclnes."
·
The defendant's answer was a general denial only. In the court below the plalntltrs
recovered, amonr other things, for the alleged Injury to lira. Brown.
Upon this appeal the learned counsel for
the railway company Insist that the damages
claimed for the sickness of the wife, and for
her medical attendance and care, are too remote to constitute a cause of action, and that
It was error on the part of the court below
not to take that part of the case from the
jury.

The first position taken by the learned
counsel for the appellant Is that the cause of
action set out In the plaintiffs' complaint Is
for a breach of contract, and not an action
In tort. Upon this point we cannot agree
with the appellant. We think the gravamen
of the action Is the negligence and carelessness of the appellant's agents and employ(\s
In directing the plaintiffs to leave the train
before they had arrived at the end of their
journey. They did not leave at a place short
of their destination knowing that fact, but
through the neglect of the appellant's employt'!s they were Induced to leave the train
short of their journey's end, supposing that
they had reached It. It ts true, the plalntilfs
In their complaint state that they paid their
fare and went on board the train as passengers, to be carried from one point to another
upon the appellant's road, and that by reason
of suth payment and entry upon that train It
became the duty of the appellant to carry
them from the point of starting to their destination. These facts are, perhaps, sufficient
to constitute a contract on the part of the
appellant to safely carry them to their destination. Still, It Is ne<'<'SSal'y In all actions
against a carrier of passengers to state fa cts
which show the right of the party to be car-
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ried before he can complain of any breach of

duty on the part of the carrier in not convey-

ing them safely, or in not carrying them to

their destination. The complaint in this case

is not so much that the plaintiffs were not

carried to their destination, but that on the

way the appellant's employes carelessly and

negligently induced them to quit the train

before they arrived at their destination, and

that in consequence of such wrong on the

part of the appellants they suffered damage.

It is the negligence in puttingthe plaintiffs

oii the train before the journey was com-

pleted which is complained of, and not a

breach of the contract for not carrying them

to the end of their journey.

We see no reason for distinguishing this

case from the class of cases which hold a

railway company liable in tort for an injury
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done to a passenger, while traveling on a

train. caused by collision, the breaking down

of a bridge, or from any defect in the road

or cars. All these matters are a breach of

the contract to carry the passenger safely,

yet the carrier is held liable, in an action of

tort, for any injury sustained, based upon the

allegation that it was incurred through the

carelessness and negligence of the company.

All the cases hold that the person injured

through the negligence or carelessness of the

carrier may proceed either upon contract, al-

leging the careless or negligent acts of the

defendant as a breach of the contract, or he

may proceed in tort, making the carelessness

and negligence of the company the ground of

his right of recovery; and if he proceed for

the tort it becomes necessary on the part

of the plaintiff to show that he stands in the

relation of a passenger of the carrier, in or-

der to show his right to recover damages for

the negligence of the carrier in not dischar-

ging his duty in carrying him safely. Where

the relation of passenger and carrier exists,

the law ﬁxes the duty of the carrier towards

the passenger, and any violation of that duty

is a wrong; and if injury occurs to the pas-

senger from such wrong, the carrier is respon-

sible and must make good the damage result-

ing therefrom,. Wood v. Railway Co., 32 Wis.

398; Walsh v. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23;

Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657-675, and

cases cited. In this case we deem it material

to determine whether the action is an action

for a tort,-or an action for a breach of the

contract to carry the plaintiffs to their desti-

nation, because we think the rules of dam-

ages in the two actions are essentially differ-

ent. We hold that the action in this case is

based upon the tor_t of the defendant in neg-

ligently and carelessly directing the plain-

tiffs to leave the cars before they reached

their destination.

The plaintiffs claim. and the evidence

shows, that they and their child, about seven

years old, were directed to leave the cars, by

the brakeman. at a place some three miles

east of .\lauston, being told at the time that

it was Mauston, their place of destination.
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rled before he can complain of any breach of
tluty on the part of the carrier in not conveying them safely, or ln not carrying them to
their destination. '.rhe complaint ln this case
Is not so much that the plalntllfs were not
carried to their destination, but that on the
way the appellant's employl's carelessly and
negligently Induced them to quit the train
before they arrived at their destlnlltlan, and
that In consequence of such wrong on the
part of the appellants they suffered damage.
It ls the negllgence in putting _the plaintiffs
otr the train before the journey was completed which ls complained of, and not a
breach of the contract tor not carrying them
to the end of their journey.
·we see no reason for distinguishing this
case from the class of cases which hold a
rallway company liable ln tort for an Injury
done to a passenger, while traveling on a
train, caused by collision, the breaking down
of a bridge, or from any defect ln the rond
or cars. All these matters are a brP1teh of
the contract to carry the p11!1,.:rnger snfely,
yet the carrier Is held llnhle, In 11u netlon of
tort. for any injury sustained, bns:•d upon the
allegation that It was lncurre<l through the
~relt•sRne!ls aud negligence of the company.
All tht> cnses hold that the person Injured
through the negligence or carelessness of the
carrier may proceed either upon contract, alleging the careless or negligent nets of the
defendant as a breach of the contract, or he
may proceed In tort, making the carelessness
and nt>gllgence of the company the ground of
bis right of recove1·y; and If he proceed for
the tort It becomes necessary on the part
of the plaintllf to show thnt he stnnds In the
rt>latlon of a passenger of the earrler, In ordC'r to show bis right to re<'Over tlnnmges for
the negligence of the cnrrl<'r In not discharging his rlnty In cqrrylng him snfel)·. ""here
the relation of pas11enger ntul c•a1·rlpr exists,
the law fixe~ the duty of the carrie1· towards
the passenger, and any violation of that duty
Is a. wrong; and If Injury occurs to the passenger from such wrong, the carrier Is responsible and must make good the damage resulting therefrom. Wood v. Railway Co., 32 Wis.
398; Walsh v. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23;
Craker v. Rallway Co., 36 Wis. 657--675, and
cases cited. In this case we dl'em It material
to determine whether the aC'tlon is an action
tor a tort, -or an action tor a breach of the
con trill't to carry the plalntllfs to their destlnn tlon, lll'cause we think the rules of damages In the two actions are essentially dUTert•n t. We hold that the action In this case ls
hnst>d upon the to1:t of the 1lefendant In neg·
ll)!i>lltly aml carl'h•1111ly direl'tlng the plain·
tltl's to leave the eurs bt>fore they renched
thC'lr desthmtlon.
'l'he plniutltrs clnlm, nnd the evluence
shows, th11t they aud tlwir child, about seven
Y<'llrB ohl. were 1llrt•l'tt-'1I to IP11ve the cnrs, by
the brnkC'Inlln, Rt ll )lllll' I' l>Olne three miles
t•ast of lluuston, lwlng told at the time that
It was :Mauston, tlwh' pince of destination.

When they Jett the care It Wll.S night; It wns
cloudy, and bad rained the day before; that
there was a. freight train stnndlng on a side
track where they were put otr the train; no
platform, and no lights visible except thoet.>
on the freight train; that plalntllTs soon asc<'rtalnl'd that they were not at Mauston, and
uld not know where they were. They did
not see the station-house, although there was
one, but It was hid from their view by the
freight train standing on the side track. They
supposed they were at a pince two miles east,
where the train sometimes stopped, but where
there was no station-house. They started
west on the track towards :Mauston, expecting to find a house where they might stop,
but did not find one until they came to the
bridge. about a mile east of Mauston, and
then tlH•y thought It easier to go on to Mauston tlmn 8eek shelter at tbe house, which wns
a considerable distance from the track. They
Wl'nt on to llamrton and arrived there late at
nlirht. Mrs. Brown quite exhausted from the
walk. She was pregnant at the time. She
hacl severe pains during the night, and the
pains continued from time to time, and after
a few days she commenced ftowlng. The
pains and flowing continued until some time
In December, when a miscarriage took pince,
after which Inflammation set In, and for some
time she was so sick that she was In lmml·
nent danger of dying. The plnlntllfs cL'llm
that the miscarriage and subsequent sickness
were all caused by the walk Mrs. Brown was
compelled to take to get from the place where
they were left by the train to Mauston.
The Important question In the case Ill
whether the appellant ls liable for the injury
to Mrs. Brown, admitting that It was caused
by her walk to :Mauston. Whether the slcknel!s of Mrs. Brown W8.8 caused by the walk
to Mauston was an IBBue In the case, and the
jury ha'"e found upon the evidence that It
was caused by the walk. There ls certainly
some evidence to sustain this finding of the
jury, and their flnding ls, therefore, conclusive upon this point. Admitting that the
walk caused the miscarriage and sickness of
the plnlntllf Mrs. Brown, It Is Insisted by the
learned counsel for tbe appellant that the
appellant 18 not liable for such Injury: that
It le too remote to be the subject of an aetlon; that the negligence and carelessness of
the defendant's employ~ In putting the plain·
titre olf the cars at the place they did was
not tbe proximate cause of the miscarriage
and sickness, and for that reason the appel·
lant company Is not liable therefor.
To sustain tllls position of the lenl'lll'd counsel for the appellant reliance ls pla<'etl upon
the case of' Walsh v. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23,
and It ls lnsl11ted that there can be no rt>al
distinction mnde behnen that case and this.
Upon a careful ex11mhllltlon of that case It
will be seen, we think, the court did distinguish between an action which was purely
an action for a l>rench of contract and on<' In
tort. In that case the learned circuit judge
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charged the jury as follows: "If you ﬁnd that

the failure to return to Madison on the day

in question, at the time agreed upon in the

contract, was caused directly by orders from

the headquarters and principal manager of

the railway company, made with the full

knowledge that the plaintiff and the other

ext-ursionists were ready and waiting to be

carried home according to the arrangement

made therefor, and made in wilful disregard

of the rights of the plaintiff and the other

excursionists, subordinaiing their rights to

the convenience of the company, when they

had the means at hand readily to have ful-

tilied their duty; in short, that the conduct

of the company was wilful and oppressive.—

then you may give full compensatory, ilmugh

not punitive, damages, embracing such loss

of time, such injury to health, such annoy-
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ance and vexation of mind, and such mental

distress and sense of wrong as you ﬁnd was

the immediate result of the misconduct, and

must necessarily and reasonably have been

expected to arise therefrom to the plaintiffs

as one of the excursionists." This instruc-

tion was excepted to, and this court held the

instruction erroneous, and reversed the judg-

ment for that cause.

The present chief justice, who wrote the

opinion in the case, takes special pains to

show that the action was based solely upon a

breach of contract, and was in no sense an

action of tort, and he expressly declares that

the rule of damages is not the same where the

action is for a breach of contract as for a

tort. Upon this point he uses the following

language: “It will be seen that the circuit

court was requested to charge that the plain-

tiff was only entitled to recover such damages

as naturally and fairly resulted from the

breach of contract, but could not recover dam-

ages for the disappointment of mind. sense

of wrong, or injury to his feelings by reason

of such breach. This rule the learned circuit

judge disaﬂirmed, holding that if the conduct

of the company was wilful and oppressive,

then such injury to health, annoyance, and

vexation of mind, mental distress, and sense

of wrong as were the immediate result of the

misconduct, and must reasonably have been

expected to arise therefrom to the plaintiff,

were proper matters to be considered in giv-

ing compensatory damages. This was con-

founding the lmportant distinction, so far as

the rule of damages is concerned,_ between an

action in tort and one upon contract. It was,

in fact, applying to this case the rule which

was laid down in Craker v. Railway Co., 36

Wis. 657, in an action for a tort committed

by an agent of the company. In the case of

wrongs the jury are permitted to consider in-

jury to feelings and many other matters

which have no place in questions of damages

for a breach of contract."

The chief justice then quotes at large from

the case of Hobbs v. Railway Co., 10 L. R.

Q. B. 111, with approval. In that case the

English court of appeals held that when the

chargt•1l the jury as follows: "It yon fi1ut thnt
the failure to return to M111tl!lon on the dny
In question, at the Umt• 1l7:r1•P1l upou In the
contract was caused dlr!'<'tly by orders from
the headquarters and principal manager of
the railway company, made with the full
knowledge that the plalntUT and the other
t•x1·11r1do11l;its were ready and waiting to be
•·nrrled home according to the arrangl'ment
11u1de therPfor, null ma1h~ In wllfnl dlsrt•gnrd
oC the rights of the pll1lntltf and the other
t•xcur11l1111lsts, suhordluatlug their rights to
the conn•nlenl'P of the com1mny, when they
1111d the llll':lns at hnnd rPadlly to ha¥e fnllilletl tlll'lr duty; In short, that the conduct
of the company was wilful nnd opprr><slYe.tl1t>n ~·on ma~· i:lve full com1w11><11 tory, t hon~h
not punitive, d1111111i:es. emhrnl'ing sucll 1011s
(}f time, such Injury to health, such annoyance nml ¥exntlon of mind, and St)('h mentnl
dlstre88 and sense of wrong as you find was
tlle Immediate result of the ml;«:·ondu<"I, and
must necessa1·1ly and re11sonnhly lun·p been
expected to arise therefrom to the plaintiffs
as one of the excursionists." This Instruction was excepted to, and thl!! court held the
Instruction erroneous, and reversed the judgment for that cau!W.
· The present chief justice, who wrote the
oplulon In the cnse, takes sprclal pains to
show tbat the action was hnsetl solely upon a
lJrPuch of contract, and was lo no lilense an
action of tort, and he expr1•Hsl~· dc>clares that
the rule of damages Is not the same where the
~action Is for a breach of contract as for n
tort. Upon this point he uses the followlng
111nguage: "It will be seen that the circuit
t'OUrt was rP111wstP1l to charge that the plalntltl' wns only t>ntitll'll to rt>cover Huch damages
as 1111t11rally and fairly resulted from the
hreach of contract, but could not recover damages for thl• disappointment of mlrnl. sense
<Jf wrong, or Injury to his feelings by reni100
<Jf such breach. This rule the learned circuit
judge dlsafflrmed, holding that If the conduct
of the company was wilful and oppressive,
then such Injury to health, annoyance, and
vexation of mind, mental distress, and sense
<Jf wrong as were the Immediate r£•snlt of the
misconduct, and must reasonably haw been
expected to arise therefrom to the plalnt!IT,
were proiwr matters to be consl!lf'red In giving compensatory damages. This was confomullng the Important distinction, so far as
the rule of damai:Ps ls concerned,. between an
action In tort and one upon contraet. It wn1<,
lo tact, applying to this case the rnle which
was lnltl down In Craker v. Hllliway Co., au
Wis. tiiii, In an adlon for a tort committed
by au ngt>nt of the compnny. In the case of
wrongs the jury are permitted to cousltlt>r Injury to feelings anti mnny other mutters
whkh have no place In questions of damages
for a breach of contract."
The chief Jnstice then qnotPs at l!1rge from
the case of llohhs v. Unllwny Co., 10 L. R.
Q. B. 111, with npprm·nl. In tltnt cniie the
English court of 11p1wnls liehl that wlleu tile

r11ilwn~· tomp11ny had negl!'dPll or refm<t•(l
to carry the plalntitl's to their destination.
and they were compellt>d to get out at a st11tlou about five wiles from It, late at night,
and being unable to get a conYeyance or accommodation at an Inn they walked home a
dli;tance of five miles In the rain, and the wife
caught cold a111l wns sick as 11 ronsequence of
the walk and exposure, they could not reco¥rr
for the Injury to the wife.' It would seem.
from the opinions given by the learned jmlges In the Hubbs Case, that they treated the action B!! a.n action upon eontract and not an :trtlon for a tort. All the judges speak of It 11s
au action to recover for the hrt>nch of contract
to carry the plalntifl's to tbPlr dPstlnation.
The rule as to what damages may he recon•red In actions for breach of contract Is
laid down hy this court In the case of Candee v. Tell•gruph Co., 34 Wis. .fill, cited from
Hadley v. Hnxt•111lale, 9 Exeh. J41, and appro¥ed. lt Is 11s follows: "\\'hpre two parties httYe made a coutrnct, whid1 one.of them
bas broken, the damages whh-h the other
ought to receh·e In respect of such })reach of
contrnct should he either snch as mny fnlrly
and substantially be considered as arising
naturally-that Is, according to the nsual
course of things-from such breach of contract Itself, or such 11s may rensonably he supposed to have been In the contemplation of
both pa1·t11.>s, at the time they made the contmct, as the probable result of the breach of

It."
The latter part of this rule, ns above quoted, would seem to cover all cases of br~ad1
of contract; for It must be presumed that
the parties would reasonably be supposed to
have contemplated that the party Injured by
the breach of the contract would sustain such
damages as would fairly and substantially, In
the usual course of things, result from such
breach. And f!o It Is often said that, In an
action for a hrPnrh of contract, the damng-es
to be recon~re1l are such as may rensonaoly
be supposed to have been In the contemplation of both parties when they made It.
Under this rule the damages which may be
recovered Ju 11n action for the b1·eacb of a
contract are sometimes more remote and farreaching thnn those recoverable t'or a tort.
In the case of Richardson v; Chynoweth, 26
Wis. QijG, ls an Illustration or the rule. In
that case the court say: "In SUl'h cllsPs,
where the controllh~g party Is advised of the
special purpose of the thing to 'Ue c·o1111ilek1l,
antl of the damage that would naturully fi('crue from tnllure to complete It at the s11L•dfle<l time, nnil In view of this expressly stipulates to tllilsb It at a given time, there Is no
rcrumn why he should not be respom;ible for
such dnmuge as Is the direct nnturnl re>-iuit
of his failure, even tbongh beyond the mere
dltTerence between the contract nnd market
price." See Shepherd v. G11;:llght Co., 15
Wis. 318; Flick v. W1~therbee, 20 Wis. 3tl2.
In many cnseR of hrP11C'l1 of contrnN the
courts have by their dcC'lsions establislwd a
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rule of damages which is applicable to all

of a class. in an action for a breach of con-

tract to pay money at a ﬁxed time, the dam-

ages are the lawful interest on the money

withheld, from the time it was payable to the

date of the judgment, unless the contract ex-

pressly stipulates for other damages. So, in

act,ions for a breach of a covenant of war-

ranty of title, the damages are limited, ordi-

narily, to the purchase money paid and in-

terest. In these and other classes of cases

the damages are ﬁxed by arbitrary rules;

but still the general rule above stated, that

the damages are such as “would reasonably

be supposed to have been contemplated that

the party injured by the breach of the con-

tract would sustain," would apply to such

cases; for, in contracts of the classes above

mentioned, the parties would enter into them
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knowing the law ﬁxing the damages for the

breach, and so they would be supposed to

have contemplated the payment of such dam-

ages in a case of breach and no other.

In the case of Hobbs v. Railway Co., supra,

the learned justices state the rule in case of

breach of contract in more concise language.

They say: “Such damages are recoverable as a

man when making the contract would con-

template would iiow from a breach of it."

Under this rule it was held in the Hobbs

Case, and by this court in the Walsh Case,

that in an action for a breach of contract in

failing to carry a passenger to his destination

damages could not be recovered for injury

to the health, annoyance, and vexation of

mind and mental distress, on the ground that

such damages were not such as the parties

making the contract would contemplate as

likely to result from its breach.

We are not disposed now to question the

correctness of the decision made by this court

in the case of Walsh v. Railway Co., supra,

limited as that case was to an action solely

for a breach of contract. In such cases the

wilfuiness of the party in refusing to fulﬁl

the contract does not in any way change the

rule of damages. The rule as to the damages

in actions upon contract is the same whether

the breach be by mistake. pure accident, in-

ability to perform it, or whether it be wilful

and malicious. The motives of the party

breaking the contract are not to be inquired

into. 1 Sedg. Meas. Dam. 439 et seq., and

cases cited.

The rules which limit the damages in ac-

tions of tort, so far as any general rules can

be established, are in many respects different

from those in actions on contract. The gen-

eral rule is that the party who commits a

trespass or other wrongful act is liable for

all the direct injury resulting from such act,

although such resulting injury could not have

been contemplated as a probable result of the

act done. 1 Sedg. Meas. Dam. 130, note;

Eten v. Luyster, 00 N. Y. 252; Hill v. Win-

sor, 118 Mass. 251; Lane v. Atlantic Works,

111 Mass. 136; Keenan v. Cavanaugh, 44 Vt.

268; Little v. Railroad Co., 66 Me. 239; Col-
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rule of damageis which is applicable to all
of a clnss. lu au 11dion for a breach of contrnct to pay money at a fixed time, the damages are the lawful interest on the money
withheld, from the time It was payable to the
date of the judgment, unless the contract expressly stipulates for other damages. So, In
actions for a breach of a covenant of warranty of title, the damages are limited, ordinarily, to the purchase money paid and Interest. In these and other classes of cases
the damages are fixed by arbitrary rules;
but still the general rule above stated, that
the damages are such as "would reasonably
be supposed to have been contemplated that
the party Injured by the breach of the contract would sustain," would apply to such
cases; for, In contracts of the classes above
mentioned, the parties would enter Into them
knowing the law fixing the damages for the
breach, and so they would be supposed to
have contemplated the payment of such damages In a case of breach and no other.
In the case of Hobbs v. Railway Co., supra,
the learned justices state the rule In cnse of
breach of contract In more concise language.
They say: "Such damages are recoverable as a
man when making the contract would contemplate would flow from a breach of it."
Under this rule It was held In the Hobbs
Case, and by this court in the Wlllsh Case,
that In an action for a breach of contract In
falling to carry a passenger to his destination
damages could not be recovered for Injury
to thP health, annoyance, and vexation of
mind and mental distress, on the ground that
such damages were not such as the parties
making the contract would contemplate as
likely to result from Its breach.
We are not disposed now to question the
correctness of the decision made by this court
in the case of Walsh v. Railway Co., supra,
limited as that case was to an action solely
for a breach of contract. In such cases the
wilfulness of the party In refusing to fulfil
the contract does not In any way change the
rule of damages. The rule as to the damages
In actions upon contract is the same whether
the breach be by mistake, pure accident, lnablllty to perform It, or whether It be wilful
and malicious. The motives of the party
breaking the contract are not to be Inquired
Into. 1 Sedg. Meas. Dam. 439 et seq., and
cases cited.
'fhe rules which limit the damages In actions of tort, so far as any general rules can
be established, are in many respects dltTerent
from those In actions on contract. The general rule ls that the party who commits a
t1·espass or other wronJtful net Is liable for
all the direct Injury resulting from such act,
although such resulting Injury could not have
been f'ontemplated ae a probable result of the
act done. 1 Selig. Meas. Dam. 130, note;
Eten v. Luyster, 00 N. Y. 252; Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mnss. 2:H; Lane v. Atlantic Works,
111Mass.136; Keenan v. Cavanaugh, 44 Vt.
2U8; Little \". lfallroad Co., 66 Me. 239; Col-

lard v. Railway Co., 7 Hurl. & N. 79; Hart
v. Railroad Corp., 13 Mete. (Mass.) 99, 104;
Wellington v. Oil &., 104 Mass. 64; Metallic
Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R . Co.,
109 Mass. 277: Salll>lmry v. Hcrchenroder,
106 Mass. 458; Perley v. Railroad Co., 9S
Mass. 41-1; Kl'llogg v. Railway Co., 26 Wis.
223; Patten v. Hallway Co., 32 Wis. 524, and
36 Wis. 413; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N.
Y. 217; Ward v. Vanderbilt, 34 How. Prac.
144; Bowas v. Tow Llne, 2 Sawy. 21, Fed.
Caa. No. 1,713. These cases, and..tnany morcwhlch might be cited, clearly establish th(t
doctrine that one who commits a trespass or
other wrong Is liable for all the damage
which legitimately fiows directly from sucll
trespass or wrong, whether such damages
might have been foreseen by the wrong-doer
or not.
As stated by Justice Colt In the case of
Hiil v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251: "It cannot
be said, as a matter of law, that the Jury
might not properly find It obviously probable
that Injury In some form would be caused to
those who were at work on the fender by
the act of the defendants In running against
It. This constitutes negligence. and It Is not
necessary that the Injury, In the precise form
In which It In fact resulted, should have been
foreseen. It Is enough that It now appears
to have been a natural and probable consequence."
In the case of Bowas v. Tow Line, supra,.
Judge Hotl'man, speaking of the rule In relation to damages on a breach of contract, a.s
contrasted with the rule In case of wrongs.
says: "The etl'ect of this rule Is more often
to limit than to extend the llablllty for a
breach of contract, although sometimes,
when the special circumstances under which
the contract: was made have been communicated) damages consequential upan a breach
made under those circumstances will be
deemed to have been contemplated by the
parties, and may be recovered by the defendant. But this rule, as Mr. Sedgwick remarks, has no application to torts. He who
commits a trespass must be held to contemplate all the damage which may legitimately
flow from his Illegal act, whether he may
have foreseen them or not: and so far as It
Is plainly traceable be must make compensation for It."
The justice and propriety o! this role are
manifest, when applied to cases of direct Injury to the ·person. It one man strike another, with a weapon or with his hand, he is
clPnrly liable for all the direct injury the
party struck sustains therefrom. '.file fact
that the result of the blow Is unexpected aml
unusual can make no dltl'erence. It the
wrong-doer should In fact Intend but slight
Injury, and deal a blow which In nlnety·n.lne
cases In a hundred would result In a tritlln1t
Injury, and yet by accident produced a \'err
grnve one to the person receh·lng It, owlni:
either to the state of health or other acddental clrcumstanees o! the party, such fnet
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would not relieve the wrong-doer from the

consequences of his act. The real question

in these cases is, did the wrongful act pro-

duce the injury complained of? and not

whether the party committing the act would

have anticipated the result. The fact that

the act of the party giving the blow is un-

lawful renders him liable for all its direct

evil consequences.

This was the substance of the d('t-islt)n in

the old and often-cited squib case of Scott v.

Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892. Justice Nares there

says that “the act of throwing the squib

being unlawful, the defendant was liable to

answer for the consequences, be the injury

mediate or immediate;" and in this view of

the case all the judges agreed, although they

differed upon the question as to the form of

th action. -
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n the case at bar the question to be

termined is whether the negligent act'of th

defendant's empioyes in putting the plaintiffs

and their child off the train in the night-time,

at the place where they did, was the direct

cause of the injury complained of by the

plaintiffs, or whether it was only a remote

cause for which no action lies. We must

in considering this case take it for granted

that the walk from the place where they left

the cars to Mauston was the immediate cause

of the injury complained of, and the negli-

gence of the defendant in putting them off

the cars was the mediate cause. We think

the question, whether there was any negli-

gence on the part of the plaintiffs in taking

the walk, was properly left to the jury, as a

question of fact, and they found that they

were guilty of no negligence on their part.

They found themselves placed by the wrong-

ful act of the defendant where it became

necessary for their protection to make the

journey.

The fact that there was a station-house near

by, at which they might have found shelter

until another train came by, is not conclusive

that the plaintiffs were negligent in the mat-

ter. They were landed at a place where they

could-not see it, and the jury have found

that under the circumstances they were not

guilty of negligence in not ﬁnding it. The

defendant must. therefore. be held to have

caused the plaintiffs to make the journey as

the most prudent thing for them to do under

the circumstances. And, we think, under the

rule of law, the defendant must be liable

for the direct consequence of the journey.

‘Had the defendant wrongfully placed the

plaintiffs off the train in the open country,

where there was no shelter, in a cold and

stormy night, and, on account of the state of

health of the parties, in their attempts to ﬁnd

shelter they had become exhausted and per-

lshed, it would seem quite clear that the de-

fendant ought to be liable. The wrongful

act of the defendant would be the natural

and direct cause of their deaths, and it would

seem to be a lame excuse for the defendant,

that if the plaintiffs had been of more robust

wouhl not relleve the wrong-doer from the
consequenees of his act. The real question
In these eases Is, did the wrongful act produce the Injury COWllialned ot? and not
whether the party committing the act would
have anticipated the result. The fact that
the act of the party giving the blow Is unlawful renders him Hable fqr all Its direct
evil consequences.
This was the substance of the dl'd~ion in
the old und often-cited squib case of 8eott v.
Slwplwrd, 2 W. Bl. 892. Justice ·Nares there
says that "the act of throwing the squib
being unlawful, the defendant was liable to
ans\Ver for the consequences, be the Injury
mediate or Immediate;" and In this view of
the case all the judges agreed, although they
1lltrered upon the question as to the form of
th action.
n the case at bar the question to be
!ermined Is whether the negligent act 'of
tlt>fPndnnt's employ~s In putting the plalntitrs
and their <"hlld otr the train In the night-time,
nt the pince where they did, w1u1 the direct
cause of the Injury complulncd of by the
plalntltrs, or whether It was only o. remote
cause for whleh no action lies. We must
In considering this case take It for granted
that the walk from the place where they left
the cars to Mauston \Vas the Immediate caul!e
of the Injury complained of, and the negligence of the defendant In putting them oft'.
the cars was the mediate cause. We think
the question, whether there was any negligence on the part of the plalntltl's In taking
the walk, was properly left to the jury, as a
question of fact, and they found that they
were guilty of no negligence on their part.
They found themselves placed by the w1·ongful act of the defendant where It became
necessary for their protection to make the
journey.
The tact that there was a station-house near
hy, at which they might have fotwd shelter
until another train came IJy, Is not conclusive
that the plalntllfs were negligent In the matter. '.fhey were landed at a. place where they
could . not see It, and the jury have found
that under the drcumstanees they were not
guilty of negligence In not finding It. The
defendant must. therefore. be held to have
1·a11setl the plulntllTR to make the journey 118
the most prudent thing for them to do under
th1• l'ir1•umstanc•es. And, \Ve think, under the
ruh•s or law, the defendant must be liable
tor the direct consequence of the journey.
•Hnd the defendant wrongfully placed the
11lulntUrs orr the train In the open country,
whl'rc thPre was no shelter, In a cold and
1-1tormy ni~ht, and, on account of the state of
ht>11lth of the 1mrties, In their atti>mpts to find
sbeltt>r they had hecome exhausted nnd perished, It would f!l'l'ID quite clear thnt the defendant ought to be liable. 'l 'be wrongful
net of the defendant would be the natmal
aud direct cause or tlwlr tli>aths, aml It would
seem to be a lnme ex<·u~l' for the defewlnnt,
that If the plalntUfs bad been of more robust
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health they would not bnve iie1·ished or have
surrered any material Injury.
The defendant Is not excused because It did
not know the state ot health of Mrs. Brown,
and Is equally responsible for the consequence of the walk as though Its employ~s
bad full knowledge of that tact. This court
rxpressly so held In the case of Stewart v.
City of Ripon, 38 Wis. 584, and substantially
In the case of Oliver v. Town of La Valle, 36
Wis. u92.
lipon the findings of the Jury In this ease
It appNtrs that the defendant was guilty of
a \Hong In putting the plalntltrs otr the c· :rs
at tlw 11laC'l' they did; that In order to protect themselves frQm the effects of ;nwh
wrong they made the walk to Mauston; that
In making such walk they were guilty of no
negligence, but were compelled to make It on
account of the defendant's 'Wrougtul act; and
that on account of the peculiar state of health
ot Mrs. Brown at the time she was Injured
by such walk. There was no Intervening Independent Clluse of the Injury other thnn the
act of the defendant. All the nets done by
the plalntltrs, and !rom which the injury
flowed, were rightful on their part, and compelled by the act of the defendant. We think,
therefore, It must be held that the Injury to
Mrs. Brown was the direct result or the defendant's negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate and not the remotP
cause of the Injury, within the decisions
above quoted. We can see no reason why
the defendant Is not equally liable tor an Injury sustained by a person who Is placed In
a dangerous position, whether the Injury ls
the Immediate result of a wrongful act, or
results trom the act ot the party In endeavoring to escape from the Immediate danger.
When by the negligence of another a per-''
son Is threatened with danger, and be at- :
tempts to escape such threatened danger by:
' an act not culpable In ltselt under the cir-.
i cumstances, the person guilty of the negll·
i gence Is liable for the Injury received In such
iattempt to escape, even though no lnjtlry
Iwould have been sustained had there been
· no attempt to eRcnpe the threatened danger.
' This was so held, and we think properly, In
the case of a passenger riding upon n stnge-·
coach, who, supposing the coach woulcl he
·overturned, jumped therefrom and was Injured, although the coach did not overturn.
and would not have done so had the passenger remained In his seat. The passenger acted upon appearances, and, not having acted
l negllgently, It was held he could recover; It ·
heing shown that the coach was driven negligently at the time, 'Which negligence produced the a1l11earo.nee of danger. Jones v. ·
Boyce, 1 Starkie, 493. The ground of tlw ·
) decisions Is very aptly and briefly stated hy .
, Lord Ellenborough in the case as follows~
!\"It I place a man In such n situation thnt he
must adopt o. perilous alternative, I am re- •
·sponslble for the consequences."
.
' So In the case at bar the defendant, by

I

l
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its negligence, placed the plaintiffs in a

'position where it was necessary for them to

act to avoid the consequences of the wrong-

ful act of the defendant, and, acting with

ordinary prudence and care to get them-

selves out of the difﬁculty in which they

had been placed, they sustained injury.

Such injury can be, and is, traced directly

to the defendant's negligence as its cause,

and it is its proximate cause, within the

rules of law upon that subject . The true

meaning of the maxim, causa proxima non

remota spectatur, is probably as well de-

ﬁned by the late Chief Justice Dixon in the

case of Kellogg v. Railway Co., supra, as

by any other judge or court. He states it

as follows: “An eiiicient adequate cause

being found, must be considered the true

cause, unless some other cause not incident

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

to it, but independent of it, is shown to

have intervened between it and the result."

In the cae of Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94

U. S. 469, the court say: “We do not say

that even the natural and probable conse-

quences of a wrongful act or omission are

.n all cases to be chargeable to the mis-

feasance or nonfeasance. They are not

when there is a suﬁicient and independent

'cause operating between the wrong and in-

jury. In such a case the resort of the suf-

ferer must be to the originator of the inter-

mediate cause. But when there is no in-

termediate eﬂlcient cause the original wrong

must be considered as reaching to the effect;

and proximate to it. The inquiry must,

therefore, always be whether there was any

intermediate cause disconnected from the

primary fault, and self-operating, which pro-

duced the injury. ' ‘ “ In the nature of

things there is in every transaction a suc-

cession of events, more or less dependent up-

on those preceding. and it is the province of

a jury to look at this succession of events

or facts and ascertain whether they are not-

urally and probably connected with each oth-

er by a continuous sequence, or are dis-

severed by new and independent agencies,

and this must be determined in view of the

circumstances existing at the time."

Within this deﬁnition the negligence of the

defendant was the proximate cause of the

injury to Mrs. Brown, as there was no other

cause not incident to such negligence which

intervened to cause the same.

There is, I think, but one case cited by

the learned counsel for the appellant which

appears to be in direct conﬂict with this

view of the case, except those which relate

to breaches of contract, and that is Car 0o. v.

Barker, 4 Colo. 344. This case is, we think,

unsusmined by authority, and is in direct con-

ﬂict with the decisions of this court in the

cases of Stewart v. City of Ripon and Oliver

v. Town of La Valle, supra. This decision is,

it seems to me, neither supported by the

principles of law nor humanity. It in ef-

fect says that if an individual unlawfully

compels a sick and enfeebled person to ex-
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its negligence, placed the plaintll'fs In a pose himself to the cold nncl storm to escape
· position where It was necessary _for them to worse consequences from his wrongful act,
act to a-rold the consequences of the wrong- he cannot recover damages from the wrongful act of the defendant, and, acting with doer because it was his sick and enfeebled
ordinary prudence and care to get tllem- condltiou. which rendered his exposure Inselves out of the dUllculty In which they jurious. Certainly such a doctrine does not
had been placed, they sustained Injury. commend itself to those kinder feelings
Such injury can be, and is, traced directly which are common to humanity, and I know
to the defendant's negltgence as Its cause, of no other case which sustains Its concluruid it ls its proximate cause, within the sions.
In the case of Sharp v. Powell, L. R. 7 C.
mies of law upon that subject. The true
weaning of the maxim, causa proxlma non P. 253, the defendant was not held liable In
reruota spectatur, ls probably as well de- an actlou of tort under the following circumfined by the late Chief Justice Dixon in the stances: He unlawfully washed a van in the
case of Kellogg v. Railway Co., supra. as street, and the water ran down the gutter
qy any other judge or court. He states It towards a. grating leading to the sewer. In
as follows: "An efficient adequate cause consequence of the extreme cold weather the
being found, must be considered the true grating was obstructed with lee, so that the
cause, unless some other cause not Incident water could not escape, and so spread out
to it, but independent of It, le shown to and fro:re over the causeway, which was
have Intervened between It and the result." badly paved and rough, and there froze.
In the case of Railway Co. v. Kellogg, W The plalntill's horse, while being led put
U. S. 46'9, the court say: "We do not say the spot, slipped upon the Ice and was lamed.
that even the natural and probable conse- The action .,.as brought to recover for the
quences of a wrongful act or omission are Injury to the horse, and because It was
.n all cases to be ch1u·geable to the mis- shown that the defendant did not know that
feasance or nonfeaimuce. They are not the grate was· stopped so that the water
when there is a suttleient and independent could not escape, he was held not liable.
cause opera.ting between the wrong and In- This case comes within the rule above statjury. In such a case the resort of the suf- ed; there was an intervening and lnde1>eudferer must be to the originator of the Inter- ent agency "hlch caused the forming of the
med late cause. But when there is no in- lee In the street, and the consequent Injury,
termediate efficient cause the orlglna.l wrong vll'l. the frozen condition of the grate, of
must be considered as reaching to the effect,· which he was Ignorant, and for which he
and proximate to it. The Inquiry must, was In no way responsible.
The cases of Railway Co. v. Birney, 71 Ill.
therefore, always be whether there was any
Intermediate cause disconnected from the 391, and I"ra.n<'ls v. Transfer Co., 5 Mo. App.
primary fault, and self-operating, which pro- 7, were both cases elmllar to the one at bar,
duced the Injury. • • • In the nature of but both cases were decided ln favor of the
things there Is In every transaction a suc- defendants, because It was held by the court
cession of events, more or less dependent up- that the plalntills, after being wrongfully
on those preceding. and It Is the provln<'e of left by the defendants short of their Joura jury to look at this succes!!lon of events ney's end, were guilty of gross negligence
or fucts and ascertain whether they are nat- in their manner of attempting to complete
urally and probably connected with each oth- the journey, and so were iiot entltlecl to reer by a continuous sequence, or are dis- cover. I should say, from the reasoning of
severed by new and Independent agencies, tne Judges In both these cases, that the
and this must be determined In view of the judgment would have been for the plalntUre
had there been no fault on their part, and an
circumstances existing nt the time."
Within this defl.nltion the negllgence of the Injury had occurred to them In prosecuting
defendant was the proximate cause of the the journey not arising from their fault. or
Injury to Mrs. Brown, as there was no other the fault ot a third person.
cause not Incident to such negllgence which
In the case of Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill.
11, the defendant was doing no wrong . to
Intervened to cause the same.
There Is, I thin.II:, but one case cited by the plalntiO', and, so far as the case shows,
the learned counsel for the appellant which was unconscious of her existence at the
appears to be In direct confilct with this time. It was an exceptional case.
view of the case, except those which relate
It would extend this opinion to too great
to breacl:.es of contract, and that le Car Co. v. length to undertake any review of the alBarker, 4 Colo. 344. This case Is, we think, most Infinite number of case$ In which the
unsustalned by authority, and Is in direct con- question of remote or proximate causes Is dis·
tlict with the decisions of this court In the cussed. No general and ftxed rule can be
cas<'s of Stewart v. City of Ripon and Ollver laid down to govern all cases. It is said by
v. Town of La Valle, supra. This decision Is, the sup1·eme court of the United States in
It seems to me, neither supported by the Railway Co. v. Kellogg, supra: "The true
principles of law nor humanity. It In ef- rule Is that what ls the proximate cause of
fect soys that If an Individual unlawfully an injury Is ordinarily a question for the
<'ompels a sick and enfeebled person to ex- jury. It le not a qu<'Stlon of science or legal
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knowledge. It is to be determined as a

fact, in view of the circumstances of fact at-

tending it." And similar language was used

by this court in the ease of Patten v. Rall-

way Co., 32 Wis. 5214135. In that case the

present chief justice says: "At all events,

we think the question was properly submit-

ted to the jury to determine, whether under

all the circumstances the failure of the com-

pany to have a light at the depot on the

arrival of the train was the direct and pr i-

mate ause of the accident.“'

e think that all the objections made b

e learned counsel for the appellant to the

right of the plaintiffs to recover for the in-

jury to the health of Mrs. Brown were over-

ruled by this court in the cases of Oliver v.

Town of La Valle and Stewart v. City of

Ripon. In the Oliver Case the injury com-
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plained of was like that in the case at bar.

The only difference in the two cases is that

in the Oliver Case the evidence connecting

the injury with the negligence of the defend-

ant was more satisfactory than in the case

at bar. But the question of the conclusive

ness of the evidence is one for the jury,

and they have settled that question in favor

of the plaintiffs. In the Oliver Case the

negligence of the town caused the defend-

ant's horses to fall through and get entan-

gled in a bridge in the highway, which ren-

dered it necessary that the plaintif f should

make exertions to free the horses from their

diﬂiculty, and such exertions caused the in-

jury complained of. It is the same in the

case at bar, only not as plain in its circum-

stances. The negligence of the defendant

put the plaintiffs in a situation which ren-

dered it necessary for theiu to make an ex-

ertion to get out of such difﬁculty, and in

doing so the plaintiff Mrs. Brown was in-

jured, the same as Mrs. Oliver in the other

case.

The case of Stewart v. City of Ripon set-

tles the other question, that the pecuiiar con-

dition of Mrs. Brown at the time is no de-

fense to her claim for damages.

The objection made that the verdict should

be set aside because the evidence shows a

want of care on the part of the plaintiffs,

and that the injury resulted from such want

of care after the walk to Mauston, was

clearly a question of fact for the jury. it

does not appear from the record that any

instruction upon this point was asked for

by either party on the trial. There is, there-

fore, no error upon this point on the instruc-

tion. The evidence is not so clear that the

damage was caused by the subsequent neg-

lect of the plaintiff to procure proper medical

attendance as would justify this court in set-

ting aside the verdict as against the evi-

dence.

The judgment of the circuit court is aﬂirm-

COLE, C. J., and LYON, J., dissent.

On Rehearing.

April 5, 1882.

TAYLOR, J. Although the learned counsel

kuowl<'dge. It Is to be tletl•1·ml11ed as a
fnct, lu \"it•w or the drcumstuuces or fact att!'udlug It." And similar language was used
by tl!.ls court In the ease or Pattt·n v. Hallway Co., :i2 Wis. ri:!-hj35. In that case the
present d1ie! justice says: "'At nil events,
we tlllnk the question wtts prnperly submit·
ted to the jury to detPrmlne. wllether uuder
all the elrcumstanePs the failure or the company to ha\·e a light at the dl•pot on the
arrival or the train was th1! direct and pr 1mate auee or t!w acdllPnt."•
e think that all the objections made b
e learned counsel !or the appellant to the
right or the plalntlft'e to recover for the Injury to the health of Mrs. Brown were o\·erruled by this court In the cases of Oliver v.
Town of La Valle and Stewart v. City of
lUpon. In the Oliver Case the Injury com·
plained of was like that In the case at har.
The only dlft'erence In the two ca11!'8 le thut
In the Ollvt>r Case the evidence conneding
the Injury with the negllgen<'e of the defendant was more satisfactory than In the 1·aee
at bar. But the question of the concht!li\·enees of the eviflence Is one for the jury,
and they have eetth•d that question In ra,·or
of the plnlutlft's. In the Oliver Case the
negligence of the town caused the d<'fendant'e horses to fall through and get entangled In a bridge In the highway, which rendered It necessary that the plalntur should
make exertions to free the horses from their
dlmculty, and such exertions en.used the Injury complained of. It Is the same In the
case at bar, only not as plain In Its clrcum1tan<>es. The negligence of the defendant
put the plalntlft'e In a situation which rendered It necessary for them to make an exertion to get out of such dllfteulty, and In
doing ao the plalntUI' Mrs. Brown was Injured, the Bame as MN. 011\"er In the other
case.
The case of Stewart v. City of Ripon settles the other question, that the peculiar condition of Mrs. Brown at the time le no defense to her claim for damages.
The objection made that the verdict should
he set aside because the evidence shows a
want of care on the part of the plalnttft'e,
and that the Injury resulted from such want
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of care after the wulk to Maut;ton, wa!o
clearly a qut>.ition of fact for the jury. It
does uot appenr from the teco1·d that any
Instruction upon this point wa1:1 asked for
by either party on the trial. There is, tllen•fore, no error upon this point on the Instruction. The evidence le not so clear that the
damage was c:rnsed by the 11uhsequent nPglect or the plulntlft' to pro(~ure 1•roper medil'al
attendance as would justify this court In setting aside the verdict as against the evidence.
The judgment of the ch'cult court le attirmCOLE, C. J., and LYON, ;r,, dissent.
On HehParlng.
April 5, 1882.
TAYLOR, ;J. Although the learned counsel
for the appellant has made a very vigorous,
not to say denunclatory, attack upon the
opinion filed In this case, we do not deem It
proper to deviate from our ordinary rule of
denying the motion for rehearing without
comment, when no questions are raised or
argued upon such motion which were not
fully argued at the original hearing. In
denying thls motion we deem It proper to
say that the Intimation ot the learned counsel for the appellant that this case was not
thoroughly argued at the original bearlug,
or carefully considered by the court before
the opinion waa delivered, le hardly just either to the counsel or the court. Certainly,
on the part of the court, we Intended to give
It that careful consideration which rte Importance demanded, and we are not conscious that we have fallecl In our duty In
that respect, and after reading the very carefully prepared brief submitted by the learned
counael for the appellant, and bearing hie
clear and forcible oral argumE>nt at the original hearing or this case, we think he does
Injustice to himself In suggesting that the
points decided were not ·thoroughly argued
at such bearing.
NOTE. See Vosburg v. Putney, ante, 165,
and Lewis v. Railway Co., ante, 182.
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MacKAY v. OHIO RIVER R. CO.

DA.\I.Ha.:S IN

ACTIO~S

l\IucKA Y v. OHIO RIVER R. CO.
(11 S. E. 737. R4 W. Vn. 65.)
~llJ>rl'ml' ~onrt of App1>11li1 of "'est Virginia.

(11 S. E. 737. 34 W. Va. 65.)

JunP :!4.

l~)(l.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

June 24. 1390.

Error to circuit court, Ohio county.

V. B. Archer and Robert li'hit-e, for plain-

tiff in error. J. O. Pendleton, for defend-

ant in error.

B RA .\'N()N, J. This was an action oftres-

pass on theense. in the1drcait court of Ohio

county, brought by Winﬁeld S. MacKay

against the Ohio River Railroad Company,

resulting in a verdict and judgment for the

plaintiff for $539.17, to which judgment this

l

writ of error was granted on the petition ‘

of said company.

laration will raise the question whether

it states a cause of action ex contractu

or ex delicfo; whether it isin assumpsiton
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a contract for transportation, or for tort

for the ejection of the plaintiff from a. car.

It avers that the defendant company an-

dertook and promised,for certain hire and

reward paid to it, to safely and securely

convey the plaintiff in its cars from the

town of Ravenswood to Wheeling, and

back again to Ravenswood, and that the

plaintiff, conﬁding in such promise and un-

dertaking of defendant, did take a seat as

a passenger, in the defendant's car, and was

conveyed to Wheeling, and that after-

wards, still conﬁding in such promise and

undertaking of the defendant, he took a

seat as a passenger in one of its cars to be

conveyed back from Wheeling to Ravens-

wood; but the defendant, not regarding

its promise and undertaking, but contriv-

ing to injure the plaintiff. did not convey

him from Wheeling to Ravenswood, but

neglected and refused so to do. Thus far

the declaration seems to be based on the

contract of conveyance made by the de-

fendant, as a carrier, with the plaintiff.

But it then immediately avers that, in-

stead of so conveying the plaintiff, the de-

fendant, by its servants, violently and

with great force caused the plaintiff,

against his will and protest, to be ejected

from said car, and to be pushed and hurled

from it upon the ground, and to be pre-

vented from going to Ravenswood on that

day. by means whereof he was compelled

to walk along distance to a hotel, was

greatly humiliated in his feelings and hurt

- in his pride, by being exposed to other

passengers on the car, and was compelled

to remain in Wheeling, from his business

and homc. and to pay hotel bills, and

spend three or four dollars for telegrams

sent to his wife, to allay her uneasiness

on account of his failure to reach home

when expected, and to spend money to

purchase a ticket to reach home, and to

borrow money for that purpose, and that

his wife was ill, and her alarm from his

failure to reach home when expected in-

jured her, and protracted her iliness, caus-

ing him to pay large medical bills, and

Error to circuit court, Ohio county.
V. R. Arel1t>1· nnd Robert White, for plaintiff in error. J. O. Pendleton, for defendant in error.
BHA:-.;No~.J. 'l'hiK wnKnnactlon oftresll"""''n thPr11><1•. in tlwr-irrnlt court of Ohio
eounty, broui?ht by WlnflPld S. MacKay
ngninst the Ohio River Hallroad Company,
r1•sulting inn VPrcllct and Judg;mPnt for the
plulntlff for $:iil9.17, to which judgment this
writ of error was granted on thl' petition
of Haidro•upany. An Inspection of thedeclarntion wlll rahie the question whethe1·
It states a caui'!e of action ex contr:wtll
or e:r delicto; whether It ts In 11ss1Jm11situn
a contract for transportation. or for tort
for the ejection of the plaintiff from I". car.
It avers that the defendlmt compnny undertook and promised, for certain hire and
reward paid to It, to safely and securely
convey the plaintiff In its cars from the
town of Ravenswood to Wheeliug, and
back again to Rarenswood, and that the
plain tiff, conflrling in such promise and unflertaklng of defendant, did take a seat as
a passenger, In thedefendant'srar, and was
<!onveyed to Wheeling, and that afterwords, r;tlll confiding In such promise and
undertaking of the defendant, be took a
l'<'fl t ar; n par;Renger In one of its cars to be
cnnvPycd back from Wheeling to Ravenswood; but the defendant, not regarding
Its promlae and underta\clni;t. but contriving to Injure the plaintiff. did not convey
him from Wheeling to Ravent1wood, but
n<'11;le1•tf>d and refuE<ed so to do. Thu11 far
the dechLrotlon seems to be based on the
eontract of conveyance made by the cleft'11<lant, as a carrier, with the plaintiff.
But It then immediately nvers that, lnf!tcnd of 1110 convt:ying thP plaintiff, the defendant, hy Its servants, violently and
with great force caused the plaintiff,
ugninRt his will and protest, to be ejected
from said rar, and to be pushed and hurled
from It upon the ground, and to be prevented from going to Ravenswood 011 that
d11y. h;\· means whereof be was compelled
to wnlk a long 11iHtance to 1:1 hotel , was
grrntly humiliated In his feelings and hurt
in his pride, by being exposed to other
JlllSH!'llµ;Prs on the car, and WRS compl•lled
to l't'lllllln In Wheeling, from his huslneKB
u111l hom<'. u111l to 11n.v hotel hills, and
8[>1'1111 thrPe or four doll a rs for telegrams
8Pll t to hir; wi ·e, to alluy her un<'n!'.liness
011 m·eount of bis fnilnre to reach home
wh1•n t'Xp('Cterl, and to spend mone.v to
1•11reh11><c u ticket to rl'ach homl', and to
horrow money for thut rrnrpoRP. nnd that
his wire war; Ill, and her alarm from his
lailnrl' to rf':1ch home when e:q11'Ctf'd injure1l hf'r, nnd protrnderl hl'r lllm•!oir;, eau;;lnµ; him to pay lnrire medical hills, and
thnt hiR b1111i11ess wal'! damaged hy hiH dete11 ti on from home, a11<.l he sur;tuincl.I n umeroaH ot l11·r lnjur:l'R. to hlR rlnmugt> ,10,000.
The 11111,.;t of th iH muttt•r relatl'R to the
tort of 1-jrt'l Ing tl.e plaintiff from the earH,
aud lookH to that llH the en use or ~rnva
mcu ol the uctlou. The dt.>clnratlon thus

AGAI:SST CARRIEUS.

contains matter based on the contract.
and matter based on the tort; and It i,.;
r;omewhut dlfHcult to say whether it aim,.
to 11tate the breach of the contract to convey, or the tort In ejecting him from t,lw
car, as the l(ra.vamell of the action. But
I ltcaunotbetreatedasdoublelnnature. It
must be classed either as an artion ex contrnct11 or ex delicto. The writ summon!!
the defendant to answer un netlon of tre11pa11s on the case, and the declaration denomlnatl'H the action as trespaHH on the
case; and I &ouclude to regard the Htatement of the contract of conveyance as a
passengt>r as matter of inducement explunatory of the rt-a son of the plaintlff't1 preRence on the car, and the ejection of the
plaintiff from the car with force and arm11
UH the R"TR varnen of the action. and shall
treat the action as trespa.ss on the case.
This classlflcatlon of the nctlon is necessary in passing on the motion to exclude
the plaintiff's evidence; for, if we rPgard
the declaration as In ass r1111psit, the evidence would go to 11ustaln the action, and
the motion to exclude It woulrl consequently be oyerruled, but, If we regard it
as In caire, the evidence lt1 not tmfttclent to
sustain the action, and the motion to exclurle it should have been sustainert.
The plaintiff's evidence shows that bf'
purchased from the deft>ndant's agent at
Ravenswood what was regarded a roundtrip ticket from Ravenswood to Wheeling
and return, and paid t7.a& for it, and under it went to Wheeling, and, when he
started to return to Ravenswood, found
that his ticket was stamped on each end
from "Ravens wood to Wheeling" ln11 tead
of being stamped, as It should have been,
on one end for passage from Ravenswood
to Wheeling, and on the other from Wheeling to Ravenswood; that he did not notice the mistake when hll purcha11ed tbt•
ticket, ancl first noticed It when he hoarded the train at Wheeling to return to ltnvenr;wood. '.rile conductor on the train to
Wheeling tore off one encl or coupon of the
ticket, and whrm, on his return, the plaintiff presented his ticket to tbe conductor,
he 1·erused to receive It because itcalled for
a pasr;uge from Ravenswood to Wheeling,
not from 'Vheeling to Ravenswood. and
@aid to plaintiff: "This ticket Is no goo1l.
You will have to pay your fare, or get
off, "-and the plaintiff replif'd, "I'll be
damne11 If I do." The conduetor pulk'<l
the bell-rope to stop thl\ train; and , as
the train was stopping, plaintiff asker1 the
conductor what waa the matter with thf'
ticket. and he sail.I It was not goo1l. The
plalntlH Informed him tbat he bad conw
up on it the day before with Conductor
Patrick: and the conductor, Rice, then
sal•l, "He gave you the wron1t end," and
said, further, "You wlll have to puy your
fare." Plaintiff then said to him that he
hall no money, anrl that, If the con1luctor
hHd given him the wrong end of the ticket.
It wul! a mlHtnke, and it dill not eor;t any
more to tnkf' him hack thnn to bring him
up, to which Conductor Hice rc1Jlied, "It
don't mnke a damn bit of dlffercnrl'," and
that 11Iaint.lff must pay fare or get <1ff.
Wlwn the tmin stopped. the plaintiff s1thl:
"Jr I get off here. fJOmebody will have to
pay for It. I want to get borne OD this
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train." Plaintiff says he then ,',ot off the ‘

train down upon the street in the city of 1

Wheeling. He further says: “Of course

the passengers could not hear what was

said between the conductor and myself.

and they did not know what I was put off

for." I

There is no act of trespass shown by |

this evidence. There is not the slightest '

evidence of iorce or violence used by any i

of the deiendant's employes upon the|

plaintiff. He was not, as alleged in the

train... Plalntln HllYB ht• then : .ot on the ' Is loet, or wher«> hy miHta'ke the wrong
train down upon the 11tr1't.'t In the city of ticket wuR tlPllYercd to the pm1eenger. and
Wheeling. He further enys: "Of cour1te he will be ohllged to pay his fure a second
the (lflRl!(>Dgers could not bear what was time to pul'l'lne hie journey, am1 , if he Is unsaid between the conductor and myl!elf, able to do so, great delay and Injury nrny
and they did not know what I was put off result. Such delay nod Injury would he
,'the natural result of the los11 of the til·ket
for."
Th<'re Is no net of trespass sho\\"n by 1 or breach or the contract, but would. In
thit1 e\·iden('e. There ls not the !!llghtl-st pnrt, at least, be In com1equence of the
e'l"Mt·nce of force or violence u11ed by any p!'Cnnlnry ('lrcumstanceR of the party.
or the deh•1ulant's employt-s upon the ThatflU('h cases are exce11tional, and howplaintiff. He wa11 not, as alleged in the e\•er un!ortnnate thf" party who Is eo situ•lt't·larntlon, vlolt•ntly and with p:reut force ate1l, yet no rule ba11 ever been devil;ecl
eje<:ted ttnd pm1hcd and hurlt•<I h·om the that would not at tlmt'B lnjurlo1111ly afft'Ct
car, but wnlked from It himself, without those It was de!!lgned to acr.ommodate.
the slightest battery or assault upon bis The jndge then asks: "How, thl'n, is the
per1mn. He does not bim11elf say so, and conductor to ae('ertnln the <·ontral't enother evidences mnke ttqulte clt>11r thll t no tprerl Into between the JHt11s 11ger 1rnd the
force or violence WllR m~ed. The e\'ldence railroad company wht're a ticket le purdof'E! Rhow a brearh of the company's con- chaRrd and pl'l"Rente<l to him? Pruetlcaltract to con'l"ey the plaint lff ""a JJRl!11enger, ly, there nre but two way11,-one, the evlor an aa&reement to sell a dlfft•rent tk•ket, rlrnce 11fforde<l by the ticket: the oth·•r,
but not a trespaes for whll'lt an al'tlon the etatemPnt of the pu11Re11gcr, contrabased on a tort can be maintained. It 18 dicted by the th·ket. Which should govsimply the ease of a refueal and failure to ern? • • • Thf"r" Is hnt one rule which
carry out Its coutract. of t·on veyun('e, for can 11afely be tolf"rated with 1tny dl-'Cent
which an action of treHpaes on the cal!r, In rrgard to the rlghtR of ruilroatl co111panle11
ass11mpsit ba11ed on that contract, mi~ht and pa!!l!t•np:ers generally. As ti•ween
be maintained. The mere manner of his the rondnctor anti p1:111eengernnd thf"rl?!'tlt
expulsion would not sustain the action as of the latter to travel. the tlckt't procltwt·<I'
one based on tort. The plaintiff'!! evi- must be conclusive evidence; and he mu11t
dence 18 that the condu('tor"talke<l 11hort" producf" ft, when cttlll'tl upon, ae the e,·tto him, ttrid be to the condurtor, and, dence of his rl2ht to the st•at he claim!:!.
when he was present.Ing hie views ae to "'here a pa88enger has p11rchn11ed a t;ckPt,
the validity of the tkket, the ronductor and the conductor does not carry him ncsaid, "It don't make a damn bit of <ilffer- cordlng to Its terms, or If the compt111.~·,
en~. "-that he bad to get on or pay fare.
throu~h the mistake of Its agent, has givIn the late raee In the l'll)lreme cunrt of en him the wrong tll'ket, so that he h11R
North Carolina, (lto11e v. Railroad Co., 11 heen compelled tu rellnqul11b hie Kt'Ut, or
S. E. ltt>p. 526, I au action for putting plaln- pay hf11 fare a second time In order to rt·ttn and her husband off a train, It ap- taln It, he would have a remedy 8Jl'lli1111t
peared that, their ticket not being stamped the 1•01111mny for a breach of tbP controct;
as rf'<}ulrerl, the conclnctor told the hue- b11t he would have to adopt a dedarut:u 1
hand they must pay fnrr or get on, and dlffPrlng esl!entlally from the on~ resol"tt-<l
afterwards. at the next station, ealcl. In a to In thlH ca11e." In that caee the pu11l!e11brueqne, dt>elded manner: "This le H., If ger hit cl paid to a point beyond that callt•cl
you are going to get off," and. they say- for by the ticket, and, rPfuelng to pny ful'e,
ing they bad no Intention of getting off wae ejt'Cted, and was denied a recovery In
unll'88 ordert>d, he said," 'rhen I order you an action on the case. The prim·lple
off.~ am\ they got oH,.and rt'tarned and
enunrlnted In this cal!e In Mkhigan. thnt,
paid fare, and It was held that the com- ae bPtween the pns11eng-t>raml the conclnctpany wae not llahle for damages, though or, tl•e tlt'ket Is the conclu11lve evldenc<> of
plaintiff was lying on plllow11, and app1tr- the paHeenl(er's rlir;hts, Is eustnlned fn ~t-v
ently an lnvRll<I. But. had force been 0t1ed, eral well·ronshlt>red ('Al!ee. 'l'ownRend v.
if no more titan wee necessary to re- Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 295: opinion hy
move the plaintiff from the cur, or If It be Chief JustiPe CoOl.EY In Hufford v. Hailsaid that actual force IM not. nec('1111ary to road Co., ll3 Mkh. ll'l. l>l N. W. Rt>p. 5 :o;
eu11taln the action, but thatthreate1w<1 ex- Railroad Co. v. Griffin, 6~ Ill . 4!J!); J\lcpuhdon and departure of the pus11rngcr Clure v. Rnllroad Co., 34 Md. fi.12: 8lw't,111
from the car by reason of It shall 11ta11tl in v. Ratlrond Co., 21} Ohio St. ~14: DownH v.
lieu of tt. I do not think the uctlon can be Rttllroad Co., 36 Com1. 2'7; Petrie v. H11llroa1l Co., 42 N. ,J. Law, 449; Y.orton v.
maintained.
In Frederkk v. Railroad Co., 37 Mich. Unilroud Co., 54 Wis. 2J4. 11 N. W. HPp.
342, It Is said that the uniform and uni- 4"'2; Bracleha w v. Railroad Co., 135 .Mai;i.i.
versal prnctlce Is for railroad cumpuniPR 40i.
to lesue tlekets with the plttcl'H d<·11i;.;nu ted
In the Ohio caee of Shelton v. Rnllron1l
from and to which the p1111111>ngt•r h:! to be Co .. eupra, It wne held that the fuct th11t
earned, and that tlll'Ht' tlckPte are unhesl- a tlck<'t had bct'n rrnrcha11ecl, which was
tath1gly ftccepted by the conductor ae evl- oftrrwnrdR wrongfully taken up h.v a
dencu of the contract l1etwee11 the com- cuncluctor on ont' trnln, will not re:le,·e"
pany and pa11Hc11gcr, nnll that the conduct- pnRsPnacer from the duty of huylnu; u th-k ·
or has selcloru any otlll•r mt'llllK of 1u1cer- . et or paying fare on onot!Jer train of thP
talnlng or leftt·nlng. within time to be of defcn1lant, and that In 11uch case thP ri~ht
any avail, the termi.i of thecontruct, unlcRs of action would he for wrongfully tuk111g
he relies on the Rt8 temrnt O! th!' pllRHCJl· ur1 the ticket. and not for rPlllU\'tJ.l lrum
ger, ('Ontrndlcte<l, perhupH, by the til-kPt, the train for h11lure to pay ht re.
and that there wlll be cm1ee wlll'rc a ticket
In the llllnuliJ case above cited, (Hall1

0

declaration, violently and with great force I

ejected and pushed and buried irmn the

car, but walked from it hintself, without I

the slightest battery or assault upon his '

person. He does not himself say so, and

otherevidences make itquitc clear that no

force or violence was used. The evidence
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does show a breach of the company‘s con-

tract to convey the plaintiff as a passenger,

or an agreement to sell a different ticket,

but not a trespass for which an action

based on a tort can be maintained. It is

simply the case of a refusal and failure to

carry out its contract of conveyance, for

which an action of trespass on the casc,in

assumpsit based on that contract, might

be maintained. The mere manner of his

expulsion would not sustain the action as

one based on tort, The plaintiff's evi-

dence is that the conductor“talked short"

to him, and he to the conductor, and,

when he was presenting his views as to

the validity of the ticket, the conductor

said, “It don't make a damn bit of differ-

ence, "-that he had to get off or pay fare.

In the late case in the supreme court of

North Carolina, (Rose v. Railroad Co., 11

S. E. Rep. 526,) an action for putting plain-

tiff and her husband off a train. it ap-

peared that,their ticketnot being stamped

as required, the conductor told the hus-

band they must pay iarc or get off, and

afterwards. at the next station, said. in a

brusque, decided manner: “This is H., if

you are going to get off," and. they say-

ing they had no intention of getting off

unless ordered, he said, “Then 1 order you

off." and they got offfrand returned and

paid fare, and it was held that the com-

pany was not liable for damages, though

plaintiff was lying on pillows, and appar-

ently an invalid. But. had forcebeen used,

if no more than was necessary to re-

move the plaintiff from the car, or if it be

said that actual force is not necessary to

sustain the action,but thatthreatened ex-

pulsion and departure of the passenger

from the car by reason of it shall stand in

lien of it. 1 do not think the action can be

maintained.

In Frederick v. Railroad Co., 37 Mich.

342, it is said that the uniform and uni-

versal practice is for railroad companies

to issue tickets with the places designated

from and to which the passenger is to be

carried, and that these tickets are unhesi-

...
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road Co. v. Griﬂin,l it was held that if a

passenger pay fare to a certain station,

and the agent inadvertently give him a

ticket to an intermediate station, the

demand of a second fare will be a breach

of theimplied contract on the part of the ,

company to carry him to the proper sta-

tion. By paying a second time, his action

will be as complete as if he resist the de-

mand, and suffershimself to be ejected; and

his ejection will add nothing

of action. It is his duty to pay the second

fare; and, if the company fail to make

reparation, he can maintain his appropri-

ate action. This case recognizes the con-

tract as the proper ground of action.

Hall v. Railroad Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 585.

in Yorton v. Railroad Co., supra, the

passenger. desiring to stop over, and ha v- ‘
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ing the right toa stop-overticket, was giv-

en instead a trip check, through the con-

ductor's fault; and it Was held that a

second conductor may demand additional

fare, and may, on refusal to pay,eject him

from the train, using no unnecessary force.

and that such ejection will be no ground

of recovery against the company, though

it w‘ be liable for the fault of the ﬁrst

conductor.

in Townsend v. Railroad Co., supra, it ,

was held that a regulation of a railroad

company requiring passengers to present

evidence to the conductor of a right to a

seat or pay fare, is reasonable, and for

non-compliance a passenger may be put

otf, and the wrongful taking of the pas-

senger's ticket by a conductor ofa pre-

vious train, on which the passenger had

performed part of his journey, does not

exonerate him from compliance with the

regulation, and that for the wrongful act

to his cause ‘

of the former conductor the company is

liable. It does not justify the passenger

in violating the company's lawinl regula-

tion on another train.

In Hibbard v. Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 455,

it was held that a passenger who had a

ticket in his pocket, and had exhibited it

once to the conductor, and refused to ex-

hibit it again when called on, was proper-

ly ejected for refusing to exhibit his ticket.

Here the plaintiff had a ticket not

good for the ,trip he was making, and

declined to pay fare. He cannot main-

tain an action for ejection, or a threat-

ened election, from the train, but must

look to the breach of contract, or the act

of receiving money for the round trip and

giving a wrong ticket. If the passenger

have a ticket good for the passage, and

the conductor should refuse to recognize

it, and expel the passenger, the act would

be a tort; and an action as foratortcould

be maintained. Judge COOLEY said in

Hufford v. Railroad Co., supra, that all

the judges of the Michigan supreme court

agreed that if the ticket was apparently

D.UIAtH~S

IN .\.CTIONS AGAINST C.\.RRll!.'RS.

rond Co. v. Griffin,) It waH hehl that if Rt
puHH1·nger pay Jure to a certain station,
un1l the agent lnadVl•rtmtly give him a
ticket tQ an Intermediate station, the
demand of a second fare wl11 be a breach
or tht> Implied contract on the part of the
co111p11ny to carry him to thP proper station. By paying a second time, his action
will be as complete as if he J"t>slst the demand, und suffera himself to be ejected; and
llls ejection will add nothing to hie cause
or uctlon. It ls his duty to pay the second
fare; and, if the company fall to make
reparation, he can maintain his appropriate action. This case recognizes thl'I contract as the proper ground of action.
Hall v. Railroad Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 585.
In Yorton v. Rnllroad Co., suprn, the
passenger. deslrln1e to stop over, nnd ha v10111; the right toa stop-over ticket, wasglven Instead a trip check, through the conducto1·'"' fault; and It ~ held that a
Pec.·ond conductor may demand additional
fare, 11nd may, on refm1al to pny, eject him
from the train, using no unnece8118ry force.
and that such ejection will be no ground
of recovery against the company, though
It
be liable for the fault of the first
conductor.
In 'fowmiend "· RalJroa.d Co., supra, It
was f)Pld that a regulation of a railroad
compuny requiring passP.ngerH to pre11ent
evidence to the conductor of a right to a.
sent or 11ay rare, le reasonable, nnd for
non-compliance a passenger mny be put
off, end the wronarful taking of the pas11enger's ticket by a conductor of a previous train, on which the passe11~1· had
pPrformerl part ol his journey, does not
exonerate him from compliance with the
regulation, and that for the wrongful act

w•

of the former conductor the company Is
liable. It does not justify the paHtwng<'I·
In violating the company's lawlul l"l'~nht
tlon on another train.
In Hibbard v. Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 4.'J.'i,
It was heltl that a paRsenger who had &
ticket In hie pocket, and had exhibited It
once to the conductor, and refused to exhibit It again when called on, waH properly ejected for refusing to exhibit bis ticket.
Here the plaintiff ha<l a ticket not
gtfod for the .trip he was making, and
declined to pay fare. He cannot maintain an action for ejection, or a threatened ejection, from the train, but must
look to the breach of contract, or the act
of receiving money for tl1e round trip and
giving a wrong ticket. If the passenger
have a ticket good for the passaire, and
the conductor sboulcl refuse to recognize
It, and expel the passenger, the act would
be a tort; and an action as for a tort could
be maintained. Judge CooLEY said In
Hufford v. Railroad Co., supra, that all
the judges of the Michigan supreme court
agreed that If the ticket was apparently
good the pas11enger need not leavl'lthe car.
But here the ticket was very apparently
not good. Therefore the motion of thi.
defendant to reject plalntlH's evidence as
not sustaining bis action should have
been sustained, not overruled. As the evidence should have been excluded, It becomes unnoceesary to pass on the Instructions. 'l'he judgment le reversed• the verdict of the jury set aside, and the case 18
remanded for -a new trinl in accordance
with principles herein Indicated.
SNYDEH, P., and ENGLISH, J., concurred. LUCAli, J., dl&Reutlog.

t:.\HHlEltS O.b' PASSE!\GERS.
C.\ltllIEllS OF PASSENGERS.

l':U.!'\\"llI:Tll v. CIIH".\W), B. & Q. RY.
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.r‘.l1l..\‘“'Uil'l‘H v. CHl('.\GO, B. & Q. RY.

(Ii:~ ~-

w. r,,."-1,

1)5 lown. 98.)

CO,

(63 N. W. 584, 95 Iowa. 98.)

Supt-cme (‘ourt of Iowa.' May 28. i895.

Appeal from district court, Adams county;

H. M. Towner. Judge.

(in the morning of September 27, 1893, the

plaimiff procured a ticket on defend:mt's line

of road from Prescott to Corning, a distance

of 715; miles. Because of the fair at Corning,

the company was selling round-trip tickets at

reduced rates, which tickets had to be ﬁlled

in with a pen. The plaintiff was late reach-

ing the depot at Prescott, so that there was

no time to ﬁll up a round-trip ticket, and he

told the agent to give him a “straight ticket."

The train was moving, and plaintiff took the

ticket handed him, and caught the train, and

got onto the rear platform. Because of his
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haste, he did not pay for the ticket, but said

to the agent that he would pay on his return,

to which the agent assented. By a rule of

the company, tickets must be used on the

day they are purchased, and. if not so used.

they may be returned, and the purchase

money will be refunded. The ticket given

plaintif f was dated September 24, 1893. in-

stead of the 27th, the day on which it was

handed to plaintiff. The delivery of the

ticket to plaintiff was a mistake. it having

before been sold, and not used, and then re-

1

' thereafter.

of the time on which said ticket will be

honored, and, as such, is a reasonable limita-

tion and rule. You are further instructed

that, presnunptively, the date of the ticket

was the day of its sale. But if, as a mat-

ter of fact, the day of the sale differs from the

date of the ticket, yet the said ticket by its

express terms was good from the date of

sale, and you ﬁnd from the evidence that said

ticket was purchased by plaintiff on the 26th

or 27th day of September, 1893, and was pre-

sented within one day from the actual date

of such sale, it was good for such passage

between the points named. to wit, Prescott

and Corning." The instruction is said to in-

~11pr1•mp

Court of Iowa. ' Moy 28.

um;;,

ApJH'lll from dh•trlct court, Adame county;
H. ~l. 'l'ownPr..Ju<lgt-.
On the moruiug of September 27, l8!1:i, the
plainiitT 111·ocuretl u tkkl't nn dl'fentl1wt'>< line
of road from Pr~<·ott to Corning, a <ll11tnnce
of i~~I miles. aecause ot the fnlr at Cuming,
tllp rumpany wss selling round-trip tickets at
rPdm·1~1 1·ates, which tlckPts hud to be Hlled
lu with a pen. '.fhe plaluti!Y was late reaching the depot at Prescott, so that there wss
no time to fill up a round-trip tkket, and he
told the agent to give him a ..stnihrht ticket."
'l'he train ""'&s moving, and plaiutilT took the
th·ket handed him, and caught the train, nml
i:ot unto the rear platform. Bel·n~ of hi11
haste, he dltl not pay for the ti<'ket, but Raid
to tlw agent that he would pay on his return,
to whkh the agent assented. By a rule llf
the company, tlC'kets must be used on the
<lay thPy are pur<"hased, and. If not eo usell.
tht>y may be returned, and the purcha."le
money wlll be refunded. The ticket given
plalntll!' was dated S1>ptemlK'r 24. um:~. Instead of the 27th, the (\ay on which it wns
handed to plalntilT. The <lPllvl.'ry of the
ticket to plaintlO'. was a. mistnkl.', It lun·lng
before been sold, and not used, and tllen re41el.'med, as above stated. The redemption
wn11 b.v the night agent at Prescott, who put
It In th(• 1lrnwer In the ticket office, and the
dny 11;..:,.ut, without noticing the date, gave lt
to pin intl!Y. \\'hen a short dlstnnce tnnn
rreS4·11tt. the eonductor asked for plolntill's
ticket, ontl the ticket In question was bonded
him. whid1. IH><·ause of Its date, he ref11sP1l,
and 1h•111m11!Pd t.h<> fare. The regular fnre to
Con1ini: Is :!'2 1·ent11, 11nd hy the ntl(>s of the
co1111m11)', 11uthoriz1•d by th+> laws of the 11tntP,
10 c1•nts above the reinllnr fare Is collect!'d
by Politi m·tors when the ticket oftlpe hos lweu
op1•n fo1· a reasornt hie time before tile departure ot trains, and ticket11 are not secured. Aftpr the refmml of the coruluctor to
rece-lve the ticket, plnlutitr ol'l'ered to Jlay the
r<>i:ular farP. I.Jut rE"fm~ed to pny the :ulrll·
tional 10 c<>nti•. The tmln was l:!topf>l!!I, aml
plaintiff ejPl'tPd, and this action is for dnmuges. There was a ve1·cli<'t and jud~ment fo1·
tl:P plnlntilT, and the dPfP-n<lnnt appPale(l.
Attir111e11.

volve error because it treats the transaction

between the agent and plaintiff as a sale of

the ticket, when it appears that the tickct

:0-:111i1h ~kl'h1•1.,.,011, for app1•1lunt.
\\"1•1!>', fOl' :ll'lH'llt-e.

Dnvis &

was not paid for on delivery, but it was

paid for afterwards on the same day On

that branch of the case the court gave the

following instruction: “In the case at bar it

is admitted that plaintiff procured a ticket

from the defendant's agent at Prescott be-

fore entering defendant's cars. It is also ad-

mitted that payment was not made until

On this branch of the case you

‘ are instructed that a neglect of plaintiff to

deemed, as above stated. The redemption 1

after, constitute a valid consideration and

was by the night agent at Prescott, who put

it in the drawer in the ticket ofﬁce, and the

day :u.u-nt, without noticing the date, gave it ,

to plaintiff. When a short distance from

Prosculr. the conductor asked for plaintiffs

Gfl.-\NGEfl, J. 1. Thp 1·<111rt J!'ll\"f' thr jnry
the following Instruction: "The tkkct iutro" 11n·d iu evid1•11ct'. aml wl1ieh is n•lmitt1•d :i
th<! one purl'lmsed by plaintifl' of (}pfl>111tant's
:1~<'llt, is datP1l l'lept1·111lwr :.!!, l~fl3, and ('011taiu~ the following dan~c : 'Continuous pas':1:::'P within one tin)· of date of i;ale.'
You
are i11><u·1wt•~I that ":till l'1:111•e Is a lirnitation
LAW fl.\.:\l.:.!tl Ell.-:!J

of the time on which said tkket will he
honoreu, and, as such, ls a rensouable lhnitntlon awl rule. You are further instructe1\
that, Jll"t.•:111mptlvely, the date of the tir!H•t
was the duy of Its !!Ille. But tr. as a mutter of fn!'t, th<> day of thP ~llP 1lilfers from thP
date of the ticket, yet the 11:1itl tickN hy its
expn~s tE"rms '\Vas goo1l from t be date of
sale, and you find from the l'\'h!P111·e tllnt sahl
ticket was pun·hased hy plnlntitl' on the 2Uth
or 27th day of 8t'l>i1•mher, 1SH3. and was pre' sented within one tlay from the actual dute
ot such sale, It was good for such passage
betwl'en the poinh1 named. to wit, Prescott
and Corning." The lnst111ctlon ls t!ttld to Involve error because it treats the tronsnction
betw!'E'n the ngPI1t and plaintiff as a tialc of
the ti<:ket, when It appears thnt the tll'kl'I.
wu11 not paid for on delivery, hut lt w:is
paid for afterwurils on the same day On
that branch of the 1i1S4.• the court gave tlw
following Instruction: .. In the case llt bar It
ls ndmltted that pl:1intilf proeur1>d a til'kN
from the defen1.l ant'ti ugent at PrPsL'Ott lx·fore !'lltPring defendant's cars. It 111 al110 1ul111ith•(I thut puyuwnt w11s not nuHle until
thereafter. On th!s hrnnl'11 of tlle case yuu
arP lnstr1wted that a neglect of plaintiff to
PU>' fo1· the snme at th11t time, muler the circumstau<'es shown on the trial of this cn.'<l',
·would not alonP, or tor thnt rl.'n!<On, mvrhidUe the tkket; nnd an nn·t-pllmce on tlw
part of the ngent of pL'llntlf'l"s promise to por
th1>rrfor on his rPt11r11, nnd a Jl:t)"llll'llt tlwn·
nftPr, con!'tltnte a vnlltl consiilPratlon u11d
pnym<>ut thl•retor." It !'('('Ill!! to us tllnt thnt
Is the conect rule. Hud there been a refu>'nl
to nc<·ept the ticket bl~l·11use nut paid tor, th!'
QUPstiou might IJe dl1'1'N'ent. It Ill not wlm t
could be cnllell a credit sale, nor was It l11t<>1Hll'd as sul.'h, but only a delay in paynw11t
bec:mse there wns not time to 1my nnd g1•r
the train, nrnl payment was expel·ted the
mme duy, nml so mncle.
2. There is n further coruplnint of lnstnw·
tlon No. 6 becn nst', not wit hstnmling tlu•
clause, "eontinuous pa><sagt• within one day
of date of sale," it holtls the til'kPt good if
prp:·wntctl "within onp day from the uetunl
<late of such sale." 'I'llis contPntion mea11><
thnt thP valhllty of tlu: ti<'k1•t for the pa..;sa;..:1• li<'IH'llll<•1I upon ltl'.I tla 11• rat her than tl11.•
fu!'t as to the sale. ·we 1·nunot concur in
that view. It Is not to be believed that tl11•
<'•>mpa ny evn lnt<>111lP<l to sell a tieket that
shonlll not he ho11or!'i.I for a Jl:tl'sage on thr
<lay ot the a\'lnnl snle. It Is tme that tl11•
lntPnt Is. In su<'11 f'llSPS, to hn \'c thP two
dah•!>! co1w11r. hut no l'"lllJlan~· or pern<111
woulrl ever design that its mi><I a ke In s11l'l1
a war should he to thl' tJr!'judin~ of n 1mr·
cluv-a•r of a ticket. It Is not tu be 1k11l>t(•d
thnt both the compan~' an1l the plaintlft' lr.tPmled that the tic-ket i11 quetition ~llo!!ld l>f'
gootl for a pa><~ai.:1• on tlu) trai11 on which it
wai,i otl'(•l'P(l. The fads ndmlt of no ot l11·r
1·011dw•io11. It Is equally trne that th~ pl:1 i11·
,•tilI W:.tS, a$ betWCCll hilll~l'if UnU the CUiU-
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pany, entitled to passage on that train, and l on the ticket, and, refusing to pay his fare

that his ejectment from it was wrongful.

The more diﬂicult question is as to his rem- ,

‘ edy for the wrong done him; that is, when ,

the conductor refused to accept the ticket

because of its date, had the plaintiff the le- ‘

gal right to insist on a passage on that train,

and resist removal therefrom, or should he

have paid his fare, as demanded, and sought ;

redress from the company on that basis, or,

not wishing to do that, should he, on request

of the conductor, to avoid damage, have left

the train without resistance, and based his

damage on the mistake in selling him the

ticket? Authorities on this question are far

from being harmonious. Other courts have,

and this court should, in determining these

questions. keep in mind the ditliculties to

be met with and overcome in a successful
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management of the railway passenger trafﬁc

of the country, both as to the public and the

carriers. To such an end it is clearly im-

portant that there shall be rules for the

guidance of empioyes in the diflerent parts

of the service, and that such rules should be

conclusive as to their course of conduct, even

though at times the rule may operate to the

prejudice of an individual passenger. We

may instance a case or two as illustrative

of it, as when a person who has purchased

a ticket loses it. All will at once see that,

although he has paid for the passage, he is ‘

not entitled to it on the lost ticket. because

the only evidence to show the conductor that

he has purchased a ticket is his word, and .

the confusion and consequences to result ,

I ger to the claims of the conductor in either

i case, and his seeking a remedy otherwhw

from such a system of management are too

manifest to deserve comment. Take, also, a

case in which a ticket is paid for, but no ‘

ticket handed to the passenger, through the ,

neglect of the agent, and the passenger

boards the train with no evidence of a right

to a passage. The equitable status of the

passenger in this case is somewhat stronger

than in the other, but the importance of a

rule of conduct for the conductor is equally V

strong. In such a case there is no harsh-

ness in the rule requiring him to seek his

damage, if any, on the basis of a failure to

deliver the ticket, and which excludes him

from any rights on the train because of his .

payment for the ticket. It is safe to state,

as a rule of passenger traiiic, that no person

has a right to passage on a train without

paying fare, unless a ticket or other evidence

of a right to transportation is presented to

the conductor. This holding, at the outset.

puts us to that extent in line with the au-

thorities on the subject, a number of which

are cited by appellant in support of its con-

tention in this case. A case relied on by

appellant is Frederick v. Railroad Co.,.37

Mich. 342. We have examined the case with

care. in that case it was claimed by plain-

tiff that he called and paid for a ticket from

ishpeming to Marquette, and, by mistake,

DAMAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

pany, entitled to passage on that train, and on the ticket, and, refusing to pay bis fare
that his ejectment from It was wrongful to Marquette, he was ejected from the tmin,
The more difficult question le as to bis rem· because of· which he brought the action. In
edy for the wrong done him; that ls, when that case It will be seen that the passenger
the conductor refused to accept the ticket bad no ticket from l\Iorgnn to Marquette, a
bec>ause of Its date, bad the plalntltT the le- fact known to him before reaching Morgan.
gal right to Insist on a passage on that train, The case In this respect ls quite In line with
and resist removal therefrom, or shoul'd he the rule we announce, and, In this respect.
hnYP paid his fare, as demanded, and sought unlike tlle case at bar. The opinion in that
redress from the company 0•1 that basis, or, case deals somewhat elaborately with the
not wishing to do that, should he, on request Importance of rules to guide conductors, and
of the conductor, to avoid damage, have left ot the conclusiveness of the ticket as to his
the train without resistance, and based his duty. In the opinion in that case It is said:
damage on the mistake In selling him the "As between the conductor and passenger.
ticket? Authorities on this question are far the ticket must be the conclusive evlde111·1•
from being harmonious. Other courts have, of the extent of the passenger's right to
and this court should, In determining these travel. No other rule can protect the couquestions, keep in mind the difficulties to ductor In the performance of his duties, or
be met with and overcome In a successful enable him to determine what he may or
manngement of the railway passenger traffic may not lawfully do In managing the train
of the country, both as to the public and the ' or collecting fares." With the proposition
carl"lers. To such an end It Is clearly Im- we do not dltTer, for, as between the conducportant that there shall be rules for the tor and passenger, no other rule can well
guidance of employ~s in the dltTerent parts obtain, but that ls not to say that a paSl!enof the service, and that such rules should be
ger may not have rights on a train that a
conclusive as to their course of conduct, even conductor, obsen·lng bis instructions, may
thClugh at times the rule may operate to the not violate so that the company wlll be Ii·
pr(,judlce of an Individual pas11enger. We able. The reasoning In that case would
may Instance a case or two as Illustrative carry the elfect of the rule further than we
of It, as when a person who has purchased Indicate our approval. It treats of the du·
a ticket loses It. All wlll at once see that, ties of passengers, even when entitled to a
although he bas paid for the passage, he ls passage on a ticket, and the right ls denied
not entitled to It on the lost ticket, because by a conductor, and when a wrong tlcket is
the only evidence to show the conductor that Issued by mistake of the agent, so that he
he has purchased a ticket ls his word, and , has not the ticket he should have, and It
the confusion and consequences to result favors a yielding on the part of the pnsiieufrom such a system of management are too
ger to the claims of the conductor In either
manifest to deserve comment. Take, also, a case, and his seeking a remedy otberwil!c·
case In which a ticket Is paid for, but no than for an ejectment from the tmln. Thi•
tlc•ket handed to the passenger, through the force of that case as an authority In the reneglect of the agent, and the passenger speC'tS stated ls much lessened, If not entirely
boards the train with no e\'ldence of a rlgl1t lost. from the fact that, of the four judges,
to a passage. The equltahle status or the two of them place their concurrence In an
passenger In this case is somewhat stronger ' attirwance on a different ground, and it does
not appear that the reasoning referred to ls
than In the otbel", but the Importance of a
rule of conduct for the conductor Is equally approved by them. In a late r Michigan
strong. In such a cnse there Is no harsh· case, that of Hulford v. Railway Co., 5.1
ness in the rule requiring him to seek bis l\Iicb. 118, 18 N. W. 580, the language of the
damage, If any, on the basis of a failure to Frederick Case, that we approve, le In subdeliver the ticket, and which excludes him stance stated and approved. In the latter
from any rights on the train be<'au11e of bis case the ticket purchased was a part ot an
payment for the tkket. It Is AAfe to state, excursion ticket that bad, in part at least.
as a rnh• of pa11<Nenger tra!llc, that no person been canceled, and Lhls was R)lparent on the
hn" u right to passage on a train without face of the ticket. The agent, when shown
the ticket hy the purchaser, said It was good,
pa~·lng fare, unless a ticket or other evidence
of a. right to transportation Is presented to
but it really was not. In that case, to pretlw t·muluctor. This holcllng, at the outset. vent ejectment from the train, the passenputs 1111 to tbnt extent in line with the au- ger pa.id the fare, and the action was for
thorltl<"I! on the> subject, a numlle1· of which damages because the conductor luld his band
are c ited by appellant In su11port of ltR con- on him to put him olf, and took bold of the
tention In this <'HRe. A <·nsP rc>lll'd on by bell rope to stop the train for that purpmie.
a11pellnnt is Fredt•rick v. Unilroud Co.,, 37 It Is not nece s1mry for us to say whether 0r
not we concur In the holding in that case,
Mich. 342. We have examlnpd the case with
for we uuderstan<l thnt court to rest its holdcan•. In thnt case It wnH ..1:1imecl hy plainiug on the apparent inn1lldity of the tieket
tiff thnt hr enlled and pail.I for a ticket from
111hpe111i11g to :\lnrquette, uml, by mistake, on Its fn<·e. it ha Ying !wen <·n neeled. It hi
Uw c·u1uh1dor gnve blm one t\.I Morgan, an said In that opinion: ''Hut w e are all of th!'
1nte1·1111•cli11tc station. He rode w Morgan oplnlou thut, if the plaintiff's ticket wus
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apparently good, he had a right to refuse to

leave the car." That is what we regard as

the situation in this case. Plaintiffs ticket

was apparently good on its face. It should

have entitled him to one ﬁrst-class passage

from Prescott to Corning. The fact render-

ing it not good was a rule of the company

as to the time in whiqh it could be used.

These rules are changeable at the pleasure of

the company, and when a ticket is purchased

from one station to another, and on its face

it indicates a right to that passage, no rule

or regulation of the company should be per-

mitted to defeat that right. A passenger has

a right to assume that an agent placed at a

station will observe the rules with reference

to such matters as dates in or on a ticket.

What may ‘be the rule to-day may not be to-

morrow. Conceding plaintiff to have known
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of the rule previously, he was not called

upon to question the act of the agent as to

the rule on the day he bought the ticket. It

is neither reasonable nor practicable for pas=

sengers to take notice of such matters, or at-

tempt to correct agents in regard to them.

With a ticket that expressed his right to a

passage to Corning, he was not required to

look behind it for the authority of the agent

to issue it. We do not understand that the

supreme court of Michigan would apply the

rule as to yielding to the directions of a con-

ductor to a case like this, where the ticket

is apparently good, but, even if otherwise,

we cannot so hold. It would be doing too

much in favor of a party in the wrong

merely to subserve a public convenience, for

which much is claimed. A thought in argu-

ment is, and some language of the opinions

referred to seems to favor it. that it is the

duty of the passenger to not enhance dam-

ages by resistance, because it is of no use,

but that he should submit quietly to eject-

ment, and then seek his damages. To say

the least, we think he may make any resist-

ance, not amounting to a criminal disturb-

ance of the peace. as was done in this case,

and that he is not called upon to ubmit to

a wrongful ejection for the purpose of econ-

omizing the damages to be recovered. Town-

send v. Railway Co:, 56 N. Y. 295, ls another

case cited and relied upon by appellant. In

that case the passenger had surrendered his

ticket to a conductor on another train. He

changed trains, as was necessary, to reach

his destination, but he had no evidence what-

ever of a right to a passage on that train.

He claimed to the conductor that he had pur-

chased a through ticket, and that the other

-conductor had taken it, and not given it back.

For a refusal to pay, he was ejected, ans‘ a Y

of another train; that he should have left

the train without resistance, and if he in-

vited force, by resistance, the company was

not liable for it. The rule is not against our

conclusions. The conductor was right in re-

fusing the passage without a ticket. In such

a case the passenger must pay or leave the

train. If he does not he is in the wrong.
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llpparently good, be had a right to retuse to of another train; that he should bave left
leave the car." That ls what we regard as the train without resistance, and If he Inthe situation ln this case. PlalntUf's ticket vited force, by resistance, the company was
was apparently good on Its face. It should not llnble for it. The rule Is not against our
have entitled him to one first-class passage conclusions. '.rbe conductor was right in retrom Prescott to Corning. '.rhe fact render- fusing the passage without a ticket. In su<'h
ing lt not good was a rule of the company a case the passenger must puy or leave the
.ns to the time in whl<;J1 It could be used. train. If be does not he ls in the wrong.
·These rules ure changeable nt the pleasure of But even in that case two of the judges
the <.'Olll)lany, and when n ticket Is purdiased based their concmrence on the first gl'Ound,
trom ouc station to another, and on its face and one on the last.
it indicates a right to that passage, no rule
The case of Huffonl v. Railway Co., cited
or regulation of the eompnny should be per- above, was appealed a second time and ls
mitted to defeat that right. A 1111sscnger has reported tn 64 lflch. 631, 31 N. W. GH. It
a right to assume thnt an 11gt>ut pluced nt a will be remembered that It le the case wllcre
station will observe the rules with reference tile canceled ticket was sold and refused by
to such matters as dates In or on a tkket. the conductor. As bearing upon the effeet
What may 'be the rule t1>-!lay may not be to- of such a ticket when presented this lanmorrow. Conceding plulntllT to have known guage is used: "The ticket given by the
of the rule previously, he wus not ('Ulled agent to tbe plaintiff was the evhlence ag1·ped
upon to question the act of the agent us to upon by the parties, by which the defendant
the rule on the day he bought the ticket. It should thereafter recognize the rights of the
ls neither reasonable nor practicable for pas: plaintiff in his contract; and neither the
sengers to take notice of such matters, or at· company, nor any of Its agents, could the1·etempt to correct agents In reganl to them. after be permitted to say that the ticket was
Wlth a ticket that expressed bis right to a
not such evidence, and conclusive upon the
passage to Corning, he wae not required to subject. Passengers are not Interested In
look behind It for the authority of the agent the Internal affairs of the companies whose
to ISBue It. We do not understand that the coaches they ride in, nor are they requh·ed
supreme court of Michigan would apply the 1 to know the rules and regulations made by
rule aa to yielding to the directions of a con- the directors of a company for the control
ductor to a case like thls, where the tkket of the actions of Its agents and the managels apparently good, but, even if otherwise, ment of its affairs." The .:ase bolds that
we ca'lnot so hold. It would be doing too even the canceled ticket, because lsl'ued for
much In favor of a party in the wrong a p:u1snge, wils good and con<·w~1 ~e. H.iu·
merely to subserve a public convenience, for way Cu. v. J>ougherty, 86 Ga. 744, 12 S. E.
whlcb much ls claimed. A thought ln argu- . 747, was an action by a colored woman for
ment ls, and some language or the opinions being ejected from a train, where there was
referred to seems to favor It. that it Is the a mlstakt-, ber ticket being to Asheville,
duty of tbe passenger to not eul11111l'e dam- N. c.. Instead of Atlama, Ga.. as she supages by resistance, be<>nuse it Is of no use, llOsed. In the opinion it Is snlfl: ""'t> think
but that be should submit quietly to eject- she had a right to rely on tbe ticket she had
ment, and then seek bis damages. To say purchased from tbe agent of the raU1·oad
the lenst, we tblnk he may make any resist· company as belng a proper one, without an
ance, not amounting to a criminal dlstur'b- examlnntlon of the same; and, nothing elRe
ance of the pence. ns wns clone in this case, appearing, there being no Intervening cirand that he Is not <·ailed upon to submit to cumstances wblcb required her to look at the
a wrongful ejection tor the purpose of econ- ticket, if she could have read the same, such
omizing the damages to be recovered. Town- conduct upon the part ot the railroad comaend v. Railway Co;; 56 N. Y. 295, \s nnothei pany and its agents authorized her to recover
case cited and relied upon by appellant. In d:unages." 8ee Hnilroad Co. v. Olds. 77 tia.
that case the passenger had surrendered his 673; Railroad Co. v. Winter's Adm'r, 14:l U.
ticket to a conductor on another train. He B. 60, 12 Sup. Ct. 356; Railway Co. v. Fix,
changed trains, as was necessary, to reach 88 Ind. 381; Railway Co. v. Hold1·idge, 118
his destination, but he had no evidence what- Ind. 281, 20 N. E. 837; Railroad Co. v. Hice,
ever of a right to a passage on that train. 64 Md. 63, 21 Atl. 97; Murdock v. Rnih"oad
He claimed to the conductor that be bad pur- Co., 137 Mass. 293; Burnham v. Railway Co.,
«hased a through ticket, and that the other 63 Me. 298.
.conductor had taken it, and not given Lt back.
Some importance ts attnt•hed to the fact
For a refusal to pay, he was ejected, am' a
tbat the plalntur acquiesced in the demand
recovery bad in the lower court. The case of the conductor by offering to pny the rPi:uwas reversed on two grounds, the latter lar tare, and only objected to the extra 10
ground helng the pnrt of the opinion relied cents, but we do not see how that malces a
on by nppellant. The rule of the case Is that dll'lerence as to his right of recovery. It Is
the rewedy was an action for the wrongful not to be questioned but that he claimed his
act of the first conductor in taking hie ticket; right to a passage on the t!cket. and matlc
that the act of the first condnl'tor did not jus- the offer to avoid ejcctment from the train.
tify the v1olation of the lawful regulations As he had a ticket. he felt that he should not
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be called upon to pay a penalty tor a neglect
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ot which he was not guilty. We cannot see

DA\IAGICS IN ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.

be called upon to pay a penalty for a neglect

of which he was not guilty. We cannot see

how an offer to pay that was not accepted

could excuse his ejectment from a train on

which he was entitled to be.

The court authorized the jury to ﬁnd ex-

emplary damages, if it found that the act

bf defendant was malicious. Complaint is

‘ made of the instruction under the evidence.

‘ but it was warranted. There was evidence

of the previous bad feeling and threats

which, with what was done at the time of

the ejectment, made the question one for the
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jury. The judgment is aﬂirmed.

how an offer to pay that was not accepteu
could excuse. his ejectment from a train on
which he was entitled to be.
The court authorized the jury to find exemplary damages, it it found that the act

Of defendant was mallclous.

Complaint is
made of the instruction under the evidence,
but it was warranted. There WM cv!Ueu<:e
of the previous bad feeling and threats
which, with what was done at the time or
the ejectment, made the question one tor the
jury. The Judgment is affirmed.
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PRIMROSE v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

(14 Sup. Ct. 1098, 154 U. S. 1.)

May 26, 1894.

No. 59.

In error to the circuit court of the United

States for the eastern district of Pennsyl-

vania.

This was an action on the case, brought

January 25, 1888, by Frank J. Primrose, a

citizen of Pennsylvania, against the Western

Union Telegraph Company, a corporation of

New York, to recover damages for a negli-

gent mistake of the defendant's agents in

transmitting a telegraphic message from the

plaintiff, at Philadelphia, to his agent at

Waukeney, in the state of Kansas.

The defendant pleaded (1) not guilty: (2)

that the message was an unrepeated mes-

sage, and was also a cipher and obscure mes-
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sage, and therefore, by the contract between

the parties under which the message was

sent, the defendant was not liable for the

mistake. At the trial. the following facts

were proved and admitted:

On June 16, 1887, the plaintifl' wrote and

delivered to the defendant, at Philadelphia,

for transmission to his agent, William B.

'1‘oland, at Ellis, in the state of Kansas, a

message upon one of the defendant's printed

blanks, the words printed below in italies

being the words written therein by the

PRIMROSE .,, WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.
(14 Sup. Ct. 1008, lM U. S. 1.)
Ha1 26, lSM.
No. 59.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States tor the eastern district of PenD17l·
vnnla.
-This wu an action on the case, brought
January 25, 1888, by Frank J. Primrose, a
<:ltlzen of Penna7lvanla, agalD.Bt the Western
Union Telegraph Company, a corporation of
New York, to recover damages for a negligent mistake of the defendant's agents In
tranamlttlcg a telegn1.t1hlc message from the
plnlnillr, at Phllndelphl11, to bis agent at
Wnukeney, In the state of Knrn•as.
'.rhe drtE>ndnnt pleaded (1) not guilty; (2)
that the ml'ssage waa an unrepeated message, and was nlso a cipher and obscure message, and there-tore, by the contract bl'tween
the parties under whl<'h the message was
sent, the defendant was not liable for the
mistake. At the trial, the following tacts
were preved and admitted:
On June 16, 18S7, the plaintiff wrote nnd
dellvered to the defendnnt, at PlllladE>lphla,
tor transmission to his agent, William B.
Tol:md. at Ellis, In the stute ot Kansas, a
m~sage upcn one of the defendant's printed
blank.", the words prlntrd below In Italics
being the wol"'ls written therein by the
plaintiff, to wit;
'''fll1'l WESTimX UXIO:S TELgGUAPH
COlll'A.NY.

plaintiff, to wit:

"'l‘HE WESTEllN UNlON

COMPANY.

TELEGRAPH

"THOs. 'r. EPKERT.

GV-i,-rai .\i,n8-mr.

“Receiver's No.

NORvIN GREEN.

Pm-sident.

Check "_

_ _Tim: 1‘“1ie?1

13

“Fond the following message,

subject to the terms on back

ht-ri2()f, which are hereby

agreed to.

“To Wm. B. Toland, Ellis, ]?ans1zs.

“Drape! am e.rreedi'ngl_1/ b1my bay all kinds qua

1)er/mps brncken half of it mmca moment promptly

of purchases.

‘FRANK J. PRIMROSE.

“W READ THE norms AND AGnEl£h1l£NT oN

BACK or nus BLANK._El1" '

June 16, 1887.

Upon the back of the message was the fol-

lowing printed matter:

"ALL MESSAGES TAKEN BY THIS CO\I-

PANY ARE SUBJECT TO THE FOL-

LOWING TERMS:

“To guard against mistakes or delays, the

sender of a message should order it RE-

PI~L\'l‘lCD; that is, telegraphed back to the

ori,ginating oﬂice for comparison. For this,

om-half the regular rate is charged in ad-

dition. It is agreed between the sender of

the foilowin,'.,' message and this company

that said company shall not be liable for

"TBOS. T. E<'KERT,
NORVIN OREF.:N.
O.-u••ral llau&l!91'.
President.

-----"Receiver'11No. I Tlme :iled
1

I

Check

•eend the following messagA,}
s11hjcct to t_he terms on back June 16 1887.
h(•rnof, which are hereby
'
agreed to.
•To Wm. B. Toland, BUti, Kan6tu.
• Dupnf am urudingly bUlt]/ briy all kind• quo

per/111 p.~ brricken J1alf of it mince moment promptly
(Jj purelta1u.
•FRANK J. PRIJfROSB.

"t1r

RP!A D THE 1'0TIC'E AND AGREEMENT 01'
BACK OF TIJIS BLANK.

Al"

.

Upon the back of the message was the following printed matter:
••ALT.1 :MESS.AGES TAl{EN BY THJS COMPA:SY ARE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TERMf$:
"To gunrd against mistakes or delays, the
sencl<>r of a mcss:1ge should order It Rill·
PE.\TED; that ls, telPgraphed back to the
ori;.:inating office tor comparison. !<"or this,
on<· hall' tile regular rate Is charged In ndditi011. It is n;.:rcPd between the sender of
thl' following mPssng<' and this company
th::t 1'nid compnn.v sh:tll not be liable for
mi:;tnkcs or <ll•lnys lu the transmission or
clelh·ery or for non<l<·:ivny of any C'iJ:E·
PEATED 1111.-s -a:;c, wh1.:tl.Jer happening by

85i

negligence of lta aervants or otherwise, beyond the amount received tor sending the
aame; nor for mistakes or delays In the
transmission or delivery or for nondelivery
of any REPEATED message beyond fifty times
the sum recelTed for sending the same, unlesa specially lnaured; nor In any case for
delays arising from unavoidable Interruption
In the working ot Its lines, or tor errors In
cipher or obscure messages. And this com~
pany ls hereb7 made the agent ot the sender, without llabWty, to forward any message over the lines of a07 other company
when neceasary to reach Its destination.
"Correctness In the transmission ot a message to any point on the lines of this company can be JNBUllED by contract In writing,
stating agreed amount ot risk, and pnymen•
of premium thereon, at the following rates.
In addition to the usual charge tor rl'peated
messages, vlz. one per cent. for any dlstanc<'
not exceeding 1,000 miles, nnd two per cent.
tor any greater distance. No employe of th1•
company ls authorized to vary the foregoing
"No responsiblllty regarding messages at·
tacbes to this company untll the same ar<'
presented and accepted at one of Its trani:mltt!ng otncea; and, If a messuge Is sent tll
such office by one of the company's messengers, he acts for that purpose as the agent
ot the sender.
"Mci;sagea will be delivered free with'•
the establlshcd tree delivery limits of the
tE>rmlnal otnce. For delivery at a grN1tl'r
tllstance, a special charge will be made to
cover the coat or such dellYery.
"The comprmy will not be liable for damages or statutory ppnnltles In any casP where
the claim Is not presented In writing within
sixty days n1'ter th~ mef:snge Is tlled with
the company for transmission.
"NORVIN GREEN, President.
"THOS. T. ECKERT, General Manager."
On the evening of the

sam~

day, an agent

ot the defendant delivered to Toland, at
Wnukeney, upon a blank of the defendant
company, the message In this form, the wlitten word& being printed below in Italics:
"THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH
COMPANY.
"This comJJany TR.ANSMl'l'S and DELIYEHS mesimges only on conditions limit·
Ing Its liability, which ban been assented to
by the sender of the following message.
"Errors can be guarded against only by repenting a message back to the sending eta·
tlon for comparl~rn. and the company wlll
not hold Itself liable for errors or dl'!nys In
transmission or delivery of U~HEPEATED
MESSAGES beyond the amount 01' tolls
paid thereon. nor In any cnse where the claim
Is not prc•sented In writing within sixty days
aft('!' sending the m<'~sagr.
"This is nn U~I:El'L\TF.D l'IIE!'~.\OE,
and is t1div<'l'l'<l hy r<'qn<'st of the Sl'll(kr,
unller ti.le c011tlitions nau1 L'U ubu1·e.
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, "THOS. T. ECKERT,
Gt>neral Man-.

DAMAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

WTHOs. 't‘. ECKERT. NORvIN GREEN.

I

I

NORVIN GRP:EN.

I

Pl'llfJld~nti.

'!llUMRER SENT BY REC'D BY
CHECK.
Rt.
S.
F. N.
22 QiUul ae.ztra worrl1.

General Manager. President

NUMBER sENT BY REC'D BY CillICK.

Iii. S. F. N. 22 Collect Scadra words-

“RECEIVED at 5 K. p. m. June 16,1887.

“ Dated Philadelphia, l0. Forwarded from Ellis.

“To W. B. Toland, Wau/senry, Kansas.

“Destroy am e.1:ccrdl'ng(y busy buy all kinds quo

"RECEIVED at 5 K. p. m.
June 16, 1887.
"Dated Philadelphia, 16. F<>r11JardedfromElli8.
"To W. B. Toland, Waukeney, Kanaaa.
"Dealroy am tJ:Zcudingly buay buy all kinda quo
perltapa bracken l1alf of it mince moment p1·omptly

fJ/ purcl1a1e.

•FRANK J. PRIMROSE.•

perhaps bracken ha.I_/‘of it mince moment promptly

of purchase.

“FRANK J. PRLi[ROSE."

The difference between the message as

sent and as delivered is shown below, where

so much of the message sent as was omitted

in that delivered is in brackets, and the

words substituted in the message delivered

are in italies.

“[Despot] Destroy am exceedingly busy

[bay] buy all kinds quo perhaps bracken half
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of it mince moment promptly of purchasc[s]."

By the private cipher code made and used

by the plaintiff and Toland, the meaning of

these words was as follows:

“Yours of the [ﬁfteenth] aerentcmfh re-

ceived; am exceedingly busy; [I have bought]

buy all kinds. ﬁve hundred thousand pounds;

perhaps we have sold half of it; wire when

you do anything; send samples immediately,

promptly of [purchases] purchase."

The plaintiff testiﬁed that on June 16. 1887,

he wrote the message in his own oﬂice on

one of a bunch or book of the defendant's

blanks which he kept at hand, and sent it to

the defendant's oﬂlce at Philadelphia; that

he had a nmning account with the defend-

ant's agent there, which he settled monthly,

amounting to $180 for that month; that he

did not then read, and did not remember that

he had ever before read, the printed matter

on the back of the blanks; and that he paid

the usual rate of $1.15 for this message, and

did not pay for a repetition or insurance of it.

He also testiﬁed that he then was, and for

many years had been, engaged in the busi-

ness of buying and selling wool all over the

country, and had employed Toland as his

agent in that business, and early in June,

1887, sent him out to Kansas and Colorado,

with instructions to buy 50,000 pounds, and

then to await orders from him before buying

more; that, before June 12th, Toland bought

50,000 pounds, and then stopped buying; and

that he had sent many telegraphic messages

to Toland during that month and previously,

using the same code.

The defendant's agent at Philadelphia,

called as a witness for the plaintiff, testiﬁed

that he sent this message for the plaintiff,

and knew that he was a dealer in wool, and

that Toland was with him, but in what ca-

pacity he did not know; that he had fre-

quently sent messages for him, and consid-

cred him one of his best customers during the

wool season; that telegraphic messages by

the present system were sent and received by

sound, and were all dots and dashes; that

“b" was a dash and three dots, and “y" was

two dots, a space, and then two dots; and that

The difference between the message as
sent and us delivered ls shown below, where
so much of the message sent as was omitted
In that delivered ls ln brackets, and the
words substituted 1n the meSt1age deliYered
are In ltnllcs.
"[Despot] Deatroy am e:s.ceedlngly busy
[bay J buy all kinds quo perhaps bracken half
ot 1t mince moment promptly of purchase[s]."
By the private cipher eode made and UBed
by the plaintiff and Toland, the meaning of
these words was as follows:
"Yonrs of the [tHteenthl aer~umfh received; am exceedingly busy; [I hnve bought)
bu.I/ all kinds. 'five hundred thousand pounds;
perhaps we have sold hull' of It; wil"e when
you do anything; send samples Immediately,
prom1itly of lpurchascs] purcli111e,"
'l'he plaintiff testified thnt on June 16. 1887,
he wrote the messuge In his own otHee on
one o:f a bunch or book of the defendant's
blnnks which he kept at hnnd, nnd sent 1t to
the defl'ndant's otftce at Plllladelpbla; that
he had a running account with the defendant's ogent there, which he settled monthly,
am01mtlng to $180 for thnt month; that be
did not then read, and did not remember that
he had ever before read, the printed matter
on the back of the bl:mks; and that he pald
the usual rate of $1.15 for this message, and
did not pay for a repetition or Insurance of It.
He also testified that be then was, and for
many years had been, engaged In the business of buying nnd selling wool all over the
country, and had employed Toland as his
ni:ent ln that busln~s. and early 1n June,
1887, sent him out to Kansas and Colorado,
with instructions to buy 50,000 pounds, and
then to await orders :from him before buying
more; that, before June 12th, Toland bought
50,000 pounds, and then stopped buying; and
that he had sent many telegr:iphlc messages
to Toland during that month and previously,
ui;lng the same code.
The defendant's agent at Philadelphia,
called as a witness for the plaintiff, testified
that be sent this message tor the plnlntl!T,
ond knew that he was a dealer In wool, and
thnt Toland was witl1 him, but In what capacity he did not know; that he had frequently sent messnges for him, and consld·
cred him one of Ws best customers during the
wool season; that telegraphic messages by
the present system were sent and received by
iie:>Und, and were all dots and dashes; that
"b" was a dash and tbr<>e dots, and "y" was

two dots, a space, and then two dots; and that
the difference between "a" and "u" was one
dot, "a" being a dot and a dash, and "u" two
dots and a d:ish, and the pause upon the last
touch of the "u;" that an experienced telegraph operator, 1f the words were properly
rapped out, and he was paying proper attention, could not Wl'll mistake the one for the
other, but might be misled 1f he was not
careful; and that lt was very likely that another dot could be put 1n 1f there was any Interruption In the wire. He fw-ther testified
that there was a great difference between the
words "despot" and "destroy" 1n telegraphic
symbols; and that the letter "s" was· made
by three dots, so that, it an operator received
the word "purchases" over the wires, and
wrote down "purchase," he omitted three
dots from the end o:f the word.
The plnlntlff Introduced depositions, taken
In September, 1888, ot one Stevens and one
Smith, who were respectively telegraph operntors of the defendant at Brookville and nt
Ellis, In the state of Kansas, on June 16,
1887.
Stevens testified thnt Brookville was a relay
station of the company, nt which messnges
from tbe east were repented westwnrcl; that
on that day one Tindall, his fellow operato;·
In the Brookville office, banded him a copy ln
Tinuiw's handwriting of the messnge In question (an Impression copy of which .he identified and annexed to his deposition), containing the words "despot" and "bay," and he Immediately transmitted lt, word for word, to
Ellis; that the equipment of the omce at
Brookville wos ln every respect good and suf·
ficlent; and that he had no recollection o!
the wires between lt and Ellis having been 1n
other than good condition on that day.
Smith testified that on that day he received
the message at Ellis from Brookville, and
Immediately wrote It down, word !or word,
just as received (nnd Identified and amwxed
to his deposition an lmpresston copy of what
he then wrote down), containing the words
"destroy" and "buy," and transmitted It, exactly as he received It, to Wnukeney, to
which Toland had directed any messages tor
him to be forwarded; nnd that the office at
Ellis was well and sufficiently equipped for
Its work, but he could not recall what was
the condition o:f the wires between it and
Brookville.
'£he plaintiff also Introduced evidence tending to show that June 16, 1887, was a bright
und beautiful day at Ellis and Waukeney;
that Toland, upon receiving the message at
Waukeney, made purchases of about 300,000
pounds of wool; and that the plaintiff, In settllng with the sellers thereo:f, su.lrered a loas
of upwards ot $20,000.
'l'he l!lrcult cow-t, following White v. Tel~
graph Co., 5 Mccrary, 103, 14 Fed: 710,
and Jones T. Telegraph Co., 18 Fed. 717,
ruled that there was no evidence of gross
negligence on the part of the defl'ndant; and
that, as the messnge hnd not been repeated.

-

-

- ------
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the plaintiff, by the terms printed upon the

back of the message, and referred to above

hi signature on its face, could not recov'er

more than the sum of $1.15, which he had

paid for sending it. The piaintiff not dalm-

ing that sum, the court directed a verdict for

the defendant, and rendered judgment there-

on. The plaintiff tendered a bill of excep-

tions, and sued out this writ of error.

Geo. Junkin and Jos. de F. Junkin, for

plaintiff in error. Silas W. Pettit, John H.

Dillon, Geo. H. Fearons, and Rush Taggart,

for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action by the sender of a tele-

graphic message against the telegraph com-

pany to recover damages for a mistake in the

transmission oi.‘ the message, which was in

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

cipher, intelligible only to the sender and to

his own agent, to whom it was addressed.

The plaintiff paid the usual rate for this mes-

sage, and did not pay for a repetition or in-

surance of it.

The blank form of message, which the

plaintiﬂl ﬁlled up and signed, and which was

such as he had constantly used, had upon its

face, immediately above the place for writing

the message, the printed words, “Send the

following message, subject to the terms on

back hereof, which are hereby agreed to;"

and, just below the place for his signature,

this line: “ @‘Read the notice and agree-

ment on back of this blank "

Upon the back of the blank were conspicu-

ously printed the words, "All messages taken

by this company are subject to the following

terms," which contained the following condi-

tions or restrictions of the liability of the

company:

"[1] To guard against mistakes or delays,

the sender of a message should order it RE-

PEATED; that is, telegraphed back to the

originating ofﬁce for comparison. For this,

onehalt the regular rate is charged in addi-

tion. It is agreed between the sender of the

following message and this company that

said company shall not be liable for mistakes

or delays in the transmission or delivery or

for nondelivery of any UNREPEATED message,

whether happening by negligence of its serv-

ants or otherwise, beyond the amount re-

ceived for sending the same; [2] nor for mis-

takes or delays in the transmission or deliv-

cry or for nondelivery of any REPEATED mes-

sage beyond ﬁfty times the sum received for

sending the same, unless specially insured;

[3] nor in any case for delays arising from

unavoidable interruption in the working o!

its lines, or for errors in cipher or obscure

messages." After stating the rates at which

correctness in the transmission of a message

may be insured, it is provided that “no em-

ploye of the company is authorized to vary

the foregoing." "[4] The company will not

be liable for damages or statutory penalties

m any case where the claim is not presented

in writing within sixty days after the mes-
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tn any caae where the claim Is not presented
ln writing wlthln sixty days after the message la filed with the company tor transmission."
The conditions or restrictions, the reasonableness and mlldlty of which are directly
Involved In this case, are that part of the
first by which the company le not to be llable for mistakes In the transmission or dellvery of any message beyond the sum reGeo. Junkin and Joe. de P. Junkin, tor ceived tor sending lt, unless the sender or·
plaintltr In error. Silas W. Pettit .Tobn H. ders It to be repeated by being telegraphed
Dlllon, Geo. H. Fenrons, and Rush Taggart, back to the originating otftce for comparison,
for defendant in error.
and pays half that sum In addition; and that
part of the third by which the company ls
not to be liable at all for errors In cipher or
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case, obscure messages.
delivered the opinion of the court.
Telegraph companies resemble railroad
This was no action by the sen1kr ot a tele- companies and other common carriers, in
graphic message against the telPgraph com· that they are Instruments ot commerce, and
pany to recover damages for a mistake ln the In that they exercise a. public employment,
transmission of the message, which was in and are therefore bound to serve all customcipher, Intelligible only to the sender and to ers alike, without discrimination. They
bis own agent, to whom It was addressed. have, doubtless, a duty to the publlc to reThe plalntltr paid the usual rate for this mes- ceive, to the extent ot tbelr capacity, all
sage, nnd did not pay for a repetition or ln- messages clearly and intelllglbly written,
euranc~ of It
and to transwlt them upon rea::ionable term3.
'£he blank form of mc~snge, which the nnt t!IC'y arc not common carriers. Their
plaintiff filled up and signed, and wllich was duties are different, and are performed ln
such as be had constantly used, had upon Its dllferent ways; and they are not subject
face, Immediately above the place for writing to the s:ime llabllltles. Express Co. v. Caldthe message, the printed words, "Send the well, 21 Wull. 2U!, 269, 270; Telegraph Co. v.
following message, subject to the terms on Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 4Gi.
back hereof, whlcb are hereby agreed to;"
The rule ot the common law by which
and, Just below the place tor hle signature, common carriers of goods are held llablc
0:11 line: "lir Read the notice and agree- for loss or Injury by any cause whatever, exment on back of this blank ..El. n
cept the act of God or of public ~nemles, does
Upon the back of the blank were conspicu- not extend even to warehousemen or wharr.ously printed the words, "All messages taken lngera, or to any other class of bailees, except
by this company are subject to the following Innkeepers, who, like carriers, have peculiar
terms," which contnJned the following condi- opportunities for embezzling the goods or
tions or restrictions of the liability of the for collusion with thieves. The carrier has
company:
tue actual and manual possession ot the
"[1] To guard against mistakes or delays,
~oods.
Tbe Identity of the goods which he
the sender ot a messnge should order lt RE- receives with those which he dellvers can
PEATED; that Is, telegraphed back to the hardly be mistaken. Their value can be
originating oftlce tor comparison. For this, easily estimated, and may be ascertained by
one-half the regular rate Is charged In addl- inquiry of the consignor, and .the carrier's
tkln. It le agreed between the sender of the compensation fixed accordingly; an<l his liatollowlng message and thlB company that bility in damages 18 measured by the value
said company shall not be liable for mlstnkee ot the goods.
or delays in the transmission or delivery or
But telegraph companies are not bailees,
for nondelivery of any UNREPEATED message, ln any sensP. They are lntrusted with nothwhether happening by negligence of Its serv· ing but an order or message, which Is not to
ants or otherwise, beyond the am~unt re- be carried In the form or char:icters in whkh
ceived for sending the same; (2) nor for ml&- It ls received, but ls to be translated and
takes or delays ln the transmission or dellv- transmitted through different symbols, by
ery or for nondelivery of any REPEATED mes- means ot electricity, and Is peculiarly liable
sage beyond fifty times the sum received for to mistakes. 'l'lle message cannot be th<1
sending tile same, unless specially insured; subject ot embezzlement. It ls or no lntrln·
(3) nor In any case tor delays arising from sic value. Its importance cannot be estimatunavoidable Interruption In the working of ed, except by the sender, and often cannot
lts llnes, or for errors in cipher or obscure be disclosed by him without danger of defeating his purpose. It may be wholly valmeSillges." After stating the rates at which
correctness In the transmission of a message ueless, If not forwar<le<l Immediately; and
may be Insured, ft is provided that "no em- the measure or damages, for a !allure to
ploye of the company ls authorized to vary transmit or deliver lt, has no relation to nny
the foregoing." "[4] The company will not value of the message Itself, except ns s ucb
be llallle !or damages or statutory pcnaltica value way be disclosed by the message, or

the plalutUr, by the terms printed upon the
back of the meesage, and referred to above
hla algnature on lta !ace, could not recover
more than the sum of $1.u;, which he bad
paid tor sending lt. The plaintltr not claiming that aum, the court directed a verdict for
the aefendo.nt, and rendered judgment thereon. The plalntltr tendered a bill of exceptions, and sued out thle writ of error.
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be agreed between the sender and the com-

pany.

As said by Mr. Justice Strong, speaking

for this court, in Express Co. v. Caldwell,

above cited: "Like common carriers, they

cannot contract with their employers for ex-

emption from liability for the consequences

of their own negligence. But they may by

such contracts, or by their rules and regula-

tions brought to the knowledge of their em-

ployers, limit the measure of their responsi-

bility to a reasonable extent. Whether their

rules are reasonable or unreasonable must

be determined with reference to public poli-

cy, precisely as in the case oi.‘ a carrier."

By the settled law of this court, common

carriers of goods or passengers cannot, by

any contract with their customers, wholly

exempt themselves from liability for dam-
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ages caused by the negligence oif themselves

or their servants. Railroad Co. v. Lock-

wood, 17 Wall. 357; Liverpool & G. W.

Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397,

442, 9 Sup. Ct. 469, and cases cited.

But even a common carrier of goods may,

by special contract with the owner, restrict

the sum for which he may be liable, even in

case of a loss by the carrier's negligence;

and this upon the distinct ground. as stated

by Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the

whole court, that “where a contract of the

kind. signed by the shipper, is fairly made,

agreeing on the valuation of the property

carried, with the rate of freight based on

the condition that the carrier assumes lia-

bility only to the extent of the agreed valu-

ation, even in case of loss or damage by the

negligence of the carrier, the contract will

be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of

securing a due proportion between the

amount for which the carrier may be respon-

sible and the freight he receives, and of pro-

tecting himself against extravagant and fan-

ciful valuations." Hart v. Railroad Co., 112

U. S. 331, 343, 5 Sup. Ct. 151.

By the regulation now in question, the tele-

graph company has not undertaken to wholly

exempt itself from liability for negligence;

but only to require the sender of the message

to have it repeated, and to pay half as much

again as the usual price, in order to hold the

company liable for mistakes or delays in

transmitting or delivering or for not deliv-

ering a message, whether happening by neg-

ligence of its servants or otherwise.

In Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444,

453. 8 Sup. Ct. 577, the effect of such a regu-

lation was presented by the certiﬁcate oi!

the circuit court, but was not passed upon

by this court, because it was of opinion

that. upon the facts of the case, the damages

claimed were too uncertain and remote.

But the ft-tls(\innhll'ili‘8.\‘ and validity of such

re;_'ulations have been upheld in i\it-Andrew

v. 'l‘cl\-‘.:1'aph Co., 17 C. B., 3, and in Baxter

v. '.l‘clcgr:\ph Co., 37 U. C. Q. B. 470, as well

as by the great prepomleranee of authority

in this country. Hnly a, i.(_‘\\' of the principal

DALIAGES IN ACTIONS AGAINST TELEAIRAPH COMPANIES.

361

Mr. Justice Alvey (since chief justice of Mary-

land and of the court of appeals of the dis-

trict of Columbia), said: “The appellant had

a clear right to protect itself against extra-

ordinary risk and liability by such rules and

regulations as might be required for the pur-

pose." “The appellant could not, by rules

and regulations of its own making, protect

itself against liability for the consequences

of its own willful misconduct or gross neg-

ligence or any conduct inconsistent with

good faith; nor has it attempted by its rules

and regulations to afford itself such exemp-

tion. It was bound to use due diligence, but

not to use extraordinary care and precaution.

The appellee, by reqnirmg the message to be

repeated, could have assured himself of its

dispatch and accurate transmission to the

other end of the line, if the wires were in
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working condition; or. by special contract

for insurance, could have secured himself

against all consequences of nondelivery. He

did not think proper, however, to adopt such

precaution, but chose rather to take the risk

of the less expensive terms of sending his

message; and, having refused to pay the

extra charge for repetition or insurance,

we think he had no right to rely upon the

declaration of the appellant's agent that the

message had gone through, in order to ﬁx the

liability on the company." .

In Passmore v. Telegraph Co., 9 Phiia. 90.

78 Pa. St. 238, at the trial in the district

court of Philadelphia, there was evidence

that Passmore, of whom one Edwards had

offered to purchase a tract of land in West

Virginia, wrote and delivered to the company

at Parkersburg, upon a blank containing

similar conditions, a message to Edwards,

at Philadelphia, in these words: “I hold the

Tibbs tract for you; all will be rigbt,"—but

which, as delivered by the company in Phila-

delphia, was altered by substituting the

word "sold" for "hold;" and that Edwards

therenpon broke off the contract for the pur-

chase of the land, and Passmore had to sell

it at a great loss. The verdict being for the

plaintiff, the court reserved the question

whether the defendant was liable, inasmuch

as the plaintiff had not insured the message

nor directed it to be repeated, and after-

wards entered judgment for the defendant,

notwithstanding the verdict, in accordance

with an opinion of Judge Hare, the most im-

portant parts of which were as follows:

“A railway, telegraph, or other company,

charged with aduty which concerns the public

interest, cannot screen themselves from lia-

bility for negligence; but they may prescribe

rules calculated to insure safety, and dimin-

ish the loss in the event of accident, and

declare that, if th -se are not observed, the

injured party shall be considered as in de-

fault, aud precluded by the doctrine of

contributory negligence. The rule must

howevcr. be such as that reason, which is said

to be the life of the law, can approve; or.

at the least, such as it need not condemn.
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by Judge Hare and above stated. 78 Pa. St.

246; Telegraph Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St.

442, 455, 18 Atl. 441.

In Breese v. Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 132,

the plaintiffs' agent wrote, at his own oilic(!

in Palmyra, on one of the company's blanks,

substantially like that now before us, and

delivered to the company at Palmyra, a mes-

sage addressed to brokers in New York, and

in these words, “Buy us seven ($700) hundred

dollars in gold." In the statement of facts

upon which the case was submitted, it was

agreed that he had never read the printed

part of the blank, and that “the message

thus delivered was transmitted from the

ofﬁce at Palmyra as written; but, by some

error of the defendant's operators working

between Palmyra and New York," it was

received in New York and delivered in this
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form, "Buy us seven thousand dollars in

gold," and the brokers accordingly bought

that amount for the plaintiffs, who sold it at

a loss. It was held that there was no evi-

dence of negligence on the part of the com-

pany, and that, the message not having been

repeated, the company was not liable.

In Kiley v. 'l'eiegruph Co., 10!) N. Y. 231,

235-237, 16 N. E. 75, a similar decision was

made. the court saying: “That a telegraph

company has the right to exact such a stipu-

lation from its customers is the settled law

in this and most of the other states of the

Union and in England. The authorities hold

that telegraph companies are not under the

obligations of common carriers; that they

do not insure the absolute and accurate trans-

mission of messages delivered to them; that

they have the right to make reasonable regu-

lations for the transaction of their business,

and to protect themselves against liabilities

which they would otherwise incur through

the carelessness of their numerous agents,

and the mistakes and defaults incident to the

transaction oi.‘ their peculiar business. The

stipulation printed in the blank used in this

case has frequently been under consideration

in the courts, and has always in this state,

and genemlly elsewhere, been upheld as rea-

sonable." “The evidence brings this case

within the terms of the stipulation. It is not

the case of a message delivered to the oper-

ator, and not sent by him from his oﬂice.

This message was sent, and it may be infer-

red from the evidence that it went so far as

Buffalo, at least; and all that appears fur-

ther is that it never reached its destination.

Why it did not reach there remains unex-

plained. Iti was not shown that the failure

was due to the willful misconduct of the do

fendant, or to its gross negligence. If the

plainiifl' had requested to have the message

repeated back to him, the failure would have

been detected and the loss averted. The case

is therefore brought within the letter and

purpose of the stipulation."

In the supreme judicial court of Massachu-

setts, the reasonableness and validity of such

regulations have been repeatedly aiﬁrmed.
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by Judire Hare and above stated. 78 Pa. St.
246; 'l'elegraph Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St.
442, 4;iii1 18 AU. 441.
In Breese v. Telegraph Co., 48 X. Y. 132,
the plaintiffs' agent wrote, at his own ollicc
In Palmyra, on one of the company's -blanks,
suhstantially like that now before us, and
delivered to the company at Palmyra, a message addressed to brokers In New York, and
In these words, "Buy us seven ($700) hundred
dollars in gold." In the statement of facts
upon which the case was submitted, It was
agreed that he had never read the printed
part of the blank, and that "the message
thus delivered was transmitted from the
office at Palmyra as written; but, by some
error of the defendant's operators working
between Palmyra and New York," It was
recelverl in New York end delivered. ln this
form, "Buy us seven thousand dollars In
gold," and the brokers accordingly bought
that amount for the plnlntill's, who sold It at
a loiss. It was held that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company, and that, tbe message not having been
repeated, tbe company was not lialJle.
In Kiley v. Telegraph Co., lOU N. Y. 231,
235-237, 16 N. E. 75, a similar decision. wns
made. tbe court saying: "That a telegraph
company has the right to exact such a stipulation from Its customers is the settled law
in this and most of the other states of thr
Union and In England. The authorities hold
that telegraph companies nre not under the
obligations of common carrlet•s; that they
do not Insure the absolute and accurate tr-.insmlssion of messages delivered to them; tbwt
they have the right t<> make reasonable reguln tious for the transaction of their business,
und to protect themselves against liabilities
which they would otherwise Incur through
the cnrelet!Sness ot their numerous agents,
and the mistakes and defaults Incident to the
transaction of their peculiar bU&lness. The
stipulation printed In the blank used In this
case has frequently been under consideration
In tho courts, and has always In this state,
and generally elsewhere, been upheld as reasonable." "The evidence brings this case
within the terms of the stlpulatloo. It Is not
the case of a messoge delivered to the oper·
ator, and not sent by him from his oftice.
This message was sent, and It may be Inferred from the evidence that lt went so far as
Buffalo, at least; and all that appears further Is that lt never reached its destination.
Why lt did not reach there remains unexplained. Ill was not shown that the failure
was due to the willt'ul misconduct ot the defendant, or to Its grose negligence. If the
plaluti:l' hnd req1wsted to have the message
repeated back to him, the failure would ha,·e
been detected and t!le loss averted. The cuse
ls therefore brought within the letter and
purpose ot the stipulation."
In the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, the reasonableness and validity of such
regulations bnYe been repeatedly a1H.rmed.

Ellis T. Telegraph Co., 13 Allen, 226; Redpath v. Telegraph Co., 112 Mass. 71; Grinnell
v. Telegraph Co., 113 Maes.. 299; Clement v.
Telegraph Co., 137 Mass. 463.
· There are cases, Indeed, In which such regulations have been considered to be wholly
void. It will be sufficient to refer to thosespecially relied on by the learned counsel for·
the plalntllr, many of which, however, upon
examination, appear to have been ln1lucncea
by conslderati<>ns which have DC> application.
to the case a.1: bar.
Some of them were actions brought, not by·
the sender, but ·by the receiver, of the message, who bad no n<>tlce of the printed condltl<>ns uotll after be received It, and could
not therefore have agreed to them In advance. Such were Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg,
35 Pa. St. 298; Harris v. Telegraph Co., 9'
Pbila. 88; and De la Grange v. Telegraph
Co., 25 La. Ann. 383.
Others were cases of night" messages, In
which the whole provision as to repeating
was omitted, and a sweeping and cowprei.Jcnslve provision substituted, by wbleh. In effect, all liability beyond the price paid was
avoided. True v. Telegraph Co.• 00 ?tle. 0. 18;
Bartlett v. 'felegrapb Co.,' li~ Me. ::lUU, :!15;
Candee v. Tel1:gruph Co., 34 Wis. 471, 47U~
Hlbb;ird v. Telegraph Co., 33 Wis. 5J8, 51H.
In Bartlett's Case tbe court said: "Most, It
not all. the cases upon this subject, refer to.
rules requiring the repeating ot messai::es to
insure accuracy, and seem to be justitil-<1 In
their .conclusion on the ground that, owing
to the liability to error from causes beyond
.the skill and core of the operatOl', it is but
a matter of common care aJld prudence to
ba.ve the messages repeated, the neglect or
which ln messages of Importance, after being
warned of the danger, Is a want of care on
the part of the sender, an.d, as the person
sending the message ls presumed to be the
best judge ot its imports.nee, be must, on his
own resp<>nslblllty, make his election whether to have it repeated." 62 Me. 216, 217.
The passage cited from the opinion of the
circuit court ot appeals ln Delaware & A.
Telegraph & Teleph<>n.e Co. v. State, 3 U. S.
App. 30, 105, 2 C. O. A. 1, and 50 Fed. 677.
in which the same judge who bad decided
the present case ln the circuit court said, "It
le no longer open to question that telephone
and telegraph companies are subject to the
rules governing common carriers and others
engaged ln like public employment," had regard, as Is evident from the context, and
from the reference to Budd v. New York, 143
U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, to those rules only
which require persons <>r corporations exercising a public employment to serve all alike,
without discrimination, and which make
them subject to legislative reguln.tion.
In Rittenhouse v. Independent Line, etc, 1
Daly, 474, 44 N. Y. 263, and In Turner v. Telegraph Oo., 41 Iowa, 458, It does not appear
that the company bad undcrrokeu to rt:~trict
Its liability by expre&1 stipulation.
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The Indiana decisions cited appear to

have been controlled by a statute of the state

enacting that telegraph companies should “be

liable for special damages occasioned by fail-

ure or negligence of their operators or serv-

ants in receiving, copying, transmitting, or

delivering despatches." Telegraph Co. v.

Meek, 49 Ind. 63; Telegraph Co. v. Fenton,

52 Ind. 1.

The only cases cited by the plaintiff in

which, independently of statute, a stipulation

that the sender of a message, if he would hold

the company liable in damages beyond the

sum paid, must have it repeated and pay hall,‘

that sum in addition, has been held against

public policy and void, appear to be Tyler v.

Telegraph Co., 60 UL 421, 74 Ill. 168; Ayer v.

Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495; Tele-

graph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301; Tele-
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graph Co. v. Crali, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. 309;

Telegraph Co. v. Howell, 38 Kan. 685, 17 Pac.

313; and a charge to the jury by Mr. Justice

Woods, when circuit judge, as reported in

Dorgan v. Telegraph Co., 1 Am. Law T. (N.

S.) 400. Fed. Cas. No. 4,004, and not included

in his own reports.

The fullest statement of reasons, perhaps,

on that side of the question, is to be found in

Tyler v. Jelegraph 0o., above cited.

In that case the plaintiffs had written and

delivered to the company on one of its blanks,

containing the usual stipulation as to repeat-

ing, this message, addressed to a broker:

“Sell one hundred (100) Western Union; an-

swer price." In the message, as delivered by

the company to the broker, the message was

changed by substituting

(1,000)." It was assumed that “Western

Union" meant shares in the Western Union

Telegraph Company. The supreme court of ‘

Illinois held that the stipulation was “unjust,

unconscionable, without consideration, and

utterly void." 60 ‘Ill. 439.

The propositions upon which that decision

was based may be sutiieiently stated, in the

very words of the court, as follows: “Wheth-

er the paper presented by the company, on

which a message is written and signed by the

sender, is a contract or not, depends on cir-

cumstances;" and “whether he had knowl-

edge of its terms, and consented to its restric-

tions, is for the jury to determine as a ques-

tion of fact, upon evidence alinnde." “Admit-

- ting the paper signed by the plaintiffs was a

contract, it did not, and could not, exonerate

the company from the use of ordinary care

and diligence, both as to their instruments

and the care and skill of their operators."

"The plaintiffs having proved the inaccuracy

of the message, the defendants, to exonerate

themselves, should have shown how the mis-

take occurred;" and, “in the absence of any

proof on their part, the jury should be told

the presumption was a want of ordinary care

on the part of the company." The 1)rlnli.‘1l

conditions could not "protect this company

from losses and damage occasioned by causes

wholly within their own control," but “must

The Indiana decisions cited appear to
h&ve been controlled by a atatute ot the state
enacting that telegraph compa.nlee should "be
llable for BPC!Clal damages occaalODed by fall·
ure or negligence of their operators or serv·
au.ta In receivlllg, copying, transmitting, or
delivering despntcbes." Telegraph Co. v.
Meek, 40 Ind. 53; Telegraph Co. v. -Fenton,
52 Ind. 1.
The only cases cited by the plnlntltr In
which, Independently of statute, & stipulation
that the sender of a message, If he would hold
the company liable in damages beyond the
1um paid, must have It repeuted and pay halt
that aum In addition, has been held against
puhllc policy and void, appear to be Tyler v.
Telegraph Co., 60 IlL 421, 74 Ill. 168; Ayer v.
Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495; Telecrapb Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 801; Telegraph Co. v. Crall, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. 309;
Telegraph Co. v. Howell, 88 Kan. 685, 17 Pac.
313; and a charge to the jury by Mr. Justice
Woods, when circuit judge, as reported In
Dorgan v. Telegraph Co., 1 Am. Law T. (N.
8.) 40G, Fed. Cas.. No. 4,00!, and not Included
In bis own reports.
The fullest statement of reasons, perhaps,
on that 11!de of the question, Is to be found in
Tyler v. .:'elegrapb Co., above clt!'d.
In that case the plalntltrs had written and
delivered to the company on one ot Its blanks,
containing the usual stipulation as to repeating, this message, addressed to a broker:
"Sell one hundred (100) Western Union; answer price." In the message, as delivered by
the company to the broker, the messnge was
changed by substituting "one thousand
(1.000)." It was assumed that "Western
Union" meant shares In the Western Union
Telegraph Company. The supreme court of
Illinois held that the stlpulntlon wns "unjust,
unconscionable, without comlderatlon, and
111tterly void." 60 111. 430.
The propositions upon which that decision
was based may be autliclently stated, In the
nry words ot the court, as follows: "Wheth·
er the paper presented by the company, on
which a message Is written nod signed by the
sender, ls a contract or not, depends on cir·
cumstnnces;" and "whether he had khowl·
edge of Its terms, and consented to Its restl'lctions, ls for the jury to determine as a question of fact, upon evidence nliunde." "Admit. ting the paper signed by the pln.lntltrs was a
contract, It did not, nnd could not, exonernte
the compnny from the use of ordinary cnre
and diligence, both as to their lnstrurnPnts
and the care nod skill of their opernto1·s."
"The plaintiffs ha;lng proved the Inaccuracy
or the message, the defendants, to exoncmte
themselves, should have shown how the mis·
take occurred;" and, "In the absence ot any
proot on their pnrt, the jury should be told
the presumption was a want of ordinary cm·e
on the part ot the company." 'l'he prlntpd
conditions could not "protect this cowpauy
from losses and damage occasioned by causes
wliolly within their own control," but "must
be confined to mistakes due to the Infirmities
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of tele~pby, and which are unavoidable."
60 Ill. 431-433.
The effect of that construction would be
either to hold telegraph companies to be 1111bject to the liability of common carriers, which
the court admitted In an earlier part of Its
opinion that they were not, or else to allow to
the stipulation no e.trect whatever; for, It they
were not common carriers, they would not,
eTen 1t there were no express atlpulntlon, be
liable for unavoidable mistakes, due to cnuses
over which they had no controL
But the final, and apparently the prlnclpn.l,
ground for that decision, was restated by thl'
court when the case came before It a second
time, as follows: "On the question whether
the regulation requiring messages to be repented, printed on the blank of the company
on which a message la written, la a contract,
we held It was not a. contract binding In
law, for the reason the law Imposed upon the
companies duties to be performed to the public, and for the pertormnnce of which they
were entitled to a compensation fixed by
themselves, nod which the sender hnd no
choice but to pay, no matter bow exorbitant
It might be. Among these duties, we held,
was that of transmitting messages correctly;
that the tn.ri.tr paid was the consideration for
the performance of this duty In each particular case, and, whl'n the charges were paid, the
duty of the company began, and there was
therefore no consideration tor the supposed
contract requiring the sender to repent the
message at an additional cost to him of fifty
per cent. of the original charges." 74 Ill. 170,
171.
The fallacy In that reasoning appears to us
to be In the assumption that the company, under Its admitted power to fix a reasonable
rate of compensation, establishes the usual
rate as the compensation tor the duty of
transmitting any message whatever; whereas, what the company has done la to fix that
rate for those messages only which nre transmitted at the risk of the sender, and to require payment of the higher rate ot half as
much ngnln it the company la to be liable for
mistakes or dl'lays In the transmission or delivery or In the nondelivery of a message.
Indeed, that learned court frankly aum!tted
that Its decision was against the general current of authority, saying: "It must, howe;cr,
be conceded that there Is grl'at harnany In
the decisions that these companies can protect themselves from loss by contract, and
that such a. regulation as the one under which
appellees defended Is a reasonable rcgulntion.
and amounts to a contract." And, again:
•·we are not satlslled with the grounds on
which a majority of the decisions ot respr'ctnble courts nre placed." 60 Ill. 430, 431, -t:hl.
In the case at bar, the message, as appeared
by the plaintiff's own testimony, was written
by him at his office In Philadelphia., upon one
of a bunch of the defendant's blanks, which
he kept there !or the purpose. Although he
testified that he did not remember to have
read the printed matter on the back, he did
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not venture to say that he had not read it;

still less that he had not read the brief and

clear notices thereof upon the face of the

message, both above the place for writing the

message and below his signature. There can

be no doubt, therefore, that the terms on the

back of the message, so far as they were not

inconsistent with law, formed part of the

contract between him and the company un-

der which the message was transmitted.

The message was addressed by the plain-

tiff to his own agent in Kansas, was written

in a cipher understood by them only, and

was in these words: “Despot am exceed-

ingly busy bay all kinds quo perhaps bracken

half of it mince moment promptly of pur-

chases." As delivered by the company to

the plaintiffs agent in Kansas, it had the

words “destroy" instead of "despot," “buy"
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instead of “bay," and “pm-chase" instead of

"purchases."

The message having been sent and received

on June 16th, the mistake, in the iirst word, of

“&espot" for “destroy," by which, for a word

signifying to those understanding the cipher,

that the sender of the message had received

from the person to whom it was addressed

his message ot June 15th, there was substi-

tuted a word signifying that his message o1f

June 17th had been received (which was evi-

dently impossible), could have had no other

effect than to put him on his guard as to

the accuracy of the message delivered to

him.

The mistake of substituting, for the last

word "purchase," in the singular, the word

"purchases," in the plural, would seem to

have been equally unimportant, and is not

suggested to have done any harm.

The remaining mistake, which is relied on

as the cause of the injury for which the

plaintiff seeks to recover damages in this ac-

tion, consisted in the change of a single let-

ter, by substituting “n" for “a," so as to put

“buy" in the place of “bay." By the cipher

code, “buy" had its common meaning, though

the message contained nothing to suggest to

any one, except the sender or his agent, what

the latter was to buy; and the word “bay,"

according to that code, had (what no one

without its assistance could have conjec-

tured) the meaning of “I have bought."

The impression copies of the papers kept

at the'det'endant's oﬂices at Brookville and

Ellis, in the state of Kansas (which were an-

nexed to the depositions of operators at those

oliiees, and given in evidence by the plain-

tiilf at the trial), prove that the message was

duly transmitted over the greater part of its

route, and as far as Brookville; for they

put it beyond doubt that the message, as re-

ceiwrd and written down by one of the opera-

tors at Brookville, was in its original form,

and that, as written down by the operator

at Ellis, it was in its altered form. While

the testunony of the deponents is conﬂicting,

there is nothing in it to create a suspicion

that either of them did not intend to tell the
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not venture to say that he had not reaa tt;
still less that he had not read the brief and
clear notices thereof upon the face of the
message, both above the place for writing the
message and below his signature. There can
be no doubt, therefore, that the terms on the
back of the message, so far as they were not
Inconsistent with law, formed part of the
contract between him and the company under which the message was transmitted.
The message was addressed by the plalntitr to his own agent In Kansas, was written
In a cipher understood by them only, and
was In these words: "Despot am exceedingly busy bay all klndl!' quo perhaps brncken
half of It mince molllf'1t promptly of purchases." As delivered by the company to
the plalntitr's agent In Kansas, It had the
words "destroy" lnste~d of "despot," "buy"
Instead of "lmy,'' and "purchase" instead of
"purchases."
The message having been sent and received
on Jlllle lUth, the mistake, in the first word, of
"itespot" for "destroy," by which, for a word
signifying to those understanding the cipher,
that the semler of the messn~e bad received
from the person to whom It was addressed
his message ot June 15th, there was substituted a word signifying that his message of
June 17th had been receiYed (which was evidently Impossible), could have had no other
effect than to put him on his guard as to
the accuracy of the message delivered to
him.
The mistake of substituting, for the last
word "purchase,'' In the singular, the word
"purchases," In the plural, would seem to
have been equally unimportant, and ls not
su~gested to have done any harm.
Tlle remaining mistake, which Is relied on
as the cause of the Injury for which the
plalntltr seeks to recover damages In this action, consisted In the change of a single letter, by substituting "u" for "a," so as to put
"buy" In the place of "bay." By the cipher
code, "buy" had Its common meaning, though
the message contained nothing to suggest to
any one, except the sender or his agent, what
the latter wn.s to buy; and the word "bay,"
according to that code, had (what no one
without Its assistance could have conjecturNl) the menning ot "I have bought."
The Impression copies of tlle papers kept
at the·' d<'fendant's offices at Brookville and
Ellis, In the state of Kansas (which were annexed to the depositions of operators at those
o1tices, and given In evltlence by the plaintiff at the trial), prove that the message was
duly transmitted over the greater part of Its
route, and as far as Brookville; for they
pub it beyond doubt that the message, as reet-ivcd and wrlttt>n down hy one of the operators at Brookville, was in its original form,
aud that, as written down by the operator
at Ellis, It was In Its altcrrrl form. While
the testimony of the deponents Is conflicting,
th•!re is 11 othl11g- in It to cr1·:1 tr a irn~pk : on
that dtht'l' of tlwrn did not intend to tell the

truth; nor ls there anything ln the case tending to show that there was any defect In the
defendant's Instruments or equipment, or
that any of Its operators were Incompetent
persons.
If the change of words ln the message was
owing to mistake or lnatt~ntlon of any of the
defendant's servants, It would seem that It
must have consisted either In a want ot
plainness of the handwriting of Tindall, the
operator who took It down at Brookvllle, or
in a mistake of his fellow operator, Stevens,
In reading thnt writing or In transmitting it
to Ellis, or else In a mistake of the opera tor
at Ellis In taking down the message at that
place. If the message had been repeated,
the mistake, from whate\·er cause It arose,
must have been detected by men.ns of the
dlll'erlng versions made and kept at the offices at Ellis and Brookville.
As has been seen, the only mistake of any
consequence In the trnnsmlsslon of the message consisted In the change of the word
"bay" Into "buy," or rather of the letter "a"
Into "u." In ordlna1·y handwriting, the likeness between these two letters, and the likelihood of mist.'lklng the one for the other,
especially wllen neither the word nor the
context has any meaning to the reader, are
familiar to all; and In telegraphic symbols,.
according to the tesUmony of the only witness upon the subject, the dll1'erence between
these two letters Is a single dot.
The conclusion Is Irresistible that, If there
was n<'gligence on the part of any of the defendant's servants, a jury would not have
been warranted In finding that It was more
than ordinary negligence; and that, upon
principle and authority, the mistake was one
for which the plalntltr, not having had the
message repeated according to the terms
printed upon the back. thereof, and forming
part of his contract with the company, could
not recover more than the sum which he had
paid for sending the single message.
Any other conclusion would restrict the
right of telegraph companies to regulate the
amount of their liability within narrower
limits than were allowed to common carriers
In Hart v. Railroad Co., already cited, In
which 11.ve horses were delivered by the plalntllr to a. railroad company for transportation
under a. bill of lading, Signed by him and by
its agent, which stated that the horses were ·
to be trnnsported upon the terms and condi tlons thereof, "admitted and accepted by"
the plaintll1' "as just and reasonnble," and
that freight was to be paid at a rate specified, on conllition that the carrier assumed
a liability not exceeding ~:!00 on ea.ch horse;
and the circuit court, and this court on writ
or e1Tor, hC'ld tllat the contract between the
parties could not be controlled by evidence
that one of the horses was killed by the negllg-ence of the railroad company, and was a
race horse, worth $15.000. 2 :\IcCrary, 3:~"l,
7 Fed. G:JO; 11::! u. s. ::::n, 5 Sup. Ct. 1::>1.
It is also to be rcme111 ucrcu tila t, by tile
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third condition or restriction In the printed

either arising naturally-I. e. according to th<'
usual com·se ot things-from such breach of
these pe.rtlett, It ls stipulated that the com· contract itself, or such as may reasonably
pany shall not be "liable In any case" "for be supposed to have been In the contemplaerrors In cipher or obscure messages;" and tion ot both parties, at the time they made
that It Is further stipulated that "no em· the contract, as the probable result ot the
ploye ot the company Is authorized to vary
breach ot It Now, it the special cireumthe foregoing," which evidently includes this ' stances under which the contract was actualas well as other restrictions.
ly made were communicated by tlle plalntift'~
It la difficult to see anything UDl"<'asonable
to the defendants, and thus known to both
or a:,ralnst public policy In a stipulation that parties, the damages resulting from the
l1' the handwriting of a message · delivered breach or such a contract,. which they would .
to the company tor transmission ls obscure, reasonably contemplate, would be the amount
so as to be read with dUHculty, or la In ot injury which would ordinarily follow from
cipher, so that the reader has not the usual a breach of contract under these special ckassistance of the context In ascertalnlug par- cumstancee so known and communicated.
ticular words, the company will not be re- But, on the 0U1er hand, if these speclnl cirsponsible for Its miscarriage, and that none cumstances were wholly unknown to the
ot Its agents shall, by attempting to trans- party breaking the contract, he, at the most,
mit such a me888.ge, make the company recould only be supposed to have had in his
sponsible.
contemplation the amount which would arise
As the message was taken down by the
generally, and in the great multitude of cases
tele~nph operator at Brookville In the same
not atrected by any special circumstances,
words In which It was delivered by the plaln- from such a breach of contract." 9 Exeh.
titr to the compauy at Philadelphia, It Is evl- 354, 355.
dl'11t that no obscurity in the message, as
In Sanders v. Stuart, which was an action
originally written by the plalntltr, had any- by commission merchants against a person
thing to do with Its failure to reach Its ultiwhose business Lt was to collect and transmate destination In the same form.
mit telegraph messages, tor neglect to trans·
But lt•ce1"talnly was n cipher message, and
mit a message In words by themselves wholly
to hold that the ncct>pt:mce by the detend- unlntelllgible, but which could be understood
ant"s opl'mtor at Philadt>lpllia made the com- by the plalntitrs' correspondent In New York
pany liable for errors In Its transmission
as giving a large order for goods, whereby
would not only disregard the express atlputhe plalntltrs lost protits, which they would
la tlon that no ('mploye ot the company could
otherwise have made by the transaction, to
vary tlle condltlons of tlle contract, but would
the amount of n;;o, Lord Chief Justice Colerwholly nullity the condition as to clphc•r idge, speaking for himself and Lords Jusmess:igN~, ror the fact that any message Is
tices Brett and Lindley, said: "Upon the
written in cipher must be apparent to every
facts ot this case, we think that the rule In
reader.
Hadley v. Baxendale npplies, and that the
Beyond this, under any contract to transdamages recove1·able are nominal only. It
mit a message by tclegmph, as under any
Is not necessary to decide, and we clo not
otller contract, the dumnges for a breach
give any opinion. how the case might be It
the messnge, Instead of being ln language
must be limited to those which may be fairly
considered as arising according to the usunl
utterly unintelligible, bad been conveyed In
course of things from the brench or the very
plain and Intelligible words. It was concontract in question, or which both parties veyed in terms which, as fnr ns the defendmust rensonahly have unde1·stood and con- ant was concerned, were simple nonsense.
t<>mplukd, whe:n making the contract, ns For this reason, the SPCOnd portion of Baron
Alderson's rule clearly applles. :No such
llkdy to result from Its brcnch. This wns
directly adjudged in TdP;..rraph Co. v. Hall,
damages as above mentioned could be 'rea124 U. S. 444, S Sup. Ct. [ii'i.
sonably supposed to lln ve been in the conTn Ilndl!'y v. Baxendale (decided in 18:>1) templation ot both parties, at the time they
0 Exch. 3!j, ever since com;irlered a leadln~
made the contract, as the probable result
case on both sides or the Atlantic, and :iv- of the breach of it;' for the simple reason
proved and rollowPd by this com·t In Tele- that the defpnclant, at least, did not know
graph Co. v. Hall. above cited, nnd In How- what his contract was about, nor what nor
ard v. ~Iunufnctw-ing Co., 13!) U. S. H.19, 20H.
whether any damage would follow from the
Wi. 11 Sup. Ct. 500; Baron Alderson lnltl
breach ot It. And tor the same reason, viz.
down, as tlle principles by which the jury tlle total ignorance of the clefenclant as to
ought to be guided in <'stimatlng the dam- the subject-matter of the contract (an lg-norai::es arising out or any breach of con- ance known to, and Indeed Intentionally protract, the following: "Where two parties cured by, the plaintifl'.s), the first portion ot
have made a contract which one ot them
the rule applies also; for there are no damhas broken, . tlle damages which the other
ages more tllan nominal which can 'fairly
party ought to receive In respect of such
and reasonably be considered as arising natbreach or contract should be such a R urally-I. e. according to the usual course ot
things-from the breach' of such a contract
may !nirly and reasonably be consiclerP•I
terms forming part of the contract between

36.3

third condition or restriction in the printed

terms forming part of the contract between

these parties, it is stipulated that the com-

pany shall not be “liable in any case" "for

erro1s in cipher or obscure messages;" and

that it is further stipulated that “no em-

ploye of the company is authorized to vary

the foregoing," which evidently includes this

as well as other restrictions.

It is diﬂlcult to see anything unreasonable

or against public policy in a stipulation that

if the handwriting of a messagedelivered

to the company for transmission is obscure,

so as to be read with diﬁiculty, or is in

cipher, so that the reader has not the usual

assistance of the context in ascertaining par-

ticular words, the company will not be re-

sponsible for its miscarriage, and that none

of its agents shall, by attempting to trans-
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mit such a message, make the company re

sponsible.

As the message was taken down by the

tele;_'raph operator at Brookville in the same

words in which it was delivered by the plain-

tiff to the company at Philadelphia, it is evi-

dent that no obscurity in the message, as

originally written by the plaintiff. had any-

thing to do with its failure to reach its ulti-

mate destination in the same form.

But it'certainly was a cipher message, and

to hold that the acceptance by the defend-

ant's operator at Philadelphia made the com-

pany liable for errors in its transmission

would not only disregard the express stipu-

lation that no cmploye of the company could

vary the conditions of the contract, but would

wholly nullify the condition as to cipher

messages, for the fact that any message is

written in cipher must be apparent to every

reader.

Beyond this, under any contract to trans-

mit a message by telegraph, as under any

other contract, the damages for a breach

must be limited to those which may be fairly

considered as arising according to the usual

course of things from the breach of the very

contract in question, or which both parties

must reasonably have understood and con-

templated, when making the contract, as

likely to result from its breach. This was

directly adjudged in Telegraph Co. v. Hall,

124 U. S. 444, 8 Sup. Ct. 577.

In Hadley v. Baxendale (decided in 1854)

9 Exch. 345, ever since considered a leading

case on both sides of the Atlantic, and ap-

proved and followed by this court in Tele-

graph Co. v. Hall. above-cited, and in How-

ard v. Manufacturing Co., 130 U. S. 199, 206.

207, 11 Sup. Ct. 500; Baron Aiderson laid

down, as the principles by which the jury

ought to be guided in estimating the dam-

ages arising out of any breach of con-

tract, the foliowing: "Where two parties

have made a contract which one of them

has broken, _the damages which the other

party ought to receive in respect of such

breach of contract should be such as

either arising naturally—i. e. according to the
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as this." 1 C. P. Div. 326, 328, 45 Law J.

C. P. 682. 684.

In Telegraph Co. v. Gildersicve, already re-

ferred to, which was an action by the sender

against a telegraph company for not deliver-

ing this message received by it in Baltimore,

addressed to brokers in New York, "Sell

ﬁfty (50) gold," Mr. Justice Alvey, speaking

for the court of appeals of Maryland. and ap-

plying the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, above

cited, said: “While it was proved that the

dispatch in question would be understood

among brokers to mean ﬁfty thousand dol-

lars of gold. it was not shown. nor was it

put to the jury to ﬁnd, that the appellant's

agents so understood it, or whether they un-

derstood it at all. ‘Sell ﬁfty gold' may have

been understood in its literal import, if it

can be properly said to have any, or was as
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likely to be taken to mean ﬁfty dollars as

ﬁfty thousand dollars by those not initiated;

and, if the measure of responsibility at all

depends upon a knowledge of the special cir-

cumstances of the case, it would certainly

follow that the nature of this dispatch should

have been communicated to the agent at the

time it was offered to be sent, in order that

the appellant might have observed the pre-

cautions necessary to guard itself against the

risk. But without reference to the fact as

to whether the appellant had knowledge of

the true meaning and character of the dis-

patch, and was thus enabled to contemplate

the consequences of a breach of the contract,

the jury were instructed that the appellee

was entitled to recover to the full extent of

his loss by the decline in gold. In thus in-

structing the jury, we think the court com-

mitted error, and that its ruling should be

reversed." 29 Md. 232, 251.

In Baldwin v. Telegraph Co., which was an

action by the senders against the telegraph

company for not delivering this message,

“'l‘clegraph me at Rochester what that well

is doing," Mr. Justice Alien, speaking for the

court of appeals of New York, said: “The

message did not import that a sale of any

property or any business transaction hinged

upon the prompt delivery of it, or upon any

answer that might be received. For all the

purposes for which the plaintiffs desired the

information, the message might as well have

been in a cipher or in an unknown tongue.

It indicated nothing to put the defendant up-

on the alert, or from which it could be in-

ferred that any special or peculiar loss would

ensue from a nondelivery of it. Whenever

special or extraordinary damages, such as

would not naturally or ordinarily follow a

breach, have been awarded for the nonper-

formance of contracts, whether for the sale

or carriage of goods or for the delivery of

messages by telegraph, it has been for the

reason that the contracts have been made

with reference to peculiar circumstances

known to both, and the particular loss has

been in the contemplation of both, at the

time of making the contract, as a contingen-
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land was in his employ, had no tendency to

show what the message was about. Accord-

ing to any understanding which the tele-

graph company and its agents had, or which

the plaintif f could possibly have supposed

that they had. of the contract between these

parties, the damages which the piaintitt seeks

to recover in this action, for losses upon wool

purchased by Toland. were not such as could

reasonably be considered. either as arising,

according to the usual course of things. irom

the supposed breach of the contract itself, or

as having been in the contemplation of both

parties, when they made the contract, as a

probable result of a breach of it.

In any view of the case. therefore, it was

rightly ruled by the circuit court that the

piaintiff could recover in this action no more

than the sum which he had paid f.0r, sending
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the message. Judgment aﬂirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER and Mr. Justice

HARLAN dissented.

Mr. Justice WHITE. not having been a

member of the court when this case was ur-

gued, took no part in its decision.

land was In his employ, bad no tendency to
-show whnt the message wns about. According to any understanding which the tel~
graph company nnd Its agents hnd, or which
the plaintlfr could possibly have supposed
that they hnd, of the contract between these
parties, the damages which the plalntltt seeks
to r<'COvet• in this action, for losses upon wool
purchased by Toland. were not such as could
reasonably be considered, either as arising,
according to the usual course of things, from
the supposed breach of the contract Itself, or
as having been In the contemplation of both
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parties, when they made the contract, as a
probable result of a breach of It.
In any view of the case, therefore, It wns
rightly ruled by the circuit court that the
plaintiff could recover In this action no wore
than the sum which lle llad paid t.or sendhlg
the message. Judgment atlit'wed.
l\Ir. Chief Justice FULLER and Mr. Justice
HARLA.i.V dissented.
Mr. Justice WHITE, not hnvlng be<>n n
member of the court wllen this case was 11rgued, took no part In Its decision.

368

DAMAGES IN ACTIONS’ AGAINST TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

XVESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. WILSON.

(14 South. 1, 32 Fla. 527.)

Nov. 8, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Escambia coun-

ty; James 1(‘. McClellan, Judge.

Action by Charles M. Wilson against the

Western Union Telegraph Company for a

failure to transmit and deliver a message.

Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant ap-

peals. Reversed.

Mallory & Maxwell, for appellant. John

C. Avery, for appeilee.

Supreme Court of Florida.

TAYLOR, -T. The appeilee sued the ap-

pellant in the circuit court of Escambia

county, in case, for damages for its faiim-e

to transmit and deliver a telegraphic mes-

sage in cipher. The suit resulted in a judg-

ment for the plaintiff in the sum of $688.88,
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and therefrom the defendant telegraph com-

pany appeals.

The declaration alleges as follows: “That

the Western Union Telegraph Company, a

corporation, the defendant, on the 12th day

of December, 1887, was engaged in the busi-

ness of transmitting telegraphic messages

between Pensacola, Fla., and New York, in

the state of New York, and in the delivery

thereof to other cable and telegraph com-

panies for transmission to Liverpool, Eng-

land, where the said plaintiff had a. regular

merchant broker or agent, to wit, one A.

Dobell, through whom the plaintiff negoti-

ated, by means of such messages, the sale in

Europe of cargoes of lumber and timber, the

p1aintiil" being then and there a timber and

lumber merchant at the city of Pensacola.

That on said day the plaintiff delivered to

the defendant, and the defendant received

from him at its oﬂice in the city of Pensa-

cola, aud undertook to transmit and cause

to be transmitted, and it was its duty to

transmit and cause to be transmitted, to the

said A. Dobell, the following cipher message:

‘Dobell, Liverpool: Giadfuiness—shipment—

rosa — bonhenr — inciform — banewort —

margin,'—which the said Dobell would have

understood, and the plaintiff intended to be

an offer of a cargo of lumber and timber

from said port of Pensacola for sale through

the said Dobell in Europe, and the said Do-

bell would have sold the same for the plain-

tiff on the terms of said offer at a proﬁt to

the plaintiff of twelve hundred dollars, but

the defendant failed and neglected to send

the said message, in violation of its duty

to the plaintiff, and to the piaintiff's loss of

$1,200," and therefore he sues, etc.

At the trial the plaintiff, over the defend-

ant's objection, was permitted to testify, in

esialdisiunent of the damages claimed, that

he had to sell his cargo of lumber in Europe

~upon the market for the best price he could

get, which was 52 shillings a load, and

which amounted to $630.84 less than the

price at which he offered same for sale in

the message failed to be sent. The over-

ruled objection of the defendant to this testi-
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employed, or the compensation demanded | be a complete upheaval of all the old land

for sending an unimportant dispatch, or that

it would aid the operator in its transmission.

For what reason, then, could he demand in-

formation that was in no way whatever to

affect his manner of action, or impose on

him any additional obligation? It could

only operate on him persuasively to perform

a duty for which he had been paid the price

he demanded, which, in consideration thereof,

he had agreed to pt-rform, and which the

law, in consideration of his promise, and the

reception of the consideration therefor, had

already enjoined on him." The answer to

all this is that the same argument is equally

applicable as a reason why the rule in Had-

ley v. Baxendale should not apply to carriers

of goods for hire. The carrier of goods, in

contracting to carry and deliver, deals with

the tangible. When he contracts, he has in
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his mind's eye, from the visible, tangible

subject of his contract, what will be the

probable damage resulting directly from a

breach of it on his part, and so has the

other party to the contract with the carrier.

Therefore,‘ the damage likely to ﬂow from

a breach by the carrier can properly be said

to enter mutually into the contemplation of

both parties to the contract, and it is this

mutuality in the contemplation of both parties

to the contract of the results that will be

likely to ﬂow directly from its breach that

really furnishes that equitable feature of the

rule that the damages thus mutually contem-

plated are in fact the damages that the law

will impose for the breach. Why? Because,

in the eye of the law, the parties having

mutually contemplated such damages in go-

ing into such contract, those damages can

alone be inferred as having entered into their

contract as a silent element thereof. The rule

in Hadley v. Baxendale is applicable alone to

breaches of contract, and formulates con-

cisely the measure of damages for the breach

of/those contracts that do not within them-

selves, in express terms, ﬁx the penalty to

follow their breach. In other words, this

rule does nothing more than to give ex-

pression to that part of the contract which,

in the eye of the law, has been mutually

agreed upon between the parties, but con-

cerning which their contract itself is silent.

This essential leading feattu'e of the rule, we

think, was wholly lost sight of in the discus-

sion of the question in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer,

supra, i. e. that the damages provided for un-

der the rule arise ex contractu, and that, un-

less there is mutuality in all the essential ele-

tents that enter into or grow out of the

contract, the whole fabric becomes unilateral,

and abhorrent in the eyes of the law. The

assertion, as a rule of law, that one party to

a contract shall alone have knowledge that

a breach of that contract will directly re-

sult in the loss of thousands of dollars, and

that upon such breach he can recover of the

other party to the contract all of such, to

him, unforeseen, unexpected, uncontemplated,

nonconsented-to damages, seems to us to

:'l(O
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egraph Co., 60 Me. 9; Squire v. Telegraph

Co., 98 Mass. 232; Telegraph Co. v. Wenger,

55 Pa. St. 262; Tyler v. Telegraph Co., 60

Ill 421; Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md.

232; Telegraph Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 76 Tex.

217, 13 S. W. 70; Cannon v. Telegraph Co.,

100 N. C. 300, 6 S. E. 731; Landsberger v.

Telegraph Co., 32 Barb. 530; Manville v.

Telegraph Co., 37 Iowa, 214; Telegraph Co.

v. Edsall, 63 Tex. 668; Hibbard v. Telegraph

Co., 33 Wis. 558; Thompson v. Telegraph

Co., 64 Wis. 531, 25 N. W. 789; Abcles v.

Telegraph Co., 37 Mo. App. 554; Telegraph

Co. v. Cornwell, 2 C01o. App. 491, 31 Pac.

393; 3 Suth. Dam. 298; Wood, Mayne, Dam.

40; Thomp. Elect. §§ 311-316, inclusive; Id.

§§ 346, 358-375, inclusive. Opposed to this

array of authorities are the following de-

cisions by divided courts, with the exception

of the Georgia and Mississippi cases: Tel-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

egraph Co. v. Hyer, supra; Daughtery v.

Telegraph Co., 75 Ala. 168; Id., 89 Ala. 191,

7 South. 660; Telegraph Co. v. Way, 83 Ala.

542, 4 South. 8-1»l; Telegraph Co. v. Fatman,

73 Ga. 285; Alexander v. Telegraph Co., 66

Miss. 161, 5 South. 397. The case of Tele-

graph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, is also

cited as sustaining a contrary rule. but a

careful reading of that case will disclose the

fact that the conclusions reached are predi-

cated upon a statutory provision in their

Code. In the case at bar, the message that

it is alleged the defendant company failed to

send was in cipher, and contained nothing

that would indicate to the defendant's oper-

ator whether it contained a criticism upon

the “Horse Fair" painting by the great artist,

Rosa Bonhenr, named in the message, or

whether it related to a matter of dollars and

cents. There was no explanation made to the

operator as to its meaning or importance,

except that the plaintiff said that the word

"gladfuiness," in the message, had a special

meaning. What that special meaning was,

he did not disclose. Under these circum-

stances, all that the plaintiff could rightfully -

recover for the defendant's failure to send or

deliver the message would be nominal dam-

ages, or, at most, the sum paid by him as the

price of its transmission. It was error,

therefore, for the court to admit testimony

as to the damage sustained by the plainti

by the loss of sale of a cargo of timber con

sequent upon the failure to forward the mes-

sage.

There is another feature presented in the

proofs, aside from all that has been said up-

on the rule of damages in such cases, that

would prevent the recovery had in this case.

The plaintiff himself testiﬁes that he re-

ceived from his agent, Dobell, in Europe, an

offer for the cargo of timber. What that

offer was, is nowhere stated or shown. Then

he says: “I decided to make a ﬁnal propo-

sition, which I did by taking the message to

the telegraph oiﬁce, that was not sent, which

message, when translated, was an offer by

me of said cargo of timber for sale at 54

shillings per load." Then he says that he

/

)
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egrnph Co., 60 Me. 9; Squire v. Telegraph missed the sale of the cargo n.t the terms
Co., 08 Mass. 232; Telegraph Co. v. Wenger, offered by him ln his message In consequence
55 Pa. St. 262; Tyler v. Telegraph Co., 60 of the defendant's !allure to send tt, and con·
Ill 421; Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. scquently had to sell on the market for the
232; Telegrnpli Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 76 Tex. best price he could get, which was 52 shll217, 13 S. W. 70; Cannon v. Telegraph Co., lings per load. There is not a wonl ot proof
100 N. C. 300, 6 S. E. 731; Lamlsbcrger v.
In the record to show that his offer contained
Telegraph Co., 32 Barb. 530; Manville v. in the unsent message would ever have been
Tt'legrnph Co., 37 Iowa, 214; Teleg1·aph Co. accepted, or that he could ever at any time
v. Edsall, 63 Tex. GG8; Hibbard v. Telegraph have sold the timber at the price at which
Co., 33 Wis. 558; Thompson v. Telegraph he so offered It, or that It could ever have
Co., 6! Wis. 531, 2:1 N. W. 789; Abeles v. bcl•n sold at nny greater price than the one
'.L'elegl'llph Co., 37 l\Io. App. 554; Telegraph he actually receh·ed tor same, whether IJ!g
C'..o. v. Cornwell, 2 Colo. App. 491, 31 Pac.
message had been sent or not. Yet, ln the
3~3; 3 Suth. Dam. 298; Wood, Mayne, Dam.
face of this state ot the proofs, damn;;es
40; Thomp. Elect. §§ 311-316, Inclusive; Id.
have been allowed to the plaintiff equal to
§§ 346, 358-375, Inclusive. Opposed to this
the dltl'erence between a price nt whkh he
army of authoriti<'s are the following de- simply offered his timber for snle, and the
clslons by divided courts, with the exception price actually l'ecelved lJy him for It, withof the Georgia and ::\Iisslssippi cases: Tel- out a word of proof to show whether the
egr11ph Co. v. Hyer, supra; Daughtery v. higher price at which he offered it for sale
Telegraph Co., 75 Ala. 168; Id., 89 Aln. 101, could ever have been obtained for it or
7 South. 660; Telegraph Co. v. Wny, 83 Ala. not.
542, 4 South. 844; Telegraph Co. v. Fatman,
'l'he nppellee contends thnt because of the
73 Ga. 285; Alexander v. Telegraph Co., 66 decision in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, supra,
Miss. 161, 5 South. 397. The case of Tele- the question of dnmnges cannot ·be considgrnph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, ls also erE'd; thnt, ns to this case, it Is stnre decisls.
cited as sustaining a contrary rulf', but a
This dochine, as we understand it, ls prop·
careful reading of that case will disclose the erly applicable to decisions furnishing rules
fnct that the conclusions reached are predl- of property, and those construing statutes,
catcd upon a statutory provision In their and to those passing upon the validity ot
Code. In the case at bar, the message that contracts in which Investments have or may
It Is alleged the defendant company failed to have been made upon the fnlth of the ndjnsend was in cipher, and contained nothing dlcatlon ns to their validity, In which cast'S
that would Indicate to the detendhnt's oper- former decisions upon the same que1.1tlons
ntor whether It contained a criticism upon will be adhered to, but we do not think this
the "Horse Fair" painting by the great artist, cnse falls within the rule.
Rosa Bonheur, named in the message, or
In reversing the former ruling of the court
whether It related to a matter of dollars and in the Hyer Case, we do not interfere with
cents. There was no explanation made to the nny vested right acquired upon the faith or
operator as to its meaning or Importance, tb.at adjudication, but pass upon the rule or
except thnt the plaintiff said that the word damages, as upon an abstract proposition, to
"glndfulness," tn the- message, had a special follow the breach of such contracts. Ot the
meaning. What that special meaning was, erroneousness of the rule as lnld down In
he did not disclose. Under these circum- · that case, we are perfectly and clParly sntstances, all that the plaintiff could rightfully · isfied; and In such cnse, In determining the
recover for the defendant's failure to send or propriety of overruling It as a solemn ndju.
deliver the message would be nominal dam- dicntlon, we are to be governed largely by a
ages, or, at most, the sum paid by him as the ronsideratlon of the results that will likely
p-rice of Its transmission. It was erro~r flow from the enunciation nnd establishment
therefore, for the court to admit testimony ot the .one or tb.e other of the two rules. It,
as to the damage sustained by the plaint!
In such case, we conclude that the affirmance
by the loss of sale ot a cargo of timber con
ot what we deem to be the erroneous rule In
sequent upon the failure to forward the mes- that case will be productive of more far·
sage.
reaching and harmful results than would
'.fhere ts another feature presented tn the follow the dlsaflirmance thereof, then it beproofs, aside from all that has been said up- comes our duty to overturn It, and such we
on tbe rule of damages In such cases, that think would be the result here. Besides bewould prevent the recovery had tn this case. Ing unilateral and wb.olly unfair, as we have
The plalntHT himself testifies that he re- before stated, we cannot see why, If the proceived from his agent, Dobell, ln Europe, an tectlon of the rule ln Hadley v. Baxendale ls
oft'er for the cargo of timber. What that to be withheld from contracts with telegraph
offer was, Is nowhere stated or shown. Then companies, It should not also be denied In
he soys: "I decided to make a final propo- the dally recurring contractunl controversies
sltlon, which I did by taking the message to between Individuals. To overturn the rule In
the telegraph otflce, that wns not sent, which controversies as between man and man,
mess:1i.:-t>, when trnnslated, was an offer by
\Vould be such an uprooting of the old land·
me of i;;ai(l cargo ot timber for sale at 54 marks n.s to make it Impracticable to surshlll!ngs per load." Then he says that he mlse the harmful results that would follow.
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Entertaining these views, we do not think

that the doctrine of stare decisis constrains

us to adhere to the rule in the Hyer Case,

but thlnn (hat less harm will follow our re-

turn to the well-beaten and familiar track

that furnishes a plain and easily compre-

hended rule for all contracting parties, be

they corporate or individual. .

The judgment appealed from is reversed,

and a new trial ordered.

RANEY, C. J'., (concurring) A reconsld.

.

eration of the question of the measure of

damages involved here conﬁrms the correct-

ness of the view expressed in my dissenting

opinion in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla.

649 et seq., 1 South. 129, and I concur in the

opinion of Judge Taylor, that the rule fol-

lowed in the case mentioned is unfair, and
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ought not to be perpetuated; and, without

committing myself further upon the question

of stare declsis, my conclusion is that more

injury will result in the future from adhering

to the rule of the Hyer Case than will accrue

to parties to past transactions from changing

it, and that the judgment should be re-

versed. Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) (33,

and note 1; Wells, Stare Dec. 5 624 et seq.;

Chamberlain, Stare Dec. 19.

MABRY, J., (dissenting) The question of

liability to damage for a failure on the part

of a telegraph company to send a cipher

message is not a new one in this court.

Over six years ago this question was delib-

erately settled here by the decision in the

case of Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla. 652, 1

South. 129. It is proposed new to revel-se

this case, and my view is that it should not

be done. Every question in reference to

cipher messages entering into the ease now

before us was fully discussed and maturely

considered in the Hyer Case, and this case

has the support of decisions in Alabama,

Mississippi, Georgia, and Virginia. Under

the decision in the Hyer Case. there was a

remedy for damages for a failure on the part

of a telegraph company to send a cipher mes-

sage, when it had, for compensation. agreed

to do so. There is much merit in the rule

that, where the company holds itself out to

the public as a transmitter of cipher mes-'

sages for pay, it houid not be allowed. after

receiving the money and agreeing to send the

message, to deny its liability for damages

resulting from its own violation of duty on

the ground that the message was in cipher,

and its contents not known to the company

when it agreed to send it. This court hav-

ing planted itself in favor of this rule over

six years ago. I do not think we should now

disturb it. I do not see how greater harm

will result from adhering to the decision than

overruling it.
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FIRST NAT. BANK OF BAlt.\'lCSViLLE v.

VVESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

(30 Ohio St. 555.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1876.

Error to district court, Belmont county.

J. H. Collins, for piaintif f in error. J. W.

Okey and O. J. Swaney, for defendant in er-

ror.

WRIGHT, J. The First National Bank of

Barnesville brought an action in the court

below, against the telegraph company, to re-

cover damages for failure to transmit and

deliver a telegraphic message. The bank

was located in Barnesvilie, Ohio. It had

done business with one Aaron Lowshe, and

.had frequently cashed drafts for him, in a

small way, prior to February, 1809. In that

month, Lowshe wanted two more drafts

cashed—one on Beiiis & Milligan, New York,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

for $1,000; one on Ege & Otis, same place,

for $1,400. The amounts being large, and

the bank cautious, the cashier wrote to a

correspondent in New York, George F. Baker,

- cashier First National Bank, New York, as

follows: “Would like information in respect

to Mess. Ege & Otis, No. 168 W. W. Market;

also, Mess. West, Titus & Co., No. 129 West

street. Are they responsible parties? If not

too much trouble, would be pleased to have

you inquire of each, if dft., at sight, drawn

by A. Lowshe for $1,400 to $1,000, would

be paid. If the ﬁrms or either of them, are

not reliable for that amt., or if they should

be unwilling to accept, please answer by

telegram. If all right, need not dispatch.

If not right, would' like to hear by Saturday

evening. (13th)."

This letter was dated at Barnesville, Feb-

ruary 11th, which appears to have been

Thursday. No mention is made, it will be

observed, of Bellis & Miiligan, on whom the

$1,600 draft was drawn.

The letter was received in New York by

Baker, to whom it was addressed, on Febru-

ary 15th. It is stated in evidence that the

ordinary time of mail communication, be-

tween Barnesville and New York, is two days.

This advice to Baker probably reached its

destination after close of bank hours, on Sat-

arday, and was taken up in the ordinary

course of business on Monday morning. On

that day Baker made inquiries of Ege & Otis,

mi whom the $1,400 draft was drawn. and at

4:55 of that day telegraphed as follows. to

the Bank at Barnesvilie: “February 15, 1809.

To J . F. Davis, Cash., Barnesvilie, 0'. Parties

will accept if bill lading accompanies the

draft. Parties stand fair. Geo. F. Baker, C."

This message never was received at Barnes-

ville. There is testimony tending to show

that it started to and perhaps reached Buffa-

lo. But it is not traced beyond that point,

and the telegraph company give no satisfac-

tory account of what became of it. The one

certain fact about it is, that the Barnesviile

bank never received it. New York not be-

ing heard from, the Barnesvilie bank cashed

the drafts, on Monday the 15th, before three
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‘it is true. and perhaps might have had it in

noon or evening of February 16, 1869, any

means would have been used to recover the

money; if so, what? A. I am conﬁdent

means would have been used to recover it."

Mr. Lowshe also makes this statement: "Q.

If the bank had discovered, while you were

at Barnesville or Zanesville, that those drafts

which you had cashed at the Barnesville bank ,

would not be accepted, and had demanded

the money back, would you have refunded it ‘

to the bank? A. At Zanesville, on the after-

noon of the ﬁrst day there, I sent ﬁve hun- i

dred dollars of the money home. Had the

bank informed me at Barnesville the drafts

would not be accepted, I would have return-

ed the money to the bank. Had such infor-

mailon reached me at Zanesville. before I

sent the live hundred dollars home, I would
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have returned it all. Had such information ‘

reached me at Zanesville after I sent the ﬁve

hundred dollars home, I would have returned

the balance to the bank. I would have re- ,

turned the money immediately on receiving

such information."

In this connection the court charged the

jury in effect, that if defendants were guilty ‘

of negligence in not transmitting the message, 1

then plaintiffs must show that Lowshe was |

' where they could have reached him with legal

process and that he had property in such po-

sition that the law could lay hold of it; and if

this was not shown, but it appeared that the

recovery of the money depended upon the

happening of a new contingency which might

or might not have occurred. the damages

were so remote that no recovery could be had.

Upon the case as thus made, we are clearly

of opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled

to substantial damages. If the New York '

dispatch had arrived upon the 15th or 16th,

it is not made apparent, either in pleadings or ;

proof. how the bank was to secure itself. with

that certainty the law requires, in order to

justify a claim for damages. It is not made I

to appear that Lowshe 'had property that

could be seized. He had obtained this money, I

his possession, but he might easily have put

it beyond the reach of process. But even if

he had the money where he could lay his hand

upon it, it is not p inted out how the bank

proposed to reach 1 Had he been arrested

on the ground of fraud, it might have been ‘

diﬂicult to sustain such aprot-ceding, until aft-

er the drafts had been actually protested for ,

nonacceptance, by which time Lowshe was

lost sight of. Nor is it alleged or proved that

an actual arrest would have produced the

money. It is true, the bank claims that Mr.

Lowshe would have returned the money, be- ‘

cause he said he would; still the jury might

have considered that as the “mere contin- .

gency," which, the court instructed them, only

occasioned a damage that was remote.

The rule as to damages is thus laid down

by Earl. J., in Leonard v. Telegraph Co., 41

N. Y. 544: “The damages must ﬂow directly

and naturally from the breach of contract,
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pany, the company making such mistake will

not be liable in damage for such loss."

In Landsberger v. Telegraph Co., 32 Barb.

536, it was held that plaintiff could not re-

cover damages, because, “on receiving the

despatch from transmission, the defendant

had no information whatever in relation to it,

or the purposes to be accomplished by it, ex-

cept what could be derived from the dispatch

itself."

In ,Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232,

Allen, Tel. Cas. 390, it is held that knowledge

of special circumstances must be shown, to

lay a foundation for special damages. Ste-

venson v. Telegraph Co., 16 U. C. Q. B. 530,

537. The telegraph cases, generally, follow

the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, with re-

gard to notice, as is shown by the numerous

authorities cited by counsel.
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It therefore appears to us that the possi-

bility of recovering the money from Lowshe

was a contingency too remote upon which

to base a recovery. The fact. that the com-

pany were not advised of any importance

attaching to the message, either by the mes-

sage itself or actual notice given. goes further

to show a case where substantial damages

cannot be recovered.

And in this connection, and as relating to

the question of damages, we may consider

the rule, “causa proxima non remota spec-

tatur," as to which Parsons says (volume 2,

p. 257, "Telegraphs, Measure of Damages"):

“If the telegraph company is in default, but

their default is made mischievous to a party

only by the operation of some other interven-

ing cause, then the rule above mentioned

would prevent the liability of the company;

because their default would only be the re-

mota, the remote or removed cause of the in-

jury, and not the proxlma. or nearest cause."

If the telegraph company were guilty» of

negligence in not delivering the message at

Barnesvilie, the question remains, whether

there would have been a loss if there were no

other cause intervening. Clearly the failure

in the message was not the moving cause

that induced Lowshe to obtain the discounts

and pocket the money; neither would the

delinquency of the telegraph company have

occasioned any damage had Lowshe evi-

denced that integrity which, in a virtuous

mind, would have induced the return of the

money to the bank. The loss was occasioned

by two causes,—the short-coming of the tele-

graph company, in not delivering the mes-

sage. and the still shorter-coming of Lowshe,

in appropriating to himself what belonged to

somebody else.

In Lowery v. Telegraph Co., 60 N. Y. 198,

B. sent a telegram to plaintiff, asking for:

$500; by mistake, the telegraph company

changed the message to $5,000, which B. ob-

tained, embezzled, and absconded. The ref-

eree held the telegraph company liable for the

loss in the whole amount. This was held

error; that defendant's negligence was not

the proximate cause of the loss, as the em-
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pany, the company making such mistake will
not be llnble In damage for such loss."
In Landsberger v. Telegraph Co., 32 Barb.
u36, It was held that plalntifr could not recover damages, because. "on receiving the
cle:<patch from transmission, the defendant
had no lntormatlon whatever lu relation to It,
or the purposes to be accomplished by it, except what could be tlerived from the tlispatch
itself."
In :.relegrnph Co. v. Gll<lersleve, 29 Mtl. 232,
Allen, Tel. Cas. 390, It Is held that knowledge
of special circumstances must be shown, to
lay n foundation for special dnmages. Stevenson v. Telegraph Co., 16 U. C. Q. B. 530,
5:fi. The telegraph cases, generully, follow
the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, with regard to notice, as Is shown by the numerous
authO'l'ltles cited by counsel.
It therefore appears to us that the possibility of recove1·lng the money from Lowshe
was a contingency too remote upon which
to base a reco,·ery. The fact that the company were not advised of any importance
attaching to the message, either by the mes·
sage Itself or actual notice given, goes further
to show a case where substantial damages
cannot be recovered.
And In this connection, and as relating to
the question of damages, we may consider
the rule, "causa proxima non remota speetntur," as to which Parsons says (volume 2,
p. 257, ··Telegraphs, Measure of Damages"):
"If the telegraph company Is ln default, but
their default ls made mischievous to a party
only by the operation of some other intervening cause, then the rule above mentioned
would prevent the liability of the company;
because their default would only be the remotn, the remote or removed cause of the Injury, and not the proxlma. or nearest cause."
If the telegraph company were gullt~ of
negligence In not delivering the message at
Barnesvllle, the question remains, whether
there would have been a loss If there we1·e no
other cause Intervening. Clearly the failure
In the message was not the moving cause
that Induced Lowshe to obtain the cllscounts
and pocket the money; neither would the
delinquency of the telegraph company have
occasioned any damage had Lowshe evidenced that Integrity which, In a virtuous
mind, would have lndu<>ed the return of the
money to the bank. The loss was occasioned
by two causes,-the short-<'omlng of the telegrnph company, In not delivering the message. and the stlll shortPr-<•omlng of I..owshe,

In appropriating to himself what belonged to
somebody else.
In Lowery v. Telegraph Co., 60 N. Y. 198.
B. sent a telegram to plaintiff, asking for_
$500; by mlstske, the telegraph company·
changed the message to $5,UOO, which B. obtained, embezzled, and absconded. '.rhe referee held the telegraph company liable for the
loss In the whole amount. This was held
error; that defendant's negligence was not
the proximate cause of the loss, as the embezzlement of B. did not naturully result
therefrom, and could not rea110uably have
been expected.
In this case, the court, quoting from Crnlu
v. Petrie, 6 Hill, 522, lay down this rule:
"To maintain an action for special damages.
they must appear to be the legal and natural
consequences arising from the tort, and not
from the wrongful act of a third person Induced thereby. In other words, the damages must proceed wholly and exclusively
from the Injury complained of."
In any aspect, therefore, in which we areable to view the case, we cannot but consider that the damages are too remote to uphold recovery to any substantial amount.
But the plaintllr was entitled to recover
nominal damages. Upon the breach of an
agreement, the law Infers damages. and, if
none are pro\•ed, nominal can be recovered.
Sedg. Meas. Dam. 47; Field, Dam. 679; Parks
v. Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 425; Oandee v. Telegraph Co., 34 Wls. 471.
The plaintiff asked the court to charge that.
If the nondelivery of the message was by
reason of defendant's negligence, plalntllr'
was entitled to nominal damages, lf there
were no actual damage. This was refused.
and the court did charge that there was n~
right of action, unlel's Injury was shown.
This was error, for which the judgment must
be reversed.
The state of the pleadings relieves us from
consideration of those points ln the ca~
which refer to the special contract which
forms the heading to the message Itself.
This contract was set up as a defense In the
answer to the original petition. Subsequently, however, an amended petition was filed.
To this on answer was filed, not making thn
original answer a part thereof, and not set·
ting up the special contract as a defense. In
this state of the pleadings. we look to theamended petition and answer alone. Thus
the special contract Is eliminated from tht!'
case. Judgment reversed.
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CONNELL v. “'ESl‘ER..\' UNION TEL. 00.

(22 S. W. 345, 116 Mo. 34.)

Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2.

May 16, 1893.

Error to circuit court, Pettis county; Rich-

ard Field, Judge.

Actionby Mat.hewConnell against the West-

ern Union Telegraph Company for failure to

promptly deliver a telegram. From an or-

der of dismissal for want of jurisdiction,

plaintiff appeals. Atiirmed.

Wm. S. Shirk, for plaintiff in error. Karnes,

Holmes & Krauthoff, Charles E. Yeater, and

G. H. I'‘earons, for defendant in error.

GANTT, P. J. This is an action for dam-

ages for the negligence of defendant in

failing to deliver to plaintiff the following

telegraphic message sent to him by his wife:

“Sedalia, Mo., Dec. 13, 1589. To Matt Con-
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nell, Soldiers' Home, Leavenworth, Kan-

sas: Your child is dying. liiary." The 1

plaintiff alleged that his wife paid the cus-

tomary charge, 50 cents, for its transmis-

sion, and that he had refunded that sum to

her. Piaintiff then alleges that his child died on

the 24th day of December, 1889, "and that if

said message had been transmitted and

delivered with any degree of diligence or

promptness whatever, he would have been

able to be present with his said child during

its last sickness, and at its death, and that ‘

by reason of the great negligence and care-

lessness of defendant in failing to deliver .

said message, and of his being thereby de- I

prived of being with his said child during

its last sickness, and at its death, he lost,

not only the ﬁfty cents paid for sending said

message, but also suffered great anguish and

pain of mind and body, and was physically

and mentally prostrnted when he learned that

his child had died, and been buried, without

knowledge on his part of its sickness and

death." He alleges that he was an inmate

of the soldiers‘ home from December 13,

1889, continuously, till February 21, 1890,

and by the slightest diligence he could have

been found. He alleges, further, that he is

damaged in the sum of $5,000, for which he

prays judgment. On motion of defendant the

circuit court struck out of the petition the

words, “but also suffered great anguish and

pain of mind and body, and was physically

and mentally prostrated, when he learned

that his child had died, and had been buried,

without knowledge on his part of its sick-

ness and death." This left the action pend-

ing for the 50 cents only, and, plaintiff declin-

ing to amend, the court sustained another

motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction

of the subject-matter of the action.

The sole question discussed by the appel-

lant in this case is this: “Where a telegraph

company is advised by the contents of a

message that great mental suffering and pain

will naturally result from its neglect to trans-

mit aul deliver the message promptly, can

damages be recovered by the sendee for such

mental agony and distress, caused by a fail-

3i6
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cial telegram could recover for the mental an-

guish caused by delay in its delivery. The

authorities relied upon by the supreme court of

Texas in that case were actions for physical

injuries, in which the mental agony formed

an inseparable part,_s. doctrine never ques-

tioned in this state since Porter v. Railroad

Co., 71 Mo. 66. The learned commissioner

who prepared the opinion did quote a sug-

gestion of the authors of Shearman & Red-

ﬂeld on Negligence, to the effect that they

thought such an action ought to lie, but they

did not claim that any court in this country

or England had previously sustained their

view. The Texas mse has been followed in

that state in a great number of cases, and

has been adopted in Indiana, North Carolina,

Kentucky, Alabama, and Tennessee. On the

other hand, this new departure has been vig-
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orously assailed and denied by the supreme

courts of Mississippi, Georgia, Kansas, and

in Dakota, and in a most luminous dissenting

opinion by Judge Lurton, of'the supreme

court of Tennessee, now judge of the United

States circuit court for the sixth circuit, in

which Folkes, J., concurred. The majority

of the supreme court of Tennessee do not

go to the length contended for by the appel-

lant here. The majority lay great stress

upon the fact that by virtue of a statute

in Tennessee a cause of action is given to

the aggrieved party for damages for failure

to deliver any message. Hence they argue

that, as the party has the right to some

damages by virtue of the statute, they con-

clude they may add the anguish of mind as

an element. It is impossible to escape the

feeling that the very able judges were re-

sorting to a ﬁction to justify them in sup-

porting the action. The case of So Relle

v. Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 310, has been no-

where more ﬂatly repudiated than by the

supreme court of Texas itself, in Railway 00.

v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563. Judge Stayton, in an

able and lucid discussion of the authorities,

demonstrates “that the cases in which

damages have been allowed for mental dis-

tress ‘ ' ' was the incident to a bodily

injury suffered by the distressed person, or

cases of injury to reputation or property, in

which pecuniary damage was shown, or the

act such that the law presumes some dam-

age, however slight, from the act complained

of. They are not cases in which the bodily

injury or other wrong was sai1‘ered by one per-

son, and the mental distress by another." The

reasoning of the supreme court of Tennessee

—that, because the Code gave an action for

some damages, that opened the way to add

damages for mental distress—is, we think, at

complete variance with our own decisions.

In this state we have a damage act which

gives a right of action where death has re-

sulted, and similar statutes exist in most of

the states. The construction placed upon

these statutes has been that no relative,

save those named in the statute, can

recover at all, and no recovery as a
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clal telegram could recover for the mental angule.h c1msed by delay In Its delivery. The
authorities relied upon by the supreme court of
Texas In that case were actions for physical
Injuries, In which the mental agony formed
an Inseparable part,-a. dootrtne never questioned In this state since Porter v. Rallroad
Co., n Mo. 66. The lea.med oommlssloner
who prepared the oplnlon did quote a suggestl-On of the authors of Shearmnn & Redfield on Negligence, to the effect that t.hey
thought such an aotlon ought to lie, but they
did not cln.lm that any court In this country
or England had previously sustained their
vlPw. Tlie Texas case has been followed In
that state In a grrot number of cases, and
bas been adopted In Indiana, North Carolina,
Kentucky, Alabama, and Tennessee. On the
other hand, this new departure has been vigorously assailed and denied by the supreme
courts ot Mlsslsslppl, Georgia, Kllil.9!U!, and
In Dakota, and In a most luminous dissenting
opinion by Judge Lurton, of· the supreme
court of Tennessee, now judge of the United
States circuit court for the sixth circuit, In
which Folkes, J., concurred. The majority
ot the supreme con.rt of Tennessee do not
go to the length contended tor by the appellnnt here. 'l'he majority lay great stress
upon the tact th&t by virtue of a statute
in Tennessee a cause of aotlon is given to
the aggrieved party for damages for failure
to <lellrnr any message. Hence they argue
that, as the party bas the right to some
clamnges by virtue ot the statute, they conclude they may add the anguish of mind as
:m element. It ls Impossible to escape the
feeling that the very able judges were re-sorting to a fiction to justify them In supporting the action. The case of So Relle
v. Telf·grnph Co., 55 Tex. 310, bas been nowhere more 11atly repudiated than by the
supreme court of Texas itself, In Railway Oo.
v. Levy, 59 '.rex. 563. Judge Stayton, in an
able and lucid discussion 1>f the authorities,
demonstrates "that the cases 1n which
damages have been allowed tor mental distress • • • was the Incident to a bodily
injury suft'ered by the distressed person, or
cases of injury to reputa.tion or property, In
which pecuniary damage was shown, or the
net such that the law presumes some damflA"<", however slight, from the act complained
of. '!'hey are not oases In which the bodily
Injury or other wrong was sulfered by one person, nm! the mental distress by another." The
reasoning of the supreme court of Tennessee
- thnt, because the Code gave an aotion for
some damnges, thnt opened the way to add
<famaires for mental distress-ls, we think, nt
complete vmi:mce with our own decisions.
In this state we have a d:lmage act which
gives a right olf action where death has re11ulted, and similar st.'ltutes <'X.illt ln most of
di.e stltPs. '111e constru.otlon placed upon
1lwse statutes has bePn that no rcla tlve,
~ave
those named In the statute, can
1·l'rover at nil, nnd no recovery as a
,.;ol:l Hum fo1· lll<'Utal suffeling Is allowed,

where nM: expr(>!lsly given by the statute.
Field, Dam. 498; Porter v. Rallrnad Co., 71
Mo. 66; Parsons v. Railroad Oo., 91 Mo.
286, 6. S. W . Rep. 464; Schaub v. Railroad
Oo., 106 Mo. 74, 16 S. W. Rep. 92._
But 1t ls aald damages tor Injury to the
feelings have always been allowed In actions
founded upon a breach of promise to marry,
and this ls true In this as In other stwtes. Wilbur v. Johnson, 58 l\!o. 600; Bird v. Thompson, 96 Mo. 424, 9 S. W. Rep. 788. But it
has always been regarded as an exception to
the rule. In this aotion, plaintiff's pecuniary
loss forms an important element. The action is of common-law origin, and at common
law the husband, on marrlage, became liable
tor the wife's debts, and tor support In a
manner nnd style commensurate with his
own social st.anding, and evidence of his station In lite and ftnnnclal condition has always
been admitted. Wilbur v • .Johnson, supra.
As wns well said by Cooper, J., in Telegraph
Co. v. Rogers, 68 l'l!iss. 748, 9 South. Rep.
823: "This action, though In form one for
the breach of contract, partakes In several features of the chnracteristlcs of an
action for the willful tort; and, though the
damages recoverable for the plain tUl' for
mental suffering are spoken of as 'compensatory,' the fervent language of the courts
Indicates how shadowy ls the line that sep·
arates them from those strictly pecuniary."
Harrison v. Swift, 13 Allen, 144; Kurtz T.
Frank, 76 Ind. 595; Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N.
Y. 475; Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N. J. Law,
77. "Especially those cases In which evidence of seduotion ls admlbted. to ascertain
the damages. So much, Indeed, does the
motive ot the defendant enter Into the question of damages, that In Johnson v. Jenkins,
24 N. Y. 252, the defendant was permitted
to give In evidence, In mitlgntlou of damages, the fact that he refused to consummate
the marriage because of the settled opposl·
tlon of bis morther, who was In lntlrm
health."
'l'hese considerations sufficiently indicate
the reasons that actuated the courts to
make this exception. Few precedents tor
this action wlll be found where the defend·
ant was impecunious. The lenmed counsel
has collected various other cases In whkh
mental anguish was recognized as an element of dnmnge, and concludes with the
query, "It allowed in these, why not In this
action?" Let us consider these In the order
of his brief: Assault nnd battery. Under
this bend ls cited the caso of Crnke1· v.
Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657. In that case the
comluctor of a train seized upon the moment when the other employes were absent
from the car to tnkc Improper liberties with
a Indy passenger. The evidence showing that
he placed hls arm nrmmd her, and, against
her vehement protests, kissed her. It was
a dear physical violation ot her person,
which the courts hnve ever held constituted
an n11snult and bnttery, and actionable. Thr.
law reckesst•s sud1 a wrong in Its Initial
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stages. The protection of the person has

ever been an object of great solicitnde to

the common law. The present ability of

actual violence often justiﬁes recourse to

extreme measures in preventing a consum-

mation of threatened wrong to the person.

The cases cited under this head clearly add no

weight to plaintiff's claim. The cases of ma-

licious prosecution and false imprisonment

come under that general class of willful

wrong to the person, affecting the liberty,

character, reputation, personal security, and

domestic relations. Judge Lumpkin, in Chap-

man v. Telegraph Co., (Ga.) 15 S. E. Rep. 901,

disposes of the argument attempted to be

drawn from this class as follows: “In an ac-

tion for wrongful attachment, on the ground ‘

that the defendant was about to dispose of his

property with intent to deprive his creditors,
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it was held (by a divided court) that the mor-

tiﬁcation was a part of the actual damages. .

Byrne v. Gardner, 33 La. Ann. 6. Of course '

it was a case of serious injury to the plain-

tit!'s business standing, and therefore, even if

sound, is no authority on the present question.

In an action for false imprisonment, or for

malicious arrest and prosecution, mental an-

guish has been held a proper subject for

compensatory damages. Fisher v. Hamil-

ton, 49 Ind. 341; Stewart v. Maddox, 63

Ind. 51; Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637, 5

S. E. Rep. 204. Of course, such injuries are

essentially willful, and, besides, are viola-

tions of the great right of personal security

or personal liberty." As to the action of

seduction, every lawyer knows that proof

of some service by the daughter has been

invariably required to sustain it; and the

same rule is rigidly adhered to in Magee v.

Holland, 27 N. J. Law, 86, to which we are

cited by counsel, for the forcible abduction

of a daughter. In the case of enticing away

a daughter, we are referred to Stowe v.

Heywood,7 Allen, 118. The court permitted .

damages for mental suffering on the express

ground that it was a willful injury, and

declined to say whether such damages could

ever be recovered for negligence alone, as

in the case at bar. This case illustrates the

greatest diiiienlty in estimating damages

for mental suffering. Judge Mctcalf says:

“Mental suffering cannot be measured aright

by outward manifestations, for there may

be a show of great distress where little or

none is felt. And great distress may be

concealed, and borne in silence, with an

apparently quiet mind. Ab inquieto saepe

simulator quies." "And we nowhere ﬁnd

that any other evidence of mental suffer-

ing, besides that of the injury which was

the alleged cause of action, was ever be-

fore admitted." The court reversed the

case because the trial court permitted evi-

dence “tending to show" plaintif f suffered

from “pain and anxiety of mind." It is

hardly necessary to add that in a case of

libel or slander, if the words are not ac-

tionable per se, special damages must be al-
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plaintiff, is not to be expected. That the

grief natural to the death of a loved relative

shall be separated from the added grief

and anguish resulting from delayed informa-

tion of such mortal iliness or death, a.nd

compensation given for the latter only, is

the task imposed by the law, as determined

by the majo1ity of the supreme court of

Tennessee." “It is legitimate to consider

the evils to which such a precedent logically

leads. Upon what sound legal considera-

tions can this court refuse to award dam-

ages for injury to the feelings, mental dls- :

tress, and humiliation, when such injury re-

sults from the breach of any contract? Take

the case of a debtor who agrees to return

the money borrowed on a certain day, who

breaches his agreement willfully, with

knowledge that such breach on his part
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will probably result in the ﬁnancial ruin

and dishonor of his disappointed creditor.

Why shall not such a debtor, in addition to

the debt and the interest, also compensate his

creditor for this ruin, or at least for his

mental sufferings? Upon what principle

can we longer refuse to entertain an action

for injured feelings consequent upon the

use of abusive and defamatory language,

not charging a crime, or resulting in special

pecuniary damage? Mental distress is, or

may be in some cases, as real as bodily

pain, and it as certainly results from lan-

guage not amounting to an imputation of

crime; yet such actions have always been

dismissed as not authorized by the law as

it has come down to us, and as it has been

for all time administered."

this state in regard to this contract, shall it

not apply to all disappointments and mental

sufferings caused by delays in railroad '

trains? Telegraph companies are common

carriers; so are railroad companies; and yet

this court, in the Trigg Case, held the com-

pany not liable for mental anguish, as an

independent cause of action for a mere act

of negligence. A similar conclusion was also

reached in the United States circuit court

for the fourth circuit in Wilcox v. Railroad

Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 264, 3 C. C. A. 73, where

the plaintiff made a special contract for a

train to take him to the bedside of a sick

parent. The court held that the trouble of

mind caused by the delay at a railroad

station could not be made the basis of an

action, saying: “But we know of no decided

case which holds that mental pain alone,

unattended by injury to the person, caused ‘

, Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S. W. Rep. 351; Rail-

by simple negligence, can sustain an action."

“The plaintiff was the subject of two mental

pains,—one, for the condition of the sick

person; the other, from the delay at the sta-

tion,—the latter, only, being the subject of .

this action." “It cannot be pretended that

damages from the latter cause of ‘anxie-

ty' and ‘suspense'—uncertain, indeﬁnite, un-

deﬁnable, unascertainable, dependent so

largely on the peculiar temperament of the
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89 Ala. 510, '7 South. Rep. 419;Thompson v.

Tele;:raph Co., 106 N. C. 549, 11 S. E. Rep.

269; Chapman v. Same. (Ky.) 13 S. W. Rep.

880; Young v. Same, 107 N. O. 370, 11 S. E.

Rep. 1044; Thomp. Elect. 5 378, and cases

cited. The cases opposing this view are, no-

tably, the dissenting opinion of Judge Lurton

in Wadsworth v. Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn.

695, S S. W. Rep. 574; Chapman v. Telegraph ‘

Co., (Ga.) 15 S. E. Rep. 901, in which Judge

Lumpkin, of the supreme court of Georgia, '

reviews all the cases in a most admirable

tone, and with great clearness; Wilcox v.

Railroad Co., (4th circuit,) 52 Fed. Rep. 264,

3 C. C. A. 73; Crawson v. Telegraph Co., 47

Fed. Rep. 544; Chase v. Same, 44 Fed. Rep.

554, where all the authorities are cited; West

v. Same, 39 Kan. 93, 17 Pac. Rep. 807; Russell

v. Same, 3 Dak. 315, 19 N. W. Rep. 408; Tele-
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graph Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9 South.

Rep. 823; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. 577; Com-

missioners v. Coultas, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222;

'1‘yler v. Telegraph Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 634;

Kester v. Telegraph Co., (Taft, Judge,) 3.3

Fed. Rep. 603.

We are fully aware that the plaintiﬂ."s

claim appeals strongly to the sensibilities;

but to adopt that view we must either be

guilty of adopting one rule of damages for

I one class of common carriers, and the breach

t of their contracts, or we must conclude that

1 all of our predecessors in the great common-

; law courts were at fault, and henceforth

‘ repudiate, not only their utterances, but our

own, on this subject, and this we have no

inclination to do. We prefer to travel yet

awhile super antiquas vias. If, in the evolu-

tion of society and the law, this innovation

should be deemed necessary. the legislature

can be safely trusted to introduce it, with '

those limitations and safeguards which will

be absolutely necessary, judging from the

variety of cases that have sprung up since

the promulgation of the Texas case. Our

conclusion is, the judgment should be and is

aﬂlrmed. All concur.
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DWYER v. CHICAGO, ST. P;, M. & O. RY.

co.
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DWYER v. CHICAGO, ST. P.', M. & O. RY.

CO.

(51 N. W. 244, 84 Iowa, 479.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. Feb. 1, 1892.

Appeal from district court, Plymouth coun-

ty; Scott M. Ladd, Judge.

Action for pe|sonal injury. Judgment for

plaintiff and the defendant appealed.

(ISl N. W. 244. 84 Iowa, 479.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. Feb. 1, 1892.
Appeal from district court, Plymouth county; Scott M. Ladd, Judge.
Action for personal Injury. Judgment for
plalntHl' and the defendant appealed.
J. H. & C. M. Swan, for appellant. Joy,
Hudson, Call & Joy, for appellee.

J. H. & C. M. Swan, for appellant. Joy,

Hudson, Call & Joy, for appellee.

GRANGER, J. 1. The plaintif f is the ad-

ministrator of the estate of Ann Dwyer,

deceased, who was on the 9th day of July,

1889, struck by defendant's cars, as a re-

sult of which she died about 30 days there-

after. The petition speciﬁes the injuries sus-

tained, and adds: “All of which caused her

great pain and suffering for a period of about ,

thirty days, when she died from such in-
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juries." A motion to strike out the words as

to pain and suffering was overruled, and the

court instructed the jury that, if it found for

the plaintlff, to allow a “reasonable compen-

sation for pain and suffering." The jury re-

turned a general verdict for the plaintiff for

$3,000, and specially found that $2,300 of the

amount was for “pain and suffering," and

$700 “as damages to the estate." An assign-

ment brings in question the correctness of

the court‘s action in permitting the jury to

consider pain and suffering as an element of

damage. The action was commenced after

the death of plaintli‘i."s intestate. If the ac-

tion had been commenced in her life-time, it

is unquestioned that pain a-nd suffering caus-

ed by the injury would have been a proper

element of damage; and this would be true

if, after the commencement of the action, she

had died, and her administrator had been sub-

stituted as party plaintiff, and prosecuted

the suit to judgment. Muldowney v. Rail-

way Co., 36 Iowa, 462. We come, then, to

the important inquiry if such damages are

permissible in such a case, where the action

is commenced by the administrator. The

only authority for maintaining such an action

by the legal representative is by virtue of the

statute. At the common law, the cause of

action abated with the death of the injured

party. The law authorizing the action is

found in Code, 2525. “All causes of action

shall survive and may be brought notwith-

standing the death of the person entitled or

liable to the same." We are cited to no case,

in this or any other state, where the rule

contcnded for by the appellee, and allowed

by the district court, has been sustained. It

is claimed, however, that the reason for this,

as to other states, is because of the peculiar-

ity of the statutes under which such actions

are permitted to survive. In several cases

this court has expressed its view as to the

measure of damages in such cases, and in

such a way that the appellant regards the

law on this point as settled in its favor, while

the appellee regards the language thus relied

upon as merely incidental to other points de-

termined, and in no way decisive of the ques-

GRANGER, J. 1. The plalntltr Is the administrator of the estate of Ann Dwyer,
deceased, who was on the 9th day of July,
1889, struck by defendant's cars, as a result of which she died about 30 days thereafter. The petition specifies the Injuries sustained, and adds: "All of which caused her
great pain and sulferlng for a period of about
tlllrty days, when she dll!d from such Injuries." A motion to strike out tlle words as
to pain and suffering was overruled, and the
court Instructed the jury that, if it found for
the plaintiff, to allow n "reasonable compensation for pain and sull'ering." The jury returned a general verdict for the plalntltr for
$3,000, and specially found that $2,300 or the
amount was for "pain and sulferlng," and
$i00 "as damages to the estate." An assignment brings In question the correctness of
the court's action in permitting the jury to
consider pain and sull'erlng as an element of
damage. The action was commenced after
the death of plalntUl''s Intestate. If the action had been commenced ln her life-time, it
ls unquestioned that pain and sutrerlng caused by the Injury would have been a proper
element of damage; and this would be true
If, after the commencement of the action, she
had died, and her administrator had been substituted as party plalntitr, and prosecuted
the suit to judgment. Muldowney v. Railway Co., 3Cl Iowa, 462. We come, then, to
the Important inquiry if such damages are
permissible in such a case, where the action
ls commenced by the administrator. The
only authority for maintaining such an action
by the legal representative ls by virtue of the
statute. At the common Jaw, the cause of
action abated with the death of the Injured
party. The law authorizing the action ls
found In Code, § 2525. "All causes of action
shall survive and may be brought notwlth·
stnnding the death of the person entitled or
liable to tlle same." We are cited to no case,
In this or any other state, where the rule
<'ontcuded for by the appellee, and allowed
by the district court, has been sustnlned. It
Is dnlmed, howevel.", that the reason for this,
ns to other states, Is because of the peculiarity ot the statutes under which such actions
are permitted to survive. In several cases
this court has expressed Its view as to the
measure of damages In such cases, and in
F.:uch n way that the appellant regards the
lnw on this 1>olnt nil settled In Its favor, while
the nppellee regards the language thus relied

upon as merely Incidental to other points determined, and ln no way decisive of the question now before us. It ls true that the precise question now before us was not Involved
for determination in any of the Iowa cases
cited, and the language 1."elied upon by the appellant has been used incidentally ID the discussion of other questions; but it is not to be
understood, because of this, that such language ls without value In our deliberations on
this question; for much of the language so
used ls In regard to questions so allied to this
in Its legal significance as to make them determlna ble upon quite similar considerations.
For Instance, the rule as to the measure of
damage In cases of this kind has been considered, and, with the point before us in view, a
rule excluding such damage has been adopted.
In Rose v. Railway Co., 39 Iowa, 246, It la
said: "The action ls brought by the administrator for the injury to the estate of the deceased sustained in his death. There Is therefore no basis for damage for pain and sufl'er·
Ing. • • • Compensation for the pecuniary
loss to his estate ls alone to be allowed."
See, also, Donaldson v. Railway Co., 18 Iowa,
at page 290, and Muldowney v. Railway Co.,
: 3Cl Iowa, at page 468. In the latter case the
action was commenced by the injured party,
who died pending the suit, and his administrator was substituted; and it was held that
pain and suffering were proper elementa of
damage because of the action having been
commenced by the Injured party; but the
court guards the rule by saying: "A different
rule would obtain lf the action had been commenced after his death." It ls thought that
the expression may be accounted for on the
1 theory that the case was determined under a
dltrerent statute. Rev. St. § 3467, under
which the action arose, ls as follows: "~o
cause of action ex dellcto dies with either or
both of the parties, but the prosecution thereof may be commenced or continued by or
against their personal representatives." With
reference to the particular matter under consideration, It ls dlftlcult to trace a distinction
between the statutes. The one says, In effect, that such causes of action shall survive
the party, and the other that it does not die
with the party. The effect of each ls to create a survival, and the one, as plainly as the
other, contemplates the existence of the cause
of action before the death. It ls not the effect of either, as seems to be thought by the
appellee, to create a cause of action because
of the death. The statutes deal with the
"cause of action," and not with the role of
damage to be applied. In fixing the damage, we look to the wrong to be remedied;
to the injury to be repaired. It the action Is
brought by the Injured party, the law attempts to remedy the wrong to him,-not specifically to his estate,-and that may include
loss of property, time, and that bodily ease
and comfort to which he ls entitled as against
the wrong-doers. If the action Is brought to
repair an injury to bis estRte, the law lookiJ.
'j
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in ﬁxing the rule of damage, to how the es-

tate is affected by the act, and attempts to

repair the injury. Loss of time and expenses

paid, as a result of the wrong, presumably

lessen the estate; but bodily pain and sutfer-

mg in no manner affect it. It is an item of

damage peculiar to the person, and not to

pecuniary or property rights. Under our stat-

ute, these damages belong "to the estate of

the deceased." Code, § 2526. This distinc-

tion is maintained throughout all the cases

and authorities that have come to our notice.

This court has repeatedly said that these ac-

tions are for “injury to the estate." See

cases cited supra: Rose v. Railway Co., Don-

aldson v. Railway Co., Muldowney v. Rali-

way Co. Mr. Sutherland. in his work on

Damages, (volume 3, p. 282,) speaking in gen-
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eral of these statutes of survival of actions,

says: “The measure of damages is not the

loss or suffering of the deceased, but the in-

jury resulting from his death to his family.

It is only for pecuniary injuries that this stat-

utory right of action is given. Although it

can be maintained only in cases in which an

action could have been brought by the de-

ceased if he had survived, damages are given

on different principles and for different caus-

es. Neither the pain and suffering of the de-

ceased, nor the grief and wounded feelings of

his surviving relatives, can be taken into ac-

count in the estimate of damages." In Rail-

way Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, a like case, it

is said, speaking of the wife or next of kin,

who, under the Illinois statutes, are the bene-

ﬁciaries in such a case: “They are conﬁned

to the pecuniary injuries resulting to the wife

and next of kin; whereas, if the deceased had

survived, a wider range of inquiry would

have been admitted. It would have embraced

personal suffering as well as pecuniary loss,

and there would have been no ﬁxed limita-

tion as to the amount." The language of

the Illinois statute is different in phrascology

from ours, but not to the extent of inducing

a different rule in this respect. Under the

statute of Minnesota. so similar to ours as to

justify the same rule as to these damages, it

is held that “no compensation can be given

' ' ' for the pain and suffering of the de-

ceased." Hutchins v. Railway Co. Qiinn.) 46

N. W. 79. We conclude, without doubt, that

the district court erred in its ruling on the

motion and the instruction to the jury. Some

other questions are argued which we have

examined, the consideration of which would

require extensive quotations from the evi-

dence. and we think they do not involve re-

versible error, and it is unnecessary to dis-

cuss them. The cause is remanded to the

district court, with instructions to deduct

from the judgment entered the $2,300 allowed

for pain and suffering, and give judgment for

the balance. Modiﬁed and aﬂirmed.

in fixing the rule of damage, to how the estate ts atrected by the act, and attempts to
repair the Injury. Loss of time and expenses
paid, as a reBUlt of the wrong, presumably
lessen the estate; but bodily pain and sufrerlng In no manner aliect It. It Is an Item of
damage peculiar to the person, and not to
pecuniary or property rights. Under our statute, these damages belong "to the estate of
the deceased." Code, § 2526. This distinction Is maintained throughout all the cases
and authorities that have come to our notice.
This court bas repeatedly said that these actions are tor "Injury to the estate." See
cases cited supra: Rose v. Railway Co., Donaldson v. Rallway Co., Muldowney v. Railway Co. Mr. Sutherland, In his work on
Damages, (volume 3, p. 282,) speaking In general ot these statutes of survival of actions,
says: "The measure of damages Is not the
loss or sulferlng of the deceased, but the !njury resulting from his death to his family.
It ls only tor pecuniary lnjurlell that this statutory right ot action is given. Although It
can be maintained only In cases In which an
action could have been brought by the deceased It he had survived, damages are given
on dllferent prlnclple11 and tor dltre1·ent causes. Neither the pain and suffering of the deceased, nor the grief and wounded feelings of
h1a surviving relatives, can be taken Into account In the estimate of damages." In Rall-

way Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, a like case, It
Is said, speaking of the wife or next of kin,
who, under the Illinois statutes, are the beneficiaries In such a case: "They are confined
to the pecuniary Injuries resulting to the wife
nod next of kin; whereas, If the deceased had
survived, a wider range of Inquiry would
have been admitted. It would have embraced
personal sutl'erlng as well as pecuniary loss,
and there would have been no fixed limitation as to the amount." The language of
the Illinois statute Is different In phraseology
from ours, but not to the extent of inducing
a different rule In this respect. Under ti.Jc
statute of Minnesota, so similar to ours as to
justify the same rule as to these damages, It
Is held that "no compensation can be given
• • • for the pain and sufterlng of the deceased." Hutchins v. Railway Co. (Minn.) 46
N. W. 79. We conclude, without doubt, that
the district court erred In Its ruling on th!!
motion and the Instruction to the jury. Some
other questions are argued which we havo
examined, the consideration of which would
require extensive quotations from the evidence, and we think they do not Involve reversible error, and It Is unnecessary to discuss them. 'l'he cause Is remanded to the
district court, with lnstructlona to deduct
from the judgment entered the ,2,300 allowed
tor pain and sulfering, and give judgment to1·
the balance. Mod!Jled and aftlrmed.

DAMAGES .FOR CAUSING DEA TH.
MORGAN v.

362

DAMAGES FOR CAUSING DEATH.

MORGAN v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO. (No.

14,812.)

(30 Pac. 603, 95 Cal. 510.)

Supreme Court of California. Aug. 5, 1892.

Department 2. Appeal from superior court,

Kern county; A. R. Conklin, Judge.

Action by Flora Morgan against the South-

ern Paciﬁc Company to recover damages for

the death of her child caused by defendant's

negligence. From a judgment rendered on

the verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiff, de-

fendant appeals. Reversed.

The facts fully appear in Morgan v. Paciﬁc

Co., 30 Pac. 601.

E. L. Craig, Foshay Walker, Horace Hawes,

and R. B. Carpenter, for appellant. Charles

SOUTH~RN

PAC. CO.

(No.

14,8!2.)
(30 Pac. 603, 95 Cal. 510.)
Supreme Court of California. Aug. IS, 1892.
Department 2. Appeal from superior court,
Kern county; A. R. Conklin, Judge.
Action by Flora Morgan against the South·
ern Pacific Company to recover damages for
the death of her child caused by defendant's
negligence. From a judgment rendered on
the verdict of a jury In favor of plnintltr, defendant appeals. Reversed.
The facts fully appear In Morgan v. Pacific
Co., 30 Pac. 601.
El. L. Craig, Foshay Walker, Horace Hawes,
and n. B. Carpenter, tor appellant. Charles
G. Lambe1'Son, Lamberson & Taylor, and J.
W. Ahern, for respondent.

G. Lambcrson, Lamherson & Taylor, and J.

W. Ahern, for respondent.

liIcFARLAND, J. The parties to this ac-
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tion are the same as in Morgan v. Paciﬁc Co.,

30 Pac. Rep. 601 (No. 14,841, this day decid-

ed), in which plaintiff recovered a judgment

for $15,000 for alleged personal injuries re-

ceived by being thrown from the steps of de-

fendant's car, which judgment was by this

court aﬂirmed. When she fell from the steps

of the car she had in her arms her infant

daughter, aged about two years. Nine days

afterwards the child died ﬁom an attack of

pnenmonia; and plaintiff brought this present

action to recover damages for the death of said

child, upon the theory that the pnenmonia was

caused by said fall. The jury gave her dam-

ages in the amount of $20,000, for which sum

judgment was rendered; and defendant ap-

peals from the judgment, and from an order

denying a motion for a new trial. The evi-

dence upon the issues of the alleged negligence

of defendant's employes at the time of the ac-

cident, and the alleged contributory negligence

of piaintiff, was substantially the same as in

the other case, and as to those issues the ver-

dict cannot be disturbed. There was some ev-

idence tending slightly to show that the death

of the child was caused by the accident, but

it is not necessary to inquire whether or not it

was suﬂicient to establish that fact, because

the judgment must clearly be reversed on ac-

count of the excessive damages awarded by

the jury.

There_was no averment in the complaint of

any special damage, and no averment of any

damage at all, except the general statement

that the child died, "to the damage of plaintif

f

in the sum of ﬁfty thousand dollars;" and

there was no evidence whatever introduced or

offered upon the subject of damage. The ju-

ry. therefore, had nothing before them upon

which to base damages except the naked fact

of the death of a female child two years old;

and it is apparent. at ﬁrst blush, that “the

amount of the damages is obviously so dispro-

portionate to the injury proved as to justify

the conclusion that the verdict is not the result

of the cool and dispassionate discretion of the

jury." The main element of damage to plain-

tiff was the probable value of the services of

McFARLAND, J. The parties to thls action are the same as in Morgan v. Pacific Co.,
30 Pac. Rep. 601 (No. 14,841, this day decld·
ed), ln which plalntltl' recovered a judgment
for $15,000 for alleged personal Injuries received by being thrown from the steps of defendant's car, which judgment was by this
court amrmed. When she fell from the steps
ot the car she had In her arms her Infant
daughter, aged about two years. Nine days
afterwards the child died from an attack of
pneumonia; and plalntl1l' brought th1s present
action to reoover damages for the death of said
child, upon the theory that the pneumonia was
caused by said tall. The jury gave her damages In the amount of $20,000, tor which sum
judgment was rendered; and defendant appeals from the judgment, and from an order
denying a motion for a new trial. The evidence upon the Issues of the alleged negligence
ot defendant's employes at the tlme ot the accident, and the alleged contributory negligence
ot pin lntltr, was substantially the same as In
the other case, and as to those 188Ues the verdict cannot be disturbed. There was some ev·
ldence tending slightly to show that the death
ot the child was caused by the accident, but
It Is not necessary to Inquire whether or not It
was sufficient to establish that fact, because
the judgment must clearly be re•ersed on ac·
count or the excessive damages awarded by
the jury.
There . was no averment In the complaint of
any special damage, and no averment of any
dnnmge at all, except the general statement
that the child died, "to the damage of plalntitr
In the sum of fifty thousand dollars;" and
there was no evidence whatever Introduced or
offered upon the subject of damage. The ju·
ry. therefore, had nothing before them upon
which to l:nse damages except the naked fnct
of the den th of a female child two years old;
and It Is apparent. at first blush, that "the
amount of the damages Is obviously so dlsproportlonute to the Injury provoo as to justify
the conclusion tbnt the verdict Is not the result
of the cool and 1li!<passionatc di,:crctlon of thf

jury." The main element of damage to plaintllr was the probable value of the services or
the deceased until she had attained her ma·
jorlty, considering the cost of her eupport and
maintenance during the early and helplelll'
part of her life. We think that the court erred
In charging that "the jury ls not limited by the
actual pecuniary Injury sustained by her, by
reason of the death of her child." An action
to recover damages tor the death of a relative
was not known to the common law; It Is ot
recent legislative origin. There are statutes
In many of the American stat.-,s providing for
such an action, and It bas been quite uniformly held that In such an action th~ plalntitr does
not re1>resent the right of action which the deceased would have had If the latter had survived the Injury, but can recover only for the
pecuniary 1088 sutreroo by the plalntltr on account of the death of the relative; that sorrow
and mental anguish caused by the death are
not elements of damage; and · that nothing can
be recovered as a solatlum for wounded feel~
lngs. The authorities.outside of this state are
almost unanimous to the point above stated.
The following are a few of euch authorities:
Railroad Co. v. Vandever, 36 Pa. St. 298; Iron
Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. St. 95; Railroad Co. v.
Freeman, 36 Ark. 41; Railroad Co. v. Brown,
26 Kan. 443; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lllly, 73
Ind. 252; Donaldson v. Railroad Co., 18 Iowa,
280; Railroad Co. v. Paulk, 2! Ga. 3fitl; Railroad Co. v. Miller, 2 Cc-lo. 4HG; Kesler v.
Smith, 66 N. C. 154; March v. Walker, 48
·.rex. 372; Railroad Co. v. I..evy, 59 Tex. 003;
James "· Christy, l!i Mo lli2; Hyatt v.
Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Chicago v. Major, 18
Ill. 349; Railrood Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill 198;
Blake v. Railroad Co., 18 Q. B. 93.
With respect to the decisions In this state we
do not think those cited by respondent (except
one) are, when closely examined, Inconsistent
with the general authorities. Beeson v. Mining Co., 57 Cal. 20, Is a lending case on tbe
subject, and Is cited by all the cases which
follow It. In that rose the action was brought
by the widow for the death of her husband,
and the question was whether or not the lower
court erred In allowing evidence of the kindly
relations between the plalntltr and the deceased during the lifetime or the latter. The
court sustained the ruling of tbe court below,
but clearly upon the ground that those relations could be considered only In estlmntlng
the pecuniary loss. The court say: "It la
true that In one sense the value of social relations and of society cannot be measured
by any pecuniary standard; • • • but, In
another sense, It might be not only possible,
but eminently fitting, that a loss from severing social relations, or from deprh·atlon of
society, might be measured or at least considered from a pecuniary standpoint. • • •
It a husband and wife were living apart by
mutual consent, neither rendering the other
assistance or kindly omces, the Jury might
take Into consideration the absence of social
relations and the absence of society lu esti-
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mating the loss sustained by either from

the death of the other. So if the husband

and wife had lived together in concord, each

rendering kindly oﬂices to the other, such

facts might be taken into consideration, not,

as the books say, for the purpose of afford-

ing solace in money, but for the purpose of

estimating pecuniary losses. The loss of a

kind husband may be a considerable pe-

cuniary loss to a wife; she loses his advice

and assistance in many matters of domestic

economy." A quotation is made from a

Pennsylvania case where the same rule was

applied to the loss of a wife, the court say-

ing that “certainly the service of a wife is

pecuniarlly more valuable than that of a

mere hireling." The Beeson Case, therefore,

does not decide that the jury may depart

from a pecuniary standpoint in assessing
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damages; it merely holds that in estimating

the pecuniary losses of a wife from the

death of her husband they may consider

whether or not the deceased was a good has-

band, able and willing to provide well for

his wife. The opinion of the court no doubt

goes somewhat further in this direction than

the general current of authorities, but it de-

cides nothing more than above stated. Cook

v. Railroad Co., 60 Cal. 604. also cited by re-

spondent, decides nothing more than the

Beeson Case. In McKeever v. Railroad Co.,

.39 Cal. 300, the point was not involved, and

in Nehrbas v. Railroad Co., 62 Cal, 320, the

point does not appear in any way to have

been involved; and the dictum at the close

of the opinion, as it refers to the Beeson

Case, must be held as only intended to go to

the length of the latter case. It is true, how-

ever, that in Cleary v. Railroad Co., 76 Cal.

240, 18 Pac. 269, a decision in department,

views were expressed favorable to respond-

ent's contention. The opinion of the commis-

sion in that case was, however, expressly

based on Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, and

upon, as we have seen, a misunderstanding

of that case. There appears to have been no

petition for a hearing in bank. it was stat-

ed in that case that there could be a recov-

ery for the “mental anguish and suffering of

the parents." but we have been referred to

no other case that holds such doctrine. Cer-

tainly it was not so held in the Beeson

Vase. But entirely contrary views were ex-

pressed in the latest decision of this court

on the subject (Munro v. Reclamation Co.,

84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 306). In that case-

which was for the death of an adult son—

the lower court had instructed that the jury

in estimating the damages might consider

“the sorrow, grief, and mental suffering oc-

casioned by his death to his mother;" and

this court held the instruction erroneous,

and for that reason reversed the judgment,

the court holding that such a rule would

afford an “opportunity to run into wild and

excessive verdicts." The court said: “We

are of opinion that the court erred in includ-

ing in the instruction the words‘ ‘sorrow,

mating the loss sustained by either from
the death of the other. So It the husband
~nd wife had lived together In concord, ea.ch
rendering kindly offices to the other, such
facts might be taken lnto consideration, not,
as the books say, for the purpose of atrordlng solace In money, but for the purpose of
.estimating pecuniary losses. The loss of a
kind husband may be a considerable pe-cunlary loss to a wife; she loses bis advice
and assistance In many matters of domestic
-t->conomy." A quotation Is made from a
Pennsylvania case where the same rule was
ap11lll'd to the loss of a wife, the court snylng thnt "certainly the service of a wife Is
pecunlorlly more valuable than that or a
mere hireling." The Beeson Case, therefore,
does not decide that the jury may depart
from a pecu.nlary standpoint In assessing
damages; It merely holds that ln estimating
the pecuniary losses of a wife from the
death of her husband tlley may consider
·whether or not the deceased was a good husband, able and willing to provide well for
his wife. The opinion of the court no doubt
goes somewhat further ln this direction than
the general current of authorltles, but It de~ldes nothing more than above stated. Cook
v. Rallroad Co.• 60 cal. fl<», also cited by ri>spondent, decides nothing more than the
Beeson Case. In McKeever v. Railroad Co.,
59 Cal. 300, the point was not Involved, and
lo Nehrbas v. Railroad Co., 62 Cal, 320, the
point does not appear In any way to have
been Involved; and the dictum at the close
of the opinion, as It refers to the Beeson
Case, most be held as only Intended to go to
the length of the latter case. It ls true, however, that In Cleary v. Railroad Co., 76 Cal.
240, 18 Pac. 269, a decision In department,
views were expreRsed favorable to respondent's contention. The opinion of the commission In that case was, however, expressly
based on Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, and
upon, as we have seen, a misunderstanding
of that case. There appears to have been no
petition for a hearing In bank. It was stat~ In thnt case that there <'ould be a reco\·ery for the "mental anguish and suffering of
the parents," but we have been referred to
no other case that holds such doctrine. Certainly It was not so held In the Beeson
·Case. But entirely contrary views were expressed In the latest decision of this court
<>n the subject (Munro v. Reclamntlon Co.,
84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 303). In that casewhlch was for the death of an adult soothe lower court had Instructed that the jury
fn estimating the dnwages mli:ht consider
"the sorrow, grief, and mental surrerlng oc<'asloned by hie death to his mother;" and
this court held the Instruction erroneous,
and for that reason reversed the Judgment,
the court holding that such a rule would
alTord an "opportunity to run Into wild and
~xeesi;ilve verdlets." The court said: "We
llre of opinion that the court erred In lnclud111;.: in the ln!ltr1wtlon the words, 'sorrow,
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grief, and mental suffering, occasioned l1y
the death of the son to his mother.' In thus
directing the Jury the court fell Into error.
In our opinion, the damage should have been
confined to the pecuniary loss sutl'ered by
the mother, and the loss of tlle comfort, society, support, and protection of the lk>eensed. • • • We have found no case In which
damages for sorrow, grief, and mental suffering are allowed, under any of the st:i.tutes." And, further, that the statutory nc·
tlon Is a new one, "and not the transfe1· to
the representative of the right of ncti<>n
which the deceased person would have had
it he had survived the Injury." The case
was decided In bank. Justice Thornton delivered the opinion, which was concurred In
by two other justices, and a fourth justice
concurred In the judgment, and most, therefore, have concurred In the one· main reason for which the judRment was reversed.
Ile may not have been ready to say that the
"comfort and society" of the deceased could
be considered. There was only one dissent,
but upon what ground does not appear. We
think, therefore, that the case Is full authority on the main point. At all events, we
think that the opinion states the general
propositions of law governing the case correctly, although, as to·one matter, It may be
misunderstood. The language, "the loss of
the comfort, society, support, and protection
of the deceased," must be held as having
been used within the meaning given to It In
Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, as herelnbefore
stated, that le, with reference to the value
of the life of the deceased, and the pecuniary
loss to the plalntltr caused by the death.
The said language would not be correct In
any other sense. But In the case at bar the
jury were not confined by the ln!ltructlons to
pecuniary 1088 or any other kind ot loss;
they were given wide range to run Into any
wild and exce"slve verdict which their caprke might suggest. Wedonotthlnkthntthe
complaint ls detective because It does not
specially aver the loss ot the services of the
deceased; that was a natural and necessnry
sequence of the death. It was not special
damage necessary to be a verre<l. 'fhere Is
nothing In the point made by reflpondent
that the answer was not verified. Upon thnt
point the court ruled In favor of defendant,
and plalntltr Is not appealing. The jmlgment and order appealed from are reve1·soo,
and a new trial ordered.
SHARPSTEIN, J. I concur.
DE HAVI~N. J. I concur In the judgment
and generally In the foregoing o)llnlon. The
measure ot damages In actions hy a parent
for the death or a child, when the fn<'tR are
not such as to warrant exemplary damages,
·Is correctly stated In section ifl3 of Rhe11rman and Redfield on Ne1dlg-ence. as follows:
"The dama~es recoverable by n hu~hnnd. parent, or master fol' a negligent Injury to the
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person of his wife, child, or servant are

strictly limited to an amount fully compen-

satory for the consequent loss of service for

a period not exceeding the minority of the

child, or the term of service of a servant,

and the expenses which the plaintif f has in-

curred in consequence of the injury, such

as for surgical attendance, nursing, and the

like." The sixth instruction given upon the

:;quest of plaintiff, to the effect that “in

estimating the damage sustained by her the

jury is not limited by the actual pecuniary

injury sustained by her by reason of the

death of her child, but such damages may

be given as under all the circumstances of

the case may be just," is contrary to this

rule, and was erroneous. The object of sec-

tion 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure is

not to give redress or compensation for the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:11 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

mental distress of a mother, consequent up-

on the death of her child. The general lan-

guage of section 377 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, that in actions of this character

"such damages may be given as under all

the circumstances of the case may be just,"

is used with reference to the fact that the

damages which are allowed to be recovered

by sections 376 and 377 of the Code of Civil

Procedure are, with the exception of the ex-

penses incurred by the plaintiff in conse-

quence of the injury resulting in the death

for which they are claimed, prospective in

their nature, relating, as they do, to the loss

of future service, and necessarily based up-

on probabilities, and upon data which in

many respects are uncertain, and therefore

the estimate of such damages must neces-

sarily call for the exercise of a very large dis-

cretion upon the part of the jury; and all

that is meant by the language quoted is that

the jury shall, in view of all the circumstan-

ces of the case, and considering also the age

and the ability of the deceased to serve the

relative for whose beneﬁt the action is

brought, give such damages as they shall

deem just, keeping in view that such dam-

ages are to be measured by what shall fair-

ly seem the pecuniary injury or loss to the

plaintiff.

Hearing in bank denied.
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person of his wife, child, or servant are
strictly limited to an amount tully compensatory for the consequent loss of service f<.>r
a period not exceeding the minority of the
cl!ild, or tl!e term of service of a servant,
nnd the expenses which the plaintiff has Incurred in consequence of the Injury, such
as for surgical attendance, nursing, and the
like." The sixth instruction given upon the
:~uest of plaintlft', to the elfect that "in
estimating the damage sustained by her the
jury Is not limited by the actual pecuniary
injury sustained by her by reason of t!le
death of her child, but such damages may
be given as under all the circumstances of
the case may be just," Is contrary fo this
rule, and was erroneous. The object of section 3i6 of the Code of CivH Procooure is
not to give redress or compensation for the
mental distress of a mother, consequent up.
on the death of her chlld. The general Ian, guage of section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that In actions of this character
"such damages may be given as under all
the circumstances ot the case may be just."

ls used with reference to the fact that the
damages which are allowed to be recovered
by sections 376 and 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure are, with the exception of the expenses Incurred by the plalntllf in consequence of the injury resulting In the death
for which they are claimed, prospective In
their nature, relating, as they do, to the loss
of future service, and necessarlly based upon probabilities, and upon data which In
many respects are uncertain, and therefore
the estimate of such damages must nece:;isarily call for the exercise of a very large discretion upon the part of the jury; and all
that is meant by the language quoted ls that
the jury shall, ln view of all the circumstances of the case, and considering also the age
and the ablllty of the deceased to serve the
relative for whose benefit the action is
brought, give such damages !lS they shall
deem just, keeping in view that such darn·
ages are to be measured by what sllall fairly seem the pecuniary injury or loss to the
plalntllf.
Hoo.ring ln bank denied.
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DEMAREST et alqv. LITTLE.

(47 N. J. Law, 28.)

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

1885.

Argued at November term, 1884, before

BEASIJCY, C. J., and DIXON, REED, and

MAGIE, JJ.

DE.MAUEST et nl. ""I". Ll'.l"fLK

ot the lite ot · dec!'ased." Pa uhnlt>r v. U11 ll-

(47 N. J. Law, 28.)
C'ourt of New Jersey. Feb. Term,
188.5.
Argu{'(l at November term, 1884, before
BEA~LEY, C. J., and DIXON, REED, and
~IAGIE, JJ.
B. Williamson, tor the rule. John Linn,
opposed.

road Co., 34 N. J. Law, 151. Com1ienRatlo11
for such deprivation ls tlleretorc the soil'
measure ot llamage In such cases. A difficult task Is thereby Imposed upon a jury, for
they are obliged to determine prohahllltlis.
and "must, to a large extent, tom1 tiwlr"-i>stlmate of damages on conjectures nnc1 un<;!et·talntles." But the case In hand set>ms to prt'sent Iese compllcatN1 problems than other
cases of thc> sawe nature .
De('f'llst>d left no widow, and but thret>
chlldrf'n. All of them had reachro mntur Jtr.
Two son8 wne SPlf-Rupportlng; tilt' 1Jnuich·
ter was married. HP owed no prt•sent duty
of support, and there Is nothing to show nnr
ftxe<l allowance or even C'asu11J hC'netactlonH
to them. They are therefore dPprlved of 1111
Immediate p<>cunlary adrnutug,. derlvabll•
trom him. At his death he wus In business.
In partne1·shlp with his sons and son-In-law.
All the partners gave attention to the buslnP11s and the <'a11ltul w11s furnished by d1•1•p11sed. His death dls!'lolvetl the partnPr11hl1)
1rn1l dPtH"ived thP 11urvlvlng partnel"!I of 1md1
!JeuelH 11s they had derived from hli:; 1•rt>1llt,
capital, skill and reputation. But the Injury thus resulting Is not wltbln the scope of
this stutute, which gives damages for lnju .
rles resulting from the sevt>rnnce ot a rel11·
tlon of kinship and not ot contract. No dnrn ·
ages could be awarded on that ground.
Defen<lantli!Jstrenuously urge that , outi!lllu
of the partnership or In the event of Its dissolution. the next of kin had a reasonable
<'XJll'l'tntlon of deriving from the parf>ntal rt'111 tion an odvuntage by way of senlces rl'ndl'rlj1J or counsel glvt'll hy df'ceased In th<>lr
affnlrs. A claim or this i::ort lllU!lt be ('llJ'I'·
fully restricted within tlw llmlti;i of the stnt·
utl'. 'rhe co111111elR of a flltJJ('r 11111)·. In a IDOl'nl point of \"iPw. hf' ot" itw!<th1111hlt' n1hu•.
The Ninllcle11tl11l h1ter1'0ursl' ht>IWl'l'll Jllll"l'Hf
RIHl c·hllll m:1y he JJl"IZf'<l hP)"lllUI llll'Hsure, 111111
Its c!PprlYn ti on may hf' 11roduc·tin• of the k1•p11f'St puln. But the Jeici11l11t11rl' hnR not s<'l'll
fit to Jlerm It recover)' for ~m<·h luJurlt»•. It
hll!! r.-strlcted recover~· tu the pl'1·unlary Injury; that Is, the loss ol' 110111Plhlng having
pecuniary value.
~ow, It may with some rPn11on hi' :111tll"ip11te1l that a fathPr, out of lovp :mil nfl1•c·tlon.
might. If dn·um>1t1111cef! rt'lldt'l'Pll it proi11•1·.
perfonn 11:ratultnuf! service for a d1lld. whl<'h
by rendering uunf'1•essary the employuwut of
11. paltl servant, would he of pecuniary vnhw.
am1 thnt he might, by advlC'e In respect to
hm!lne11s uft'alr11, be of a poll!<lhlP p ecuniary
l11•11pflt. But wlwtlwr such an nnt.h•ip:itlon IR
rP:Jl'<ounhJp or not must dt•1wnd on till' ..tr1·111118ta 11< P:i. Coni<lde rlng tht> uice. tlw a~,.,111·p1\
JJo!<ltlon, the buslnei;s and otlwr l'Pllltluns of
1lws1• ehlldren, It Is ohviou!' t1111t tlH' 11roh:1·
hlllty of any pPl'nnlnry aclrnnt11g,. to ae1·nw
to them In tlwsP m0tles wns \"l'l'Y small. Iii·
dl'Pd , It. would not b e too mud1 to sny thnt
rPMort mu~t he h.1d to 1<(l!'<'lllntlo11 to rli,.,1·0\·er any such advantage. At all events, corn--

~npl't'me

B. Williamson, for the rule. John Linn,

opposed.

Feb. Team,

MAGIE, J. This action was brought to re-

cover damages for the death of plaintiffs

testatot‘, which occurred in the disaster at

Parker's Creek Bridge, on the Long Branch

Railroad, on June 29, 1882. Defendant was

charged with responsibility therefor as re-

ceiver of the Central Railroad Company of

New Jersey, and as having, in that capacity,

contracted to carry deceased with due care.
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The case was ﬁrst tried in 1883. and a ver-

dict rendered for plaintiffs, assessing their

damages at $30.000. This verdict was aft-

erwards set aside upon a rule to show cause.

.\'o opinion was delivered. but the court an-

nounced that a new trial was allowed be-

cause the damages were excessive. The case

has been again tried, and the verdict has

been again rendered for plaintiffs. assessing

their damagesat $27,500. A rule to show

cause was allowed, and is now sought to be

made absolute upon the following grounds:

First, that the evidence was not suiiicient to

justify the conclusion that testator's death

was due to nu-gll[:enc8 or want of care; sec-

ond, that if so, defendant, as recch'er. was

not liable for any negligence except his own,

while the alleged negligence was that of em-

pioyes; and third, that the damages award-

ed are excessive.

Upon the ﬁrst ground it was urged that

the evidence upon this trial was variant from

and more favorable to defendant than that

produced on the former trial. Whether that

be so or not, a careful perusal of the evi-

dence satisties me that there was suﬂlcient

to warrant the conclusion that testator's

death was due to negligence or want of prop-

er care.

The second objection has already been dis-

posed of in a case growing out of this same

disaster. and in which the court of errors

has aﬂirmed the responsibility of the receiv-

er for such negligence. Little v. Dusenbcrry,

46 N. J. Law. 614. The verdict ought not to

be disturbed on those grounds.

The question presented by the claim that

the damages are excessive is of'morc diflicui-

ty. The action is created by statute. which

supplies the sole measure of the damages re-

coverable therein. 'll‘hey are to be determin-

ed exclusively by reference to the pecuniary

injury resulting to the widow and next of

kin of deceased by his death. The injury to

be thus recovered for has been deﬁned by

this court to be “the deprivation of a reason-

able expectation of a pecuniary advantage

which would have resulted by a comiimance

LAW DA)I.2d lCd.—25

.\IAUIE, J. Thia action was brought to recover damages for the deuth ot plulutltrs
tt-stntor, which occurred In the disaster at
Parker's Creek Bridge, on the Long Branch
Railroad, on June 29, 1882. Detenwrnt was
charged with responsibility therefor as receiver or the Central Railroad Company of
Xew Jersey, and as having, In that capacity,
l'outrnc-ted to c-arry deceased with due cnre.
'file case was flrst tried In ll'\~i. and a n•1·11lct renderL'll !01· plnlutlfls. ass1'11sing thPlr
1lnm11gps at :i;ao.ooo. This 'l"ertllct was ntt1•rwar1lR set usitlt• upon a rule to 11how cause.
Xo opinion w11s 1lt•lh·ered, lmt the court nn1111nnL"l'll thut a 1ww trlnl w11R allowed be1·;rn111' the d11111ages wt>re l'Xcesslve. The case
h111< h1•en ugaln tried, Rnd the verdict has
het>n ag11ln rf'ndered tor plalntllT11, asspssing
their damuges at $2i,!"'100. A rule to show
cRuse wns allowed, and Is now sought to be
made absolute upon the following grnunds:
First, that tiJI' 1•\"ldence was not surti<·lt'nt to
ju11tlfy the c·ondnslon that testator's tl1~ath
w:11< due to n.. i.llgt>nce or want or <'are; 11el'11nd, tbut It so, dPfendant. 1111 re<·Pin•r. w11s
not lla!Jle tor any nPgllge1wP t'X<"l'llt hl11 own,
while the alleged negllgencl~ was that of t'IDploy~s; and third, that the dnmngrl'I nw:mlPtl are ex<'f'sslve.
Upon the first grouncl It was urgt'1l thnt
thl' 1•vldeJlf'(' upon this trlnl wns variant from
nncl nwr" fnvorab!P to cll'ft•tulant than that
11rodm•ed on the former trio!. \\'lwther thut
he so or not, a corl'fnl 1wn1sal of tlw rvl1l1m<'e sath1Hes me that tht're was RutHdent
to warrant the conclusion that tP,.,tntor's
1leath was 1hl(' to nPgllgPllf'P or want of propl'r care.
The 11P1·ontl ohjt>l"tion hus ah·t>ail)· ht•Pn 1JIR.po11etl or In a. CllSI' growing ont or thi!< !<Ullle
•I h•1111tn. and In whlt-h thl' <'ourt or l'l"rors
lmi< nftirmf'tl th<> rt'spon11lhlllty of thP rt•<·t>lv Pr for such 1wgllgt>IH'P. LlttlP v. DmwnhPrry,
4fi X • •J. J..nw. li14. The Vt'111ll't nui.:ht 1111t to
ht• lll11turhPtl on tho11e irromull".
Thi' 11111•stlon pre11entt•1l hy the dnlm that
tht• <l1111111ges are ex1-e,.,1<iVP i>< of"mor,. clittil'l1lI)'. Tht• octlon Is ('rP11tP1l hy "tlltutP. which
11nppll~ the sole 1111'11MllrP of the tl11111ag1•1< re1·11n•ra!JIP tlwr1•ln. ThPy are to hi' 1lo·tPr111lnl'll exdush·1•l)' hy r1•fe1·euc·e to the pP1·nniory
injury re!'lultlng to thP widow and nPxt or
kin ot 1le<"l'll!<l'1l hy hl11 1ll'ath. The Injury to
Jw thu11 rP1·nvPrl'tl for hnl'I heen 1lertned hy
this court to be "the clt'privntlon ot a r1' 1111onahle expectation of n 1wc·11ni11ry nrlnrnta:re
whl<'h would ha'l"e rPRHltl'tl hy a contl11111111ee
I.AW DA :\I.211 E•l.- 2:J

0

DAMAGES FOR CAUSING DEATH.
386

DAMAGES FOR CAUSING DEATH.

pensation for this injury in this case could

not exceed a small sum without being excess-

ive.

The principal basis for plaintiff's claim is

obviously this: That the death of deceased

put an end to accumulations which he might

havetherenfter made and which might have

come to the next of kin. Deceased had ac-

cumulated about $70,000, all of which, ex-

cept $10,000 capital invested in the business,

seems to have been placed in real estate and

securities as if for permanent investment.

By his will the bulk of his property was given

to his children. At his death he had no oth-

er sources of income than his investments

and his busines.

In determining the probability of accumu-

lations by deceased if he had continued in

life, no account should be taken of the in-
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come derivable from his investments. These

have come in bulk to the children, who may,

if they choose, accumulate such income. A

deprivation of the probability of his accumu-

lating therefrom is no pecuniary injury. On

the contrary, it is rather a beneﬁt -to them

to receive at once the whole fund in lien of

the mere contingency or probability of re-

ceiving it, though with its accumulations (at

best uncertain), in the future. Indeed, the

beneﬁt thus accruing to the next of kin in

receiving at once this whole property, in the

view of one of the court, is at least equiv-

alent to the present value of the probability

of their receiving it hereafter. if deceased had

continued in life, with all his probable future

accumulations from any source whatever, in

which case it is evident that his death has not

resulted in any pecuniary injury to them.

But without adopting this view of the evi-

dence, it is plain that in determining probable

future accumulations attention should be re-

stricted to such as would arise from the labor

of deceased in his business. His ‘receipts

from the business for the two years it had

been conducted were proved. What he ex-

pected was not proved, but left to be in-

ferred for his mode of life. At death he was

about ﬁfty-six and a half years old, and by

the proofs had an expectation of life of six-

teen and seven-tenths years.

From these facts the jury were to ﬁnd what

deceased would probably have accumulated.

what probability there was that his next of

kin would have received his accumulations,

and then what sum in hand would compen-

sate them for being deprived of that proba-

bility. In what manner the jury attempted

to solve this problem we cannot ascertain.

Plaintiffs' counsel attempts to show the cor-

rectness of the result reached, by calculation.

He assumes the income of deceased from his

business during the last year as the annual

income likely to be obtained, and deducts on-

ly $1,000 each year as the probable expendi-

ture of deceased, and then ﬁnds the present

worth of the net income so determined for

the deceased's expectation of life is $27,710.-

32.

pensntlon for this Injury In this case could
not exceed a small sum without being excessive.
The principal basis for plalntllf'e claim la
ohvlously this: That the death of deceased
put an end to accumulations which he might
have thereafter made and which might have
come to the next of kin. Deceased had accumulated about $70,000, all of which, except $10,000 capital invested in the business,
seems to have been placed In real estate a.nrl
securities as If for permanent investment.
By his will the bulk of his property was given
to his children. At his death he had no other sources of income than his Investments
nnd his business.
In determining the probability of accumulations by deceased If he hnd continued In
life, no account should be taken of the Income derivable from his Investments. These
have come In bulk to the children, who may,
if they choose, accumulate such Income. A
1leprlvatlon of the probability of his accumulating therefrom ls no pecuniary injury. On
the contrary, It le rather a benefit ·lo them
to receive at once the whole fund In lieu of
the mere contlngeney or probabillty of receiving It, though with Its accumulations (at
best uncertain), In the future. Indeed, the
benefit thus accruing to the next of kin In
receiving at once this whole property, In the
view of one of the court, Is at least equivalent t.o the present value of the probability
of their receiving It hereafter, If deceased hnd
continued In life, with all his probable future
accumulations from any source wh.'ltever, In
which case It ls evident that his death hns not
resulted In any pecuniary Injury t.o them.
But without adopting this view of thl' evldmce, It is plain that In determining probable
future accumulations attention should be restricted to such RR would ar!Re !rom the labor
of deceased In his business. Hl8 · rec·elpts
from the business for the two years it had
been eon1lucted were proved. 'Vhat he expected was not proved, but left to be Inferred for his mode of life. At death he was
ab-Out fifty-six and a half years old, and by
the proofs had an expectation of life of slxl<'CU 11nd sen•n-tl'uths years.
From the11e fll<'ts the jury were to find what
deceased would probably havP accumulated.
what prohublllty tht•re wmi that his next of
kin would have received his aceumulatlons,
and then what sum In hand would compensatl' them for being d<"prlve1-I of that probability. In what manner the jury attempted
to solve this problem we cannot ascertain.

Plaintiffs' counsel attempts t.o show the correctness of the result reached, by calculation.
He assumes the Income of deceased from his
business during the last year as the annual
Income likely to be obtained, and deducts only $1,000 each year as the probable expenditure of deceased, and then 1lnds the present
worth of the net Income so determined for
the decelU!ed's expectation of llfe ls $27,710.32.
'l.'hls calculation tests the propriety of this
verdict, and In my judgment conclusively
shows that It was rather the result of sympathy or prejmll<'e than a fair deduction from
the evidence. For, assuming the amount n1trlbutable to the loss of deceased's services
was but small (and If more It was excessive).
the award of the jury on this account wa11
but a few hundred dollars lees than the pres·
ent worth of the full net Income If recelve1I
for his full expectancy of life. To reach s11tl1
a result the jury must have found every Olli'
of the following contingencies In favor of
the next of kin, viz.: That deceased, who had
already acquired a competence, would have
continued In the toll of business for his full
expectancy of life; that he would have retained sufficient health of body and vigor or
mind to enable him to do so, and as successfully as before; that he would have been ab!I'
to avoid the losses Incident to business, and
would have safely Invested his accumulations:
and that the next of kin would have received
such accumulations at his death. A. verdict
which attributes no more weight than this
has, to the probabUlty that one or more of all
these contingencies would happen, cannot
have proceeded from a fair consideration of
the case made by the evidence.
Having 1·eached this conclusion, what shouM
be the result as to the verdict? The charge
of the court below declared the rule of dnmages with accuracy. The verdict Is a sec·
ond one. and somewhat smaller than that
prevlomdy Ret aside as exceRslve. It Ii; 11n .
usual to set aside a 1.1econd verdict, but thouirh
unusual It Is within the power of the court
In the exen·lse of Its diseretlon. That powPr
will be discreetly used In setting aside any
verdict which does palpable Injustice.
To ohvlate, If posRlble, the ne>ce!!slty of another trial, It has been determiner} that If
plalntltrs wlll reduce their \·erdlct to *l:i.001
hy remitting the excess. the verdil't may
i;tand for that sum, and the rule to show
cause be dlscharg!'d. Unless thl~Y comwnt to
such remission, the rule must be made nhsolute.

I
DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PUOPF>RTY.
DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PROPERTY.
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D\\'iGI-IT v. ELMIRA, C. & N. R. CO.

(30 N. E. 398, 132 N. Y. 199.)

Court of Appeals of New York,Second Division.

March 15, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Fourth department.

Action by Ira Dwight against the Elmira,

Cortland & .\orthorn Railroad Company.

From a judgment for piaintif f entered on an

order atiirming a judgment entered on the

report of a referee, defendant appeals. Re-

versed.

James Armstrong, for appellant . Ray-

mond L. Smith, for respondent.

PARKER, J. The judgment awards to

the plaintif f $303 for damages occasioned by

the defendant's negligence in setting on ﬁre

and destroying 21 apple-trees. 2 cherry-trees,

and 2t,;; tons of standing grass, and also in-
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uring 7 apple—trees, the property of plain-

iff. The only question presented on this ap-

peal is whether the proper measure of dam-

ages was adopted on the trial.

A witness called by the piaintif f was ask-

ed: “Question. What were those twenty-one

trees worth at the time they were killed?"

Objection was made that the evidence did

not tend to prove the proper measure of

damages, but the objection was overruled,

and the answer was: “Answer. I should

say they were worth ﬁfty dollars apiece."

Similar questions were propounded as to the

other trees; a like objection interposed; the

same ruling made; answers to the same ef-

fect, except as to value, given; and appro-

priate exccptions taken. Testimony was al-

so given, tending to prove that the land

burned over by the ﬁre was depreciated in

value $30 per acre. The only evidence of-

fered by the plaintiff, touching the question

of damages, was of the character already

alluded to. »

Fruit-trees, like those which are the sub-

ject of this controversy, have little if any

value after being detached from the soil, as

the wood cannot be made use of for any

practical purpose; but, while connected with

the land. they have a producing capacity

hich adds to the value of the realty. Neces-

sarily the testimony adduced tended to show,

not the value of‘ the trees severed from the

freehold, but their value as hearing trees,

}('OnBe(Sted with and depending on the soil

, for the nourishment essential to the growth,

of fruit. How much was the realty, of which

the trees formed a part, damaged, was the

r(sult aimed at by the questions and at-

tunpted to be secured by the answers. Can

the owner of an injured freehold because

the trees taken or destroyed happen to

be fruit instead of timber trees, have his

damages measured in that manner? is the

question presented now, for the ﬁrst time,

in this court, so far as we have observed.

'l‘he learned referee followed the decision in

Whitbeck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644, in

which the proposition is asserted that, while

fruit-trees form a part of the land, the true

887

which the proposition ls asserted that, while
fruit-trees form a part of the land, the true
rule is that lt the thing destroyed has a .
value which can be accurately measured
March 15, 18W.
without reference to the value of the soil in ·
Appeal from supreme court, general term, which It stands, or out of which It grows, ·
Fourth department.
tbe recovery must be for the value of the ·
Action by Ira Dwight against the Elmira., thing destroyed, and not for the difference
..Cortland & Northern Railroad Company. In the value of the land before and after '
From a Judgment for plaintitr entered on an such d<.'Structlon. The court cited no au-<>rder attirmlng a judgment entered on the thority tor the conclusion reached, and our
report of n referee, defendant appeals. Re- attention has not been called to any prior
versed.
decision justifying Its position. Nor has the
James Armstrong, for ~ppellant. Ray- 'Vhitbeck Case been approved in this court,
although cited and distinguished In Argotmond L. Smith, for respondent.
singer v. Vines, 82 N. Y. 309. While the
PARKER, .J. The judgment awards to rule ls, undoubtedly, as stated by the learned
the plalntur Ki03 for damages occasioned by judge In the Whitbeck Case, that a recovery
tbe defendant's negligence In setting on fire may be had for the value of the thing dend destroying 21 apple-trees, 2 cherry-trees,
stroyed, where It has a value whkh may
and 2¥.i tons of standing grass, and also In· be accurately measured without i·eference
urlng 7 apple-trees, the property of plaln- to the soil In which It stands, he app:ll'ently
itr. The only question presented on this ap- overlooked the fact that fruit-trees do uot
peal Is whether the proper measure of dam- have such a value; and the rule was. thereni:es was adopted on the trial.
fore, as we think, wrongly applied. Cases 1
A witness called by the plalntltr was ask- are not wanting to lllustrate a proper appll- .
ed: "Question. What were those twenty-one cation of that rule. Where timber forming i
trees worth at the tlme they were killed?" part of a forest Is fully grown, the value of ;
Objection was made that the evidence did the trees taken or destroyed can be recover- !
not tend to prove the proper measure of ed. In nearly all jurisdictions, this is all
damages, but the objection WllB overruled, that may be recovered; and the reason as- .
.and the answer was: "Answer. I should signed for It Is that the realty has not been .
say they were worth fifty dollars apiece." damaged, because, the trees having bce1Similar questions were propounded as to the brought to maturity, the owner Is advantag-\
other trees; a like objection interposed; the ed by their being cut and sold, to the end'
.same nillng made; answers to the same ef· that the soil may again be put to productive
fE-ct, except as to value, given; and appro- uses. 3 Suth. Dam. p. 374; 3 Sedg. Dam.
priate exceptions taken. Testimony was al- (8th Ed.) p. 45; Single v. Schnelder, ao Wis.
so gh-en, tending to prove that the land 570; Webster v. Moe, 35 Wis. 75; · Webber
burned over by the fire was depreciated In v. Quaw, 46 Wis. 118, 49 N. W . 830; Hasel,-alue $30 per acre. The only evidence of. tine v. Mosher, 51 Wis. 443, 8 N. W. 273;
fered by the plo.lntltf, touching the question Tuttle v. Wilson, 52 Wis. G-13. 9 N. W. 8:..'2;
of damages, was of the character already Wooden-Ware Co. v. U. S., 100 U. S. 432, 1
Sup. Ct. 398; Gra.essle v. Carpenter, 70 lowa,
alluded to.
Fruit-trees, like those which are the sub- 16U, 30 N. W. 392; Ward v. Ralh'ood Co., 13
ject of this controversy, have little It any Nev. 44; Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt. U28;
\'alue afte1· being de tached from the soil, as Adams v. Blodgett, 47 N. H. 219; Cushing v.
the wood cannot be made use of for any Longfellow, 26 Me. 306. In this state It Is
practical purpose; but, while connected with settled that even where full-gMwn timber
rthe land. they have a producing capacity ls cut or destroyed the damage to the laud
'which adds to the value of the realty. Ncces- may also be recovered, and In such ca ses
t!arlly the testimony adduced tended to show, the measure of damages Is the dltfe1·ence in
not tbe value of" the trees severed from the the value of the land before and after the
freehold, but their value as bearing trees, cutting or destruction complained of. Argot11·tmnected with and depending on the son singer v. Vines, 82 N. Y. 308; Van Deneen
. for the nourishment essential to the growth . v. Young, 29 N. Y. 36; Easterbrook v. Hallot fruit. How much was the realty, of which road Co., 51 Barb. 94. The rule Is also apthe trees formed a part, damaged, was the plicable to nursery trees grown tor marruult aimed at by the questions and at- ket, because they have a value for transh mpted to be secured by the answers. Can planting. The soil Is not damaged by their
the owner of an Injured freehold because removal, and their market value necessa1·i1y
the trees taken or destroyed happen to furnishes the true rule of damages. 3 Sedg.
be fruit instead of timber trees, have bis Dam. (8th Ed.) p. 48; Blrket v. Williams. ao
damages measured In that manner? ls the Ill. App. 451. CoRI furnishes another Illusquestion presented now, for the first time, tration of the rule making the value of the
In this court, so far as we have observed. thing separated from the realty. although
The learned referee followed the decision in once a part of It, the measure of damages.
Whitbeck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644, In where It has a value after rewoval, anJ the

DWIGHT "· ELMIRA, C. & N. R. CO.
(30 N. E. 398, 132 N. Y. 199.)
<:aurt of Appeals of New York, Second Division.
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land has sustained no injury because of it. 3

Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) p. 48; 3 Suth. Dam.

p. 374; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 36, note

2; Stockbridge iron Co. v. Cone Iron-Works,

102 Mass. 80; Coal Co. v. Rogers, 108 Pa.

St. 147-152; Dougherty v. Chesnutt 86 Tenn.

1, 5 S. W. 444; Coleman's Appeal, 62 Pa. St.

252; Ross v. Scott, 15 Lea, 479-488; For-

syth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291; Chamberlain

v. Collinson, 45 Iowa, 429; Morgan v. Pow-

ell, 3 Q. B. 278; Martin v. Porter, 5 Mees. &

W. 351. On the other hand, cases are not

wanting where the value of the thing de-

tached from the soil would not adequately

compensate the owner for the wrong done,

nd in those cases a recovery is permitted,

||mbracing all the injury resulting to the

land. This is the rule where growing tim-

ber is cut or destroyed. Because not yet

fully developed, the owner of the freehold
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is deprived of the advantage which would

accrue to him could the trees remain until

fully matured. His damage, therefore, nec-

essarily extends beyond the market value of

the trees after separation from the soil, and

the difference between the value of the land

before and after the injury constitutes the

compensation to which he is entitled. Long-

fellow v. Quimby, 33 Me. 457; Chipman v.‘

Hibberd, 6 Cal. 163; Wallace v. Goodall, 18

N. H. 439-456; Hayes v. Railroad Co., 45

Minn. 17-20, 47 N. W. 260. In Wallace's

Case, supra, the court said: “The value of

young timber, like the value of growing

crops, may be but little when separated from

the soil. The land, stripped of its trees may

be valueless. The trees, considered as tim-

ber, may from their youth he valueless; and

so the injury done to the plaintiff by the tres- I

pass would be but imperfectly compensated 1

unless he could receive a sum that would be

equal to their value to him while standing

upon the soil." The same rule prevails as to

shade-trees, which, although fully developed,

may add a fmther value to the freehold for

ornamental purposes, or in furnishing shade

for stock. Nixon v. Stillwell (Sup.) 5 N. Y.

Supp. 248, and cases cited supra. The cur-

1
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" DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PROPERTY.

rent of authority is to the effect that fruit-

trees and ornamental or growing trees are

subject to the same rule. Montgomery v.

Locke, 72 Cal. 75, 13 Pac. 401; Mitchell

v. Billingsiey, 17 Ala. 391-393; Wallace v.

Goodall, 18 N. H. 439-456; 3 Sedgw. Dam.

(8th Ed.) § 933.

It is apparent from the authorities already

cited, as well as those following, that in cases

of injury to real estate the courts recognize

two elements of damage: (1) The value of

the tree or other thing taken after separa-

tion from the freehold, if it have any; (2)

the damage to the realty, it any, occasioned

by the removal. Ensley v. Mayor, 2 Baxt.

144; Striegel v. Moore, 55 Iowa, 88, 7 N. W.

413; Longfellow v. Quimby, 33 Me. 457;

Foote v. Merrill,_54 N. H. 490. A party may

DAMAla<;s FOR IN.TUIUJ<;S TO PROPERTY.

land has sustained no Injury because ot It. 3 rent of authority ls to the effect that trultSedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) p. 48; 3 Suth. Dam. trees and ornamental or growing trees are
p. 374; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 36, note subject to the same rule. Montgomery v.
2; Stockbridge :Iron Co. v. Cone Iron-Works, Locke, 72 Cal. 75, 13 Pac. 4-01; Mitchell
102 l\lass. 80; Coal Co. v. Rogers, 108 Pa. v. Billingsley, 17 Ala. 391--393; Wallace v.
St. 147-152; Dougherty v. Chesnutt 86 Tenn. Goodall, 18 N. H. 439-456; 3 Sedgw. Dam.
1, 5 S. w. 444; Coleman's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. (8th Ed.) § 933.
1o2; Ross v. Scott, 15 Lea, 479-488; ForIt ls apparent from the authorities already
syth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291; Chamberlain cited, as well as those following, that in cases
v. Collinson, 45 Iowa, 429; Morgan v. Pow- ot Injury to real estate the courts recognize
ell, 3 Q. B. 278; Martin v. Porter, 5 Mees. & two elements of damage: (1} '.fhe value o! \
W. 351. On the other hand, cases are not the tree or other thing taken after separawanting where the value of the thing de- tlon trom the freehold, If It have any; (!!)
. tached from the sou would not adequately the damage to the realty, It any, occasioned
ompeneate the owner tor the wrong done, by the removal. Ensley v. Mayor, 2 Baxt.
nd In those cases a. recovery le permitted, 144; Striegel v. Mooce, 55 Iowa, 88, 7 N. W.
mbraclng all the Injury resulting to the 413; Longfellow v. Quimby, 33 Me. 457;
land. This le the rule where growing tim- Foote v. Merrlll,.54 N. H. 490. A party may
ber le cut or destroyed. Because not yet be content to accept the market value of the
fully developed, the owner of the treehold thing taken when he ls also entitled to rele deprived of the advantage whlch would cover tor the Injury done to the freehold.
accrue to him could the trees remain untll But If he asserts his right to go beyond the
fully matured. His dama~-e, therefore, nee- value ot the thing taken or destroyed a·fter
essarlly extends beyond the market value ot severance from the freehold, so as to secure
the trees atter separation from the eon, and compensation for the damage done to his
the dlfl'erence between the value ot the land land because ot It, then the measure of dambefore and after the Injury constltutee the ages ls the difference In value of the land
rompensatlon to which he le entitled. Long- before 11.nd after the Injury. In this ca.se the
fellow v. Quimby, 33 Me. 457; Chipman v. plnintifl' was not satisfied with a recovery
Hibberd, 6 Cal. 163; Wallace v. Goodall, 18 based on the value ot the trees deirtroyed.
N. H. 439-456; Hayes v. Railroad Co.,
after separation from the realty. of which
Minn. 17-20, 47 N. W. 260. In Wallace's they formed a part,-as Indeed he should not
Case, supra, the court eald: "The value of have been. as such value was little or noth~·oung timber, like the value of growing
lng,-so he sought to obtain the loss occacrops, may he but little when separated from sloned to the land by reason of the destructhe soil. The land, stripped of its trees may tlon of an orchard of fruit-bearing trees,
be valueless. The trees, considered as tim- which added largely to Its productive value.
ber, mny from their youth be valueless; and This was his right, but the measure of damso the Injury done to the plaintiff by the tree- . ages In such a case is. as we have observe<I.{
pafls would be but Imperfectly compensated : the difference In value of the land before and\
r unless he could receive a sum that would be
after the Injury; and as this rule was not
· equal to their value to him while standing followed, but rejected, on the trial, and a
· upon the soil." The same rule prevails as to method of proving damages adopted not recshade-treee, which, although fully developed, ognlzed nor permitted by the courts, the judgmay add a fm·tl1er value to the treehold !or ment should be reversed. All concur, except
ornamental purposes, or In furnishing shade BRADLEY, BROWN, and LANDON, JJ .•
for stock. Nixon v. Stillwell (Sup.) 5 N. Y. dissenting.
Judgment reversed.
Supp. 248, and cases cited supra. The cur-
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BEEDE v. LAMPREY.

(15 Atl. 133, 64 N. H. 510.)

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Belknap.

July 19, 1888.

( Trover for 200 spruce logs. The defendant

was defaulted, with the right to be heard as

to the assessment of damages. Facts found

by the court. The parties own adjoining tim-

ber lots in Moultonborough. The defendant,

while engaged in an operation on his own lot,

negligently, but without malice, cut over the

line dividing the lots, and cut down, trimmed,

hauled to, and deposited in the lake at Mel-

vin village, in Tuftonborough, and thence

towed to his saw-mill, the trees in question,

which facts constitute the cause of action.

The question whether the measure of dam-

/ages is the value of the stumpage, or the

value of the logs when cut and trimmed, or
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( when deposited in the lake, or when deliv-

Supreme Court of New Bampahlre. Belknap.
Jul7 19, 1888.
( Trover for 200 spruce logs. The defendant
was defaulted, with the right to be beard as
to the assessment of damages. Facts found
by the court. The parties own adjoining tlm·
ber lots ID Moultonborough. The defendant,
while engaged ID an operation on bis own lot,
negllgently, but without malice, cut over the
line dividing the lots, and cut down, trimmed,
.hauled to, and deposited lo the lake at Melvin village, in Tuftonborough, and thence
towed to his saw-mill, the trees lo question,
which tacts constitute the cause of action.
'rbe question whether the measure of damges ls the value of the stumpage, or the
value ot the logs when cut and trimmed. or
vhen deposited In the lake, or when dellv·
ered at the mlll, was reserved
E. A. & C. B. Hibbard, for plalntltr. Jewell & Stone, for defendant.

f:

‘ered at the mill, was reserved.

E. A. & C. B. Hibbard. for plaintiff. Jew-

ell & Stone, for defendant.

ALLEN, J. The claim of the plaintiff to

recover as damages the value of the legs at

/the mill, which includes the value added by

‘ cutting and transporting them, is founded up-

.on his title and right of possession of the

I‘ property there, and his right to treat it as

, converted at any time between its severance

from the realty and the commencement of the

action. The plaintiff had the title to the logs

and the right of possessing them at the

mill. Whenever and wherever they may have

been converted, the conversion did not change

the title so long as the property retained its

identity. The title could be changed only by

salt for damages with judgment, and satis-

faction of that judgment. Smith v. Smith, 50

N. H. 212, 219; Dearth v. Spencer, 52 N. H.

213. 'l‘he plaintiff might have recovered the

logs themselves at the mill, or wherever he

could have found them, and so availed him-

self of their value there, by repievin, or by

any form of action in which the property in

specie. and not pecuniary damages, are sought.

But in such a case, it the claimant makes a

title, no question of damages or compensation

for loss arises. He recovers his own in the

form and at the time and place in which he

ﬁnds it. In trespass quare ciausum, with an

averment of taking and carrying away trees,

the plaintiff may recover for the whole in-

‘jury to the land, including the damage for

prematurely cutting the trees, and for the loss

of the trees themselves, but nothing for the

value added by the labor of cutting and trans-

porting them. Wallace v. Goodall, 18 N. H.

456; Foote v. Merrill. 54 N. H. 490. Trover

cannot be maintained for any injury to the

realty, but only for the conversion of chattels;

and in this case the plaintiff is limited in his

recovery to the loss of the trees; that is, his

loss by the defendant's converting them by

their severance from the land. The usual rule

of damages in actions of trover is compensa-

tion to the owner for the loss of his property

occasioned by its conversion; and where the

ALLEN, J. The claim of the plalotltr to
,recover as damages the value of the logs at
/ the mill, which Includes the value added by
i euttlng and transporting them, Is founded up: on his title and right of possession of the
/ property there, and his right to treat It as
, eonverted at any time between Its severance
from the realty and the commencement of the
action. The plalntltr had the title to the logs
and the right of posr.esslng them at the
mill. Whenever and wherever they may have
been converted, the conversion did not change
' the title so long as the property retained Its
tdentlty. 'The title could be changed only by
suit tor damages with judgment, and satisfaction of that judgment. l:lmltb v. Smith, 50
N. H. 212, 219; Dearth v. Spencer, 52 N. H.
213. 'l'he plalntltr might have recovered the
logs themselves at the mill, or wherever he
..:ould have found them, and so availed himself of their value there, by replevln, or by
any form of action In which the property In
s11ecle, and not pecuniary damages, are sought.
But In such a case, If the claimant makes n
title, no question of damages or compensation
for loss arises. He recovers bis own In the
Curm and at the time and place In whlcb he
finds It. In trespass quare clausum, with an
a\·erment of taking and carrying away trees,
the plaintltr may recover tor the whole In• jury to the land, Including the damage tor
prematurely cutting the trees, and for the loss
ot tbe trees themselves, but nothing for thf
value added by the labor of cutting and transpo11lng them. Wallace v. Goodall, 18 N. H.
456; Foote v. Merrill, M N. H. 490. Trover
cannot be maintained for any Injury to the
realty, but only tor the conversion of chattels;
and In this case tbe plalntlft' Is limited In his
recovery to the lo!'S of the trees; that Is, bis
loss by tbe defendant's converting tbem by

I
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their severance from the land. The usual rule
of damages In actions of trover le compensation to the owner for the lose of hie property
occasioned by Its conversion; and where tbe
conversion la complete, and results In an entire appropriation of the property by the{
wrong-doer, the loes Is generally measured by
the Talue of the property converted with Interest to the time of trial. Hovey v. Grant,
52 N. B. 569; Gove v. Watson, 61 N. H. 136.
Tbe defendant converted the loge by cutting
and severing tbe trees from the land, and, the
conversion being complete by that wrongful
act, their value there represents the plalntUr's
loss. His loss la no greater by reason of the
value added by the labor of cutting and transportation to the mill. It does not appear that
the logs were of special or exceptional value
to the plalntltr upon the land from which they
were taken, nor that be had a special.use for
them other than obtaining their value by a
sale, nor that the market price had risen after their conversion. It, In estimating the
damages, the value at the mill, Increased by
the cost of cutting and transportation, Is to
be taken aa the criterion, the plnlntltr will recelve more than compensation for hie loss.
With such a rule of damages, It, besides the
defendant, another trespasser had cut logs of
an equal amount upon the same lot, and had
hauled them to the lake shore, and a third bad
simply cut and severed the trees. from tbe
land, and sold them there, and suits for their
conversion bad been brought against each
one. the sums recovered would d!IJ'er by the 1
cost of transporting the logs to the place of '
the alleged conversion, while the loss to the
plalntltr would be the same ·In each ot the
three cases. The Injustice of such an appllc,a tlon of the rule of damnges le apparent
from the unequal results. In Foote v. Merrtll, supra, which was trespass qunre clausum, and for cutting and removing trees, It
was decided that the plalntltr could recover
tor the whole Injury to the land, Including the
value ot the trees there, but not any increase
In value made by the cost of cutting and taking them away. In the opinion It ls said,
(Hibbard, J.:) "If the owner of timber cut
upon his land by a trespasser gets, poasesslon of it Increased In value, be has the beneftt of the lnrreased value. The law neither
divests him of bis property, nor requh'es him
to pay for Improvements made without his
authority. Perhaps, lo trover, and, possibly,
In trespass de bonls asportatls, he may he entitled to the same beneftt." This dictum, not
being any part of, nor n~ary to. the decision of that case, and given In language expressive of doubt, cannot be Invoked as a
precedent decisive ot this case. ·when trespass de bonls nsportatls Is coupled with trespass auare clnusum. either as a sepnrnte count
or as an averment In aggravation of damages, as In Foote v. Merrill, the Increase In
damages bv reason or such averment and
proof of It Is the value of the chattels taken

I
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and converted; and in such a case is the same

as the whole damages would have been in an

action of tresnas de bonis. Smith v. Smith,

50 N. H. 212. 219. Had the plaintiff in Foote

v. Merrill, sued in trespass for taking and

carrying away the trees merely, he would

have recovered their value upon the lot at the

time of the taking, allowing nothing for the

expense of cutting and removing them; and

no good reason appears why the same rule of

damages should not prevail in trover as in

trespass de bonls asportatis. The loss to the

plaintiff from the taking and carrying away

of his property is, ordinarily, the same as the

conversion of it by complete appropriation,

and the rule of compensation for the loss

gives him the value of his property at the

time and place of taking or conversion, and

interest from that time for its detention.
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The English cases upon the subject give as

the rule of damages. when the conversion and

appropriation of the property are by an inno-

cent mistake. and bona ﬁde, or where there

is a real dispute as to the title, the value of

the property in place upon the land. allow-

ing nothing for enhancement of value by la-

bor in its removal and improvement. But

hen the conversion is by fraud or willful

respass, the full value at time of demand

nd refusal is given. Martin v. Porter, 5

Mess. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 Adol.

& E. (N. S.) 278; Wood v. Morewood, Id. 440,

note: Wild v. Holt. 9 Mees. & W. 672; In re

United Collierles Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46. The

rly New York cases give the full value at

he time of conversion, including any value

dded by labor and change in manufacturing.

etts v. Lee. 5 Johns. 348; Curtis v. Groat.

6 Johns. 168; Babcock v. Gill, 10 Johns. 287;

Brown v. Sax, 7 Cow. 95; Baker v. Wheeler,

8 Wend. 505. In these cases the conversion

is treated as tortious, and the same as if

made by willful trespass. In later cases a

distinction is made between a willful taking

and conversion. and the rule of just compen-

sation is upheld in case of the conversion of

trees at least, and their value upon the land,

is given as damages when the conversion

does not result from willful trespass. Whit-

beck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644; Spicer v.

Waters, 65 Barb. 227. The Illinois decisions

make no distinction between cases of willful

trespass and those of conversion by mistake

or inadvertence, and include in damages all

enhancement in value, from any cause, be-

fore suit is brought. Robertson v. Jones, 71

Ill. 405; Coal Co. v. Long, 81 Ill. 359; Rall-

road Co. v. Ogle, 82 Ill. 627. In Maine the

increased value added by cutting and re-

moving the timber is not included in the

damages, although the conversion be by will-

ful trespass. Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me.

306; \Ioody v. Whitney. 38 Me. 174. And

the same rule seems to govern in Massachu-

setts. (Iron Co. v. Iron-Works, 102 Mass. 80,

80.) and did in Wisconsin (Weymouth v. Rail-

way Co., 17 Wis. 567; Single v. Schneider, 30

Wis. 570) until the legislature of that stater

nut! cou,·erte<l; and In such a case ls the same Wis. 570J until the legislature of that state.
as the whole damages would have been in an In 187a, enacted a statute providing that the
action of tresoa!!lll de bonis. Smith v. Smith, rule of damages, In the case or one wrong·
50 N. H . 212. 219. Had the plalntltr In Foote fully cutting and converting timber on thev. Merrill, sued ln trespass for taking and land of another, should be the highest marcarrying awa.v the trees merely, he would ket value of the property up to the time orhave recovered their value upon the lot at the trial, in whatever state it might be put.
time ot the taking, allowing nothing for the Webster v. Moe, 35 Wis. 75; Ingram v. Ranexpense of cutting and removing them; and kin, 47 Wis. 400, 2 N. W. 755. '£he weight·
no good reason appears why the same rule ot of authority, however, in this country ls In .
damages should not prevail in trover as in favor of the rule which gives compensation
trespass de bonls asoortatls. The loss to the for the loss; that ls, the value of the propplalntltr from the taking aud carrying away erty at the time and place of conversion,
of his property ls. ordinarily, the same as the with Interest after, allowing n<>thlng tor
conversion of It by complete appropriation, value subsequently added by the defendant.
aud the rule of compensation for the loss when the conversion does not proceed from
glYeS him the value of his property at the wlllful trespase, but from the wrong-doer's
time and place of taking or conversion, and ml.stake or from his honest belief of owner. ship in the property, and there are no cirInterest from that time for its detention.
'l'he English cases upon the subject give as cumstances showing a special and peculiar
the rule or dama11:es. when the conversion and value to the owner or a contemplated special
appropriation of the property are by an inno- use or the property by him. Forsyth v.
cent mistake. and bona fide. or where there Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291; Herdlc v. Young, M
ls a real dlsoute as to the title, the value of Pa. St. 176; Wooley v. Carter, 7 N. J. Law,
the property In place upon the land, allow- 85; Coal Co. v. McMlllan, 49 Md. 549; Coal
lng nothlnir tor enhancement of value by la- Co. v. Cox. 39 Md. 1; Bennett v. Thompson,
bor In Its removal and Improvement. But 13 Ired. HG; Uallway Co. v. Hutchins, 8Z
ben the conversion ls by fraud or willful Ohio St. 571; Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich.
respass, the tun value at time of demand 311; Winchester v. Craig, 33 Mich. 205; Nesnd refll881 ls given. Martin v. Porter, 5 bitt v. Lumber Co., 21 Minn. 491; Ellis v.
Mees. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 AdoL Wire, 33 Ind. 127; Ward v. Wood Co., 13
Nev. 44; Waters v. Stevenson, Id. 177; Gol& E. (N'. S~ 278; Wood v. Morewood, Id. 44-0,
Parker, 88
note: Wlld v. Holt. 9 Mees. & W. 672; In re ler v. Fett, 30 Cal. 481; Gray
United Collieries Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46. The Mo. 160, 166; Wooden Ware Co. v. U. S.•
rly New York cases give the full value at 106 U. S. 432, 434, 1 Sup. Ct. 398; Sedgw.
e time ot conversion, Including any value Dam. (5th Ed.) 571, 572; Cooley, Torts, 457.
dded by labor and change In manufacturing. 458, note. In cases of conversion by wllltul ,
etts v. Lee. 5 Johns. 348; Curtis v. Groat. act or by fraud, the value added by the
6 Johns. 16~; Babcock v. Gill, 10 Johns. 287; wrong-doer, after conversion, ls sometimes
Brown v. Su, 7 Cow. 95; Baker v. Wheeler, given as exemplary or vindictive damages,
8 Wend. 505. In these cases the conversion or because the defendant Is precluded from
ls treated as tortlous, and the same as it showing an increase in value by his own
made by wmtul trespass. In later cases a wrong, and from claiming a correspondlngdistinction ls made between a willful taking reductlon of damages. The contention of
and conl·erslon, and the rule of just compen- the plalntltr that he ls entitled to recover
sation ls upheld In case or the conversion of the value or the logs increased by the extrees at least, and their value upon the land, pense of cutting and removal to the mlll in
ls given as damages when the conversion Woltborough, because, as the case flnds, the
does not result from wllltul trespus. Whit- defendant's acts constituting the conversion
beck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644; Spicer v. were negligent, cannot be sustained on any
Waters, 65 Barb. 227. The Illinois decisions ground warranting vindictive damages. The
make no distinction between eases of willful cutting and taking the logs was not wlllful
trespass and those of conversion by mistake trespass; nor does It appear that the deor inadvertence, and include In damages all fendant's want of reasonable care amounted
enhancement in value, from any cause, be- to a fraud. No malice Is shown, nor were
fore suit ls brought. Robertson v. Jones, 71 there other facts of outrage upon which such
Ill. 405; Coal Co. v. Long, 81 Ill. 859; Rail- damages could be predicated. No part of
road Co. v. Ogle, 82 Ill. 627. In Maine the the damages In dispute ls found as exemIncreased value added by cutting and re- plary, aud the plaintiff cannot be permitted
moving the timber Is not Included In the to assign as damages to his feelings a. mere
damages, although the conversion be by will- value added to the property by the defendful trespass. Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me. ant after the completion ot the tort, nor take
300; Moody v. Whitney, 88 Me. 174. And as a benefit that which Is outside of compenthe S11me rule seems to govern In Massachu- sation for the wrong. l<'ay v. Parker, 53 N.
setts. (Iron Co. v. Iron-Works, 102 Mass. 80, H. 342; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56. N. H. 456; Kim80.) and did In Wisconsin (Weymouth v. Rail- ball v. Holmes, 60 N. H. 163. The damages
way Co., 17 Wis. 567; Single v. Schnelder, 30 ~ust ~ accordln_g to the usual riil~l_u_ ~fu!~i._

f

E

v.

~

INJURIE~

INJURIES TO REAL PROPERTY.

391

)£h1§:lLi5 the value o1' the property at the

time of conversion, and interest after. The

severance of the trees from the land, and

their conversion from real to personal prop-

erty, was in law a conversion of the proper-

ty to the defendant's use. The value of the

trees. immediately upon their becoming chat-

teis,—that is, as soon as telled,—which is

found to be $1.50 per thousand feet, with in-

terest from that time, the plaintiff is entitled

to recover. Judgment tor the plaintiii.

SMITH, J., did not sit. The others con-
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curred. '

TO REAL PROPERTY.

)\·hlch is the value of the property at the
time of conve1"Slon, and Interest after. The
severance of the treei; from the laria. and
their conversion from real to personal property, was lo law a conversion of the prOl)9rty to the defendant's UBe. The value of the
trees, immediately upon their becomlns chat-

8!H

telB,-that la, u soon as felled,-which 18
found to be $Ui0 per thowiand feet, with interest from that time, the plaintiff Is entitled
to recover. Judgment tor the pla.lotUI'..
SMITH, J.._ did not alt.
curred.

The others con-

3
DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PROPERTY.

GASKINS

T.

DAVIS.

M2

(20 S. E. 188, 115 N. 0. 85.)

DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PROPERTY.

Supreme Court of North Oarolina.
1894.

LJJ)

GASKINS v. DAVIS.

Oct. 16,

(20 S. E. 188, 115 N. C. 85.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina. Oct. 16,

1894.

Appeal from superior court, Craven county;

Bynum, Judge.

Action of trespass by Patsy Ann Gaskins

against Henry C. Davis. Judgment was ren.-

dered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Appeal from 'superior court, Craven county;
Bynum, Judge.
Actloo of trespass by Patsy Ann Gaskins
against Henry C. :Qavls. Judgment was re~
dered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
W. W. Clark, for appellant. F. M. Simmons and P. M. Pe&r88.ll, for appellee.

Reversed.

W. W. Clark, for appellant. F. M. Sim-

mons and P. M. Pearsail, for appellee.

AVERY, J. The plaintiff's complaint is in

the nature of a declaration for trespass in

the entry by the defendant upon her land,

after being forbidden, and cutting, carrying

iaway, and converting to his own use valuable

itimber that was growing thereon, to her
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idamage $500. The logs, after being severed,

were transported to Newbern in two lots. one

of which lots was seized by plaintiff after

reaching that city, where it was much more

valuable than at the stump, and was sold

by her for the sum of $112. The other lot

was converted into boards and sold by the

defendant. The defendant, for a second de-

fense, sets up by way of counterclaim the

seizure of the logs by the plaintiff; and

though the counterclaim may be a defective

statement of the defendant's cause of ac-

tion, in that it fails to aver an unlawful tak-

ing, the defect is cured, if the counterclaim

can be maintained at all, by the reply, which,

by way of alder, raises the question of the

rightfuiness of the seizure. The well-estab-

lished rule is that in such cases the injured

party is entitled to recover of the trespasser

the value of the timber where it was ﬁrst

severed from the land and became a chattel

(Bennett v. Thompson, 13 Ired. 146), together

with adequate damage for any injury done to

the land in removing it therefrom. As long

as the timber taken was not changed into a

different species, as by sawing into boards,

the owner of the land retained her right of

property in the speciﬁc logs as fully as when

by severance it became her chattel, instead

of a part of the realty belonging to her. Pot-

ter v. Mardre, 74 N. ,C. 40. The value of the

material taken indicates the extent of the

loss, where there are no circumstances of ag-

gravation or willfuiness shown, and is the

usual measure of damages. Where the tres-

passer has converted the property taken into

a diiierent species, under the rule of the

civil law which we have adopted, the article,

in its altered state, cannot be recovered, but

only damages for the wrongful taking and

conversion. when the change in its form is

“made by one who is acting in good faith, and

under an honest belief that the title was in

him." In Potter v. Mardre, supra, Rodman,

J., delivering the opinion of the court, says:

“The principle of equity [applied in that case]

is supported by the analogy of the rule estab-

iished in this state by the decisions which

hold that a vendee of land by a parol con-

A.VERY, J. The plalntlff's complaint la In
the nature of a declaration for tresp8.8s tu
the entry by the defendant upon her land.
. after being forbidden, and cutting, carry!Dg
away, and converting to his own use valuable
timber that was growing thereon, to her
\ damage $500. The logs, after being severed,
were transported to Newlx>.rn In two lots. one
of which lots was seized by plaintiff after
reaching that city, where it was much more
valuable than at the stump, and was sold
by her for the sum of $112. The other lot
was converted Into boards and sold by the
defendant. The defendant, for a second defense, sets up by way of counterclaim the
seizure of the Jogs by the plaintiff; and
though the counterclaim may be a defective
statement of the defendant's cause of action, in that it fails to aver an unlawful taking, the detect ls cured, if the counterclaim
can be maintained at all, by the reply, which,
by way of aider, raises the question of the
rightfulness of the seizure. The well-establlslied rule Is that in such cases the injured
party Is entitled to recover of the trespasser
1 the value of the timber where it was first
severed from the land and became a chn ttel
{Bennett v. Thompson, 13 Ired. 146), together
with adequate damage for any injury done to
J the land In removing It therefrom. As long
ae the timber taken was not changed into a
different species, as by sawing into boards,
the owner of the land retained her right of
property ln the specific logs as fully as when
by sen"!rance it became her chattel, instead
of a pa rt of the realty belonging to her. Potter v. :\iardre, 74 N. C. 40. The value of the
material taken indicates the extent of the
loss, where there are no circumstances of aggravation or willfulness shown, and is the
usual measure of damages. Where the trespaRRcr has converted the property taken Into
a different species, under the rule of the
civil law which we have adopted, the article,
tn its altered state, cannot be recovered, but
only damages for the wrongful taking and
conversion, when the change In Its form Is
"made by one who Is acting In good faith, and
under an honest belief that the title was In
him." In Potter v. :\Iardre, supra, Rodman,
J., delivering the opinion of the court, says:
"'.l'he principle of equity (applied In that case]
Is irnpported by the analogy of the rule estab-

I

llshed In this state by the declslons which
hold that s. vendee of land by a parol contract of sale, who takes possesslon and makes
Improvements, and la afterwards ejected by
the vendor, may recover the value of his Improvements. Albea v. Grlftln, 2 Dev. & B.
Eq. 9. So If one .who has purchased land
from another, not having title, enters and Improves, believing his title good, and Is ejected
by the rightful owner, he la entitled to compensation. In both cases one who Is morallv
innocent has contused his prope!"ty with th;t
of another, and he ls held entitled to separate it ln the only way ft can be done, T1z.
by being allowed the value of bis Improvements in the raw material." The judge laid
down coITectly the rule as to the damage\
that the plalntilf was entitled t.o recover of
the defendant for the original trespass,-the
value of the logs when severed at the stump,
and adequate damage for injury done to the
land ln removing them. Potter v. Mardrt>,
supra; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 36; Ross
v. Scott, 15 Lea, 4'i9. The character of the
logs had not been changed by cutting and
transporting to Newbern, but the value had
probably been greatly enhanced. The approved rule, where the plalntifr ls askingdamage for trespass, seems to be that the
owner Is entitled to recover the value of
the logs when and where they were severed/
and without abatement for the cost of sever
ance. Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md. 549.
But, If he prefers to follow and claim the
timber removed, he ts entitled t.o do so, as
long as the species remains unchanged. The
plalntllf was entitled to recover In a claim
and delivery proceeding the logs that she
seems to have acquired peaceful possession
of without action. Was the defendant ~n
titled, by way of recoupment, to the benefltJ
of the enhanced value imparted to the prop1 ·
erty by transporting it t.o market? Had they
been sawed up in planks, and used to construct a boat, the plaintiff would not have
been entitled to recover the boat, or the material used in its construction. But If the
plaintilf had then unlawfully seized and lost
or destroyed the boat, and the defendant hn'~
been thereby driven to an action to recover
compensation for his loss, he might have recovered the value of the boat, together with
the damage, If any, done to his land In removing it therefrom; but the present plll.lntilf would have been entitled "to deduct.
by way of counterclaim, the value of the
timber which was manufactured into the
boat, just after It was felled and converted
Into a chattel." Potter v. Mardre, supra. It
seems to have bet>n conceded that the dt>!endant cut and carried a way the logs under the
honest but mistaken belief that the land upon
which they were growing was his own.
Where a trespasser acts in good faith under
a claim of right in removing timber, though
he may not be allowed compensatlon for the
cost of converting the tree Into a chattel, may
be not recoup, In analogy to the equitable doc-

INJURil!IS TO BJllA.L PROPERTY.
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trine of bettermems, for additional value im-

parted to the property after its conversion in-

to a chattel, and before it is changed into a

different species? The judge below, in allow-

ing the defendant, by way of recoupment,

the beneﬁt of the enhanced value imparted to

the logs by removal from the stump to the

Newbern market, seems to have acted upon

the idea that the defendant, by reason of his

good faith, was entitled to the beneﬁt of the

hmprovement in value imparted by his labor

and expense. In Ross v. Scott, supra, where

it appeared that the defendant had entered

upon land to mine for coal, and, under the

honest but erroneous belief that he was the

owner. had built houses thereon, it was held

that the plaintif f might recover the cost of

the coal in situ, subject to reduction by an

allowance for permanent improvements put

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

upon the land. See, also, In re United

Merthyr Collieries Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46; Hil-

ion v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432; Forsyth v.

Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291. The weight of authori-

ty, it must be conceded, sustains the rule

that, where the action is brought for damages

for logs cut and removed in the honest belief

on the part of the trespasser that he had title

them, the measure of damages is the value

in the woods from which they were taken,

with the amount of injury incident to re-

moval. not at the mill where they were car-

ried to be sawed. 'I‘iiden v. Johnson, 532 Vt.

628. 36 Am. Rep. 769, and note, 770; Ilcrdic

v. Young. 55 Pa. St. 176; Hill v. Canﬁcld. 56

Pa. St. 454: Moody v. Whitney. 38 Me. 174;

Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me. 306; Gollcr v.

Fett, 30 Cal. 482; Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H.

496; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571.

In the absence of any evidence that would

justify the assessment of vindictive damages,

there is only one exception to the rule, as we

have stated it, and that is where the trees

destroyed are not the ordinary timber of the

forest, but are peculiarly valuable for orna-

ment, or as shade trees.

It being settled in this state that the right

to the speciﬁc chattel, which vests on sever-

ance from the land in the owner of the soil,

remains in him till the species is changed,

we are constrained to go further, though

it may sometimes subject a mistaken tres-

passer to hardship, and hold that the true

owner is entitled to regain possession of a

log cut and removed from his land, either

by recapture or by any other remedy pro-

vided by law, whatever additional value may

have been imparted to it by transporting it

to a better market, or by any improvements

in its condition short of an actual alteration

of species. In Weymouth v. Railroad Co.,

17 Wis. 550, the court say: “In determining

the question of rccaption the law must either

allow the owner to retake the property, or it

must hold that he has lost his right by the

wrongful act of another. If retaken at all,

it must be taken as it is found, though en-

hanced in value by the trespasser. It cannot

be returned to its original condition. The

trlne f>f betterment.11, for additional value Imparted t.o the property after Its conversion lnt.o a chattel, and before It ls changed Into a
d.Uferent species? The 'udge below, 1n allowing the d9fendant, by way of recoupment,
the benetlt of the enhanced value Imparted t.o
the logs by removal from the stump to the
Newbern market, seems t.o have acted upon
the Idea thnt the defendant, by reason of his
.Jtood faith, was entitled to the benefit of the
'mprovement In value Imparted by his labor
and expense. In Ross v . &ott, supra, where
tt appeared that the defendant had entered
upon land t.o mine for coal, and, under the
honest but erroneous belief that he was the
owner, had built houses thereon, It was held
that the plaintiff might recover the cost of
the coal In situ, subject to reduction by an
allowance for permanent Improvements put
upon the land. See, also, In re United
:\lerthyr Collieries Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432; Forsyth v.
Wells, 41 Pa. St 291. The weight of authority, It must be conceded, sustains the rule
that, where the action Is brought tor damn~rs
for logs cut and removed In the honest bellef
on the part of the trespasser that he had title
~ them, the measure of damages Is the value
l.!n the woods from ~hlch they were tnk<'D,
with the amount of Injury Incident to removal, not at the mill where t11Py were carried to be sawed. Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt.
028. 36 Am. Rep. 769, and note, 770; IIerdlc
v. Young. 55 Pa. St 176; Hill v. Canfield. l'iO
Pa. St. 454; Moody v. Whitney. 38 Me. 174;
Cushing v. Longfellow, 20 Mc. 306; Goller v.
Fett, 30 Cal. 482; Foote v. Merrill, M N. H.
4V6; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571.
In the absence of any evidence that would
justify the assessment of vim.llctlvc damagc11,
there ls only one exception t.o the rule, as we
have stated It, and that Is where the trPes
destroyed are not the ordinary tlmlJer of the
forest, but are pccullnrly valuable for ornament, or as shade trees.
It being Eettled lo this state that the rlght
to the specific chattel, which vests on severance from the land In the owner of the soil,
remains In him till the species Is changed,
we are coustrnlned to go further, though
It may sometimes subje<'t a ·mistaken trespasser to hardslllp, and hold that tlle true
owner Is entitled to regn.ln possession of a
log cut and removed from his land, either
by recapture or by any other remedy proYlded by law, whatever additional value may
have b('(>n Imparted t.o It by transporting It
to a better market, or by any Improvements
In Its condition short of au actual alteration
of species. In Weymouth v. ~allroad Co.,
l i Wis. 550, the court say: "In determining
the question of rccriptlon the law must either
allow the owner to retake the property, or It
must hold that he has lost his right by the
wron,11:!111 act of another. It retaken at all,

. .
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lt must be taken as It ls found, though enhanced In value by the tresp888er. It cannot
be returned t.o Its original condition. The
law, therefore, being obliged t.o say either
that the wrongdoer shall lose his labor, or
the owner shall -lose the right to take the
property wherever he may find It, very prop.
erly decides 1n favor of the latter. But where
the owner voluntarily.waives the right t.o reclaim the property Itself, and sues for damages, the dlfticulty of separating the enhanced value from the original value no longer exists. It is then entirely practlcablt'! to
gh·e the owner the entire value thnt was
taken from him, which It seems thnt natural
justice requires, without adding to it such
value as the "property may have afterwards
acquired from the labor of the defendant. In
the case of recaptlon the law does not allow
It, because It ls absolute justice that the original owner should" have the additional value.
But whC'l"e the wrongdoer bas by his own ·
ii.ct created a state of fact.<i, when either he
or the· owner must lose, then the law says
the wrongdoer shall lose." Id., 20 Am. Rep.
529, note. When, therefore, the plnlntltr rec-.i.ptured the one lot of lo~ that had been
enhanced In value by transportation from
the stump to the city market, she but exerl
clsed the rig-ht given her by law to peacefully regain possession of her own chat.tels
wherever found. She was guilty of no In
frlngemeot of the rights of the defendant, for
which an action would lie. It ls familiar
learning that a detendnnt can only maintain
successfully a counterclaim when It is of
such a nature that he could recover upon 1t
In a separate suit broui;:ht against the plaintiff. The defendant could not recover, ther&-~
fore, either In a 41st1nct action tor the tnklng
of the logs, or by way of counterclaim.
When the plaintiff recaptured the Jogs she
was guilty of no wrong, and the question ot
title to the property so rightfully ta.ken was
eliminated trom all possible future controversy, Her remedy by a.ct ot the In w remalned as to so many of the logs as she had
not regained possession of by her own act.
Alter she had recaptured one lot the property
in them In tlJelr altered state, and at the new
situs, revested In her, with the absolute jns
dlsponendl, as In the case of. her other personal property. Nothing remained to be adjusted In the courts, except her claim for ,
dalllUA'CS ·for the taking of the other lot and \
the Injury t.o the land, if any, Incident t.o the
removal of both lots. It was error, therefore, to Instruct the jury t.llat the enhanced f
value Imparted by removal t.o the one lot /
ot logM might be allowed the defend..'lnt as a \
counterclaim, so as t.o set orr the damag-es
assessed tor Injury to the land and tor the
value at the stump of the other lot, and the
plaintllf ls entitled to a new trial.
New trial.

l

DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PRQPJ.j}RTY.
OMAHA & GRANT SMELTING & REFINING CO. et al. v. TABOR et a1

394

DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PROPERTY.

OMAHA & GRANT SMELTING & RE-

FINING CO. et al. v. TABOR et al.

(21 Pac. 925, 13 Colo. 41.)
Supreme Court of Colorado. May 28, 1889.

(21 Pac. 925, 13 Colo. 41.)

Supreme Court of Colorado. May 28, 1.

Commissioners' decision. Appeal from dis-

trict court, Lake county.

/ Two suits. in the nature of actions in tro-

ve

‘

r, brought by Horace A. W. Tabor, David

H. Mofiatt, Jacob J. B. Du Bois, James G.

Blaine, and Jerome B. Chal‘fee,—the ﬁrst,

against Eddy, James, and Grant; the second,

against the Omaha 80 Grant Smelting & Re-

ﬁning Company, in which it appears the bus-

iness of the former defendants was merged.

Plaintiffs alleged that they, with Charles E.

Rider, were the owners and in the possession

of the mine in the county of Lake known as
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the “lvluid of Erin Lode," and as survey

“Lot No. 568," and “Mineral Entry No.

384," from the 1st day of January, 1882, un-

til the 11th of October, 1883. That between

the 3d ol"July and the 31st of August, 1883,

Thomas Ovens, Stanley G. Wight, and oth-

ers wron;_vfm"ly entered upon the prouerty,

and mined and took out a large quantity of

valuable ore, and sold the same to thedefend-

ants, who converted it to their own use; and

that the ore so mined, sold, and purchased

by the defendants was of the value of 825.-

000 over and above the cost of mining, rais-

ing, hauling, and treating. That about the

9th day of March, 1886, the plaintiff Jerome

B. Chaffee died, and David H. Moffntt be-

came executor. That on or about the 20th

of Noveml-er, 1885, Charles E. Rider sold and

transferred to l‘‘vid H. Moffatt his cause or

causes of action in the premises, and that the

defendants mixed and confused the ores of

plaintiffs with other ores, destroyed their

identity, and sold and converted them into

money. Plsintills pray judgment for $25,-

000. and interest. Defendants answer, de-

nying all the allegations in the complaint,

except the allegation of sale and assignment

by Rider to Moffatt, in regard to which they

say they are not informed, and the allegation

that defendant had not paid plaintiffs for the

ore. which is admitted. For further defense,

defendants allege that, at the time of the al-

leged entry and wrongful taking of ore, Stan-

ley G. Wight, Jervis Joslin, Chester B.

Bullock, Loyd Park, A. W. ltucker, and

Rucker were the owners and in the

possession of the Vanderbilt lode mining

claim, which conﬂicted with and embraced a

part of the Maid of Erin claim. That the

territory in conﬂict was in htigation between

the respective parties. '1‘hat several actions

at law and equity concerning it were pend-

ing and undetermined. That at the dates

mentioned in the complaint Wight and oth-

ers were mining and taking ores from the

Vanderbilt claim, and from th.-it part in con-

fhct with the Maid of Erin. 'l‘hat these facts

were unknown to defendants; and that the

ore so taken, or a part of it. was sold and

Commissioners' decision. Appeal from district courl, Lake county.
'l'wu suits, in the nature of ;wtio11s in trnver, brought by Horace A. W. Tabor, David
JI. Moffatt, Jacob J.B. Du Bois, James G.
Blaine, and Jerome B. Chaffee,-the first,
against Eddy, James, and Grant; the second,
against the Omaha & Grant Smelting &, Refining Company, in which it appears the business of the former defendants was merged.
Plaintiffs alleged that they, with Charles E.
Rider, were the owners and in the possession
of the mine in the county of Lake known as
the "Maitl of Erin Lode," and as survey
"Lot No. 568," and "Mineral Entry No.
384," from the 1st day of January, 1882, until the 11th of October, 1883. That between
the 8d of July and the 31st of A11gm1t, lt!t!3,
Thomas Ov1>11s, Stanley G. Wight, and others Wl'Ungfuiiy entere,J upon the pro1•erty,
a11d minl'd and took out a large quantity of
vai uat.le ore, and sol<l Lhe :mme to thP. defe111lanti1, who convertl'd it tu their own u:1e; and
that the ore so mined, sold, and purchased
by the defendants was of the value of $25,000 over and above the t·ost of miuing, rnising, hauling, and treating. That about the
9th day of March, 1880, tl.te plaintiff Jerome
ll. Chaffee died, and David II. Moffatt became executor. 'fhat on or about the 20th
or Noverul .er, 1885, Charles E. Rider sohl and
transfnred to r •vid H. l\lolfatt his cause or
causes of adion in the premises, and that the
detendants mixed and confused the ores of
pfaintitis with other ores, destroyed their
ident.ity, •tnd sold and converted them into
money. Plaintiffs pray judgment for 825,000. and inlerest. J)efentlants answer, de~
nying all the allegations In the complaint,
except the allegation of sale and assignment
by Hider to Moffatt, in regard to which they
say they are not informed, and the allegation
that defendant had not paid plaintiffs for the
ore. which is admitted. }~or further defense,
defendants allege that, at the time of the alleged entry amt wrongful taking of orf', Stanley G. Wight, Jervis Joslin, Chester B.
Bullock, J,oyd Park, A. W. !tucker, and
- - - Rucker were tl1e owners and in the
possession of the Vanderbilt lode mining
claim, which conflicted with and embraced a
part of the Maid of Erin claim. 'fhat the
territory in contlict was in litigation between
the respective parties. 'fhat several actions
at law and equity concerning it were pending and undetermined. That at the dates
mentioned in the complaint Wight and others were mining and t11king ores from the
Vanderbilt claim, and from that part in conflict with the Maid of Erin. That these facts
were unknown to defendants; and that the
ore so taKeII, or a part of it. was sold anrl
delivered to the defendant at its smelting

works in Leadville, as ore from the VRnderbilt lode, and purchased by defendants in
regular courst' of lrnsiness. That long after
the purchase of the ore by defendants they
were informed that the ore was taken from
the ground in dispute. Defendants furlber
say, in answer, that some time during August or September, 1883, they did purchm1e
ores belonging to Wight, Hucker, and others
which were known as and called "Vanderbilt Ores," whkh as defendants bt>lieve were
taken from the Vandnbilt claim, of which
the s;iicl Wight and others were the owners
and claimants, and in possession under claim
and color of t itle. Plaintiffs. in reply, deny
that Wight and others were the owners of
any part of the Vanderbilt claim in conHict
with the Maid of Erin claim; deny that any
part of the Vanderbilt claim conflicted; and
allege that prior to the date mentioned tht>
government of the United l:itatt'S had sold to
the plaintiffs Tabor and Du Hois the Maid of
Erin claim, and given a receiver's r"ceipt for
the same from the land.office at Leadville~
and a,·er that Ovens and Wight wrongfully
went into a portion of the gr11und descril>etJ
in the complaint while plaintiffs were in possi•ssion of it, ancl mined and carrit!d away tlte
ore, which was the same ore rueutiuneJ in
defendants' answer; deny that Ovens anti
Wight had any title to the ground from whkb
ore wa~ taken, and avn that all the possession they had wa:1 wrongful aml illegal, and
temporary, for the purpose of obtaining the
ore; that the entry of Ovens and Wight w1L'I
through a shaft on the Big Chief claim, nol
owned by either party to the contl'Uversy,
and that from such shaft they worked over
the boundary into plaintiffs' property; deny
that defendants did not know that Ovens and
Wight were taking the o~·e from plaintiff:i'
ground; and aver full notice and knowledge
of the fact. The two suits were consolidated
for the purpose of the trial. The venue was
changecl to LakA county; the cause trieal before the court and a jury, .April 15. 1888~
verdict for plaintiffs against Eddy, James,
and Grant for $3,990.45, and against the
Omaha & Grant Smelti11g & Relining Company for $14,:397.67. '!'here are 61 as~11g11ments of error. Of these, 38 are to the ruling of the court in admitting and rejl'ctin;.;
te:1timony; 22 (being those from 39 to W.
both inclusive) are to the rulin~sof the court
in giving and refusing the instructions asked;
the 61st and last is to the refusal of the
court to grant a new trial. The other facls
necessary to a proper understanding of the
case necessarily appear in the opinion.
Pattersoti & 1'/tomas, for appt·llant. Wolcott & Vaile, J. B. 1Ji11sdl, anu L. C. Rod;well, for appellees.
REED, C., (ofter stating the far:t.v a.•
aboce. ) The lirst 15 and the 18th error1111s11igned are to the ruling of the court on the
cross·examination of plaintiffs' witness O. IL
Harker. Counsel in their argument for BP'
pellants say: "The defendants sought t«:
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show by cross-examination of the plaintiffs' ' James v. Stookey, 1 Wash. C. C. 330.t

witnesses that at the time of the commission

of the trespasses complained of, the Maid of

Erin mine was owned by the Henriett Mm-

ing 80 Smelting Company and J. B. Du Bois,

and that the original trespassers were en-

joined at the suit of these parties by proper .

proceedings instituted for that purpose, but ,

1 this action. And although he was the ageit

‘ of plaintiffs, in charge of their work in the

they were not permitted to do so." it ap-

pea1s that counsel for appellants (defendants

below) upon the trial attempted, on cross-

examination of the witness, to show that the

plaintiﬂ Du Bois owned one-half of the Maid

of Erin property, and the Henriett Company

the other hall‘, and that the other plaintiffs

were not owners, by showing that the wit-

ness had so stated in a legal document signed
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and veriﬁed by him as manager and agent in

some former proceeding concerning the prop-

erty, in which case an injunction was issued

to restrain a trespass upon the Maid of Erin

claim upon the complaint so signed and ver-

itied; bntthe court would not permit it to be

done. An examination of the questions asked

the witness, which the court did not per-

mit him to answer, will show that none of

the testimony sought went to any issue in

the case, was not directed to anything in his

direct testimony, and was not legitimate

cross-examination. Many of the questions

were in regard to facts that could only have .

been proved by production of records or doc-

umenls. Some of the questions were in re-

gard to suits at law and proceedings where

there is nothing in the record to show he in

any way participated or.of which he had any

knowledge; and all the testimony sought, in

our view of the case, was immaterial, except

in so far as it tended to discredit him or

weaken his testimony by showing that his

acts or declarations on previous occasions

were at variance and inconsistent with his

testimony at that time. This counsel had a

right to do by introducing the records or doc-

uments, and asking him in regard to oral

statements. It appears that in the course of

the trial the papers executed by the witness,

to which his attention was called, were ad-

mitted in evidence for the purpose of im-

peachment,—the only legitimate purpose they

could serve.

It is clear that the title of the Henriett

Company to one-half of the Maid of Erin

- claim could not have been established by pa-

rol statements, or the acts of an agent in

verifying papers where the facts were so

stated. Counsel say this was one purpose

for which the evidence was sought to be elic-

ited on cross-examination. llad it been

proper cross-examination, and directed to an

issue, it was incompetent for the declared

purposes for which it was sought. The

agency of the witness had not been estab-

lished by any testimony but his own. He stat-

ed under oath at the time suit was brought

that he was the manager and agent of the

ahow by cr088-examination of the plainti1's' •
witnesses that at the time of the commi11Sion
of the trespasses complained of, t.he Maid of
Erin miDe was owned by the Henriett Mm·
ing & omelting Company and J.B. Du &is,
and that the original trespa.'4sers were enjoined at the suit of these pa1·ties by proper
proceedings instituted for that purpose, but
they were not permitted to do so." It a~
pears that counsel for appellants (defendant.a
below) upon the trial attempted, on cross·
t!Xamination of the witness, to show that the
plain tilt Du Bois owned one-half of the Maid
of .Erin property, and the Henriett Company
the olher bait, and that the other plaintiffs
were not owners, by showing that the witness lutd so stated in a legal document signed
and veriHed by him as manager and agent in
some former proceeding concerning the property, in which case an injunction was issued
to restrain a tresp1tss upon the Maid of Erin
claim upon the complaint so signed and veorilil'd; but the court would not permit it. to be
clone. An examination of the questions asked
the witness, which the court did not per·
mit him to answer, will show that none of
the teiJtimony sought went to any issue in
the case, was not directed to anything in his
1lirect testimony, and was not legitimate
cross-examination. Many of the questions
were in regard to fact11 that could only have_
been provtd by production of records or documenls. Some of the questions were in regard to suits at law and proceedings where
there is nothing in the record to show he in
any way participated or.of which he had any
knowledge; and all the testimony sought, In
our view of the case, was immaterial, except
in so far 11s it tended to discredit him or
weaken his testimony by showing that bis
acts or declarations on previous occasions
were at variance and inconsistent with hie
l:E'Stlmony at that time. This counsel had a
right lo do by Introducing the records or documents, and asking him in regard to oral
statements. It appears that In the course of
the trial the papers executed by the witness,
to which his attention was called, were ad·
mitted in evidence for the purpose of Impeachment,-theonly legitimate purpose they
c,'OullJ serve.
It is clear that the title of the Henriett
Company to one-half of the Maid of Erin
. claim could not have been established by parol statements, or the acts of an ageot in
verifying papers where the facts were so
stated. Counsel say this was one purpose
for which the evidence was sought to be elioited on cross-examination. Had it been
proper cross-examination, and directed to an
issue, it was incompetent for the declared
purposes for which It was sought. The
agency of the witness had not been estublished by any testimony but his own. He stated under oath at the time suit was brought
that he was the manager and agent of the
HenriettCompany. This was insufficient. An
agency cannot be established by his own det•
larations. Harker v. Dt!ment, 9 Gill, 16:
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James v. Stookey,! Wash. C. C. 830.t If an
agency had been proved, it was that ut thti
time of verifying the papers he was the man·
ager and Kgent of the Hemiett Company;
and his sworn sta~ment that. he wm1 such
agent, and that his principal ownbd one-halC
of defendants' claim, could not be binding
upon or ln any way affect the plai11tiffs in
this action. .And although hti wa:i tl1e ac.et t
of plaintiffs, in charge of their work ill the
M1lid of Erin, no statement, no mutter how
solemnly made by him as the agent of the
Hemiett Company, in favor of such company,
or agai11st the title of plaintiffs, could 11ffect
eit.her, much less conclude and estop the plaintiffs from asserting the contrary, as is urged
by counsel. There was no plea or property in
the Henriett Comp;my, and of entry and juAtitlcatlon und..r such a title. The defend1mt in
this case cannot set. up a title of a third perll()n in defense, unlt-ss he in sorne mannl'r
eonnecls himself with it. Duncan v. Spear,
11Wl'nd.54; Weymouth v. Hailroad Co., 17
Wis. 555; Harker w. Dt>ment, 9 Gill, 7. It
follows that the court did not err in limiting
the tl'stimony on the cross-examination to
the attempted discrediting of the witn1·ss,
and in refusing to admit records, except fur
purposes of impt>achment.
It is assigned for error that the court allowed plaintiff Tabor to telltify to a con\'ersation with McComb after the lattt-r had
been called, and had givt!n his \·ersiou of it.
Counsel put It upon the ground that a party
cannot be :illowed to contradict or impeach
his own witness. It does not appear that
Tabor was called for any such purpose, or
that his testimony had that e1!...ct. He Wllli
called to give his version of what occurrecl
at that interview with McComb. A ca1·eful
comparison of the testimony of both shows
that of Tabor more corroborative of t.han coutradictory to that of McComb,-at least, AA
to the result of such conver<mtion,-11lthongli
there is some discrepancy in regard to I.he
hmgu1tge used. "The party calling a wit.ness is not precluded from proving the trnth
of any particular fact by any other competent
testimony." 1 Green!. Ev.§ 448.
Appellants' counsel rely upon the conversation of Tabor with McComb as " licem1e or
consent on the part of 1'a\Jor to the ent1·y and
taking of the ores from the Maid of Erin
ground, and contend that his license or consent as a co-owner to the extent of one-sixteenth of the Maid of El'in ground was conelusive upon himself, and slso upon his coowners or the other fifteen-sixteenths, anti
was equi\'alent to a license or consent from
all, to the extent of covering the entire prope1ty. A license or consent cannot be extended by inference as a consent to entPr
property not spoken of or referre.! to in the
conversation, and we can find nothing in tl11·
testimony of either McComb or Tabor in regard to entering and taking ore from the
Maid of Erin ground. It was not attempted
1
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to be shown that Ovens. Wight, and Rucker

entered under license or consent from Tabor.

At the conversation both testify that Tabor

was informed the parties had entered under

an order from the court, against which he

was powerless for the time. It further ap-

pears that those parties were in at the time

McComb and Tabor had the conversation,

and McComb only asked consent to join

them'. It cannot be contended that such a

consent was a license to Ovens, Wight, and

Rucker to enter. The testimony went to the

jury, and in the eighth and ninth instruc-

tions given on prayer of plaintiffs they were

instructed‘, in effect. that they could uotlimit

or reduce the amount to be recovered by rea-

son of the supposed license or consent of

Tabor, unless they should ﬁnd that there was

a consent on his part that they should enter
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through the B.g Chief shaft, and take the

ore from the Maid of Erin claim; and the

same proposition is submitted in theinstruc-

tion given on behalf of defendants in place

of No. 7‘ refused. These instructions on

that point, we think, were correct. and fairly

submitted to the jury the question of license

or consent. -And it is evident from the ver-

dict that the jury found against any such

license or consent; and. the jury having so

found, it would seem unnecessary to deter-

mine whether the instructions were correct

or otherwise in regard to the extent such con-

sent. if found, should affect or modify the

amount; or, in other words, whether it should

cover the whole taking of ore, or be conﬁned

to the one-sixteenth owned by Tabor. The

jury having found no consent or license on

the part of Tabor, (l8ft-1‘|‘l2I,nts could not be

prt'jmliced by the instructions of the court in

regard to its effect, if it were found.

The question is quite different from what

it would be if it related to a transaction is

the ordinary course of business relative to

the joint property of tenants in common.

Here it is attempted to justifyatort, and

the injury to the entire property by the sup-

posed license of one joint owner. If the en-

try had been made by Tabor in person, and

the wrongs attempted to be justltied under

permission from, had been done by, him, his

co-tenants could have had against him the

same actions at law for injuries to their in-

terests that all a1e attempting to en1orce

against parties having no interest. It is

held “an action on the case sounding in tort

may be maintained by one tenant in common

against his co-tenant for a misuse of the com-

mon property, though not amounting to a

total destruction of it." McLellan v. Jen-

ness, 4;3 Vt. 183; Agnew v. Johnson. 17 Pa.

St. 373; Lowe v. Mdler, 3 Grat. 205. And,

if one tenant in common assume to own and

sell the thing held in common. the other may

mamtain an action of trover against him.

Burbank v. Crooker. 7 Gray, 159; Wheeler

v. Wheeler, 33 Me. 347; Coursin's Appeal,

79 Pa. St. 220; White v. Osborn, 21 Wend.

72; bmyth v. Tankersley, 20 Ala. 212. , The
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to be shown that Ovens, Wight, and Rucker be extended to cover acts of others that heentered under license or consent from Tabor. could not legally have done himsell. Hence
.A.t the conversation both testify that Tabor the coun was conect In holding and Instructwas informed the parties had entered under ing the jury that the consent or llcsnse of
an order from the court, against which he Tabor, if such were found, could only extend
was powerless for the time. It fu1ther ap- to the inten·st owned by him in the com1non
pears that those parties were ip at the time proptirty•
.McComb and Tabor had the conversation,
Appellants further assign for error the rul ·
and McComb only asked consent to join Ing of the.court in 111lmitting the testimony
them: It cannot be contended that such a of Tabor when called by the plaintiffs to
cousent was a license to Ovens, Wight, and show that, by a p1nol agreement made at the
Rucker to enter. The testimony went to the ti111e of the conwyance Qf the diff4'rent Interjury, and in the eighth and ninth instruc- ests by Tahor, Moffatt, and Chaffee in the
tions given on prayer of plaintiffs they were Henriett Company, possession of the properinstrnctt>d~ in effect, that they could not limit
ty conveyed was to remain in the grantors
or reduce the amount to be recovered by rea- until the purchase price Wl\S paid; that u.
son of the surposed license or consent of never was paid; and possession under the
Talior, unless thPy should find that there was conveyance never d4'Jivered. A part of such
a coll!wnt on his part that they should enter testimony-that which went to show that
thrnugh the B.g Chief shaft, and take the possei1sion was to be retained-was inad·
ore from the Maid of Erin claim; and the missi11le. "All conveyances of real e~tate
same proposition is submitted in the instruc- and of any intf>rest therein duly executed
tion given on behalf of defendants in place and delivered shall be held to carry with
of No. 7, refused. Th~e instructions on them the right to immediate possession of
that point, we think, wne correct, and fairly the premhrns or interest conveyed, unless a
submiltecl to the jury the question of license future day for the possession is therein specior consent. ·And it is evident from the ver- lleil." Gen. St. c. 18, § 9; Drake v. Root, 2
dict that the jury found against any such Colo.·685. Under the statute, it is certainly
license or constlnt; and, the jury having so required that the intention to postpone the
fou11d, it would s"em unnecessary to deter- operati•>n of a deeil shall be declar4'd in the
mine whether the instruct.ions were correct _instrnment, and it cannot be proved by parol.
or othet·wise in regard to the extent sncb con· It follows that the instructions of the court
sent, if found, should affect or modify the on this point were in part erroneous; that
amount; Ol', in other words, whether it should part of the t•·stirnony going to prove that
cover the whole taking of ore, or be confined possession of the property was ne\'er delivto the one-sixteenth owned by Tabor. 'Ihe ered, and remained in the grantors, was
jury having found no consent or license on clearly competent and proper; and the inthe part or Tabor, defendants could noL uo structions of the court were proper on that
pn•j 111liced IJy the instructions of the court in point.
re~:ml to its effect, if it were found.
The admission in evidence of the deeds of
'l'he question is quite different from what reconvcyance by the Henriett Mining Comit wo11ld be if it related to a transaction i~ pany and the assignment of Uhler of his
the on.linal'y course of business ri•lative to cause of action was. not erron':lous, and
the joint property of tennnts in. common. should be s11slained,-tht1 former investing
Uere it is attempted to justify a tort, and plaintiffs with full title before the comthe injury to the entire prop(•rty by the sup- rnenc...ment of suit; and of the validitv of
posed license of one joint owner. If the en- the latter, so ns to enable Moffatt, assignee,
try hail been maile by Tabor in person, and to succeed. to all the r:ghts of his assignor.
the wrongs attempted to be JUStitied under there can be no question tm1ler our statute.
permission from, had been done by, him, his Had defendants, by proper and comµetent
co-tenants could have had ngainst !Jim the testimony, atiempted to prove the ownersame actions at law for injuries to their in- ship of one-half of the Maid of Erin claim in
terests that all aie attemvtiug to enforce the Hen·iiett Company, it would have been
11gainst parties having no interest. It is inadmissi11le. There was no atteruped justiht'ld "an actian on the case sounding in tort llcat on of entrv of Wi!:ht and others unmay be maintained by one tenant in common dei· the Henriett title of one-half. Under a
against his cu-tenant for a mhrnse of the cum- plea that the close upon which the alleged
nion property, though not amounting to a trespass was committed was not at that
total destruction of it." .McLellan v. J Pn- time the close of the plaintiff, the defrndant
ness, 43 Vt. ltl3; Agnew v. John~on, 17 Pa. may show lawful right to the possesi;ion of
St. 37J ; Lowe v. Miller, 3 Grat. 205. And, the close in a third person, undel' whom he
if one tenant in common assume to own and claims to ha ve acted. .Jones v. Chapman, 2
sell the thing held iu comuion, the othrr may Exch. 803. But a bare tort.fensor can not
mamtain an action of trover against him. st•t up in defense the t;tle of a third person
Burbank v. C1·ooker, 7 Gr;iy, 159; Wheeler between whom and himself there is no privBranch v. Doane, 18
itv of connection.
v. Wheeler, 33 Me. 347; Coursin's Apµeal,
79 Pa. ~t. 220; White v. O~burn, 21 Wt>nd. C~mn. 238. Jn justifying ~inder a third per72; ::..myth v. Tankersley, 20 Ala. 212• . 'l'he son, the defendant must show both the title
authority of the tenant in common could not aud the po:.se:;a.011 of that person, (C)lambers
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v. Donaldson, 11 East, 65; Merrill v. Bur-

bank, 23 Me. 538; Reed v. Price, 30 Mo.

442,) and that the acts were done by that

person's authority. (Dunlap v. Glidden, 31

Me. 510.) A defendant can only justify up-

on the ground of a better right or title than

the plamtiﬂs have.

And it has been held ,

that mere naked possession, however ac- -

quired, is good as against a person having

no right to the possession. Knapp v. Win-

I and gave a receipt.

chester, 11 Vt. 351; Haslem v. Lockwood, ‘

87 Conn. 500; Cook v. Patterson, 35 Ala.

102. It will be apparent that in the judg-

ment of this court the effort of defendants

to set up title to half of the property in the

Maid of Erin claim in the Hennett Company,

without a plea to that effect, and attempt-
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ing to show privity or attempting to justify

under it, was unwarranted in law, and that

no testimony should have been taken in

support of any such attempted defense.

Another defense interposed, which seems

incompatible with the former, was that cer-

tain parties, named in the answer, were the

owners of the Vanderbilt claim, and that

such claim conﬂicted with and comprised a

part of the Maid of Erin claim, and that the

claim was in the possession of the owners

named under claim and color of title; and

that the ground from which the ore was tak-

en was in conliict between the owners of the

claim, and that divers suits in regard to the

same were pending and undetermined; that

Wight and othe1s, while engaged in mining

the Vanderbilt claim, took the ores from the

ground in controversy, which defendants

bought as Vanderbilt ore; and that the same

was taken by the owners of such claim while

the locus was in their possession under color

of title. it is shown in evidence that there

were two entries on the property in contro-

versy,—the ﬁrst by Wight, one of the owners

of the Big Chief in 1882. after the Maid of

Erin had a receiver‘s receipt from the United

States land-oilice, when a drift was run from

the Big Chief shaft for the Maid of Erin,

and was run over the line 20 or 28 feet, in-

lo the Maid of Erin ground. The second

entry was by the s:une party and others, in

the same way, and upon the same g1ound.

Neither entry was made by extending the

work of the Vanderbilt claim to its exterior

limits, and thus entering the Maid of Erin

property. The party entering and partici-

pating in the proceeds of the ores mined

were not the owners of the Vanderbilt, but

seems to have been one made up for the occa-

siun,—part of the owners of the Vanderbilt,

some of the owners of the Big Chief, and, per-

haps, parties owning in neither. 'l‘he plain-

tiﬂs pleaded title to the Maid of Erin claim

from the government of the United States,

and put in evidence a receiver's receipt for

the purchase of the property, of date Novem-

ber 23, 1881, and a patent from the United

States government dated March 17, 1884.
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v. Donaldson, 11 East, 65; Merrill v~ Bur• and in courts of hiw is evidence of the true
bank, 28 Me. S.'38; Reed v. Price, SO Mo. performance of every prerequh1ite to its is442,) and that the acts were done by that suance, and cannot be questioned either in
person's authorlLy. (Dunlap v. Glidden, 81 court.> of law or equity, except upon grountl
Me. 510.) A defendant can only justify up- of fraud or mi11take, and, if not assailed for
on the ground of a better right or title than fraud or mistake, is conclusive evidence of
the pJamtitla have. And it has been held title. On the23d of November, 1881, thegovthat mere naked possession, however ac- ernml'nt parlell with its title to the Maid of
quil'f'd, is good a.'I against a person having ' Erin property, sold it to Tabor and Du Bois,
no right to tht' possession. Knapp v. Win- and gave a receipt. The government could
chester, 11 Vt. a;;1; Haslem v. LockwoocJ, thereafter no more dispostl of the land th;m
37 Conn. 500; Urok v. Patterson, 85 Ala. if a patent had been issued. "The llnnl certiftcate obtained on the payment of the money
l{)"~. It will be apparent that in the judgment of this <'011rt the etTort of dl:'fendants Is as binding on the governwent as the patto set up title to half of the property in the ent. • • • When the patent issues it
Maid of Erin claim in the Hennett Company, relates back to the entrv. • • •" ARwithout a plea to that e11ect, and attempt- trom v. Hammond, 8.McLean,107; 2 Blaching to show pr1vity or attempting to j11~t1fy ley v. Coles, 6 Colo. 350; Poire v. Wells, Id.
under it, wns unwllrranted in law, and that 406; Steel v. Smallin~ Co., 106 U. S. 447. 1
no testimony should have been taken in Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; HeydenMdt v • .Mining
Co., 93 U.S. 634. The patent does not insupport of any such attempted defense.
Another defense interposed, which seems vest the purchaser with any additional prop.incompatible with the former, was that cer- erty in the land. It only gives him better legal
tain parties, named In the answer, were the evidt'nce of the title which he first acquired
owners of the Vanderbilt claim, and that by the certiHcate. Cavender v. Smith, 5
such claim confticted with and comprised a Cluri<e, (Iowa,) 189; Id. 3G. Green, 349; Arpart of the Maid of Erin claim, and that the nold v. Grimes, 2 Clarke, (Iowa,) l; Carroll
claim w11s in the posst>ssion of the owners v·. Salford, 8 How. 460; B11gnell v. Brodernamed under claim and color of title; 11nd ick, 13 P11t. 450; Carman v. Johnson, 29
that the ground from which the ore was tak- .Mo. 9i; Hutchings v. Low, 15 Wall. 88. A
en was in conftict betwePn the owner.i of the patent title cannot be attacked collnterally.
<'!aim, and that divers suits In regard to the "Individuals cnn resist the conclw;ivenessof
same were pending and undetel'mined; that the patent only by showing that it conllicts
Wight and others, while engag..d in mining with prior rights vested in them." Boggs
the Vanderbilt claim, took the or1•s from the v. Mining Co., 14 Cal. 362; Leese v. Clark,
ground in controversy, which defendants 18 Cal. 555; Jackson v. L1,wton, 10 Johns.
bought as Vanderbilt ore; and that the same 24. An "adverse possession" is delined to
was taken by the owners of such claim while ht! the t-njoyment or land, or such !'state as
the lucus was in thefr possPssion undel' color lies in grant, under such circumstances as
of title. lt is shown in evidence that there lndic11t11 that such enjoyment has been comwere two entries on the pt'operty in conlro- menced and continued unde1· assel'tion or colt•r
versy,-the llrst by Wight, one of the owners of right on the part of the possessor. Walof the Big Chief in 11;82, after the Maid of lace v. Duffield, 2 Serg. & H. 527; }'rench
Erin had a receivl'r's receipt from the United v. Pearct'I, 8 Conn. 440; Smith v. Burtis, 9
States land-office, when a drift was run from Johns. 174. The entry of a stranger, and
the Big Chief shaft for the Maid of Erin, the taking of rents or profits by him, is
and was run over the line 20 or 28 feet, In- not an adverse possession. When two parties
to the Maid of Erin ground. 1.'he St'C•>nd are in possession, the law adjudges it to be
entry was by the same party and others, in the posses~ion of the party who ha.'! the
the Mame way, anti upon the same ground. ri~ht. Heading v. Hawsterne, 2 Ld. lrnym.
:Neither entry was ma•le by extending the 82J; Ifarr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213; Smith v.
work of the Vanderbilt, claim to its exterior B11rLi:1, 6 Johns. 218: Stevens v. llullister, 18
limits, 11nd thus entering the Maid of Erin Vt. 29!; Brimmer v. Long Wharf, 5 Pick.
property. The party entering and partici- 131. Possellsion, to ho supported by the la",
pating in the proceeds of the ores mined must be under a claim of right, and adverse
Wl're not the owners of the Vanderbilt, but possession must he strictly proved. Grube
B!lf'ms to have been one made up for the occa- v. Wells, 84 Iowa, 150. '.rhe color must
sion,- part of the owners of the Vanderbilt, arise out of some conveyance purporting to
some ol the ownt!rs of the Big Chief, and, per- convey title to a tract of laud. a Washb.
h11ps, parties owning in neither. The plain· Ut'al Prop. 155; Shackleford v. Bailey, 85
titrs pleaded title to the Maid of Erin claim Ill. 391.
from the government of the United States,
'l'he title of the Maid of Erin claim was in
and put in evidence a receiver's receipt for the goyernment of the United States until
the J•Urchase of the property, of date .N"ovem- din•:ited by its own act. 'fhere could be no
ber 23, 1881, and a patent from the United adversll possession against the government.
States government dated March 17, 1884. The claim1mts of the Vanderbilt claim enIt has been frequently held that a patPnt for teretl u11tler license only from the governland emanating from thl' government of the
Uuitt!d ::States is the highest evidence of title,
s Fed. Caa. No. 596.
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ment. Admitting, for the purposes of this

case. that the entry under the license was

legal, that they had complied with the laws

of congress and the state, and that their pos-

session extended toand was protected to their

evtenor lines while the fee remained in the

government, when the fee passed from the

government to the other party conveying the

locus, before that time in controversy, the

supposed license was revoked, and all acts

and declarations of the parties themselves,

whether by record or otherwise, as estab-

hshing a possessory right, were void as

against the grantees of the government,

and there could be no entry under color of

title, except by some right by conveyance

either from the government or its grantees.

The fact of the actual possession and occu-
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pancy of the Maid of Erin by plaintiffs was

not seriously disputed, and the testimony

was ample to warrant the jury in ﬁnding the

fact. The government had granted thel 'nd

previous to the entry of Wight and others,

and that such possession under a legal title

was co-extensive with its bounds is so well

settled that authorities in its support are un-

necessary.

We do not think the court erred in refusing

to admit the testimony offered in support of

possessory title of the Vandrrbilt in the land

from which the ore was taken. nor in re-

fusing the testimony in reference to litigation

and suits pending between the parties.

Neither the title nor right of possession of

plaiutiffs could he attacked collaterally as at-

tempted, and the testimony offered under

the law as shown above was incompetent and

inadmissible to prove either adverse pos-

session or color of title. From our view of

the law controlling the case, as stated above,

it follows that the court did not err in re-

fusing the instructions asked on this point

by the defendants, or in giving those which

were given. They were substantially correct.

The sale of ore by Wight and others, and

purchase by the defendants. was a conver-

sion. A “conversion" is di-ﬁned to be any

act of the defendant inconsstent with the

plaintill"s ri;:ht of possession, or subversive

of h.s right of property. Harris v. Saunders,

2 5trob. Eq. 370. note; Webher v. Davis, 44

Me. 147; Gdman v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311: Clark

v. Wlnlaker, 19 Conn. 319. The defend-

ants, by purchasing the ore, acquired no

title, and are consequently equally liable for

its conversion as the parties who sold it.

Clark v. Wi-lls, 45 Vt. 4; Clark v. ltideout,

39 N. II. 238; Carter v. Kingman, 103 Mass.

517. And it was a matter of no importance,

so far as the legal liability of defendants was

, concernel, whether they were ignorant or

' informed of the true ownership. Morr|ll v.

Moulton. 4U Vt. 242; Johnson v. Powers, Id.

611; Railroad Co. v. Car-Works Co.'. 32 N.

J. Law, 517; Dixon v. Caldwell, 15 Ohio St.

412; Hoffman v. Carow. 22 Wend. 285. The

principle caoeut emptur applies. A person

•
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ment. Admitting, for the purposes of this title ls, does so at his peril, and, although
case, thaL the entry under the license was honestly mistaken, will be liable to the ownt>r
l('gnl, that they had complied with the laws for a conversion. Taylor v. Pope, 5 Colet.
<>f congress and the state, and that tll('ir pos- 413; Gilmore v. Newlon, 9 Alltin, 171;
s~ssion extended to and was protected to their
8praights v. Hawley, 39 N. Y. 441.
exterior lines while the fee remained in the ) The question of the proper measure ot
government, when the fee passed from the , damages is one of much greater difficulty.
gowrn ment to the other party conveying the : "\Ve can find no conclusive adjudication in our
lucus, before that time in controversy, the own court. The decisions of the different
suppose<l license was revoked, and all nets states are conHicting and irreroncllaule. Alanli declamtions ot the pa1·ties themselves,
though, under our Co<le, different forms of
wlu•ther by record <>r othel'wise, as estab- action are abolished, the principles controlling
lishing a po:is6llsory right, were void as the uitfe1·ent 1&ct1ons remain the same as beagaiust the grantees of the government, fore its adoption. Consequently the law apand there could be no entry under color of plicable and to be administf'red in each case
title, except by some right by conveyance depends llS much as formerly upon the nateither from the government or its grantees. ure of the case,-the allegations and the disThe fact of the actual possession and occu- tincti ve fol'm the case assumes. In many
pancy of the Maid of Erin by plaintiffs was states thti courts have attempted in this acnot seriously dispntej}, and the testimony tion to make the rule of damage correspond
was ample to warrant the jury in finding the to that in the action of trespass, and make it
fact. The govt'rnment had grnnted the l 1nd In that respect as full and complete a remedy.
previous to the entry of Wight and others, Io the state of New York it was long hPld ,
and that such pos~es8ion under a legal title and perhaps still is, that the increased value
was co-extensive with its bounds is so well of the propetty, ad<led by the labo1· and acts
settled that authorities in its support are un- ot defendant, belongs to the rightful owner ·
of the property, and the value of the propPrty ·
necessary.
We do not think the con rt erred in refusing in its new and improved state thus becomes ,
to admit thP testimony offered in support of the measure of damages, but the doctrine
possessory title of the Vand.. rbilt in the land has been questioned and severely critfrised
from which the ore was taken, nor in re- in the same state. Brown v. Sax, 7 Cow. ~5.
fusing the testimony in refert'nce to litig1ttion In trespKSs, damage for the whole injury, inand suits pending between the parties. cluding diminution in the value of lhe land
Neitht>r the title nor right of possession or by the entry and removal, as well as of tilt'
plaintiffs could he attacked collaterally as at- value ot the property removed, may be retempted, and the testimony offered under covered; and the charactp1· of the t>ntry,
the law as shown above was incompPtent and whether willful and malicious, or in good
inadmissible to prove flilher adverse pos- faith, through inadvertence or mistake, is an
81'89ion or color of title. ~'rom our view of important element.-an element that cannot
the law controlling the case, as stated above, enter into the action of trover. In trover,
it follows that the court did not err In re- thP specific articles cannot be recovered as in
fusing the instructions asked on this point replevin. Consequently th~ same rule as lo
by the defendants, or In giving those which inc1·eased value cannot be applied &!J in that
were given. Tht>y were su bstan tiaily corrl'ct. action, where the specitic property can be
The sale or ore by Wight and others, and followed, and, when identified, taken without
purchase by the tlefendants, was a con \·er- regartl to the form it has assumed. lt seems,
sion. A "conversion" is d··fined to be any on principle, therefo1·e, (and this is in haract of the defendant incons.stent with the mony with the English a11thoritiPS and those
plaintiff's riµht of possession, or subversive of many of the states,) that where a party ·
of h.s right of pruptirty. Harris v. Saurulers, makes his election, and adopts trover, the]
2 Strob. E'l. 370, note; Wt'bher v. Havis, 44 rule of damage is and should be proper com·
Me. H7; Gilman v. Hill, 36 .N. H. 311: Clark pensation for the property taken and con-·
v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. am. The defend- verted, regardlt>ss of the manner or Pntry and.
ants, by purchasing the ore, acquired no taking; and, where the chattel was severed
title, ant! are con1:1e'luently equally liable for from the realty, regardless of the diminished
its conversio>n a.'! the parties who sold it. value of the reaU.y by reason of the taking.
Clark v. w..11s, 45 Vt. 4; Clark v. Hideout, In other words, the true rule should be the
3::1.N. H. :.!38; <..:arter v. Kingman, toa Mass. value of the chattel as such when and where
517. And it was a matt.. rof no importance, first severed from the realty and becoming a
so far as the legal liability of defenJants was chattel. An examination of the authoriLies
conct'rne I, wht'ther they were ignorant or will show that the rule of damages to some
informed of the true ownership. Morrill v. extent depends upon the form of action,
Moulton, 4lJ Vt. 242; Johnson v. Powers, Id. -whether the action is for an injury to the
till; H.ailruad Co. v. Car-Works Co:. 32 N. land itself. or for the conversion or a chattel
J. Law, 517; Dixon v. Caldwt'll, 15 Ohio St. which had been severed from the land. Thia
412; Hoffman v. C..:arow, 22 Wt'nJ. 285. 'fhe distinction seems well founded in principle
lJl• nciple caf>t!llt em11for applies. A person and rf'ason. This view of llie law is suppurchasing property of the party In pos~e.s ported by Martin v. Porter, 5 Mees. & W. 352;
aioo, wiLllout ascertaining wlle1·e the true Wild v. Holt, 9 Mi=es. & W. 672; Morgan"·
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Powell. 8 Q. B. 278; Hilton v. Woods, L. R.
4 Eq. 482; Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 806;
Goller Y. Fett, 30 Cal. 481; Coleman's Appeal,

Powell, 8 Q. B. 278; Hilton v. Woods, L. R.

4 Eq. 432; Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306;

Goller v. Felt. 30 Cal. 481; Coleman's Appeal.

62 Pa. St. 252; Cushing v. Longfellow, 26

Me. 306; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291;

Kier v. Peterson, Id. 857; Moody v. Whit-

ney, 38 Me. 174. We are therefore of the

opinion that the rule of damage adopted, and

the instructions of the court as to the meas-

ure of damage, were erroneous, and that it

should have been the value of the ore sold, as

shown. less the reasonable and proper cost of

raising it from the mine after it was broken,

and hauling from the mine to the defendants'

place of business.

sary to decide whether or not plaintiffs‘ coun-

sel, by stating in the complaint that the ore

taken and converted was of a certain value

“over and above the cost of mining, digging. .
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and extracting the same from the ground,

raising the same to the surface, hauling the ‘

same to thedefendants' reduction works. and -

the cost of treating the same," and det'end- '

ants taking issue upon it, precluded them

from proving and taking greater damage

upon the trial; but if it were necessary, for

the purpose of determining this case, we

should be inclined to so hold. In this action

value is a material averment, and the plain-

tiffs have deliberately asserted one rule, and,

issue having been taken upon it, should not

be permitted to change base. and adopt upon

trial another more disadvantageous to the de-

fendants. In this case it could not have

been said the evidence was in support of the

allegation or directed to an issue. The testi-

mony should have been directed to the issue,

or the pleadings amended.

Counsel for appellees. after obtaining leave

from this court, assigned for cross-error the

refusal of the court to allow interest on the

amount found due from the time of the con-

version, and the instruction of the court on

that point. It is true, as stated by the learned

judge, “that interest in this state is a creat-

ure ol' statute. and regulated thereby; that it

, is only recoverable in the absence of contract

in cases enumerated in the statute; and that

damages to property arising from a wrong or

negligence of the defendants is not one of the

enumerated cases." This could not come

under the last clause of the instruction. It

is not for damage to property. It is for the

wron'_-ful detention of money belonging to

plaintiffs. It is I-learly distinguishable from

Railroad Co. v. Conway, 8 Colo. 1. 5 Pac.

Rep. 142, and Hawley v. Barker, 5 Colo. 118. .

There does not appear to have been any de-

cision in this state directly on the question

presented.

We do not ﬁnd it neces- ‘

The same statute has been con- i

strued in Illinois (from which state it was

taken)as allowing interestin this class ofcuses

from the time of the conversion, and there

has been an unbroken line of decisions in

that state from Bradley v. Geiselman, 22 Ill.

494, to llailroad Co. v. Cobb, 72 I1]. 148, in

62 Pa. St. 252; Cushing v. Longfellow, 26
Me. 806; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291;
Kier v. Peterson, Id. 857; Moody v. Whitney, 38 Me. 174. We are therefore of the
opinion that the rule of damage 11dopteJ, and
the instructions of the court as to the measure of damage, were erroneous, and that it
hould have been the value of the ore sold, as
shown. less the reasonable and proper cost of
raising it from the wine after it was broken,
and hnu llng from the mine to the defendant!!-'
place of business. We do not find it necesary to decide whether or not plaintift's' rouneel, by stating in the complaint that the ore
taken and converled wwi of a certain \'1tlue
"over and above the cost of mining, digging,
amt extracting the same from the Jt'Wllnd,
raising the same to the surface, hauling the
same to lhe 1lefendants' reduction works, and
the cost of treating the same," nnd dt-fendants laking issue upon it, lireeluded them
from proving and taking grt'ater damage
upon the trial; but if it were ne<lt'seary, for
the purpose of determining this rase, we
should be inclined to so bold. Iu this action
value is a material averment, and thl' plaintift"s have deliberately asserted one rult', and,
issue having been taken upon it, should not
be permitted to change base. and adoj.Jt upon
trial another more disadvantageous to thedefflndant.s. In this c11se it could not have
been said the evidence was in support of the
allegation or directed to an issue. 'fltt1 tl'8timony should have been directed to the is:tue,
or the pleadings amended.
Counsel for appell~. after obtaining leave
from this court, assigned for cross-error the
refusal of the court to 11llow lntert'St on the
amount found due from the time of the conVt'rsion, and the Inst.ruction of the court on
that JlOint. It is true, as stated by the learned
judg8, "that Interest lo this st11te is a creature of statute. and regulatt'd therelJy; that it
. is only recoverable in the absl'nce of contract
in cases enumeratl'd in the statute; and that
damages to pl'Operty arising from a wrong or
nei.cligenct' of the defendants is not one of the
enumerated cases." This could not come
under the last clause of the instruction. It
is not for damage to prop..rty. It is for the
wroni.:ful detention of money belonging to
plaintiffs. It is dearly distingnishalJle from
.Railro;1d Co. v. Conway, 8 Colo. 1. 5 PllC.
&>p. 142, and Hawley v. Barker, 5 Colo.118.
There does not appear to have bPen any deeision in this statt' directly ou the question
pre.tented. 'fhe iiame statute has been con-

q

1

strued in Illinois (from which state it was
taken)as allowing interest in this class of cm1f'S
from the time of the convert1ion, nnd thne
baa been an unbroken line or decisions in
that state from Brndley v. Gefs..Jman, 2:! Ill.
494, to Haill'Oad Co. v. ColJb, 72 lll. 14::!, in
which it. is said, reviewing the dedsiorn~:
"The doctrine established by these authorities is, where property has been wrongfully
taken orcon\lerted into money, and an acti.1n
of trespa.'ls or tro\'er may be maintained, interest may properly be recovered; and this
is based upon the statute which 1tuthorh:es
interest when there has been an unrea.~on
at.le and vP.xalio11s delay of paym1mt. ThPre
can be no difference between the delnyof payment of a moneyllemand an•I one wh' re property has been wrongfully lakt>n, or taktm anti
converted into ruoney or its equivalent. '.Fite
two rest upon the same principle." The rule
is that wl1en the statute of another state is
adopted the construction o! the ijtatnte in
that state le also adopt•·d, and remains the
true construction until authoritativelv construed by the courts of the state a1lopting it.
The gener1tl rule in trover is that Lim 1h1111Bftes should emhracA the value oC the prop·
erty at the timA of the convt'111ion, with interest up to the time of judgment, anJ this
1·uu, has bt'en fol1ow1•ll in auuusL ii 11ot all
the stntes, and seems right on pa·i nciple. nut
our statute does not seem to have ri-ct>ivetl
the same construction here as in thP elate uf
Illinois. While In that state it 111\.'i heen p11t
plainly and squarely as lntereitt u11der t.he
statute. in our state dama~e for the dt't1•11tion
of thti money equal to the Ieical inLert'st 11 pon
the value of the chattels converted from the
t.ime of the conversion has been allowetl, not
as inter~t. but as damaire. .Machetta v.
W imle~s. 2 Colo. 170; Hanauer v. Bartels, Id.
514; 'fucker v.l'arks, 7 Colo. ti2, l l'ac. Hep.
427. WethinkthecourtPrre<lin its in:1trnc·
hons to the Jnryon this point. They should
ha\'e been instructed to add to the amount
found as t.he value of the or,., as further '
damage, a sum equal to legal intt>re~t on the
s11me from the time of the conversion. }'or
the errors in llllSe!!slng the damage, the C11lle
should be reversed, and reman led for a nt'W
t1ial in accordance with the views herein expressed.
HICHMOND and PATTISO::-i, CC., concur.

PER CURI AM. For the rea!lon11 11tatl'd
in the fort"going opinion the juJg.ment i11 reversed.
Reversed.
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(1 Sup. Ct. 898, 106 U. S. 482.)

E. E. BOLLES WOODEN WARE CO. v.

UNITED STATES.

(1 Sup. Ct. 398, 106 U. S. 432.)

Supreme Court of theslélnited States. Dec. 18,

1 2.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Eastern District of Wiscon-

sin. ’

Samuel Hastings, Jr., for plaintif f in

error.

Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 18,
1882.
In Error to the Circuit Co11rt of the United
States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
'
Samuel D. Hastings, Jr., for plalntur ID
error.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for defendant In
error.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for defendant in

error.

MILLER, J. This is a writ of error to

the circuit court for the eastern district of

Wisconsin, founded on a certiﬁcate of di-

vision of opinion between the judges holding

that court. The facts, as certiﬁed, out of

which this difference of opinion arose ap-

pear in an action in the nature of trover,
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brought by the United States for the value

f 242 cords of ash timber, or wood suitable

for manufacturing purposes, cut and re-

moved from that part of the public lands

known as the reservation of the Oneida tribe

( of Indians. in the state of Wisconsin. This

, timber was knowingly and wrongfully taken

‘from the land by Indians, and carried by

them some distance to the town of Depere,

and there sold to the E. E. Bolies Wood-

Ware Company, the defendant, which was

not chargeable with any intentional wrong

or misconduct or bad faith in the purchase.

The timber on the ground, after it was felled,

was worth 25 cents per cord, or $60.71 for

the whole, and, at the town of Depere. where

defendant bought and received it, $3.50 per

cord, or $850 for the whole quantity. The

question on which the judges divided was

whether the liability of the defendant should

be measured by the ﬁrst or the last of these

valuations. It was the opinion of the circuit

judge that the latter was the proper rule of

damages, and judgment was rendered

against the defendant for that sum. We

cannot follow counsel for the plaintiff in er-

ror through the examination of all the cases,

both in England and this country, which his

commendable research has enabled him to

place upon the brief. In the English courts

the decisions have in the main grown out of

coal taken from the mine. and in such cases

the principle seems to be established in those

courts that when suit is brought for the

value of the coal so taken. and it has been

the result of an honest mistake as to the

true ownership of the mine, and. the taking

was not a willful trespass, the rule of dam-

l ages is the value of the coal as it was in the

mine before it was disturbed, and not its

value when dug out and delivered at the

mouth of the mine. Martin v. Porter, 5

Mees. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 Adol.

& E. (N. 8.) 2'8; Wood v. Morewood. 3 Adol.

& E. 440; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 438;

Jegon v. Vivian, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 760.

. . The doctrine of the English courts on

this subject is probably as well stated by

Lord Hatherly in the house of lords, in the

MILLER, J. This ls a writ of error to
the ch-cult court for the eastern district of
Wlscon11ln, founded on a certificate of division of opinion between the judges holding
that court. The facts, u cert11!.ed, out of
which this dHrerence of opinion arose apear In an action In the nature of trover,
brought by the United States for the value
f 242 cords of ash timber, or wood suitable
tor manufacturing purposes, ~t and re-moved from that part of the public lands
known as the reservaflon of the Oneida tribe
( ot Indians. In the state of Wisconsin. Tbls
, timber was knowingly and wrongfully taken
"from the land by Indians, a.nd carried by
them some distance to the town of Depere,
and there sold to the E. E. Bolles WoodWare Company, the defendant, which was
not chargeable with any intentional wrong
or misconduct or bad faith in the purchaee.
The timber on the ground, after it was felled,
1 was worth 25 cents per cord, or $00.71 for
the whole, and, at the town of Depere, where
defendant bought and received It, $3.50 per
cord, or $850 for the whole quantity. The
question on which the judges divided was
whether the llablllty of the defendant should
\ be measured by the ftrst or the last of these
valuations. It was the opinion of the circuit
judge that the latter was the proper rule of
damages, and judgment was rendered
against the defendant for that sum. We
cannot follow counsel for the plalntltf In error through the examination of all the cases,
both in England and this country, which his
commendable research haA enabled him to
place upon the brief. In the English courts
the decisions have In the main grown out of
coal taken from the mine. and In such cases
the principle seems to be established In those
courts that when suit Is brought tor the
n1lue of the coal so taken. and It bas been
the result of an honest mistake as to the
tn1e ownership of the mine, and the taking
wns not 11 willful trespass, the rule ot dam, ages Is the value of the coal as lt was In the
mine before it was disturbed, and not Its
value when dug out and delivered at the
mouth ot the mine. Martin v. Porter, 5
Mees. & W. 3!il; Morjtan v. Powell. 3 Ado!.
& E. (:S. S.) 278; Wood v. Morewood. a Adol.
& E. 440; Hilton v. Woode, L. R. 4 Eq. 438;
.Jegou v. Vivino, J,. R. 6 Ch. App. 700.

~

1

The doctrine of the English courts on
ibis s~bject le probably as ·well stated by
Lord Hatherly In the house of lords, in the
Cl\lle of Livingston T. Coal Co., L. R. 5 App.
Cas. 33, as anywhere else. He said: "There
ls no doubt that If a man furtively. and in
bad faith, robs hie neighbor of his property,
and because it ls underground is probably
for some little time not detected, the court ot
equity in tbi11 country will struggle, or I
would rather say, will usert its authority,
to punish the fraud by ilxlng the person wltll
tbe value of the whole of the property which
he has so furtively taken, and making him
no allowance In respect of what he has so
done, as would have been justly made to
him if the parties had been working by
agreement." But "when once we arrive at
the tact that a.n Inadvertence has been the
cause of the misfortune, then the simple
course Is to make every just allowance for
outlay on the part of the person who has so
acquired the property, and to give back to
the owner, so far as Is possible under the
circumstances of the case, the full value of
that which cannot be restored to him In
specie."
There seems to us to be no doubt that In
the case of a wlllful trespass the rule as
stated above ls the law of damages both In
England and In this country, though In some
of the state courts the milder rule has been
applied even to this class of cases. Such are
some that are cited from Wisconsin. Single
v. Schnelder, 24 Wis. 299; Weymouth v. Rall·
road Co., 17 Wis. 567. On the other hand.
the weight ot authority In this country as
well as In England favors the doctrine that
where the trespass ls the result of Inadvertence or mistake, and the wrong was not ,
lntentlona.l, the value ot the property when
first taken must govern, or it the conve1·s!o11
sued for was after vnlue had been added t9
It by the work of the defendant, he should
be credited with thl!! addition. Winchester
v. Craig, 33 Mich. 20:;, contains a full examination of the authorities on the point.
Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 236; Baker v.
Wheeler, 8 Wend. 500; Baldwin v. Porter.
12 Conn. 484. While these principles are
sutflclent to enable us to fix a measure of
damages In both classes of torts where the
orlgina.l trespasser Is defendant. there remains a third class where a purebaser from
him Is sued, as In this case, for the conversion of the property to his own use. ID such
case, lf the first taker ot the llroperty wertgullty of no wlllful wrong, the rule cnn In
no case be more stringent against the defendant who purchased of him than agnln1:1t
bis vendor.
But the case before us la one where, by
reason ot the willful wrong of the pa1-ty who
committed the trespll88, he was liable, under
the rule we have eu1>posed to be established,
for the value ot the timber at Depere the
:uomeut before he sold It, and the question
to be decldl'd le whether the defeudnnt who

l:\.ICltlES TO
I.\'.iijlilES T0 REAL P.R0l'El.{'l‘\'.
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purchased it then with no notice that the'

property belonged to the United States, and

with no intention to do wrong, must respond

by the same rule of damages as his vendor

should if he had been sued. It seems to us

that he must. The timber at all stages of

the conversion was the property of plaintiff.

its purchase by defendant did not divest the

title nor the right of posseslon. The recov-

ery of any sum whatever is based upon that

proposition. This right, at the moment pre-

ceding the purchase by defendant at Depere,

was perfect, with no right in any one to set

up a claim for work and labor bestowed on

it by the wrong-doer. It is also plain that

by purchase from the wrong-doer defendant

did not acquire any better title to the prop-

erty than his vendor had. It is not a case

where an innocent purchaser can defend
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himself under that plea. If it were, he would ,

, fendant was the innocent purchaser of the

be liable to no damages at all, and no re-

covery could be had. On the contrary, it is

a case to which the doctrine of caveat,

‘ a market was the largest item in their value

emptor applies, and hence the right of re

covery in plaintiff. On what ground, then,

can it be maintained, that the right to re-

cover against him should not be just what it

was against his vendor the moment before

he interfered and acquired possession? If

the case were one which concerned addition-

al value placed upon the property by the

work or labor of the defendant after he had

purchased, the same rule might be applied as

in case of the inadvertent trespasser. But

here he has added nothing to its value. He

acquired possession of property of the .United

States at Depere. which, at that place, and in

its then condition, is worth $850, and he

wants to satisfy the claim of the government

by the payment of $60. He founds his right

to do this. not on the ground that anything

he has added to the property has increased

its value by the amount of the difference be-

tween these two sums, but on the proposition

that in purchasing the property, he pur-

chased of the wrong-doer a right to deduct

what the labor of the latter had added to its

value.

If, as in the case of an unintentional tres-

passer, such right existed, of course defend-

ant would have bought it and stood in his

shoes; but, as in the present case, of an in-

tentional trespasser, who had no such right

to sell, the defendant could purchase none.

Such b the distinction taken in the Roman

law as stated in the Inst. Just. lib. 2, tit. 1,

§ 34.

After speaking of a painting by one man

on the tablet of another, and holding it to

LA “' DA\I.2d Ed.—26

be absurd that the work of an Appelles or

Parrhasins should go without compensation

to the owner of a worthless tablet, if the

painter had possession fairly, he says, as

translated by Dr. Cooper: “But if he, or any

other, shall have taken away the tablet felo-
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purchased It then with no notice that the·
property belonged to the United States, and
wlth no intention to do wrong, must respond
by the same rule ot damages as his vendor
should It he had been sued. It seems to us
thnt he must. The timber at all stages of
the conversion was the property of plalntUr.
Its purchase by defendant did not divest the
title nor the right ot possession. The recovery or any sum whatever le based upon that
proposition. This right, at the moment preceding the purchase by detentlant at Depere,
was perfect, with no right In auy one to set
up a claim for work antl labor bestowed on
It by the wrong-doer. It Is also plain that
by purchase from the wrong-doer defendant
did not acquire any better title to the property than his vendor had. It Is not a case
where an Innocent purchaser can defend
himself under that plea. It 1t were, he would
be liable to no tlamages at all, and no recoyery could be had. On the contrary, It Is
a case to which the doctrine of caveat
emptor applies, and hence the 1ight or recovery In plalntllr. On what ground. then,
ren It be maintained. that the right to recover against him should not be just what 1t
was against bis vendor the moment bctore
he Interfered and acquired possession? It
the case were one which concerned additional value placed upon the property by the
work or labor or the defendant alter he had
purchased, the same rule might be applled as
in case of the Inadvertent trespasser. But
here be has added nothing to Its value. He
acquired possession of property of the ,United
States at Depere, which, at that place, and In
Its then condition, is worth $850, and he
wants to satisfy the claim of the government
by the payment of $60. He founds his right
to do tble. not on the ground that anything
he has added to the property has Increased
Its value by tbe amount of tile dltrerence between these two sums, but on the proposition
that In purchaBlng the property, he purd1n11ed of the wrong-doer a right to deduct
what the labor ot the latter had added to Its
value.
It, as in the case or an unintentional trespasser, eucb right existed, ot course defenclant would have bought It and stood In his
shoes; but, as In the present case, ot an Intentional trespasser, who had no such right
to sell, the defendant could purchase none.
Such Is the distinction taken In the Roman
law as stated In the Inst. Just. lib. 2, tit. 1,

l'ltOPEHTY .

4Ul

be absmd that the work of an Appelles or
Parrhasius should go without compensation
to the owner ot a worthless tablet, If the
painter had possession fairly, he says, as
translated by Dr. Cooper: "But If he, or any
othel', shall have taken away the tablet teloniously, It ls evident the owner may prosL'cute by action of thett."
The case of Nesbitt v. Lumber Oo.1 211\Ilnn.
491, ls directly In point here. The supreme
court of lllnnescita says: "Tbe defendant
claims that because they [the logs] were enhanced In value by the labor of the original
wrong-doer In cutting them, and the expense
of transporting them to Anoka, the plaintiff
ls not entitled to recover the enhanced value,
that Is, that he Is not entitled to recover the
lull value at the time and place of conversion."
'
That was a case, like this, where the defendant was the Innocent purchaser ot the
logs from the willful wrong-doer, and where,
as In this case, the trans1.10rtatlon of them to
a market was the largest Item In their value
at the time of conversion by defendant; but
the court overruled the proposition and aftinned a ju<lgment fo1· the value at .Anoka,
the place of sale. To es~ablish any other
principle In such a case 118 this would be
very dlsaBtrous to the interest of the public
in the Immense forest lands of the govern~
ment. It has long been a matter of complaint that the depredations upon these lauds
are rapidly destroying the finest forests In
the world. Unlike tbe Individual owner,
who, by fencing and vigilant attention, can
protect his valuable trees, the government
has no adequate defense against this great
evil. Its liberality In allowing tree~ to be cut
on Its land for mining, agricultmal, and other spec!Oed uses, ha.<J been used to screen
the lawless depredator who destroys and
sells for profit. To hold that when tile government fin<ls its own property In hands but
one remove from these wlllful trespassers.
and assel'ts Its right to such property by the
slow processes of the law, the holder can
set up a claim for the rnlue which has been
added to the property by the guilty party In
the net of cutting. down the trees and removing tbe timber, Is to give encouragement
and reward to the wrong-doer, by providing
a sate market for what he bas stolen and
compensation for the labor he bas been compelled to do to make his theft effectual and
pl'ofitable.
We concur with the circuit judge In thlR
• 34.
After speaking of a painting by one man I case, and the judgment of the circuit court
on the tablet of another, and holding It to ls affirmed.
L.\ W D.Ul.!!d Etl.- 26
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{judgment appealed from is both illegal and

GRIGGS v. DAY et al.

(32 N. E. 612, 136 N. Y. 152.)

Uourt of Appeals of New York. Nov. 29,

1892.

Appeal from superior court of New York

City. general term.

Action by Clark R. Griggs against Mel-

ville C. Day and another, as executors of

Cornelins K. Garrison, for an accounting

for transactions had between plaintiff and

said Garrison. From a judgment of a ref-

eree both parties appeal. For former re-

ports, see 11 N. Y. Supp. 885, 12 N. Y. Supp.

958, 18 N. Y. Supp. 796, and 19 N. Y. Supp.

1019. Reversed.

Melville O. Day and Esek Cowen, for ap-

pellants. John H. Post. for respondent.

EARL, C. J. This action was brought
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against Cornelins K. Garrison, since deceas-

ed, for an accounting. It was referred to

a referee. and he ordered judgment in favor

of the plaintiff for upwards of $188,000.

The record is very voluminous, and in the

briefs submitted and the arguments of coun-

sel many questions of law and fact were

presented for our consideration. A careful

study of the record has satisﬁed me that the

unjust. In September, 1879, the piaintiff

entered into a contract with the Wheeling

& Lake Erie Railroad Company, an Ohio

corporation, for the construction and equip-

ment of its line of railroad in that state

according to the speciﬁcations and upon the

terms and conditions mentioned in the con-

tract. By one of the provisions of the con-

tract the railroad company was "to furnish

the contractor available subscriptions, or pro-

eeds thereof, and aid, to the amount of

$4,000 per mile of main track, branches,

and sidings, or so much as may be neces-

sary to furnish right of way, grade, bridge,

and tie said railroad between Hudson's and

Martin's Ferry," a distance of 143 miles, and

“to use its best endeavors to secure for the

contractor available subscriptions and aid

to the extent of $4,000 per mile, or so much

as may be necessary," for a similar pur-

pose. as to the balance of the road, a distance

of 58 miles. For the performance of this '

contract, besides the aid to be furnYshed

as above stated, the plaintiff was to receive 1

bonds and stock of the company. He was

without ﬁnancial ability, and he applied to

Garrison for ﬁnancial aid to enable him to

perform his contract; and upon his appli-

cation Garrison, from time to time. advanc-

ed him large sums of money, amounting in

all, besides interest, to nearly $4,500.000. For

the money so advanced the plaintiff as-

signed and delivered to Garrison as collat-

eral security his construction contract and

bonds and stock of the company, and some

of it was repaid by the sales to him of bonds

and stock. In 1882 the plaintif f received

from the company for extra work claimed

to have been done by him. and on account

of its failure to perform the portions of the

t
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and stock. In 1'882 the plaintiff received
from the company for extra work claimed
(32 N. E. 612, 136 N. Y. 152.)
to have been done by him, and on account
of its failure to perform the portions ot the
Uourt of Appeals of New York. Nov. 29,
1892.
contmct above quoted, Its promissory notes,
Appeal from superior court ot New York amounting to $1,949,710.72, and they were
dellvered by him to Garrison for moneys adCity, gcneml term.
Action by Clark R. Griggs against Mel- vanced and to be advanced by him tor the
construction of the road. Garrison held
ville C. Day and another, as executors of
these notes until May, 1883, when there was
Cornelius K. Garrison, for an accounting
due to him for moneys advanced to the
tor transactions had between plalntllf and
said Garrison. From a judgment of a ref- plalntltT for the construction or the road
eree both parties appeal. For former re- nearly $2,500,000. He then received from the
company 2,280 of Its second mortgage bonds
ports, see 11 N. Y. Supp. 885, 12 N. Y. Supp.
of the denomination of $1,000, at 75 cents
9[,8, 18 N. Y. Supp. 796, and 19 N. Y. Supp.
on the dollar, amounting, with some Interest.
1019. Reversed.
to $1,736,000, to apply upon his claims, and
Melville C. Day nnd Esek Cowen, for ap- he then surrendered to It all of the abovepellants. John H. Post. for respondent.
mentioned promissory notes, and they were;
canceled. On the same day he caused au
EARL, C. J. This action was brought original entry to be made In his journal.against Cornelius K. Garrison, since deceas- one ot his account books,--as follows: "This
ed, for an accounting. It was referred to amount of notes and Interest. $2,002,643.13,
a referee, and he ordered judgment in favor taken from contractor at 75 per cent., $1,of the plaintllf tor upwards ot $188,000. 546,982.35." He then charged the company
'111~ record Is very voluminous, and In the
In his books of account with the whole
briefs submitted and the arguments of coun- amount of the notes and Interest. and gave
sel mnny questions ot law and fact were It credit for $1,736,000,-the price, Including
presented for our consideration. A careful Interest, at which lie took the second mortBtudy of the record has satisfied me that the gage bonds; and he credited the plalntlfr
judgment appealed from is both Illegal and with the sum of $1,546,982.35. The dltrerunjust. In September, 1879, the plalntur ence between the total amount due upon the
entered into a contract with the Wheeling notes and the amount allowed by him for
& Lake Erle Railroad Company, an Ohio the second mortgage bonds was $326,043.13.
corporatloo, for the construction and equip· and thus he had In hls hands, not used for
ment of lts llne of ru.llrond ln that state the payment of the bonds, the notes to tbnt
acrordlng to the s~lficatlons and upon the amount, which he then surrendered to the
terms and conditions mentioned In the con- company without any consideration what·
tract. By one ot the provisions of the con- ever; and, as the referee found, be elected
tract the railroad company was "to furnish to look to the company as his debtor on
the contractor available subscriptions, or pro- open account for that amount. The referee
~eds thereof, and ald, to the amount of
alB-O found that by reason of the surrender
\ '4.000 per mile of main track, branches, of the notes In consideration of the purcbast•
and sidings, or so much as may be neces- ot the bonds, and by reason of the surrender
sary to furnish right ot way, grade, bridge, of the balance of the notes, and by reusou
and tie said railroad between Hudson's and of the election before mentioned, Gan·ison
lllartln's Ferry," a distance of 143 miles, and discharged the Indebtedness of the plaintiff
"to use lts best endeavors to secure tor the to him to the amount ot the face value of
contractor available subscriptions and ald the notes at the time ot the surrender. H(•
to the extent of $4,000 per mile, or so much also found tbat the plaintlll"s rights us
as may be necessary," for a shnllar pur- pledgor In the construction contract. and In
P'-'B'.!. as to the balance of the road, a distance the bonds, stock, and other property trant1of 58 miles. For tbe performance of this ferrcd to Garrison as collateral security, were
contract, besides the aid to be tumt!-ihed never cut ofr by foreclosure of his rights, or
as above stated, the plalntllf was to receive In any other way. These fncts bavlng been
bonds and stock of the company. He was found by the referee, be found. among other
without financial ability, and he applied to conclusions of law, that the legal effect of
Garrison for financial aid to enable him to the surrender by Garrison to the rallroa41
perfol'm his contract; and upon his nppll- company of the promissory notes held br
catlon Garrison, from time to time, a<lva nc- him as collateral security for moneys at!·
vaneed to the plaintiff. and of the cbnrge
1 e(l him large sums of money, amounting in
1 all, ht>sides interest, to nearly $4.500.000. F()r by blm against tbe railroad company of th<'
the money so advanced the plaintiff as- full amount of the notes and Interest. wui<
signed and delivered to Garrison as collat- to relleve tbe plaintiff from any llahlllty to
eral securit y bis <'on~truction contract and him for the amount thereof; and In the ac·
bonds a1Hl ~t oc k of the co111!lllny, and 80me c·ounting be charged Garrison with the full
of It wns repaid by the sales to him of bonds amount of the notes, wltb interest. Tb~
GRIGGS v. DAY et al.
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only question which I deem it important ,

now to consider is whether the learned

referee was right in making that charge.

The further fact must be taken into con-

/sideration that the notes surrendered were

- of no value as against the company. It

was utterly inolvent, with property no

more than sufﬁcient to pay its ﬁrst mort-

gage bonds. The second mortgage bonds

were absolutely of no intrinsic value. The

referee held these facts to be immaterial,

and that, under the circumstances. Garri-

son had made himself chargeable with the

-full amount of the notes, without reference

l'to their value. Such a conclusion is some-

what startling, and should not be sanctioned

unless it has support in well-recognized

principles of law or authorities which we feel

constrained to follow. The entries in Garri-
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son's books of account in reference to these

notes have very little bearing upon the con-

troversy between these parties. They were

private entries, made by Garrison, undis-

closed to the plaintiff. and without his author-

ity. They were important simply as evidence,

and are entitled to no more weight than would

have been the oral declarations or admissions

of Garrison made to any third party. They

show what use he made of the notes, and

about that there is no dispute. They did not

bind the plaintiff, and he has never, so far as

appears, assented to them. They show that

Garrison intended to take the notes at 75

cents on the dollar, and that he was willing

to allow the plaintiff that sum for them. But

there was no actual purchase of them. If that

entry had come to the knowledge of the plain-

tiff, and he had adopted it, and so notiiied

Garrison, he could probably have held him

ito a purchase of the notes for that sum. But

(he repudiates that entry, and refuses to let

‘Garrison have the notes for that sum. He

cannot use that entry to fasten upon him

a purchase of the notes at their face value.

The minds of the parties never met upon

such a contract. Garrison either purchased

the notes used in exchange for the bonds at

75 per cent. of their face value, or he did

not purchase them at all. Therefore, as the

plaintiff repudiates the purchase at the price

<_named, there was no contract of purchase;

‘and as to these notes, pledged for collateral

security, Garrison must be held to have wrong-

fully converted them to his own use. It would

make no difference whether we consider these

notes as having been exchanged for the bonds.

or as having been used in payment for the

bonds. In either view, Garrison was, at most,

guilty of a conversion of them. As to the

balance of the notes, which were surrendered

to the company without any consideration.

there was simply a wrongful conversion of

them. They had no value as obligations

against the company, and it is preposterous to

suppose that Garrison intended by the sur-

render to charge himself for their full face

value against an indebtedness of the plaintiff -

to him for money actually loaned. By the

403

<>nl;y question which I deem it Important to b1m tor money actually louetL B1 the
now to consider ls whether the lea.med surrender be did not Intend to release the
company trom lte indebtedness evidenced by
referee was rlght ln maklne that charge.
The further fact must be taken Into con- the notes. but he Intended and elected still
lderatlou that the notes surrendered were to hold the Indebtedness, evidenced by his
-of no value as against the company. It charge In open account upon his books.
was utterly Insolvent, with property no The obligation of the company wa.e not immore than llU1D.clent to pay lte llrst mort- paired or lessened by the transaction, and it
gage bonds. The second mortgage bonds owed just as much after it as before. Even (
were absolutely of no Intrinsic value. The lf he made the notes his own by surrenderreferee held these tacts to be Immaterial, ing them, there was simply a ronverslon of
.and that, under the circumstances, Garrl- them. It ls true that he elected to hold the
'11Qn had made himself chargeable with the company as his debtor upon open account, just
/full amount of the notes, without reference a.e it was his debtor before for the same
\.to their value. Such a conclusion ls some- amount evidenced by the notes. He dtd not
what startling, and should not be sanctioned take a new debtor, but he retained and In-unless It has support In well-recognized tended to retain the same debtor. Herc
11rinclples of law or authorities which we feel there was no novatlon, and nothing resem«'Dl'ltrnlned to follow. 'l'h~ entries In Garrl- bling It. It usually, if not always, takes
.son'a books of account In reference to these three parties to make a novatlon, and they
notes have very little bearing upon the con- must all concur upon sufficient consid~rutlon
troversy between these pe.rtles. They were lo making a new contract to take the place
private entries, made by Garrison, undis- of another contract, and In substituting 11
closed to the plalntltf, and without hls author- new debtor Jn the place of another debt(}r.
ity. They were Important simply as evidence, "Novation" ls thus briefly defined: '"A transund are entitled to no more weight than would action whereby a debtor le discharged from
have been the oral declarations or admissions bis llablllty to his original creditor by conof Garrison made to any third party. They tracting a new obligation In favor of a
show what use be made of the not~s. and new creditor by the order of the original
about that there Is no dispute. They did not creditor." 1 Pare. Cont. 217. Here there
bind the plalntltr, and be has never, so far as was no element answering to tl1ls detlnl.appears, assented to them. They show that tlon. There was no Intention to make a no. Garrison Intended to take the notes at 75 vatlon, no consideration for a new contract,
." ~nts on the dollar, and that he was willing no concurrence of the three or even or
! to allow the plalntltr that sum for them. But the two parties. So we reach the conclusion ..__ t
there was no actual purchase of them. If that as to all the notes that Garrison, by their
I
entry had come to the knowledge of the plaln- surrender, made himself liable for a wrongtlft', and he had adopted lt, and BO notlHed ful conversion of them to his own use, and
Garrison, he could probably have held him thus became responsible to the plalntltr for
"'
!to a purchase of the notes for that sum. But the damages caused by the wrong; and the
.he repudiates that entry, and refuses to let question Is, what were such damages? 'l'he
Garrison have the notes for that sum. He answer must be, the value of the notes con--i
•.·1mnot use that entry to fasten upon him verted. There can be no other measut·e, as
u purchaRe of the notes at their face value. fllatmeaeures the entire damaite of thl:!
"The minds of the parties never met upon plalntllf absolutely. As to the notes surrensuch a contract. Garrison either purchased dered for the bonds, the plalntltr could have
the notes used ln exchange for the bonds at elected to take the bonds or their value;
i5 per cent. or their race value, or he did but this he refuses to do, as the bonds have
not purchase them at all. Therefore, as the no value, and thus he ls conllned absolutely
plaintiff
repudiates the purchase at the price to the value of the notes.
(
. named, there was no contract of purchase;
Now, how does the case stand upon au'and a.e to these notes, pledged for collateral thority? In Garlick v. James. 12 Johns. Ho,
seeui·lty, Garrison must be hehl to have wrong- the plaintiff deposited with the defendant a
fully converted them to his own use. It would promlsso1·y note of a third person as collatmake no dltrerenre whether we consider these eral security for a debt, and the defendant,
notes as having been exchanged for the tJoncl"· without the knowledge or consent of the
or as having been used lo payment !or the plaintitr, compromised with the maker of the
bonds. In either view, GarrlRon was, at most, note, and surrendered the note to him upou
guilty of a conversion of them. As to the payment of one halt of the face thereof. It
balance of the notes, which were surrendered was found that the moker wns at the time
to the company without any consideration, of the compromise abundantly able to pay
there was simply a wron~ul conversion of the full amount of the note. and under such
them. They had no vnlue as obligations circumstances lt was properly held that the
against the company, and It Is preposterous to pledgee was liable for the balance unpaid upsuppose that Garrison Intended by the sur- on the note. In Hawks v. Hincbclltr, 17
render to charge himself for their full face Barb. 492, the plalntltT sued the defendant
i·nlue against an Indebtedness of the plalntltr upon an account for mcrdi:rndlse delivered,

f
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- and the defendant showed that the plaintiff

took two notes for the amount of the ac-

count as collateral security for the payment

thereof; that he transferred one of the notes

to a person, who recovered judgment there-

on against the makers, and afterwards as-

signed the judgment to one Prindle; that he

recovered judgment upon the other note, and

assigned that to Prindle; and it appeared

that the defendants in those judgments had

never paid the notes or the judgments. It

was held that the plaintiff, the pledgee, could

not recover upon his account. It was not

shown upon what consideration the notes

and the judgments were transferred by the

pledgee, or that at the time of the transfer

the makers of the notes were not perfectly

solvent. The plaintiff there relied upon the

simple fact that the notes and judgments
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were not paid. Upon this state of the facts

the court held that the presumption, nothing

appearing to the contrary, was that the note

and judgments were transferred by the plain-

tif f for the full amount appearing to be due

upon them, and hence he was charged with

the full amount. There are some broad ex-

pressions contained in the opinion, which,

when isolated from the facts of the case,

tend to give some countenance to the plain-

tii1"s contention here. In Vose v. Railroad

Co., 50 N. Y. 369, it was held that a wrong-

ful sale by a creditor of collateral securities

placed in his hands by the principal debtor

does not, per se, discharge even a surety

for the debt (much less the principal debtor)

in toto, but that by such sale the creditor

makes the securities his own to the extent

of discharging the surety only to an amount

equal to their actual value. In Potter v.

Bank, 28 N. Y. 641; Booth v. Powers, 56 V.

Y. 22; and Thayer v. Manley, 73 N. Y. 305,

—it was held that in an action to recover

damages for the conversion of a promissory

note the amount appearing to be unpaid

thereon at the time of the conversion, with

interest, is prima facie the measure of dam-

ages, but that the defendant has the right to

show in reduction of damages the insolven-

cy or inability of the maker, or any other

fact impugning the value of the note. In

Bank v. Gordon, 8 N. H. 66. where the bank

had received a note as collateral security,

and had subsequently, without the consent of

the pledgor, compromised it by receiving the

one half thereof from the maker, it was

held that the bank was bound to credit the

pledgor with only the amount received upon

compromise, upon proof that the compromise

was advantageous, and that the maker was

insolvent, and unable to pay the balance; and

the general rule was laid down which was

announced in the cases last above cited. If

the pledgee of the note of an insolvent mak-

er may surrender it upon a compromise for

one dollar without being made liable for

more than he receives, upon what conceiva-

ble principle can a pledgee be held for the

face value of a‘worthless note by surren-
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and the defendo.nt showed that the plalntltr
took two notes for the amount ot the account as collateral security for the payment
thereof; that he transferred one of the notes
to a person, who recovered judgment thereon against the makers, and afterwards assigned the judgment to one Prindle; that be
recovered judgment upon the other note, and
assigned that to Prlndle; and it appeared
that the defendants In those judgments bad
never paid the notes or the judgments. It
wa.s held that the plalntltr, the pledgee, could
not recover U.I>On his account. It was not
shown upon what consideration the notes
r und the judgments were transferred by the
pledgee, or that at the time of the transfer
the makers of the notes were not perfectly
solvent. The plalntltr there relied upon the
simple fact that the notes and judgments
were not paid. Upon this state of the facts
the court held that the presumption, nothing
appearing to the contrary, was that the note
and judgments were transferred by the plaintitr for the full amowrt appearing to be due
upon them, and hence he was charged with
the full amount. There are some broad expressions contained in the opinion, wWcb,
when Isolated from the facts of the cuse,
tend to give some countenance to the plalntitr's contention here. In Vose v. Railroad
Co., 50 N. Y. 369, it was held that a wrongful sale by a creditor of collateral securities
placed in bis hands by the principal debtor
does not, per se, d1scharge even a surety
for the debt (much less the principal debtor)
in toto, but that by such sale the creditor
makes the securities his own to the extent
of discharging the surety only to an amount
equal to their actual value. In Potter v.
Bank, 28 N. Y. 641; Booth v. Powers, 56 N.
Y. 22; and Thayer v. Manley, 73 N. Y. 305,
-it was held that in an action to recover
damages for the conversion of a promissory
note the amount appearing to be unpald
thereon at the time of the conversion. with
interest, le prlma facle the measure of damages, but that the defendant bus the right to
show In reduction of damages the Insolvency Qr Inability of the maker, or any other
tact Impugning the value of the note. In
Bank v. Gordon, 8 N. H. 66, where the bank
bad received a note 118 collateral security,

and had subsequently, without the consent of
the pledgor, compromised It by receiving the
one half thereof from the maker, it waa
held that the bank was bound to credit the
pledgor with only the amount received upon
compromise, upon proof that the compromise •
was advantageous, and that the maker waa
Insolvent, and unable to pay the balance; and
the general rule was lald down which was
announced In the cases last above cited. If
the pledgee of the note of an Insolvent maker may surrender it upon a compromise for
one dollar without being made Hable for
more than he receives, upon what conceivable principle can a pledgee be held for the
face value of a ~orthless note by surren·
dering it without any consideration whatever? If one intrusted with a note as agent,
or holding It as pledgee, loses It by his carelessness, or even wlllfully destroys It, he can,
In an action against him by the principal or
pledgor, be held liable only for the value of
the note. It Garrison had broken Into the
plaintitrs safe and taken these· notes without any right whatever, in an action tor
thefr conversion the vlalntltr could have recovered against him as damages only the actual, not the face, value of the notes. l
need go no further. Other Illustrations are
not needed. Our attention has been called
to no case In law or equity which upholds
the pla.lntltr's contention as to these notes.
I should be greatly surprised to find any,
and do not believe there are any. I have
assumed, without a careful examination of
the defendants' objections to the notes, that
they were valid, and pro1Jerly issued by the
company for their full amount. I ha.Ye also
ussumed, without examining the matter, that
upon this record we must bold against the
contention of the defendants that the second mortgage bonds took the place of the
notes given for them, and were held in th<:>ir
stead as collateral security. Statement~
made upon the argument by the counsel tor
the appellants render it unnecessary for us
to consider any other objections to the judgment, and for the reasons stated the judgment should be reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide the event. All concur;
GRAY, J., in result.
Judgment reversed.
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DIMOCK et al. 7. UNITED STATES NAT.

BANK.

(25 Atl. 926, 55 N. J. Ltlw, 296.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Feb. 6, 1893.

Error to circuit court, Union county; Van‘

Syckel, Judge.

Action on a note by the United States Na-

tional Bank against Anthony W. Dimock

and others. Plaintiff had judgment, and

defendants bring error. Aﬂirmed.

The facts appear in the following state-

ment by DEPUE, J.: \

This suit was brought upon a note of which

the following is a copy:

“$Z)0,00(). New York, April 15, 1884. Four

months after date, without grace, we prom-

ise to pay to the United States National

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Bank, or order, at its oiiice in the city of

New York, the sum of ﬁfty thousand 00/l00

for value received, with interest at the rate

of six per cent. per annum payable; having

deposited herewith, and pledged as collater-

al security to the holder thereof, the fol-

lowing property, viz.: 2()0 shares Bankers‘

& Merchants‘ Tel. stock; 200 shares Mis-

souri Paciﬁc R. R. stock; 200 shares Dela-

ware, Lac. & W. R. R. stock; 15 shares Cen-

tral Iowa, Ill. Div. 1st bonds,—with author-

ity to the holder hereof to sell the whole of

said property, or any part thereof, or any

substitute therefor, or any additions there-

to, at any brokers' board in the city of New

York, or at public or private sale in said

city or elsewhere, at the option of such hold- '

er, on the uonperformance of any of the

promises herein contained, without notice of

amount claimed to be due, without demand

of payment, without advertisement, and

without notice of the time and place of sale,

each and every of which is hereby express-

ly waived.

“It is agreed that, in case of depreciation

in the market value of the property hereby

pledged, (which market value is now

$5 ,) or which may hereafter be pledged

for this loan, a payment shall be made on

account of this loan upon the demand of the

holder hereof, so that the said market value

shall always be at least per cent. more

than the amount unpaid of this note; and

that, in case of failure to make such pay-

ment, this note shall, at the option of the

holder hereof, become due and payable

forthwith, anything hereinbefore expressed

to the contrary notwithstanding; and that

the holder may immediately reimburse

by sale of the said property or any part

thereof. In case the net proceeds arising

from any sale herennder shall be less than

the amount due hereon, promise to

pay to the holder, forthwith after such sale,

the amount of such deﬁciency, with legal

interest.

"It is further agreed that any excess in

the value of said collaterals, or surplus from

the sale thereof beyond the amount due

UlMOCK et at

UNITED STA.TES NAT.
BANK.
(25 Atl. 9'l6, M N. J. Law, 296.)
Court of Brrora and Appeals of New Jel'Hy.
Feb. 6, 1893.
Error to circuit court, Union county; Van
Syckel, Jud.Ke.
A.cti-On on a note by the United States National Bank against Anthony W. Dimock
and others. Plalntur bad Judgment, and
derendanta bring error. Amrmed.
The racta appear 1n the following statement by DEPUE, J.:
'--..
This suit was brought upon a note of which
the following ls a copy:
~ "$50,000. New York, April Ui, 1884. Four
months after date, without grace, we promise to pay to the United States National
Bank, or order, at Its otHce In the city of
New York. the sum of fifty thousand oofioo
for value received, with Interest at the rate
of six per cent. per annum payable; hal"lng
deposited herewith, and pledged as collateral security to the holder thereof, the following property, viz.: 200 shares Bankers'
& Mercllants' Tel. stock; 200 shares Missouri l'aelllc R. R. stock; 200 shares Dela·
ware, Lac. & W. U. ll. stock; 15 shares Central Iowa, Ill. Div. 1st bonds,-wlth authority to the holder hereof to sell the whole of
said property, or any part thereof, or any
substitute therefor, or any additions thet"eto, at any brokers' board In the city of New
York, or at public or private sale In said
elty or elsewhere, at the option of such hold- ·
er, on the nonperformance of any of the
promises hel"eln contained, without notice of
amount claimed to be due, without demand
of payment, without advertisement, and
without notice of the time and place of sale,
each and every of which 18 hereby expressly waived.
"It Is agreed that, In case of depreciation
tn the market value of the property hereby
pledged, (which market value Is now
$ - , ) or which may hereafter be pledged
for this loan, a payment shall be made on
account of this loan upon the demand of the
holdel" hel"eof, so that the said market value
t1hali always be at least - - per cent. more
than the amount unpaid of this note; and
that, in case of failure to make such payment, this note 11hall, at the option of the
bolder hereof, become due and payable
forthwith, anything herelnbefore expressed
to the contracy notwithstanding; and that
the holder may Immediately reimburse - by sale of the said property or any part
thereof. In case the net proceeds arising
from any sale hereunder shall be less than
the amount due hel"eon, - - promise to
pay to the holder, forthwith after such sale,
the amount of such deftclency, with !egal
Interest.
"It Is further agreed that any exce11s in
the value of said collnternls, or 11urplus from
the sale thereof beyond the amount due
T.
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hereon, shall bo applicable upon any•other
note or claim held by the holder hereof
against - - now due or to become due,
or that may be hereafter contracted; and
that, if no other note or claim against - ls so held, such surplus, after the payment
of this note, shall be returned to - - or
- - assigns.
"It Is furthel" agreed that, upon any sale
by virtue hereof, the holder hereof may purchase the whole or any part of such property discharged from any right of redemption, which la hereby expressly released to
the holder hereof, who shall retain a claim
against the makel" hereof for any deficiency
arising upon such sale. A. W. Dlmoek &
Co."

.

The other facts appear In the opinion of
the court.
Bradbury C. Chetwood, for plalntltr In er·
ror. Edward A. & Wllllam T. Day, for de·
fendants 1n erl:"or.
DEPUE, J. (after stating the facts). The
note on which this 11ult was brought was
In terms made payable In four months after ~
date. · It became due August US, 1884. This
suit was brought May 21, 1891. The suit
was In all respects regular, and its regu·
larlty was in no wise dependent upon that
paragraph In the pledge of securities which.
upon certain conditions, accelerated the maturity of the note, and made the money pay- .
able at a tlme earllel" than that namell on
it11 face. The securities pledged for the payment of the note were sold by the plalntifr .
ou the Uith of May, 1884, as the note matured '
In the following August. From the sale the
11um of $45,456.26 was realized, leaving a /
balance due on the note of $4,456.25, for ;
which the plalntur claimed Judgment. The ·
defendants' contention was that the sale In .
May was unauthorized, and amounted in
law to a conversion. In all other respects
the sale was In conformity with the power.
On the theocy that the 88le at the time In .
question was unauthorized, the defendants
contended that they were entitled to have
the value of the securities allowed to them \
at thell" highest market price between the ·
conversion and the time of the trial. The
defendants gave In evidence the fact that In
Decembel", 1886, and April and May, 188i,
these secul"ltles were worth In the market
the sum of $56,860, sufficient to pay the1
plalntltr's note, and leave a balance of $G,1·
8tlO due the defendants. The defendants'
claim was disallowed, and judgment given
for the plalntltr for the sum of U,45G.25,
being the balance due on the note after crediting on It the proceeds of sale with Interest.
The case was tried by the judge, a jury being waived. A general exception was taken
to his finding. Upon such an exception, If
thel"e be evidence ta sustain the finding, the
exception wlll not be sustained.
The plalntltf ls a nntlonnl bank, locnte<l In
the city of New York. The defendants, at

J
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the time of these transactions, were bankers

and brokers in New York. The debt for

which the note was given was a loan of $50,-

000 to the defendants. The form of the con-

tract pledging securities for the repayment

of loans is such as is usual in that city. It

must be assumed that the parties were

aware of the effect of the terms of such con-

tracts, and with the course of dealing in that

market with securities pledged as security

for loans.

By the ﬁrst paragraph in the defendants'

contract the plaintiff was authorized to sell

the securities at any brokers' board in the

city of New York, or at public or private sale

in said city or, elsewhere, at its option, on

the nonperformance of any of the defend-

ants' promises therein contained, without

any notice of the time and place of sale.
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This contract was embodied in and made

part of the note itself, and the promise to

pay in the note was one of the promises on

the nonpayment of which a sale was author-

ized. The sale was made through a ﬂrm of

brokers who were members of the stock ex-

change in New York city. There is no

foundation in the evidence for complaint of

the manner or fairness with which the sale

was conducted.

The power of the plaintiff to sell the se-

curities before the four months named in the

note had expired depends upon the con-

struction and effect of the second paragraph

of the contract. There was some discussion

on the argument as to the right to ﬁll the

blanks in that paragraph. The evidence was

not suﬂicient to justify the court in ﬁlling

the blanks. The contract will be construed

in the condition it was in when it was de

livered to the plaintiff. In this paragraph

it is provided that, in case of a depreciation

in the market value of the property pledged,

the defendants should, on demand by the

holder of the note, make a payment thereon,

so that the market value of the securities

should always be more than the amount of

the debt; and that, in case of the failure of

the defendants to make such payment, the

note should, at the payee's option, become

due forthwith; and that the plaintiff might

immediately reimburse itself by the sale of

the property or any part thereof; and that in

case the net proceeds of such sale should be

less than the amount then due on the note,

the defendants should forthwith, after such

sale, pay the amount of such deﬁciency, with

interest. The power to sell the securities be-

fore the maturity of the note, according to

its terms, was made to depend upon the con-

currence of two conditions,—the depreciation

in the market value of the property pledged;

and the failure of the defendants, after de-

mand, to make a payment on account of the

loan, so that the market value of the secu-

rlties pledged should be more than the

amount due on the note. The proof was

that on the 6th of May, 1884, the ﬁrm of

Grant. Ward & Co. failed, and the Marine
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the tlme of these transactions, were lmnkers
and b1'0kers in New York. The debt for
which the note was given was a loan of ,50,·
000 to the defendants. The form of the contract pledging securities for the repayment
of loans is such as is usual in that city. It
'must be assumed that the parties were
n ware of the ellect of the terms of such contrncts, and with the course of deallng in that
market with securities pledged as security
tor loans.
By the first paragraph In the defendants'
contract the plaintiff was authorized to sell
the securities at any brokers' board In the
city of New York, or at public or private sale
In said city or elsewhere, at lts option, on
the nonperformance of any of the defendants' promises therein contained, without
any notice of the time and place of sale.
This contract was embodied in and made
part ot the note itself, and the promise to
pay in the note was one of the promises on
the nonpayment of which a. sale was authorized. The sale was made through a. 11.nn of
brokers who were members of the stock exchange In New York city. There ls no
foundation In the evidence for complaint of
the manner or fairness with which the sale
was conducted.
The power of the plaintllf to sell the securl ties before the four months named In the
note had expired depends upon the construction and effect of the second paragraph
of the contract. There was some discussion
on the argument as to the right to fill the
blanks in that paragraph. The evidence was
not sulliclent to justify the court in filllng
the blanks. The contract wlll be construed
In the condition It was in when It was delivered to the plaintiff. In this paragraph
1t is provided that, In case of a. depreciation
In the market value of the property pledged,
the defendants should, on demand by the
holder of the note, make a payment thereon,
so that the market value of the securities
should always be more than the amount of
the debt; and that, In case of the failure of
the defendants to make such payment, the
note should, at the payee's option, become
due forthwith; and that the plaintiff might
Immediately reimburse Itself by the sale of
the property or any pa.rt thereof; and that in
case the net proceeds of such sale should be
less than the amount then due on tbe note,
the defendants should forthwith, after such
sale, pay the amount of sucb deficiency, with
interest. The power to sell the securities before the maturity of the note, accorcllng to
lts terms, was made to depend upon the concurrence of two condltlons,-the depreciation
in the market value of the property pledged;
and the failure of the defendants, after demand, to make a payment on account of the
loan, so that the market value of the securltlett pledged should tie more than the
amount due on the note. The proof was
thnt on the 6th of May, 1884, the firm of
Grant, Ward & Co. tailed, and the Marine

Bank closed lts doors. On the 14th, the Metropolitan Bank closed Its doors, and a number of leading bankers tailed. These failures created a panic in the money market.
and a. great depreciation In the market valtK>
of all commercial securities. Early on the
morning of the 15th, the defendants' embarrassments led them to an as81gnment· tor
the benefit of their creditors. It fully appoored that, at the commencement of business hours on the morning of Ma.y 15th, the
securities pledged had B<> depreciated tba.t
their market value was considerably below
the amount of the plaintiff's debt. Under a
pledge, with a power of sale such as exists
in this case, the pledgee, unless restrained
by other conditions In the contract of pledge, ,
has a right to sell whenever the condition of
the market makeG It prudent for him to do 1
so for the protection of bis Interests. The
other condition was that a. demand shoulo
be made upon the defends nts, and that, upon such demand, the defendants should pay
on account of the note a sum sulliclent to reduce the amount due below the market value
the securities then had. The case shows
that, at the beginning of business hours on
the rooming of the 15th, two notices were
served on the defendants. One <>f these notices was' In form signed by the cashier of
the bank, In these words: "l hereby call
your loan of April 15, 1884, for $50,000.,.
This notice was plainly not a demand in conformity with the condition expressed In the
contract. A depreciation In the market value of the securities pledged did not convert
the loan, which was ma.de on tour months'
time, into a. call loan. That condition of affairs Imposed upon the defendants the obligation not to pay the note in full, but, by a
payment upon tt, to reduce the loan until
the amount remaining due was under the
market value of the securities. It appeared
In evidence that the other notice served was 1·
"a demand tor the payment on account of\
the loan to a degree corresponding to th<>
depreciation of the securities." Neither the
original notice nor a copy was produced.
The witness who testified upon this subject
was not able to state the a.mount of the depreciation, but he added that such deprecla·
tlon was known to both the borrower and
lender. The object of a demand In a contract of this sort is to give the party an
opportunity to comply with the terms of his
contract, and preserve ble securities from
sale before the expiration of the time for
which the loon was negotiated; and lt wouht
be reasonable that, In making the demand.
the party, before he ls put In default, should
have been made aware of the extent of the
deprecilitlon, approximately at least, and the
sum required to be paid to save his rights
should be specified. It the case rested 11olely)
on the sulliclency of the demand made, T
should have some hesitation in sustaining
this judgment.
A.BSumlng that tlie sale of the securlttes lD
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May was unauthorized, it was a conversion

of the property, though the sale was made in

good faith. Nevertheless, the judge's ﬁnd-

ing, and the rule of damages applied, were

correct. The general rule is that the meas-

ure of damages for conversion is the value

of the property at the time of the conversion.

This rule has been modiﬁed with respect to

the conversion of stocks and bonds, commer-

cial securities vendible in the market, the

market value of which is liable to frequent

and great ﬂuctuations, caused by the depres-

sion and inﬂation of prices in the market.

In Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, the

court of appeals held that as between a cus-

tomer and his broker, holding stock pur-

chased for the former which had been pledg-

ed as ‘seem-ity for advances made in the

purchase, the measure of damages for the
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conversion by an unauthorized sale was the

highest market price between the time of

the conversion and the trial. Relying upon

this case, the defendants put in evidence no

proof of value except the market value in

December, 1886, and April and May, 1887.

But Markham v. Jaudon has been overruled

by a series of cases in the New York courts,

and the rule adopted that in such cases the

principal may disaﬂirm the sale, and that

the advance in the market price from the

itime of sale up to a reasonable time to ie

\place it after notice of the sale was the prop-

er measure of damages. Baker v. Drake,

53 N. Y. 211, 66 N. Y. 518; Gruman v. Smith,

81 N. Y. 25; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368.

These decisions were made in cases where

the transactions were dealings between the

customer and broker in the purchase and

sale of stocks on a margin. Subsequently

the same rule was applied where the owner

of stock for which he had paid full value,

and which he held as an investment, put it

in the hands of a broker as collateral securi-

ty for the debt of a third person, upon condi-

tion that it should not be sold for six months,

the stock having been sold without the own-

er's authority before the expiration of that

time. Under the decisions of the New York

courts, reasonable time, where the facts are

undisputed, is a question of law for the

court. Wright v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 238, 18

N. E. 79. In Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368,

30 days after the sale and notice of it was

regarded as reasonable time. The rule of

the highest intermediate value between the

time of the conversion and the time of the

trial has been rejected in the supreme court

of the United States as the proper measure

of damages, and the rule that the highest in-

termediate value between the time of the

conversion and a reasonable time after the

owner has received notice of it was adopted

as the correct view of the law; for the rea-

son, as expressed by Mr. Justice Bradley,

that more transactions of this kind arise in

the state of New York than in all other parts

of the country, and that the New York rule,

as ﬂnally settled by its court of appeals, has

Ma7 waa uauthorlzed, It wal!I & conversion
of the property, though the sale was made In
good faJtb. Nevertheless, the judge's finding, and the rule of damages applied, were
correct. The geiier&I rule ls that the measure of damages for conversion is the value
of the property &t the tlme of the conversion.
Tbil!I rule baa been modified with reBpeCt to
the conversion of stocks and bonds, commerdal securities vendible 1n the market, the
market value of which 11!1 liable to frequent
and great ftuctuatlons, caused by the depresl!llon and lnft&tlon of prices In the market.
In Markham v. Jaudon. 41 N. Y. 235, the
court of appeals held that as between a customer and bis broker, holding stock pu~
c~ased for the former which b&d been pledged as 'Becurity for advances made In the
pureb.aae, the measure of damages for the
conversion by an unauthorized Bille was the
highest market price between the time of
the conversion and the trial. Relying upon
thil!I cue, the defendantl!I put 1n evidence no
proof of value except the market value lo
December, 1886, and April and May, 1887.
But Mftl'kham v. Jaudon bas been o\•erruled
by a series of cases In the New York courts,
and the rule adopted that In such cases the
principal may dlsattirm the sale, and that
the a<lYance In the market price from the
( time of ale up to a reasonable time to replace it after notice of the sale was the proper measure of damages. Baker v. Drake,
53 N. Y. 211, 66 N. Y. !il8; Gruman v. Smith,
81 N. Y. 25; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368.
These decisions were made In cases where
the transactions were dealings between the
cUl!ltomer and broker In the purchase and
sale of stocks on a margin. Subsequently
the same rule was applied where the owner
of stock for which be bad paid full value,
and which be held as an lnveBtment, put it
In the bands of a broker as collateral security for the debt of a third person, upon condition that It should not be aold for six months,
the stock having been BOid without the owner'• authority before the expiratlon of that
time. Under the decisions of the New York
1-ourtB, reasonable time, where the facts are
undisputed, ls a question of law for the
(.'OUrt.
Wright v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 238, 18
~. ]j). 79.
In Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368,
:ro days after the sale and notice of It was
regarded IUI reasonable time. The rule of
the highest Intermediate value between the
time of the conversion au<l the time of the
trial has been rejected In the supreme court
ot the United States as the proper measure
ot damages, and the rule that the highest Intermediate value between the time of the
conversion and a reasonable time after the
owner has received notice of It was adopted
as the correct view of the law; for the reason. as expresi-ed by Mr. Justice Bradley,
that more transactions of this kind arise In
the state of New York than In all other partB
ot the Muntry, and that the New York rule,
as finally settled by Its court or nppeals, hns
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the most reason 1n lta favor. Gallgher v.
Jones, 129 U. S. 194, 9 Sup. Ct. 335. The
principle upon which this doctrine rests ls
the consideration that the general rule that
In an action for a conversion the market
\'Blue of the property at the time of the conversion would atrord an inadequate remedy,
or rather no remedy at all, for the r1'll.l Injury, which consisted In the wrongful salt:
or property of a fluctuating value at au unfavora!Jle time, chosen by the broker hhnself;\
hence the cost of replacing the securities by
a purchue In the market, allowing a reasonable time for that purpose, bas been regard- ,
ed as the proper measure of damges. As
W&l!I said by Mr. Justice Bradley In Galli;her
v. Jones: "A reasonable time after the
wrongful act complained of 1.8 to be allowed
to the party Injured to plo.ce himself In tbe
position he would have been In had not bis
rights been Invaded." The general rule that
the market Yalue at the time of the converBlon ls the measure of daruages being found
to be impracticable 1n these cases, and having been abandoned, the etfort bas been to
obtain some rule by which substantlul justice, as near as may be, may be attained.
In En~land the market value at the time of
the trial appears to be the measure of damages. Owen v. Routh, 14 C. B. 327. In
some of the sister states the rule of the highest Intermediate price before the trial bas
been adopted. In New York, and In most of
the sister states, as well as In the supreme
court of the United Sta.tee, the formula whl<~h
has been caHed the "New York Rule" hua
been adopted, and ls the rule which will accomplish the most complete justice In the ordinary transactions between the broker and
bis customer dealing in stocks when nn unauthorized sale Is the act ot conversion. In
such cases the customer bas a. choice or remedies. He may claim the benefit of the sail:\
and take the proceeds; be may require the
broker to replace the stock, or replace It himself, and charge the broker for the loss; or
he may recover the advance In the market
price up to a reasonable time within which/
to replace It after notice of the sale. Cook,
Stock & S. 460. But where stocks and negotiable securities are pledged as collateral
security for the payment or a debt to become due and payable on a future day, another element enters Into the consideration
of the compensation to be a warded to the
owner of the securities for the unauthorized
sale of them before the debt matures. Upon such a bailment It ls the duty of the
pledgee to keep the securities In hand at all
times ready to be delivered to the pledgor on
the payment of the debt. Cook, Stock & S.
469-471. An unauthorized sale bMore the
debt matures Is a conversion, ror which the
pledgor may have remedy In the manner
above mentioned. But the sale may be made !
when the market Yalue Is depreciated, nnd:
the market with a downwarrl tendency. "li1e
market m~y revive, and prices ue enhn m~e<l
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hhefore the debt matures. Under such cir-

“cumstances, a rule that the piedgor shall be

at liberty to elect to treat the unauthorized

sale as a conversion, or to hold the pledgee

for the breach of his duty to keep the secu-

rities until the maturity of the debt. and

recover as damages the market value of the

\securitles as of that time, would commend

itself in reason and justice. As applied to

the facts of this case, this rule would be

eminently just. The plaintiff in good faith

sold the securities in the manner authorized

by the contract of pledge. The breach of

duty was in selling at an unauthorized time.

The debt was not paid or tendered at maturi-

ty; and if the plaintiff had held the stock,

and sold it at that time, the sale would have

been strictly in conformity with the power.

If the defendants lost anything by the sale
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at a time unauthorized, they would be rec-

ompensed for that loss by an award of dam-

ges equivalent to the market value of the

securities at the time the debt became due.

Tested by either of these standards, the prop-

er credit was allowed, the proof being that

the prices of the securities were less when

the note matured than when the securities

were sold. No evidence of an increased

price prior to December, 1886, was produced.

The ﬁnding of the judge should be atiirmed

on the ground, also, that the sale was con-

sented to and ratiﬁed by the defendants.

The notices served on the morning of May

15th informed the defendants that the secu-

rities pledged had, in the plaintiffs estima-

tion, depreciated in market value, and that

the contingency provided for in this part of

the contract had happened, and also plainly

indicated the purpose on the part of the

piaintilf to avail itself of‘the right which,

under those circumstances, would accrue un-

der the contract. Immediately after the sale

was made, the defendants had notice of the

fact of sale, and, very shortly after, of the

amount realized therefrom. No objection

was made to the sale or the amount realized.

On the 4th of June, 1884, the defendants

ﬁled a schedule of their indebtedness under

their assignment. This schedule was veri-

ﬁed by the oaths of the defendants that it

contained a true account of their creditors,

and of the sum owing to each, and also a

statement of any existing collateral or other

security for the payment of such debt. In

this statement the plaintiff was put down as

a creditor for the sum of $4,737.50, which

was about the amount due the plaintif f after

the proceeds were applied to the debt; and

to this speciﬁcation of the existing debt due

the plaintiff was appended a statement that

for the payment of this debt there was no ex-

isting collateral or other security. In Sep-

tember, l885, the defendants caused to be

presented to the plaintiff a composition

agreement with a view to a compromise with

their credito1s, in which the debt due the

plaintiff was stated to be the sum of $5,118.-

87, ﬁgures which represented approximately

clr-

\~umstnnces, a rule that the pledgor shall be
1at liberty to elect to tree.t the unauthorized
'sale as a conversion. or to hold the pledgee
for the breach of his duty to keep the securities until the maturity of the debt. and
recover as damages the market value of the
securities as of that time, would commend
'itself In reason and justice. As applied to
the facts of thls case, this rule would be
eminently just. The plaintill' in good truth
sold the securities In the manner authorized
by the contract of pledge. The breach of
duty was In selling at an unauthorized time.
The debt was not paid or tendered at maturity; and If the plalntllf had held the stock,
and sold It at that time, the sale would have
been strictly In conformity with the power.
It the defendants lost anything by the sale
at a time unauthorized, they would be recompensed for that loss by an award of dam')nges equivalent to the market value of the
/!ecurlties at the time the debt became due.
Tested by either or these standards, the proper credit was allowed, the proof being that
the prices of the securities were less when
the note matured than when the securities
wore sold. No evidence of an Increased
price prior to December, 1886, was produced.
The finding of the judge should be affirmed
on the ground, also, tllat the sale was consented to and ratified by the defendants.
\The notices serv~ on the morning of :\lay
I 15th Informed the defendants that tile secu1l'ities pledged had, In the plalntllf's estim.a·
tion, depreciated In market value, and that
the contingency provided for In this part of
the contra.ct had happened, and also plalnly
Indicated the purpose on the part of the
plalntlfl' to avail itself or · the right which,
under those clrcnmstances, would accrue under the contrac_t. Immediately after the sale

was made, the defendants had notice of the
fact of sale, and, very shortly after, of the
amount realized therefrom. No objection
was made to the sale or the amount realized.
On the 4th of June, 1884, the defendants
filed a. schedule ot their lndebtedcess under
their assignment. This schedule was verified by the oa.ths of the defendant.8 that It
contained a. true account of their creditors,
and of the sum owing to each, and also a
statement of any existing collateral or other
security for the payment of such debt. In
this statement the plaintltr was put down u
a creditor for the sum of $4,737.50, which
was about the amount due the plaintill' after
the proceeds were applied to the debt; and
to this specification or the existing debt due
the plalntltr was appended a statement t.hllt
for the payment of this debt there was no existing collateral or other security. In l:5eptember, 1885, the defendants caused to be
presented to the plaintill' a composition
agreement with a view to a. compromise with
their credlto1s, In which the debt due the
Qlalntill' was stated to be the sum of $5,118.·
87, figures which represented approximately
the net amount due the platntltr on the note
after applying thereon the proceeds of the
sale of the securities, with Interest. This
agreement was signed by the plaintill', but
the project fell through, the defendants being
unable to etrect a compromise with all their
creditors. The defendants bad the election
either to ratify the sale, and claim the benefit of it, or repudiate lt, and hold the plalntltr in damages. The act of the defendants
ln applying the proceeds of the sate as a
credit on the plalntiff's note ls so positive
and emphatic an act of ratification and adoption that it cannot be retracted. The case
was properly decided at the trial, and the
judgment should be a.ftl.1'11led.

l.:\Jl'Hll!:S

·ro

PERSONAL PROPgHTY.

ELLIS v. BILTON.
I.\JUltIES TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.

(43 N. W. 1048, 78 Mich. 150.)

409

',against, and was injured.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. ll'i, 1881J.

ELLIS v. HILTON.

(43 N. W. 1048, 78 Mich. 150.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Nov. 15, 1889.

Error to circuit court. Grand Traverse

county; RAMsDELL, Judge.

Error to circuit court, Grand Traverse
county; RAlllSDELL, Judge.
Pratt. & Davis, for appellant. Lorl11 Robilrts (J. H. Adsit, of counsel), for appellee

Pratt & Davis. for appellant. Lorin Rob-

erts (J. 1i. Adsit. of counsel), for appellee.

LONG, J. This is an action to recover

damages against the defendant for negli-

gently placing a stake in a public street in

Traverse City. which plaintiff's horse iau

It was conceded

on the trial by counsel for defendant that

the horse of plaintiff was so injured that it

was entirely wortldess. Plaintiff claimed

damages, not only for the full value of the

horse, but also for what he exp.nded in at-

tempting to cffent a cure. and on the trial
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his counsel stated to the court that plaintiff

was entitled to recover a reasonable expense

in trying to cure the horse before it was de-

cided that she was actually worthless. The

court ruled, however. that the damages could

not exceed the value of the animal. A claim

is made by the declaration for moneys expend-

ed in trying to effect a cure of the horse after

the injury. Upon the trial the plaintiff testi-

tied that he put the horse. after theinjury, in-

to the hands of a veterinary, and paid him

$35 forcure and treatment. On his cross-‘ex-

amination, he also testiﬁed that the veteri-

nary said “there was hopes of curing her, if

the muscles were not too badly bruised. He

didn't say he could cure her. He thought

there was a chance that he might."

)r. DeCow, the veterinary, was called. and

testiﬁed, as to the injury, that the stake en-

tered the breast of the horse, on the left

side. about six inches; that the muscles were

bruised, and the left leg perfectly helpless.

He got the wound healed, but on account of

the severe bruise of the muscles the leg be-

came paralyzed and useless. On being asked

whether he thought she could be helped when

he ﬁrst saw her, he stated that he did not

know but she might; that she might be

helped. and kept for breeding purposes, and

be of some value.

It is evident from the testimony that the

plaintiff acted in good faith in attempting

the cure, and under the belief that the mare

could be helped, and be of some value. The

court below, however, seems to have based

its ruling that no greater damages could be

recovered than the value of the animal, and

that these moneys expended in attempting a

cure could not be recovered, upon the ground

that the defendant was not consulted in rela-

tion to the matter of the attempted cure.

Whatever damages the plaintlff sustained

were occasioned by the negligent conduct of

the defendant, and recovery in such cases is

always permitted for such amount as shall

compensate for the actual loss. If the horse

had been killed outright the only loss would

have been its actual value. The horse was

seriously injured; but the plaintiff, acting in

LONG, J. This ls an action to recover
damages a~ainst the dt>fendant for negligently placmg a stake in a public st1·1•et in
Traverse City, which plaintiff's horse ran
against, and was iuj ured. It was conceded
<m the trial by co11m1el for defendant. that
the horse of plaintiff was so injured that 1t
was entirely worlhless. Plaintiff' clai111ed
damages, not only fur the full value of the
horse •. but also for what he exp•·nded in attempl111g to effeet a cure, and on the trial
his counsel stated to the court that plaint1Jf
~as t.>~litled to recover a reasonable expense
rn trymg to cure the horse before it was rte.cidPd that she was actually worthless. The
( court ruled, however, that the damages could
not exceed the value of the animal. A claim
is made Ly the declaration for moneys expended in trying to effect a cure of the horse after
the injury. Upon the trial the plaintiff testified that be put the horse, after the injury, into the hands of a veterinary, and paid him
8% for cure and treatment. On his cross~ex
amination, he also testified that the veterinary said "there WM hopP.s of curing her, if
the muscles were not too badly bruised. He
clidn 't say he could cure her. He thought
there was a chance that be might."
Jr. DeCow, the veterinary, was called, and
testified, as to the Injury, that the stake entered the breast of the horse on the !eft
liide. 11bout six Inches; that the'muscles were
bruised, and the left leg perfectly helpless.
He got the wound healed, but on account of
the sevPre bruh1e of the muscles the leg be<mme paralyzed and useless. On Leing asked
whether he thought she could be helped when
he flr.1t saw her, he stated that he did not
know but she might ; that she might be
helµed, and kept for breeding purposes, and
be of some value.
I.t i~ evident from the testimony that the
plamtift acted In good faith in att,.rnpting
the cure, and under the belief that the mare
could be helped, and be of some value. The
<:ourt below, however, seems to have based
its ruling that no greater damages could be
.-ecovered than the value of the animal, and
that these moneys expended in attempting a
cu1e could not be recovered, upon the ground
t!1at the defendant was not consulted in relat1?n to the matter of the attt>mpted cure.
Whatever damages the plainUf sustained
were occasioned by the negl i ~ent comluct of
the defendant, and recovery in such cases is
al ways permitted for such amount as shall
comµensate for the actual los~. H the horse
had Leen killed outright the only loss would
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ha\•e bf'en its actual Yalue. The hor.1e was
seriousl.Y injure~; but th.e plaintiff, acting in
good faith, and m the belief that she might be
helped and made of some value, expended
this 835 in care and medical treatment. He
is the loser of the actual valuti of the horse.
and what he in good faith thus expended.
He Is permitted to recover the valut>, but cut
off from what he has paid out. Tllis is not
compensation.
Counsel for defendant <'Ontentls that such
damages cannot exceed the actual value of
the property lost, because the Joss or destruct i ~n is total. '!'lrnre may be cast's holding to
this rule; b11t it Sl'ems to me the rule is well
stated, and baiwd upon good rt.>:isoil, in Watson v. Bridge, 14 Me. 201, in which the court
says: "l'lainti!T is entitled to a fa ir indl\mnity for his Joss. He has lost the value of
his horse, and also what he has e :qwml ~d in
endeavoring to cure him. The jury having
allowed this part of his claim, it rnusL lie un?erstood t.hat it Wall an expense pr11dPntly
mcurred, m tho 1easonahle expectation th.it
it would prove benellcial. It was incurred,
not to aggravate, but to le11sen the a111ount
for whieh the defendants mi~ht be hehl liable. Hiul it proved successful, they would
have had the benefit or it. 1' s it turned out ·
othnwise, it is but just, in >11r ju<lgment,
that they should susLain thP oss." Iu Murphy v. McGraw, 41 N. W. :tep. 917. it appeared on the trial that tht' hor,,e was worlhless at the time of purchase by reason of a
disease calletl "eczema." The court charr"tl
the jury that If the plaintiff was led by defendant to keep on trying to curt'! the horse
the expense therrof would be chargPalile to the
defendant, as would also be the case if there
were any circumstances, in the judgment of
the jury. which rendered it. rem1onahle that.
he should keep 011 trying as long as he did to
effect the cure. The plaintiff recovered for
such expense und on the hearing here the
cllarge of the trial court wa.'! held correct.
It is a question, nnder the circuihstances,
for the jury to determine whether the plaintiff acted in good faith, and upon a reasonable belief that the horse could be cure<l, or
made of some value, if properly taken care
of; and the trial court was in erri>r in withdrawing that part. of the case from tlwm.
Such damagt-s, of course, must always be
confined within rea..<ionable bounds, and 110
one would be justified, under any circumstances, in expending more than the animal
was worth in attempt ing a cure. This is the
only erro1· we nee:I notice. 'fhe judgment
of the court below must be rever:sed, with
costs, and a new trial ordered.
CHAMPLIN and MORSE, JJ., concurreil
with LO:NG, J.
SHERWOOD, 0. J.
sult.

I concur In the re-

CAM P BELL, .J. I think the rule laid
down at the circuit t11e proper one.
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SILSBURY v. M(C0().\' et al.1

(8 N. Y. 379.)

Court of Appeals of New York. July. 1850.

This was an action of trover for a quantity

of whisky. On the ﬁrst trial before Willard,

circuit judge, at the Montgomery circuit, in

May, 1843, the plaintiffs were nonsuited.

The supreme court on bill of exceptions set

aside the nonsuit, and ordered a new trial.

See 6 Hill, 425. The case was again tried

in November, 1844, before the same judge.

On that trial it was proved that one Hack-

ney, a deputy of the sheriff of Montgomery

county, on the 22d of March, 1842, by virtue

ﬁ1f a ﬂeri facias issued on a judgment in the

‘supreme court in favor of \IcCoon and Sher-

man, the defendants, against Uriah Wood,

sold the whisky in question, being about

twelve hundred gallons, having made a pre-
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vious levy thereon; and that upon the sale

the defendants became the purchasers, and

afterward converted it to their own use. The

whisky was levied on and sold at the distil-

lery of the plaintiffs, who forbade the sale.

The plaintlffs having rested, the defendants

offered to prove, in their defense, that the

whisky was manufactured from corn belong-

“lg to Wood, the defendant in the execution:

that the plaintiffs had taken the corn and

manufactured it into whisky without any au-

thority from Wood, and knowing at the time

they took the corn that it belonged to him.

The plaintiffs' counsel objected to this evi-

dence, insisting that Wood‘s title to the corn

was extinguished by its conversion into whis-

ky. The circuit judge sustained the objection

and refused to receive the evidence. The de-

fendants‘ counsel excepted. The plaintiffs

had a verdict for the value of the whisky,

which the supreme court refused to set aside.

See 4 Denio, 332. After judgment the de-

fendants brought error to this court, where

the cause was ﬁrst argued by Mr. Hill, for

the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Reynolds, for

the defendants in error. in September, 1848.

Court of Appeals of New York. July. 1850.
This was an action of trover for a quantity
of whisk)·. On the first trial before Wlllanl,
drcult judge, at the Montgomery circuit, In
May, 18!3, the plalntilTs were nonsulted.
The supreme court on bill of exceptions set
ni<ide the nonsuit, and ordered a new trial.
~e 6 Hill, 425. The case was again tried
in November, 1844, before the same judge.
On that trial 1t WRB proved that one Hackney, a deputy of the sherltr of }lontgomery
county, on the 22d of llarch, 1842, by virtue
K,t a fierl faclas Issued on a judgment In the
supreme court In favor of McCoon and Sherman, the defendants, against Uriah Wood,
i;oJ<l the whisky In question, being about
twelve hundred gallons, having made a previous levy thereon; and that upon the sale
the defendants became the purchasers, and
afterward converted it to their own use. The
whisky was levied on amt sold at the distillery of the plalntltrs, who forbade the sale.
The plalntllTs having rested, the defendants
olTered to pro;e, In their defense, that the
whisky was manufactured from corn belonging to Wood, the defendant In the execution;
that the plalntltTs had· taken the corn and
manufactured 1t Into whisky without any authority from "'ood, and knowing at the time
they took the com that It belonged to him.
The _plaintiffs' counsel objected to this evldenee, ll!slstlng that Wood's tltle to the com
was t-xtlngulshed by Its conversion Into whisky. The circuit judge sustained the objection
and refused to receh:e the evidence. The defendants' counsel excepted. The plalntltrs
had a verdict for the value of the whisky,
which the su11reme court refused to set aside.
See 4 Denio, 332. After judgment the defendants brought error to this court, where
the cause was first argued by Mr. Hill, ror
the plalntltTs In error, and Mr. Reynolds, for
the defendants In error, In September, 1848.
The judges being divided In opinion. a. reargument was ordered, which came on In January last.
N. Hill, Jr., for plalntltrs In error. M. T.
Reynolds, for defendants In error.

'l‘he judges being divided in opinion. a rear-

gument was ordered, which came on in Janu-

ary last.

N. Hill, Jr., for plaintiffs in error.

Reynolds, for defendants in error.

M. T.

RUGGLES, II. It is an elementary princi-

ple in the law of all civilized communities,

that no man can be deprived of his property,

except by his own voluntary act, or by opera-

tion of law. The thief who steals a chattel,

or the trespasser who takes it by force, ac-

quires no title by such wrongful taking. The

HUGGLES, J. It le an elementary prlnclpl«> In the law of all clvlll7..ed co01munltles
that no man can be deprl;ed of his property:
except by his own voluntary act, or by operation of law. The thief who steals a chattel,
pr the trespasser who takes It by force, acquires no title by such wrongful taking. The
suln:1c>11uent possession by tile thief or the trespasser Is a continu!ng trespass; and If, during
Its continuance, the wrong-doer enhances the
value of the chattels by labor and skill he·
stowed upon It, as by sawing logs Into bourils,
splitting timber Into rails, making leather In-

subsequent possession by the thief or the tres-

passer is a continuing trespass; and if, during

its continuance, the wrong-doer enhances the

value of the chattels by labor and skill he-

stowed upon it, as by sawing logs into boards,

splitting timber into rails, making leather in-

1 Dissenting opinion of Bronson, C.J'.,omitted.

to shoes, or iron into bars, or into a tool; the

manufacttn'ed article still belongs to the own-

er of the original material, and he may re-

1

Dissenting opinion of Bronson, C.J., omitted.

to shoes, or Iron Into bars, or Into a tool; tbemanufactured article still belongs to the owner of the original material, and he way retake It or recover !ta Improved value In iw)
action for damages. And If the wrong-doersell the chattel to an honest purchaser having
no notice of the fraud by which It was acquired, the purchaser obtains no title from
the treepaa~r. because the trespasser had
none to give. '.fhe owner of the original material may etlll retake It In Its Improved state,
or he may recover Its Improved value. The
right to the Improved value In damages Is a
consequence of the continued ownership. It ·
.would be absurd to say that the original own-:
er may rt>take the thing by an action of re-'
plPvln In Its Improved state, and yet that hemay not, It put to his action of trespass ortrover, recover Its Improved value In damages. Thus far, It Is conceded .that the com- ·
mon law agrees with the civil.
They agree In another respect, to-wit, that
If the ehattel wrongfully taken afterward'
come Jnto the hands of an Innocent holder
who, believing himself to be the owner, converts the chattel into a thing of different
species, so that Its Identity Is destroyed, the- ·
original owner cannot reclaim It. Such a
change ls 8'8id to be wrought when wheat Is
made Into brt-all. olives Into oil, or grapes
Into wine. In a 111se of this kind the elumge
In the species of the chattel la not an Intentional wrong to the orhdnal owner. It Is.
therefore, rpgarded as a de11tructlon or consumption of the original materials, and tht>
true owner le oot permitted to trace their
Identity Into the manufactured artlde, for
the purpose of appropriating to hie own us1•
the labor and skill of the Innocent occupant
who wrought the change: but be Is put to hi"'
action for damages as for a thing consumed.
and may recover its value as It wns when
the conversion or consumption took place.
There ls great confusion in the books upon
the question what constitutes change of Identity. In one case (Y. B. 5 Hen. VII. p. 15), It ls
said that the owner may reclaim the goods
so long as they may be known, or In other
words, ascertained by Inspection. But this
In many casef! Is by no means the beat evldenee of Identity ; and the examples put by
way of Illustration ser;e rather to disprove
than to establish the rule. The court say
that If grain be made Into malt. It cannot tw
• reclaimed by the owner. because It can not
be known. But If cloth be made Into a cont.
a tree Into squared timber, or Iron Into n
tool, It may. Now as to the cases of the coat
and the ttmber they may or may not be capable of ldentlfieatlon by the senses merely; and
the rule Is enth'ely uncertain In Its appllC'lltlon; n11d as to the Iron tool, It certalnlv cannot be idl'ntitted as made of the orlgln~l material, without other evidence. This lllustrntlo11, therefore, contradicts the rnle. In anol hPr case ()loore, 20), trees were made Into
timhcr, nod It was a rljudged that the owner
of the trees might reclaim the timber, "b<>-
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/cause the greater part of the substance re-

mained." But if this were the true criterion

it would embrace the cases of wheat made in-

to bread, milk into cheese. grain into malt,

and others which are put in the books as ex-

amples of a change of identity. Other writ-

ers say that when the thing is so changed

that it cannot be reduced from its new form

to its former state, its identity is gone. But

this would include many cases in which it has

been said by the courts that the identity is

not gone; as the case of leather made into

a garment, logs into timber or boards, cloth

into a coat, etc. There is. therefore, no deﬂ-

nite settled rule on this question: and al-

though the want of such a rule may create ‘

embarrassment in a case in which the owner

seeks to reclaim his property from the hands

of an honest possessor. it presents no difﬁ-
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culty where he seeks to obtain it from the

wrong-doer; provided the common law agrees

with the civil in the principle applicable to

such a case.

The acknowledged principle of the civil law

is that a willful wrong-doer acquires no prop-

erty in the goods of another, either by the

wrongful taking or by any change wrought

in them by his labor or skill, however great

that change may be. The new product in its

improved state belongs to the owner of the

original materials, provided it be proved to

have been made from them;

loses his labor, and that change which is re-

garded as a destruction of the goods. or an

alteration of their identity in favor of an

honest possessor, is not so regarded as be-

tween the original owner and a willful vio-

lator of his right of property.

These principles are to he found in the Di-

gest of Justinian. Lib. 10, tit. 4, leg. 12, §

3. “If any one shall make wine with my

grapes, oil with my olives, or garments with

my wool, knowing they are not his own, he

shall be compelled by action to produce the

said wine, oil or garments." So in Vinnins‘

Institutes (title 1, pl. 25): "He who knows

the material is another's ought to be consid-

ered in the same light as if he had made the

species in the name of the owner, to whom

also he is to be understood to have given his

labor."

The same principle is stated by Puffendorf

in his law of Nature and of Nations (b. 4, ch.

7. it 10), and in Wood':-x institutes of the Civil

Law tpage 92), which are cited at large in

the opinion of Jewett . J., delivered in this

case in the supreme court (4 Denio, 338), and

which it is unnecessary here to repeat. In

Brown's (iivil and Admiralty Law (page 240),

the writer states the civil law to be that the

uIji]:lntll owner of any thing improved by the

act of another. retained his ownership in the

thing so improved. unless it was changed into

a different species; as if his grapes were

made into wine, the wine belonged to the

maker. who was only obliged to pay the own-

er for the value of his grapes. The species,

however, must be incapable of being restored
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/cause the greater part of the
re- to Its ancient form; and the materials mUiSt
m&lned." But If this were the true criterion have been taken In Ignorance of their being
It would embrace the cases of wheat made In- the property of another.
to bread, mllk Into cheese, grain Into malt,
But 1t wu thought In the court below that
and others which are put In the books as ex- this doctrine had never been adopted into thl'
amples of a change of Identity. Other writ- common law, either in E,ngland or here; and
ers say that when the thing I.a so changed the distinction between a wlllfUl and an Inthat It eannot be reduced from Its new form voluntary wrong-doer herelnbefore mentlonto Its former state, Its Identity Is gone. But ed, was rejected not only on that ground but
this w<>uld Include many Cll8e8 In which It baa also because the rule was supposed to be too
heen snld by the courts that the Identity is harsh and rigorous against the wrong-doer.
not gone; as the case of leather made Into
It le true that no case has been found In
n garmPnt, Jogs Into timber or boards, cloth the English books In which that distinction
into a eoat, etc. There Is, therefore, no def\- has hPen expressly recognized; but It Is
nlte settled rule on this question; and al- Pqnally true that In no case until the present
though the want of sucn a rule may create has It been rPpudlated or denied. The comt-mbarrnssment In a case In which the owner mon law on this subject waa evidently borseeks to reclaim bis property from the hands rowed from the Roman at an early day; and.
of an honest posseBBor. it pre11Pnts no dim- at a period when the common law furnished
culty where he seeks to obtain It from the no rule whatever In a case of this kind. Bracwrong-doer; provided the common law agrt>es ton, in his treatise compiled In the reign of
with the civil In the principle a1>plleuhle to Henry III., adopted a portion of Justinian's
such a case.
Institutes on this 11ubject without noticing
Tht> neknow!l'llged prlndplt> of the civil law the distinction; and Blackstone, In bis Cowls tbftt a willful wrong-doer lll'qulres no prop- meutarles (voluuw 2, p. 404:), In stating what
c·rty In the goods ot another, t>lther by the the Roman law was, follows Bracton, but nelwrongtul taking or by any change wrought tber or these wrltPrs intimate that on tbP
In them by his labor or skill, however great point In question there ls any dltlerence he·
that change may be. The new product In Its tween the civil and the common lnw. The
lm11roved state belongs to the owner of the authorities referred to by Blackstone In sup.
original materials, provided It be proved to 11ort of his text are three only. '.rbe first In
have been made from tht>m; the trespasser Brooks' Abridgement, tit "Property." 2.1, Is
loses his labor, and that change wbl<'h Is re- the case from the Year Book, 5 H. VII. p. Hi
gR!'ded ll8 a destruction of the good!!. or an (translated In a note to 4 Denio, 33~. In whleh
alteration of their Identity In favor of an the owner of leather brought trespass for
honest possel!SOr, Is not so regarded as be- taking slippers and boots, and the defendant
tween the original ownPr and a wlllful vlo- pleaded that he was the owner of the leatht•r
lator of his right of profl(>rty.
I and balled It to J. S., who gave It to the
These principles are to be found In the Dl- plalntlt't, who manufactured it Into slippers
gest of Justinian. Lib. 10, tit. 4, leg. 12, t and boots, and the defendant took them as
a. "If any one shall make wine with my he lawfully might. The plea was held good
grapes, oil with my olives, or garments with and the title of the owner of the leather unmy wool, knowlni;c they are not bis own, he changed. The second reference Is to a case
shall be compelled by rwtlon to produce the In Sir Francis Moor's Reports (page 20), In
said wine, oil or garments." So In Vlnnlus' which the action was trespass for taking
Institutes (title 1, pl. 2;)): "He who knows timber, and the defendant justitled on the
thP matnlal Is another's ought to be ronsld- ground that A. entered on bis land and eut
•·red In the same light as If ht> had Wllde the down trees and made timber thereof, and car11pecles in the name ot the owner, to whom rled It to the place where the trespass was
also he Is to be understood to have given his alleged to have bPl'n committed, and aft1>1·labor."
ward gave It to the plalntlft', and that thP
Thf' R8.1De principle Is stated by Putrendorf detendant, therefore, took the timber as ht•
In hl11 law of Nature and of Nations (h. 4, cb. lawfully might. In these cases the ehattrh•
i. • 10), and In Wood'11 ln1<tltnte!'I of the Civil bad pas11ed from the hands of the original
Law 1p:1g!' 92), which arl' cited at large In trespasser llfto thl' hands of a third per.sou:
the opinion of Jewet~ J., delivered In this In both It was held that the title ol' the orlic·
l"ase In the 11upreme court (4 Denio, 3.~). and lnal owner was unchanged, and that ht> hn1I 11
which It Is unnecessary here to repeat. In right to the property In Its Improved statP
Brown's Civil and Admiralty Law (pnge 240), agalnRt the third person In 1>ossesslon. Tlwr
the wrltPr !'ltates the civil law to ht> that the are In conformity with the rule of the civil
n~lglual own1>r of any thing lmprovt>d hy the
law; and certainly fall to prove any dilTt>r·
1H't of anoth1>r, l'l'talned bis owm•rshlp In the
ence between the clvll and the common lnw
thing 110 hnprovptl, unless It was d11mged Into on the point In question. The third case cit·
11 dltrt>rl'nt RJl!'dPs;
as If bis grapt•s were ed le from Popbam"s Reports (page 38), and
mnde Into wine, the wine belong1><l to the was a case of conl'u!'lon of goods. The plain·
111akpr, who wns only ohllgPd to pay the own- tltr voluntarily mixed bis own hay with the
1•r tor thP vahtt! of his grapes. 'l'he spPcles, hay of the defendant, who carried the whole
however, must be Incapable of being restored away, for which be was sued In trespm•s:
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and it was adjudged that the whole should

go to the defendant; and Blackstone refers to

this case in support of his text, that “our

law to guard against fraud gives the entire

property, without any account, to him whose

original dominion is invaded and endeavored

to be rendered uncertain without his own

consent." The civil law in such a case would

have required him who retained the whole of

the mingled goods to account to the other for

his share (Just. Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, § 28); and

the common law in this ‘particular appears to

be more rigorous than the civil; and there is

no good reason why it should be less so in a

case like that now in hand, where the neces-

sity of guarding against fraud is even greater

than in the case of a mingling of goods, be-

cause the cases are likely to be of more fre-

quent occurrence. Even this liability to ac-
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count to him whose conduct is fraudulent

seems by the civil law to be limited to cases

in which the goods are of such a nature that

they may be divided into shares or portions,

according to the original right of the parties;

for by that law if A. obtain by fraud the

parchment of B. and write upon it a poem, or

wrongfully take his tablet and paint there-

on a picture, B. is entitled to the written

accounting for the value of the writing or

of the picture. Just. Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, §§ 23,

24. Neither Bracton nor Blackstone have point-

ed out any difference except in the case of

confusion of goods between the common law

and the Roman, from which on this subject

our law has mainly derived it principles.

So long as property wrongfully taken re-

tains its original form and substance. or may

be reduced to its original materials, it be-

longs, according to the admitted principle

of the common law, to the original owners

without reference to the degree of improve-

ment. or the additional value given to it by

the labor of the wrong-doer. Nay more, this

rule holds good against an innocent purchaser

from the wrong-doer, although its value be

increased an hundred fold by the labor of the

purchaser. This is a necessary consequence

of the continuance of the original ownership.

There is no satisfactory reason why the

wrongful conversion of the original materials

into an article of a different name or a differ-

ent species should work a transfer of the

title from the true owner to the trespasser,

provided the real identity of the thing-can

be traced by evidence. The diﬂiculty of prov-

ing the identity is not a good reason. It re-

lates merely to the convenience of the tem-

edy, and not at all to the right. There is

no more diﬁiculty or uncertainty in proving

that the whisky in question was made of

Wood's corn, than there would have been in

proving that the plaintiff had made a cup

of his gold. or a tool of his iron; and yet in

those instances. according to the English

cases, the prooi.I would have been unobjec-

tionable. In all cases where the new pro-

duct cannot be identiﬁed by mere inspection,

the original material must be traced by the
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and it was adjudged that the whole should
go to the defendant; and Blackstone refers to
this case In support of his text, that "our
law to guard against fraud gives the entire
property, without any account, to him whose
original dominion Is Invaded and endeavored
to ·be rendered uncertain without his own
consent." '£he civil law In such a case would
have required him who retained the whole of
the mingled goods to account to the other for
his share (Just. Inst Ub. 2, tit l, § 28); and
the common law in this particular appears to
be more rigorous than the civil; and there Is
no good reason why It should l.Je less so In a
case like that now In hand, where the neces!!lty of guarding against fraud Is even greater
than In the case of a mingling of goods, becnuse the cases are likely to be of mo1·e frequent occurrence. Even this liability to account to him whose conduct Is fraudulent
seems by the civil law to be lhulted to cases
In which the goods are of such a nature that
they may be divided Into shares or portions,
accordin;;: to the original right of the parties;
for by that law If A. obtaln by fraud the
parchment of B. and write upon it a poem, or
wrongfully take his tablet and paint there•
on a picture, B. ls entitled to the written
parchment and to the painted tablet, without
accounting for the value of the writing or
of the picture. Just. Inst. lib. 2, tit. l, §§ 23,
24. Neither Brncton nor Blackstone have pointed out any dift'erence except In the case of
eonfusion of goods between the common law
and the Roman, from which on this subject
our law has mainly derived Its principles.
So long as property wrongfully taken ret.nins Its original form and substance, or may
be reduced to Its original materials, It belongs, according to the admitted principle
of the common law, to the original owners
without reference to the degree of Improvement. or the additional value given to It by
the labor of the wrong-doer. ~ay more, this
rule holds good against an Innocent purchaser
from the wrong-doer, although Its value be
increased an hundred fold by the labor of the
purchaser. This ls a necessary consequence
of the continuance of the original ownership.
There Is no satisfactory reason why the
wrongful conversion of the original materials
Into an article of a different name or a dlft'erent species should work a transfer of the
title from the true owner to the trespasser,
provhled the real Identity of the thing ·can
be traced by evidence. The dlftlculty of proving the Identity Is not a good reason. It relates merely to the convenience of the remedy, and not at all to the right. There Is
no more dlftlculty or uncertainty In proving
that the whisky In question was made of
·woorrs corn, than there would have been Ill
proving that the plalntllr had made a cup
of his gold, or a tool of his Iron; and yet In
those lnstnncel'!, according to the English
cnses, the proof would hnve been unobjectionable. In all cases where the new product cannot be Identified by mere Inspection,

the original material must be traced by the
testimony of witnesses from hand to haml
through the process of transformation.
Again: The court below seem to have rejected the rule of the civil law applicable to
this ca.se, and to have adopted a principle
not heretofore known to the common law;
and for the reason that the rule of the civil
law was too rigorous upon the wrong-doer
1n depriving him of the benefit of his labor
bestowed upon the goods wrongfull~· taken.
But we think the civil law In this respect Is
In conformity not only with plain principles
of morality, but supported by cogent reasons
of public policy; while the rule adopted by
the court below leads to the absurdjty of
treating the willful trespasser with greater
kindness and mercy than It !"hows to the Innocent possessor of another man's goods. A
single example may suffice to prove this to be
so. A trespasser takes a quantity of Iron ore
belonging to another and converts It Into Iron,
thus rhanglng the species and Identity of the
article; the owner of the ore may recover Its
value In trover or trespass; but not the value
of the Iron, because under the rule of the
court below It would be unjust and rlgoroui1
to deprive the trespasser of the value of bis
labor In the transmutation. But If the same
trespasser steals the Iron and sells It to an
Innocent purchaser, who works It Into cutlery, the owner of the Iron may recover of
the purchaser the value of the cutlery, be·
cause by this process the original material Is
not destroyed, but rema1ns, and may be 11"·
duced to Its former state; and according to
the rule adopted by the court below as to
the change of Identity the original ownerslllp
remains. Thus, the Innocent purchaser Is
deprived of the value of his labor, while the
guilty trespasser Is not.
Tbe rule adopted by the court below seems.
therefore, to be objectionable, because It operates unequally and unjustly. It not only
divests the true owner of his title, without
his consent, but It obliterates the distinction
maintained by the civil law, and as we think
by the common law, between the guilty and
the Innocent; and abolishes a salutary check
ag:iinP-t violence and fraud upon the right!! of
property.
We think, moreover, that the law on thl~
subject has been settled by judicial declslon11
In this country. In Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns.
349. it was decided that as against a trespasser the original owner of tpe property may
seize It In Its new shape, whatever alteration
of form It may have undergone, If he cnn
prove the Identity of the original materials.
That was a case In which the defendant bad
cut down the plaintiff's trees and made them
Into !!hlngles. The property could neither br
ldt•ntified by Inspection nor restored to It!!
original form; but the plaintiff recovered thf'
value of the shingles. So, In Ourtls v. Groat.
6 Johns. 169, a trespasser cut wood on another's land and com·erted It Into charcoal.
It was held that the charcoal still belonged
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to the owner of the wood. Here was I.

change of the wood into an article of different

kind and species. No part of the substance

of the wood remained in its originhl state;

its identity could not be ascertained by the

senses, nor could it be restored to what it

originally was. That case distinctly recog-

nizes the princlpie that a willful trespasser

cannot acquire a title to property merely by

changing it from one species to another. And

the late Chancellor Kent, in his Commenta-

ries (volume 2, p. 363), declares that the Eng-

lish law will not allow one man to gain a ti-

tie to the property of anmner upon the prin-

ciple of accession, it he took the other's prop-

erty willfully as a trespasser; and that it

was settled as early as the time of the Year

Books, that whatever alteration of form any

property had undergone, the owner might
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seize it in its new shape it he could prove the

identity of the original materials.

The same rule has been adopted in Penn-

sylvania. Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle. 427.

And in Maine and Massachusetts it has been

applied to a willful lutermixture of goods.

Ryder v. Hatinnvay. 21 Pick. 304, 305; Win-

gntc v. Smith, 7 Shep. 287; Willard v. Rice,

11 Metc. (.\Iass.) 493.

We are, therefore, of opinion that if the

piaintiffs below, in converting the corn into

whisky, knew that it belonged to VVood, and

that they were thus using it in violation of

his right, they acquired no title to the manu-

factured article, which, although changed

from the original material into another of dif-

ferent nature, yet, being the actual product

of the corn, still belonged to Wood. The

evidence offered by the defendants and re-‘

jected by the circuit judge ought to have

been admitted.

The right of Wood's creditors to seize the

whisky by their execution is a necessary con-

sequence of Wood's ownership. Their right

is paramount to his, and of course to his elec-

tion to sue in trover or trespass for the corn.

The judgment of the supreme court should

be reversed and a new trial ordered. Judg-

ment reversed.

GARDIXER, JEWEl‘T,

PRATT, JJ., concurred.

IH'liLlil;"l‘, and

BRONS()N. C. J., and HARRIS, J., dissent.

TAYLOR, J., did not hear the argument,

and gave no opinion.

to the owner of the wood. Here was a
1·hange of the wood Into an article of different
kind and spe<'le11. :Xo part of the substnnce
of the wood rewalnPd In Its orlgiu\l st!lte;
Its Identity could not be ascertained by the
81'Dlles, nor could It be restor.e d to what It
originally was. That case distinctly re1.."0gulzes the prlnl'lpie that a willful treKpasser
C 1·1mnot acquire a title to property merely by
\ •·hanging lt from one species to another. And
the late Chancellor Kent, In bis Commentaries (volume 2, p. 863). declare11 that the Engll11h law will not allow one man to gain a title to the property of anotner upon the prlndple of accession, If be took the other's propPrty willfully as a trespasser: and that It
was settled as early as the time of the Year
Books, that whatever altnlltlon of form any
11ropt>rty had undt•rgone, the ownE'!r mlitllt
seize It In Its new shape If he could pron! th1•
Identity ut tht• original materials.
The 81\DlP rule has been adopted In Penn11ylvanla. ~uyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawlt>, 4:!7.
And In ~lulnt> and :Mall88chusetts It has ht>Pll
11ppllecl to u willful lntermlxturE'! of good11.
Hyder v. Hatlmway. 21 Pick. 304, 305; Wingate ,.. ~ml th, 7 Shep. 287; Willard v. Rice,
11 Mt>tc. (:Mau.) 493.

I

We are, therefore, of opinion that if the
plaintiffs below, in converting the corn Into
whisky, knew that It belonged to Wood, and
that they were thus using 1t In violation of
his right, they acquired no title to the manufactured article, which, althou~h changed
from the original material Into another of different nature, yet, bt>ing the actual product (
of the corn, still belonged to Wood. Thl'
evidence offered by the defendants and re'
jected by thl-l circuit judge ought to bave
been admitted.
The right of Wood's creditors to seize the
whisky by their execution ls a neces11nry consequence of Wood's ownership. Their right
is paramount to his, and of course to his elp1··
tlon to sue lo trover or trespass for the com.
The judgment of the supreme court shoulil
be reversetl and a new trial or1lered. Judgment rever8('1),
GARDl:XER, JEW:h.'TT, Hl"I<LBFT, ancl
PRATT, JJ., concurred.
BHO~SO:X,

C. J., and HAHHI8, J., dissent.

TAYLOH, J., did not hear the argument.
and gaye no opinion.
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(7 N. W. 85, 54 lewa, 632.)
DAMAGES FOR 1NJUan:s"ro raornurr.

OLEMENT v. DUFFY.

(7 N. W. 85. 54 Iowa, 632.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. Oct. 21, 1880.

Appeal from circuit court, Wright county.

( This is an action of replevin for 225 bushels

of wheat. The writ was issued on the twen-

ty-sixth day of September, 1879, and the

wheat being in stack, the sherif f delivered it

to the plaintiff, who proceeded to thresh and

market it. Each party claimed to be the ab-

solute owner of the grain. The trial was had

on the nineteenth day of November, 1879.

A jury was empanelied, and the plaintiff in-

troduced his evidence, wherenpon the court,

on motion of the defendant, withdrew from

the jury the question of ownership and right

of possession, and rendered judgment there-

for in favor of the defendant. By the agree-

ment of the parties, the question of the as-
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sessment of damages and the value of the

property was also withdrawn from the jury'

and submitted to the court.

It was admitted that the wheat in contro-

versy consisted of 225 bushels, and that on

the day the same was taken from the defend-

ant. under the writ of replevin, wheat was

Itorth. in the nearest market, 65 cents per

i

‘ bushel in the nearest market.

ushel; that after the taking and before the

day of trial the wheat advanced in value.

and the highest value in the nearest market

during said interval was one dollar a bushel;

that plaintiff sold the same in market at 90

cents a bushel; that the threshing and haul-

ing to market were worth 20 cents a bushel.

The defendant offered to prove that wheat

of the quality of that in controversy was,

at the time of the trial, worth one dollar per

This evidence

was objected to, and the objection was sus-

tained, and defendant excepted. No further

evidence having been introduced, the court

held that the defendant was entitled to re-

cover the value of the wheat at the nearest

...

Supreme Court of Iowa. Oct. 21, 1880.
Appeal from circuit court, Wright county.
( This Is an action of replevln for 225 bushels
of wheat. The writ was issued on the twenty-sixth day of September, 1879, and the
wheat being In stack, the sherur delivered It
to the plalntUf, who proceeded to thresh and
market It. Each party claimed to be the absolute owner of the grain. 'l'he trial was had
ou the nineteenth day ot Nov1m1ber, 1879.
A jury was empanelled, and the plalntltr Introduced his evidence, whereupon the court,
on motion of the defendant, withdrew from
the jury the question of ownership and right
-0f possession, and rendered judgment therefor In favor of the defendant. By the agreement of the parties, the question of the assessment of damages and the value of the
property was also withdrawn from the Jury
and submitted to the court.
It was admitted that the wheat In controversy consisted of 225 bushels, and that on
the day the same was taken from the defendant. under the writ of replevln, wheat was
jvorth: In the nearest market, 65 centa per
bushel; that after the taking and before the
( day of trial the wheat advanced In value,
and the highest value In the nearest market
during said Interval was one dollar a bushel;
that plalntilf sold the same in market at 00
cents 11 bushel; that the threshing and hauling to market were worth 20 cents a bushel.
The defendant -olfered to prove that wheat
of the quality of that In controversy was,
at the time of the trial, worth one dollar per
bushel In the nearest market. This evidence
·was objected to, and the objeetlon was sustained, and defendant excepted. :No further
evidence having been Introduced, the court
held that the defendant was entitled to recover the value of the wheat at the nearest
market on the day the same was taken under
the writ of repl~ln, less the ex)'lense of
threshing and marketing, without regard to
the subsequent advance In value, and without regard to the price actually obtained by
plalnt!lf, auil n•udered Judgment accordingly.
Defendant appeals.
S. M. Weaver, !or appellant.

I

market on the day the same was taken under

the writ of replevin, less the expense of

threshing and marketing. without regard to

the subsequent advance in value, and with-

out regard to the price actually obtained by

plaintiff. and rendered judgment accordingly.

Defendant appeals.

S. Weaver, for appellant.

ROTHROCK, J. 1. The only question to

be determined is the measure of damages

which the defendant is entitled to recover.

It is claimed that he should receive the high-

est market price up to the time of the trial.

The action of repievin, or for the recovery

of speciﬁc personal property. as it is de-

nominated in the Code, is a contest for prop-

crty and not for damages. Where an issue

is made in the action. each party claims that

he is entitled to the possession of the prop-

erty. The property is the primary subject of

the conirovers_v. Ordinarily the plaintiff ex-

ecutes the bond provided for in section 3229,

and the property is delivered to him. The

ROTHROCK, J. 1. The oqiy question to
be dl'termlnl'd Is the measure of damages
whil'h th!.' defendant Is entitled to recon•r.
It Is dnlmed th:it he should rel'eh'e the highest marke t prlc<' up to the time of the trial.
Tile action of replevln, or for the recovery
of spi>C'lfic pe1·sonal propert~·. as It Is denominated In the Cude, Is a eontest for prop1•rty and not for damni:res. Where an Issue
i); nrnlle in the Bl'tlon. P:H'h party cluims that
be Is entitled to the possession of the property. The property is the primary subject of
thf' 1•0J>ll'o\'er11y. Orcllnarlly the plalntllf executes the bond provided for In section 3229,
:md the proprrty Is delh·ered to hlm. The

obligation ot his bond la "that he will appear
at the next term of the court and prosecuh•
his suit to judgment, and return the prop·
· erty If 'a return be awarded, and also pay
all costs and damages that may be adjudged
against him."
By section 3238 the jury are required to ai.sess the value of the property, as also th1•
damages tor taking or detention thereof. Wt·
think, where the plalntllf seizes the property
upon his writ, and the .defendant succeeds In
the action and ls found to be the absolute
owner ot the property, and Is therefore entitled to Its return, that the value should be
assessed as ot the time of the trial. Such Is
the obligation of the bond. The plalntlft'
thereby undertakes to deliver the property to
the defendant In case a return be awarded.
If he has In the meantime, by a sale of the
property or otherwise, put It out of his power
to make the delivery required by the bond.
he must render Its equivalent as of the tlmt>
when the delivery should have been made.
The case Is not different In principle from an
ordinary sale of property to be delh•ered lu
the future. In this case the grain Increased
In value pending the action. It Is property
of that character which ftuctuates in value.
If It had decreased In value the measure of\
the defendant's recovery would still be tlw
':"alue at the time of the trial, with damage'
for the decrease In value, because the defendant, by his bond, undertakes not only to return the property, but also to pay damages;
and the jury are, by section 3238. required to
assess the damages for the taking or detention.
A large number ot authorities have been
cited by counsel for appellant upon the ques·
tlon whether, In an action of trover, the plalntllf Is entitled to recover the value of tb1•
property at the time of the con\·erRlon, or tht•
highest value up to the time of t.he trial.
"'e have examined many casl's upon the subject. A full review of the authorities u1>0n
the question will be found In a note to tht•
sixth edition of Sedgwick on the Measure of
Damages (page 590). Upon the one haml
It Is held that In actions tor the wrongful conversion of stocks and of personal property
of ductuatlng value the men1mre of the dam·
ages Is the highest market price which the
property may have had from the date ot tbt>
conversion to the end of the trial, provided
the action be brought and pressed with proper diligence. Other authorities hold that th1•
value must be limited to the date of the OC'·
tual con\'"erslon of the property. It has beC'11
held by this court that the measure of dam ·
nges for the breach of an exPcntory contriwt
for the purc:hnse of gootls whieh are paid for
in advance Is the higlwst mnrket price up tn
the time of the trial. Cannon v. Ji'olsom. :!
Iowa, 101; Davenport v. Wells, 3 Iowa, 242.
But we need not pursue this Inquiry, nor
determlnr this question. \\'e think It I~ l'lt>:tr
that. by the very ~rrus of the bond, the plaiutllf In this case was hound to account for the

r

INJURIES TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.

INJURIES TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.

:grain and for damages for Its detention, 118
~f the time at which he was hound to deliver
Jt.
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_-grain and for damages for its detention, as

of the time at which he was bound to deliver

it.

2. It is urged by counsel for appellant that

the court erred in deducting from the value

I -of the grain the cost of threshing and market-

ing; and it is said that where a wrong-doer

\expends labor upon the property of another,

\he is not entitled to compensation therefor.

But in this case it does not appear that the

plaintiff knew, when he commenced the ac-

tion and seized the grain, that it was the de-

\,tendant's property. He may have acted in

entire good faith, believing that he was the

owner. We believe the rule should be limit-

ed to wilful wrong-doers. Such eems to

have been the opinion of the court in Sila-

bury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379. The cases

.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

where the question has arisen are mostly

those where it has been claimed that the right

of property may be lost by reason of the

change of identity. See 2 Kent. Comm. 363.

What is said in Stuart v. Phelps, 39 Iowa,

18, upon the subject, should. we think, be

considered as applicable to a wilful trespass.

In our opinion the expense of threshing and

marketing the grain was properly deducted

from the market price. Grain is ordinarily

held for sale on the market. In the stuck

it is of no value as an ar(icle of commerce;

and the plaintiff did no more than what the

defendant would have been required to do to

realize the money upon it.

For the error in assessing the value as of

the time when the grain was seized under

the writ, the judgment must be reversed.

2. It 18 urged by counsel for appellant that
the court rrred In dednetlng from the Yalue
j -of the gmln the cost of tbr!'sblng and marketing; and It Is snld that Wh!'re a wrong-doer
\ t•xpends labor upon the property of another,
1 be Is not entitled to compen!latlon therPfor.
Rut In this case It does not appPnr that the
ph1lntltr knew, when be commt•nced the a1·I tlon and splzed the grain, that It was the de\frmlant's Jlroperty. He may have acted Jn
entlrP good faith, bPllrvlng that be was the
-0wner. We believe the rule should be llwltPd to wilful wrong-doers. Such seems to
have been the opinion of the court In Sile.bury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379. The cases
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where the question has arisen arP. mostly
thoi<P where It has been claimed that the right
of prope1·ty may be lost by relll!on of the
c·hange of Identity. See 2 Kent. Comm. 363.
What Is said In Stuart v. Phelps, 30 Iowa,
18, upon the subject, should. we think, be
considered as applicable to a wilful trespass.
In oar opinion the expense of threshing and
marketing the grain was P'"Operly dedurted
from the market price. Grain ls ordinarily
held for sale on the mnrl:et. In the stn<'k
It Is of no v11lu£> as an article of commerce;
nod the plnlntltr did no more than what the
defPmlant would have be<>n rec111lred to do to
realize the money upon U.
For the error In a!!ses1<lng the value ae of
the time when the grain was seized under
the writ, the Judgment must be reversed.
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JACKSONVILLE, T. & K. W. RY. CO. v. I by its agents.

PENINSULAR LAND. TRANSPORTA-

TION & MANUFACTURING CO.I

(9 South. 661, 27 Fin. 1.)

Supreme Court of Florida. April 25, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Orange county;

John D. Broome, Judge.

J. R. Parrott, Robt. W. Davis, Hammond

~& Jackson, and T. M. Day, Jr., for appei-

lant. Alex. St. Clair-Abrams and Beggs &

i'almer, for appellee.

RANEY, C. J. This is an appeal from a

judgment recovered against appellant by the

appeilee in April, 1890, for the sum of $52,-

909.03 and costs, in an action of trespass.

The amended declaration states that the

defendant, who is a corporation under the

laws of Florida, on April 9, v1888, owned,
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controlled, managed, and operated a railroad

from the town of Sanford, in Orange county,

to Tavares, in Lake county, in this state,

known as the “Sanford & Lake Eustis Divi-

sion of the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key

West Railway Company;" and that at the

same time. and at the time of the construc-'

tion of the said Sanford & Lake Eustis road.

the plaintiff. a body corporate under the

laws of this state, was the owner of certain

buildings in Tavares, to wit: The Peninsu-

lar Hotel, of the value of $40,000; a store

building on Tavares boulevard,‘ at the corner

of New Hampshire avenue, of the value of

$0,000; and another store building, on the

same boulevard, and near the same avenue,

of the value of $2,000;

valued at $1,500; one cottage, on East Ruby

street, valued at $600; another at the corner

of the same street and Joanna avenue, valued

at $500; two other cottages on the same ave-

nue, valued, respectively, at $500 and $400;

and one on Texas avenue, valued at $400;

and that the plaintiff was at the time stated

the owner of the following personal property,

viz.: The furniture and entire outﬁt of the

hotel, oi.‘ the value of $16,000; the counters,

shelves, cases, etc., in the ﬁrst-named store,

of the value of $1,000; chairs, tables, maps,

desks, life-preservers, and harness of the

value of $1,000; one outﬁt of printing ma-

terial, of the value of $1,200,—the buildings,

tenements, and personal property aggregat-

ing in value the sum of $72,100. That the

railroad was constructed along Tavares bou-

lcvard, within 150 feet of plaintiﬂ"s stores

and hotel, and within 1,000 feet of all the

other above-described property; and that de-

fendant, although well aware of the inﬂam-

mable nature of the material of which the

buildings, tenements, and personal property

were composed, and of their liability to take

lire, negligently and carelessly permitted its

locomotive engines, operated and controlled

I Portion of opinion omitted.

one livery stable, -

servants, and employee to

be run along the said boulevard without tak-

ing necessary and proper precaution to pre-

DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO PROPER'.rY.

JACKSONVILLE, T. & K. W. RY. CO. v. • by Its agents. servants, and employ(!s to
PENINSULAR LAND. TRANSPORTAbe run along the said boulevard without takTION & MANUFACTURING co.1
ing necessary and proper precaution to prevent sparks of fl.re escaping from the smoke(9 South. 661, 27 Fin. 1.)
stack of the locomotive engines, thereby endangering the pro1w1·ty of. the plalntU'l' to deRnpreme Court of Florida. April 25, 1891.
struction by fire; aud that, on the morning
Appeal from circuit court, Orange county; of the day aforesaid, the defendant's train of
.John D. Broome, Judge.
cars, drawn by one of Its locomotive engines,
J. R. Parrott, Robt. W. Davis, Hammond and controlled, managed, and operated by
· & .Jnckson, and T. M . Day, Jr., tor appel- one .of Its employ~. agents, and servants,
hlnt. Alex. St. Clair-Abrams and Begg11 & started from the said boulevard for Sanfo1·d,
the said locomotive not having a spark-arI 1:1hner, tor appellee.
rester therein, (If there was any spark-arrester at all,) so aITanged as to prevent the esIlAXEY, O. J. This ls an appeal from a cape ot sparks from the smoke-stack; and
judgment recovered agalnRt appellant by the the defendant having negligently, recklessly,
appellee In April, 1890, tor the sum of $52,- and carelessly omitted and failed to exercise
909.03 and costs, In an action of trespass.
due care and precautlon to prevent the escape
The amended declnratlon states that the j of sparks of fl.re from the smoke-stack or
defendant, who Is a corporation under the said locomotive engine, and not t>.xerclslng
laws of Florida, on April 9, .1888, owned, due care and dlllgence In managing, controlcontrolled, managed, and operated a railroad ling, and operating the locomotive. It, the said
from the town ot Sanford, In Orange county, locomotfre, there being at the time of leaving
to Tavares, In Lake rounty, In this state, said boulenrd, and before, a high wind
kuowu as the "Sanford & Lake Eustis Divi- blowing, threw out from Its smoke-stack a
sion of the Jacksonville, Tampa & Key considerable number of sparks and blazing
"'est Railway Company;" and that at the fragments of wood, which then and there
same time, and at the time of the construe-· set fl.re to a certain wooden sidewalk on said
tlon ot the said Sanford & Lake Eustis road. boulevard, and the fl.re was communicated
the plalntllT, a body corporate under the . to the adjacent buildings, Including the plainlaws of this state, was the owner of certain I tiff's said hulldlngs. tenements, and personal
hnlldlngs In Tavares, to wit: The Penlnsu- , property, and plaintiff's properties aforesaid
lnr Hotel, ot the Yalue of $4(),000; a store : were, all and each of them, totally destroyed
building on Tavares boulevard; at the corner by said fire; the plalutur being without fault.
of :Sew Hampshire avenue, of the value of and unable to arrest or prevent the spread
$6,000; and another store building, on the of the fire, which fire was caused by the
snme boulevard, and near the same avenue, gros~ negligence of dE'fendant In not exercisot the value of $2,000; one liver~· stable, ing due care am.I preeautlon In preventln:r
valned at $1,500; one cottage, on East Uuby the escape of the sparks from the locomotlvl';
street, valued at $600; another at the corner ' the plalntltr claiming '75,000 damages.
of the same street and Joanna avenue, valued
at $500; two other cottages on the same aveVII. As to the measure of damages, the folnue, valued, respectively, at $~00 and $4-00; lowJn11: lnstruc>tlons. numbered here as In tbe
and one on Texas avenue, valued at $400; rerortl. were given to the jury:
and that the plalntltr was at the time stated
"(21) That the nwnsure of dawuge In cases
the owner of the following personal property, of this kind Is the value of the property at
\'lz.: The furniture and t>ntlre outfit of the the time It was destroyed, wltll Interest at the
hotel, of the value of $16,000; the counters, rate of 8 per cent. per annum; that the Jury
shelves, cases, etc., In the first-named store, have the rll{ht to arriYe at this value from
of the value of $1,000; chairs, tables, maps, the testimony of the witnesses, of the weight
desks, life-preservers, and harnes11 of the and credibility of which they are thE' sole
Ynlue of $1,000; one outfit of printing ma- judges." (117th error assigned.)
terial, 1>t the value of $1,200,-the buildings,
"(8) [General charge by the court:] It the
tent>ments. and personal property aggregat- jury believe from the evlclencl' that the fire
ing In Ynlue the sum of $72,100. '!'hat the which destroyed plaintiff's propt>l"ty was causrallroa1l was eou~tnicted along Tavares boll• ed, as laid clown In the declaration, by the
levurcl, within trio fePt or plalntllT's stores negllgt>tl<'e of the defendant as a proximate
and hotel, and within 1,000 fe<'t ot all the <'ause, and that no n(>gllgence of the plalotlll'
other above-deR<'rlbPd property; and that de· c01wurrt>d as l'Ontrlbutlng to thL• result, the
fendant, although well aware ot the Inflam- plalutllT Is (>ntltled to recoYer from the demable nature of the material or which the fendant the value of the property destroyed
Imlldiugs, t!'nen•ents, and per1mnnl prop!'rty at the time and place of Its destruction, which
were composed, and of their llnl>lllty to take value you must a1·rlve at from the 1wldence.
fl.re, negligently and l'arelessly permitted Its with eight per cent. per annum lntt>rest added
locomoth·e engines, oiwrated and controlled from the 9th of April, 18AA, t.o this tlnw."
(1:l8th error assigned.)
1 Portion of opinion omitted.
l:pon the same question the following In1
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structions were asked for by the defense, and

refused to be given by the court, numbered

here also, as in the record. to-wit:

“(28) The court instructs the jury that,

should they ﬁnd from the evidence that the

defendant is liable for the burning of plain-

tiff's property, in estimating the damages for

the property destroyed they must be govern-

ed by the market value of the property at the

time and place it was destroyed." (Its re-

fusal is assigned as the 128th error.)

W29) That it devolves upon the plaintiff to

prove by a preponderance of evidence, the

market value of the property destroyed." (Its

refusal is assigned as the 129th error.)

“(30) That, should the jury ﬁnd from the

evidence that defendant is liable for the

burning of plaintiffs property, in estimating

the damags resulting therefrom they are con-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ﬂned to the market value of the property de-

stroyed at the time and place of its destruc-

tion, and they are not to be governed alone

by the cost of the property to the plaintiff;

bufthey may take into consideration the age

of the property destroyed, its deterioration

from use, its situation, the quality of its ma-

terials. and all other facts given in evidence

which bear on the market value of the proper-

ty at the time and place it was destroyed."

(Its refusal is assigned as the 130th error.)

The law as to what is the “measure of dam-

age" in the abstract, in cases where the prop-

crty of one has been destroyed, unintentional-

ly, but by the negligence or carelessness of

another, where there is no element of will-

fuiness or maliciousness in the destruction, is

well settled to be “just compensation in mon-

ey for the property destroyed;" such an

amount as will fully restore the loser to the

same property status that be occupied before

the destruction. To arrive at the amount of

such compensation. inquiry, in the absence

of malice, is necessarily conﬁned strictly to

the ascertainment of the value of the proper-

ties destroyed, with such incidents of inter-

est for the retention of such value from the

person entitled thereto as may be sanctioned

by law. The contention of the appellant in

urging as error the giving of the above-

quoted instructions by the court on this sub-

ject, and the refusal to give the above in-

structions by it asked for, is that the plain-

tiff, in establishing the value of his destroyed

properties should have been conﬁned to proof

of its market value at the time and place of

its destruction; and that the admission of evi-

dence as to the original cost of the properties,

and as to the depreciation thereof from its

original cost by usage or 0therwise, was er-

roneous; and that it was error to instruct

the jury that the plaintiff was entitled, as

matter of law, to interest. at the rate ﬁxed

by law, upon whatsoever amount of damages

they might ﬁnd the plaintiff to be entitled to.

Wherever there is a wcll-known or ﬁxed

market price for any pr.|[wrty. the value of

which is in controvcrs_v. it is proper. in os-

tablishing the value. to prove such market

£1tr11<:tions were asked tor hy the !lPf••n><P, and
refused to be given by the court, numbered
here also, as In the recor1t. to-wit:
"(28) The court lnstl'\1ct,; the jUl'y that,
should they find from the evidence that the
defendant ls liable for the burning of ph1lutitf's property, In estimating the damages Cor
the property destroyed they must be governed by the market value of the prup!'rty at the
time and place It was destroyed." (Its refusal Is assigned as the 1:!8th error.)
"(29) That It devolves upon the plalntur to
prove by a preponderance of evidence, the
market value of the property destroyed." (Its
refusal Is assigned as the 129th error.)
"(30) That, should the jury find from the
evidence that defendant Is liable tor the
burning of plalntHf's property, In estimating
the damn .. , s resulting therefrom they are conllned to the market value of the property destroyed at the time and place of Its destruction, and they are not to be governed alone
by the cost of the property to the plalutltr;
but-they may take Into consideration the age
of the property destroyed, Its cletcrlorntlon
from use, Its situation, th!' quality of Its watt>rlal11. and all other facts given In evidence
which lwar on the market value of the property at the time and place It was destroyed."
(Its refusol ls assigned as the 130th error.)
The law as to what Is the "measure of damage" In the abstract, In cases where the pro)Jt'rty of one has been destroyed, unintentionally, but by the negligence or carelt•ssness of
nnother, where tbrre Is no eh.• mPnt of wlllfnlness or maliciousness in the destruction, Is
well settled to be "just compensation In money for the property destroyed:" SU<'h an
amount as will fully restore the loser to the
1-1nme pro1wrty status that be oc<·11piP1l hcfore
the destruction. To arrive at the n11101111t of
such <·om1wmmtlo11. lrn;ulry, In tht• n\Jsl'nce
of malice, Is nen•s8nrily confineu strictly to
the as<·t·rtalnment or the value of the propt•rtles destroyed, with such Incidents of lntrrest for the retention or such value from the
person t•ntltlt•d till'rdo as may be snn..tloned
by law. The contention of the appellant in
urging 11s rrror tlw giving of tlw altuve<1uoted Instructions lJy the court on this subject, and the refusal to gl•e th.. :i hon! Instructions by it nske>d for, Is that tl11• pl:1 l11tift', In estn \Jlishlng the value of his 1lestru~·e1l
properties shuuhl have been co11fl11P1l to JJrouf
of Its market value at thr time arnl plnee of
its 1lPstructlon; arnl that the :11!J11ls,..lou of cvl1lence as to the original cost of thr prop<'t·th•s,
urn! as to the de1>1·ed11tiou thcr<'of from Its
orli.:lual cost by usage or otherwl><P, was erroneous; and that It Will'! eno1· to lu~truct
the jury that tl11• plalutlff wns !'11ti1h•11. ns
mutter of law, to int<'rest. at th<' rut<' fixed
1.Jy law, upon whatsOP\·er a111111111t of tl:1111a;rt•s
they might fiml the plnl111 itT to he entlth•1l to.
·w herever there Is a wl'il·known or lixed
murket price for an~· pr.1111•rt r. tlw value of
whlt·lt Is In contron•r,.;~·. it is pn)pc•r. In <>stahli>'hi11:r the vahlt'. lo JH'u\·e snclt murkct
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value; but, In ord1•r to say of a tltlng tila 1 it
has a market value, It Is necessary that there
shall be u marlfot tor such commodity; that
Is, a d<>nmnd therefor,-an ability, from sud1
tlemnnd, to sell the same when a sale ther1•11f
Is de,.ired. ·where, therefore, there ls no d1•mand for a thlng,-no ability to sell the snnw,
-then It <'annot be said to have a market
value "at a time when, and at a place where."
there Is no market tor the same. We think
It would have been a very harsh rule In a
case like this to have confined the plalntllr to
proof of the market value of the property at
the time and place of its destruction, In the
absence of proof that at the time and pince
of such destruC'llon there was a market for
such property. ln cases where property Is ot
a \Veil-known kind In general use, having a
recognized standard value, It ls not proper to
cir:!umscribe the proof of such value within
the limits of the market demand at the time
when, and at the place where, It was destroyed.
Were the rule contt:>rnled for to prevail, then
the compensation tor personol properties, confpss1•11ly worth thousands of tlollars, woulll
be retlu<·Ptl to a pittance In cents If destroyed
en route from market to market, In a thlnlysettlcd, barren country where. there was no
demand, simply because of the accident of
"time and place" of Its destruction. In actlous of this kind, where the value of the
properties destroyed Is the crltel'ion of the
1unount of damage to be awarded, and the
property destroyed has 110 market value at
the place of Its destruction, tlwn all such p1•rtinent facts and circumstances are admissible In evidence that tend to establish Its real
and ordinary value at the tlm(! of its destr1wtlon; such tacts us will furnish the jury, who
alone cfotermlne the amount, with such pertinent data as will enable them reasonably and
lntl'lligently to ar1'h'e n~ a fnl1· valuation; nnll
to this end the original market cost of thr
property; the mmrner In whkh It has bt:>ell
usNl; Its grneral comIi tion n ml quail ty; till'
percentage of Its depreciation since Its purchase or <'rectlon, from use, damage, nge, clt•cny, or otherwlse,- are all elements of proof
proper to he submitted to the jury to aid tlwrn
In usc·1•rtalnlng Its value. And to establish
vulue In such cases the opinions or witnesses
n«11uaintP1l with the stmulurd vulne of s1wh
prnpertles are properly admlsslhlP. Rnlli\·:1 :i
,., Lear, 23 Fin. 403, 2 South. !Wi: Rnilrm1 ·l
C'o. v. \Viuslow, 00 Ill. 219; 1 Thomp. Trinl~.
§ 3.'\0; Railroad Co. v. Irvin, 27 lll. 178; Whi11•
v. lformann, 51 Ill. 243; Railroad Co. v. Bm1nPll, 81 l:'n. St. 414; Vandine v . Burpee, 1:1
:\ll'tC. 28~. JmlgC! Cooley, In Insur:rnce Co.
v. Horton, 28 Mich. 175, In speaking of e,·i1h•m·e bnsPtl on a knowle1lge of tlw 1mrchas,•
prlee of propPrty, says: "The objP<'tlon that
tlw 1la11ghter of the plaintiff wBs allowe1l tn
t1•stlfy to the value of nrtldes \1111·111·<1, withont
having heen shown to possess the proJl" r
lrnowh~di.w to qualify her to i;pt>ak ns nn Pxpl'rl. was not well taken. :-lhe lt't-:t lf\Ptl th:11
i;he \Jought a good wauy of tile arlle!Ps, awl
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was present when others were bought. On

this evidence she had some knowledge of

values which it was proper she should com-

municate to the jury. The extent of that

knowledge, and its suﬂlciency as a basis for

a verdict, were to be tested by her examina-

tion, and by the good sense and judgment of

the jurors." Coburn v. Goodall, "2 Cal. 498,

14 Pac. 190; Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass.

122; Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119, (Gil. 85;)

The ‘Slavers, 2 Wall. 375; Johnston v. War-

den, 3 Watts, 104; Whipple v. Walpole, 10 N.

H. 130; Joy v. Hopkins, 5 Denio, 84. In Nor-

man v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136, the court says:

“The ordinary, and in general the only, legal

course is to lay such facts before the jury as

have a bearing on the question of damages,

and leave them to ﬁx the amount. They

are the only proper judges. They are impar-
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tial, and capable of entering into these ordi-

nary matters." In Clark v. Baird, 9 N. Y. 183,

Johnson, J., delivering the opinion, says:

“Upon this ground, as well as upon that of

superior convenience and the constant recep-

tion of such testimony upon trials without ob-

jection,—a tacit, but strong, proof of its pro-

priety,—it must be deemed established that,

upon a question of value, the opinion of a wit-

ness who has seen the thing in question, and

is acquainted with the value of similar things,

is not incompetent to be submitted to a jury."

Hamer v. Hathaway, 33 Cal. 117; Rogers v.

Insurance Co., 1 Story, 603; Blydenburgh v.

‘ Welsh, 1 Baldw. 331; Whitbeck v. Railroad

Co., 36 Barb. 644; Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J.

Law, 707; Brown v. Werner, 40 Md. 15; Al-

lison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542; Railroad Co.

v. Marley, 25 Neb. 138, 40 N. W. 948; Browne

v. Moore, 32 Mich. 254. We think the evi-

dence as to values admitted in this case were

fully conﬁned within the limits of the princi-

ples announced, and that there was no error

in the admission of such testimony, nor in the

giving of the instructions above quoted upon

the question of the measure of damages, nor

in the refusal to give the above-quoted in-

structions asked for by the appellant.

IOilOiI

The amount which it would have cost to

erect buildings of the same kind on the day

of the ﬁre, less a proper deduction for dete-

rioration, is not the proper measure of dam-

ages in a case of this kind. In Burke v.

Railroad Co., 7 Heisk. 451, where the plain-

tii‘f‘s dwelling and contents had been de-

stroyed by ﬁre communicated by sparks from

the railroad company's locomotive, the jury

were instructed that the measure of dam-

ages would be just what it would cost in

cash at the time and place of the burning to

replace the house and each article consumed

in it. This was held to be inaccurate, and

calculated to produce confusion in the esti-

mate of damages, and the better instruction

to be that the measure of damages would

he the value of the property destroyed at the

time and place of the destruction. In Rall-

1oad ('o, \~. “'inslow, 66 ill. 2l9, a case of

was prl•tient when others were bought. On
this e¥1dence she had some knowledge of
values which It was proper she should communicate to the jury. The extent of that
knowledge, and its sutllclency as a basis for
a vertllct, were to be tested by her exnm.lnation, and by the good sense and judgment of
the jurors." Coburn v. Goodall, 72 Cal. 498,
14 Pac. 190; Com. v . Sturtlvant, 117 Mass.
122; Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119, (GJl. 85;)
'fhe Slavers, 2 Wall. 375; Johnston v. Warllen, 3 Watts, 104; Whipple v. Walpole, 10 N.
H. 130; Joy v. Hopkins, 5 Denio, 84. In Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136, the court says :
"The ordinary, and In general the only, legal
course Is to lay such facts before the jury as
have a bearing on the question of damages,
and leave them to tlx the amount. They
are the only proper judges. They are impartial, and capable of entering Into these ordluary matters." In Clark v. Baird, 9 :N. Y. 18.3,
Johnson, J., delivering the opinion, says:
"Upon this ground, as well as upon that of
superior convenience and the constant reception of such testimony upon trials without objeetlon,-a tacit, but strong, proof of Its proprlety,-it mm1t be deemed establlshed that,
upon a question of value, the oplnJon of a witness who has 8een the thing In question, and
Is U<'(Jualnt.ed with the value of similar things,
ls not incompetent to be submitted to a jury."
Hamer v. Hathaway, 33 Cal. 117; Rogers v.
Insurance Co., 1 StOry, 603; Blydenburgh v.
Welsh, 1 Baldw. 331; Whitbeck v. Railroad
· Co., 36 Barb. 644; Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J.
Law, 707; Brown v. Werner, 40 Md. 15; Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542; Railroad Co.
v. Marley, 25 Neb. 138, 40 N. W. 948; Browne
v. Moore, 32 Mich. 254. We think the evidence as to values admitted in this case were
fully confined within the limits of the prlnelples announced, and that there was no error
in the admission of such testimony, nor In the
giving of the Instructions above quoted upon
the question of the measure of damages, nor
in the refusal to give the above-quoted Instructions asked for by the appellant

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The amount which It would have cost to
erect buildings of the same kind on the da.y
of the fire, less a proper deduction for deterlorntlon, ls not the proper mensure of damll!;"<'S in a case of this klnu.
In Burke v.
llnllrnad Co., 7 Heisk. 451, where the plalntltl''s dwelling and contents bad been destroyed by fire communicated by sparks from
the rnllroad company's locomotive, the jm·y
were Instructed that the measure of damages would be just what It would cost In
<·a~h nt the time and place of the burning to
r1·plm•e the house and each article consumed
in It. This was held to be Inaccurate, and
calculated to produce confusion In the estimate of damages, and the better Instruction
to be that the measure of damages would
hf' the ¥ahw of the property dPMro~·ed at the
t ltnt• :llul pin re of the dt>stnll'tlon. In Rallroatl ('11. , • . "'ln>'low. GH 111. :!W, a case of

condemnation of private property for railroad purposes, the company having taken
the land and destroyed the buildings upon
It, It ls said: "For all the property of appellees taken by the corporation for their uses,
or damaged by It, just compensation must
be maue to the owners. If a building
stands In the way of the road which It Is
necessary to destroy, Its value must be paid
by the corporation, and the jury, In estimating tts value, will take Into consideration,
not the value of the materials composing
the building, but the value of the building
as such."
The value of the property at the time and
place of the fire is the question the jury la
to pass upon. This the court charged, and
the plalntlfr admitted. Market \"&Jue Is what
a thing will sell ror. Railroad Co. v. Bunnell, 81 Pa. St. 414. To make a market,
however, there must be buying and selling.
Blydenburgh v. Welsh, 1 Baldw. 340. Prop·
erty may have a value for which the owner
may recover if it be destroyed, although it
have no market value. Railroad Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354, 380. "Suppose," asks the
court In the case just cited, "a rod of railway
track, or a shade tree, or a fresco painting
on the walls or celling of a house, or a bushel
of corn on the western plains, should be destroyed, could there be no recovery for these
articles simply because there might be nu
actual market value for the same?" To
tlx the market value of a thing, It seems to
us that there must be a selling of tl1lngs of
the same kind. It there had ever been a
sale of an hotel, or of any other building,
In 'l'avares, we are not Informed; and we
have no judicial knowledge, nor does the
record Inform us, that hotels have a market
value there., Yet, though there Is no market
value or standard value, the plalntltr should
not be allowed more than the property destroyed by fire on the 9th of April, 1888,
was reasonably worth in Tavares. To do
this it is proper to invoke the aid of all facts
calculated to show Its value, and we are unable to perceive that the circuit judge erred
In admitting the evidence ot the cost of replacing the building on the day of the fire.
It was a fact tending to show, and to be
considered with others, by the jury In determining what amount of money would 1mt
the plaiutll! In the position in which be watJ
nt the time. If there were any other facts
Incident to the conuition of Tavares, consitl·
ered in a busil'.~ss or other point of view,
calculated to affect the value of this or any
other pro1>erty there, and which would qualify or outweigh the item of this cost of
restitution, and such facts do not appear in
the record, we are not responsible. It must
be assumed there were none other existing.
By saying the testimony was admissible we
do not say what weight should be given it.
nor do we come into conflict with the Tennessee and Illinois cnses Inst mentioned. 'l'be
evident meaning of tho,.:p cas1's is that the
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cost of restitution or of the materials is not

the measure of damages governing the jury,

and not that such facts can never be con-

sidered in arriving at the true value or meas-

ure of damages. If an article has no mar-

ket value, its value may be shown by proof

of such elements or facts affecting the ques-

tion as exist. Recourse may be had to the

items of cost, and its utility and use. 2

Suth. Dam. 378. In Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J.

Law, 707, the plaintiff was permitted to

show the cost of a bedstead as tending to

prove its value. This cost was the price at

which a regular dealer in such articles had

sold it when new in the ordinary course of

trade. "A sale so made," said the court,

“was evidence of the market,value of the

thing when new, and the value of such goods

when worn can scarcely be ascertained ex-
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cept by reference to the former price, and

the extent of the depreciation. Of course,

the cost alone would not be a just criterion

of the present value, but it would constitute

one element in such a criterion, and the at-

tention of the jury inthis case was clearly

directed to the importance which it deserved

to have." See, also, Sullivan v. Lear, 23

Fla. 463, 474, 2 South. 846. In Whipple v.

Walpole, 10 N. H. 130, it was held it was

admissible to prove what horses like those

lost or injured cost at a town near the place

where the loss occurred. Upon the same

principle, and for even stronger reasons, we

think that the cost of restitution at the time

of the destruction of the building was an

element which might be considered by the

jury with others in ascertaining value.

The suggestion of appellants brief that

what a building is used for, whether it was

a home or a business house, what income

was derivable from it, where it was located,

what its surroundings, enter into the consid-

eration of value, is, as to the hotel, met by

the evidence in this case, and, except as to

that of income, the same may be said of the

other buildings. Whether or not any of the

buildings were proﬁtable as investments at

the time of the ﬁre the defendant could, if

such evidence was admissible, have elicited

on cross-examination of plaintiffs witnesses,

or by independent testimony, asmight have

been proper under the circumstances; and

the same may be said also of the suggestion

as to the “prospects" of these properties, and

of the value of other property in the vicinity,

and of the land after the houses were burn-

ed. “What were the whole premises worth

in the market as they stood at the time of

the ﬁre," is, if we substitute the words “at

Tavares" for “in the market," the question

really submitted to the jury for decision.

The question of value in cases where, as

here, there is no market value, is one pe-

culiarly for the jury. Nothing has been per-

mitted to go to this jury which it was im-

proper for them to consider in coming to 8.

conclusion as to the value of the several

kinds of property involved. It cannot be

eoet ot restitution or ot the materials ls not
the mt•asure of damag<>s governing the jury,
and not that such tacts can never be con·
sldered In arriving at the true value or me&8ure of damages. It an article has no mar·
ket value, Its value may be shown by proof
<>f such elements or facts atrectlng the question as exJst. Recourse may be had to the
items ot cost, and Its utility and use. 2
~uth. Dam. 3i8.
In Luse v. Jones, 39 N. ;J.
Law, i07, the plaintltr was permitted to
8hOW the COSt Of a bedstead as tending to
prove Its value. This cost was the price at
which a regular denier In such articles had
solil It when new In the ordinary course of
trade. "A sale so made," said the court,
"was evidence of the market, vnlue ot the
thing when new, and the value of such goods
when worn can scarcely be ascertained ex·
eept by refl!rence to the former price, and
the extent of the depreciation. Of course,
the cost alone would not be a Just criterion
-0f the present value, but it would constitute
-0ne element In such a criterion, and the attention of the Jury In· this case was clearly
<lirected to the Importance which It deserved
to have." See, also, Sulllvan v. Lear, 23
Fla. 463, 474, 2 South. 8-16. In Whipple v.
Walpole, 10 N. H. 130, It was held It was
admissible to prove what horses like those
lost or Injured cost at a town near the place
where the loss occurred. Upon the same
principle, and tor even stronger reasons, we
think that the cost of rcstltotlon at the time
of the destruction of the building was an
element which might be considered by the
jury with others In ascertaining value.
The suggestion of appellant's brief that
what a bulldlng is used tor, whether it was
a home or a business house, what Income
was derivable from It, where It was located,
what Its surroundings, enter Into the consideration or vafue, ls, as to the hotel, met by
the evidence In this case, and, except as to
that of Income, the same may be said of the
other buildings. Whether 01• not any of the
buildings were profitable as Investments at
the time ot the fire the defendant could, If
such evidence was admissible, have elicited
<>n cro~s-examlnatlon ot plaintiff's witnesses,
<>r by Independent testimony, as .might have
been proper under the circumstances; and
the same may be said also of the suggestion
as to the "prospects'' ot these properties, and
of the value of otlwr pro1ll'rt~· In the vklnlty,
and ot the land after the housPs were burn·
ed. "What were the whole premises worth
ln the market as the~· stood at the time ot
the fire," Is, It we substitute the words "at
Tavares" ror "In the market," the question
really submitted to the jury for decision.
The question ot value In cases where, as
here, there Is no mnrket value, Is one peculiarly tor the jury. Nothing has been permitted to go to this jury which It was lm}lroper for them to ronshln In coming to a
<·onrluslon as to the vnh1f' of the several
kinds or property lnvoh·ed. It cannot be
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assumed that there were other persons who
would have testified to facts or clrcumstan·
ces other than those shown by the record,
of a character to lnftuence the jurors to a
lower estimate ot the values, or have themselves placed a less \'alue on the property.
The jury bas returned a verdict according
to Its judgment, and It Is undeniable thnt
they have not given the plnintltr the benent
ot the several values Insisted upon by the
plalutltr's chief witness, but it Is apparent
that, after considering nil the tacts and circumstances and testimony, the jury has said
what they deemed the property to be wo1·th,
tailing considerably below the aggregate of
that witness' opinion. There was. In our
judgment, suftklent evidence to sustaln the
verdict, and we tall to find In the brief any
contention that the verdict should be reversed as being excessive. . It there were
such contention, we could not sustain It.
VIII. Upon the question ot the allowance
of Interest as matter of right upon the
amount ot damages found by the jury, from
the date of the destruction of the property
In cases like this, where the damages sued
tor are unllquldated, the tollowlng author!·
ties, with others that we have examined,
hold, In etrect, "that the jury may, at their
discretion, allow and Include Interest In their
verdict as damages, but not as Interest eo
nomlne:" 2 Sedg. Meas. Dam. p. 190; authorities cited In note to Shelleck v. l<'rcnch,
6 Am. Dec. 196; Black v. Transportation Co.,
45 ·Barb. 40; Railroad Co. v. Sears, l.lll Ga.
499; Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. 13:l; G1U'rett
v. Rallwny Co., 36 Iowa, 121; Brady v. Wilcoxson, 44 Cal. 239. In all these authorities
no other reason Is given for this rule than
that It has been so· held In other cast!s that
have gone before them, except that In a few
cases It ls put upon the ground that where
property ls wrongfully taken and withheld,
the defendant gets the benefit ot Its use dur·
Ing the detention, and ls required to pay In·
terest as compensation tor such use, when
In cases ot property wrongfully destroyed
the defendant derives no benefit therefrom.
The answer to this theory Is that, In cases
ot this kind tor the negligent and wrongful
destruction of property, the Issue as to the
amount of the compensation docs not dep<:"nd
upon benefits that accrued therefrom to
the defendant, whose negligent net brought
about the destruction; but the Issue nsts
wholly upon the question as to what Is the
sum ot the damage to the party whose prop·
erty bas· been destroyccl.
Nelthe1· do we
think this theory can propel"ly be applied
even In cases of trespnss and trover. Inter·
est on the value ot the property taken In .
those cases cannot co1-rPctly be sold to be
allowed to the plalntl!T "because the defendant derives benefit from the use of the
property," but Is allowt>d to th!! plalntil'f to
compensate him tor his d!'prlvatlon or Its
use during the detcntlon tlwrcof. Suppose
lu this case the furniture In this hotd, In-
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stead of being destroyed, had been wrongful-

ly taken by the defendant. and had been car-

ried away and disposed of at once by gift

to other parties, or had been destroyed by

ﬁre or otherwise after the taking, so that it

really derived no beneﬁt therefrom, in an

action for the recovery of its value interest

under the modern authorities would be re-

coverable as matter of legal right; but in

such case, would the subsequent gift or de-

struction thereof, and absence of beneﬁcial

use to the defendant, have any effect upon

the right to the recovery of interest? The

answerin the negative is self-evident,

In Ancrum v. Slone, 2 Speer, 594, in which

this question of interest is discussed at great-

er iength than in any case we have exam-

ined holding this view, Frost, J., says: “To

the argument, if interest may be allowed in
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the aggregate damages found by a verdict,

why may it not be allowed eo nomine?—the

reply is: The law does not inquire into the

particulars of a verdict for damages, and

in some cases interest furnishes a just and

convenient measure for the jury. But it is

a stated compensation for the use of money,

and, as it cannot be separated, even in idea,

from debt, seems not properly incident to un-

certain and contingent damages. The dis-

tinction is admitted to be one of form, de-

pending on the form and cause of action. It

is necessary and obligatory by law. to main-

tain the forms of action, with the distinctive

rules which govern them. If this argument

is not allowed to be decisive, there is no rea-

son why assumpsit should not be brought on

a sealed instrument, or one form of action

serve alike for all contracts as well as torts.

Besides, in actions sounding in damage, the

liability, amount, and time, necessary inci-

dents for the allowance of interest, are not

ascertained and determined until the verdict

is rendered. Interest being stated damages

on pecuniary liabilities, to ﬁnd a sum with

interest in an action sounding in damages is

to allow damages on damages, which is an

'ncongruity." The pith of the argument here

is that the distinction grows out of and de-

pends upon the “form" of action, and that it

is necessary to maintain the “forms of ac-

tion," with the distinctive rules which gov-

ern them. We cannot give our consent that

matters of substance founded upon right shall

be thus made subservient to the maintenance

of the mere forms of action; or that money

which rightfully belongs to a party shall be

,'.:iveit when called by the name “damages,"

and withheld if chanced to be called “inter-

est." In Parrott v. Ice Co., 46 N. Y. 361, the

,-ourt says: “In cases of trover, replevin,

and trespass, interest on the value of prop-

erty unlawfully taken or converted is allowed

by way of damages, for the purpose of com-

plete indemnity of the party injured, and it

is diﬂicult to see why, on the same principle,

Interest on the value of property lost or de-

stroyed by the wrongful or negligent act of

another may not be included in the damages."

DAMAGES l<'OR IN'JURIES TO PROPERTY.

stead of being destroyed, had been wrongful- In the case of Ancrum T. Slone, supra, the
ly tak?.n by the defendant. and had been car- court says: "It Is neeessary to the allowried away and disposed of at once by gift ance and estimate of Interest to ascertain the·
to othei· parties, or had been destroyed by sum due, and the time when payable." At
fire or otherwise after the taking, so that It what time does the liability for the negligent
i·eally derived no benefit therefrom, In an destruction of property attach to the wrongndlon for the recovery of Its value interest doer if It shall be found that all things concur
under the modern authorities would be re- to set such liability In motion? It has been
co,·e1·11.ble as matter of legal right; but in sometimes contended that such liability atsuch case, would the subsequent gift or de- taches only upon the finding of the jury. We
11tructlon the.r eot, and absence of beneficial do not think so. The verdict of the jury simuse to the defendant, have any effect upon ply declares the liability and fixes th<>
the right to the recoV'ery of Interest? The amount. The law attaches the liability at
answer 'In the negative ls self-evident.
the time of the destruction, If all the circumIn Ancrum v. Slone, 2 Speer, 594, In which stances attendant thereon concur in stamping
this question of Interest Is discussed at great- the case with the legal elements of liability.
er length than in any case we have exam- As before seen, the measure of the loser's
ined holding this view, Frost, J., says: "To damage Is the value of his property destroyed
the argument, It Interest may be allo\ved In at the time of its destruction. " rhy at the
the aggregate damages found by a verdict, ·time of destruction? Because It Is at that
why may It not be allowed eo nomlne?-the tlme that the destroyer becomes liable for
reply Is: The law does not inquire Into the such value. The loser, before and at the time
particulars of a verdict for damages, and of such destruction, was entitled to his propIn some cases Interest furnishes a just and erty, and the beneficial use of It; and Inconvenient measure for the jury. But It Is stantly, upon such destruction, becomes, una stated compensation for the use of money, der the law, entitled to Its value In money at
and, as It cnnnot be separated, even In Idea, the hands of the wrong-doer, and can sue Infrom debt, seems not properly Incident to un- stantly for such value. Because, through the
certain nnd contingent damages. The dis- law's delays, no opportunity ls afforded to
tinction Is admitted to be one ot form, de- have the amount of thnt value declared by a
pending on the form and cause of action. It jury for a year, perhaps several years, Is It
is necessary and obligatory by law, to main- right that the loser shall, during all that time. '
tain the forms of action, with the distinctive be kept out of both his property, Its use, and '
niles which govern them. It this argument Its value, without some remuneration for the
Is not allowed to be decisive, there Is no rea- retention by the wrong-doer of such Yalue ·!
son why assumpslt should not be brought on Upon every principle of right we cannot think
a sealed Instrument, or one form ot action so. The theory of the measure of liability
serve alike for all contracts IUl well as torts. In such cases ls just com11ensatlon. \Ve canBesides, in actions sounding In damages, the not see either justice or completeness of the
liability, amount, and time, necessary Inci- compensation dispensed under a rule that dedents for the allowance of Interest, are not clares a party who wrongfully destroys anascertained and determined until the verdict other's property to be Hable at the tlme of
Is rendered. Interest being stated dnmagee such destruction for the value• thereof, but
on pecuniary liabilities, to find a sum with that permits the wrong-doer to withhold such
Interest In an action sounding In damages ls value for years. without some compensation
~o allow damages on damages, which Is an
tor such retention. 'Ve cannot appreciate tlw
bncongruity." The pith of the argumeqt here force of the argument of the learned jmlg1~
Is that the distinction grows out of and de- In Ancrum v. Slone, supra, "that to allow Inpends upon the "form" of action, and that It terest In an action for damages would be to
Is necessary to maintain the "forms of ac- allow damages on damages." 1t Is true thnt "
tion," with the distinctive rules which gov- In n certain sense It Is an allowance of dam·
t•rn them. We cannot give our consent that ages on damages, (Interest being a speciri>
matters of substance founded upon right shall of damage,) but It Is not an allowance of
lit• thus made subservient to the maintenance damage on damage, for the same cause ot·
of the mere forms of action; or that money damage. In the one case the principal sum
which rightfully belongs to a party shall be -the value of the property destroyed-ls
!l'h·en when enlll'd by the name "damages," awarded as the damage for the wrongful df'·
arnl \\1thheld if chanced to be called "inter- struction; In the other, interest Is allowed as
,.,.t." In Parrott v. Ice Co., 46 N. Y. 361, the the damage for the wrongful detention of
..onrt says: "In cases of trover, replevln, such value. In Chapman v. Railway Co., 26
11ncl trt>slJ:tSi!I, interest on the value of prop- Wis. 304, Chief Justice Dixon says: "In tres-r
Pl'tY unlawfully taken 01· com·e1ted Is allowe•l pass, trn;er, or replevln for the same pro)lh~· way of damages, for the purpose of comerty taken or converted by the defendants.
pi<•te Indemnity of the party Injured, and It such would hnve been the legal rule of damis difficult to see why, on the same principle, ages; or, rather, the value, with Interest
Interest on the value of property lost or de- from the time of the faking or conYerslon. .
stroyed by the wrongful or negllgflnt act of Why should not the snmf' rule prevail In tlli«
nnother may not lw inl'lmled In the damnges." action·( \Ye are at a lo~R to al'lsign any g1101I
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mason for the distinction. if it can be said-

that it exists, or if it can he said to be in the

discretion of the jury to give interest by way

of damages in this case, whilst in the others

they must give it as a matter of strict legal

right. We say we can see no good reason

for the discrimination. The object of the

rule, or of any rule of damages in any of the

cases, is to give just and full compensation

for losses actually sustained. It is obvious,

regard being had to such compensation,

which constitutes the foundation of the rule,

that the giving of interest is as essential in

this case as in any of the others. It is im-

material to the party who has lost his prop-

erty, whether it has been taken and convert-

ed, hr negligently destroyed by the other.

His loss is the same in either case, and in

either case he should be entitled to the same
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compensation." This view of the law ac-

cords fully with ours. and seems to be sus-

tained also by the following authorities: 1

Suth. Dam. 174; Railroad Co. v. Marley, 25

Neb. 138, 40 N. W. 948; Mote v. Railroad Co.,

27 Iowa. 22; Sayre v. Hewes, 32 N. J. Eq.

652; Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119 (Gil. 85).

In the case of Milton v. Blackshear, 8 Fla.

161 (decided in 1859). relied upon to establish

a contrary view, the question under discus-

sion was not involved. The action in that

case was upon an account for lumber sold and

delivered; and there is nothing in the deci-

sion that conﬂicts with the views here ex-

pressed. Neither do we ﬁnd anything in our

statute that is inconsistent therewith. Our

statute (page 585, § 1, McClel. Dig.; chapter

1483, Laws 1866) provides as follows: "The

legal rate of interest to be charged on all

notes, money, or liability of whatsoever char-

acter, and upon all judgments, shall be eight

per centum per annum." In view of the

charges given, we must assume that they

were heeded by the jury, and that they in-

cluded interest in their verdict from the date

of the ﬁre to the day of their ﬁnding upon

the amount found by them to be the value of

the property destroyed, which value, by arith-

metical rules, we ﬁnd to be, in round num-

bers, forty-ﬁve thousand and some hundred

dollars. The remainder of the verdict of

$52,900.03 represents interest found by the

jury for the period of 2 years and 17 days

intervening between the ﬁre and the verdict.

The established measure of damage in such

cases being complete compensation. we feel

that it would be doing a positive wrong to

the plaintiff were we, because of these in-

structions on the question. to order either a

new trial, or a remittitur of this sum, to

which, upon every principle of right, the

plaintiff is justly entitled. The errors as-

signed for giving the above-quoted 21st and

8th instructions on the subject of interest

and measure of damage, and for the refusal

to give the above-quoted 28th. 29th, and 30th,

instructions asked for, cannot be sustained.

OO0OIIO

The member of the court whose name ap-

1·t uson for the distinction, If It cnn be said
that It exists, or If It can be said to be In the
discretion of the jury to give lnterl'st by way
of damages In this case, whilst In the others
they must give It as a matter of strict legal
right. We say we ean see no good reason
for the discrimination. The object of the
1·ule, or of any rule of damages In any of the
<.'llses, ls to give just and full compensation
for loeses actually sustained. It Is obvious,
regard being bad t.O sucb compensation,
which constitutes the foundation of the rule,
that the giving of Interest Is as essential In
this case as In any of the others. It Is Im·
materlal to the party who has lost bis prop-erty, whether It has been taken and convert·ed, or negligently destroyed by the other.
His loss Is the same In either case, and In
either case he should be entitled to the same
c.·ompensatlon." This view of the law aceords fully wlth ours, nnd seems to be sustained also by the following nuthorltlt>s: 1
i:;tuth. Dnm. 174; Railroad C'o. v. ~Iarley, 25
:o-;eb. t:lR, 40 N. W. 948; l\lote Y. Hullroad Co.,
27 Iowa. 22; Sayre Y. HPwes, 32 N. J. Eq.
652; Derby v. Gallup, 5 :\llnn. 119 (Gil. 85).
In the case of Milton v. Blackshear, 8 Fla.
161 (decided In l&~'l). rellro upon to establish
a contrary view, the question under dlscus~lon was not Involved.
The action In that
<>ase was upon an account for lumber sold and
delivered; and there Is nothing In the declRlon that confllct8 with the views here expressed. Neither do WP ftnd anything in our
gtatute that Is lnconslRtent thE>ri>wlth. Our
-gtatute (page 585, I 1, McClel. Dig.; chapter
1483, Laws 1866) provides as follows: "The

legal rate of Interest to be charged on all
notes, money, or liability of whatsoever character, i:i.nd upon all judgments, shall be eight
per centum per annum." In view of the
charges given, we must assume that they
were heeded by the jury, and that they included interest In their verdict from the date
of the fl.re to the day of their finding upon
the amount found by them to be the value of
the property destroyed, which value, by arithmetical rules, we 11.nd to be, In round num·
hers, forty-11.ve thousand and some hundred
dollars. The remainder of the verdict of
$52,009.03 represents Interest found by the
jury for the period of 2 years and 17 days
Intervening between the fire and the verdlrt.
The established measure of damage In such
cases being complete compensation, we feel
that it would be doing a positive wrong to
the plaintiff were we, becuuse of these instructions on the question, to order either a
new trial, or a remlttltur of this sum, to
which, upon every principle of right, the
plalntltr Is justly entitled. The errors ussigned for gl\"lng the above-quoted 21st and
8th Instructions on the subject of Interest
and measure of damag!', and for the refusal
to give the above-quoted 28th. 29th, and 30th,
Instructions asked for, cu nnot be snstnlned.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The member of the court whose name appears at the hE>ad of this opinion feels It Is
due to his associate, Mr. Justice TAYLOR. to
say that he prepa1·ed about the same numbe1·
of the sub<llvlslons of this opinion aa were
prepared by: such member.
·
The judgment Is amnned.
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LINSLEY v. BUSHNELLJ

(15 Conn. 225.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

1842.

A. left his cart, ﬁlled with wood, by the

side of the fence within the highway, before

his homestead, in the evening; and the next

morning, the cart was found in the travelled

path. about ﬁve rods distant from the place

where it was left. upset, lying on one side,

and the wood by it, constituting together a

dangerous obstruction in the road. By whom,

or by what agency, this was done, did not ap-

pear; but A., knowing the situation of his

property, and having a reasonable opportuni-

ty to remove it, suffered it to remain there

two or three days, when B., travelling along

the highway in the night, in a one-horse

wagon, drove accidentally upon the cart and
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wood, without previously discovering them,

by reason of which he was violently thrown

from his wagon, and severely and dangerous-

ly injured.

Baldwin & Kimberly, for the motion. R. I.

Ingersoll and C. A. Ingersoll, opposed.

July,

CHURCH, J . 1. Questions of minor impor-

tance have been discussed upon this motion,

which it may be well to dispose of, before

considering the leading principle of the case.

First, it has been objected, that the testi-

mony of Collins was iniproperly admitted.

Collins testiﬁed, that, immediately after the

plaintiff received the injury. the defendant

said, “I did not mean to remove the cart and

wood, until somebody got injured, and then

make known who put them into the trav-

elled road." And afterwards, he said, “What

would you do? I am provoked every day. I

won't touch the wood, if half Branford runs

into it, and gets killed, &c." This testimony

was admissible, for several reasons. It con-

duced to prove, that the defendant knew the

situation of the cart and wood; that he rec-

ognized them as his own, and had not aban-

doned them, or resigned his claim to any tres-

passer; that he had a reasonable time to re-

move them, but purposely permitted them to

remain; and also, it furnished strong evi-

dence of the recklessness of the defendant;

and if it did not prove any special malice

towards this plaintiff. it might legitimately

affect the question of damages in the case.

'2Iall v. Steamboat Co.. 13 Conn. 319: Sears

.'. Lyons, 2 Starkle. 317; Treat v. Barber, 7

Conn. 274; Churchill v. Watson, 5 Day, 140;

Bracegirdle v. Orford, 2 \Iaule & S. 77; Mer-

est v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. -H2.

Secondly, it was objected that the facts

claimed by the plaintiff do not sustain either

count in his declaration. In the ﬁrst count,

it is alleged, that the defendant “wrongfully

and unjustly put and placed, and caused to

be put and placed, divers, to wit, ten logs of

t- Dissenting opinion of White, J., omitted.

wood, and a large ox cart, in the said high-

way; and wrongfully and injuriously kept

and continued, and negligently and wrong-
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unprovoked and severe personal injury, and

thus driven the plaintiff to seek redress in

the courts of law, be permitted to say, that

the trouble and expense of the remedy was

unnecessary, and was not the necessary re-

sult of his own acts, connected with his re-

fusal to do justice?

There is no principle better established, and

no practice more universal, than that vin-

dictive damages, or smart money, may be,

and is. awarded, by the verdicts of juries, ,

in cases of wanton or malicious injuries. and

whether the form of the action be trespass ,

or case. We refer to the authorities before

cited, and also to Dennison v. Hyde, 6 Conn.

508; Wort v. Jenkins, 14 Johns. 352; Mer-

riils v. Manufacturing Co., 10 Conn. 384; Ed-

wards v. Beach, 3 Day, 447.

court have given damages to indemnify the
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party for the expense of establishing it."

The argument in opposition to the doctrine of

the charge, is substantially founded upon the

assumed principle, that the defendant can-

not be subjected in a greater sum in dam-

ages than the plaintiff has actually sustained.

But every case in which the recovery of vin-

dictive damages has been justiﬁed, stands

opposed to this argument. And we cannot

comprehend the force of the reasoning, which

will admit the right of a plaintiff to recover,

as vindictive damages, beyond the amount

of an act and injury equally wanton and

willfully committed or permitted, will deny

to him a right to recover an actual indemnity

for the expense to which the defendant's

misconduct has subjected him. In the cases

to which we have been referred, in other

states, as deciding a different principle, the

courts seem to have assumed, that the tax-

able costs of the plaintiff are his only legiti-

mate compensation for the expense incurred.

If taxable costs are presumed to be equiv-

alent to actual, necessary charges, as a mat-

ter of law; every client knows, as a matter

of fact, they are not. And legal ﬁctions

should never be permitted to work injustice.

This court has repudiated this notion. It

was formerly holden in England, and per-

haps is so considered now, that no action

would lie for the injury sustained by the

prosecution of a vexatious civil action, when

there has been no arrest or imprisonment;

because the costs recovered, compensated for ‘

that injury. But this court, in the case of

Whipple v, Fuller, 11 Conn. 582, hold a con-

trary doctrine, and say: “We cannot, at this

day, shut our eyes to the fact known by

every body, that taxable costs afford a very

partial and inadequate remuneration for the

necessary expenses of defending an unfound-

ed suit."

2. But the question intended by the parties

more particularly to be discussed and con-

sidered, arises from that part of the charge

In this last ,

case, Daggett, in argument for the defend- 1

ant, admits, that where an important right is 1

in question, in an action of trespass. “the '
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to this case, and to the legal obligations of

this defendant. Nor is it less applicable, if

it be conceded, that the defendant has done

nothing more than knowingly and willingly

to permit his property so to remain as to en-

danger others. He thus made and selected

the public highway as its place of deposit,

and is equally responsible, as if he had placed

it there, by his own direct agency.

It has been very properly admitted, by the

defendant, in argument, that the owner of

beasts, who knows their dangerous propensi-

ties, is liable for the injurious consequences

of such propensities, unless he uses reason-

able efforts to restrain them. Thus, the own-

ers of horses and cattle accustomed to wan-

der, and of dogs accustomed to bite, are lia-

ble; and we perceive no essential distinction

between such cases and the present. Here,
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the defendant as well knew, that his prop-

crty, placed in the centre of the public trav-

elled road, would endanger the safety of trav-

ellers, as the owner of a ravenous dog knows,

that the animal let loose, will do the same

thing. There is nogood sense ‘in the distinc-

tion, which has been attempted to be made,

between animate and inanimate property, in

this respect. Nor can it make an essential

difference, whether the injury be occasioned

by the peculiar condition or situation of real

or personal estate. ‘If the owner of a weak

and tottering wall, permits it to overhang a

public street, without suﬂlcient shores; if the

owner of a gate permits it to stand open

across the side-walk, at night, even if thrown

open by a trespasser; if the owner of land,

upon which a nuisance has been erected, by

a stranger, permits it to remain; these are all

cases, in which it is admitted, there would

remain a legal responsibility upon such own-

ers. But it is said, it is by reason of their

possession of the premises. In the present

case, as we have seen, the possession of this

defendant was equally certain, and his con

trol over the property equally absolute. as in

the cases stated.

The burden of the defendant's claim has

been, that, as he did not place the property in

the public highway, he was under no legal

obligation to remove it. Let this position be

tested, by a few more cases, in addition to

those already stated. A stranger, without

the knowledge of the owner, unlooses a fu-

rious dog from his chain, or a tiger from his

cage;—are no efforts necessary, on the part

of the owner, to restrain them, after he is in-

formed of their situation? A wrong-doer un-

fastens the stage-horses in a public street; is

the owner justiﬁed in permitting them to re-

main loose, and thereby endanger the lives

of the passengers within, and the travellerl1

without?

This is not a case, where property has been

taken wrongfully from the owner, and placed

beyond his control; nor a case where he can

be considered as having abandoned it, and as

having no longer any possession of it. This

defendant at all times asserted his owner-

DAMAGES FOR PEllSO.\'.~\L i.\'JUltlEb‘.

425

GOODHART v. PE.\.\'SYLVANIA R. CO.

(35 Atl. 191, 177 Pa. St. 1.)

July 15, 1&6.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Miiiiin

county.

Action by James M. Goodhart against the

Pennsylvania Railroad Company. There was

a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant ap-

peals. Reversed.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Rufus C. Elder and George W. Elder, for ap-

Err"! to in the ﬁrst and second assignmvms

pellant. D. W. Woods & Son, for appellee.

WILLIAMS, J. The plaintiff received the

injury complained of while a passenger on one I

of the trains of the defendant company. The

train was being moved in two sections. The

ﬁrst section, on which the plaintiff was riding,

had stopped to repair a break in one of its air
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pipes, and had sent its ﬂagman back to warn

approaching trains. The second section, hav-

ing been misled by the signal displayed by an

operator at a signal tower, came along at full 3

speed; and, its engineer failing to notice the

ﬂagman and his efforts to warn him of the po-

sition of the ﬁrst section, the accident result-

ed, and the plaintiff was thrown from his seat,

and injured. At the trial but two questions

were raised: First. Was the accident and

the co1isequent injury to the plaintiff due to

the negligence of the employes of the defend-

ant? If so, then, second, what was the prop-

er measure of damages to be applied by the

jury? It does not appear that any contest

was made over the ﬁrst of these questions.

The only real ground for controversy was

over the measure of damages, and the evi-

dence should have been conﬁned to the issues

of fact that related to this controversy. The

evidence in regard to the examination made

by Dr. Morton was not directed to the extent

of the plaintiffs injuries, but to the severity

of the examination. Its evident object was

to persuade the jury that the character of the

examination and the conduct of Dr. Morton

and his assistants was unnecessarily harsh

and annoying, and was a proper subject to be

considered in assessing the plaintiff's dam-

ages. But it must be borne in mind that a

claim was being made against the railroad

company for damages based upon an alleged

injury received in consequence of the accident

already referred to. In order to determine in-

teliigently the extent of its liability, it was im-

portant for the defendant to know the nature

of the injury,and the extent to which the plain-

tlf f was affected byit. This could onlybeknown

as the result of a medical examination made

by competent and experienced physicians.

Dr. Morton and his assitants were selected

as proper persons to make the examination,

and advise the defendant company of their

estimate of the plaintiff's condition, and its

consequent liability. If, in the discharge of

their professional duty to their employer, they

went beyond what was reasonably necessary

and employed methods and tests that were

cruel, and such as the judgment of the med-
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negligence of another. This lost time is ca-

pablc of exact compensation. It will require

so,much money as the injured man might

have reasonably earned in the same time by

the pursuit of his ordinary calling. But let

us further assume that these days of enforced

idleness have been days of severe bodily suf-

fering. The question then presented for the

consideration of the jury would be:

ﬁlled with pain, instead of being devoted to

labor? Some allowance has been held to be

proper; but, in answer to the question, “How

much?" the only reply yet made is that it

should be reasonable in amount. Pain can-

not be measured in money. It is a circum-

stance, however, that may be taken into the

account in ﬁxing the allowance that should i

' ty, as judged of by the expert witness, but the

be made to an injured party by way of dam
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ages. An instruction that leaves the jury in

regard it as an independent item ,of damages, ‘

to be compensated by a sum of money that

may be regarled as a pecuniary equivalent,

is not only inexact, but it is erroneous.

word “compensntion." in the phrase “com-

pensation for pain and suffermg," is not to be

understood as meanmg price or value, but as

describing an allowance looking towards ree-

ompense for or made because of the suffering

consequent upon the injury. in computing the

damages sustained by an injured person,

therefore, the calculation may include not on- ‘

ly loss of time and loss of earning power, but,

in a proper case, an allowance because of

suffering. The third item, the loss of earn-

ing power, is not always easy of calculation.

It involves an inquiry into the value of the

labor, physical or mtellectual, of the person

injured, before the accident happened to him,

and the ability of the same person to earn

money by labor, physical or intellectual, after

the injury was received. Proﬁts derived from

an investment or the management of a busi-

ness enterprise are not earnings. The deduc-

tion from such proﬁts of the legal rate of in-

terest on the money employed does not give .

to the balance of the proﬁts the character of

earnings. The word “earnings" means the

fruit or reward of labor; the price of services

performed. And. Law Dlct. 390. Proﬁts rep- .

resent the net gain made from an investment,

or from the prosecution of some business, aft-

er the payment of all expenses incurred. The

net gain depends largely on other circumstan-

ces than the earning capacity of the persons

managing the business. The size and loca-

tion of the town selected, the character of the ,

commodities dealt in, the degree of competi-

tion encountered. the measure of prosperity

enjoyed by the community, may make an en- 1

terprise a decided success, which under less

favorable circumstances. in the hands of the '

same persons, might turn out a failure. The

proﬁts of a business with which one is con-

nected cannot tlzcrefore be made use of as a

measure of his earning power. Such evidence

may tend to show the possession of business

qualities, but it does not ﬁx their value.
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years, would hold up at its maximum to the | When future payments are to be anticipated

very end oi. hfe. It assumes, in the fourth

place, that he is entitled to recover, not only

the present worth of his future earnings, as

the jury has estimated them, but a sufﬁcient

sum to enable him to go out into the market,

and purchase an annuity now,equai to his esti-

mated earnings. The ﬁrst, second, and third

of these are assumptions of fact. The fourth

is an assumption of law, and is clearly wrong-

and capitalized in a verdict, the plaintiff is

entitled only to their present worth. This is

the exact equivalent of the anticipated sums.

From what has been now said, it follows

that substantially all of the assignments of

error are sustained. The judgment is revers-

ed, and a venire tacias de novo awarded.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Sl‘ERi{ET'1‘, O. J., dissenti-
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LARSON v. CHASE.

(50 N. W. 238, 47 Minn. 307.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Nov. 10, 1891.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin coun-

ty; Hooker, Judge.

Action by Lena Larson against Charles A.

Chase for the unlawful mutilation and dis-

section of the body of plaintiffs husband.

Demurrer to complaint overruled. Defend-

ant appeals. Aﬂirmed.

Bradish & Dunn and Babcock & Garrigues,

for appellant. Arctander & Arctander, for

respondent.

MITCHELL, J. This was an action for

damages for the unlawful mutilation and dis-

section of the body of plaintiff's deceased

husband. The complaint alleges that she was

the person charged with the burial of the

body, and entitled to the exclusive charge

and control of the same. The only damages
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alleged are mental suffering and nervous

shock. A demurrer to the complaint, as

not stating a cause of action, was overruled,

and the defendant appealed.

The contentions of defendant may be re-

solved into two propositions: First. That

the widow has no legal interest in or right

to the body of her deceased husband, so as

_to enable her to maintain an action for dam-

ages for its mutilation or disturbance; that,

if any one can maintain such an action, it is

the personal representative. Second. That a

dead body is not property, and that mental

anguish and injury to the feelings, independ-

ent of any actual tangible injury to person

or property, constitute no ground of action.

Time will not permit, and the occasion does

not require, us to enter into any extended

discussion of the history of the law, civil,

common, or ecclesiastical, of burial and the

disposition of the body after death. A quite

full and interesting discussion of the sub-

ject will be found in the report of the referee

(Hon. S. B. Ruggles) in Re Beekman Street,

4 Bradf. Sur. 503. See, also, Peirce v. Pro-

prietors, 10 R. I. 227. 19 Am. Law Rev. 251,

10 Alb. Law J. 71. Upon the questions who

has the right to the custody of a dead body

for the purpose of burial, and what remedies

such person has to protect that right, the

English common-law authorities are not very

helpful or particularly in point, for the rea-

son that from a very early date in that coun-

try the ecclesiastical courts assumed exclu-

sive jurisdiction of such matters. It is easy

to see, therefore, why the common law in its

early stages refused to recognize the idea of

property in a corpse, and treated it as be-

longing to no one unless it was the church.

The repudiation of the ecclesiastical law

and of ecclesiastical courts by the Ameri-

can colonies left the temporal courts the

sole protector of the dead and of the liv-

ing in their dead. Inclined to follow the

precedents of the English common law, these

courts were at ﬁrst slow to realize the

changed condition of things, and the conse- ,

quent necessity that they should take cogni-

zance of these matters and administer reme-
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whole matter of sepulture and custody of the

body after burial was within the exclusive

cognizance of the church and the ecclesias-

tical courts. But whatever may have been

the rule in England under the ecclesiastical

law, and while it may be true still that a

dead body is not property in the common

commerical sense of that term, yet in this

country it is, so far as we know, universally

held that those who are entitled to the pos-

session and custody of it for purposes of de

cent burial have certain legal rights to and

in it which the law recognizes and will pro-

tect. Indeed, the mere fact that a person has

exclusive rights over a body for the purposes

of burial leads necessarily to the conclusion ‘

‘ fringement on a legal right, mental suffe1ing

that it is his property in the broadest and

most general sense of that term, viz.. some-
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thing over which the law accords him ex-

clusive control. But this whole subject is

only obscured and confused by discussing the ,

question whether a corpse is property in the

ordinary commercial sense, or whether it has

any value as an article of trafﬁc.

portant fact is that the custodian of it has

a legal right to its possession for the purposes

of preservation and burial, and that any in-

terference with that right by mutilating or

otherwise disturbing the body is an actionable

wrong. And we think it may be safely laid

down as a general rule that an injury to any

right recognized and protected by the com-

mon law will, if the direct and proximate

consequence of an actionable wrong, be a

subject for compensation.

It is also elementary that while the law

as a general rule only gives compensation for

actual injury, yet, whenever the breach of

a contract or the invasion of a legal right is

established, the law infers some damage;

‘and, if no evidence is given of any particular

amount of loss, it declares the right by

awarding nominal damages. Every injury

imports a damage. Hence the complaint stat-

ed a cause of action for at least nominal dam-

ages. We think it states more. There has

been a great deal of misconception and con-

fusion as to when, if ever, mental suffering,

as a distinct element of damage, is a subject

for compensation. This has frequently re-

sulted from courts giving a wrong reason for

a correct conclusion that in a given case no

recoverycould be had for mental suffering,

placing it on the ground that mental suffer-

ing, as a distinct element of damage, is nev-

er a proper subject of compensation, when

the correct ground was that the act complain-

ed of was not an infraction of any legal

right, and hence not an actionable wrong at

all, or else that the mental suffering was not

the direct and proximate effect of the wrong-

ful act. Counsel cites the leading case of

Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577-598. We

think he is laboring under the same miscon-

ception of the meaning of the language used

in that case into which courts have not infre-

The im- ‘
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SLOANE et al. v. SOUTHERN CAL. RY.

CO. (L. A. 48.)I

(44 Pac. 320, 111 Cal. 668.)

Supreme Court of California. March 23, 1896.

Department 1. Appeal from superior court,

Riverside county.

Action by Annie L. Sloane and another

against the Southern California Railway.

Company. From a judgment for plaintiff,

and from an order denying a new trial, de-

fendant appeals. On condition that plaintiff

remit a part of the amount recovered, the

order and judgment are aﬂlrmed.

W. J. I-Iunsaker, for appellant. Sweet,

Sloane & Kirby and Works & Works, 10!‘ t1* 1 tering into such contract. Jones v. The Cor-

‘‘ tez, 17 Cal. 487; Head v. Railroad Co., 79

spondents.

HARRISON, J. The plaintlf f Annie L.

Sloane purchased a ticket, April 8, 1894, from

the agent of the defendant, at North Pomona,
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for passage from that place to San Diego,

and on the same day took passage upon the

regular passenger train of the defendant.

Before reaching San Bernardino the conduct-

or of the train took up her ticket, without

giving her any check or other evidence of her

right to be carried to San Diego, and on ar-

rlving at San Bernardino she was required

to change cars, and enter another train of

cars of the defendant. After entering this

train of cars the conductor in charge thereof

demanded of her her ticket, and upon her

stating to him that she had given it to the

conductorof the other train, and the circum-

stances therewith, she was informed by him

that she must either pay her fare or leave

the train. She had no money with her, and

when the train reached East Riverside she

left the car. After getting oﬂ the train, she

started to walk back as far as Colton upon

the rail1oad track, a distance of about three

miles, but, after walking a portion of the

way. secured a seat in-a passing vehicle, and

was carried to Colton, where she spent the

night with her sister-in-law. On the next

day. having borrowed some money with

which to purchase another ticket, she re-

sumed her passage, and was carried to San

Diego. The present action was brought to

recover damages sustained by reason of the

wrongful acts of the defendant's agents. The

cause was tried by a jury, and a verdict ren-

dered in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum

of $1.400. From the judgment entered there-

on, and an order denying a new trial, the

defendant has appealed.

it is contended by the appellant that, as the

plaintiff lei.t the car at East Riverside in ac-

cordance with the previous directions of the

conductor, and no personal violence was used

or displayed towards her, her only right of

action is for a breach of the defendant's con-

tract to carry her to San Diego, and that the

extent of her recovery therefor is the price

t Rehearing denied.

paid for the second ticket, and a reasonable

compensation for the loss of time sustained

by her. The plaintiffs right of action against

the defendant is not, however, limited to the
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her; but he maintains that the evidence fails

to show such conduct. The evidence was,

however, before the jury, and they were

properly instructed in reference thereto; and,

although it might be urged upon them that

this evidence was insutiiclent to establish

such conduct, we cannot say, as a matter of

law, that it was not proper to submit the

question to their judgment.

Evidence was given at the trial tending to

show that Mrs. Sloane had been previously

subject to insomnia. and also to nervous

shocks and paroxysms. and that, owing to her

physical condition, she was subject to a recur-

rence of these shocks or nervous disorder if

placed under any great mental excitement;

and that, by reason of the excitement caused

by her exclusion from the car, there had been -

a recurrence of insomnia and of these parox-
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ysms. The court instructed the jury that, if

they found for the plaintiffs, “in assessing

damages, if it appears from the evidence that

the plaintiff Annie L. Sloane was wrongfully

deprived of her right Yo ride on defendant‘s

cars, and expelled therefrom in a manner and

under circumstances calculated to inﬂict, and

which did inﬂict, feelings of indignity and in-

sult, the jury is authorized to consider, under

the evidence, the injured feelings of the plain-

tiff, the indignity endured, her mental suffer-

ing, the humiliation and wounded pride which

one in her condition of life and standing in

the community would experience, together

with any bodily harm or suffering occasioned,

and to award such an amount for damages as

will compensate her for such humiliation, suf-

fering, and other detriment." The jury were

not specially instructed with reference to any

damages that might have been sustained by

reason of the recurrence of this disturbance of

the nervous system, but it is reasonable to

suppose that the above evidence was offered

by the plaintiffs for the purpose of recovering

damages for the injury that might be thus es-

tablished, and that, under that portion of the

above instruction in which the jury were au-

thorized in assessing damages to consider

"any bodily harm or suffering occasioned" by

the expulsion of Mrs. Sloane from the cars, it

was intended that they should consider this

evidence, and the injury which it established.

The defendant objected to the introduction of

the evidence, and excepted to the instruction,

and insists that under no circumstances could

the jury consider this effect upon the plaintiff

as an element of damage for which the defend-

ant is liabie; that the court should not have

directed the jury to consider any mental suf-

fering experienced by her. '

Counsel for the appellant has discussed, in

his brief, the want of liability on the part of

the defendant for any damages for mental suf-

- fering, and has cited many authorities in sup-

port of the proposition that mere mental anx-

iety, unaccompanied with bodily injury or ap-

prchended peril, does not afford a right of ac-

tion.

To the extent that the term “mental ‘
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from fright and nervous shock, and was trou-

bled with insomnia, and that her health was

seriously impaired. The jury were instructed

that if, in their opinion, great fright was a ;

reasonable and natural consequence of the cir-

cumstances in which the defendant by its

negligence had placed her, and that she was

actually put in fright by those circumstances.

and if the injury to her health was, in their

opinion. the reasonable and natural consequence

of such great fright, and was actually occa-

sioned thereby, the plaintiff was entitled to re-

cover damages for such injury. It was object- ‘

ed to this instruction that, unless the fright

was accompanied by physical injury, even

though there might be a nervous shock occa-

sion'ed by the fright, such damages would be i

too remote. In holding that this objection was

not well founded, and that the nervous shock ‘
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was to be considered as a bodily injury, the

court held that, if such bodily injury might be

a natural consequence of fright, it was an ele-

ment of damage for which a recovery might

be had, and, referring to the contention of the

defendant, said: “It is admitted that, as the

negligence caused fright, if the fright contem-

poraneously caused physical injury, the dam-

age would not be too remote. The distinction

insisted upon is one of time only. The propo-

sition is that, although. if an act of negligence 1

produces such an effect upon particular struc-

tures of the body as at the moment to afford

palpable evidence of physical injury, the rela-

tion of proximate cause and effect exists be-

tween such negligence and the injury, yet such

relation cannot in law exist in the case of a

similar act producing upon the same struc-

' tures an effect which at a subsequent time-

say a week, a fortnight. or a month—must re-

sult without any intervening cause in the same

physical injury. As well might it be said that

a death caused by poison is not to be attribut-

ed to the person who administered it, because

the mortal effect is not produced contempora-

neously with its administration." At the close

of its opinion, Lord Chief Baron Palles says:

“In conclusion, I am of the opinion that, as the

relation between fright and injury to the nerve

and brain structures of the body is a matter

which depends entirely upon scientilic and

medical testimony. it is impossible for any

court to lay down as a matter of law that, if

negligence cause fright, and such fright in its

turn so affect such structures as to cause in-‘

jury to health, such injury cannot be a conse

quonce which, in the ordinary course of things,

would ﬂow from the negligence, unless such

injury accompanied such negligence in point

of time." This case is quoted at great length

and with approval in the eighth edition of Mr.

Sedgwick's treatise on Damages, at section

,86t). Mr. Beven, in the recent edition of his

work on Negligence (volume 1, pp. 77-81), also

comments upon it with great approval. In

Purcell v. Railroad Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W.

1034, the defendant so negligently managed

one of its cars that a collision with an ap-

proaching cable car seemed imminent, and
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where she had been hurt. Testimony was giv- 1 the humiliation, injuries to her health, etc.,-—

en to the effect that such hurt was sutiicient 1

to cause the development of the cancer, and

that, in the opinion of the experts, they would

attribute it to that muse. It was shown that,

previous to the accident she had been in ap-

parently good health and condition. The court

held that it was for the jury to determine,

from the evidence, whether the cancer did re-

sult from the injury, and, if so, that the de-

fendant was liable, even though it had no rea-

son to anticipate such a result. “It is not for

the defendants to say that, because they did

not or could not in fact anticipate such a re-

sult of their negligent act, they must there-

fore be exonerated from liability for such con-

sequences as ensued. They must be taken

to know and to contemplate all the natural

and proximate consequences, not only that

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

certainly would, but that probably might, ﬂow

from their wrongful act." See, also, Fell v.

Railroad Co., 44 Fed. 253.

The court properly left to the jury to de-

termine whether Mrs. Sloane exercised rea- ‘

sonable prudence in undertaking the walk

from East Riverside to Colton, and, if so, that "

the injury sustained by her was a proper ele-

ment of damage to be recovered. It could not

say, as matter of law, or instruct the jury,

that under the evidence before them, such

walk was or was not necessary, or whether

the route selected by her was the most feasi- 1

ble; nor would it have been justiﬁed in direct-

ing them not to allow compensation for any

injury sustained by the walk, upon the

ground that, if she had waited a few hours,

she could have gone upon the cars. Malone v.

Railroad Co., 152 Pa. St. 390, % Atl. (B8.

The refusal of the court to strike out cer-

tain portions of the complaint as irrelevant is

not a ground for reversal of the judgment.

The matter embraced therein was relevant

to the plaintiffs‘ right of recovery, and they

were justiﬁed in setting forth in their com-

plaint the several acts of the defendant which

constituted the wrong for which they sought

' redress. The defendant does not claim to have

been prejudiced by any of the probative mat-

ters contained in these allegations, and, even

if this matter might have been properly struck .

out by the court. after the cause has been

tried upon its merits the judgment will not

be reversed for such technical error.

The demurrer to the complaint was proper-

ly overruled. The cause of action set forth

therein is neither ambiguous nor uncertain.

It clearly states a single ground of recovery,

viz. the unlawful violation by the defendant

of the obligation it had assumed to .carry

Mrs. Sloane to San Diego; and, although

the damages caused to her by this violation of

its obligation were made up of the injuries

to her person, as well as the money paid by

her as the consideration of this obligation,

they all resulted from the wrong committed

by the defendant. It was necessary that she

should point out the particulars in which she

had sustained injuries from the defendant,-

-134
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the jury respecting the measure of care

which a railroad company must exercise to-

wards its passengers. Rorer, P». R. p. 951; ‘

Railroad Co. v. Homer, 73 Ga. 251. The pas-

senger is not required to question the action

of the conductor in taking up his ticket,

but has to assume that his conduct in tak-

ing or withholding the ticket is in accord-

ance with the rules of the company. It is

therefore incumbent upon the conductor to

exercise more than ordinary care in seeing

that. after he has taken the ticket from the 3

passenger, the latter shall be provided with

the means of continuing his journey. It is

not error to hold that this requires extreme

care and diligence. We are of the opin-

ion, however, that the damages allowed by

the jury were excessive, and not justiﬁed

by the evidence. They were properly told
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that they could not award the plaintif f ex- ‘

emplary damages, but only such as would

be a full and fair compensation to her for

the injury and detriment she had suffered

as the proximate results of the defendant's

wrongful acts.

show that the conductor was rude and in-

sulting in directing her to leave the train at

East Riverside is quite meager, and consists

more of her statement of its character than

of the language used by him. The jury were

instructed that, in estimating the amount of

damages she could recover by reason of the

humiliation in being excluded from the car,

they were not at liberty to consider her ‘

peculiar nervous temperament, but to allow

only such damages as would have resulted

to a person of ordinary or usual tempera-

ment. So, too, the evidence concerning the

effect of this expulsion from the car upon

her nervous condition consists more of gen-

eral statements than of details, and it does

not appear that this effect was of more than

The testimony tending to ‘

I brief duration. She does not claim to have

1 sustained any direct physical injury by rea-

son of the walk to Colton. She testiﬁes, as

do also her husband and Dr. Averill, that,

‘ except for her nervous condition, she was

‘ in fair health, and that she was abundantly

able to take a walk of two or three miles-,

and it is not suggested that the walk had

any effect upon her nervous condition, or

that she suffered any direct inconvenience

therefrom after her return to San Diego. The

walk itself was not attended with any un-

usual inconvenience. It was upon the rail-

1 road track, in a level country, on an after-

noon in April. The distance is not given,

but, after going about a mile, or as far as

l the railroad bridge, she was taken into a

‘ passing vehicle, and carried to Colton.

1 While the amount of damages that may be

i awarded in a case like the present is in the

‘ discretion of the jury, it must be a reasonable

| and not an unlimited. discretion, and must

be exercised intelligently and in harmony

, with the testimony before them. We think

l that the jury in the present case must have
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MITCHELL v. ROFHE§.‘TER RY. CO.

(45 N. E. 354, 151 N. Y. 107.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 1. 1R96.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Fifth department.

Action by Annie lilitchell against the Roen-

ester Railway Company. From an order (28

N. Y. Supp. 1136) aﬂirming an order (25 N.

Y. Supp. 744) setting aside a nonsult, defend-

ant appeals. Reversed.

Charles J. Bissell, for appellant. Norris

Bull, for respondent.

MARTIN, .1'. The facts in this case are

few, and may be brieﬂy stated. On the 1st

day of April, 1891, the plaintlff was standing

upon a crosswalk on .\iain street, in the city

of Rochester, awaiting an opportunity to

board one of the defendant's cars which had

stopped upon the street at that place. While
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standing there, and just as she was about to

step upon the car, a horse car of the defend-

ant came down the street. As the team at-

tached to the car drew near, it turned to the

right, and came close to the plaintiff, so that

she stood between the horses‘ heads when

they were stopped. She testiﬁed that from

fright and excitement caused by the approach

and proximity of the team she became un-

conscious, and also that the result was a mis-

carriage, and consequent iliness. Medical

testimony was given to the effect that the

mental shock which she then received was

suﬂicient to produce that result. Assuming

that the evidence tended to show that the de-

fendant's servant was negligent in the man-

agement of the car and horses, and that the

plaintiff was free from contributory negli-

gence, the single question presented is wheth-

er the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the

defendant's negligence which occasioned her

fright and alarm, and resulted in the injuries

already mentioned. While the authorities are

not harmonious upon this question, we think

the most reliable and better-considered cases,

as well as public policy, fully justify us in

holding that the plaintiff cannot recover for

injuries occasioned by fright, as there was

no immediate personal injury. Lehman v.

Railroad Co., 47 Hun, 355; Commissioners v.

Coultas, 18 App. Cas. 222; Ewing v. Railway

Co., 147 Pa. St. 40, 23 AtL 340. The learned

counsel for the respondent in his brief very

properly stated that “the consensus of opin-

ion would seem to be that no recovery can be

had for mere fright," as will be readily seen

by an examination of the following additional

authorities: Haile v. Railroad Co., 60 Fed.

557; Joch v. Dankwardt, 85 Ill. 331'; Can-

ning v. Inhabitants of Williamstown, 1 Cush.

451; Telegraph Co. v. Wood, 6 C. C. A. 432,

57 Fed. 471; Renner v. Canﬁeld, 36 Minn. 90,

30 N. W. 435; Allsop v. Allsop, 5 HurL & N.

534; Johnson v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 6 Nev.

22-i; Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227. If it be

admitted that no recovery can be had for

fright occasioned’ by the negligence of an-

other, it is somewiiat diﬂlcult to understand

how a deli'ndant would be liable for its con-
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TURNER v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO.

(46 Pac. 243, 15. Wash. 213.)

Supreme Court of Washingtop. Aug. 31, 1896.

Appeal from superior court, Spokane coun-

ty; Jesse Arthur, Judge.

Action by W. W. D. Turner against the

Great Northern Railway Company. There

was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant

appeals. Reversed. '

(3. Wellington, Jay H. Adams, and M. D.

Grover, for appellant. Graves & Wolf, for

respondent.

ages for the failure on the part of the defend-

ant to transport the plaintiff and his wife

over its line of railway from St. Paul, Minn.,

to the city of Spokane, in accordance with its

agreement and duty. The material facts set

forth in the complaint are, brieﬂy, that the

defendant is, and at all the times mentioned in
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the complaint was, a corporation operating a

line of raiiwayfrom St . Paul to Seattle by way

of the city of Spokane; that on May 30, 1894,

the plaintiff purchased from the agent of de-

fendant at St. Paul tickets for himself and

wife, and procured checks for their baggage,

over defendant's railway from St. Paul to

Spokane, and was induced so to do by the

representation of said agent that defendant's

passenger train which would leave St. Paul

on the said day would reach the city of.

Spokane on the morning of the 2d day of J uue

ductor's division; that, owing to serious dam-

age to that road, caused by high water, plain-

tiff could proceed no further, and was com-

pelied to remain in Missoula from the 2d to

the 20th day of June; that on said last-men-

tioned day plaintiff paid the fare demanded

‘ for transportation to his home at Spokane,

‘ which place he reached on the 21st day of

June, having been delayed over night at Hope,

Idaho; and that the expense necessarily in-

curred for extra railroad fare and for board

and lodging during the delays at Helena, Mis-

soula, and Hope was $80.20. It is averred in

the complaint that: “During their detention

' and delay plaintiff's said wife, in consequence

ANDERS, J. This was an action for dam- ‘

following, and that the tickets purchased .

from the defendant's agent were limited to

that time and train; that defendant then well

knew that it had not been able to run a

through train from St. Paul to Spokane for

several days prior to that time, and that, ow-

ing to a serious break in its roadbed west of

Havre, it would not be able to i‘un .<iu'ii

through train for a long time thereafter,

which fact it negligently and fraudulently

concealed from the piaintiff; that plaintiff

and his wife took passage on defendant's pas-

senger train which left St. Paul on the even-

ing of May 30, 1894, and when said train

reached Havre the conductor thereof inform-

ed the plaintif! that, because of some damage

to defendant's road further west, in the state

of Idaho, the train would proceed no further,

but that the plaintiff and his wife would be

taken on defendant's line of railway to

Helena, Mout., from which place they would
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be the settled rule, that the granting or re-

fusing of a motion for a bill of particulars is

within the sound discretion of the trial court,

and its ruling in that regard will not be re-

viewed on appeal, except in cases where there

has been a palpable abuse of such discretion.

4 Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N. Y. 176; People v.

Tweed, 63 N. Y. 194; Dwight v. Insurance

Co., 84 Y. 493. No such case, we appre-

hend, is presented here. The object of the

statute is to enable a party reasonably to

protect himself against surprise on the trial

(Butler v. Mann, 9 Abb. N. C. 49); but we are

unable to see how the defendant could have

been surprised by the testimony adduced by .

the plaintiff corroborative of the averments of

the complaint, to which defendant's motion

for a bill of particulars was especially ad-

dressed. So far as the complaint is concern-
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ed, its allegations were suﬂicient to let in the

evidence admitted. The damages claimed, or

at least those claimed for loss of time, were

general, and therefore were not required to

be speciﬁcally alleged. Thomp. Carr. Pass. p.

550.

It appears from the testimony of plaintiff

of showing that the plaintif f himself was not

in fault in taking the particular train on

which he started home. It was also compe-

tent as tending to prove the contract be-

tween the parties; but, for that purpose, it

was comparatively unimportant, in view of

the fact that the tickets themselves, which

were prima facie evidence of the defendant's

contract, represented upon their face that

plaintiff would be carried to his destination

within the time mentioned by the ticket

seller.

Objection is made by the defendant to the

action of the court in permitting the re-

dent to state to the jury the amount he

s compelled to pay for board and lodgi-1:

and other necessary expenses for himself

and wife while at lliissoula, and it is urged

‘th much earnestness that the expense in-

that he purchased his tickets for transporta- '

tion at the otiice of the Union Depot at St. '

Paul, and not at the ofﬁce of the defendant

company, and that the person from whom

he purchased them was engaged in selling ‘

tickets over various other lines of railway

whose trains entered and departed from that

depot. Upon the trial the court permitted

the plaintiff, over the objection of defendant,

to detail a conversation between himself and

the ticket seller, which occurred at the time

the plaintiff purchased his tickets, in which

the ticket seller stated, among other things,

that defendant's trains were running

through to Spokane on schedule time, and,

if there were no accidents, plaintiff would

arrive at his destination on the morning of

June 2, 1894. It is contended that this was

error, for the reason that it was not shown

that the person who made these statements

was an agent of the defendant, and author-

ized to bind it by such declarations. But the

fact that the tickets so sold were furnished
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you suffered on account of your delay, being

separated from your baggage, and all of

those things that are proper under the ruling

of the court, in consequence of this delay,"

the plaintiff was allowed, notwithstanding

the defendant's objection. to testify that he

was greatly worried, troubled, and annoyed

by the combination of circumstances sur-

roundin,:I; him at that time, among which

v.-cre that he had to pay out more money

than he had contemplated paying out; that

the Northern Pacilic Railroad Company‘

would not board him at Missoula, as they

did their passengers; his means were limit-

ed. and he did not know how long he had to

stay there; that he could not hear from

home, the telegraph line being broken down;

that his wife was taken sick, and lay in bed

three days, in consequence of her worriment,
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and that he could not make her comfortable

under the circumstances. Damages for

“worriment" and disappointment resulting

from such circumstances are too remote to be

recovered in this action. The mental anxi-

ety of the plaintiff induced by the sickness

of his wife and his inability to make her

comfortable, or his limited means, or his in-

ability to hear from home owing to the in(er-

ruption of telegraphic communication, can-

not be regarded as the proximate result of

the alleged'wrongful acts, or omissions of

the defendant, and the court therefore erred

in permitting this testimony to be submitted

to the consideration of the jury.

The court also erred, and for the same rea-

son, in instructing the jury generally that the

plaintiff was entitled to recover, for worry and

mental excitement, such sum as would fairly

and reasonably compensate him therefor.

"Damages will not be given for mere incon-

Yenience and annoyance such‘ as are felt at

every disappointment of one's expectations, if

there is no actual physical or mental injury."

1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 42. And hence

damages cannot be recovered for anxiety and

suspense of mind in consequence of delay

caused by the fault of a common carrier.

Trigg v. Railway Co., 74 Mo. 147; Hobbs v.

Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111; Hamlin v.

Railway Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 408; Walsh v. Rail-

way Co., 42 Wis. 23. Nor, in an action against

I. railroad company for a refuml to carry,

can the plaintiff recover damages for fatigue

suffered by him in walking to his place of des-

tination, or for mental and physical suffering

caused by sickness contracted in such walk.

Railway Co. v. Thomas (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S.

W. 411). But it is urged by the learned coun-

sel for pluintiff that this court, in the case of

Willson v. Railroad Co., 5 Wash. 621, 32 Pac.

468, and 34 Pac. 146. repudiated the doctrine

that damages cannot be recovered for mental

suffering which is not connected with physical

injury, and that the testimony and the instruc-

tion as to mental anxiety and excitement above

mentioned were in accordance with the prin-

ciple there announced. That was an action

for damages for an unlawful expulsion of a
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was delayed in reaching his destination by the

fault of the defendant, he was damaged, on

account of lost time, to an amount exactly

equal to that which he would have earned by

the practice of his profession (for it is as a

lawyer only that he claims damages for loss

of time) had he been at home during such de-

lay; but to entitle him to a reco\ery it was

incumbent upon him to prove such amount by

competent and legal evidence. As to the proof

of damages for time lost by professional men.

Mr. Sedgwlck says: “In the case of most pro-

fessional men, there can be no way of ﬁxing

a general scale of vemuucratibn. The exclu-

sive services of such men cannot be measured -

by any pecuniary scale common to a whole

class. The most trustworthy basis of dam-

ages in such a case is the amount which the .

injured party has earned in the past. This is,
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nowever, only evidence from which the jury

will be enabled to say what the services of

such a man as the plaintiff are worth, and the

jury should distinctly understand that it is

not to be taken as the necessary and legal

measure of damages." 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.)

5 180. And this statement of law seems to

be amply supported by the authorities. It is

apparent, therefore, that the “most trustwor-

thy basis of damages" was not adopted in the

trial of this cause. There was no proof what-

ever of what the plaintiff actually earned as

an attorney, either before or after the particu-

lar time in question. Of course, he earned

nothing immediately before that time, because ,

he had not beﬁl engaged in the practice of the

law for the preceding two years; but, as he

resumed the practice of his profession imme-

upon the subject, and the question involved

was not one of science or skill, such as could

not be determined by a jury of ordinary intel-

ligence, without the aid of the opinions of oth-

ers. If facts only had been stated, the jury

could have drawn their own conclusions. Up-

on this issue the jury were instructed that for

_loss of time plaintiff was entitled to recover

such sum as his time at home, for the period

he was delayed by reason of defendant's fail-

ure to transport him, was reasonably and fair-

ly worth in his profe<sion or business; and as

an abstract proposition of law the instruction

was correct, but as‘ applied to the proofs it was

misleading. because it virtually authorized the

jury to adopt the amount stated by the plain-

tiff himself, or that which they might infer

from the testimony of either of the other wit-

nesses, to be the reasonable value of plaintiffs

time, as the absolute and certain measure of

damages. Even if it were conceded that the

evidence was admissible, and that it showed a

"general scale of remuneration" common to

all attorneys such as the plaintiff, the instruc-

tion would still be open to the same objection,

for it left out of consideration entirely the

probability that plaintlﬂ! would have had pro-

fessional empioyment had he been at home

during the period of his detention. Yonge v.

Stmmship Co., 1 Cal. 333; 3 Suth. Dam. (2d

Ed.) § 93"‘; 2 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 863.
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SUMMERFIELD v. WESTERN UNION

TEL. CO.

(57 N. W. 973, 87 Wis. 1.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Jan. 30, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, Douglas coun-

ty; Charles Smith, Judge.

Action by Fred G. Summeriield against

the Western Union Telegraph Company for

damages for delay in transmitting a mes-

sage. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant

appeals. Reversed.

The other facts fully appear in the follow-

ing statement by WINSLOW, J.:

Action for damages for delay in the deliv-

ery of a telegram. Plaintiff resided on a

t‘-arm about 10 miles from the village of Iron

liiver, Wis.

D., with plaintiff's brother J. W. Summer-

ﬁeid. Defendant had an oﬂice at each of
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these places. October 23, 1892, J. W. Sum-

merﬁeld left at defendant's oﬂice at Lisbon

a message addressed to plaintiff, care of Burt

Clark, Iron River, reading as follows:

“Mother is dying. Come immediately. J.

W. Summerﬁeld." The fees for the transmis-

sion of the message were paid, but the evi-

dence tended to show that the message was

negligently delayed, and was not delivered

to Clark until October 28, 1892, and plaintiff

did not receive it until after noon of that day.

Plaintiffs mother died on the 26th day of

October. Plaintif f claimed that he would

have gone to his mother's bedside bad he re

ceived the telegram in due time, and that,

by reason of his failing to receive the mes-

sage until after his mother's death, he was

deeply “mortiﬁed, grieved, hurt, and shock-

ed, and suffered intense anguish of body and

mind, and was thereby thrown into a state

of nervous excitement and tremor, which ren-

dered him sick, and impaired his health and

strength, and that he still suffers from the

effect of the same." Upon the trial, objection

was made to the reception of any evidence

under the complaint, because it did not state

facts sufﬁcient to constitute a cause of ac-

tion, which objection was overruled, and ex-

ception was taken.

The court charged the jury, among other

things, as follows: “If you ﬁnd that the

message, in the exercise of ordinary dili-

gence, considering all the circumstances of

the case, was unreasonably delayed, and

that, if it had been delivered with reasonable

promptness, the plaintiff could and would

have responded thereto, and reached his

mother before her death, and that plaintiff

suffered mental pain from a sense of disap-

pointment, sorrow, chagrin, or grief at being

deprived of being at his mother's deathbed,

your verdict should be for the plaintiff in

such sum as will fairly compensate him for

his mental suffering and damages, if any, to

his nervous system, caused by the shock of

such mental suffering." A verdict for the

plaintiff for $652.50 was rendered, and, from

judgment thereon, defendant appealed.

His mother lived at Lisbon, N. '

D-\\i.\(ll&S FOR Pl-:ll.\‘()N.\L h\'.lURliu‘S.

pt-nsatory, and the reason given for their

allowance is that the one cannot be separat-

ed from the other. (2) In actions for breach

of the contract of marriage. (3) In cases of

willful wrong, especially those affecting the

liberty, character, reputation, personal se-

curity, or domestic relations of the injured

party." To this latter class belong the ac-

tlons of malicious prosecution, slander and

libel, and seduction, and they contain an ele-

ment of malice. Subject to the possible ex-

ceptions contained in the second and third

of the above classes, it is not believed that

there was any case,—certainly no we1l-con-

sidered case.—prior to the year 1881, which

held that mental anguish alone constituted

a suﬂicient basis for the recovery of dam-

ages. In that year, however, the supreme

court of Texas, in So Relle v. Telegraph Co.,

55 -Tex. 308, decided that mental sufforing
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alone, caused by failure to deliver such a

telegram as the one in the present case, was

suilicient basis for damages. The principle

of this case has been followed with some va-

riations, by the same court, in many cases

since that decision, and its reasoning has

been substantially adopted by the courts of

last resort in the states of Indiana, Ken-

tucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Ala-

bama, in cases which are cited in the briefs

of counsel. On the other hand, the doctrine

has been vigorously denied by the highest

courts in the states of Georgia, Florida, Mis-

sissippi, Missouri, Kansas, and Dakota, and

by practically the unanimous current of au-

thority in the federal courts. All of these

cases will be preserved in the report of this

case, and the citations need not be repeated

here. The question is substantially a new

one in this state, and we are at liberty to

adopt that rule which best commends itself

to reason and justice. It is true that it has

been held by this court, in Walsh v. Railway

Co., 42 Wis. 32, that, in an action upon

breach of a contract of carriage, damages

were not recoverable for mere mental dis-

tress; but, as we regard this action as being

in the nature of a tort action, founded upon

a neglect of the duty which the telegraph

company owed to the plaintiff to deliver the

telegram seasonably, that decision is not con-

trolling in this case. The reasoning in favor

of the recovery of such damages is, in brief,

that a wrong has been committed by defend-

ant which has resulted in injury to the plain-

tif! as grievous as any bodily injury could be,

and that the plaintiff should have a remedy

therefor. On the other hand, the argument

is that such a doctrine is an innovation upon

long-established and well-understood princi-

ples of law; that the diﬂiculty of estimating

the proper pecuniary compensation for men-

tal distress ls so great, its elements so vague,

shadowy, and easily simulated, and the new

ﬁeld of litigation thus opened up so vast,

that the courts should not establish such a

rule. Regarding. as we do, the Texas rule

as a clear innovation upon the law as it

-
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their operators, servants, or employee in re

celving, copying, transmitting, or delivering

dispatches or messages. We cannot regard

this statute as creating, or intended to create,

in any way, new elements of damage.

Whether its purpose was to obviate the dlﬂ:l-

culties which were held fatal to a recovery

in the case of Candee v. Telegraph Co., 34

Wis. 471, or to effect some other object, is

not a question which now arises; but it

seems clear to us that, had a radical change

in the law relating to the kinds of suffering

which should furnish a ground of damages

been contemplated, the act would have ex-

pressed that intention in some unmistakable

way. We see nothing in the law to indicate

such intention.

Finally, it is said that verdicts for injuries

to the feelings alone have been sustained in
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this court, and the muowmg cases are cnt*(l.

Wightman v. Railway Co., 73 Wis. 169, 40

N. W. 689; Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis.

657; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N. W.

527. Without reviewing these cases in de-

tail, it is suﬂicient to say that there was in

all of them the element of injury or discom-

fort to the person, resulting either from actu-

al or threatened force, and they cannot be

relied upon as precedents for the allowance

of damages for mental sufferings alone.

It follows from these views that the instruc-

tion excepted to was erroneous. Judgment

reversed, and action remanded for a new

trial.

CASSODAY, J ., dissents.
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MAHONEY v. BELFORD.

(132 Mass. 393.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suffoik. March 3, 1882.

Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk

county; Staples, Judge.

Action by Dennis Mahoney against Charles

A. Belford for slander. Verdict for piaintil'f.

Exceptions by defendant. Exceptions over-

ruled.

U. G. Keycs, for piaintiff. H. E. Swasey,

for defendant.

DEVENS, J. The defendant had charged

the plaintif f with stealing from his employer,

F. M. Weld. He had pleaded a justitication,

but at the trial did not seek to establish the

truth of the words alleged to have been ut-

tered. He did endeavor, in mitigation of

damages, and to show that the slander did
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not originate with himself. to offer testimony

as to the general reputation as to the plain-

tiff's having. during the time he lived with

Weld, and also at the time of the alleged

slander, stolen from him. In such an action,

evidence may be given of the general repu-

tation of the plaintiff in those respects in

which it has been assailed by alleged slander.

“'here one has been charged with theft, it

may be shown that he was generally reputed

a thief, in order thus to show that no serious

injury can have been inﬂicted on him. Clark

v. Brown, 116 Mass. 504. But what the de-

fendant sought to prove was not the plain-

tlffs general reputation, which was the gen-

eral character he had gained in the com-

munity by his course of life. but what was

the common rumor as to a particular transac-

tion, namely. his having stolen from Weld.

The defendant sought to show. not that the

plaintiffs general reputation was bad, but

that in a single instance he was generally re-

puted to have behaved badly. This would

have been to have proved the common talk

as to an individual subject of scandal. A

general report that the piaintit‘f is guilty of

the particular crime with which he was char-

ged cannot be received in evidence in mitiga-

tion of damages. Aidt-rman v. French, 1

Pick. 1; Bodwell v. Swan. 3 Pick. 876: Clark

v. Muusell, 6 \Ictc. t\Iass.) 373; Stone v.

\'arney. 7 \Iete. (\Iass.) 86: Peterson v. Mor-

gan. 116 Mass. 350.

Upon the qucrilltin of damages the court

instructed the jury "that they might consider

the injury, if any shown, to the mental feel-

ings of the plaintiff, which was the natural

and necessary result of the words used, if in

fact they were used as alleged, and were

slanderous; that mental suffering was an

element of damage." This was correct. The

words, if uttered at all, were uttered, as ap-

pears by the bill of exceptions, in an angry

dispute at an election, in the presence of

from twenty to sixty persons. While the evi-

dence was circumstantial. and not direct,

that the plaintlff had been actually damniﬁed

and had endured mental suffering in conse-

quence, “the occasion, circumstances, manner
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CAHILL v. MURPHY. (No. 14,047.)

(30 Pac. 195, 94 Cal. 29.)

Supreme Court of California. March 26, 1892.

Commissioners' decision. Department 2.

Appeal from superior court, Humboldt coun-

ty; G. W. Hunter, Judge.

Action by Mary Cahill against Daniel Mur-

phy for slander. From a judgment for plain-

tiff, and from an order denying his motion

for a new trial, defendant appeals Afﬁrm-

ed.

Frank McGowan, for appellant.

Weaver, for respondent.

J. H. G.

FITZGERALD, O. This is an action for

slander. The complaint alleges, in sub-

stance, that oil or about the 21st day of Sep- ‘

tember, 1889, and for a long time prior

thereto, plaintiff, with her children, occupied
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certain rooms in an hotel of which the de-

fendant was owner and proprietor; that one

of these rooms was situated on the ground

ﬂoor of the hotel, and used by her for the

purpose of carrying on and conducting a gen-

eral merchandising business; that on said

last-mentioned date, the soot in the chimney

leading from the room used as a store be-

came ignited, causing an alarm of ﬁre to be

given; and it is further alleged, upon in-

formation and belief, that the ﬁre was com-

municated to the soot in the chimney from a

ﬁre in the stove situated in said store. The

slanderous words, out of which this action

arose, are alleged to have been falsely and

maliciously spoken by the defendant of and

concerning the plaintiff, and are laid as fol-

lows: “This is twice you [the plaintiff mean-

ing] have tried to burn us [the said hotel

meaning] out to get your fourteen hundred

dollars insurance. But I will report you

[the said plaintiff meaning] to the insurance

company to-morrow morning, and have your

insurance taken away from you." It is fur-

ther alleged that the defendant, by the use

of these words, intended to convey the mean-

ing that the plaintif f willfully and malicious-

ly communicated the ﬁre to the soot in said

chimney, and that by so doing she was

guilty of an attempt to commit the crime of

arson. and that they were so understood by

those in whose presence they were uttered,

to the damage of plaintiff's character and

business in the sum of $10,000. A demurrer

was interposed to the complaint, which, upon

the grounds stated, was properly overruled.

Defendant therenpon answered, speciﬁcally

denying the material allegations of the com-

plaint, and, upon the issues thus joined,

plaintiff had verdict and judgment for $1,200.

The only error complained of, which we

deem it necessary to consider, relates to the

ruling of the court upon defendant's objec-

tion to the following question propounded to

plaintiff on her examination in chief as a

witness, and after she had testiﬁed, without

objection, that she had “a family of four

children." “Question. How many of them

are dependent upon you for support?" (Ob-
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jection that it was excessive. In this case

we think the evidence immaterial, and its ad-

mission by the court a mere technical error.

People v. Fick, 89 Cal. 144, 26 Pac. 759. The

judgment and order should be aﬂirmed, and

we so advise.

We concur: TEMPLE, C.; FOOTE, 0.

PER CURIAM. For the reasons given in

the foregoing opinion the judgment and or-

der are aﬂirmed.
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Hearing in bank denied.
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HAYNER v. COWDEN.
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AGGRAVATION OF DA .\L\GES.

(27 Ohio St. 292.)

HAY.\'Elt v. COWDEN.

(27 O1l1o St. 292.)

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1875.

Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. Term, 1875.
Error to district court, Miami county.

Error to district court, Miami county.

James Murray, J. T. Janvier, and H. G.

Sellers, for plaintiff in error. Conover &

Craighead and Morris & Son, for defendant

James Murray, J. T. JanYlcr, and H. G.
Selle1-s, for plalntitr In error. Conover &
Craighead and Morris & Son, tor defendant
In en"Or.

in error.

WRIGIIT, J. The slander alleged in the ‘

petition consists in falsely charging plaintiff,

a minister of the gospel, with drunkenness.

It is also averred that the words were spok-

en of and concerning him in his ministerial

profession and pastoral oﬂice. The demurrer

admits all that is averred, and thus this

question is raised: ' ar e

a minister of the gospel with drunkenness,

w en spoken of him in hi$_DJ.‘.Q£eS8l01l.or_mlL-

ing, acdonablgpersg? We answer that they
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are. We understand the rule to be, that

woLdispol§e,!l_9La_p_ersnnc.tend1n,p10_JnJ11re

him 1n 1iT§_Qiﬂ$&._pmfessmnnnlmdaane_thns

WM. 1 Starkie, Sland. 9; Townsh.

and. & L. § 182; 2 Add. Torts, 957 (section

2, c. 17, Edition of 1876 of this book, has a

large collection of authorities on the sub-

ject); 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 102; Fouiger v. New-

comb, L. R. 2 Exch. 327; Demarest v. Har-

ing, 6 Cow. 76.

Calling a clergyman a drunkard was held

actionable in McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney,

176; Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 251.

Such words are actionable because they

tend to deprive him of the emoluments which

pertain to his profession, and may prevent

his obtaining employment. It is not, as

counsel seem to suppose, that giving a

clergyman this right of action is because his

oiiice is higher than that of his fellow men.

It is a right which belongs to all who have

professions or callings, and in this clergy-

men are not different from others.

This principle is entirely different from

that upon which proceeded the cases of Hol-

lingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430; Dial v.

Holter, 6 Ohio St. 228; Alfele v. Wright, 17

Ohio St. 238. In all these, the words im-

puted a criminal offense, and did not relate

to profession or calling.

Upon the trial of the case, it was insisted

by defendant that the words were not spo-

ken of the plaintiff in his character as a min-

ister. The court fairly left this to the jury,

and said if they were not so spoken, they

would ﬁnd for defendant . The jury ﬁnd this

issue for the plaintiff, and in the face of

that ﬁnding, it is impossible for us, sitting

as a court of error, to say that they were not

spoken of the plaintiff in his character or

capacity as a clergyman. If they were as

we have seen, they are actionable.

In the cases cited by defendant—Lumly v.

Allday, 1 Tyrw. 217; Brayne v. Cooper, 5

Nit'es. & W. 249; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Adol. &

E. 2; Buck v. Henly, 31 Me. 558; Redway v.

Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Van Tapel v. Capron, 1

Denio, 250—it was held that the words spo-

ken did not touch the plaintiffs in their va-

WRIGHT, J. The slander alleged In "the
petition consists In falsely charging plalntitr,
a minister ot the gospel, with drunkenness.
It is also averred that the words were spoken of and concerning him In his ministerial
1wofesslon o.nd pastoral office. The demurrer
admits all that Is averred, aud thus this
question Is raised: ,Are w1ll'da which char~
a minister of the gospel with drunkenness,
wh n smken of him in his profession Ot CDll1n2, ac ona~Ie {!er se? We answer that they
are. We uni'Iersfilnd the rule to be, that
wo1·ds spoken or a Jli"""on tending to !nJnre
Jifri in bis omce. pmffflslon or trade are thns
acUonable. 1 Starkie, Sland. 9; Townsh.
Brand. & L. I 182; 2 Add. Torts, 957 (section
2, c. 17, Edition ot 1876 ot this book, has n
large collection ot authorities on the subject); 1 Am. Leed. Cas. 102; Foulger v. Newcoinb, L. R. 2 Exch. 327; Demarest v. Baring, G Cow. 76.
Calling a clergyman a. drunkard was held
actionable In McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney,
170; Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 251.
Such words are actionable because they
tend to deprive him ot the emoluments which
pertain to his profession. and may prevent
his obtaining employment. It ls not, as
counsel seem to suppose, that giving a
clergyman this right ot action ls because his
ottlce ls higher than that ot bis fellow men.
It Is a right which belongs to all who have
p1"0fesslons or callings, and In this clergymen are not dUTerent trom others.
This principle ls entirely dUTerent from
that upon which proceeded the cases ot HolIlngsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430; Dlal v.
Holter, G Ohio St. 228; Altele v. Wright. 17
Ohio St. 238. In all these, the words Imputed a criminal offense, and did not relate
to profession or calllng.
Cpon the trial ot the case, it was Insisted
by defendant that the words were not spoken of the plaintiff In his character as a minister. The court fairly left this to the jury,
nnd !mid It' they were not so spoken, they
would find for defendant. The jury find this
Issue for the plaintiff, and In the tace or
that finding, It ls Impossible for us, sitting
ns a court of error, to say that they were not
F:poken ot the plaintiff In hie character or
capacity as a clergyman. If they were as
we have seen, they are actionable.
In the caRes cited by defendant-Lumly v,
All<lny, 1 Tyrw. 217; Brayne v. Cooper, 5
\ln-s. & W. 24!:1; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Adol. &

DA~L\UES.

E. 2; Buck v. Henly, 31 Me. 558; Redway v.
Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Van Tapel v. Capron, 1
Denio, 250-lt was held that the words spoken did not touch the plaintiffs In their various trades or employments. But to charge
a minister with drunkenness does have such
an effect. Congregations would not employ
clergymen with Intemperate habits, and the
development ot such a vice would be cause
tor speedy removal from omce. When the
question Is reduced to a mere matter ot dollars and cents, the purity, the Integrity, the
uprightness ot a minister's life ls his capital
In this world's business.
Against the objection made, plalntltr otrered evidence ot the ~Ith of the defendant,
and In the charge the court said this evl·
dence might be considered In connection
with the question ot exemplary damages.
We see no error In the admission ot the evidence or the charge ot the court upon the
subject. That punitive or exemplary damages In a proper case may be given is not an
open question In Ohio. In Roberts v. Mason. 10 Ohio St. 277; Smith v. Pittsburg, Ft.
W. & 0. Ry. Co., 23 Ohio St. 10, the court
allowed the jury t.o consider the wee.Ith of
defendant in connection with the question ot
punitive damages. It, then, punishment be
an object ot a verdict, a small sum would
not be telt by a defendant ot large wealth.
The vengeance ot the law would scarcely be
appreciated, and be could atrord to pay and
slander still. There are cases which put
the adml88lon ot the evidence upon this
ground. Alpln v. Morten, 21 Ohio St. 536, Intimates that the reason ls to enable the jury
to determine bow much plalntitr bas been
injured. This case collects the authorities
on both sides of the question, to which
might be added McBride v. Laughlln, 5
Watts, 375; Wagoner v. Richmond, Wright.
173; Sexton v. Todd, Id. 320; 2 Green!. Ev.
249; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 199, note 6; Horsley
v. Brooks, 20 Iowa, 115; Buckley v. Knapp,
48 Mo. 153. We see no error In the admission ot the evidence, or the charge ot the
court on the subject.
-There are some other questions raised by
counsel, to :which we briefly allude:
The defendant asked the court to charge
the jury: "It they find that the words
spoken by the defendant ot and concerning
the plaintiff were untrue, and that the defendant has not reasonable cause to believe
them to be true, yet. It they are satisfied
trom the evidence that the defendant did believe them to be true, such state ot tacts
would not warrant a verdict for punitive or
exemplary damages, but tor compensatory
damages only." With which request the
court refused to comply, but, on the contrary, charged the jury that such was not
the law, to which the defendant then and
there excepted.
We do not understand the law ot slander
to be, that It ls a defense that the slanderer
believed his words to be true, when he had
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no grounds for so believing. Beliei‘ must

have a foundation in something. Take

away the foundation, and what can be left?

The charge seems to us a solecism. Belief

can only be claimed as a defense, or in mit-

igation, where it is based upon such facts or

reasons as wopld incline a reasonable per-

son so to believe. Inasmuch as this charge

was asked in reference to exemplary dam-

ages, and there was evidence tending to

show that the words had been spoken under

circumstances indicating wantonness and

recklessness, the charge was properly re

fused.

It appears to be seriously argued that in a

minister oi‘ the gospel a single act of intox-

ication is not a fault, and therefore a charge

of that kind cannot be injurious. We can

hardly assent to this proposition. In a re-
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ligious teacher one offense of the kind must

be considered a grave departure from pro-

priety and duty; and to say that the act has

been committed is calculated to impair use-

fuiness.

As to the question of excessive damages:

The verdict was large; still we do not think

defendant can complain, in view of all the

circumstances of the case.

Judgment aﬂirmed.

SCOTT, C. J., and WHITMAN and JOHN-

SON, JJ., concurred. DAY, J., dissented.

no grounds tor 110 believing. Belief must
have a foundation In something. Take
a way the foundation. and what can be left?
The charge seems to us a solecism. Belief
e11u only be claimed as a defense, or in mitigation, where It ls based upon such facts or
l'easons as wopld lncllne a reasonable person so to believe. Inasmuch as this charge
was asked In reference to exemplary dawnges, and there was evidence tending to
show that the words hnd been spoken under
circumstances Indicating wantonness and
rec klessness, the charge was properly r&
fused.
It appears to be seriously argued that In a
minister ot the gospel a single act ot lntox-
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!cation ls not a fault, and therefore a charge
ot that kind cannot be Injurious. We can
hardly assent to this proposition. In a religious teacher one offense ot the kind must
be considered a gra\·e departure from propriety and duty; and to say that the act has
been committed ls calculated to Impair usefulness.
As to the question ot excessive damages:
The verdict was large; still we do not think
cle!endant can complain, in view of all the
circumstances ot the case.
Judgment affirmed.
SCOTT, C. J ., and WHITMAN and JOHN·
SON, JJ., concurred. DAY, J., dissented.
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BENNETT v. HYDE.

(6 Conn. 24.)

(6 Conn. 24.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July,

July,

1825.

1825.

Action for slander. Verdict for plaintiff.

Heard on motion for new trial. Motion de-

nied.

tileaveland & Frost, for the motion. God-

dard & Judson, opposed.

Action for slander. Verdict tor plaintllt.
Heard on motion tor new trial. Motion denied.
(:tea \'<'land & Frost, tor the motion.
tlard & Judson, opposed.

God-

HOSMER, C. J. The evidence in a cause

must be conﬁned to the points in issue; and

the character of either party cannot be en-

quired into, unless put in issue expressly, or

by the nature of the proceeding itself. 1

Phil. Ev. 139.

in this case, conformably to the established

doctrine of our courts, the character of the

plaintiff was in issue. It was the object of

the defendant's attack; the injury to it is

the gravamen complained of; and for the
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vindication of it, the present action was in-

stituted. It was said, by Chief Justice Kent,

in Foot v. Tracy, 1 Johns. 46, 52: “The char-

acter of the plaintiff must be considered as '

coming in, at least collaterally, upon the

trial;" and this court, in Stow v. Converse,

4 Conn. 42, which was an action for a libel,

declared that “the plaintiff's character may

in'_nmx_eil_Ll1ecanse_t is m issue," The plain-

tiff's character is not made the subject of

enquiry, at the defendant's option, and shut

out of view, or the subject of investigation,

as shall best subserve the defendant's pleas-

ure and interest. To a rule so inequitable,

for the want of mutuality, the courts in this

state have never acceded; but they have

recognized and acted on the principle, that

the ﬁnal object of the plaintiffs suit, is the

vindication of his character; and that his

reputation, of consequence, is put in issue,

by the nature of the proceeding itself. The

case of Rawson against Hungerford, in Mid-

dlesex county, is not merely analogous with

this, but goes beyond it. In an action for

the breach of a promise of marriage, the

character of the plaintiff was considered to be

so far in issue as to authorize the reception

objcction,—not to sustain it from attack, but

to prove its excellence.

It has been frequently adjudged, in this

state, and may be considered as established

law, that the plaintiff in an action of slander

may prove the amount of the defendant's

property to aggravate damages; and, on the

other hand, that the defendant may recur to

the same evidence for the purpose of miti-

gating them. The same rule is deducible

from the law of Massachusetts (Larned v-

Buﬂinton, 3 Mass. 546); admitting evidence

in proof of the plaintiff's rank and condition,

to increase the damages, or to lessen them,

according as the facts should be found. It

is not to be inferred, that the damages are.

of course, to be proportioned to the defend-

ant's property; but merely that property

forms an item, which, in the estimate, is

deserving of regard. Great wealth is gen-

erally attended with correspondent inﬂuence:

and little inﬂuence is the usual concomitant

HOSl!EU, C. J. The evidence in a cause
must be conJlned to the points in issue; end
the character of either party cannot be en<1ulred into, unless put In Issue exp1·essly, or
l.Jy the nature of the proceeding itself. 1
Phil. Ev. 139.
ln this case, contormably to the estal.Jllshed
docu·lne of our courts, the character of the
1ilaintltr was In Issue. It was the object of
the defendant's attack; the injury to it Is
the gravamen complained of; and tor the
vindication of it; the present action was instituted. It was said, by Chief Justice Kent,
in Foot v. Tracy, 1 Johns. 46, 1>2: "The character of the plo.lntitr must be considered as
coming in, at least collaterally, upon the
trlul;" and this court, in Stow v. Converse,
4 Conn. 42, which was an action for a libel,
declun•tl that "the plalutlfr's character may
he iiroveil. becatise It Is In Issue." The plalntlft''s eharncter Is not made the subject of
enquiry, at the defeudant's option, and shut
out of view, or the subject of investigation,
as shall best subserve the defendant's pleasure and interest. To a rule so inequitable,
for the want of mutuality, the courts In this
state have never acceded; but they have
recognized and acted on the principle, that
the final object of the plalntltrs suit; ls the
vindication of his character; and that his
reputation, of consequence, ls put in issue,
by the nature of the proceeding itself. The
case of Rawson against Hungerford, in Middlesex county, ls not merely analogous with
this, but goes beyond lt. In an action for
the breach of a promise of marriage, the
character of the plalntltr was considered to be
so far In Issue as to authorize the reception
of evidence, in opposltJon to the defendant's

objL•dlon,-uot to sustain It from attack, but
to prove its excellence.
It has been frequently adjudged, In thig.
st11te, autl may be considered as established
law, that the plaintlft'. In an action of slander
may prove the amount of the defendllllt's.
property to aggravate damages; and, on the
other hand, that the defendant may recur to
tlw same evidence for the purpose of mitigating them. The same rule Is deducible
from the law of Massachusetts (Larned v.
Bufllnton, 3 Mass. 046); admitting evidenceIn proof of the plaintiff's i·ank and condition.
to increase the damages, or to Jessen them.
according as the facts should be found. It
Is not to be Inferred, that the damages are.
or course, to be proportioned to the defendant's property; but merely that property
forms an Jtem, which, In the estimate, ls
deserving of regard. Great wealth Is generally attended with correspondent lnftuence~
and little lnftuence ls the usual concomitant
of little property. The declarations or a man
of fortune concerning the character of another, like a weapon thrown by a vigorous
hand, will not fall to inti.let a deeper wound
than the same declarations made by a man of
small estate, and, as a consequence· not uncommon, of small lntl.uence. Property, therefore, may be, and often is, attended with the
power of pemetratlng ueat d~, and, lo
the estimate of a Jury, becometHW terestlng
enquiry. I am not asserting what ought to
be, but what Is; and that the degree of Injury, necessarily, le dependent, In some measure, on the considerations before mentioned.
Whether the rule that the amount of the defendant's property, In the action of slander.
may be enquired Into, originated solely from
those principles in combination with the Justice and propriety of admitting somewhat of
a penal sanction, 1n cases, In which the most
atrocious calumny is not punishable In a criminal prosecution, I do not declare. But that
such rule does exist, and has uniformly been
recognized In our courts, Is unquestionable;
and It Is not the subject of regret. that the
reputations of the Innocent and estlmablcthus have an additional shield agaJnst the
malice of the calumniator.
The other Judges were of the aa.me opinion.
1 New trial not to be granted.

.\W:H.\L\TlO~
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(64 Me. 553.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1875.

Trespass by George W. Johnson against

Mannsseh Smith for assault and battery.

\'erdict for plaintiff. Heard on defendant's

exceptions. Exceptions sustained.

The exceptions were as follows: “The de-

fendant offered evidence of his property and

means. as~'[Téa'ring upon te matter. of puni-

tive damages and in mitigation thereof. The

plaintiff introduced no evidence tending to

show that the defendant had any property

whatever, and did not claim that the dam-

ages should be increased by reason of wealth

or any pecuniary ability on the part of the

defendant. The court excluded this evidence

offered by the defendant, and he excepted.

“The defendant also requested the judge to
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instruct the jury, that, the assault and bat-

tery being acts for which the defendant was

subject to prosecution and punishment by a

criminal action or indictment, they would

not be authorized in this case to allow any-

thing as exemplary or punitive damages;

which instruction the judge refused to give.

but did afﬁrmatively instruct the jury that

the law says that, in a case of gross and

malicious assault. the jury may, in their dis-

cretion, if they deem proper, award exem-

plary damages, but there is no rule of law by

which the plaintiff can claim it as a legal

right."

T. H. Haskell, for plaintiff. Nathan Webb,

for defendant.

DANF()lt'll‘H, J. The exception to the in-

struction to the jury, that “the law says that

in a case of gross and malicious assault, or

of gross and aggravated injury, the jury

may, in their discretion, if they deem proper,

award exemplary damages, but there is no

rule of law by which the plaintif f can claim

it asalegal right," must be overruled. Such

law has become so well settled in this state,

even in cases where the defendant is also lia-

ble to criminal prosecution, not only by the

decided cases, but also by a uniform and in

point of time a somewhat extended practice

in our courts, that it is now too late to dis-

turb it, unless by legislative enactment. God-

dard v. Railway Co., 57 Me. 202. and cases

there cited. Besides, to allow the exception

contended for, and permit the plaintiff to re-

cover exemplary damages for injury to his

property. and refuse it_under similar circum-

stances for an injury to his person. would in-

troduce a greater inconsistency and render the

law more unsymmetrical than is now claim-

ed for it.

LAW DA\I.2d Ed.—29

The other exception must be sustained. It

does not clearly appear whether the testi-

mony offered would have tended to show de-

fendant's general reputation as to property

or his actual condition in that respect. In ei-

‘ ther event, it should have been received, as it

was 1mI1_Lllgl_lj_j£_o_ﬂ.l€_iS:illi:- So far as the

cause of action rests upon an injury to the
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The otl11•r l'Xt'L'Jllion mnst lw sustaint>d. 11
dof's not clearly appear whether the te~Li 
mony otfPreci would have tended to show dPfendn11t'11 general reputation as to pro1wrty
Supreme Judicial Court of .\Inine. 1875.
Trei<pass by George \Y. Johnson ugulnst or his actual eondltiou in that respect. In ei·
Manni;i.;eh Smith for a,;sault :llld hatt<'ry. llw1· t>VPnt, it should have bct•n rcct>ive<I, as it
Verdict for pluintlfl'. Heard on defrudaut's wus ucrtl!!~!!L!..o_!l.le js,.111> ~o fur as tlw
cau><c of action rests upon au Injury to tllP
exceptions. Excl'ptions sustninPtl.
cbnrueter, or nn Insult to the person. com·
'l11c exceptions were as follows: ..The de- pensnto1·y damngf's may be increased liy proof
fendant otf1•red e'l"idl•nce of his propcrt.r and of the wt-nltb of the d1.• f1•111lnnt. This !8 u11011
means. as....11l>nring upoulliematter or punl- tlw ground thnt weallh ls au t•lenwnt whll'i1
tl\·e dumngl'S aud In miti1rntio11 thei·eof. The got•H to makl' up his rn11k lllHl intlUPll<'e In
plnintifl' introduced no e\·idence tending to soeil•ty. nml thereby n•111l1·rs the Injury or in11how tbut the defendant bad any property sult rP!mltlng from bis \\Tongful acts the
whatever, and did not claim thnt the dam- greater. Humphries v. Parker, 52 Me. i)()i,
ages should be increased by reason of wealth 508; 2 Green!. Ev. § 269. But In such eases.
or any PPl'tllllnry ablllty on the part of the as It Is rather the reputation for, than tbP
dE'fendant. 'fbe court excluded this evidence possPsslon of, wealth, which Is the cause of
offered by the deft>ndnnt. and he excl'pted.
' this Increased rank, tlw testimony must col'·
"The defendant also requested the judge to 1·espond, anll uni~· the general qut>stiou as to
Instruct the jury. that. the as11ault and hat- his clrcumstanees can bp asked, and not thP
tery being acts for which the defendant was detail. Stanwood v. Whitmore, 63 Me. 2(Y;I.
1mhject to prosel'utlon anti punli-ihment by a
But when exemplary damnges are claimed.
criminal action or lndl..tment, tlwy woul<I a tlltfPrent question Is prPsented. The defend·
not be authorl?.Pcl In this case to 11llow an_\'· ant's pe('unlary ability Is then a matter for
thing as exemplary 01· punitive tl11n111ges; the consideration of the jury, on the ground
whkh lnstruetion the judge rpfused to gin'. tbnt a given sum would be a much greatPr
but did atflrmath"Ply Instruct the jury thnt punishment to a man of small means thnn to
the law says that, In a case of gross and one of larger. McBride v . McLaughlin, 5
malicious ai;sault. the jury may, lo their dis· Watts. 3i5. Upon this point actual wealth
cretloo, If thPY deem proper, award exem- could only be materlnl. As bearing upon this
plary damages, but there Is no rule of law by point the testimony was offered and exelml·
which the plalntlfl' can claim It as a legal ed. This took l'rom the jury an element prop·
right."
er for their consideration.
T. H. Haskell, for plalntilf. N'atban Webb,
It Is true the plaintiff offered no proof upfor dPft>ndant.
on this point and elalmed no damages by
reason of defendant's "wealth or pecunlar)·
DA!'<FOltTII, .T. The exct>ptlon to the In- ability;" but If It wns competent for the plnlnstruction to thl' jury, that "the law says that tlfl' to prove defendant's weultb to lncrea&·
lo a case of gross and malicious assault, or bis damages, It was equally competent for
of gross and 11ggramted Injury, the jury the defendant to show a want of It to diminmay, In their dlscrt•tlon, If they deem proper, ish them; and the w11h·lng ot the right by th1·
award exemplary damngt>s, but thPre Is no one, Is no reason why It shoulcl be taken l'rom
rnle of law by which the plnlntlfl' eau claim the other. Nor does the mere non-claim of
It as a legnl right," must be ovprruled. 8uch damages on thn t gronnrl, the right to punltlvl'
law bas become so well settled In this statr, damages being still insisted upon, take it
even In cases where the defendant is ulso lht· from the consideration of the jury. HencP
ble to criminal prosecution, not only by the the exclusion ot the tpstlmony left them In
decided cases, hut nlso by a uniform and In darkness where thPY were entitled to light.
point ot time n sotn(•whnt extl'mlt•<I prn<"tlce It the plaintiff really Intended to ntlmlt that
In our courts. that It Iii now too lltll' to dis· thP defendant was without means, tbl' tes11 turb It, unlP!<s hy leglslatln~ Pnactnwnt. Ood· mony could have done him no harm; but
dard v. Rnllway Co.. i'ii ~le. 20'2. an1l <'nses such an admission was not distinctly marli>.
there eltPd. ReslclP!l, to allow the Px1·Pptlon ancl Jn the absence of It, the Pxcluslon of thP
c·ontended for, and permit the plalntlfT tu rP- tPstimony would be Injurious to the defernl·
cover <•xemplary dnmagl's for Injury to his ant. It certainly deprived him of a legal
pro1wrty. and refuse It. mu.Jt>r Rlmllnr cln·um· right.
t<tances for an Injury to his person. would lnExceptions sustained.
trocluce a great{•r lncousl,.h•ney and rPnclPr the
l11w morP un><ymmi>tril-al than Is now dahnAPPLETOX. C. J., and WAJ/l'O:'.'\. BAH ·
ed for It.
ROWS, and Pl!:TERS, .T.J.. eoncnrred.
LAW DAM.2d Ed.-29
JOil:'.'\SO:'.'\ '"· S\llTH.

(64 Me. 5:>3.)
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(20 S. W. 209, 111 Mo. 506.)

. BECK v. DOWELL.

(20 S. W. 209, 111 Mo. 506.)

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Sept. 20, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Lewis county;

Benjamin E. Turner, Judge.

Action by Jennie Beck, by her next friend,

Oliver Beck, Sr., against Elijah Dowell, ex-

ecutor. From a judgment for plaintiff, de-

fendant appeals. Ailirmed.

Blair & Marchand and M. McKeag, for ap-

pellant. Clay &. Ray, F. L. Schoﬁeld, and J.

lfopreme Courf of Missouri, Division No. 2.
Sept. 20, 1892.
Appeal from circuit court, Lewis county;
Benjamin E. Turner, Judge.
Action by Jennie Beck, by her next friend,
Oliver Beck, Sr., against Elijah Dowell, executor. From a judgment for plaintUf, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Blair & Marchand and M. McKeag, for appellant. Clay & Ray, F. I.. Schofield, and J.
C. Anderson, for respondent.

C. Anderson, for respondent.

GANTT, P. J. This cause was appealed

from the circuit court of Lewis county to the

St. Louis court of appeals. That court, in

an opinion by Judge Rombauer, aﬂirmed the

judgment of the circuit court, (40 Mo. App.

71;) but Judge Biggs being of the opinion
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that the conclusion reached by the majority,

that evidence of the ﬁnancial condition of the

plaintiff, in an action when the evidence will

justify the jury in awarding exemplary or

punitive damages, was admissible, is in con-

ﬂict with and opposed to two decisions of this

court, to wit, Overholt v. Vieths, 93 Mo. 422,

6 S. W. 74, and Stephens v. Railroad Co., 96

Mo. 207, 9 S. W. 589, the cause was, under

the constitution, certiﬁed to this court.

1. When the cause was heard in the court

of appeals, the instructions were not in the

record. No efforts were made to supply them

in that court, and that court rightly proceed-

ed on the assumption that the trial court had

correctly declared the law to the jury. Since

the case has reached this court, a certiﬁed

copy of the instructions has been ﬁled with

the record. The propriety of considering

these declarations of law by this court, under

these circumstances, suggests itself at once.

While this court obtains jurisdiction to “re-

hear and determine a cause so certiﬁed to

us by either of the appellate courts, as in

cases of jurisdiction obtained by ordinary

appellate process," there is nothing in the

L'0nstitUtion that justiﬁes parties in assuming

that we will or can take cognizance of mat-

ters not in the record. When a record is de-

ﬁcient in any material respect, the practice

is uniform that the party desiring the absent

record should suggest the diminution, and

apply for a writ of certlorari, or ﬁle stipula-

lions in this court, supplying the record. In

this case nothing of the kind has been done,

but from the brief of the appellant, we take

it he assumes that.these instructions are

properly before us. There is no hardship in

requiring parties to govern themselves by

the rules of procedure, established for the

disposition of causes. For the purposes of

this appeal, these instructions are no part of

the record, and the cause will be determined

on the presumption that the trial court cor-

rectly instructed the jury. Parties must pur-

sue legal methods in perfecting their tran-

scripts, and in the proper courts, and in prop-

er seasons.

2. The point in this record, then, is that

GANTT, P. J. This cause was appealed
from the circuit court of Lewis county to the
St. Louis court of appeals. That court, in
an opinion by Judge Rombauer, affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court, (40 Mo. App.
71;) but Judge Biggs being of the opinion
that the conclusion reached by the majority,
that evidence of the financial condition of the
plaintiff, in an action when the evidence will
justify the jury In awarding exemplary or
punitive damages, was admissible, ls In confiict with and opposed to two decisions of this
court, to wit, Overholt v. Vieths, 03 Mo. 422,
6 S. W. 74, and Stephens v. Railroad Co., 96
!\Io. 207, 9 S. W. 589, the cause was, under
the constitution, certified to this court.
1. When the cause was heard In the court
of appeals, the Instructions were not in the
record. No e1forts were made to supply them
In that court, and that court rightly proceeded on the assumption that the trial court had
correctly declared the law to the jury. Since
the case has reached this wurt, a certified
copy of the Instructions has been tiled with
the record. The propriety of considering
these declarations of law by this court, under
these circumstances, suggests itself at once.
While this court obtains jurisdiction to "rehear and determine a cause so certified to
us by either of the appellate courts, as in
cases of jurisdiction obtained by ordinary
appellate process," there ls nothing In the
constitution that justifies parties In assuming
that we wlll or can take cognizance of mattt-rs not In the record. When a record ls defi<'lent In any material respect, the practice
is uniform that the party desiring the absent
record should suggest the diminution, and
apply for a writ of certiorari, or file stlpulat ions in this court, supplying the record. In
tills case nothing of the kind has been done,
hut from the brief of the appellant, we take
It he assumes that. these Instructions are
properly before us. There ls no hardship In
requiring parties to govern themselves by
the rules of procedure, established .for the
disposition ot causes. For the purposes of
this appeal, these lnstruetlons are no part of
the record, and the cause wlll be determined
on the prNmmptlon that the trial court correctly lm;trncted the jury. Parties must pur-

sue legal methods ID perfecting their transcripts, and In the proper courts, and In proper seasons.
2. The point ID this record, then, 1s that
upon which the court of appeals divided. Ill
evidence ot the financial condition ot the
plaintlJl' admissible In an action for damages,
when there are circumstances of oppression
or mallce? That exemplary damages may be
rec.'Overed In actions for trespass or personal
torts accompanied by circumstances of malice
or oppression ls no longer open to question
In this state. Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152.
Nor 1s It controverted that it 1s perfectly
competent to show the financial ability of the
defendant In such a case. The case of Stephens v. Railroad Co., 96 Mo. 214, 9 S. W.
589, was an action tor compensatory dam·
ages alone, and the learned judge who wrote
the opinion expressly says: "There Is nothing In the case to justify the giving of exempla'Q' dom~s. and the da.mqges should
\&,rnpfiDed ill..SQ.l!UleJJSDtlop tQr

~B iB~es

sustained." The case or Overholt v. Vieths,
93- Mo. 422, 6 S. W. 74, had no element In it
justifying exemplary damages, and this court
held that it was not improper to exclude evldel)ce of the mother's financial condition lo
a suit for the death of her child which had
been drowned In a pond, "In view of the fact
that she had been allowed to state her condition In llfe, and that she did her own housework and had no servant." We do not think
either of these cases can be considered as decisive of the point In this case. Exewplary
damages are allowed, not only to compensate
the sulierer, · but to punish the offender.
Franz v. Hllterbrand, 45 Mo. 121; Callahan
v. Ca1farata, 39 Mo. 137. The evidence in
this case tended to show that the plaintitl'
was a girl about 16 years old; that her fa·
ther was a tenant of defendant; that on the
day she was shot by defendant her father
and his sons were trying to water a cow In a
lot of the defendant; that a difficulty ensued,
-a general fight; that she was standing I&
the lot looking on, unarmed, when the defendant turned upon her, and shot her through
the thigh. In other words, the defendant,
with a deadly weapon, shot an unarmed girl
without lawful provocation. We think there
was ample evidence from which the jury
could find wlllful, wanton Injury. In 1 Suth.
Dam. p. 745, It is said: "In actions for torts,
the damages for which cannot be measured
by a legal standard, all the facts constituting
and accompanying the wrong should be proved; and though there be a legal standard
for the principal wrong, 1f aggravations exist
they may be proved to enhance damages; and
every case of personal tort must necessarily
go to the jury on its special facts. These
embrace the res gestre and· the age, sex, and
status of the parties; this, whether the case
be one for compensation only, or also for
exemplary damages, when they are allowed."
In Bump v. Betts, 23 Wend. 85, the supreme
comt of New York, on a question of excess-
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‘dlimsiances may be inquired into.

ive damages, pointed to the fact that the de-

fendant had the command of great wealth,

and that the plaintiff was a poor man. in

McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432, in an action

for assault and battery, the court permitted

the plaintiff to show he was a poor man with

a large family. The supreme court of lili-

nois, in aﬁirming that ruling, said: “We are

o.t

also of the opinion that the circuit court de-

cided correctly in admitting the evidence and

giving the instruction. In a.ctinns_o£-this

.1
k.in.d,_the_condl-ties-in—llfe and circumstances

(g_tlte_parties are peculiarly the proper sub-

jects f9i:_i.he,,c_on,slderation of the jury in ei-

tlmating the damages. Their pecuniary cir-

It may

be readily supposed that the consequences of

a severe personal injury would be more dis-
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astrous to a person destitute of pecuniary

resources, and dependent wholly on his man-

ual exertions for the support of himself and

family, than to an individual differently situ-

ated in life. The effect of the injury might

be to deprive him and his family of the com-

forts and necessaries of life. It is proper

that the jury should be inﬂuenced by the pe-

cuniary resources of the defendant. The

more afﬂuent, the more able he is to remuner-

ate the party he has wantonly injured." In

Grable v. Margrave, 4 Ill. 372, in an action

for seduction, the trial court admitted evi-

dence to show plaintiff was a poor man. The

supreme court. on appeal, said: “The court

therefore decided correctly in admitting evi-

dence showing the pecuniary condition of the

plaintiff. This evidence does not go to the

jury for the purpose of exciting their preju-

dices in favor of the plaintiff because he is

a poor man. but to enable them to understand

fully the effect of the injury upon him, and to

give him such damages as his peculiar condi-

tion in life and circumstances entitle him to

receive." In Gnlther v. Blowers, 11 Md. 5315,

in an action for assault and battery, the trial

court having admitted evidence for the plain-

tiff, with a view of increasing his damages,

that he was a laboring man and had a wife

tve damages, pointed to the fact that the defendant had the command of great wealth,
and that the plalntltr was a poor man. In
McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432, In an actlon
for auault and battery, the court permitted
the plalntltr to show he was a poor man with
a large family. The supreme court of Illinois, ln aftl.rmlng that rullng, said: "We are
also of the opinion that the circuit court dec!d~ correctly In admitting the evidence and
giving the Instruction. la nctlnna of &We
kind, the ~dlt«IB 111 Ute and ctrcumstnnces
the 1MU11e.s are peculiarly the proper. Ab~ fpr t be ~O!!~lderll_!_io_!l_ of_ tll.e .Jllr.?. .lll..estl!Dlltlng the damages. Their pecuniary clrcumst:mces may be Inquired Into. It may
be readily supposed that the consequences of
a severe personal Injury would be more die·
astrous to a person destitute of pecunlnry
resources, and dependent wholly on his manual exertions for the support of himself and
family, than to an Individual differently situated In life. The effect of the Injury might
be to deprive him and bis family of the comforts and necessaries of life. It Is proper
that the jury should be Influenced by the pecuniary resources of the defendant. The
more amuent, the more able he ls to remunerate the party be has wantonly Injured." In
Grable v. Margrave, 4 Ill. 372, in an action
for seduction, the trlal court admitted evidence to show plaintiff was a poor man. The
supreme court, on appeal, said: "The court
therefore decided correctly In admitting evidence showing the pecuniary condition of the
plalntlff. This evidence does not go to the
jury for the 11urpose of exciting their prejudices In favor of the plalntlll' because be Is
a poor man. but to enable them to understand
!ully the effect of the Injury upon him, and to
give him such damages as his peculiar condl·
tlon In life and circumstances entitle him to
receive." In Gaither v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536,
in an action for as..~ult and battery, the trial
court having admitted evidence for the plain·
till', with a view of Increasing bis damages,
thnt he was a laboring man and bad a wife
and children to support, the supreme court,
after quoting the language of Mc:-iamara v.
King. 7 111. 432, says: "This ls good sense,
and Is sustained by the decisions In most ot
the states. An Injury done to a person not
dependent on manual labor for the support
.of hlmeelf and fnmily Is In no wise as great

01."
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as one to a person so situated." In Reed v.
Davis, 4 Pick. 21~. the supreme court of
Massachusetts, In an action for trespass tn
forcibly evicting plalntlll' from his home,
says: "One of the defendants stated to a
wltneBB, In nnewer to bis Inquiry whether he
thought the plalntlll' could not make him suffer, that 'the plalntltr had been to jail, and
sworn out, and was not able to do anything.'
Now, that circumstance was to be taken Into
consideration by the jury. There Is nothing
more abhorrent to the feelings ot the subjects of a free government than oppressing
the poor and distressed under the forms and
color, but really In vlolatlon, of the law." "It
Is found that the dwell1ng house was small,
but the damages are not to be graduated by
the size of the building. The plalntlll also
was poor. He had seen better days, but bad
been reduced In bis circumstances. He was
thought not to be able to do anything In vindlca tion of hie rights at the law." In Dalley
v. Houston, 58 l\!o. 361, this court i;ald: "It is
next Insisted that the court Improperly told
the jury that, In the estimation ot damages,
they might take Into consideration the '("OD·
dltlon In life of plaintiff's. and their pursuits
and nature of their business.' There is no
doubt but that, in estimating damages In
such cases, the jury may properly take Into
consideration the pecuniary condition of the
parties, their position in society, and all other
circumstances tending to show the vindictiveness, or atrocity or want of atrocity. In tile
transaction, and which tend to cbal'acterlze
the assault." This decision of Judge VLrles
was concurred In by all the judges. It has
never, to our knowledge and so far as we can
ascertain, been questioned, denied. or c1·itl·
cised. It ls In harmony. as we have seen,
with the decisions of otller courts of grent
ability. It Is In harmony with the tendency
of the courts to place before the triers or
facts, whether court or jury, every taet that
will aid them In arriving at a correct verdict.
It Is evident In this case Its etl'eet was not to
create prejudice or passion. There Is noth·
Ing that smacks of either In the verdict. Accordingly we amrm the judgment or the
court of appeals, as Indicated by the OJ>lnlon
of the majority of the judges of that court,
on this as well as all other points ruled In the
case, and It wlll be so ce•tllled to that court.
All concur.

and children to support, the supreme court,

after quoting the language of Mc.\'amara v.

King, 7 Ill. 432, says: “This is good sense,

and is sustained by the decisions in most of

the states. An injury done to a person not

dependent on manual labor for the support

of himself and family is in no wise as great

as one to a person so situated." In Reed v.

Davis, 4 Pick. 215, the upreme court of

Massachusetts, in an action for trespass in

forcibly evicting plaintiff from his home,

says: “One of the defendants stated to a

witness, in answer to his inquiry whether he

thought the plaintiff could not make him suf-

fer, that ‘the plaintif f had been to jail. and

sworn out, and was not able to do anything.'

Now, that circumstance was to be taken into

consideration by the jury. There is nothing

more abhorrent to the feelings of the sub-

jects of a free government than oppressing
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MiTIG .\ TION OF DAMAGES.

GOLDS\IITH'S ADM'I{ v. JOY.

(17 Atl. 1010, 61 Vt. 488.)

Supreme Court of Vermont.

June 13, 1889.

Exceptions from Bennington county court;

Powsus. Judge.

Trespass for an assault and battery, com-

I1‘ilu'.tP(i on one Goldsmith, brought by Gold-

smil,h‘s administrator against Moses Joy. Jr.

Defendant did not deny that he made the as-

sault. it appeared, however, that an the

time. and just before, hot words had passed

between the parties. and defendant claimed

that he committed the wrong under the in-

ﬂuence of the passion induced by the insult-

ing and unjustiiiable language of plaintiff's

intestate, and that this fact should be con-

sidered by the jury in reduction both of the

actual and exemplary damages. Defendant
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was the superintendent and general manager

of the construction of a system of water-

works in the city of Bennington. and in that

capacity had in his employ about 100 men,

mostly or all foreigners. It was in reference

to the treatment of these men by defendant

that the intestate used the alleged insuitin

language. He was-suffering from Bright's

disease at the time of the affrny, and subse-

quently died of it. It was claimed that his

death was materially hastened by the as-

sault.

The court instructed the jury to award

plaintiff actual damages at any rate, no mat-

ter what the provocation which led to the

assault might have been. Upon the subject

of exemplary damages the charge was as fol-

lows: “Now. then, as to the other question

of damages. In actions of this kind under

the laws of this state, the jury is permitted

(not compelled. but permitted) in their dis-

cretion to allow to the plaintiff, in addition

to the ordinary ColIl}l€in.\'i1ior)' damages. such

damages as in their judgment the charucler

of the assault requires, in order that their

verdict may serve as a terror to evil-doers.

This is called ‘exemplary damages,'—d:un-

Bennington.

ages that are awarded by way of example; a

verdict that the community can look upon as

the wise judgment of the jury, exercised in

a case where it will be calculated to restrain

attacks of this kind in the future. I have

said, gentlemen, that the allowance of the

damages is permitted to the jury. They are

not uwarded in any case unless the trespass

—unless the assault and battery—was of

such a wanton, malicious, or aggravated

character as leads the jury to think that an

example ought -to be made of the case.

Oftentimes an assault is committed by one

man upon another under such circumstances

that the jury can see honestly that there was

no malice; that there was no wantonness;

that there were no high-handed acts that

would justify the awarding of more than

compensatory damages. On the other hand,

many cases exist where the attack is of a

wanton character, where it is inexcu-mble,

MITIGATIO.N OF DA.MAGES.

GOLDSMITH'S ADM'R v. JOY.
(17 Atl. 1010, 61 Vt. 488.)
Supreme Court of Vermont. Bennington.
June 13, 1889.

Exceptions from Bennington county courL;
PoWEHS, Judge.
Tre~pass for an

:issault and battery, commi.:tPd on one Goldsmith, brought by Golt.lsmith's 11dmi11istrator against Mosl:'s Joy, Jr.
Defendant did not deny that he made the assault. It appeared, howeve1·, that at the
time, and just before, hot words had pa.,setl
betwern the parties, and defendant claimed
that he committed the wrong nnder the intluence of the pas~ion induced by the insulting and unjustiliable language of plaintiff's
intestate, and thut this fact should be co11sider1>d by the jury In retlnl'tion both of the
actual and exemplary damages. Defendant
was the superintt•ndent and general manager
of the construction of a system of waterworks in the city of Bennington, and in that
cap:tcity had in his employ about 100 men,
mostly or all foreigners. It was in reference
to the treatment of theae men by defendant
that t110 intestate used the alleged 1ns111t1ng
langu1tge. He was suffering from Bright's
disease at the time of the affray, and subsequently died of it. It wa., claimed that his
death was maierially hastened by the assault.
The court instructed the jury to award
plaintiff actual damasres at any rate, no matle1· what the provocation which led to the
nMault might luwe been. Upon the subject
of exemplary damages the charge was as follows: "Now, then, as to the other question
of damages. In actions or this kind under
the laws or this stat6, the jury is permitted
(not compelled, but p(•rmitted) in their discretion to allow to the plaintiff, in addition
to the ordinary compensatory damages, such
damages as in their judgment the charncte1·
of the assault requires, in order that their
verdict may serve as a terror to evil-doers.
'.rtiis is called •exemplary damages,'-damages that are awarded IJy way of example; a
verdict that the community can look upon as
the wise judgment of the jury, exe1·cised in
n case where it will be calcnlated to restrain
attacks of this kind in the future. I have
said, gentlemen, that the allowance of the
damages i!I permitted to the jury. They are
not awarded in any case unless the trespitss
-unless the assault and batte1·y-was of
such a wanton, malicious, 01· a!l'gravated
character as leads ihe jury lo think that an
example ought ·to be made of the case.
Oftentimes an assault is committed by one
mau upon another under SUl'h circumstaures
that the jury can see honestly that there was
no malice: that there was no wantonness;
that there were no high-handed acts that
would justify the awarding of more than
compensatory d11111ages. On the othe1· hand,
many ca.'\es exist wher11 the attack is of a
wanton character, where it is inexcu'ialile,
where it is of a high-hamle I nature, an I the

1

jury, looking at all the facts In the case,
wisely say that the public are entitled to have
an example made in the pariicuhn case, in
order that in the future not only the defendant liimself,·but that other persons who get
into affrays, shall be restrained from making
these high-handed, inexcusable, and wanton
attaeks upon anothn. So that, gentlemen,
this question, then. is one that addrl'sses itself to your wistl discretion. Do you think,
in view or what is shown here, that this attack was of such a charnrter as wal'mnts you
in awarding exemplary1lamages? If yoil do,
then the amount of Lhese damages rests
wholly in your wise discretion. Wi1ether it
shall be a sm:tll sum or a large sum, you are
to judge of; but in any event, gentlem,.n, H
you award damages of this nature, you are
to do it berause you ttiink that this assault
upon Mr. Gohlsm1th was, under the circumstances, wholly intixcusable and wanton oo
the part of the defendant. Now, then, in
respect to that question, mere words made
use of by one person to another are no h•gal
excuse whatever for the intliction of personal
violunco. U makes no difference how violent the litnguage used may be, no man ha$
the right to use personal violence upon anothe1· when he I!! induced to simply by the
U:ie of words.
That is no defense to the action. But when you come to the question of
whether a particular case is one that desen es
the awarding of exemplary damages, then
you nre to consider all the circumstances in
the case: the provocation, if any, that the
defendant hacl; and everything that Is calculated on the one hand to aggravRte his act,
arnl on the other· ham I to p;tlliate his act, is.
to be considered. As I have all'eady said on
the main question of compen~atoryllamages,
there is no defense hel'e whatever. :No matter what was said. no matter how much
provocation the defPndant had, he is bound
to answer for the compensatory dama·~e.s, l\t
any event. As to exemplary dnmages, in
the exercise of a wise discretion you will .not
allow them unless you are satisfied that thl'
act of the defendant was high-handed, w11nton, and inexcusable, and in determining that
question you are to take into view all the
provoc.ation that he hRd. Now, then, gentlemen, if the provocation was slight, it is quite
different, and it should have less Wt>ight.in
determining the question whether you shall
award exemplary damages than it would
have if the provocation was great. Then,
again, you may look at the parties themselves. If Goldsmith was a. feeble old man.
in poor heallh, and physically unable to C•lmpete with the defendant in a personal encounter, and the defendant without any
provocation that you in your judgment say
warmnts an assault,--a violent assault.-if
he then makes an assault that is altogether
undue, uncalled for, in view of the special
cil'cumstancPs existin,st, why, then, it would
be a case lhat the jury might awarJ exemplary damai,:es. Thl' law takes notice of the
liot pas:dons that peopl·! fall into when they
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. are engaged in disputes. not by way of mak-

ing a complete defense to an action for dam-

ages, but by way of raising a doubi; in the

minds of the jury respectmg the awarding

of exemplary damages. And in determining

that question the jury are justiﬁed in looking

at the parties as they stand before them.

Take an ignorant class of men that we have

in every community,— men who have by

their education and bringing up had less op-

portunities to come within the circle of good

order and of good behavior,—the jury might

well say that as to that class of men. if they

fall into disputes and come to blows, there

would be less occasion for setting an ex-

ample than there would be if the parties oc-

cupied a higher and more prominent position

in society. The inﬂuence of an example in a

case of this kind oitentimcs depends quite
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largely upon the character of the parties in-

volved. You can cast about you in your

mind‘s eye. in the community, and pick out

men who, if they should fall into an affray

of this kind. would draw away very far from

the moorings of gooll citizenship and good

behavior, and then an exlunple would be de-

manded, if one inilicted an assault upon an-

other." Verdict anl judgment for plaintiff.

Excepti by defendant.

Ii/lai'ti~‘rchibiild, J. L. Martin, and J.

C. Baker, for plaintiff. Batchelder 86 Bates

and W.'B%5heldon, for defendant.

TYIER. J. The court instructed the jury

that there was no defense to the claim for

actual or compensatory damages; that words

were no legal excuse for the iniliction of per-

sonal violence; that. no matter how great the

provocation, the defendarit was bound in any

event to answer for these damages. It is a

gem-ral and wholesome rule of law that when-

ever by an act which he could have avoided,

and which cannot be justiﬁed in law, a per-

son inﬂicts an immediate injury by force, he

is legally answerable in damagi-s to the party

injured. The question whether provocative

words may be given in evidence under the

general issue to reduce actual damages in an

action of trespass for an assault and battery

has undergme wide discussion. The English

cases lay down the general rule that provoca-

tion may mitigate damages. The case of

Fraser v. Berkelcy, 7 Uar. 8: I'. 621, is often

referred to, in which I.ord Amsosn held that

evidence _might be given to show that the

plaintiff in some degree brought the thing up-

on himself; “that it would be an unwise law

if it did not make allowance for human in-

llrmities; and,i.f aperson commit.violexu'eat

agavvhen he is s_mal‘ti,ng underimmediate

p-ovocation, that j§_pIat].er of mitigation."

'l‘I.\'DA .,"CT LL, in Perkins v. Vaughan, 5

Scott, N. R. 881, said: "1 think it will be

' found that the result of the cases is that the

matter cannot be given in evidence where it

amounts to a defense, but that, where it does

not amount to a defense, it may be given in

mitigation of d;uuages." Linford v Lake, 3

Hurl. & N. 275; 2 Add. Torts, § 1393, recog-

are engaged In dispute!!, not by way of making a complete defense to an action for damages, but l>y way ut raising a doubt in the
minds of the jnry respect.ug the awarding
Qf exemplary damages. And in deter111ini11g
that question the j nry are jusliHed in looking
at the parties ;is they stand before them.
Take an ignorant class of men that Wf' have
in every commnnity,-men who have by
their edueation and bringing up had less opportunities to come within the cil·cle or good
<mlei· and of good belrnvior,-the jury might
well say that as to that class of men, if they
fall into di~puLes arnl come to blows, there
would be less occa~ion for s1·tting an example than there would be if the parties occnpir<I a higher and mol'e prominent po~it ion
in soeiety. The inllnence of an example in a
case of this kind 01te11limvs 1lepe11us quite
largely upon the clrnraeter of the partie;1 invol vt>d. You can ca~t abouL yon in yonr
mind's eye, in the cmumnnity, and pick out
men wlw, if they should fall into an affray
of this kind, would draw away Vt>ry far from
the n~oorings of guo:l citi:r.ensJiip and good
liehavior, and then an elea111ple would 1.Je de111andf!d, if one inllii'ted an a.-!<anlt upon an-other." Verdict an·I judgment for plaintiff.
Excepti~y defendant.
Martin~'Tchibald, J. L. Martin, and J.
C. Baker, fof plaintiff. Batchelder & J3ates
and w.~heldon, f•Jrdefendant.

'~-

TYL)R. J. The court instructed the jury
that there was no defense to the claim for
actmil or rompeusatory damage:i; that wortls
were no legal exc11s1~ for tbe inlliction of pt>rso1,11l violence; that, no matter how great the
provo:·ati•m, t.hfl defendant was bound in any
4n·ent to answer for these damages. It is a
gen1·ral and wholesome rule of law that when~ver by an act which he conhl have avoided,
mid which cannot be justilled in law, a person inHicts an immediate injury by force, he
is legally answerahle in damag..s to the party
injured. The question whethl•r provorative
words may be given in evidence under the
g1meral issue to reduce actual damages in an
.action of trespas.'i for an assault anti battery
has und.,rg.•ne wide discussion. 'fhe English
~1sea lay down the general rule that provocation way mitigate damages. The .case of
l''raser v. Herkel1~y, 7 Car. & P. 621, is often
referred to, in which I.ord ABINOER held that
~vi1Jt·nce .might be given to show that the
plaintilf in some degree brought the thing up-on him~elf; "that it would be an unwise law
if it did not muke allowance for human infirmilit-s; arul, ifa person CQJlllllit..dolenceat
Ui111e whe.'! I~ .i~ :uuartiug uuder immelliatt,i
PQ!Vocaforn, tha.t j1, mat.I.er uf mitigation~"
TINDAL, C. J., in Perkins v. VanJrhan, 5
&ott, N. R. 881, SHitl: "l think it will be
fonnJ that tht' l'esnlt of the ca.sea is that the
mHttn cannot be given in evidence where it
11111ourlls Lo a dt>fense, but that, where it does
not a11101111t to a defense, it may be given in
miligaliun of damages." Linford v Lake, 3

4;j3

Hurl. & N. 2i5; 2 Add. 'forts.§ Ia\:J3, recognizes the same rule. In this country, 2
Oreenl. Ev.§ 9a, ruites the rule that a pro\'ocation by the plainti.II .may be thl,18..sliown. if so
ft>~enl as to imluce a prcau.wption tbat via:
lence was committed under the immedi.iltii
_in01_ll'nce oftlie· p;ission 111us wrongfully ex~
£il~d. b_y ~h!l plainti1L The earlier cases commonly cited in support of this rule ar" Cushman v. Ryan, 1 8tory, 100; Avery v. Ray, 1
.Mass.12; Lee v . Woolsey, l\:JJohns. 319; and
Maynard v. lleardsley, 7 Wend. 560. The supreme court of Massachusetts has generally
recognized the doctrine that immediate provocaLion may mitigate actual damages of this
kind. Mowry v. ~mith, 9 Allen, 67; 'fyson
v. Hooth, 100 Mass. 258; arnl Bonino v. Caledonio, 144 .Mass. 2\.U, 11 N. E. Hep. 98. It
is also said in 2 ~eilg. Dam. (7th Ed.) 521,
note: "If, making du" allowance for the infirmities of human temper, the defendant has
reasonable excuse fo1· the violation or public order, then there is no foundativn for exemplary damagt>s, arnl the plaintiff can claim
ouly com pensal ion. It is merely the corollary
of this that where there is a reasonable excuse fol' the dt!!ondant, arising froru the provocation or fault of the plaintilf, but not suffi.
cient entirely to justify the net done, there
ran be no exemplary damages, and the circu111stances of mitigation must be applied to
the actual Jamagee. If it we1·e not so. the
plaintiff would get full compensation for
danrnges occasioned by himself. The rule
ought to be and is practically mutual. J.falic"
and provocation in the defendant are punished by inHicting damages exceedil1g the
measure of eompmsation, and in the plaintiff
by giving him less than that measure." In
Blll'ke v. Melvin, 45 Coun. 243, PARK, C. J.,
held that the whole transaction should go to
the jury. "They could not 11scertnin what
amo1111t of damage the plaintiff w11s entitled
to recdve by considering a part of the tram1action. They must look at the whole of it.
They must ascertain how far the plaintiff
w11s in fault, if in fault at all, and how far
the 1lefendant, and give damages accor.lingly.
The difference between a provoked and 11n
unprovoked assault is obvious. The latter
would deservepunishment beyond lheactual
damage, while the damage in the other case
would be attributable, in ft great measure, to
the misconduct of the plaintiff himself." In
Bartram v. Stone, 31 Conn. 159, it was held
that in an action for assault and battery the
defendant might prove, in mitigation of damages, that the plaintiff, immediately before
the 11ssault, charged him with a crh11t>, and
that his assault upon the plaintiff was occasioned by "sudden heat," produced by the
plaintiff's false accusation. See, 11lso, Richa1·dson v. Hine, 42 Conn. 206. In Kiff v.
Youmans, 86 N. Y. 324, the plaintiff was
upon defendant's f>remist>8 for the purpose
of committing a trespass, and the defendant assaulled him to prevent the act, and
the only question was whether he used unnecessary fore~. DANt'ultTH, J., said: "lt
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still remains that the plaintiff provoked the

tn-spass; was himself guilty of the act which

led to the disturbance of the public peace. Al-

though this provocation fails to justify the de-

fendant, it may be relied upon by him in miti-

gation even of compensatory damages. This

doctrine is as old as the action of trespass,

* * * and is correlative to the rule which

permits circumstances of aggravation, such

as time and place of an assault, or insulting

words, or other circumstances of indignity

and contumely, to increase them." In Robi-

son v. Rupert, 23 Pa. St. 525, the same rule

is adopted. the court sayinr ' “Where there

is a reasonable excuse for th.. lefendant aris-

ing from the provocation or fault of the plain-

tiff, but not sufﬁcient entirely to justil'y the

act done, there can be no exemplary damages,

and the circumstances of mitigation must be
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applied to the actual damag1 s." In Ireland

v. Elliott, 5 Iowa, 478, the court said: “The

furthest that the law has gone, and the fur-

thest that it can go, while attempting to

maintain a rule, is to permit the high provoca-

tion of language to be shown as a palliation

for the acts and results of anger; that is. in

legal phrase. to be shown in m.tig-1tion of

damages." In Thrall v. Knapp, 17 Iowa,

468. the court said: “The clear distinction

is this: Conteniporaneous provocations of

words or acts are admissible, but previous

provucations are not. And the test is whether

‘the blood has had time to cool.' "‘ * *

The law affords a redress for every injury.

If the plaintiff slandered defendant's daugh-

ters, it would entirely accord with his natural

feeling to chastise him; but the policy of the

law is against his right to do so, especially

after time for reﬂection. It affords a peace-

ful remedy. On the other hand, the law so

com; I. tely disfavors violence, and so jealous-

ly guards alike individual rights and the pub-

lic peace, that, ‘if a man gives another a

cuff on the ear, though it costs him nothing,

no, not so much as a little riiachylon, yet he

shall have his action.‘ Per Lord HOLT,

Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 955." The

reasoning of the court seems to make against

his rule that provocations such as happen

at the time of the assault may be received in

evidence to reduce the amount of the plain-

tiif's recovery.

In Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183, DIXON,

C. J., held “that, notwithstanding what

was said in Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 75.

circumstances of provocation attending the

transaction, or so recent as to constitute a

part of the res gestoe, though not sutiirient

entirely to justify the act done. may consti-

tute an excuse that may mitigate the actual

damages; and, where the provocation is

great and calculated to excite strong feelings

of resentment, may reduce them to a sum

which is merely nominal." But in Wilson

v. Young, 31 Wis. 574, it was held by a ma-

jority of the court that provocation could go

to reduce compensatory damages only so far

as these should be given for injury to the feel-

still l'emains that the plaintiff provoked the
trt>spa88; was himself guilty of the act which
led to the distul'bance of the public peace. Al·
though this pro\'ocation fails to justify the defendant, it may be reli<'d upon by him in mitigation even of compensatory damages. This
doctrine is as old as the action of trespass,
"' * * and is correlative to the rul11 which
permits circumstances of nggravation, such
as time and place of an assault, or insulting
words, or othe1· circumstances of indignity
anti contumely, to increw1e them." In ltobison v. Rupert, 23 Pa. 8t. 52;1, the same rule
is adojltetl, the court sayinj.: • "Where there
is a reasonable excuse for th~ lefendant arising from the provocation or fault of the plainti ff, but not sutflcient entirely to justify the
act done, the1·e can be no exempla1·ydamages,
and the circnmstances of mitigation must be
applietl to the actual damag1 s." In Ireland
v. Elliott, 5 Iowa, 478, the court said: "The
furthest that the law has gone, and the furtheRt that it can go, wliile attt>mpti ng to
maintain a rule, is to permit the high provocation of language to be shown as a palliation
fur the acts and rell111ts of auger; that is, in
legal phr.1st!, to be shown in m.tigalion of
dama;?es." In Thrall v. Knapp. 17 Iowa,
468, the cou1-t said: "The clear distinction
. is this: Conte111 pora neous provocations of
words or acts are admissible, but previous
provocntions are not. And the test is whether
• tl1e blood has had time to cool.' "' "' "'
The law affords a redress for every injury.
If the plaintiff slandel'ed defendant's daugh·
te1·s, it would entirely accord with his natural
fet"ling to chastise him; but the policy of the
law is against his right to do so, especially
after time for reflection. It affords a peaceful remedy. On the other hand, the law so
com1 Ltely disfavors violence, and so jealously guards alike individual rights and the public peace, that, •if a man gives another a
cuff on the ear, though it costs him nothing,
no, not so much as ~ little diachylon, yet he
11hall have his action.' Per Lord HOLT,
Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 955." The
reasoning of the court seems to make 11gai nst
his rule that pl'ovocations such as happen
at the time of the assault may be received in
evidence to reduce the amount of the plaintiff's recovery.
In Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis.183, DIXON,
C. J., held "that, notwithstanding what
was saitl in Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wh.'. 75,
cil'cnmstances of provocation attending the
transaction, or so recent as to constitute a
part of the 1·es gestre, though not snffident
entirely lo justify the act clone, may constitute an excuse that may mitigate the actual
damages; and, where the provoc11tion is
great and calculated to eiccite strong feelings
of resentment, may reduce them to a sum
which is merely nominal." But in Wilson
v. Youug, 31 Wis. 574, it was held by a majodty of the court that provocation could go
to reduce compensatory damages only so far
as these should be given for injury to the reeliugs: D1xo~. C. J., however, adhl'ring to
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the rule in Mu rely v. Dun Lar t liat it migl1l g~
to reduce all compensatory damages. But
in Fl'nelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 34!, 10 N. W.
Rep. 501, and in Corcoran v. Hal'ran, 55
Wis. 120, rn N. W. Rep. 4()8, it was clearly
held that personal abuse of the assailant by
the party assaultt>d may be consider..d in
mitigation of punilory, but not of actual
damages, which mclu<le those allowed for
mental and bodilysuffet'ing; tllata man commencing an assault and batte1·y under such
circumstanees of pro\'ocation is liable for th&
actual damages which result from snch assault. In Donnelly v. Harris, 41 Ill. 126,
the court instructed the jury that words
spoken might be considereJ in mitigation of
damages. WALKER, C. J., in delivel'ing the
opinion 1f the supreme court, remarked:
"Had this modification been limited to eicemplary damages, it would have been correct,
but it may well have been unrlerstood by th0
jury as applying to actual damages, and they
would thus have been misled. To allow them
the effect to mitigate actual damages would
be vit'tually to allow them to be ust•d as a defense. 'l'o say they constitute no defense,
and then to say they way m1ti.;ate nil !Jiit
nominal damal(es, wonld, we think, he doing by indirection what has been prohibited
from l1eing done directly. To give to words
this effect would be to abrogate, in effect,
one of the most flrmly established rules of
the law." See, also, Ogden v. Claycomb, 52
111. 366. In Gizln v. Witzel, 82 Ill. 324!, the
court said, in reference to the charge of the
court bdow: "The third instruction tt'lls the
ju1·y, among other things, that the plaintiff.
in order to recover., should have been guilty
of no provocation. This is error. Itls whol·
ly immaterial what language he may have
used, so far as the right to maintain an action is con<·erned, and even if he went beyond words and committed a technical assault.
the acts of the defendant must still be limit.
eel to a reasonable self-defense." In N onis
v. Casel, 90 Iud. 143, this precise quest.ion
was not raised, but the court said, in reference to the Instructions of the court below,
that the first part of the charge, that the
provocation by mere words, however gross
and al.msive, cannot justify an assault, was
correct, and that a person who ~akes such
words a pretext for committing an assault
commits thereby not only a mere wrong, but
a crime, 11nd the person so assaulted is not
deprived of the right of reasonable self de·
fense, even though he used the insulting
language to provoke the assault. against which
he defends himself; but, whatever may have
been his purpose in using the Kbuslve language, it cannot be mad~ an excuse for the
assault. .Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich. 471,
was a case very similar to the one at bar, and
was given to the jury under like instructions.
The supreme court said: "In regard to provocation, the court charges, in effect, that if
plaintiff provoked defendant, and the assault was the result of that p1·ovocation, he
could recover nothing beyoml his actual dam-
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ages and outlays, and would be precluded

from claiming any damages for injured feel-

ings or mental anxiety. In other words, he

would be cut of f from all the aggravated

damages allowed in cases of willful injury,

and sometimes loosely called ‘ exemplary

damages.‘ As there is no case in which a

party who is damaged, and is allowed to re-

cover anything substantial, cannot recover

his actual damages, the rule laid down by the

court was certainly quite hberal enough, and

if any one could complain it was not the de-

fendant." The court said in Prentiss v.

Shaw, 56 Me. 436: “We understand that

rule to be this: A party shall recover as a

pecuniary recompense the amount of money

which shall be a remuneration, as near as

may be, for the actual, tangible, and immedi-

ate result, injury, or consequence of the tres-
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pass to his person or property. * " * If

the assault was illegal and unjustiﬁed. why

is not the plaintiff in such case entitled to

the beneﬁt of the general rule, before stated.

that a party guilty of an illegal trespass on

another's person or property must pay all

the damages to such person or property, di-

rectly and actually resulting from the illegal

act? * * 1' Wherethe trespass orinjury

is upon personal or real property. it would

be a novelty to hear a claim for reduction of

the actual injury based on the ground of

provocation by words. If. instead of the

owner's arm, the assailant had broken his

horse's leg, "' " "' must not the defend-

ant be held to pay the full value of the horse

thus rendered useless?" The learned judge

admits that the law has sanctioned, by a

long series of decisions, the admission of evi-

dence tending to show, on one side, aggra-

vation, and on the other mitigation of the

damages claimed, but he holds the law to be

that mitigaut circumstances can only be set

against exemplary damages, and cannot be

used to reduce the actual damages directly

resulting from the defendant's unlawful act.

In a learned article on “Damages in Actions

ex Delicto," 3 Amer. Jur. 287, it is said: “If

the law awards damages for an injury, it

would seem absurd (even without resorting

to the deﬁnition of damages) to say that they

shall be for a part only of the injury." “It

is a reasonable and a legal principle that the

compensation should be equivalent to the in-

jury. There may be some occasional depart-

ures from this principle, but I think it will

be found safest to adhere to it in all cases

proper for a legal indemniﬁcation in the

shape of damages." Jacobs v. Hoover, 9

Minn. 20-1. (Gil. 189;) Cushman v. Waddell,

Baldw. 57;t and McBride v. McLaughlin, 5

Watts. 375,—are strong authorities in sup-

port of the rule that provocative language

used by the plaintiff at the time of the bat-

tery should be given in evidenceonlyin miti-

gation of exemplary damages, and that un-

tiFv-il. F‘.-1s, No. 3,516’?

less the plaintiff has given the defendant s.

provocation amounting in law to a justiﬁca-

11ges and outlays, and. would be precluded
from claiming any damages for Injured feelings or mental anxiety. In other words, he
would be cut off from all the aggravated
damages allowed in cases of willful injury,
and sometimes loosely called •exemplary
damages.' As there is no case In which a
party who Is damaged, and is allowed to recover anything substantial, cannot recover
his actual damages, the rule laid down by the
court was certainly quite liberal enough, and
if any one could complain it was not the defendant." 'rhe court said in Prentiss v.
Shaw, 56 Me. 436: "We understand that
rule to be this: A party shall recover as a
pecuniary recompense the amount or money
which shall be a remuneration, as near as
may be, for the actual, tangible, and immediate result, injury, or consequence of the trespass to his pt.>1·son or propt.>rty. • • • If
the assault was illegal and unjustified, why
is not the plaintiff in such case entitled to
the benefit of the general rule, before stated,
that a party guilty of an illegal trespass on
another's person or property must pay all
lhe 1lamages to such per:mn 01· propnty, dirt:clly autl ildllally r~u!Lirag froru th.: rn ..gul
11ct? • • • \Vherethe trt'spass orinjnry
is upon per.ional or real propt.>rty, lt would
be a novtiltv to hear a claim for reduction of
the actual· injury based on the ground of
pro\'Oc1ttion by words. It, instead of the
owner's arm, the assailant ha<I broken his
horse's leg, • • • must not the defendant be held lo pay the full value of the horse
thus rendered usl'less?" The learned judge
Admits that the law baa sanctioned, by a
long aeries or decisions, the admission of evidence tending lo show, on one side, aggravation, and on the other mitigation of the
damages claimed, but he holds the law to be
that mitigant circumstances can only be set
agaill8t exemplary damages, and cannot be
used to reduce the actual damages directly
resulting from the defendant's unlawful act.
In a learned a1·ticle on "Damages in Actions
ex Dl'licto," 3 Amer••Jur. 287, it issaid: "If
the law awards damages for an injury, it
would seem absurd (even without resorting
to the deli n ition of damages) to say that they
ehall be for a part only of the injury." "It
is a reasonable and a legal principle that the
compensation should be equivalent to the injury. There may be some occasional departures from this principle, but I think it will
be found safest to adhere to It in all cases
proper ror a legal indemnification In the
ahape of damages." Jacobs v. Hoover, 9
Minn. 204, (Gil. 1!:19;) Cushman v. Waddell,
Baldw. 57; 1 and .Mcllridti v. McLaughlin, 5
Watts, 375,-are strong authorities in support of the rule that provocative language
used by thti plaintiff at the time of the battery should be given in evidence only in mitigation of exemplary damages, and that un·- - - ----- - 1 F1~1. C'ns. Xo. :1,fi16.
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less the plaintilf has given the defendant a
provocation amounting in law to a justification ht! is entitled to receive compensation
for the actual injury sustained.
If provocative words may mitigate, it follows that they may reduce the damaites to a
mere nominal sum, and tbus practicully justify an assault and battpry. But why, under
this rule, may they not fully justify? If, in
one case, the provocation is so great that the
jury may award only nominal damages, why,
in another, In which the provocation is far
greater, should they not be perm ittt'd to ar-quit thedefttndant, and thus overturn the well.
settled rule of law that words cannot justify
an assault. On the other hand, H wonlscannot
justify they should not rrntigate. A defend·
ant should not be heard to say that the plaintiff was first in the wrong by abu,.ing him
with insulting words, anti therefore, though
he struck and injured the plaintiff, he was
only partly in the wro11g, and should p:ly
only part of the actual damag,.s. If lhe right
or thti plaintiff to recover actual damages
were in any dPgree dependent on the d.. IPnd·
1tnl's inle11t, thl'n the plainLilI's pro\'ocation
lo the llefenJant to c11111111it the as:111ult 11p11n
him woultl IJe legitimate evidence bt>aring
upon that que11lion; but It. is not. Even
lunatics and id1ot:1 are liable for actual damag~ dune by tllelll to the p1·01wrty or person
of another, and certainly a person In the full
possess.on of his faculties should be held
liable for his actual inju1·ies to another, unless done in self-defense, or unde1· reasonable
apprehen~ion that the plaintiff was about to
do htm bodily harm. 'fhe law is that a person 111 liable in an action of trespass for an
as11ault a11d Lattery, although the plaintilf
made the fir11t as11ault, if the defendant used
more fo1ce than was necessary for his prottcllon, and the symmetry of tl:e law 1s belter
preservt-d by holding that the defendant's
liuhility for 11ctual damages bl'gins with the
b... ginning of his own wrongful act. It is
certainly in accordance with what this court
held in Howland v. Day, 56 Vt. 318, that
"the law abhors the use of force either for
attack or defense, and never permits its use
unnecessarily." Exemplary damages are not
recoverable as matter of right, but. as was
stated by WHEELER, J., in Earl v. Tupper,
45 Vt. 275, they are given to stamp the condemnation of the jury upon the acts of the
defernlant on account of their m:dicious or
opp1·t-ssive character. Boardman v. Goldsmith. 48 Vt. 403, and cases cited; .Mayne,
Dam. 58-65; Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N. Y. 440.
The instructions to the jur·y upon this branch
of the case were in substantial accordance
with the law us above stated. As exemplary
damagPs wne awanlahle in the discretion of
the jury, the charge was also conect that the
inlluence of an example in a case oft.his kind
dept'nded on the character and standing of
the parties in\'olved. We fillll no error in the
charge, and the judgment is nffirmed.
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WARD v. BLACKWOOD.1

(41 Ark. 295.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas. Nov. Term. 1883.

Appeal from circuit court. Faulkner county;

J. W. Martin. Judge.

Massey sued Ward in an action ex delicto.

His complaint contained two paragraphs—

one for assault and battery. and the other for

malicious prosecution in having him arrested.

After the issues had been made up. the plain-

tiff died. \Ir. Blackwood qualiﬁed as his

administrator, and the action was revived in

his name and proceeded to a trial, which re-

sulted in a verdict against Ward for two

thous.-1nd dollars damages. Ward excepted

to the revivor in the name of the personal

representative. and afterwards moved the

court to arrest the judgment and to grant

him a new trial for this alleged error. Re-

(41 Ark. 21Ki.)
l'npr<'me Court of Arkansns. Nov. Term, 1883.
Appi>al from circ uit court. Faulkner county;
J. W. llartln, .Turlge.
:\CassPy sued \Yard in an action ex dellcto.
His complaint eontainecl two parai:rnpbsone for assault and battery. nncl the other for
ma lido us prosecution in Ila rlug- him n rn·~tecl.
After the issues had been made up. the plaintiff diL>tl. :\Ir. Blackwood qualified as his
aclmlnii>trator, nut! the action was revivC'd In
his name and proceeded to a trial, which resulted In a verdict against \Yard for two
thous:inll dollars damaires. "'nrd excepted
to the revlvor in the nnmP of the rwrsonal
n•1n·1·sp11tnti\·e. and nftPrwarcls lllO\'!'d the
1·om·t to arrest the j11dgmrnt and to irrant
him a new trial for this alleged error. Re\'t•rsl'd.

R. C. ~ewton and H!'ndcrson & Carutb. tor
UJl)lellnnt. \V. L. Terry and Bla('kwootl &
"'llllams, for nppellee.
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versed. ,

R. C. Newton and Henderson & Caruth, for

appellant. W. L. Terry and Blackwood &

Williams, for appellee.
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'l‘he court gave the following direction to

the jury: “If the assault was committed

without fault on the part of the plaintiff in

a wanton and willful manner. and under cir-

enmstances of outrage. cruelty and oppres-

sion, or with malice, they will be warranted

in ﬁnding vindictive or exemplary damages

by way of punishment and for public ex-

ample."

And it refused to give this: “If you ﬁnd

from the evidence that Massey was employed

by or for Ward, for the purpose of guarding

t-onvicts, and that some of them escaped

through the carelessness or negligence of said

.\iassey, or through his connivance, and that

Ward believed he had so acted, although said

belief or opinion will not justify the assault.

it may be considered in mitigation of dam-

ages."

The action of the court in these particulars

was excepted to. and was urged in support

of the motion for a new trial. And it was

also claimed that the damages were excess-

ive. The defendant was the lessee of the

penitentiary. The plaintif f was employed as

a guard, and was especially instructed to be

vigilant and never permit a convict to come

nearer him than twenty-ﬁve yards. He was

SlUTH. J. • • • • • • • • •
Tlw court g:n·e the following direction to
the jnr)· : "If the assault was <'ommltted
without fault on the part of th<' plnlntllr In
it wnnt nn and willful manner, and under cir1"1111stances of outrage, cruelty and oppres11ion. or with malice, they will be warranted
in finding vindictive or exemplary damages
hy wny of punishment and for public example."
And It refused to give this: "If you find
from the C\'ldence that ~L1sgpy was employed
hy or for 'Vard, for the purpoRe of guarding
1·onvktR, and that ROllll' of tlwm el'lmped
rhrough the carelessness or negligC'11ce of said
.Mass!')", or through his connlrnnce, and that
"'ard hellp\·e1l he had so acted, although said
belief or opinion will not justify the assault.
It may be considered In mitigation of damages.''
The action of the court in thesc pnrti<'nlars
was excepted to. and was urged In support
of the motion tor a new trlnl. And It was
also claimed that the damages were excesslve. The defendant was the lessee of the
penltentlnry. The plalntltr was employed as
a guard, and was especially Instructed to he
viirilant and never permit a con'l"ict to come
1warer him than twenty-five yards. He wail
1101 11 man of strong constitution nnd was In
ntthl'r fi>eble health. He seems to have fallt'll aslePp on his post about ten o'clock In the
nwrulng. a11tl thn•c eonvl<'b!, taking a1h·nntage
of hl.s condition, disarmed him and made
irootl tlll'lr escape. They were fired upon by.

not a man of strong constitution and was in

rather feeble health. He seems to have fall-

en asleep on his post about ten o'clock in the

morning. and three convicts, taking advantage

of his condition, disarmed him and made

good their escape.

l Portion of opinion omitted.

They were ﬁred upon by,

the other guards. and in the midst of the com-

motion the defendant came into the yard,

and being enraged at the escape of the con-

victs. seized a clapboard, and struck the plain-

tif f three or four times over the shoulders and

back.

This does not impress us as a proper case

for the inﬂiction of exemplary damages or

i

Port ion of opinion omitted.

the otlwr gunrcls. and In the midst of tht> eommotlon the defendant camP Into thi> ~·a nl,
and being enraged at the escnpe of thi> eonvlcts. s<>iz<'d n clnpbonrd, antl strtwk th t~ plalntitf three or four times over the shonldt>rs ancl
back.
This does not Impress us as a propn case
for the Infliction of exemplary damagt>S or
smart money. An employer who, In a fit of
pa;:sion. nssnults his servant for a. neglect of
dnty, thereh~· t'ommits n hrt>Mh of the pea<'e
and an n<'lionable wrong. But If, mnking
due allowance for the Infirmities of human
tempt>r, the defenllant has a reasonable exem~r. nrlsing from the provO(·ation or fault
of thP plaintifl'. hnt not i;:ntfkient to justify
entir<·l~· the :wt dun!'~ then damagc•R ought
not to be assc·s~ed by way of rnmlshment and
the drenmsmnces of mitigation should be
consich·red.
For the public olfense. Mas;.ey swore out a
warrant, upon which \Vard was arrested, arraigne-d. pli>arted guilty, and fined $10 and
eosts and pnhl the same. For the private lnjur~· this aetlon Is prosecuted.
And the ele. ments of damages are, the personal Indignity
Involved In the assault, the plaintllr's hodlly
pain, and sutferlng, loss of time and labor,
and diminished capacity to work from the
date of the assault to Massey's death, and
the expenses or medical and surgical attendance during hie Illness consequent upon the
Injuries received.
Cushman v. Waddell, 1 Baldw. 59, Fed. Cas.
No. 3,5Hl, was an action by a schoolmaster
against a parent for a severe beating. The
plaintllr had punished one of his pupils for
some olrense. The father went to the plalntllf's boarding-house, attacked and beat him
savagely, accompanied by very Intemperate
and vindictive language and other <'ircumstances of aggravation. The court held th.1t
no provocation could ex<'l18e the dl'fendant
from making l'ompenRatlon for all the Injury
the plalntllr had suffered hy the unlawful attack. Rut If the jury were satisfied that,
without nny previous malice towards tit<!
plalntllr, or any deliberate design to Injure
him In llt>rson or In the estimation of the puhlie, the clefendnnt acted In the beat of passlon. caused by the appearance and ac<'onn'
of his son. It wns a clrcumstnnee wblcb 011g111
to operate powerfully to reduce the damage~
to sucb as were <'Olllpi>nAAtory.
In the <'&.se under consicleratlon, tlu.•re wns
no evidence of previous malice, nor of dellberate cruelty, only of hot blood and a certaln recklessness. \Vard had never seen
Massey before. And Massey was very far
from b('lng free from fault.
For the errors above lndlcat.ed, the judgment Is reversed, and a new trial le awarded.

~llTIGAflON

SH'KHA v. SMALL l't 111.
\IlTIGAl‘ION OF DAMAGES.

4-')?

(33 Atl. 9, 87 Me. 493.)

SIFKRA v. S.\IAl'.L ct al.

Supremt> .Tudicinl Court of !\!nine.
(33 Atl. 9. 87 Me. 493.)

May 4,

l~U;J.

Supreme Judicial Court of Mnine. May 4,

ll\U5.

Exceptions from supreme judicial court,

York county.

Action on the case for libel by Raymond

Sickra against Josephine W. Small and an-

other. Plaintiff had judgment for nominal

Exceptions from 8\lllreme judi('lal rourt,
York county.
A('tion on the ('ftse tor libel by Raymond
~i<'kra Against .Josl'phine ,V, Small aud an~•ther.
l'lalntitr had jmlgmc>nt for riomlnnl
dnmagPs only, and brings CXCl'llllons. J<~xt·Pp
tions sm1tained.

damages only. and brings exceptions. Excep-

tions sustained.

G. F. Haley, for plaintiff. E. J. Cram, for

G. F. Haley, tor plaintiff.
"1efendn nts.

E. J. Crom, for

defendants.

W1-II'I‘EIIOUSE, J. This was an action of

libel for defamatory matter, publi hed in a

newspaper, representing that the plaintiff

and Mrs. Blake had “eloped," and were liv-

ing together in adultery.

At the trial, evidence was offered by the
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defendant, and admitted by the court, sub-

ject to the plaintiffs right of exception. that

the plaintiff's “general character" was bad

in the community in which he lived.

that, in actions for libel or slander, the char-

acter of the plaintiff may be in issue upon the

question of damages; but it is contended that

the inquiry should be restricted to the plain-

tiff's general reputation in respect to that ‘

trait of character involved in the defamatory

charge.

While there has been some contrariety of

opinion, or at least of expression, upon this

question, it must now be regarded as settled,

both upon principle and the great weight of

authority, that, in this class of cases, the

defendant may introduce evidence, in mitiga-

tion of damages, that the plaintiff's general

reputation, as a man of moral worth, is bad,

and may also show that his general reputa-

tion is bad with respect to that feature of

character covered by the defamation in ques-

tion; and, as to the admission of such evi-

dence, it is immaterial whether the defendant

has simply pleaded the general issue, or has

pleaded a justiﬁcation as well as the general

issue. Stone v. Varney, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 86;

Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241; Bodwell v.

Swan, 3 Pick. 376; Clark v. Brown, 116

Mass. 5053; Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613; Lamos

v. Snell, 6 N. H. 413; Bridgman v. Hopkins,

34 Vt. 533; Eastland v. Caldwell, 2 Bibb, 21;

Powers v. Cary, 6-1 Me. 1; Odgers, Sland.

& L. 34)4; Ruth. Dam. 679; Best, Ev. 256; 1

Whart. Ev. 53; 2 Starkie, Sland. 87; 1 Greenl.

Ev. § 55; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 275.

In Stone v. Varney, supra, the libel imputed

to the plaintif f “heartless cruelty toward his

child," and it was held competent for- the de-

fendant to introduce evidence, in mitigation

of damages, that “the general reputation of

the plaintiff in the community, as a man of

moral worth," was bad. After a careful ex-

amination of the authorities touching the

question, the court say, in the opinion: "Thi;‘

‘

review of the adjudicated cases, and particu-

larly the decisions in this commonwealth and

in the state of New York, seems necessarily to

\\'Hl'.fEHOl'8E, J. This wnR on ll<'lion of
Uhf'l for 1'k'fnmatory m.nttPr, put.JI hP'I In a
newspaper, n•pr<':'euting that tile iilaiutltf
and !\IM!. Blake had "elopPd," nnl\ wert> living toi;:ethpr In a1lultet·y.
At the trial, evidence was otrerell by the
deft-ndnnt, and ndmltt<'1l by the ('OUrt, subject to the plalntllf's right ot exception, that
the plalntl!T's "general charnl'ter" was bad
in the community In which he ll\•ed.
1. It was not questioned by the plnlntl!T
that, In actions for libel or slander, the char·
act1i:r of the plaintiff may be in issue upon the
question of damages; but It la contended that
the Inquiry should be restri<'te1l to the plalntltr's gPneral reputation In respect to that
trait ot charn_cter Involved In the defamatory
e!harge.
While there bas been some contrariety of
opinion, or at least of expression, upon tbls
quel'ltlon, It must now be regarded as 11ettle1l,
both upon principle and the great weight or
authority, that, in tbls claBS of cases, the
defendant may Introduce evidence, In mitigation of damages, that the plalntl!T's general
reputation, ns a man of moral worth, Is bad,
and mny also show that his general reputation le bad with respect to that feature of
<'haractt>r covered by the defamation ln que11tlon; and, as to the admission ot such evidence, It ls Immaterial whether the defendant
hn11 almply pleaded the general Issue, or ha11
pleaded a justification aa WE'il as the genernl
188ue. Stone v. Varney, 7 :Mete. (!\lss11.) 86;
Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241; Bodwell v.
l'lwan, 3 Pick. 376; Clark v. Brown, 116
Mass. 005; Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613; I..nmos
v. Snell, 6 N. H. 413; Bridgman v. Hopkins,
34 Vt. r>33; 1'~astlnnd v. Cahlwell, 2 Bibb, 21;
Powers v. Cary, 64 Me. 1; Odgers, Sl:md.
& J,, 304; Ruth. Dnm. 679; Best, Ev. 2i'16; 1
Whart. Ev. 5.3; 2 Starkie, Stand. 87; 1 Greenl.
Ev. f r.::>; 2 Greenl. Ev. I 275.
Iu Stone v. Varney, supra, the libel imputed
to the plaintiff "heartless cruPlty toward his
1·hlld," and It was held competent for· the defendant to Introduce evidence, In mitigation
of damages, that "the general reputation of
the plalntllT in the community, as a man of
moral worth," was bad. Arter a careful examination of the authorlUea touchlu1 the

OI•' DAl.IAGES.
qupstlon, the court say, In the opinion: "Thi::
re\'ll'W of the adju1llcnted cuses, and partil'll·
larly the decisions In this commonwealth null
In the state or New York, seems necessarily to
lead to the condmlion that eviden('e of general bad character le admissible In miti~ation
ot d11111ages. • • • It <'annot b<' jtU!t that
a man of Infamous charnc·tcr sb1111ltl, for the
11ame lllielous matter, be entillL>d to equal.
tlnmnge!' with the man of unblernl;1hed reputation; yet Rueb rnu!!t be tile result. unless
churnetPr be a proper suhject ot evidence lwfore a jury. Lord Ellenhorough, In 1 )lnulc
& R 2SH, snys, 'Certainly a perl'on of disparaged fnme Is not entitled. to the sn111e
nwa~i.1re of damages with one wh1's1• l'lmractl'r ii! unhlPllliRhNI, and lt Is eompPtent to
i<how that b~· evidence.'"
111 LPon:ml v. Allen. supra, the plalntltr
w1111 diar;,;\·d with lllUliclously liu.-n;ng a
Sl'hoolhouse, nnd it waR held that, In the lntrodudlon ot evidence to l1111wnd1 the character of the plulntilT, In mitigation of damages, the Inquiries should relate eithPr to the
general charnctt•r of the plnlntllT fo1· Integrity
und moral worth, or to bis re1mtntlon In regard to conduct similar In charneter to the
oft'ense wltb which the detend:rnt bad rhar&'et.l him.
In the re<'ent case ot Clark v. Brown, 116
Mass. UO::i, the plnlntllT was charged with
lar<'eny. '£be trial court admitted evllle1)('e
that the plalntllT's reputation tor honesty and
Integrity was bad, and excluded evidence that
bis reputation In resp~t to thieving was bad.
But the full court held the exclusion of the
latter evidence to be error, and reattlrmed the
rul<>, laid down In Stone v. Yarney and I..ron·
nard v. Allen, supra, that It was rompPtent
for the defendant to prove, In mitigation of
damnges, that the plaintllT's general reputation waa bad, and that It was also bud In
respect to the charges involved In the al·
leged alander.
In Lamos v. Snell, 6 N. H. 413, the defendant's right to Inquire Into the plaintiff's "general character as a virtuous and honest man,
or otherwise," was brought directly In question; and It was determined that the defendant was "not confined to evidence of character founded upon matters ot the same nnture
as Ulat specified In the charge, but mny give
In evidence the general bad character of the
plalntltr • • • In mitigation of damages,
and tor this Inquiry the plalntllT must stand
prepared."
In Eastland v. Caldwell, supra, the court
eay, In tile opinion: "In the estimation of
damages the jury must take Into consideration the general character of the plalntlft'.
• • • In this case, the defendanl''s coun::;el
was permitted by the court to Inquire Into the
plaintiff's general character In relation to the
facts In l!ll!ue; but we are or opinion he ou ~ht
to have been permlttetl to Inquire Into his
general moral character, without re'atlon to
any particular species of Immorality; tor a
man who la habitually addicted to every v.ce,
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except the one with which he is charged, is

not entitled to as heavy damages as one pos-

sessing a fair moral character. The jury,

who possess a large and almost unbounded

discretion upon subjects of this kind, could

have but very inadequate data for the quan-

tum of damages if they are permitted only to

know the plaintiffs general character in re-

lation to the facts put in imue."

With respect to the form of the inquiry,

it is said to he an inﬂexible rule of law that

tile only admissible evidence of a man's char-

acter. or actual nature and disposition, is his

general reputation in the community where

he resides. Chamb. Best, Ev. 236, note. It

would seem, therefore. that, in order to avoid

eliciting an expression of the witness' opin-

ion respecting the plaintiff's character, the

appropriate form of interrogatory would be
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an inquiry calling directly for his knowledge

of the plaintiff's general reputation in the

community, either as a man of moral worth,

without restriction, or in the particular rela-

tion covered by the libel or slander.

2. But the plaintiff also has exceptions to

the following instruction in the charge of the

presiding justice: “I am requested by the

counsel for the defendant to instruct you

that, if the plaintiffs conduct was such as to

excite the defendant's suspicions, it should be

considered in mitigation of damages, the

plaintiiff alleging that he had never been sus-

pected of the crime alleged. I give you that

instruction."

This request was doubtless suggested by

the note to section 275, 2 Greenl. Ev., which

appears to be based on the old case of Earl of

Leicester v. Walter, 2 Camp. 251. But that

case has long ceased to be recognized as au-

thority for anything more than the admission

of evidence of the plaintiffs general reputa-

tion. A similar intimation is found in Lar-

ned v. Buﬂinton, 3 Mass. 353, but in Alder-

men v. French, 1 Pick. 18, this dictum is de-

clared to be unsupported by any authority.

Again, in the later case of Watson v. Moore,

2 Cush. 134, it was held incompetent for the

defendant, in an action of slander, to prove, in

mitigation of damages, “circumstances which

excited his suspicion,and furnished reasonable

cause for belief on his part, that the words

spoken were true." The obvious objection to it

is that the damages in an action of slander are

to be “measured by the injury caused by the

words spoken, and not by the moral culpa-

bility of the speaker." We have seen that

the defendant is permitted to prove that the

plaintiffs general reputation is bad, because

this evidence has a legitimate tendency to

show that the injury is small; but the evi-

dence of general report that the plaintiff is

guilty of the imputed offense is inadmissible

for the purpose of reducing damages. Powers

v. Cary. supra; Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend.

659; Stone v. Varney, supra. A fortiori,

evidence of the defendant's suspicions, how-

ever excited, cannot be received for such

a purpose. Watson v. Moore, supra.

lUTlGATION 011' DA..'1AUES.

except the one with which he ls charged, Ill
not entitled to as heavy damages as one possessing a fair moral chsracter. The jury,
who possess a large and almost unbounded
discretion upon BUbjects of this kind, could
hnve but very Inadequate data for the quantum of damages If tlley are permitted only to
know the plalntltI's general character ID relntion to the fncts put In Issue."
With respect to the form of the Inquiry,
It ls snit.I to be an ln1lexlble rule ot law thnt
the only a<1mlsslble evidence of a man's character, or actual nature and disposition, 18 bis
general reputation in the community where
he resides. Chamb. Best, Ev. 256, note. It
would seem, therefore, that, In order to avoid
eliciting an expreS11ion of the witness' opinion respecting the plaintll!'s character, the
appropriate form of Interrogatory would be
an Inquiry calling directly for his knowledge
of the plnintll!'s general reputation In the
community, either as a man of moral worth,
without restriction, or In the particular relation covered by the libel or slander.
2. But the plaintll! also bas exceptions to
the following instruction In the charge of the
presiding justice: "I am requ<.>sted by the
counsel for the defendant to Instruct you
that, If the plaintUl'.'s conduct wns such as to
excite the defendant's suspicions, It should be
considered In mitigation of damages, the
plalntlll' alleging that be had never been suspected of the crime alleged. I give you that
instruction."
This request waa doubtless suggested by
the note to se<'tlon 275, 2 Green!. Ev., which
appears to be based on the old case of Earl of

Leicester v. Walter, 2 Camp. 2J1. But that
case has long ceased to be recognized as authority for anything more than the admission
ot evidence ot the plalntlll''s general reputation. A similar Intimation is found in Larned v. Bumnton, 3 Mass. 353, but in Aldermen v. French, 1 Pick. 18, this dictum Is declared to be unsupported by any authority.
Again, in the later case of Watson v. Moore,
2 Cush. 134, It was held Incompetent for the
defendant, In an action of elauder, to prove, ln
mltlgatlon of damages, "clrcum"1tances which
excited hlB suspicion, and furnished reasonable
cause for belief on his part, that the words
spoken were true." The obvious obje<'tion to It
ls that the damages in au action of slander are
to be "measured by the injury caused by the
words spoken, and not by the moral culpablllty ot the speaker." We have seen that
the <lefendnnt is perlllltted to prove that the
plaintlt'f's general reputation ls bad, because
this evidence has a legitimate tendency to
show that the Injury ls small; but the evidence of general report that the plalntltr ls
guilty of the Imputed offense Is Inadmissible
for the purpose of reducing damages. Powers
v. C'ar;v, supra; Mapes v. \Veeks, 4 ·wend.
G5!); 8tone v. Varney, supra. A fortiori,
evidence of the defendant's suspicions, however excited, cannot be received tor Bu.ii
a pnrpose. Wutson v. Moore, supra.
This lns.tructlon to the jury must, therefore, be held erroneous; and for thla reason
the entry must be:
Exceptions sustained.
HA.SKELL, J., C<i...icurred In the result.

MlTlGA.TIO:-; Ol•' D.ULV:ES.
MITIGATION OF 1)A\l.\(iES.

CALLAHAN v. INGRAM.
(26 S. W. 1020, 122 Mo. 355.)
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CALLAHAN v. INGRAM.

(26 S. W. 1020, 122 Mo. 355.)

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1..
~fny 28, 1804.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.,

May 28, 189-1.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county;

R. H. Field, Judge.

Action by Thomas F. Callahan against D.

App1>11J t1·om circuit court, Jackson county;
B. H. Field, Judge.
Action by Thomns F. Callahan against D.
R. lngTam tor slander. JudgmC'nt for plulntltr, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

R. Ingram for slander. Judgment for plain-

tiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Thompson & Wilcox, for appellant.

mon Bell and Wash Adams, for respondent.

MACl‘‘.\RLANE, J. Action for slander.

The petition charged that on the 4th of No-

vember, 1889, plaintiff was appointed su-

perintendent of streets of Kansas City, which

was an ofﬁce of honor and trust, under the

charter and ordinances of said city; that

on said date, at a meeting of the common

council of said city, in the presence of divers
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persons (naming other members of said

council, and the clerk thereof, and other

persons), then present, defendant "falsely

and maliciously spoke and published of and

concerning the plaintiff the false and mail-

cious words following, to wit: ‘Now, I want

to say something, and I want the reporters

tosget it. The superintendent of streets-

Har- '

ing this discussion the defendant, in the dis-

charge of his duty as a member of said com-

mon council, in discussing the oﬂicial con-

duct of plaintiff, stated that the resolution

previously introduced by him to investigate

the city ofﬁcials was aimed at Superintend-

ent Callahan; that said Callahan, in his

ofﬂcial position, as inspector of curbing, had

condemned curbing that was being put in

by one party, and permitted another man, a

favorite of said superintendent, to put in

the same stone, entailing loss on the ﬁrst

man, and bestowing oﬂicial favors on the

second; that he had also given acceptances

for curbing put in by one man to another,

knowing at the time he gave the acceptances

that the person to whom he gave them had

not done the work, and was not entitled to

them, thus enabling the second man to col-

lect pay for work done by the ﬁrst, and

defrauding one man to put money into the

pocket of a favorite of said Callahan. De-

fendant, in stigmatizing such conduct as

dishonorable and dishonest, applied the

1 term ‘downright thief,' to said superintend-

this (Jaliahan—is a downright thief, and I ‘

can prove it.' " The petition further charged

that at the time the words were spoken there

was not then pending before said council

any ordinance, motion, resolution, or report

referring to plaintiff, or the oﬂlce so held

by him; "that defendant meant and intend-

ed, by the use of said words so spoken and -

published by defendant as aforesaid, to -

charge plaintif f with being guilty of willful,

corrupt. and malicious oppression, partial-

ity, misconduct, or abuse of authority in

his ofilcial capacity, as such superintendent

of streets, or under color of his said ofﬁce.

Plaintif f further states that at the time

Tllu111pson & Wilcox, for appellant. Har- ·
mon Bell und Wash Adams, for responden1.
MAr.l•'ARLANE, J. Action for slander.
The petition charged that on the 4th ot N<>vember, 1889, plalntltl' was appointed aup('rlntendcnt of streets of Kansas City, which
was an omce of honor and trust, under the
charter and ordinances of aaid city; that
on said date, at a meeting of the common
council or said city, In the presence of divers
persons (naming other members of said
council, and the clerk thereof, and other
persons), then present, defendant "falsely
and mullclously spoke and published or nnd
concerning the plnlntltr the false nnd mall·
clous words following, to wit: 'Now, I want
to sny sonwthlng, and I want the reporters
to "'get It. The superintendent of street&this Callahan-le a downright thief, and I
can prove It.'" The petition further charged
that at the time the words were spoken there
was not then pendln~ before said council
any ordinance, motion, resolution, or report
referring to plalntltl', or the omce so held
by him; "that defendant meant and Intended, by the use or said words so spoken and
published by defendant as aforesaid, to
charge plalntltl' with being guilty of willful,
con·upt, and malicious oppre11slon, partiality, misconduct, or abuse of authority In
hie oftlclal capacity, as such superintendent
or streets, or under color of his said omce.
Plalntltr further states that at the time
Did words were eo spoken by defendant
the defendant well knew the same to be
false, and said words were iio spoken by defendant wantonly and mallclom1ly, and with
the Intention of Injuring plalntllT; that the
words spoken were false, and plnlntltr wa~
greatly Injured In said omce, and In his feelings, good name, and reputation." The answer was a general denial, and a speeinl
plea as follows: "For a second and furtllel'
answer to plalntltl''s amen•led petition, defendant says that, at the time the supposed
defamatory words were spoken by defendant, the lower house of the common council
ot Kansas City, being regula1·Jy In session.
were dlscm111lng the office of superintendent
of streets, and the actions and methods of
Supl•t·lntendent Cnll:thun, the plnlntltl'. It
bad been stated by dltrerent memb~rs of the
council that he was an lnctftclent and Incompetent officer, and bad been guilty of
misconduct, oppression, partiality, and abu!!e
ot authority, In his oWcial capacity. Dur-

'

'
,

i
·

Ing this discussion the defendant, In the discharge or his duty as a member of said common council, In dlscm1slng the oftlclal conduct ot plaintiff, stated that the resolution
previously Introduced by him to h1vC'stlgat1'
the city omctnls was aimed at Superintendent Callahan; that said Callahan, In his
otftclal position, as Inspector of curbing, had
condemned curbing that was being put In
by one pnrty, and P<'rmltted another man, a
favorite of said superintendent, to put In
the same stone, entailing loss on the first
man, and bestowing otftclnl favors on tlw
second; that he had also given acceptances
for curbing put In by one man to another,
knowing at the time he gave the acceptances
that the person to whom he gave them had
not done the work, and was not entitled to
them, thus <'nnbllng the second man to collect pay for work done by the first, and
defrauding one man to put money Into the
pocket of a favorite or said Cullnhan. Defendant, In stigmatizing such conduct as
dishonorable and dlshOlll'St, applied the
term 'downright thief,' to said superintendent. Defendant says tbnt this statement was
made In the discharge of his otftclal duty, as
above set tortb, and without malice or ill
will to plalntltl', and that he hnd good reason
to believe, and did be!Jeve, that 'the stntl'ments he made were true, and that the opprobrious epithet he used was a just nnd fair
characterlzntlon of such otllclal mlscondul"t.
Defendant further states that the circumstances above referred to are ae follows: In
June, 1887, John Henry had a private contract to put In about 82 feet ot curbing for
F. J. Baird on Twentieth street, between
Southwest boulevard and Broadway; that
said Henry did said work, and put In said ·
curbing, and said Callahan, though knowing
that said Henry had done said work, lssuc<l
acceptances to one Bashford; that, In the
fall of 1887, Johnson and Tompkins were
putting In curbing on Sixteenth street, between Penn and Broadwar, and that tlwy
got the curbmg or Richard Cummins; that
said Callahan condemned some or said stone,
and said Cummins sol<l It to one Bashford,
and Callahan allowed him to use It for curbing on anothe1· street." The reply was a
general denial.
The evld('n<'C showed that plnlntltr wns on
the 4th day of November, 1889, supcrlnten<lent of streets, and defendant was a membPr
of the city council; that detendnnt had previously held the oftlce of Inspector of curbing
and sidewalk construction; that, some time
previously, defendant had Introduced In the
lower house of the council, of wblc11 he was
a member, a resolution bearing on plnintilT's
oftlclal conduct, which had passed that house,
and gone to the upper house, where It then
remalnecl untllsposed of. On this occasion n
member raised a question of privilege; and n
general discussion and criticism ot plnlnult's
oftlclnl conduct followed, In whlrh detenctant
spoke the words attributl'll to him, making
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special reference in what he said to the al- I such act, and serve as a warning to prevent

leged misconduct set up in his special plea.

At the time no resolution, ordinance, motion.

or report was before that house. re'<peeting

plaintiff, or his ofﬁcial conduct. On the trial,

defendant offered to prove that those pres-

ent, who heard defendant's language, under-

stood it to refer to oilicial misconduct of

plaintiff in the matters referred to. lie also

oﬂered to prove the reasons and motives

which induced him to speak of plaintiff as he

did. These offers were refused by the court.

I).-fondant, in support of his special plea, un-

dertook to prove that. while plaintiff was in-

specter of curbing, he issued to one party a

certiiieate for curbing put in by another. V

Under the ordinances, the engmeer was re-

quired, after completion of work by the own-

er of the property charged therewith, to V
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grant a certiiicate of the fact, which, when

iiled, exonerated the owner from liability to ‘

pay for the improvement. Defendant of-

fered in evidence a certiﬁcate of that charac-

ter, which showed that the measurement had

been made by plaintiff as inspector, but with-

out designating who had done the work.

The court refused to permit this certiﬁcate

to be read in evidence.

At request of plaintiff, the court gave the ‘

jury the followinginstructions: “(1) Thejury

are instructed that if they believe from the

evidence that on November 4, 1889, the plain-

tiff was acting as superintendent of streets

of Kansas City, and that defendant, Ingram,

was a member of the common council of

Kansas City, and at a meeting of the lower

house of the common council, and in the

presence of various people, the defendant

maliciously used the following language of

and concerning the plaintiff in his character

of superintendent of streets, namely: ‘Now,

I want to say something, and I want the re-

porters to get it. This superintendent of

strcets—this Callahan—is a downright thief,

and I can prove it,'—and if the jury further

believes that said language was false and

untrue, then the said jury should ﬁnd for the

plaintiff. (2) Malice does not consist alone

in personal spite or ill will, but it exists, in

law, wherever a wrongful act is ‘intentionally

done without just cause or excuse. (3) The

court instructs the jury that the defendant is

not protected in this action from liability for

the words used by him against plaintiff by

reason of having uttered them in the cham-

ber of the lower house of the common council

of Kansas City. (4) The jnry_are instructed

that, in making their verdict, they may take

into consideration all the facts and circum-

stances as detailed by the witnesses; and if

the jury ﬁnd for plaintiff, in estimating the

damages which they may think plaintif f has

sustained, the jury may take into considera-

tion, and allow the plaintiff for, the mortiﬁca.-

tion to his feelings, suffered from the act of

defendant complained of, and may add

thereto, as punitive damages, such amount as

will adequately punish the defendant for

l'lp!'('lnl rPfPrPnce In wlrnt he said to the nlll'i.:ed misl'omluct sl't up lu his spel'lnl plea.
At the tillll' no r(•solution. 01·1llmuH'!', moti<m.
or r1•1iort wns before thnt house. rl'i<pl'rtlnl!
11laintiff. or his official conduct. On the trial.
<lcfrmlant oft'er<'d to prove that those prest•nt, wi10 hl'nrd defeudnnt's lnnguagP, understood It to rt•fm· to otHclnl miscon<lnct of
plaintiff in the mntt<'rs refPrred to. He also
on1•retl to prove the rea!IOns and moth·es
whic:h lnllucetl him to speak of plnintilf ns be
1lhl. 'l.'ilPSl' offl'rii were refn!Wd by the court.
I>1·fe11daut, in support of his 1>Jw1·inl pll'n, unllertool• to prove that. whil<' 1i!ni11tifT was Inspector of curbing. he Issued to one party a
el'rtifi<-ate f01· curl>ing put In by uuother.
U111h·r the ortlirnmcl's, the eui.:tucer was requir1•1\, after eompll'tion of work by the owner of the proverty charged therewith. to
grant a ce1·titicate of the fact, which, when
fii<'d, pxoncrated the owner from Jlability to
puy for the hnprovenwnt. Dl'fl'ndant offerecl in evidence a certificate of that character, which sl1owe<l that the measurement had
l>ern runde by plalntltr as lnspeetor, but without designating who had done the work.
The court refused to permit this certlfieate
to be rend In evidence.
At rl'quest of plaintiff, the court gave the
jury the following Instructions: "(l) The jury
a1·e lm1tructed that If they believe from tbe
eyldl'nce that on Novembl'r 4, 1889, the plaintiff was acting 88 superlntendt'Ut of streets
of I\:nnsas City, and tbat defendant, Ingram,
wns a member of the common council of
Kansas City, and nt a meeting of the lower
house of the common council, and in the
presence of various people, the defendant
mullclously used the following language of
aud concerning the plulntltr In hie character
ot superintendent of streets, namely: 'Now,
I want to say something, and I want the reportPrs to l?l't it. This superintendent of
streets-this Callahan-ls a downright thief,
and I can prove lt,'-flnd 1f the jury further
belleves that said language wns false and
untrue, then the said jury should find for the
plalntitr. (2) Mallce does not consist alone
In personal spite or 111 will, but it exists, In
law, wherever a wrongful act ls "lntentlonully
done without just cause or excuse. (3) The
rourt Instructs the jury that the defendant ls
not protreted In this action trom liability for
the words used by him against plalntllf by
reason of having uttered them In the chaml>cr of the lower house of the common council
of Kansas City. (4) The jury_are Instructed
that, In making their Vl'rdlct, they mny tnke
Into consld<>rntlon all the tacts and circumstances as detailed by the witnesses; and tr
the jury find for plalntllT, In estimating th1!
damnges which they may think plaintiff has
sustained, the jury may take Into conelderatlon, and allow the plalntur for, the mortification to his feelings, eutrered from the act of
defendant complained of, and mny add
thl'rcto, as punitive damages, such amount as
will adequately punish the defendant tor
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such net, and sl'rYe as a warning to preYl'nt
othl'l"s from bl'lng guilty o.t a like net." Thf!
court gave one Instruction for the dcfcm.laut,
as follon·s: "(11) The jury are Instructed that
it they l>clll've from the evidence thnt the
remnrks of dl'fl>ndant at the connc-11 meeting on the 4th of Nov<>ml>cr, 18''ID, in refPrence to plaintitT, tuken us a whole, In tll('ir
import. referred to him ns in11pr>etor of curbing, and not os !lllp<'t'lntt•nclPnt of' 1-1trp:·ti•. tlwn
your verdict should be for the d1~f1"ud:111t.''
The judgment wos tor plaintiff, fur :j;:;,ouo.
and dPfendant nppPnled.
1. Defendant admitted 11pl'aklng thl' wor1ls
lm)lnt.'<l to him, but umll'rtook to justify
what he said on the ground that he wus nt
the time a ml'mber of th<' city council of
Kani;ias City, which was In regular session.
nod hnd unclcr llhm1sslon tltl' ottlce of suprr·
lntrndent of sti·f•<'ts, nod the ottlciul action
nnd methods of plaintiff, who was then such
su)ll'rlntendent; that, In the disl'hnrge of bis.
official duty, be had the right ond prlvil<'J:t'
to discuss nnd chamctl'1·lze the offielal ml11conduct of plaintiff. There cnn be no doubt,
on proper occasion, members of the city council would be protected from "res11onslblllty
for whatever ts snld by them, which Is pertinent- to any inquiry pen<llng or Jlroposed bl'fore them," but no further. They would become "accountuble when thl'y wandrr from
the subject in hand to nssnll others." Cooley, Torts, 214; Nreb v. Hope, 111 Pa. St. rn2.
2 At!. 568. Members of the city council, in
particular, and all citizens, In genenll, are
Interested In the proper, honest, and l'ftlclent
administration of the public service, and
have the right. In the public Interest, to criticize public officers, and to prefer charges ror
malfeasance or neglect of duty, If done In
good faith, upon probable and reasonable
grounds; but the Jaw does not permit any
peiaon to slander another, on any occasion or
under any circumstances, when he Is not
protected by absolute privilege. It Is charged
In the petition, and conclusively shown by
the evidence, that when the objectlonablEwords were spoken there was no Inquiry
pending or proposed before that house of the
council, which would make th!! ()(.'CaH1on out•
ot privilege, beyond that which ts accorded
to every citizen. Defendant .was not privileged to falsely characterize the platntllT at1
a "thief," though the term was intl'nded to
apply to bis otliclal conduct. Whether the
occasion ls such as to make the communication one of privilege ls always a question or
law for the court, where there le no dispute
as to the circumstances under wmcn It wa11
made, and the court did not err In holdl.ng
that the language appllt!d to d<>fendnnt was
not privileged. Newell, Defnm. p. 391, I 9;
Odger, Sland. & L. 183; Am. & Eng. En<'.
Law, 400. ·The words spoken were actlouable In themselves, and, being admitted by
the answer, the court properly Instructed the
jury that If they were false the defcndaut
WIUI Ila ble.
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2. Complaint is made of the ﬁrst instruction

given for plaintiff, in that it is an abandon-

ment of the meaning plaintiff, in his peti-

tion, by innuendo, placed upon the words

spoken. The innuendo charges that defend-

ant intended and meant. by the language

used, to charge plaintiff with oppression and

partiality in the discharge of his ofﬁcial du-

ties as superintendent of streets; and the

claim is that he should be held to the in-

terpretation he himself placed upon them,

while the instruction authori'/.ed a recovery

on proof of the falsity of the words admit-

tedly spoken. The innuendo is intended to

deﬁne the defamatory meaning which the

plaintiff places upon the words used. In ‘

case the defamatory meaning is apparent

from the language charged, there is no ne

cessity for an innuendo at all. The pur-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

pose of the innuendo, and its effect upon the

party pleading it, is thus expressed by Town-

.send in his work on Slander (section 338):

"Where language is ambiguous, and is as

susceptible of a harmless as of an inju-

rious meaning, it is the function of an innu-

endo to point out the meaning which the

plaintiff claims to be the true meaning, and

the meaning upon which he relies to sustain

his action. This applies whether the am-

biguity be patent or latent, and whether or

not there are any facts alleged as induce-

ment. By this means the defendant is in-

formed of the precise charge he has to meet,

and to deny or justify. But the plaintiff is

subjected to the risk that if he claims for

the language a meaning which is not the

true one, or one which he is unable to make

out satisfactorily, he may be defeated on

the ground of variance or failure of proof;

for when the plaintiff, by his innuendo, puts

a meaning on the language published, he is

bound by it, although that course may de-

stroy his right to maintain the action." To

the same effect, see Starkle, Sland. & L. §

446; Newell, Defam. p. 629, § 39; Odger,

Sland. & L. 100. It will be seen that the

oﬂice of the innuendo is to set a meaning

upon words or language which are of doubt-

ful or ambiguous import, and, taken alone,

are not actionable;

case the defamatory meaning is apparent

from the words used, an innuendo is unnec-

essary. Its use is only necessary in order

to bring out the latent, injurious meaning of

the words employed. When used for this

legitimate and necessary purpose, the plain-

tiff will be bound to abide by his own con-

struction of the words used. The innuendo

thus becomes a part of the cause of action

stated. The rule, as given by all the text

writers. is different when the words charged

are actionable in themselves. In such case

the defendant can put in issue the truth of

the words spoken, either with or without the

alleged meaning-. “It will then be for the

jury to say, from the proofs, whether the

plaintiff's innuendo was sustained. If not,

the plaintiff may fall back upon the words

2. Complaint Is made of the first lnstl'Uctiuu
givt•n for plniutifT, In that It h1 nu nbnudon·
went of the meaning plnlntllT, In Ills pet!·
tlon. hy hmuN1<10, )llaced upon the wonh•
spoken. The innuendo charges that df'f\•udnnt Intended and meant, by the lnnguag<'
used, to churgP plnintilT with O)lpr\•ssion nnd
partinlity in the dh-;('hllrge or Ills otlkiul duties as supnintP11tlt•nt or strl'Pls; 111111 thr
claim Is thnt he shonlcl be lll'ld to thP interp~·tation be hims\•lf plnced upon tlwm,
while the lu1<tr11dio11 nuthoril'.P\l a rt•1·<11"l'l'r
on proof of thl' falslt~· of the words admittedly spoken. The Innuendo ls lnte111led to
define the defamatory m<>anlng whkh the
plnlntlfT places upon the words used. In
case the tlefanmtory nwaulng Is n11pnrt•nt
from the lnnJ,."tlnge chargPtl, thrre Is no necessity tor an Innuendo at nil. 'l'ht• pur·
po~ of thl' Innuendo, :111t.I lt8 effect upon the
party pleading It, Is thuH expressed hy Town.send In his work on Slandl'l' (sPctlon a:~-;):
"'Vlwre lungun1rn Is ambiguous, nnd Is tte
SUS<..'t'ptlble of a harmless as of an Injurious meaning, It Is tl1e function of an lm111endo to point out the mrauing which the
plaintltr clnlms to bt' the tnw mP1111l11,::, 11nd
tbe meaning upon which he relle11 to sustain
his action. This applies whl•ther the amhlgulty be pstrnt or latent, and whether or
· uot there are any tacts alleged ae Inducement. By this means the defendant Is Informed Of the J>rPcilm ch:trge he hall to !llf'('t,
and to deny or ju11tlfy. But the plaintiff le
11uhJt'CtPd to the risk that If he elalme for
the language a meaning which Is not the
true om>, or one which he Is unable to make
out satlsfaetorlly, be may bl' dl'fl'nted 011
the ground of varlnnc<' or failure of proof;
tor wlwn the plaintiff, by his lnnuPtulo, puts
a meaning on the lnngunge puhl111he11. hi' le
bound by It, although that course may de11troy his right to mnlntaln thl' action." To
the snme effect, Sl'f' Starklf'. Sland. & I.. I
446; Newell, Defam. p. 6'.!9, § 39; Odger,
Sland. & L. 100. It wlll be seen that the
office of the Innuendo ls to 11et a meaning
upon words or language which are of doubtful or nmhii.,ruous Import, an<l. taken alone,
are not actionable; a111l It follows thnt, In
case the dt>fnmntory mennlng Is nppnrt'nt
from the words used, an !umwndn Is nnnecP11snry. Its use Is only lll'l'P.<sary In ortler
to bring out the latent, Injurious meaning of
the words employed. Whl'n used for this
legitimate and nrcl'sHnry purpose, th<' plnlntitr wlll be bound to abide by his own con.
structlon of the words URl'd. Tlw lnmwndo
thus lx•comes a part of thr cnusl' of n1•tlon
Htatf'tl. The rule, as given by all tlw tPxt
wrltc>r!I, Is 1lllTPrPnt wlwn the words dmr,.:1'()
are actionable In them!!elves. In eueh 1·nso
the defemlnnt can put In lssul' the truth of
the words spoken, elthel' with or without the
alleged mPanlng. "It will then be for till'
jury to say, from the proof11, whrther the
plalntltr's Innuendo was sustnlned. It not,
the plnlntltr may fall l>uck upun the wur1h•

1
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thenu;elves, and ur;::e that. taken In tht'ir
nnturnl nnd olwlous slgnificu tlou. thC'y are
aetionallle in themsl'lves, without the ullegt•tl
nwnnln;::-, nntl that, the1·pfore, his 1mpr0Yl'tl
innuendo may be re.Jected as surplusag-c•.''
Newl'll, Defnm. p. H28, § 38; Ocl::er, Hlnntl.
& L. 101, nnd cnsps ciktl. "An inmwndo
will not vitiate the proceedings, though new
mat t••r he l111t·o1h1c1·1l; anti wh,.re thr 111a tt•·r
Is 111111rrfh1<111s, and the cnnsc of action is
comjllete without It, th<' Innuendo may be
rl'j(•1·ted." Sturkie, Sluntl. & L. ~'.!; Un;::1?
v. folh!'lton, 3 Hieb. Law, 242. "If n comphllut ls sufficient wltlluut the lnn11t•11tlo, the
i11111wndo may be r!'jectcd as surphumgP.
Thl' Innuendo mny always be rejected when
It 11wrl'ly lntrodlll't•s mattc>r not nccPssary
to support the action." '.l'owns. Slnncl. & L.
§ :u.i, and cases eltrd; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 4H8. The prlueiple announc1•c1 by these
authors is supported by numl'rous cnses <'ltf.'d
by tlwm,-a euse from this court being onl'.
In that case, defendant charged plaintiff
with bPlng a whore, meaning thel'eby that
plulntilf "had been guilty of the crime of
adultery." The pl'oof disclosed that plaintifr
was an unmarried woman. Upon nn appeal from a judgment In favor of 11lnlntltr,
defemlant Insisted that ae plaintiff, by Innuendo, had di•clure<I that defendant's wife Intended, by speaking the words, to Impute
adultl'ry, plaintiff wns bound to prove they
w1•re uttered In the sPnse thus ascribed to
them; but the court held that the innuendo
coultl be r1•J1•l'tl'd, anti sustained the judgrnl'nt. Hudson v. Garner, 22 Mo. 424.
Thi>re can be no doubt thut the words
"dowurl,.:ht thlPf," npplil'<I to plalntllT, Imputed to him thr erilnl' of lnrl'eny, and were
In th1•111sel ves actlo1111 hll'. The Innuendo.
ehnrglng that dPfl'n1lnnt mrnnt thereby to
chnrge plaintiff with official corruption, opprP!li<lon, and pnrtlallty also imputl•d a
crime, nnd was actionable. Rev. 8t. 188!l.
H 3i32, 3i83. Dt>fendnnt, by answer, admlt~ed thnt he applied to defPmlant the term
"downright thief," as charged. Upon thl"
state of the pleading, we do not think then•
wns error In ln!'ttructlng th!' jury thnt plaintiff could reco,·er If defendant !'poke tlll-'
word11 ns dmrgNI, and they were fnJ;;;r, un·
le~s Jllalutltr was justified In so speaking.
3. The first Instruction rPqulred the jury. In
order to find for plalntilT, to also ftn<l that
the dl't'nmutory words Wl'rP spok1·11 with malke. The second Instruction told the jurr
that malice existed In law "whene,·rr a
wrongful act ls lntt-ntlonally llonlo' without
just <'llURe or excu:le." The fifth instruetio11
authorized the jury, In 11111klng thPlr verdkt.
to nd<l thl•rl'to, Ill' punitive dnmn,.:Ps, "1m1'11
amount 011 will 111IP<J11ately p1111iRh tlw dt'fPmlant for such act, and sl'rve as a wnrning to
prevent others from being guilty of a Ilkl' act."
i.:iwmplary damages Wl're thus authorlzl'tl
without proof of exprei<11 mallee. Defendant
lnslste that punitive rl11m11g<'!I, In suits for
slmuk•r, 111·e only recon•rnblc when the w1·uni;-
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- lcging or proving special damages.

doer was actuated by actual or express mal-

ice, as distinguished from malice implied by

law. No one is excused for the libel or slan-

der of another for the reason that the wrong-

doer was without malice. The actual in-

jury suffered does not depend upon the mo-

tive of the wrongdoer. The object, then, in

giving evidence in proof of malice, is to in-

crease the damages beyond what was actual-

ly sustained. Odger, Sland. & L. 269; Towns.

Sland. & L. § 91; Suth. Dam. § 1225, and

cases cited. In slander the words are always

intentionally spoken, whatever meaning may

be imputed to them. Hence, it is said. when

slanderous words are spoken, or a libelous ar-

ticle is published falsely, the law will aﬂix

malice to them. There is no necessity of

proving express malice. Buckley v. Knapp,
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48 Mo. 161. So it is uniformly held that

when the words spoken are actionable in

themselves, and are proven to be false, the

law will imply malice. Hall v. Adkins, 59

Mo. 144; Price v. Whitely, 50 Mo. 439;

Noeninger v. Vogt, 88 Mo. 589; Mitchell v.

Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S. W. 358,

724. So it will appear that malice, such as

the law implies, is the very gist of the ac-

tion for slander. It is held in some of the

cases last cited that, when the words spoken

are actionable in themselves, the person in-

jured will be entitled to recover without al-

It is

also held that a repetition of the defamatory

words may be given in evidence for the pur-

pose of proving express malice (Nocuinger v.

Vogt, 88 Mo. 593), and thereby increasing the

damage, though malice was implied from

the words spoken. It is said that “malice,

in legal understanding, implies no more than

willfuiness." Buckley v. Knapp, supra.

Again, malice in law is deﬁned as “the

malice which is inferred from doing a wrong-

ful act without lawful justiﬁcation or ex-

cuse." 1 Starkie, Sland. & L. 213. Townsend

says: “The distinction between malice in law

and malice in fact has been supposed to con-

sist in this: that the one is inferred, and the

other is proved. The supposed distinction is

unreal and unsound; for, ﬁrst, there is no dis-

tinction between what is inferred and what

is proved,—what is, or is supposed to be,

rightly inferred is proved." Towns. Sland.

& L. p. 68, § 87. We may say, then, that

malice, whether expressed or implied, means

the same, the only difference being in the

establishment of it. When malice is implied

from the words spoken or published, the bur-

den is on the defendant to prove lawful jus-

tiﬁcatlon or excuse, or the absence of a mall-

cious intent. On the other hand, if the words

themselves do not imply malice, the burden

rests upon the plaintiff to establish it. When

malice exists, punitive damages may be

given; and it cannot be seen why a distinc-

tion should be made when the evil intent ex-

isted, whether implied or proved. It is true

a distinction is made by some courts, and it

MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.

doer was nctua ted by nctual or express malice, ns distinguished from malice Implied by
lnw. No one ls excused fo1· the libel or slander of another for the reason thnt the wrongdoer was without mnllce. The netual in·
jury suffc1·cd does not depend upon the motive of the wrongdoer. The object, !hen, In
giving evi<lence in proof of malice, ts to Increase the damages beyond what wns actually sustained. Odger, Slnnd. & L. 2G9; Towns.
Slnml. & L. § 91; Suth. Dam. § 1225, nnd
cnsPs cited. In slander the words are always
Intentionally spoken, whatever meaning may
be imputed to them. Hence, it ls said, when
slnncl~rous words are spoken, or a libelous article is published falsely, the law wlll affix
malice to them. The1·e Is no necessity ot
proving express malice. Buckley v. Knapp,
48 Mo. lGL So it is uniformly held thnt
when the words spoken are actionable In
themselves, and are proven to be ftllse, the
ln w will Imply malice. Hall v. Adkins, 59
Mo. 144; Price v. Whitely, 50 Mo. 439;
Noeninger v. Vogt, 88 Mo. 589; Mitchell v.
Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S. W. 358,
724. So it wlll appear that malice, such as
the law implies, is the very gist of the action for slander. It ls held In some of the
cases last cited that, when the words spoken
are actionable In themselves, the person In·
jured will be entitled to recover without RI·
leglng or proving special damages. It la
also held that a repetition of the defamatory
words may be given In evidence for the pur·
pose of proving express malice (:Noenlnger v.
Vogt, SS Mo. 593), and thereby Increasing the
damage, though malice was implied from
the words spoken. It ts said that "malice,
in legal understanding, implies no more than
willfulness." Buckley v. Knapp, supm.
Again, malice In law is defined as "the
malice which Is inferred from doing a wrongful act without lawful justification or excuse." 1 Starkie, Sland. & L. 213. Townsend
says: "The distinction between mallce In law
and malice In fact has been supposed to consist In this: that the one la Inferred, and the
other Is proved. The supposed distinction is
unreal and unsound; !or, first, there Is no cllstinctlon between what is Inferred and what
Is provcd,-what ts, or is supposed to be,
i·lghtly Inferred is proved." Towns. Sl:md.
& L. p. 68, § 87. We may say, then, that
malice, whether expressed or Implied, means
the same, the only difference being In the
C'stablishment o! it. When malice ls Implied
from the words spoken or published, the burden Is on the defendant to prove lawful justification or excuse, or the absence of a malicious Intent. On the other hand, If the words
themselves do not Imply malice, the burden
rests upon the plaintiff to establish it. When
malice exists, punitive damages may be
l!iven; and It cannot be seen why a distinction should be made when the evll Intent existed, whether Implied or proved. It ls true
a dl11tlnctlon ls ma<le by some courts, and it
is lwld thnt, unil'SS ex1iress malice ls proved,

exemplary dnmnges should not be allowed.
This line of decision was followed by the
St. Louis court of appeals In Nelson v. Wallace, 48 Mo. App. 193, and Fulkerson v. lfurdock, 53 Mo. App. 156. It ls argued that
punitive damages are only allowed ill tr,•i--pass
and other actions for torts, when the offense
is committed In a wanton, rude, and aggravated manner, indicating oppression, or a desire to injure, and that no renson can be seen
for t11e application of a dltTerent rule in cnses
for slander or libel. We think the distinction
does not in fact exist. Malice la implied in
the will!ul doing of any wrongful act, wlthou t justification or excuse, whereby Injury
ls clone to another, whether it be to his character, his person, or his property. 'Where
such act ls done maliciousl~-. therefore, the
Injured person shoulu be entitled to exemplary damages; and it would be Immaterial
whether malice was implied from the nature
of the act Itself, or Inferred as a fact from
all the cl!·cmnstances under which It was
committed. The question is whether the
wrong was done wlllfully, and without lawful justification or excuse. Whatever the
decisions of the other states may be, there
.seems no just ground for distinguishing between malice ln fact and malice In law, In
respect to the right to exemplary damages,
In action !or libel and slander; and tlle decisions of this state make no such distinction. In Buckley v. Knapp, supra, an In·
struetlon was approved which authorl7.ed the
recovery of punitive damages upon Implied
malice alone; and that decision was followed
in the subsequent case o! Clements v. Maloney, 55 ~Io. 359, and the doctrine has since
these decisions been regarded as settlC'd. It is
said in Bergmann v. Jones, 94 N. Y. 62: "The
falsity of the libel ls sufficient proof of mal·
Ice to uphold exemplary d:1mages, and plalnt11r's right to recover them is In the discretion of the jury. When the falseness of the
libel Is proved, as a general rule, It ls sufficient to warrant the jury in gh·lng exemplary dnmages." This ruling was approved by
the same court In Warner v. Publishing Co.,
132 N. Y. 183, 30 N. E. 393, and expressly
followed in Hintz v. Graupner, 138 Ill. 158,
27 N. E. 935. To the same effect Is tlle case
o! Blocker v. Schoff, 83 Iowa, 269, 48 N. W.
1079.

4. Exemplary damages may always be
given, in suits for slander, when the words
are maliciously spoken; but whether such
damages should be given, in any case, is a
matter within the discretion of the jury. In
ordC'r to show good faith, and want of malice, the defendant has the right to put In
evidence all the clrcmnstaneea under which
the words were uttered; and, if such circum·
stances tend to rebut malice, such damages
could only be awarded in ease the words
were mallclou.<ily spoken, but may, ln themselves, be suftlclent proof, If malice is Implied therefrom. l'lnintltT, by innuendo,
charged that defenclnnt, by the slanderous
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words used, intended to impute to him cor-

ruption in otiice. Defendant, by answer,

and in mitigation of damages, admitted that

the words spoken had respect solely to plain-

tiff's oﬂiclal conduct. Defendant offered, as

was his right to do, evidence tending to

prove the circumstances under which the

objectionable words were used, in order to

prove good faith, and want of malicious in-

tent. As has been said, defendant, as an

interested citizen, had the right to make rea-

sonable comment and fair criticism upon

plaintiff's oﬁicial conduct, but he had no

right to go beyond that, and slander him.

It was, in view of all the circumstances, for

the jury to say how far the evidence miti-

gated the malice, if at all, and to award the

damages accordingly. We think the effect

of the instruction on the measure of dam-
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ages was to ignore this defense, and, as the

question of exemplary damages was a mat-

ter independent of the right to recover, the

error was not cured by the ﬁrst instruction,

which required a ﬁnding that the words were

maliciously spoken in order to a recovery for

any amount. Exemplary damages are given

by way of punishment, and the jury should

be so instructed thereon as to leave no doubt

on the subject.

5. There was no error in refusing to per-

i

mit defendant to testify as to the motives .

which actuated him in speaking the defama-

tory words, so far as the testimony affected

the right to recover compensatory damages. ‘

The effect would be the same though he .

meant to say one thing, and said another. '

He is answerable for so inadequately ex-

pressing his meaning. Nowell, Defam. p. 1

301; McGinnis v. George Knapp & Co., 109

Mo. 148, 18 S. W. 1134. But the motives or

purposes with which the words were spoken

lie at the very foundation of malice. They

are the very conditions upon which exem-

plary or punitive damages are predicated,

and no good reason appears why defendant

should not be permitted to prove what his

motives were. Odger says: “In all cases,

the absence of malice, though it may not be

a bar to the action, may yet have a material

effect in reducing the damages. The plain-

tiff is still entitled to reasonable compensa-

tion for the injury he has suffered; but if -

the injury was unintentional, or was com-

mitted under a sense of duty, or through

some honest mistake, clearly, no vindictive

damages could be given. In every case,

therefore, the defendant may, in mitigation

of damages, give evidence to show that he

acted in good faith, and with honesty of par-

pose, and not maliciously." Odger, Sland.

& L. 317. "Upon principle, the spirit and

intention of the party publishing a libel are

ﬁt to be considered by the jury, in estimat-

ing the injury done to the piaintiff, and e\i-

dence tending to prove it cannot be excluded

simply because it may disclose another and

different cause of action." Starkie, Sland.

words used, lnt<'rn1P1l to Impute to h1m corruptlon In office. D<'ft>mlant, by -answer,
and In mitigation or datungt>s, admitted that
the words spokt>u had respt.>ct sok•ly to plnlntlft'.'s official conduct. Derendnnt offered, llB
was bis right to do, evidence tending to
prove the circumstances under which the
objectlonnhle words were used, In order to
prove good faith, and want of mnlklous Intent. As bas been said, defendnnt, as an
intert•sted cltlz<'n. had the right to mak~ reasonnhle comnwnt an<l fnJr criticism upon
plnlntllf's oflklnl conduct, but he hall no
rlgl.tt to go beyond that, and slnm1cr him.
It was, In view of all the circumstances, for
the jury to say how far the evidence mitigated the malice, If at all, and to award the
dnmnges accordingly. We think the efl'ect
ot the Instruction on the measure of damages was to lguore this defeu!!e, and, as the
qut•stlon of exemplary damages waa a matter independent of the right to recover, the
error was not cured by the first instruction,
which required a finding that the words were
maliciously spoken in order to a recovery tor
any amount. Exemplary damages arc given
by way of punishment, and the jury should
be so Instructed thereon as to leave no doubt
on the subject.
5. There was no error In refusing to permit defendant to testify as to the motives
which actuated him In speaking the defamatory words, BO tar as the testimony atrected
the right to recover compensatory damages.
The cllect would be the same though he
meant to say one thing, and said anQther.
He lB answerable tor so lnndequately ex·
pr<'sslng his meaning. Newell, Defam. p.
301; l\lcGlnnis v. George Knapp & Co., 109
Mo. 148, 18 S. W. 1134. But the motives or
purposes with which the words were spoken
lie at the very foundation of malice. They
are the very conditions upon which exemplary or punitive damages are predlcnted,
nod no good renson appears why deft>ndant
should not be permitted to prove what his
motives were. Oclger says: "In all cases,
the absence ot malice, though it may not be
a hnr to the action, may yet have a material
etr1'<'t In re<luclng the dnmn~es. 'fhc plnlntllf ls still entitled to reasonnble compcllf!a·
tlon for the Injury be hns sutlt>re<l; but it
the Injury was unlntl'ntlonnl, or wns committed under a Sl'nse of duty, or tllrough
some honest mistake, clearly, no vimllctlve
dnmni:es could be given. In every case,
th<'refore, the defendant may, In mitlgntlou
or dnmngcs, give evidence to show thn.t he
acted In good faith, and with honesty or pur-
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i pose,

and not maliciously... Odger, Slnnd.
"Upon principle, the spit'lt and
Intention ot thf' partr publishing a lillel nrc
flt to be conshlered by tho jury, In estlmn.t·
lni: the Injury done to the plnlntltr, and evl·
denee tc>ndlng to prove It cannot be excludc>d
sln!J)ly bccntLSe It may disclose another nnd
dl!Tcrent cause of action." Stnrkie, Sland.
& L. § 039. "The lntent-mennlng the Intent
to efl'l>ct certain consequc11c1•s-wlth wh'ch
nn act Is done Is matc>rlnl on the question of
the amount ot u1unages. The nb!!cnce of n
bad Intent will mitigate the damages. The
presence ot a bad Intent will airirravate
them." Townsh. Slnnd. & L. § 91. We
think e¥1dencc ot the lnt<'ntlon nnd motive
ot d<'fcndant was admissible tor the purpose
ot mitigating the punishment, by way of exemplary damages; but the jury shoult1 hove
been cautioned not to allow such evidence
to operate as a. defense to the action, or to
mitigate the actual damages sustalnul.
6. It does not appear upon the face of the
acceptance ol!ered in evidence that It au·
thorlzed any particular person to collect the
amo1mt due for putting In the curloing. yet
dellve1·y to, anu possession by, one who had
only done n. small portion ot tlle work, was
11. circumstance which mny have glYcn the
bolder an advantage; and we think the certificate should have been admitted for what
It was worth. The transaction In which the
certificate was issued by plalntltl was commented upon by detendnnt In the discus81on
In which the slanderous words were usl'<l,
and defendant had the right to place the
whole matter betore the jury, tor the pm·
pose ot showing good faith, and want of
actual malice. For the same reason, defendant should have been permitted to show
what he had been told by others In reference
to this acceptnnce. Blocker v. Schotr. "'83
Iowa, 2G5, 48 N. W. 1079; Orth v. Featherly, 87 ~llch. 320, 49 N. W. G40.
7. There was 'lO error In refusing to permit witness Lane to testify as to his understanding ot the slanderous words used by
defendant. A witness may testify to the
speaking of the slanderous words. "together
with all the attendant clrcmnstancPs au<l
connections, the elr.18tlng tacts; and, nft<'r
having done BO, It Is tor the jury to detPI'·
mine from the evidence whnt was mPnnt."
Newell, Detam. p. 308, and cases cit('\l In
note. For the errors noted tlle judgment ls
reversed, and the cause remanded.
& JJ, 317.

BARCLAY, J'., absent.
concur.

The other judges
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LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO. v. SNY-

DER.

(20 N. E. 284, 117 Ind. 435.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. February 21, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Clinton county;

Joseph C. Suit, Special Judge.

Action by James B. Snyder against the

Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway

Company, for personal injuries. Judgment

for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

S. O. Bayless and W. H. Russell, for ap-

(20 N. E . 284, 117 Ind. 435.)
l:;upreme Court of Indiana. February 21, 1889.
Appeal from circuit court, Clinton county;
Joseph C. Suit, Special Judge.
Act;on by Jawes B. Snyder against the
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway
Uomv:rny, for personal injuries. Judgment
fo1· l>l:tintlff, and defendant appeals.
S. 0. Bayless and W. H . Russell, for appellant. 'l'. H. Palmer, W. F. Palmer, B. K.
Higln!Jotham, and M. Bristow, for appellee.

pellant. T. H. Palmer, W. F. Palmer, B. K.

Higinbotham, and M. Bristow, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, C. J. The appeilee was a pas-

senger on one of the appellant's trains,

which, by the falling of a bridge, was pre-

cipitated into White river, and the appeilee

severely injured.

Dr. Bowles, an expert witness called by
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the appellant, gave an opinion as to the na-

ture and extent of the injury sustained by

the appellee, and on cross-examination it was

developed that his testimony was in part

based on statements made to him by the ap-

peilee. Waiving all questions of practice,

and deciding the appellant's motion to strike

out as if it were properly restricted to the

alleged incompetent part of the testimony,

we have no hesitation in deciding that the

trial court did right in overruling the motion.

As we have often decided, the physical or-

gans of a human being cannot be inspected

by the eyes of a surgeon, and the statements

of the sufferer must, of necessity, be taken

by the surgeon. It is not possible for any

surgeon, by a mere external examination, to

always discover the character of an injury,

and properly describe or treat an injured

man; ‘and for this reason, if for no other,

the statements of the injured person descrip-

tive of present pains or symptons are always

competent, although narratives of past oc-

currences are inadmissible. On this point

our own decisions are harmonious, and they

are right upon principle, and are well sup-

ported by authority. Railroad Co. v. New-

ell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. 836; Railway Co. v.

Falvey, 104. Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 N.

E. 908; Railway Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544,

14 N. E. 572, and 16 N. E. 197; Board v. Leg-

gett. 115 Ind. 544, 18 N. E. 53; Hatch v. Ful-

ler, 131 Mass. 574; Railroad Co. v. Johns, 36

Kan. 769, 14 Pac. 237; Qualfe v. Railroad

Co., 48 Wis. 513, 4 N. W. 658. From these

decisions we shall not depart.

The fact that the appellee was suffering

from Bright's disease at the time he was in-

jured does not impair his right of recovery.

The rule is this: “Where a disease caused

by the injury supervenes, as well as where

the disease exists at the time of the injury,

and is aggravated by it, the plaintiii is enti-

tled to full compensatory damages." Rail-

road Co. v. Hecht, 115 Ind. 443, 17 N. E. 297;

Railway Co. v. Wood, supra; Railroad Co.

v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310. and 10

N. E. 70; Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346;

Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 26-i; Jucker v.

ELLIOTT, C. J. The appellee was a passenger on one of the appellant's trains,
which, by the falling or a bridge, was precipitated Into White river, and the appellee
severely injured.
Dr. Bowles, an expert witness called by
the appellant, gave an opinion as to the nature and extent of the Injury sustained by
the appellee, and on cross-examination it was
developed that his testimony was in part
based on statements made to him by the appellee. Waiving all questions of practice,
and deciding the appellant's motion to strike
out as If it were properly restricted to the
alleged Incompetent part of the testimony,
we have no hesitation In deciding that the
trial court did right tn overruling the motion.
As we have often decided, the physical organs of a human being cannot be Inspected
by the eyes of a surgeon, and the statements
of the sufferer must, of necessity, be taken
by the surgeon. It is not possible for any
surgeon, by a mere external examination, to
always discover the character of an injury,
and properly describe or treat an injured
mff'n; and for this reason, if for no other,
the statements of the injured person descrlptl've of present pains or symptons are always
competent, although narratives of past occurrences are Inadmissible. On this point
our own decisions are harmonious, and they
are right upon principle, and are well supported by authority. Railroad Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. 830; Railway Co. v.
Falvey, 104. Ind. 400, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 N.
E. 908; Railway Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544,
14 N. J<J. 572, and 16 N. E. 197; Hoard v. Legg-ett. 115 Ind. 544, 18 N. E. 53; Hatch v. Fuller, 131 Mass. 574; Railroad Co. v. Johns, 36
Kan. 7Gn, 14 Pac. 237; Quaife v. Railroad
Co., 48 Wis. 513, 4 N. W. 658. From these
decisions we shall not depart.
1'he fact that the appellee was suffering
from Brig-ht's disease at the time be was Injured cloes not Impair his right ot recovery.
The rule ls this: "Where a. disease caused
by the injury supei-venes, as well as where
the disease exists at the time of the Injury,
and is airgravated by it, the plaintiff ls entitled to full compensatory damai:es." Railroad Co. v. Becht, 115 Ind. 443, 1i N. E. 297;
Hallway Co. v. Woo<l, supra; Hullroad Co.

OF DAMAGE:5.
'\'". Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310, and 10
N. E. 70; Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 34U;
Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264; Jucker v.
Railroad Co., 52 Wis. 150, 8 N. W. 862; Railway Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 507, 7 Sup. Ct.
128U; Railway Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa.
St. 519, 6 Atl. 545; Railway Co. v. Leslie, 57
Tex. 83.
'l'he rule we have stated is thus expressed
In one of our best text-books: "Though the
plalntllI be aftlicted with a disease or weak·
ness which has a tendency to aggravate the
Injury, the defendant's negligence will still
be held to be the proximate cause." 2 Shear.
& R. Neg. (4th Ed.) § 742.
The instructions clearly and properly state
the law on this subject.
The court did not err In instructing the
jury as to the degree of care required of the
appellant; at least, not as again.st the appellant. The rule ls well settled that carriers are bound to use the higheet practicable
degree of care to secure the satety of passengers.
There was no evidence of contributory negligence on the part of the appellee, and the
court might well have refused any instruction at all upon that point. Where a passenger ls In his proper place In the car, and
makes no exposure of his person to danger.
there can be no question of contributory negligence. Decisions like that of Railway Co.
v. Greene, 106 Ind. 279, 6 N. E. 603, in caseR
of persons Injured at a railroad crosslni:.
are not applicable to such a case as the one
at our bar. The law I~ as the jury were
told, that carriers of passengera are liable
for the slightest negligence. Any negligence
on their part ls actionable. Rallroad Co. v.
Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551.
The law will not tolerate any negligence on
the part of carrieri;i, although they are not
insurers of the safety ot their passengers.
The burden of overcoming the presumption
of negligence arising from evidence of the
occurrence of an accident and Injury to a
passenger ls upon the carrier. Packet Co.
v. :McCool, 83 Ind. 302; Railroad Co. v. Buck.
96 Ind. 346; Railroad Co. v. Newell, supra;
Railroad Co. v. Ruinboit, supra; Anderson v.
Scholey, 114 Ind. 553. 17 N. E. 12.5.
In Railroad Co. v. Pedigo, 108 Ind. 481, 8
N. E. 627, the rule was applied In a case
growing out of the same occurrence as that
In which the appellee was Injured. The
twenty-second Instruction asked by the appellant, and retused, reads thus: "The court
further Instructs you that by 'negligence.'
when used in these instructions, is meant
either the !allure to do what a reasonable
person would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances of the situation, or doing what
such person would not have done under the
existing circumstances." This Instruction
was properly refused. It Is not proper in
such a case as this to define negligence as It
is defined In this instruction. In a case of
this charaeter, the omission to exercise the
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highest degree of practicable care constitutes

negligence, but in other cases the failure to

exercise ordinary care constitutes negligence.

Counsel are greatly in error in asserting, as

they do, that the instruction correctly fur-

nishes the standard for the government of

the jury. The appellant was, as we have

substantially said, bound to do more than

prudent men would ordinarily do, since it

was bound to use a very high degree of care.

The duty of a railroad company engaged in

carrying passengers is not always discharged

by purchasing from reputable manufacturers

the iron rods or other iron-work used in the

construction of its bridges. The duty of the

company is not discharged by trusting, with-

out inspecting and testing, to the reputation

of the manufacturers, and the external ap-

pearance of such materials. The law re-
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quires that before the lives of passengers

are trusted to the safety of its bridges, the

company shall carefully and skillfully test

LAW DAM.2d Ed.—30

and inspect the materials it uses in such

structures. This duty of inspection does not

end when the materials are put in place, but

continues during their use; for the company

is bound to test them, from time to time, to

ascertain whether they are being impaired

by use or exposure to the elements. Mauser

v. Railway Co., 3 Law T. (N. S.) 585; Rail-

road Co. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323; Stokes v.

Railway Co., 2 Fost. & F. 691; Robinson

v. Railroad Co., 9 Fed. 877; Richardson v.

Railroad Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 486, L. R. 1 C.

P. Div. 342; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1; Frink

v. Potter, 17 Ill. 406; Bremnor v. Williams,

1 Car. & P. 414; Hegeman v. Railroad Corp.,

13 N. Y. 9; Alden v. Railway Co., 26 N. Y.

102.

The decision in the case of Railroad Co. v.

Boyd, 65 Ind. 527, is not in conﬂict with this

doctrine, for in that case an inspection was

made.

Judgment aﬂlrmed.

l1ighest degree of practicable care constitutes
negligence, but in other cases the failure to
exercise ordinary care constitutes negligence.
Counsel are greatly In error ln asserting, as
they do, that the. Instruction correctly furd.lshes the standard tor the government of
t;.ie jury. The appellant was, as we have
substantially said, bound to do more than
prudent men would ordiiu~rlly do, since It
was bound to use a very high degree of care.
The duty of a railroad company engaged In
carrying passengers Is not always discharged
by purchasing from reputable manufacturers
the Iron rods or other Iron-work used in the
construction of Its bridges. The duty of the
company Is not discharged by trusting, without Inspecting and testing, to the reputation
ot the manufacturers, and the external appoorance of such materials. The law requires that before the lives ot passengers
are trusted to the safety ot Its bridges, the
company shall carefully and skllll'ully test
LA.W DAM.2d Ed.-30

465

and Inspect the materials It uses In such
structures. This duty of Inspection does not
end when the materials are put In place, but
continues um·ing their use; tor the company
Is bound to test them, l'rom time to time, to
ascertain whether they are being impaired
by use or exposure to the elements. Manser
v. Railway Co., 3 Law T. (N. S.) 585; Railroad Co. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323; Stokes v.
Railway Co., 2 Fost. & F. 6!H; Robinson
v. Halh"ond Co., 9 1''ed. 877; Richardson v.
Hnilroud Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 486, L. R. 1 C.
P. Div. 342; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 .Mete. 1; Friuk
v. Potter, 17 Ill. 406; Bremner v. Williams,
1 Car. & P. 414; Hegeman v. Rallroad Corp.,
13 N. Y. 9; Alden v. Railway Co., 26 N. Y.
102.
The decision In the case ot Railroad Co. v.
Boyd, 65 Ind. 527, Is not In conflict with this
doctrine, !'or In that case an inspection was
made.
Judgment aftlrmed.
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(21 Atl. 33, 139 Pa. St 363.)

BUNTING v. HOGSETT

(21 Atl. 33, 139 Pa. St. 363.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
1891.

Jan. 12,

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 12,

1891.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Alle-

gheny county.

Action by Henry C. Bunting against Robert

Hogsett for personal injuries. Plaintiff, Hen-

ry C. Bunting, excepted to the following por-

tion of the charge to the jury: “He [plaintiff]

is also entitled to compensation for the loss

of earning power during the expectancy of his

life. That is one of the most difﬁcult things

to determine, but you have to use simply your

good judgment, for the reason that you can-

not tell how long a man may live. You can-

not tell whether he will live the full expect-

ancy of his life. No one can tell that. While

he was injured by the accident he still might
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have had a disease that would shorten his

life anyhow, and if there is proof of that. as

there is proof in this case that he had Bright's

disease. and that was not occasioned, or hard-

ly could be occasioned, by this accident, you

will take that into consideration, and consider

whether, by reason of that, his expectancy of

life is not shortened very much from what the

tables that have been given in evidence show.

It is alleged that his expectancy of life could

not be as shown in the tables, because phy-

sicians certify he has Bright's disease. Your

experience in life will tell you that that is a

very dangerous disease, and it it was not

caused by this accident—and it is not pretend-

ed it was—you will take thatlnto considera-

tion in determining the loss of his earning

power during the time which he may be ex-

pected to live." The jury returned a verdict

of $1,733 in favor of Henry C. Bunting, and

of $500 for Phoebe J. Bunting. Plaintiff,

Henry Bunting, now prosecutes this appeal,

assigning the above charge as error.

Edw. Campbell and Thos. Patterson, for ap-

pellant. A. D. Boyd and Lazear & Orr, for

appellee. _

CLARK, J . There was evidence in this case

that the plaintiil‘. Henry C. Bunting, at the

time of the trial, was suffering from what

is known as “Bright's disease of the kidneys."

Upon a chemical analysis, albumen was found

in his urine. He suffered from dizziness, fail-

ure of sight, and double vision. He was fee-

ble, had shortness of breath, and a stagger-

ing gait, and exhibited other symptoms of this

malady. The testimony of some of the med-

ical experts was that they believed him to

be suffering from Bright's disease. and there

was little, if any, evidence to the contrary.

The court very properly, therefore, instructed

the jury that there was proof of this fact in

the case; that it was a dangerous disease;

and that they should take this into considera-

tion in determining Mr. Bunting's expectancy

of life and the loss of his earning power. Nor

was there any evidence to justify the jury in

ﬁnding that this disease was caused by the

personal injuries received in the collision.

The judgment is therefore aiﬂrmed.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county.
Action by Henry C. Bunting against Robert
Hogsett for personal Injuries. Plalntlft', Henry C. Bunting, excepted to the following portion of the charge to the jury: "He [plalutllr]
Is also entitled to compensation tor the loss
of earning power during the expectancy of his
lite. That Is one of the most dllHcult things
to determine, but you have to use simply your
good judgment, for the reason that you cannot tell how long a man may live. You cannot tell whether he will live the full expectancy ot his Ute. No one can tell that. While
he was Injured by the accident he stlll might
have had a disease that would shorten his
lite anyhow, and It there ls proof of that. as
there Is proof In this case that he had Bright's
disease, and that was not occasioned, or hardly could be occasioned, by this accident. you
will take that Into consideration, and consider
whether, by reason of that, his expectancy of
llfe ls not shortened very much from what the
tables that have been given In evidence show.
It Is alleged that his expectancy of lite could
not be as shown In the tables, because physicians certify he has Bright's disease. Your
experience In life will tell you that that ls a
very dangerous disease, and If It was not
caused by this accident-and It ls not pretend-

ed It was-yon will take that ·Into consideration In determining the toss of hls earning
power during the time which he may be expected to Uve." The jury returned a verdict
ot $1,733 In favor of Henry C. Bunting, and
of $W0 for Phoebe J. Bunting. Plalntllf,
Henry Iluuting, now prosecutes this appeal,
assigning the above charge as error.
Edw. Campbell and Thos. Patterson, tor appellant. A. D. Boyd and La.zear & Orr, tor
appellee.

CI,ARK, J, There was evidence In this case
that the plalntltr, Henry C. Bunting, at the
time of the trial, was suffering from what
is known as "Bright's disease of the kidneys."
Upon a chemical analysis, albumen was found
In his urine. He suft'ered from dizziness, failure of sight, and double vision. He was feeble, had shortness of breath, and a staggering gait, and exhibited other symptoms of this
malady. The testimony of some of the medical experts was that they believed him to
be suft'erlng from Bright's disease, and there
was little, lf any, evidence to the contrary.
The court very properly, therefore. tnstruct<"d
the jury that there was proof of this fact In
tne case; that It was a dangerous disease;
and that they should take this Into consideration In determining Mr. Bunting's expectancy
of life and the loss of his earning power. Nor
was there any evidence to justify the jury In
finding that this disease was caused by the
personal Injuries received In the colllslon.
The Judgment ls therefore alHrmed.
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(“ARPEN'l‘iCR ct ai. v. AMERICAN BLDG.

& LOAN ASSN.

(56 N. W. 95, 54 Minn. 403.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota. Aug. 17, 1898.

Appeal from dist1ict court, Hennepin coun-

ty; Lochren, Judge.

Action by Charles W. Carpenter and oth-

ers against the American Building & Loan

Association. Plaintiffs had judgment, and

defendant appeals. Afﬁrmed.

Hart & Brewer, Rea & Hubachek, and 0. .

M. Cooley, for appellant. Dodd & Bowman

and Norman Fetter, (Lusk, Bunn 8; Had-

ley, of connsel,) for respondents.

COLLINS, J. In substance, the complaint

herein is identical with that involved in

Allen v. This Defendant, 49 Minn. 544, 52

N. W. Rep. 144. The conspicuous difference

in the answers in the two actions is that in
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the case just mentioned the defendant as-

sociation justiﬁed the transactions of which

the plaintiff complained, aﬂlrmed the regu-

larity and validity of the alleged sales, and

relied upon them as a perfect defense to the

cause of action, while here the answer dis-

aﬂirmed and repudiated the sales, expressly

averred their invalidity, and alleged that in

the month of May, 1892, the various stock-

holders had been notiﬁed by mail that such

pretended sales were null, and had no effect

upon their rights, and that they were en-

titled to reinstatement, upon payment of ac-

tual dues and ﬁnes; and the stockholders

were further notiﬁed that, unless their stock

was reinstated upon the terms proposed, a

sale of the same would be made on June 28, ‘

1892, pursuant to the by-laws of the associn- -

tion. The court below found that nearly all

of the pretended sales had been made in

the years 1889 and 1890.

that the notice just referred to was issued in

the month of May, 1802, by means of a cir- .

cular letter, in which it was stated that said '

sales had been declared void by the courts

of the state. It is a fair inference that

until this circular was promuigated the de-

fendant had persisted in its assertion that 3.

the sales were regular and valid; and as the

-opinion in the Allen Case was ﬁled on May

16, 1892, it may also be inferred that the

drcular was prepared after that date, and

was induced by the result of that action.

The trial court also found that the present

case was commenced June 22d, and that the

assignments under which the plaintiffs

claim were executed and delivered prior

thereto.

stock shares had been sold to defendant, in

pursuance of the circular notice. and that. in

form, the sale was regular.

We regard this cause as wholly controlled .

It 1

by that of Allen v. Association, supra.

was said in the opinion therein—and our ‘

views remain ‘the same—thnt the right of

action there recognized and upheld was

founded upon the fact that there had been

a distinct act of dominion wt-ougfuily ex-

(56 N. W. 95, M Minn. 403.)
8apreme Court of Minnesota. Aug. 17, 1800.
Appenl from district e<>urt, Hennepin county; Lochren, Judge.
Action by Charles W. Carpentn and oth~rs against the American Building & Loan
AssO<.'lntlon. PllllntUl's had judgment, and
dett'ndant appe&ls. Atftnned.
Hnrt & Brewer, Rea & Hubachek, and 0.
M. Coolt>y, for appellant. Dodd & Bowman
and Norman Fetter, (Lusk, Bunn & Hadley, of e<>unsel,) for respondent&
COLLINS, J. In substance, the complaint
hl'l'Pln la ldl•ntknl with that involvl'd In
Allt>n v. This Defendant, 49 Minn. !H4, ~2
N. W. Rep. 144. The ronspleuous dlflt>rence
tn the nnsw!!rs ln the two actions ls that In
the <'ase just mentioned the defendant assocla Uon justified the trnnsnetlons of which
the plaintiff e<>mplalnro, aJllrmed the regularity and vnlldlty of the alleged sales, and
relled upon them a8 a perfect defense to the
cnuse of actlon, while here the answer dis·
amrmPd and repudiated the sales, expressly
averred their Invalidity, and alleged that In
Uie month of May, 1892, the various stockholders had been notified by mall that such
pretended sales were null, and hnd no effect
upon their rights, and that they were entitled to relnstatl'm<>nt, upon payment ot actual dues nnd fines; nnd the st0<.·kholders
were further notified that, unless their stock
wn.s rel1111tatt'd upon the terms proposed, a
sale of the same would be made on June 23,
1892, pursuant to the by-laws of the association. The e<>urt below found that nearly all
of the pretende<l sak'8 had been m:tde In
the years 1889 and 18'JO. It further found
that the notice just referred to was issued ln
the month of l\lay, 18U'.l, by !beans ot a circular letter, ln which lt was stated that snld
sales bad been d('('lnred vold by the courts
of the state. It ls a falr Inference that
until this circular was promulgated the defendant bnd persisted ln Its assertion that
the sales were regular and valid; and as the
· oplulon ln the Allen Cnse was filed on May
16, 1892, It may also be inferred that the
circular was prepared after that date, and
was Induced by the result of that action.
The tlinl court also tound that the present
case wns commenced June 22d, and that the
Jll!lllgnments under which the plnlntltrs
dalm were exl'Cuted and dellvered prior
thereto. It was found thnt on June 23d the
stock shares bad be<>n sold to defendant, In
pursuance of the ctreulnr notlce, and that. In
fm'lD, the sale wns r<'gular.
·
We regnnl this cause as wholly e<>ntrolle:l
by that of Allen v. Assoclntlon, supra. It
was said In the opinion therein-and our
views remnln "the same-thnt the right of
:action there recognized and uphelll was
founded upon the fact that th<'re hnd been
a distinct act ot domlnlon w1-ougfuily ex-
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eretsed over the aharcholders' property, Inconsistent with their rights, and In denial
of them. The defendant corporation, by as·
sumlng to sell, and wrongfully selling, the
shares, deprived the ownt>rs of their stock,
and the advantages accrulng from lt, as
much when bidding It In tor Itself 88 when
lt accepted the bid of IL stranger, and then
transferred the title on its books. This. It
wu said, waa an act of 1Dterferenre, 11UbTel"l!lve of the rights of the stockholders to
enjoy and e<>ntrol the stock, and mny be
treo.ted by tht>m as a conversion ot ilidr
property. That any distinct act ot dominion wrongfully exerted over one's propl'l1Y,
In drnlnl of his right, or Inconsistent wtth
lt, amounts to, and may be treated rui, a
e<>nl'<>ndon, was rec-ognlzed long ago In thls
court, ln Hosstt>ldt v. Dill, 28 Minn. 4U9,
10 N. W. Rep. 781. The right, then, of the
original slmreholders, or of these plalnttrrs,
as their n88lgnees, to maintain this action,
Wll8 perfect from the day lt accrued up to
the time that detendnnt assoclutlmi nbnndoned Its former llne of defense, and offerPd
to relnstate,--a. period of from two to three
years. This was settled In the Allen C.u1e;
so that the present lnqulry ls solely ns to
the effect of the offer to reinstate upon nn
e:xJstlng and perfect right of action then
held by the shareholdl•rs or by the pln·ntlffs, and the ol'l'er wns nothing more lh:m
an offer to return to the rightful owner
property already converte<l to the dt>f<>ndant's use. It wns an attempt on the p:ut
of the 8880clntlon, alter it had actually converted the stock shares to lta own use, and
had for the term of from one to thrt'e ye:1rs
denied that the former owncra hnd nny interest In the same, to compel them to receive back the converted prope11:y, ag~1lnst
their will. The palpable purp~se ot the
offer to reinstate was to deprive the shareholdera of a clear right possessed by eneh
to elect as between remedles,-to dl't<'nulnc
whether their actions should be brought to
ree<>ver the stock shares In specie, or to recover for the value of the . same. It the
otrer could be given the full effect dP>'h·1>d,
the defendant would be allowt'd to perpetmte a wrong; to persist thnt It bnd authority so to do; and finally, when de!Pntcd ln
the courts, to take away from the injureJ
party his right to pursue his choice of concurrent remedies. It ls snfe to sny thnt the
option l\S to remedy ts not with the p:trty
who hns Inflicted the lnjul'y, for If lt Wl're
he would be permitted to take advantage
of his own wrong.
It ls well settled, a8 a general proposition,
that when an actu..'ll conversion of chatt<'ls
hns taken pince the owner ls undl'r no obllgn tlon to receive them b:1ck, when ten!l<'red
by the wrongdoer. 6 Bnc. Abr. 677: 9 Bae.
Abr. 559; 4 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 12;),
and cases cited. The right of action ls
comp·~te and perfect when the convt>rslon
tak1~ place, and the obJ<'<>t ot the nctkn
i la to recover damages, not to regain posses-
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sion of the thing itself. Even if the goods

be returned by the wrongdoer, and are ac-

cepted by the owner, after the action is

brought, damages, nominal or actual, may

be recovered. There is a class of cases

when, in trespass or trover, the defendant

may mitigate the damages by a. timely and

proper return of the property. The rules

which govern in such cases seem to be that

where the wrong lacks the element of will-

fuiness—has been committed in good faith—-

the court, in its discretion, may order a re-

turn, upon timely application by the defend-

ant, accompanied by an offer to pay all

costs, and a showing that no real injury will

have been suffered by the plaintif f when

possession is restored. The right of action

is not defeated by the order of the court,

but damages are mitigated. The subject
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and the authorities are fully reviewed in

Hart v. Skinner, 16 Vt. 138. See, also, Rey-

nolds v. Shnler, 5 Cow. 323. and Churchill

v. We1sh, 47 Wis. 39, 1 N. W. Rep. 398. We

have no such cam now before us.

The point is made upon this appeal that

it was incumbent upon the piaintiffs to pro-

duce and surrender up the stock or share

certiﬁcates before they could recover; Jos-

lyn v. Distilling Co., 44 Minn. 183, 46 N. W.

Rep. 337, being the principal authority relied

on. But plaintiffs are not asking, as was

demanded there, for the cancellation of

stock certiﬁcates, the transfer of such stock

upon the books of the association, and the

issuance of new certiﬁcates. Nor were the

conclusions reached in the Joslyn Case

adopted on any view of the negotiability of

stock certiﬁcates, but on general principles

appertaining to the doctrine of estoppel.

The transfer or assignment of the certiﬁ-

cates here involved could give the purchaser

no greater rights, as against the_ associa-

tion, than the assiguees had. Hammond v.

Hastings, 134 U. S. 401, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.

727.

The remaining points made by counsel for

appellant need not be speciﬁcally referred

to. Judgment aﬂirmed.

MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.

slon of the thing itself. Even 1f the· gOoda
be returned by the wrongdoer, and are accepted by the owner, after the action is
brought, damages, nomlnal or actual, may
be recovered. There iB a class of <l88es
when, in trespass or trover, the defendant
mny mitigate the damages by a timely and
proper return of the property. The rules
which govern bl such cases seem to be that
where the wrong lacks the element of willfulness-has been committed in good faiththe court, in Its discretion, may order a return, upon timely application by the defendant, accompanied by an otrer to pay all
., costs, and a showing that no real injury will
have been sutrered by the plaintltr when
possession is restored. The right of action
is not defeated by the order of the court,
but damages are mitigated. The subject
and the authorities are fully reviewed In
Hart v. Skinner, 16 Vt. 138. See, also, Reynolds v. Shuler, IS Cow. 323, and Churchill
v. Welsh, 47 Wis. 39, 1 N. W. Rep. 398. We
have no such case now before ua.

The point is made upon th18 appeal that
it was incumbent upon the plalntufs to produce and aurrender up the st()Ck or share
certificates before they could recover; Joslyn v. Dlstill1ng Co., 44 Minn. 183, 46 N. W.
Rep. 337, being the principal authority relk>tl
on. But plalntltrs are not asking, as was
demanded there, for the cancellation of
stock certificates, the transfer of such stock
upon the books of the association, and the
issuance of new certificates. Nor were the
conclusions reached In the Joslyn Case
adopted on any view of the negotlablllty ot
stock certificates, but on general principles
appertaining to the doctrine of estoppel.
The transfer or assignment of the certificates here involved could give the purchaser
no greater rights, as against the, association, than the asslgneCfi had. Hammond v.
Hastings, 134 U. S. 401, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.
727.
The remaining points made by counsel for
appellant need not be spec11lcal17 referred
to. Judgment afllrmed.
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WRIGHT V. BANK OF THE METROP-

OLIS.

(18 N. E. 79, 110 N. Y. 237.)

Court of Appeals of New York. October 2.

1888.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,

Fourth department.

About the 7th of January, 1878. one Henry

0. Elliott received from his correspondent in

Rome, N. Y., (B. Huntington Wright,) his

check for $2,000, payable to the order of El-

liott, with a request from Wright that he

(Elliott) would meet some drafts Wright

would draw on him. and obtain payment

from the check. He accordingly honored the

drafts, and, having indorsed the check, pro-

cured its discount by the defendant. It was

not paid when presented, and Elliott being

unable to learn the reason, went to Rome to
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see the drawer of the check. He then learn-

ed that the drawer had made a general as-

signment for the beneﬁt of his creditors, and

stated his inability to do anything for Elli-

ott. Finally, Elliott succeeded in obtaining

a number of shares of stock in different rail-

road companies, as collateral security to the

check then lying protested in the hands of

the defendant. The history of the interview

resulting in the procuring of the stock by

Elliott as given on the trial is contradictory,

but the verdict of the jury shows that they

believed that which was given on the part

of the plaintiff. From the evidence thus

given it appears that the stock was in reality

the stock of Benjamin E. Wright, the fa-

ther of B. Huntington Wright, and that it was

delivered by him to Elliott voluntarily, and

for the purpose of being used as a collateral

to his own note at six months, which was

to be used to take up the check; but the

stock was not to be sold for six months. as

it was then selling in market much below

what the father thought the stock was really

worth. The stock was owned by Mr. Wright,

as he said, for an investment, and he had no

idea of selling it; but he allowed Elliott to

take it because he felt sorry for his situa-

tion, and wanted to help him, as far as be

reasonably could, out of the diﬂiculty he

was in. Elliott took the stock and went to

New York. and had a talk with the cashier

and vicepresident of the defendant, who re-

served their decision as to whether they

would take the note and the stock. Subse-

quently, and on the 17th of January, the

cashier wrote that the stock being non-divi-

dend paying, and the note six months paper,

it would be impossible to get it through the

board; and he suggested it would be much

better to obtain Mr. Wright's consent to sell

the stock. and to make his (Elliott's) account

good in that way. Elliott inclosed this note

to Mr. Wright in a letter addressed to "B.

H. Wright;" and in response, and on the 22d

day of January, Benjamin H. Wright, the

mvner of the stock, wrote Mr. Rogers, the

cashier of defendant, refusing to sell the

stock. or to permit of its being sold. Mr.

(18 N. E. 79, 110 N. Y. 237.)
Court of Appeals of New York. October 2,
1888.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Fourth department.
About the 7th or January, 1878, one Henry
C. Elliott received from hJs correspondent ln
Rome, N. Y., (B. Huntlngton Wright,) his
check for $2,000, payable to the order of Elliott, with a request from Wright that he
(Elliott) would meet some drufts Wright
would draw on him, and obtain payment
from the check. He accordingly honored the
drafts, and, having lndorsed the check, procured Its discount by the defendant. It was
not paid when presented, and Elliott being
unable to learn the reruioo, went to Rome to
see the drawer or the check. He then learned that the drawer had made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors, and
stated his Inability to do anything for Elllott. Finally, Elliott succeeded In obtaining
a number of shares of stock In different railroad companies, as collateral security to the
check then lying protested In the hands of
the defendant. The history of the interview
resulting ln the procuring of the stock by
Elliott as given on the trial ls contradictory,
but the verdict of the jury shows that they
believed that which was given on the part
of tbe plaintiff. From the evidence thus
given It appears that the stock was In reality
the stock ot Benjamin H. Wright, the father or B. Huntington Wright, and that It was
delivered by him to Elliott voluntarily, and
tor the purpose of being used as a collateral
to his own note at six months, wl.Iich was
to be used to take up the check; but the
stock wn.s not to be sold for six months, as
It was then selllnll: In market much below
what the father thought the stock was really
worth. The stock was owned by Mr. Wright,
as he said, ror an Investment, and he had no
Idea or selling It; but be allowed Elllott to
take It because he felt sorry tor his situation, and wanted to help him, as far as he
reasonably could, out or the difficulty he
was In. Elllott took the stock and went to
New York, and bad a talk with the cashier
and vlc~president or the defendant, who reserved their decision as to whether they
would take the note and the stock. Subsequently, and on the 17th of .January, the
cashier wrote that the stock being non-dividend paying, and the note six months paper,
It would be Impossible to get It througb the
board; and he suggested It would be much
better to obtain l\Ir. Wright's consent to sell
the stock. and to make bls (Elliott's) account
good ln that way. Elllott lnclosed this note
to Mr. Wright In a letter addreseed to "B.
H. Wl'ight;" and in response, and on the 22d
•lay of Janual'y, Benjamin H. Wright, the
"w11er of the stock, wrote Mr. Rogers, the
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cashier of defendant, refusing to sell the
stock, or to permit of Its being sold. Mr.
Rogers bad never seen either of the Mess1·s.
Wl'igbt, and did not know there were two;
and subsequenUy, and about the 29th of January, Elliott told him that Mr. Wright authorl?.ed the sale of the stocks, and they
were Immediately sold, less commission for
$2,201.50. On the part of the plalntur It was
claimed that Mr. Wright, the true owner of
the stocks, never gave any such authority to
sell them, and that he was unaware that
they had been sold untll May 9, 1878. FeiJruary 14, 18Sl, the stock reached the highest price, down to the day of trial, se111ng on
that day for $18,003. '.l.'hls action was commenced October 7, 1879. Mr. \Vrlght, the
owner of the stock, was about seventy-six
years of nge in May, 1878, and In the latter
part of that .rear went south, and l·eturncd
early In the year 1879. On the 9th or May,
1878, he made a demand upon the defendant
for the stocks, and tendered to It the amount
of the check and Interest, being something
over $2,000. The cashier stated the stocks
had been sold by the authority of the owner
thereof, aa he supposed, given through Mr.
Elliott, and refused to deliver them or their
value. The original plnintltr died since the
first trial or the case, and the present one
was duly substituted. The court cbarged the
jury ti.Int It they round for the plalntltr be
was entitled to recover the highest price at
which the stocks could have been sold In the
market between the date or their actual conversion and a reasonable time thereafter, and
that the jury should fix the reasonable time,
not arbitrarily or through sympathy or prejudice; but they were to say what, under all
the circumstances, would be a reasonable
time wltbln which to commence tbls action,
and also, It may be, reasonable diligence in
prosecuting It; because if the action were
commenced In fact within a reasonable time
after the conversion of the stock, and had
been prosecuted with reasonable dlllgence
since, then the plaintitr was entitled to recover the highest market price that the stock
reached between the date or the conversion
and the time of the trial, less the amount of
the check and Interest, and with Interest on
the balance. This charge was duly excepted
to. The jury round a verdict tor $3,391.25.
There ls no evidence which shows when the
stock reached that value. Upon the rendition of the verdict both parties moved to set
It aside, the plalntltl' on the ground that he
was entltle<l, under the charge, to the highest value or the stock down t<> tbe trial, and
the defendant on the ground that the damages were excessive and contrary to evidence. The court granted the motion of the
plaintiff, and set the verdict aside on the
ground stated, and denied the motion of the
defendant. The defendant appealed to tlie
general term f1·om both of such orders. Th11 t
court reversed the order setting aside the
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verdict, and ordered judgment thereon, and

aﬂirmed the order made on defendant's mo-

tion, refusing to set aside the verdict. Judg-

ment was then entered upon the verdict of

the jury, and from that judgment both sides

appeal to this court, and they also appeal

from the orders of the general term upon

.Ml'rIGATIO:N OF

verdict, and ordered jmlgment the1·eon, and
affirmed the order made on de!endnnt'e m~
tion, refusing to set aside the verdict. Judgment wns then entered upon the verdict of
the jury, and from that judgment both sitlcs
appeal to this court, and they also appeal
from the orde1-s of the general term upon
which the judgment was entered.
W. E. Scripture, for plaintiff. Joseph H.
Choate and John Delahunty, for defendant.

which the judgment was entered.

W. E. Scripture, for plaintiff. Joseph H.

Choate and John Delahunty, for defendant.

PECKHAM, J ., (after stating the facts as

above.) This case comes before us in a

somewhat peculiar condition. As both par-

ties appeal from the same judgment, which

is for a sum of money only, it would seem

as if there ought not to ‘be much diﬂlculty in

obtaining its reversal. It is obvious, how-

ever, that a mere reversal would do neither

party any good, as the case would then go
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down for a new trial, leaving the important

legal question in the case not passed upon

by this court. This, we think, would be an

injustice to both sides. The case is here, and

the main question is in regard to the rule

of damages, and we think it ought to be de-

cided. By this charge the case was left to

the jury to give the highest price the stock

could have been sold for, intermediate its

conversion and the day of trial, provided the

jury thought, under all the circumstances,

that the action had been commenced within

a reasonable time after the conversion, and

had -been prosecuted with reasonable dili-

gence since. Authority for this rule is claim-

ed under Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 309,

and several other cases of a somewhat sim-

ilar nature, referred to therein. Markham v.

Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, followed the rule laid

down in Romaine v. Van Allen. In these

two cases a recovery was permitted which

gave the plaintiff the highest price of. the

stock between the conversion and the trial.

In the Markham Case the plaintiff had not

paid for the stocks, but was having them

carried for him by his broker (the defend-

ant) on a margin. Yet this fact was not re-

garded as making any difference in the rule

of damages, and the case was thought to be

controlled by that of Romaine. In this state

of ~the rule the case of Matthews v. Uoe, 49

N. Y. 57-62, came before the court. The pre-

cise question was not therein involved; but

the court, per Church, O. J., took occasion to

intimate that it was not entirely satisﬁed

with the correctness of the rule in any case

not special and exceptional in its circum-

stances; and the learned judge added that

they did not regard the rule as so ﬁrmly set-

tled by authority as to be beyond the reach

of review whenever an occasion should ren-

der it necessary. One phase of the question

again came before this court, and in proper

form, in Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, where

the plaintiff had paid but a small percentage

on the value of the stock, and his broker,

the defendant, was carrying the same on a

margin, and the plaintiff had recovered in

the court below, as damages for the unau-

PECKHAM, J., (after stating the fncte as
above.) This case comes before us in a
somewhat peculiar condition. As both parties appeal from the same judgment, which
ls for 11 sum of money only, it would seem
as If there ought not to 'f>e much difficulty in
obtaining its reversal. It ls obvious, however, that 11 mere reverBnl would du neither
pa1·ty any good, as the case would then go
down for a new trial, leaving the Important
legal question In the case not passed upon
by this court. This, we think, would be an
II~justice to both sides. The case ls here, and
the main question ls in regard to the rule
of damages, and we think it ought to be decided. By this . charge the case was left to
the_jury to give the highest pri~e the stock
could have been sold for, intermediate Its
conversion and the day of trial, provided the
jury thought, under all the circumstances,
that the action bad been commenced within
a reasonable time afier the conversion, and
bad ·been prosecuted with reasonable dlligence elnce. Authority tor this rule ls claimed under Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 309,
and several other cases of a somewhat similar nature, referred to therein. Markham v.
Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, followed the rule laid
down in Romaine v. Van Allen. In these
two cases a recovery was permitted which
gave the plaintiff the highest price of. the
stock between the conversion and the tiial.
In the Markham Case the plaintiff had not
paid for the stocks, but was having them
carried for him by bis broker (the defendant) on a margin. Yet this fact was not regarded as making any difference in the rule
of damages, and the case was thought to he
controlled by that of Romaine. In this state
of .the rule the case of Matthews v. Coe, 49
N. Y. 57-62, came before the court. The precise question was not therein Involved; but
the court, per Church, C. J., took occasion to
intimate that It was not entirely satisfied
with the correctness ot the rule in any case
not special and ei::ceptlona! in Its circumstances; and the learned judge added that
they did not regard the rule as so firmly settled by authority as to be beyond the reach
of review whenever an occasion should render it nece1:1sary. One phase of the question
again came before this court, and in proper
form, In Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, where
the plaintur bad paid but a small percentage
on the value ot the stock, and his broker,
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the defendant, wns carrying the same on a.
margin, and the plaintiff had recovered in
the court below, as damages for the unauthorized sale of the stock, the highest price
between the time of convel"Blon and the tfwe
of trial. The rule was applied to substantially the same facts as In Markham v. Jaudon, supra, and that case was cited as authority tor the decision ot the court below.
'.fhis court, however, reversed the judgment
and disapproved the rule of damages which
bad been applied. The opinion was written
by that very able and learned judge, Rapallo, and all the cases pertaining to the subject
were reviewed by him, and in such a masterly manner as to leave nothing further for
us to do In that direction. We think the reasoning of the opinion calls for a reversal of
this Judgment. In the course of bis opinion
the Judge said that the rule of damages, as
laid down by the trial court, following the
case of Markham v. Jaudon, bad "been recognized and adopted in several late adjudications in this state in actions for the conversion of property of ftuctuatlng value; but
its soundness as a general rule, applicable
to all cases of conversion of such property,
bas been seriously questioned, and ls denied
In various adjudications In this and other
states." 'l'he rule was not regarded as one
of those settled principles in the lnw as to
the measure of damages, to which the maxim stare declsls should be applied. '.fbe
principle upon which the case was declde<l
rested upon the fundamental theory that In
all cases or the conversion or · property (e:xcept where punitive damages are allowed)
the rule to be adopted should be one which
all'ords the plamtlff a just Indemnity for the
loss he bas sustained by the sale of the
stock; and, in mses where a loss of profits
ls claimed, it should be, when a warded at
all, an amount sutllclent to indemnify the
party injured for the loss which ls the natural, reasonable, and proximate result of the
wrongful act complained of, and which a
proper degree of prudence on the part of the
complainant would not have averted. The
rule thus stated, in the language of Judge
Rapallo, he proceeds to apply to the facts
of the case before him. In stating what in
his view would be a proper Indemnity to the
Injured party In such a case, the learned
judge commenced bis statement with the
fact that the plaintiff did not bold the stocks
for lnvestinent; and he added that, if they
had been paid for and owned by the plaintiff, dUferent considerations would arise, but
It must be borne In mind that we are treating of a speculation carried on with the capital of the broker, and not of the customer.
If the broker bas violated bis contract or(
disposed of the stock without authority, the
customer Is entitled to recover such damages as would naturally be sustained In restoring himself to the position of which he
bas been deprived. He certainly has no
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right to be placed in a better position than

he would be in if the wrong had not been

done. The whole reasoning of the opinion

is still based upon the question as to what

damages would naturally be sustained by

the plaintif f in restoring himself to the posi-

tion he had been in; or in other words, in re-

purchasing the stock. It is assumed in the

opinion that the sale by the defendant was

illegal and a conversion, and that plaintiff

had a right to disaﬂlrm the sale, and to re-

quire defendants to replace the stock. If

they failed, then the learned judge says the

plaintiff's remedy was to do it himself, and

to charge the defendants with the loss nec-

essarily sustained by him in doing so.

Is not this equally the duty of a plaintiff

who owns the whole of the stock that has

been wrongfully sold? I mean, of course, to
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exclude all question of punitive damages

resting on bad faith. In the one case the

plaintiff has afalid contract with the broker

to hold the stock. and the broker violates it

and sells the stock. The duty of the broker

is to replace it at once, upon the demand of

the plaintiff. in case he does not, it is the

duty of the plaintiff to repurchase it. Why

should not the same duty rest upon a plain-

tiff who has paid in full for his stock, and

has deposited it with another conditionally?

The broker who purchased it on a margin

for the plaintiff violates his contract and his

duty when he wrongfully sells the stock,

just as much as if the whole purchase price

had been paid by the plaintiff. His duty is

in each case to replace the stock upon de-

mand, and, in case he fall so to do, then the

duty of the plaintiff springs up, and he

should repurchase the stock himself. This

duty it seems to me is founded upon the

general duty which one owes to another who

converts his property under an honest mis-

take, to render the resulting damage as

light as it may be reasonably within his

power to do. It is well said by Earl, J., in

Parsons v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92, that "the

party who suffers from a breach of contract

must so act as to make his damages as

small as he reasonably can. He must not

by inattention, want of care, or inexcusable

negligence permit his damage to grow, and

then charge it all to the other party. The

law gives him all the redress he should have

by indemnlfying him for the damage which

he necessarily sustains." See. also, Dillon

v. Anderson, 43 N. Y. 231; Hogle v. Railroad

Co., 28 Hun, 363,—the latter case being an

action of tort. In such a case as this, wheth-

er the action sounds in tort or is based al-

together upon contract, the rule of damages

is the same. Per Denio, C. J., in Scott v.

Rogers, 31 N. Y. 676; and per Rapallo, J.,

in Baker v. Drake, supra. The rule of dam-

ages as laid down in Baker v. Drake, in

cases where the stock was purchased by the

broker on a margin for plaintiff, and where

the matter was evidently aspeculation, has

been aﬂirmed in the later cases in this court.

right to be placed ln a better poaltlon than
he would be In If the wrong had not been
done. The whole reasoning of the opinion
is still baaed upon the question as to what
damages would naturally be sustained by
the plaintiff lo restoring himself to the position he bad been in; or lo other words, lo repurchasing the stock. It is aSBumed lo the
opinion that the sale by the defendant was
1llegal and a conversion, and that plaintiff
had a right to dieamrm the sale, and to require defendants to replace the stock. It
they tailed, then the learned judge says the
plalntllf's remedy was to do it himeelt, and
to charge the defendants with the lose nee·
e88arlly sustained by him in doing so.
Is not tbls equally tbe duty of a plaintiff
who owns the whole of the stock that has
been wrongfully sold? I mean. ot course, to
exclude all question of punitive damages
resting on bad faith. In the one case the
plaintiff has a j'alld contract with the broker
to hold the stock, and the broker violates It
and sells the stock. The duty of the broker
1s to replace It at once, upon the demand of
the plaintiff. In case he does not, lt ls the
duty of the plalntltr to repurchase It. Why
should not the same duty rest upon a plalnurr who has paid In full for h1e StO<'k, and
bas deposited 1t with another conditionally?
'.rhe broker who purchased lt on a mal'gin
for the plalntltr violates hls contract and hie
duty when he wrongfully sells the stock,
just as much as if the whole purchase price
had been paid by the plaintiff. His duty ls
In each case to replace the stock upon demand, and, ln case he fall so to do, then the
duty of the plalntltr springs up, and he
should repurchase the stock himself. This
duty It seems to me ls founded upon the
general duty which one owes to another who
converts hls property under an honest mistake, to render the resulting daurnge as
light as It may be reasonably within his
power to do. It ls well said by Earl, J., In
Parsons v. Button, 66 N. Y. 92, that "the
party who suffers from a breach ot contract
must so act as to make hle damages as
small as he reasonably cnn. He must not
by Inattention, want of care, or Inexcusable
negligence permit bis damage to grow, and
then charge It all to the other party. The
law gives him all the redress be should have
by lndemnltylng him for the damage which
he necessarily sustains." See, also, Dillon
v. Anderson, 43 N. Y. 231; Hogle v. Railroad
Co., 28 Hun, 363,-tbe latter case being an
action of tort. In such a case as this, whether the action sounds In tort or Is based altogether upon contract, the rule of damages
le the same. Per Denio, C. J., In Scott v.
Rogers, 31 ·N. Y. 676; and per Rapallo, J.,
In Baker v. Drake, supra. The rule of damages as laid down In Baker v. Drake, In
cases where the stock was purchased by the
broker on a margin for plaintiff, and where
the matter was evidently a · speculation, has
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been a11lrmed In the later eases In this court.
See Gruman v. Smith, 81 N. Y. 25; Colt v.
Owens, 00 N. Y. 368. In both ca.see the duty
ot the plalotllr to repurchase the stock within a reasonable time is stated. I think the
duty exists In the same degree where the
plulntur bad paid In full tor the stock, and
was the absolute owner thereof. In Baker
v. Drake the learned judge did not assume
to declare In a case where the pledgor was
the absolute owner of the stock, and It was
wrongfully sold, the measure of damages
must be as laid down Iµ the Romaine Case.
He was endeavoring to distinguish the cases,
and to show that there was a difference between the case of one who le engaged in a
speculation with what le substantially the
money ot another and the case ot an absolute owner ot stock which Is sold wrongfully by the pledgee. And be said that at least
the former ought not to be allowed such a
rule of damages. It can be seen, however,
that the jullge was not satisfied with the
rule in the Romaine Case, even as applied to
the facts therein stated. In hie opinion be
makes use of this language: "In a case
where the loBB ot probable profits le claimed as an element of damage, It lt be ever
allowable to mulct a defendant for such a
conjectural loss. Its amount Is a question
of fact, and a finding In regard to It should
be based upon some evidence." In orde1· to
refuse to the plaint!lf In that case, however,
the damages claimed, It was necessary to
overrule "the Markham Case, which was
done. Now, so tar as the duty to repurch88e
the stock ls concerned, I see no difference lo
the two cases. There le no material distinction In the tact ot ownership of the whole
stock, which should place the plaintlt? outside of any liability to repurchase after notice ot snle, and should render the defendant continuously liable for any higher price
to which the stock might rise after conversion and before trial. As the same llablll ty on the part of defendant exists In
each case to replace the stock, and as he is
technically a wrong-doer in both cases, but
lu one no more than In the other, be should
respond In the same meo.sure of damages
iu both cases; and that measure le the
amount which, In the language of Rapallo, J.,
is the natural, reasonable, and proximate re- \
suit of the wrongful act complained of, and
which a proper degree of prudence on the
part of the plalntlt? would not have averted. The loss of a sale of the stock at the
highest price down to trial would seem to
be a less natural and proximate result ot
the wrongful act of the defendant In selling
It when plaintiff had the stock tor an Investment, than when he had It tor a speculation;
for the Intent to keep It as an Investment is
at war with any Intent to sell It at any
price, even the highest. But In both cases
the qualitlcatlon attaches that the Jose shall
only be such as a proper degr~ of prudence
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on the part of the complainant would not

have averted, and a proper degree of pru-

dence on the part of the complainant con-

sists in repurchasing the stock after notice

of its sale, and within a reasonable time.

If the stock then sells for less than the de-

fendant sold it for, of course the complain-

ant has not been injured, for the difference

in the two prices inures to his beneﬁt. If it

sells for more, that difference the defendant

should pay.

It is said that as he had already paid for

the stock once, it is unreasonable to ask the

owner to go in the market and repurchase it.

I do not see the force of this distinction. In

the case of the stock held on margin, the

plaintiff has paid his margin once to the

broker, and so it may be said that it is un-

reasonable to ask him to pay it over again
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in the purchase of the stock. Neither state-

ment, it seems to me, furnishes any reason

for holding a defendant liable to the rule

of damages stated in this record. The de-

fendant's liability rests upon the ground that

he has converted, though in good faith, and

under a mistake as to his rights, the prop-

erty of the plaintiff. The defendant is, there-

fore, liable to respond in damages for the

value. But the duty of the plaintiff to make

the damage as light as he reasonably may

rests upon him in both cases; for there is no

more legal wrong done by the defendant in

selling the stock which the plaintiff has fully

paid for than there is in selling the stock

which he has agreed to hold on a margin,

and which agreement he violates by selling

it. All that can be said is that there is a

difference in amount, as in one case the plain-

tiff's margin has gone, while in the other

the whole price of the stock has been sacri-

ﬁced. But there is no such difference in the

legal nature of the two transactions as

should leave the duty resting upon the plain-

tiff in the one case to repurchase the stock,

and in the other case should wholly absolve

him therefrom. A rule which requires a re-

purchase ot the stock in a reasonable time

does away with all questions as to the high-

est price before the commencement of the

suit, or whether it was commenced in a rea-

sonable time, or prosecuted with reasonable

diligence; and leaves out of view any ques-

tion as to the presumption that plaintiff

would have kept his stock down to the time

when it sold at the highest mark before the

day of trial and would then have sold it,

even though he had owned it for an invest-

ment. Such a presumption is not only of

quite a shadowy and vague nature, but is

also, as it would seem, entirely inconsistent

with the fact that he was holding the stock

as an investment. If kept for an invest-

ment, it would have been kept down to the

day of trial; and the price at that time there

might be some degree of propriety in award-

ing. under certain circumstances. if it were

higher than when it was converted. But to

presume in favor of an investor that he
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on the part of the complainant would not
have averted, and a proper degree of pru·
dence on the part of the complainant consists in repurchasing the stock after notice
of Its sale, and within a reasonable time.
It the stock then sells for less than the defendant sold It tor, ot course the complainant has not been Injured, for the difference
In the two prices Inures to his benefit. It It
sells for more, that dltrerence the defendant
should pay.
It Is said that as he had already paid for
the stock once, It ls unrE>asonable to ask the
owner to go In the mnrket and repurchase it.
I do not see the force of this distinction. In
the case of the stock held on margin, the
plalntur has paid his margin once to the
broker, and so It may be said that It ls unreasonable to ask him to pay It over again
In the purchase of the stock. Neither statement, It seems to me, furnishes . any reason
for holding a defendant liable to the rule
ot damages stated In this record. The defendant's llablllty rests upon the ground that
he has converted, though In good faith, and
under a mistake as to his rights, the property of the plalntur. The defendant ls, therefore, liable to respond In damages for the
value. But the duty of the plalntur to make
the damage as light as he reasonably may
rests upon him In both cases; for there ls no
more legal wrong done by the defendant In
selling the stock which the plaintiff has fully
pnld for than there ls ln selling the stock
which he has agreed to hold on a margin,
and which agreement he violates by selling
It. All that can be said ls that there ls a
difference In amount, as in one case the plalntur•s margin has gone, while In the other
the whole price of the stock has been sacrificed. But there ls no such difference ln the
legal nature of the two transactions as
should leave the duty resting upon the plaintiff In the one case to repurchase the stock,
and In the other case should wholly absolve
him therefrom. A rule which requires a repurchase ot the stock In a rP.asonable time
does a way with all questions as to the highest price before the commencement of the
suit, or whether it was commenced In a reasonable time, or prosecuted with reasonable
dlllgence; and leaves out of view any question as to the presumption that plaintiff
would have kept his stock down to the time
when It sold at the highest mark before the
day of trial and would then have sold It,
even though he had owned It for an investment. Such a presumption ls not only of
quite a shadowy and vague nature, but Is
also, as It would seem, entirely inconsistent
with the fact that he was holding the stock
as an Investment. It kept for an investment, It would have been kept down to the
day of trial; and the price at that time there
might be some degree of propriety In awarding, under certain circumstances. if It. werA
higher than when It was converted. But to

presume In favor of an Investor that he
would have held his stock during all of a
period of possible depression, and would
have realized upon 1t when It reached the
highest figure, ls to Indulge In a presumption which, it ls safe to say, would not be
based on fact once In a hundred times. To
formulate a legal llabllity based upon such
presumption I think ls wholly unjust in such
a case as the present. Justice apd fair dealing are both more npt to be promoted by adhering to the rule which Imposes the duty
upon the plaintiff to make his loss as light
as possible, notwithstanding the unauthorized act of the defendant, assuming, of
course, In all cases, that there was good faith
on the part of the appellant. It ls the natural and proximate loss which the plalntltr
ls to be Indemnified for, and that cannot be
said to extend to the highest price before
trial, but only to the highest price reached
within a reasonable time after the plalntur
lms learned of the conversion of his stock
within which be could go In the market and
repurchase It. What Is a reasonable time
when the facts are undisputed, and different
Inferences cannot reasonably be drawn from
the same facts, ls a Question of law. See
Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368; Hedges v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 223.
We think that beyond all controversy In
this case, and taking all the facts Into consideration, this reasonable time had expired
by July 1, 1878, following the 9th of May of
the same year. The highest price which the
stock reached during that period was $2,795,
and, as It Is not certain on what day the
plaintiff might have purchased, we think It
fair to give him the highest price It reached
In that time. From this should be deducted
the amount of the check and Interest to the
day when the stock was sold, a8 then It ls
p~sumed the defendant paid the check with
the proceeds of the sale. In all this discussion as to the rule of damages we have assumed that the defendant acted In good faith,
In an honest mistake as to Its right to sell
the stock. and that It was not a case for
punitive damages. A careful perusal of the
whole case leads us to this conclusion. It ls
not needful to state the evidence, but we cannot see any question In the case showing
bad faith, or Indeed any reason for Its existence. The fact ls uncontra.dlcted that the
defendant sold the stock upon what Its oflloers supposed was the authority of the owner
thereof given to them by Elliott. The opinion delivered by the learned judge at general term, while agreeing with the principle
of this opinion as to the rule of damages in
this case, sustained the verdict of the jury
upon the theory that, If the plaintiff had gone
Into the market within a reasonable time,
and purchased an equivalent of the stocks
converted, he would have paid the price
which he recovered by the verdict This left
the jury the right to fix what was a reason-
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able time, and then assume there was evi-

dence to support the verdict. In truth there

was no evidence which showed the value of

the stock to have been anything like the

amount of the verdict, for the evidence show-

ed it was generally very much less, and

sometimes very much more. But ﬁxing what

is 1 reasonable time ourselves, it is seen that

the stock within that time was never of any

such value. The judgment should be revers-

ed, and a new trial granted, with costs to

abide the event.

EARL, FINCH, and GRAY, JJ., concur.

RUGER, O. J., and ANDREWS and DAN-
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FORTH, JJ., dissent.

able t!me, and then assume there was evidence to support the verdict. In truth there
was no evidence which showed the value ot
the •tock to have been anything llke the
amount ot the verdict, for the evidence showed it was generally very much less, and
sometimes very much more. But fixing what
la a reasonable time ourselves, It Is seen that
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the stock within that ti.me was never of any
such value. The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, wltb costs to
abide the event.
EARL, FINCH, and GRAY, JJ., concur.
RUGER, 0. J., and ANDREWS and DANFORTH, JJ., dissent.

EXCESSIVE' OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.
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B.ALTIMORI~
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EXCESSIVE‘OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.

BALTIMORE & O. R. CO. v. CARR.

(17 Atl. 1052, 71 Md. 135.)

Court of Appeals of Maryland. June 11, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Prince George's

county.

Aigned before ALVEY, C. J., and

MILLER, ROBINSON, IRVING. BRYAN, '

and l\lcSHEltRY, JJ.

John K. Oowen, F. Snowden Hill. Thos.

& 0. R. CO. v. CARR.

(17 At!. 1052, 71 Md. 135.)
Court of App<'nls of Mnr~·lnnd. June 11, 1889.

Appeal frum circuit court, l:'riuce George's
county.
A1g11f"d before ALVEY, C. J., and
MILLEH, ROBINSOX, IHVI.NG, BHY A.N,
and }.lcSHEHHY, JJ.
John K. Cowen, F. Snowden Hill, Thos.
Awlers11n, and IV. Viers Bouie, Jr., for apP'"'llant. (;Jeurge Peter, J as. B. Henderson,
and William l:ita11ley, for appellee.

Anderson, and W. Viers Bouic, Jr.,for ap-

pcll-ant. George Peter, Jas. B. Henderson,

and William stanley, for appellee.

ALVEY, C. J. This is an action on the

case, brought by the appell e against the ap-

prnant for the wronglul refusal of admission

of the former to the cars of the latter, and the

?\t-tl0P was tried upon the general issue and

plea of not guilty of the wrong alleged. The

declara(ion contains but a single count, in 1
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which it is alleged that the plaintiff pur-

chased a ticket for a passage on the road of

the defendant from the town of Ruckville to

the city of Washington, and rv[nrn; thatthe

pluinliff I'ecame a passenger on thedi-felnl-

ant's road. and was transported from Rock-

vilh- to the city of \\'ashington. and that on

his return within the time limited by his

t.ckct he presented himself at the gate in the

depot of the defendant in Washington city,

in proper time to take a return train to the

town of llockvdle, scheduled to leave the ‘

depot at 5:31 P. 11., and that he was refused

by the gatekeeper admission to such train.-

And it is then alleged that the plaintiff was

entitled by virtue of his ticket to pass through

the gale, for the pnrp.se of getting on the

train, to be conveyed from Washington city

to Ru;-kville. and that it “was the duty of the

(lef(.udant to provide competent and polite

servants and agents to attend and to have

char',;e of the gate through which passengers

were comprllcd to pass to get on the said

train of cars; yet the defendant, umnindful

of its duty in this regard, refused to permit

the plaintiff to pass through the said gate to

enter the cars so as to be c'onveyed from

Washington city to the town of ltockville,

and nt*;_[lectr'(l to provide competent and polite

scrianis and agents to have charge of the

gate by winch passengcrs obtained access to

the cars, but had a rude, impolite, and in-

comp lent servant in charge of said gate,

who then and th-re refused to permit the

plaintiff to pass through said gate to the

said train of cars, and with force pushed back

the plaintiﬂ, and was guilty of other rude,

impohte, and improper treatment of the

plaintiff. by reason whereof the plaintiff was

prevenle1l from attending to his business en-

gagements in the town of ltockville, and the

feelings of the plaintif f were greatly injured

and outraged, and he was subjected to great

vexation, indignity, and disgrace, and com-

pelled and forced to remain in the city of

Washington until slate hour in the night, to-

wit, the hour often minutes past ten o‘clock;

and the plantiff therefore brings suit," etc.

The proof shows that‘the plaintiff, with a

ALVEY, C. J. This is an action on the
case, brought by the appea e ag11in8t the ap}1dla.11t for the wrong I ui refusal of admis:iion
of the former tu the cars of the latter, and the
aetioTI was tried upon the general issue and
plea ot not guilty of the wrung alleged. The
dcdarn.dou comains but a single 1..-ount, in
w11h:h it is alleged that the plaintiff purcha11•·d a tic-kt>t for a passage on the road of
tht> d1•ff'nd11nt from the town of Rockville to
the l'ih· of Washington, and ri·tnrn; that the
plaintilT l•ec:ime a pas!wnger on the 1kft>mlant's ro:ad. and was transported from HockYilJ,.. to the eity of \\'a:;hi11gton, and that on
liis rt-turn within the time lirniletl bv his
t.cht he prest>nted hirns11lf 11t the gate iii the
dt-pot or the defendant in Washington city,
in proper time to t:ike a return train to the
town of Hockv1lle, scheduled to leave the
d1·pot at 5: ill P. 111., and that he was refused
by the l{ate-keeper admission to such train ..
A111l it is the11 11lleg;•d that the plaintiff was
t'ntith·d by virtneof bis ticket to pass through
tile ga1 e, for the purp••Se of getting on the
trnin, to be conveyed from Washington city
to llo:·k ville, and that it "was the duty of the
def,..ntlant to provide 1:0111pete11t and polite
s.-rvanlll and al(ents to attend and to have
cl1ar.:e of tlie gate through which passeng.-rs
were romp•·lled to pass to get 011 the said
train of ears; yet the defendant, unmindful
or ils tlntr in this reganl, refused to permit
the plnintifT to pass lhrongh the said gate to
ent1·r the c~us so a.'I to be conveyed from
Washi11glon city to the town of H.ockville,
.ind ni>glectt>tl to provide competent and poliLe
St-nan.a and 11gents to have charge of the
gate by winch passeugns obtained access to
th" cars, but had a rudt>, impolite, and incomp ·li>nt servant in charge of said gate,
who then and th-·re refused to pe1·mit the
plaintiff to pass through said gata to the
said train of cars, and with force pushed back
the plaintiff, and was guilly of other rude,
impolite, and improper treatment of the
plaintiff, hy reason whereof the plaintiff was
prevente1l from attending to his business engagements in the town of Hock ville, and the
ft'clrn~s uf the plaintiff were greatly injured
and 0:1trag,.d, and he was subjected to great
vexation, indignity, and disgrace, and com·
pelltll.l 1md forced to remain in the city of
Washington until a late hour in the night, towit, the hour often minutes past ten o'clock;
and the 11lanLiff therdore brings suit," etc.

The proof shows that.the plaintiff, with 11.
ticket entitling him to a return passage !<>
Rockville, presented himaelf at the gate in the
depot at Washington city giving admission
to passengers to departing trains, and sought;
admission to the train that left the depot, according to published t.ime-table, at 5:31 P. u.
for Rockville and other points on the Metropolitan 1oad. The plaintiff himself tedtilies
that he reached the g:1te some two or threeminutes before the time for the train toslart;
but whether the plaintiff presented himself'
at the gate immediately before ur immediately
after the signal by gong for excluding passengers at the gate for the particular train.
would seem to be left in doubt, the evidence
upon this point being in conflict. The plaintiff testifies that he did not bear the gong.the signal for the train to start; but hesw.-ars that the train bad not left the depot,..
aud that he had time witllln which he could
have 1·eached and entered the train, if he had
heen allowed to pass the gate as he desired
to do. The proof on the part of the defendant is that thP gong had sounde<l, but th&train wa.'I delaved some two or thrt'6 minutes.
fn 11tb1<'liing arul taking Ollt SOlllt' extra l'<U'S;.
and that it is the duty of tht' gut~ket'Jwr to
act on the signal given by the sound of the
gong, and that he knew nothing of the delay
that would be caused by the taking out theextra cars. The plaintiff swears that he was.
not only pt·evtmted from having access to thetrain, hut that he was rudely resisted, and
was struck by the gate-keeper, though he says.
be w11s not physically injm·ed.
Upon the whole evidence the defendantc
offered three prayers for instruction to t.he
jury, all thl'ee of which were rejected by
the court; and the court substituted its own
instructions, intended to cover the whole·
case, in the following terms: "If the jury
find th it the plaintiff had purchased a tickat
from W.1shington to RockviJle, and intended
to leave on the 5:31P.111. train, but that by
the instructions given by defendant to its
gate-keeper passengers were not allowed t<>
pass through the gate after the last gong had
sounded for the departure of the train, in order to take such train, and that the last gonghad sounded fur the departure of the 5: :n P.
11. train before the plaintiff endeavored t<>
pass through the gate, then the plaintiff i&
not entitled to recover, unless the ju1·y find
that the gate-keeper used unnecessary force
to prevent the plaintiff from passing through
tbe gate; and, if tbe jury find that such unnecessary force was used, then the plainti.tf
is entitled to such damage as may compensatehim for the injury to his person and feelingi.
that resulted from such unnecessa1y force(21 But if the jury find that the plaintiff had
arrived at the gate before the last gong had
sounded, and had his ticket, which was duly
exhibited to the gate-keeper, but was refused
entrance to the trnin, then the plaintiff is.
entitled to such damages as the jury may
find would, under all the . circumstances,.
compensate llim for such refusal." It was.

EXCESSIVE OR

EXCESSIVE OR INSUl:‘FICH‘}NT DAMAGES.
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under these instructions that the verdict was 2 Co. v. Blocher. 27 Md. 277. But, in respect

found for the plaintiff. Exception was

taken to the instructions given, and also to

the refusal to grant the prayers offered by

the defendant. The ﬁrst of the defendant's

prayers would seem to be based upon the

But this is in form an action of tort. The

contract, it is true, entitled the plaintiff to

admission to the cars, and gave rise to the

duty onlhe part of the defendant to allow

such admission under proper circumstances;

but in cases of the class to which this be-

longs the refusal or neglect to perform that ‘

duty, as well as the negligent performance

of it, furnishes a ground of action in tort.

In such case both the non-feasance and the

misfeasance constitute a wrongful act, for

which the remedy may be either by action on

the contract or in tort, at the option of the
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party injured. Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q. B.

526: and same case ai.ﬁrmed in the house of

lords. (H Clark St F. 1.)

ab-tract PI'0P0HtiOII, may be correct enough,

but it would hkely have a tendency to mis- '

lead in a case like the present. and therefore ‘

there was no error in rejecting it. Nor do

we think there was error in rejecting the

second prayer of the defendant. This prayer

has reference to the power of the defendant

.to make, and to require to be conformed

to, reasonable rules and regulations for the

admission of passengers to its trains while in

the depot. That the enforcement of reason-

able rules and regulations for the admission

to trains in a crowded depot, where trains

are constantly departing for different points

and directions, is an actual necessity, does

not admit of question or doubt. Such regu-

lations are not only necessary to prevent

confusion and for the preservation of order,

but are necessary for the guidance and pro-

tection of the traveling public. And, such

being the case, the railroad company must .

have power to make and require to be ob-

ser\ed such reasonable rules and regulations.

But such rules and regulations must always

be enforced with due regard to the rights of

the passenger. In the ﬁrst place, the rules

and regulations must not be of a nature to be

unreasonably obstructive of the rights and

convenience of the passenger; nor should

they be enforced in an arbitrary and unrea- ‘

sonable manner, to the unnecessary hindrance

and delay of the passenger, or in a man-

ner to subject him to indignity or unneces-

sary annoyancc. And in tlus case, though

the gate-keeper may have been mistaken as ‘

to the departure of the train in fact, or as to

his duty under the rules and regulations of

the depot, yet, if the circumstances were

such. at the time the plaintiff presented him-

self at the gate, as to entitle him to admis-

sion to the train then still being in the depot,

and before it had started, such mistake of the

gate-keeper could afford no defense to the

right of the plaintif f to recover. Railroad

, ask.

theory that this is. in substance at least, an ‘

INS~F1''ICII<l~T

under these Instructions that the verdict was
found !or the plaintiff. Exception waa
taken to the instr11ctions given, and also to
the refusal to grant the prayers offered by
the defendant. The first of the defendant's
prayers wonld seem to be based upon the
theory that this is. in substance at least, an
action upon the contract of carriage of the
plaintiff over the road of the defendant.
But this is in form an action of tort. The
contract, it is true, entitled the plaintiff to
admission to the cars, and g:LVe rise to the
duty on the part of the defendant to 111low
such admission under proper circumstances;
but in cases of the class to which this belongs the rerusal or neglect to perform that
duty, as Wf'll as the negligent performance
of it, furnishes a ground of action in tort.
In such case both the non-feasanee and the
misfeasance constitute a wrongful act, fi1r
which the remeJy may be either l>y action on
the contract or in tort, at the option of the
party injured. Boorman v. Brown, 8 Q. B.
526: and same case affirmed in the house of
Jords. (11 Clark & F. 1.) The prayer, as an
ab,tract propo-1ition, m:\y be correct enough,
bnt it would likely have a tendenc·y to mislead iu a Cll8e like the present, and therefore
there was no error in rejecting it. Nor do
we think there was error in rejecting the
second prayer of the defendant. 'fhis prayer
has reference to the power of the defendant
. to make. and to require to be conformed
to, reasonable rules and regulations for the
arlmission of passengers to its trains while In
the depot. That the enforcement of reasonable rules and regulations for the admission
to trains in a crowded depot, where trains
are constantly departing for different points
and mrections, is an actual neces!lity, does
not admit of question or doubt. 8uch regulations are not only necessary to prevent
confusion and for the preservation of order,
but are necessary for the guidance and protection of the traveling public. And, such
being the case, the railroad company must
have power to make and require to be obser1 e<I such r•·asonable rules and regnlations.
But such rwles and regulations must always
be enforced with due regard to the rights of
the passl'nger. In the first place, the rules
and regulations must not be of a nature to be
unreasonably ob~trnctive of the rights and
convenience of the passenger; nor should
they be enforced in an arbitrary and unrea11onaule manner, to the unnecessary hindrance
and delay of the passenger, or In a manner to subject him to indignity or unneces.
sary annoyance. And in tins case, though
the gate-keeper may have been mistaken aa
to the departure of the train in fact, or as to
his duty under the rules and regulations of
the depot, yet, if the circumstances were
such, at the time the plaintitf presented himself at the gate, as to entitle him to admission to the train then still being in the depot,
and before it had started, such mistake of the
gate-keeper could afford no defense to the
right of the plaiutitl to recover. Railroad

DAMAGES.

Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277.
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But, In respect

to the right of the defenilant to enforc'~ rules
and regulations forndmission to its trains in
the depot, the instructions of the court were
as favorable as the defendant could po"'sibly
ask. The defendant obtained. in those instructions substantially everything that was
sought by its second and third prayns, and
therefore there was no error in refu::1ing
those prayers as presented by the defendant.
We think, however, there was error in the
second lnstrnction of the court, in re!!pect to
the question of damngi>s. The jury were instructed that, if they found for the plaintiff
for the refusal to pa.'ls him through the gate,
then he was entitled to such damages as thPy
might find would, under all the cirl'umstances, compensate him for such refusal.
This left thtt whole question of damag ..s at
large, without de6nition by the rourt, to the
discretion of the jury, and without any cri' terion to guide them. What compensation
would embrace-whether actual and necessary expen11es incurred by reason of the refusal, or the mere delay, or disappointment
in pleasure, or t.11e pos::iible losot in bn~ine:is
tr&nsactions, however ren>ote or indirect, or
for wounded feelings-were matteu thrown
. open lo the jnry, and tht>y were allowed to
; speculate upon them without rt-straint. This
is not justified by any well-established rules
of law. In the case of Knight v. Egerton, 7
' Exch; 407, where, in effect, such an instrucI tion was given, the court of exchequer held
it to be wholly insufficient, "and that it was
the duty of the judge to inform the jury what
j was the true measure of damages on thP issue, whether the point was taken or not;"
and the court directed a new trial because of
: the inde6nite instruction as to the trne measure of damages. The rule by which damagu
are to be estirullted is, as a general principle,
a qnestion of law to be decided by the court;
that is to say, the court mu11t decide and instrnct the jury in respect to what elements,
and within what limits, damages may be estiI mated in the particular action. H11rkt'r v.
Dement, 9 Gill, 7; Hadley v. Bax:ernlale, 9
Exch. 341, 354. Tht! simple question whether
damages have been sustained by the breach
of duty or the violation of right, and the extent of damagt>s sustained as the dlrPct cousequences of such breach of duty or violation
of right, are matters within the province of
the jury. But beyond this juries. as a genernl rule, are not allowed to intrude, as by
such intrusion all certainty and fixedness of
legal rule would be overthrown and destroyed.
In a case like the present the rule for measurIng the damages is 6xed and determinate, and
should be applied to all cases alike, except in
those cases where there may be malice or circurm1tances of aggravation in the wrong
complained of, for which the damages may
be enhanced. Indeed, it is of the utmost importance that juries should be explicitly instructed as to the rules by which they are to
be governed in estimating damages; for, as
it was justly observed by the court in Had·
1

1
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EXCFISSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.

ley v. Baxendale, supra, “if the jury are left

without deﬁnite rule to guide them. it will,

in most cases, manifestly lead to the greatest

injustice." In cases of this character the

jury can only give such damages as were the

immediate consequences naturally resulting

from the act complained of. with the right

to allow exemplary damages for any malice,

or the use of unnecessary force. in the com-

mission of the wrong alleged. Railroad Co.

v. Blocher, supra. The expenses incurred

by the plaintiff, occasioned by the refusal

of the defemlant to admit him to the train,

such as the expense of a ticket to travel upon

another train, and hotel expenses incurred by

reason of the delay, may be allowed for; and

mere inconvenience may be ground for dam—

age. if it is such as is capable of being stated

in a tangible form, and assessed at a money
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value; and so for any actual loss sustained

in matters of business that can be shown to

have been occasioned as the direct and neces-

sary consequence of the wrongful act of the

defendant made the ground of action. Denton

v. Railway Co., 5 El. dz B1. 860; Hamlin v.

Railway Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 408; Hobbs v.

Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111; Wood's

Mayne, Dam. 398, 399; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 254.

For the error in the second instruction of

the court, with respect to the measure of

damages. the judgment of the court below

must be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

EXCI'!SSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.

ley v. Baxendale, supra, "if the jury are left
without definite rule to guide them, it will,
in most cases, manifestly lead to the greatest
injustice." In cases of this character the
jury can only give such damagt-s as were the
lmn1erliate consequences naturally resulting
from the act complained of, with the right
to allow exemplary damages for any malice,
or the use of unnecessary force. in the commission of the wrong alleged. Railroad Co.
v. Blocher, supra. The expenses incurred
by the plaintiff, occasioned by the refusal
of the defendant to admit him to the train,
such as the expense of a ticket to travel upon
another t1·ain, and hotel expenses incurred by
reason of the delay, may be allowed for; and

mere inconvenience may lie ground tor damage, if it is such as is capable of being stated
in a tangible form, and assessed 1tt a money
value; 1md so for any actual loss sustained
in mattel's of business that can be shown to
have lieen occa.'iioned as the direct and neces11ary consequence of the wrongful act of the
defendant made the ground of action. Denton
v. Railway Co., 5 El. & Bl. 860; Hamlin v.
Railway Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 408; Hobbs v.
Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111; Wood'it
Mayne, Dam. 898, 399; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 254.
For the error In the second instr11ction of
the court, with respect to the measure of
damages, the judgment of the court below
must be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

BXOESSIVE OR INSUFF'ICIENT DAMAGES.
EXCESSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.
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LIMBURG v. GERMAN FIRE INS. CO. OF

PEORIA.l

(57 N. W. 626. 90 Iowa, 709.)

Supreme Court o! Iowa. Jan. 26, 1894.

Appeal from superior court of Keokuk; H.

Bank, Jr., Judge.

Action on a policy of insurance. Jury trial;

verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defend-

I.IMB URG ,._ GERMAN FIRlll INS. CO. OF
PIOORIA.1
(57 N. W. 626, 90 Iowa, 709.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. Jan. 26, 1894.
Appeal from superior court of Keokuk; H.
Bank, Jr., Judge.
Action on a policy of Insurance. Jury trial;
verdict and judgment for plalnutr. Defendant appeals.
James C. Davie, for appellant. J. F. Smith,
tor appellee.

ant appeals.

James C. Davis, for appellant.

for appeilee.

KINNE, J. ' ' ' ' ' '

KINNE, J, •
•
•
•
•
•
5. The jury were told by the court 1D an
Instruction that If they found that the bulld-

5. The jury were told by the court in an

1
instruction that if they found that the bulld-

_I—I;orﬁon of opinion omitted.

J. F. Smith,

ing was not totally destroyed, and it could be

repaired at an expense of $200 to $250, then

piaintlffs damages would be limited to the
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amount it would have cost to repair said

building, and put the same in as good condi-

tion as before the ﬁre occurred, with 6 per

cent. interest per annum thereon. Under the

provisions of the policy this instruction was

proper, and, whether it was so or not, the

jury were bound to follow it. The undis-

puted evidence was that for $250 the build-

ing could have been made as good as it was

bei:‘ore the tire. The jury disregarded the

court's instruction, and found for plaintiff

for the full amount of the policy, with in-

terest. The court should have set the verdict

aside for the reasons given. Reversed.

Portion of opinion omitted.

477

Ing was not totally destroyed, and It rould be
repaired at an expense of $200 to $250, then
plnlntltr's damages would be limited to the
amount It would have cost to repair said
building, and put the Bllllle In as good condition as before the fire occurred, with G per
cent. Interest per annum thereon. Under the
provisions of the policy this Instruction was
proper, and, whether It was so or not, the
jury were bound to follow it. The undisputed evidence was tliat tor $200 the building could have been made as good as It was
before the Ore. The jury disregarded the
court's Instruction, and found for 11Iaintltr
for the full amount of the policy, with interest. The court should have set the verdict
aside for the reasons given. Reversed.
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compensate her for the lnJurle& she 11ustalned that It was the duty of the circuit
(40 N. W. 809. 77 Wis. 544.)
court to set aside the verdict for that reason? That the court mlly, and In a proper
Supr<>me Court ot 'WiR<'onsin. Oct. 14, 1890. case should, Bet a11lde a verdict for Inadequacy of damagt'e and awartl a new trial,
Appeal from circuit court, Waupaca 111 not questioned . 'l'hle court so held In
county.
Emmons v. Sheldon, 26 Wl11. 648. and
ThlR Is an action to recover dama11:es for Whitney v. City of Milwaukee, 65 Wis. '"-19,
l· ..-iunnl lnJurleH to the plalntlrr, alleged 27 N. W. Rep. 39. But, to justify the interto have been canRed by a defectlvP. high- ference of the court with the ver11!ct, It
WRY in the 1lefendant town. ~n June i,
must appear from the testimony that the
1886. the plalntln was riding.with her huf!- damagel! awarded are so gro118ly disprobum.I on such hlithway In a vehicle on portionate to the Injury that, lo a wardtwo wheels, called a "dog-cart," drawn ing tlrnm, the jury must have been lnftuby one horse, then being driven hy her encl'fl by " perverted juditment. The
huRhand. When the horse was walking co11rt wns able thus to characterize the
brh1kly. one wheel of the cart struck a verdict In Emmons v. 8hehlon, for the
stone a few inches high, firmly fixed In the danrngee there awarded were bot t5,
gt·ound. and extending from the side of (which charged the plaintiff with the costs
the traveled track to within three or four of the action.) although It was prO\·ed
lucheff of one of the wagon ruts In the that tho plaintiff suttered a most Rerious
tral'k; and, by reason of the concussion, bodily lnjur.v. There seem11 to havt> been
plaintiff was thrown from the curt, nnd no controversy as to the extent of such
received the injuries complained of. On Injury. And so In Whitney v . City of Milthe trial or the cause. the court allowed waukee the undls11uted evidence proved
witneesPs for the defendant to testify, that the plalntln was so seriously Injured
against objection by the plaintiff, that, th11t the damages awarded by the jury
In their 011lnlo11, carts like the oue In which therefor were gro11sly Inadequate complaintiff was riding at the time she was pensation, ancl so Hmall that the plulntlft
Injured are unsuf<.' for the use of two per- watt chargeable ~Ith the costs, which exeom1 riding over ordinary country roads. ceeded the damngt.'8 a warded. This court
The trial resultl'd In a verlllct for the plain- was able to 11~ that the vt-rdlct was pertiff, &HRe>islng her damages at $167. 'l'he verse, and t.hut, 'quoting from the oplulon
plalntirr moved for a nt'W trial, mainly on delivered by Mr. Ju11tice 0RTO:'f, "such a
tilt' gronnd that the damages so OR!let<Red verdict le trifling with a case lo court and
are fnu•lequute to compensate her for the public justice, and unworthy of twelve
Injury she proved Hite sustained. The mo- good nnd lawful men, and ls justly calcution wus denied, and Judgment was there- lated to c11Rt odium ou the jury system
upon eu tet·ed for the plaintiff, plmmunt to and jury trials." We adhere to the rule
the vertlkt. from which Judgment she ftJ>- established In those ca11ee. Hence the
peuls to this court.
question 111, does the testimony bring thte
Cute, .Jones & Sanborn, for appellant. case within the rule? In the conshle1·aReed, Grace & Rock, for respondent.
tlo11 ef this question, we must assume
that the jury round every fact going to
LYON, J., (after 9t,.tln11: the fnct8 a8 mitigate or reduce the damage111 which
ahov ... ) ConnRPI for thP plaln•lff <'l1tl018 a they could properly find from the proofs.
l'PVerRal of the Judp;Puent on two grounds. The testimony tends to show that the
TbeKe are that the court erred In allowing plaintiff was to some extent an Invalid
wltneHReR ror the town to testify that, In before she wuH Injured, and thnt thP. puln
their opinion, the cart fn which the plain- and dbmblllty she has eufteretl since the
tiff waH riding wa11 unsafe for the use of Injury should, tn part at leust, be attwo persons riding together In It on or- tributed to previous Ill health. Then the
1lln11ry country roads, Dllll that the dam- circumstances of the Injury and her condiages awarded the plaintiff are gro!!sly In- tion pret1Pntly therenfter tend to show
adequate to compen11ate her for tbe inju- that the Injury was not 110 RCVP.re as
ries Rhe recelvt>J.
l'laimed. '!'here le considerable te11thnony
1. Undoubtedly 1t was error to admit oi the above eharncter, and we think It
testimony of the opinions of wltnesRee ~utttdent materially to mitigate her claim
that the cart wu11 tltu11 unsafe. That w1u1 for damages. Under the testimony, therea question for the Jury. upon all the facts fore. there ts a wide margin for the Jury
in the r.use. This court 11., held In Kelley In a11Hee11lng damages. Probably a verv. Fond ctu Luc, :n Wis. 179; ~leHon v. dlctfora much la.rger sum could have been
ToUord, 37 Wis. 327; Griffin v. 'l'own of held not excessive. Perhaps, If the plainWiiiow, 43 Wis. 509; and other cases. But tiff's tetJtlmony as to the extent of her inthe Jnry found for the plaintiff, and, In or
JurleM stood alone, It ought to be held that
der to do so, tbt'y must nec~arlly have the damages are lnadeqoate. But lo vle\v
foullll that the curt WllR a proper vt-hlcle of ull the testimony, and of thP fact that
to be use1l by the phtlntlff and her hus- the verdict has successfuUy paPsed the
band at the place where she was Injured. scrutiny of the leamed clrcuJt Judge, we
He1we the testimony thus Prroneomdy ad- do not feel warranted In saying that It la
mitted did not prejudice or harm the plaln- a perverse verdict. Hence. although we
tltt. nncl the error In ndmlttlng It Is not might have been better satisfied had a
9ufftclent ground for reversing the judg- somewhat gretttt-r sum been awar1led, we
are not at llhertv to disturb the ver(llet.
ment.
JI. Were the damages which the jury The Judgment of the circuit court must be
awurded the plalntlrf 80 lnudequate to allirmed.
ROBIXSON
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ROBINSON v. TOVVN OF WAUPACA.

(46 N. W. 809. 77 VVis. 544.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Oct. 14, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Waupaca

county.

This is an action to recover damages for

l. sonal injuries to the plaintiff, alleged

to have been caused by a defective high-

way in the defendant town. On June 6,

1886. the plaintiff was riding.with her hus-

band on such highway in a vehicle on

two wheels, called a“dog-cart," drawn

by one horse, then being driven by her

husband. When the horse was walking

briskly. one wheel of the cart struck a

stone a few inches high. ﬁrmly ﬁxed in the

ground, and extending from the side of

the traveled track to within three or four

inches of one of the wagon rats in the
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track; and, by reason of the concussion,

plaintiff was thrown from the cart, and

received the injuries complained of. On

the trial of the cause. the court allowed

witnesses for the defendant to testify,

against objection by the plaintiff, that,

in their opinion,cartslike the one in which

plaintiff was riding at the time she was

injured are unsafe for the use of two per-

sons riding over ordinary country road.

The trial resulted in a verdict forthe plain-

tiff, assessing her damages at $167. The

plaintiff moved for a new trial, mainly on

the ground that the damages so assessed

are inadequate to compensate her for the

injury she proved she sustained. The mo-

tion was denied, and judgment was there-

upon entered for the plaintiff, pursuant to

the verdict. from which judgment she ap-

peals to this court.

Cute. Jones & Sanborn, for appellant.

Reed, Grace & Rock, for respondent.

LYON, J., (after stating the facts as

above.) Counsel for the plain'iff claims 8

reversal of thejudghmnt on two grounds.

These are that the court erred in allowing

witnesses for the town to testify that, in

their opinion. the cart in which the plain-

tiff was riding was unsafe for the use of

two persons riding together in it on or-

dinary country roads, and that the dam-

ages awarded the plaintiff are grossly in-

adequate to compensate her for the inju-

ries she received.

1. Undoubtedly it was error to admit

testimony of the opinions of witnesses

that the cart was thus unsafe. That was

a question for the jury. upon all the facts

in the case. This court so held in Kelley

v. Fond du Lac, 31 Wis. 179; Qieson v.

Tolford, 37 Wis. 327; Grifﬁn v. Town of

Willow. 43 Wis. 509; and other cases. But

the jury found for the plaintiff. and, in or

der to do so, they must necessarily have

found that the cart was a proper vehicle

to be used by the plaintiff and her hus-

band at the place where she was injured.

Hence the testimony thus erroneously ad-

mitted did not prejudice orharm the plain-

EXCESSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.
~.TOWN

OF WAUPACA.

EXCE8SIYE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.
EXCESSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.

CARTh"R v: WEI.LS, FAROO & CO.

part of the defendant was controverted by
many witnesses for the plaintiff. The exhibition, howeYer, that was made of the plain·
Circuit Court, S. D. California. Dect-mber 10, tiff's person In court, and the tests thn t were
189-1.
there made by D1'. Hughes, amounted, I
think, to ocular dPmonstrntlon of the fact that
No. 5Gl.
the plaintiff could not possibly have at that
Thie wae an action by James A. Carter time stood upon the plank and performed
against Wells, Fargo & Oo. for damages for the work the e\·ldence without eonfllct showpersonal lnjurl!'s. The jury gave a \'erdlct ed that he was doing at the time of the acfor the plaintiff for one dollar. Plalntur cident.
moves for a new trlalo
Accepting, as the court must for the purWellborn & Hutton, for plaintiff. Pills- posps of this motion, the facts to be that the
bury, Blanding & Hayne and Graves, O'Mel· plaintUT, without fault of his own, was Inveny & Shankland, for defendant.
jured by the negligence of the defendant, It
cannot permit a verdict to stand that awards
ROSS, District Judge. This action was him damages In name only. While the court
brought to recover damages In the amount of should and always will be careful not to
$10,000 for personal Injuries alleged to have usurp the functJons of the jury, it Is, neverbeen sustained by the plalutltr by the negll- theless, Its duty to protect parties from Imgence of the defendant. The verdict of the proper verdicts, rendered through mlsC'oncepjury In favor of the plaintiff necessarily in- tlon, prejudice, passion, or ether wrong Induded a finding that the defendant was neg· fluences. Lancaster v. Steamship Co., 2G
llgent, and that there was no contributory Fed. 233; Gaither v. Railroad Co., 27 Fed.
negligence on plaintiff's purt, as set up in de- 545; Muskegon Nat. Bank v. Northwestern
fense of the action. There was much e\·I· Mut. Life Ins. Co., 19 Fed. 405; Kirkpatdence In the case tending to show that there rick v. Adams, 20 Fed. 292. In Field on Damwas no negligence on the part of the de- ages (page 886) It Is snld: "It Is less usual
fendant, and, further, that there was such for the court to Interfere with the finding of
eontributory negligence on plaintiff's part as the jury for Inadequate than for excessive
should prevent a recovery by him; and, bad damages, though It bas the power to do so.
the verllict been In favor of the defendant on • • • But a verdict may generally be set
either or both of those propositions, there aside for Inadequacy, upon the same grounds
would be no interference with It by the that warrant the court In Interfering where
-court, for the evidence In respect to those they are excessive."
matters was substantially conftlctlng, and the
To the same effect le Gaither v. Railroad
issue& in respect thereto were for the deter· Co., 27 Fed. 545.
mlnatlon of the jury, under appropriate InAnd In Sedg. Meas. Dam. (volume 2, p. G56)
structions from the court, which were given. It le said: "The forbearance of the court to
But the verdict being, In effect, that plain· Interfere with the jury Is so great that, In actiff was Injured by the defendant's negli- tions of tort, the general rule Is that a new
gence, without contributory negligence on trial will not be granted for smallness of
his own part, he was manifestly entitled at damages. But It aeems that If the jury so far
the hands of the jury to substantial dam- disregard the justice of the case as to give no
ages. The evidence was without conflict that damages at 1tll where some redress Is clearly
the collision which caused the plaintiff's In- due, the court will Interpose. So where, In
jury threw him from a scaffold eight or ten a case for negligence for defendant's servant
feet high (on which he waa at the time work- driving against the plaintiff, It appeared that
ing, for two dollan per day) to the ground, the plaintiff's thigh was broken, and considbis head and shoulder &triking on a large rock, erable expense Incurred for surgical treat·
from which he was picked up In an uncon- ment; the plaintiff obtained a verdict, dam11elous condition; and that, after regaining ages one farthing; a new trial was grantell
eonsclousness, he was carried to the county on payment of costa; and Lord Denman said:
hospital, where he remained about five weeks, 'A new trial on a mere difference of opinion
two weeks of which time he was confined to as to amount, may not be grantable; but here
his bed. These facts of themselves entitled are no damages at all' "
the plaintiff, undt>r the verdict, to substantial
In the present case the amount awarde<l
damages, and not to the merely nominal sum the plaintiff by the jury was practically no
.of one dollar. The bead and neck of the da•magee at all; yet the jury at the same
plaintiff were, at the thne of the trial, much time found, In effect, that the plalntlff was
hent to one ~Ide, nnd bis walk was that of a Injured through the negligence of the defendparalytic. The defendant Introduced many ant, without any contributory negligence on
witnesses who testified that hh appearance bis own part. The evidence, without conflict,
:and moYemente were about the same prior showed that bis Injuries by the fall were such
to the Injury complained of as they were at as, under those circumstances, entitled him
the time of the trial, and that they could see to substantial damages. For these reasons
no difference In them. This testimony on the the mation tor a new trial Is granted.
(64 Fed. 100;;.)
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CARTER v.‘ WELLS, FARGO & CO.

(64 Fed. 1005.)

Circuit Court, 8. D. California.

1894.

No. 561.

This was an action by James A. Carter

against Weils, Fargo & 0o. for damages for

personal injuries. 'l‘he jury gave a verdict

for the plaintif f for one dollar. Plaintiff

moves for a new trial;

Weilhorn & Hutton, for plaintiff. Pills-

bury, Blanding & Hayne and Graves, O‘Mel-

veny & Shanklaud, for defendant.

December 10,

ROSS, District Judge. This action was

brought to recover damages in the amount of

$10,000 for personal injuries alleged to have

been sustained by the plaintiff by the negli-

gence of the defendant. The verdict of the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

jury in favor of the plaintiff necessarily in-

cluded a ﬁnding that the defendant was neg-

ligent, and that there was no contributory

negligence on plaintiff's part, as set up in de-

fense of the action. There was much evi-

dence in the case tending to show that there

was no negligence on the part of the de-

fendant, and, further, that there was such

contributory negligence on plaintiffs part as

should prevent a recovery by him; and, had

the verdict been in favor of the defendant on

either or both of those propositions, there

would be no interference with it by the

court, for the evidence in respect to those

matters was substantially conﬂicting, and the

issues in respect thereto were for the deter-

mination of the jury, under appropriate in-

structions from the court, which were given.

But the verdict being, in effect, that plain-

tiff was injured by the defendant's negli-

gence, without contributory negligence on

his own part, he was manifestly entitled at

the hands of the jury to substantial dam-

ages. The evidence was without conﬂict that

the collision which caused the plaintiffs in-

jury threw him from a scaffold eight or ten

feet high (on which he was at the time work-

ing, for two dollars per day) to the ground,

his head and shoulder striking on a large rock,

from which he was picked up in an uncon-

scious condition; and that, after regaining

consciousness, he was carried to the county

hospital. where he remained about ﬁve weeks.

two weeks of which time he was conﬁned to

his bed. These facts of themselves entitled

the plaintiff, under the verdict, to substantial

damages. and not to the merely nominal sum

'of one dollar. The head and neck of the

plaintiff were, at the time of the trial, much

bent to one side, and his walk was that of a

paralytic. The defendant introduced many

witnesses who testiﬁed that his appearance

and movements were about the same prior

to the injury complained of as they were at

the time of the trial. and that they could see

no difference in them. This testimony on the

part of the defendant was controverted by

many witnesses for the plaintiff. The exhibi-

tion, however, that was made of the plain-
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PETEI{SON v. WESTERN UNION TEL. 0O.

(67 N. W. 646, Ci') Minn. 18.)

June 4, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Brown coun-

ty; B. F. Wcbber, Judge.

Action by Samuel D. Peterson against the

Western Union Telegraph Company. There

was a verdict for plaintiff, and from an or-

der denying a new trial defendant appeals.

Reversed.

(67 N. W. 646, 65 Minn. 18.)
Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 4, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Brown county; B. F. Webber, Judge.
Action by Samuel D. Peterson against the
W<>stern Union Telegraph Company. There
was a verdict for plalntUf, and from an order denying a new trial defendant appeals.
Ht· versed.
Ferguson & Kneeland, for appellant. B. L.
Pie1·ce, for respondent.

Ferguson & Knecland, for appellant. S. L

Pierce, for respondent

.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

START, C. J. This is an action for libel,

in which the plaintif f recovered a verdict for

$5,200, and the defendant appealed from an

order denying its motion for a new trial.

The defendant on January 19, 1893, received
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at its oﬂlce in New Ulm, from Albert Blan-

chard, a message for transmission over its

telegraph line to St. Paul, which reads thus:

“New Ulm, Minn., 1-19, 1593. To S. D. Peter-

son, Care Windsor, St. Paul, Minn.: Slip-

pery Sam, your name is pants. [Signed]

Many Republicans." The New Ulm oper-

ator sent the message over the wires to St.

Paul, where it was taken from the wire by

the operator, and delivered to the plaintiff

in a sealed envelope bearing his address as

stated in the message.

The record presents three questions for

our consideration: (1) Was the message a

libel, or fairly susceptible, on its face, of a

libelous meaning? (2) Was the evidence suf-

ﬁcient to justify the jury in ﬁnding that the

defendant maliciously published the suppos-

ed libel? (3) Are the damages awarded so

excessive as. to justify the conclusion that

the verdict was the result of passion and

prejudice? We answer each of the questions

in the aﬂlrmative.

1. The message was, on its face, fairly

susceptible of a libelous meaning. The sting

is in the word “slippery." This word, when

used as descriptive of a person, has a well-

understood meaning. It means, when so

used, that the person to whom it is applied

cannot be depended on or trusted; that he

is dishonest, and apt to play one false. Cent.

Dict. If such is the meaning of the word

as used in this message,—and of this the

jury were the judges,—it was clearly libel-

ous, because, if a man is dishonest, and apt

to play one false, he merits the scorn and .

contempt of all honorable men. To falsely

publish of a man that he is slippery tends

to render him odious and contemptible. Such

a. publication is a libel. Wilkes v. Shields

(Minn) 64 N. W. 921.

2. The question whether or not the defend-

ant maliciously published the libel is one of

some doubt, but we are of the opinion that

it was a question for the jury, under the

evidence. Technically, the defendant publish-

ed the libel when it communicated it to its

operator at St. Paul, but whether such pub-

llcation was wrongful (that is, actionable)

START, C. 1. This ls an action for libel,
In which the plaintiff recoyered a verdict tor
$5,200, and the defendant appealed from an
01·der denying Its motion for a new trial.
The defendant on January 19, 1893, received
at Its omce In New Ulm, from Albert Blanchard, a message tor transmission over Its
telegraph line to St. Paul, which reads thus:
"New l!lm, Minn., 1-19, 1~93. To S. D. Peterson, Care Windsor, St: Paul, Minn.: Slippery Sam, your name ls pants. [Signed)
Many Republicans." The New Ulm operator sent the message over the wires to St.
Paul, where it was taken from the wire by
the operator, and delivered to the plalntllf
In a sealed envelope bearing his address as
stated In the message.
The record presents three questions for
our consideration: (1) Was the message a
libel, or fairly susceptible, on Its face, of a
libelous meaning? (2) Was the evidence euftkient to justify the jury In finding that the
defendant maliciously published the supposed libel? (3) Are the damages awarded so
excessive as. to justify the conclusion that
the verdict was the result of passion and
prejudice? We answer each of the questions
in the affirmative.
l. The message was, on Its face, falrty
susceptible of a libelous meaning. The sting
le In the word "slippery." This word, when
used as descriptive of a person, has a wellunderstood meaning. It means, when so
ust.'d, that the person to whom It ls applied
cannot be depended on or trustE>d; that he
ls dishonest, and apt to play one false. Cent.
Diet. If such ls the meaning of the word
as used In this message,-and of this the
jury were the judges,-lt was clearly libelous, because, If a man ls dishonest, and apt
to play one false, he merits the scorn and
contempt of all honorable men. To falsel1
publish of a man that he Is slippery tends
to render him odious and contemptible. Such
a publication ls a libel Wilkes v. Shields
(Minn.) 64 N. W. 921.
2. The question whether or not the defendant maliciously published the libel ls one of
some doubt, but we are of the opinion that
It was a question for the jury, under the
evidence. Technically, the defendant published the libel when It communicated It to lts
operator at St. Paul, but whether such pub-

llcatlon was wrongful (that 111, actionable)
depends on the further question whether or
not It was privileged. The defendant was a
common carrier, and was bound to transmit
all proper messagE>s delivered to It for that
purpose, but It was not bound to send Indecent or libelous communications. ""here
a pro!Tered message ·is not manifestly a libel,
or susceptible of a libelous meaning, on lts
face, and Is forwarded In good faith by the
operator, the defendant cannot be hE>l<l to
have maliciously published a libel, although
the message subsequently proves to be such
ln fact. In such a case the operator cannot
wait to consult a lawyer, or forward the
message to the principal omce for Instructions. He must decide promptly, and forward the message without delay, It It Is a
proper one, and for any honest error of judgment In the premises the telegraph company
cannot be held responsible. But where the
message, on Its face, ls clearly susceptible
of a libelous meaning, ls not signed by any
responsible person, and there ls no reason
to believe that It ls a cipher message, and
lt ls forwarded under such circumstances as
to warrant the jury In finding that the operator, In sending the message, was negligent
or wanting In good tnlth In the premises, the
company may be held to have maliciously
published the libel. A publication under
such circumstances ls not privileged. The
evidence In this case was such that a finding
either way on the question whether the defendant maliciously published thle libel
would not be disturbed by the court. Whether this question was correctly submitted to
the jury on the trial of this case, we need
not Inquire; for thei·e must be a new trial
on another ground, and, If there was such
error, It la not likely to occur on the next
trial.
3. The damages In this case are so exces11lve as to conclusively show that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice.
Com·ts should Interfere with an assessment
of damages by a jury with great caution,
and sustain the verdict unless It appears
that It was the result ot passion or prejudice. But the verdict in this case admits
of no defense. As correetly stated by the
trial court In Its lnstructlous to the jury, the
sole publication of the libel in this case by
the defendant was In making it known to
Its own agent at St. Paul, and the damages
of the plalntllf were limited to such as he
sustained by reason of the publication to
such agent. In view of the fact that 11uch
agent could not disclose the contents of the
libel without becoming a criminal and exposing himself to serious punishment, and
that there le no evidence to justify the In·
ference that the contents of the message
ever reached the public, except through thE>
plalntllf, a verdict assessing his damages
at $5,200 ls simply farcical. It can only be
accounted for on the ground that It was the
result of passion or prejudice. The trial

EXCESSIVE
EXCESSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT DAMAGES.

481

court seems to have regarded the damages

so excessive as to justify a new trial. ex-

cept for the fact that this is the second ver-

dict in the case, and that one reason for set-

ting aside the former verdict was that the

damages were excessive. As a rule, the

court will not set aside a second verdict on

st'count of excessive damages, but where,

LAVV DAM.2d Ed.—31

as in this case. the verdict is controlled by

no reason. supported by no justice, and is

manifestly the result of passion and preju-

dice, it is the duty of the court to set it

aside, no matter how many similar'verdicts

may have been previously returned in the

case. Order reversed, and a new trial grant-
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ed.

seems

on

INSUFl<'ICIENT DAMAGES.

court
to have regarded the damages
so excesalTe u to justify a new trial, except for the fact that this Is the second ..-erdiet In the case, and that one reason for setting aside the former Terdlct was that the
damages were excessl:Te. .A.1 a rule, the
~urt will not set aside a second Terdlct on
account ol excessive damagea, bat wbere.
J,AW DA.M.2d Ed.-81

481

as In this case, the verdict la controlled by
no reason, supported by no justice, and Is
manifestly the result of passion and prejudice, It kl the duty of the court to set It
aside, no matter bow many similar ·verdicts
may baTe been previously returned In the
case. Onler reversed, and a new trial fP'IUlted..
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LOUISVII.LE SOUTH. R. 00. v. MINOGUE.
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LOUISVILLE SOUTH. R. 00. v. MINOGUE.

(14 S. W. 357, 00 Ky. 369.)

Court or Appeals of Kentucky.

Sept. lB., 1890.

(14 S.'W. 357, 90 Ky. 369.)

Sept. 13, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Shelby coun-

ty.

"‘ To be ofﬂcially reported. "

Court oi Appeals of Kentucky.

Appeal from circuit court, Shelby county.
·"To be otftclally reported."
L. C. Willis, E. ·l<'razler, and Thos. 1V
Bullltt. for appellant. Gilbert & Poree,
Mutt O'lJoherty, and R. C. D11.vis, for appellee.

L. C. Willis, E. Frazier, and Thos. W -'

Bullitt. for appellant. Gilbert & Force,

Matt O'Uohert_y, and R. C. Davis, for ap-

peilee. ,

HOLT, (.7. J. A train of the appellant

was delayed by the air-brakes falling to

work. it was overtaken by a construc-

tion train of the company, which was

known to those in charge of the passen-

ger-train to be but a few minutes behind

it, and a collision occurred, the only dam-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

age to the passenger-train being the de-

struction of -the rear platform of its rear

car. The appeilee, Mary J. Minogue, who

was a passenger upon it, was by the jar

of the collision thrown from her seat to

the ﬂoor of the car in which she was rid-

ing; and for the injuries she thereby sus-

tained she brought this action for dam-

ages, averring that they resulted from the

gross neglect of the appellant's agents

who were operating the trains. It is

claimed this neglect consisted in failing to

exercise care in ﬂagging the coming train.

The evidence is somewhat conﬂicting as

to whetherthis was done in time to have

enabled it to stop beiore overtaking the

passenger train; but whether the fault

layin neglect in this respect, or in the rear

it to do so, failing to check up, need not

be considered, because, whether the one or

the other, the testimony is of such a char-

acter as authorized the question of the ex-

istence or non-existence of gross neglect

upon the part of the company's agents to

be submitted to the jury. They returned

a verdict for $10,000. It is urged that this

verdict is, in view of the evidence, so ex-

cessive that, conceding it em braces both

compensatory and punitive damages, yet

this court should reverse the judgment.

The existence of ordinary neglect in such a

case authorizes compensatory damages,

while gross neglect permits the jury to

award those which are both compensa-

tory and punitive. In this instance, the

jury, if they thought proper, were author-

ized by the instructions to ﬁnd both.

Whether they have gone beyond a reason-

able limit must be determined by the con- .

duct of the company's agents connected

with the accident, and the character of the

appeilee‘:-t injuries.

measurement of compensatory damages

leaves the matter largely to the discretion

of the jury. yet the ﬁnding must be within

the conﬁnes of reason. So, too, must ex-

emplary damages be reasonably adequate

to the degree of fault. The appeilee sus-

tained extcrnal bruises, and her nervous

HOL'l', C. J. A train of the appellnnt
waR delayed by the air-brakes falling tu
work. It was overtaken by a construetlon train of the company, which was
known to those In charge of the pussenger-train to be but a few minutes behind
It, and a collision occurred, the only dnmage to the passenger-train being the destructlon of the rear platform of Its rear
car. The appellee, Mary J. Minogue, who
was a passenger upon It, was by the Jar
of the collhllon thrown from her seat to
the floor of the car In which she waa ridIng; and for the lnjurieti she thereby sustained she brought this action for damaK"es averring that they resulted from the
gros~ neglect of the uppellant'e agents
who were operating the trains. It le
clalmeu this neglect consisted In fatllng to
exercise care In ftugglng the coming train.
The evidence Is somewhat conflicting a.s
to whether this wus done in time to ha\•e
enablert It to stop before overtaking the
paMst>nger train; but whether the fault
h1.r In neglect In this respect, or In the rear
train, If It bad sufficient notice to enable
lt to do so, falling to cheek up, need not
be considered, because, whetht:'r the one or
the other, the testimony ls of such a character as authorized the question of the exlstence or non-exleten<'e of gross nel,l'lect
upon the part of the company's agents to
be submitted to the jury. '!'hey returned
a ,·erdlct for fl0,000. It Iii urged that this
verdict le, In view of the evidence, so exces1dve that, conceding It embraces both
compensatory and punitive damages, yet
this court should revel'Be the jud"ment.
'I'he existence of ordinary neglect In HU<'h a
case authorizes compensatory damages,
whlle gross neglect permltR the jury to
award tbosfl which are both compen@atory anrt pnnltlve. In this Instance, the
Jur~·, If they thought proper, were authorlzecl by the lnstructlum1 to ftnd both.
Whether they have goue beyond a reasonable limit must be dt-termlned by the conduct ef the company's agents connected
with the accident, and the character of the
appellee·H Injuries. While the rule for the
me11HUrP111ent of compensatory damages
Jen vrH the mutter la~ely to the dlst•retlon
of the jury, yet the ftnrHng must be within
the confines of reason. ::lo, too, must excmplary damagt'I! be reasonably adequate
to the degree of fanlt. The appellee llURta.Inell Pxtcrnal bru!Res, and her nervous
system was greatly shocked. There ls evldence tending to show, ho\\ ever, that It
111111 been somewhat Impaired by previous
e. Pnt -. I 111111 . diatdy 11f1.-r th .. accident,
Hlie wulkecJ to 11 1rlen<l'11 house netir by.
1111d soon after rude liome In a vehicle, a

dh1tance of several miles. She was eo11flned to her bed for seven or eight weeke,
and euftered from nervoueness und sleep.
le88ness. Since she left her bed, she hu11
walked about her room, and been to town
once or twlcP, but has been unable to do
any work. The accident occurred In Oct.ober; the case wu tried In March following; and this, briefly Rta ted, Wafl her condition during that f:H:!ttlod. Noae of her
bones were broken, hut tit one time since
the accident, tf not ever since, she lias been
troubled with partial paralysis, or an Insensibility, In one leg, from the knee down.
The probalJle duration of her Injuries h1
not shown by the testimony. Whether
thev are of a permanent character does
not appe11r. The medical te11tlmony which
was Introduced Is utterly unHntlsfactory
In this N'Spect. The burden rested upon
the appellee to show the extent of her InJuriCR. If of a permanent character, she
should have shown It. A perusul of the
evidence creates no satisfactory opinion
upon this point, and leuves the matter In
entire rtoubt. The physicians who testified say she may recovflr entirely and she
may not.
It Is Impossible to measure with anything like absolute certainty the amount
of punitive damages proper In a cnse. or
the extent of some of the elements of those
which are compenRatury. The opinion of
8 jury ha.a been. ttnd properly, no rtoubt,
regarded as the best means of even a fair
approximation, and every verdict should
be treated fJl·ima fllcle as the result of honest Judgment upon their part. They are
the coustltutlonal triers of the facts of a
case, and courts shoulrt exercise greut cautlon In interfering with their verdicts.
Litigants must not bA left, however, to
their arbitrary will, and be without remedy In cases where verdicts can be accounted for only upon the theory that
they ure the result of au improper eymI path\' or unreasonable prejudice. In such
I case8 'it ls one of the highest dutleR of a
i court to Interfere; otherwise great wrongs
· will often result, and the party be remedl·
I less. Whether it should d.> so is moM
! easily determinable In R case where compeneatory damages only are allowable.
because they In part arlmlt of exf\ct meaeurement. In such cases, this court haH
often reversed the Jury's finding. We see
I no reason why it should not do 110 In a
case like this one, but with lncreasecl cautlon, perhaps.
, In the case now presented there was no
Intentional injury. An eftort was made to
ftag the coming train, and those In charge
of It attempted. upon notice of the dunger.
to Htop it. Whether these eftort11 were of
. such a character as left the company open
i to the charKe of gros11 neglect wus a questlon for the Jury. But no purpose to ln' Jure Is shown; and, while It was properly
a queMt.lnn for the determination of the
Jnrv whethi>r the company's agents hacl
not been ai:ullty of such neglect as merited
punishment by way of punitive dumageH,
yet, In our opinion, a. case was nut presented b:v the i>vldence for a vt-rdlct of
$10.000, either upon the score of pu11ishmentor compensation, or both. It IR tru('
that railroad cumpanit:H, as to their paK1
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sengers, should be held to the exercise of

the utmost care and skill which prudent

persons would be likely to exercise as to

themselves under the like circumstances,

and in the cond uct of abusiness so hazard-

ous as railroading; but in the absence of

bad motive or purpose of injurv, or a neg-

lect so wanton as to demand the severest

punishment, and where it is utterly uncer-

tain what the result of an injury will be, a

verdict ior such a sum as has been award-

ed to theappellee strikes one at ﬁrst blush

as the result of either prejudice towards

the offending party or an undue sympathy

for the one injured. While absolute cer-

tainty an to the result of an injury should

not be required, yet a mere conjecture, or

even a probability, does not warrant the -

sv_—__—‘_—_——-____—v-——_——__liiiﬁﬁii-____w—-—-—.‘ _ ' ‘T if’ f --—-q
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giving of damages for iuture disability,

which may never be realized. The inture

etiect of the injury should be shown with

reasonable certainty to authorize dam-

ages upon the score of permanent injury.

This wasnot done in this case. The evi-

dence nhows that the appellee is as likely

to entirely recover, and perhaps in a short

period of time, as she is to be permanently

affected by the injury. To sustain a ver-

dict likethis one under such circumstances

would often result in the grossest injus-

tice, and its existence can be accounted for

only upon the ground that the jury were

swayed by prejudice, or an improper con-

trolling sympathy. The judgment is

thereiore reversed, and cause remanded for

a new trial,consistent with this opinion.

ﬂy‘/.1/&;.;.‘ ,J$*%W/4/Q

tten~ra.

ehnuld be held to tbe exercise of
the utmost care and Rklll which prudent
peraonR would be likely to exercise as to
tbemsel \"ell unrler the like clrcumstnnce8,
and in the conduct of a boBlness 110 hasardoos as ratlroadlng; bot In the absence or
bad motive or purpOAe of lnjurvh, or a neglect so wanton as to demand t e severest
purushment, and where It 111 utterly uncertain what the result of an Injury will Lie, a
verdict for such a aum a.ti hae bt-en a warded to theappellee strikes one at flrat bluHh
88 the result ur either prejudice towards
the offending party or an undue sympathy
for the one injured. While absolute certalnt.\· RR to the result or an Injury should
nut be ruqulred, yet a mere conjecture, or
nen a probability, dOtlll not warraat the
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giving of damages for future dlsablltty.
which may never be realized. The future
eft(!('t of the Injury should be shown with
reasonable certulnty to authorize damages upon the score or permanent Injury.
This was.not done In this case. The evidence Mhows that the appellee Is as likely
to entirely recover, and perhaps lu a short
period of time, al! she ls to be permanently
affected by the Injury. To 1mstaln u verdict llketbls one under such circumstances
would often result In the groseet1t Injustice, and Its existence can be acuounted for
only upon the ground that tbe Jury were
swayed by prejudice, or an Improper controltlng sympathy. The Judgment ls
therefore revel"IH!d, and-cauae remantled for
a new trial, eonelst.eot with 11bl11 upinioo.
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(53 N. W. 1094, 94 Mich. 146.)
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RETAN v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.

(53 N. W. 1094, 94 Mich. 146.)

Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 22, 1892.

Error to. circuit court, Lenawee county;

Victor H. Lane, Judge.

Action by Frank A. Retan against the Lake

Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Com-

pany to recover damages for personal in-

juries. Judgment was entered on a verdict

for $30,000 in favor of plaintiff, and defend-

ant brings error. Aﬂirmed.

O. E. Weaver (Geo. C. Greene and O. G.

(letzen-Danner, of counsel), for appellant.

Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 22, 1892.
Error to. circuit court, Lenawee county;
Victor H. Lane, Judge.
.Action by Frank A. Retan against the Lake
Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Com1>any to recover dnm'ages for pcr1;oual injuries. Judgment was entered on a ve1·dlct
tor $30,000 in favor of plolntll'C, and defend·
ant brings error. .Afll.rmed.
C. E. Weaver (Geo. C. Greene and 0. G.
<;,,tzen-Danner, of cou·n sel), for appellant.
\\'utts, Bean & Smith and L. R. Pierson, for
appellee.

“'-atts, Bean & Smith and L. R. Pierson, for

appellee.

LONG, J. Plaintiff recovered a judgment

against,the defendant for $30,000 damages

for negligent injuries. The negligence com-

plained of was in allowing a sidewalk which
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crosses defendant's main track, and extends

along the side of a public street in the vil-

lage of Hudson, to become out of repair, and

dangerous to public travel, and by means of

which the plaintiff's foot was caught and

fastened in said walk between one of the

planks and one of the rails of defendant‘s

track, and while being so held one of de-

fendant's trai.ns of cars ran over him, cutting

off both his feet. The main track of de-

fendant's road, extending easterly and west-

erly, crosses Main street in that village at a

very acute angle. A sidewalk 6 feet wide

has been maintained on the north side of

Main street for some distance for over 30

years by the owners of the abutting prop-

erty, and by the village at the street cross-

ings. The defendant company has main-

tained this walk over its right of way since

1868. In that year the village council, by

resolution, directed the building of a side-

walk on the north side of Main street be-

tween Tiﬂln and High streets, and notiﬁed

the defendant to build that portion across its

right of way, which it did, and has ever

since maintained it. The planks of the walk

inside the railroad tracks ran parallel with

the rails. Crossing the track at such an

acute angle, the extreme length of the plank

sidewalk is about 27 feet, though the walk

is only 6 feet wide. The planks are laid

away from either rail from 2 to 2I/; inches,

to allow the ﬂange of the car wheels to pass

la'tween them and the rails. The plank in

the walk next the south rail had become

split on the west end, so that a piece had

been torn out about 14 inches long, leaving

an open space between the rail and the

plank 3% inches wide at the end, extending

14 inches along the plank, and narrowing

down to 2 or 2% inches. On January 3, 1891,

the plaintiff, while passing along this walk,

dropped his mitten near the center of the

planking between the rails. He passed be-

yond the rails about 25 feet, when, missing

the mitten, he retraced his steps to get it,

and, arriving at the west end of the plank-

ing, he turned and saw the fast mail train

of defendant approaching from the west. As

LONG, J. Plaintitr recovered a judgment
against, the defendant for $30,000 damages
for negligent Injuries. Tqe negligence complained of was In allowing a sidewalk which
crosses defendant's main track, and extends
along the side of a public street in the vii·
lage of Hudson, to hecome out of rrpnlr, and
dangerous to public travel, and by means of
which the plalntltr's foot was caught and
fnsteued In said walk between one of the
planks and one of the rails of defendant's
trn<'k, and whill' being so held one of defl'rnl1111t's trains of cars ran over him, cutting
off hoth his feet. The main track of defendnut's road, extending easterly and west·
erly, crosses l\Inln street In that vlllage at a
n:ry acute angll'. A sidewalk 6 feet wide
has been maintained on the north side of
:\lnln street for some distance for over 30
yl'ars by the owners of the ahuttlng property, and by the village at the t!treet crossings.
The defendant company has maintained this walk over its right of way since
1808. In that year the village council, by
resolution, dfrected the building of a sidewalk on the north side of Main street between Tiffin and High streets, and notified
tlw defendant to build that portion across Its
rig..l!t of way, which it did, and hns ever
since maintained It. The planks of the walk
Inside the railroad tracks ran parallel with
the rails. Cro!!sing the trnck at such an
acnte angle, the extreme length of the plank
sidewalk Is ahout 27 feet, though the walk
Is only 6 fe£~ t wide. The planks are laid
a wny from l'ither ra.il from 2 to 21:4 inches,
tn allow the tlang-e of the car wheels to pass
ht'hl'l'Pn them and the rails. The plank In
the walk next thr south rail had become
spilt on the west end, so that a piece had
b<'en torn out about 14 Inches long, leaving
an open space between the rail and the
IJlank 3~~ inches wide at the end, extending
H: Inches along the plank, and narrowing
down to 2 or 211~ Inches. On January 3, 1891,
the plalntltr, while passing along this walk,
dropped his mitten near the center of the
planking between the mils. He passed beyond the rails about 25 feet, when, missing
the mitten, he retraced his steps to get it,

and, arriving at the west end of the planking, he turned and saw the fast mail trnln
of defendant approaching from the west. .\M
he turned towards the west, his foot, which
was resting upon the south rail of the de~
fendant'll track, slipped oft, and was caught
In this space left by the broken. pia,nk. He
tried to extricate his foot, and, finding he
could not do so, he signaled the train to
stop. 'l'he train was then at or near what
Is called the "Stone Bridge," about 58! feet
away, and running, as the engineer testifies.
about 12 miles an hour, but gaining speed.
The engineer, as soon as he saw the plalntltr was ca-qght, made every possible e1lort
to stop the . train, but was unable to do so
until the engine and tender had run over the
plaintltr, and cut otr the left foot above the
ankle and crushed the right one. Both feet
were subsequently amputated; the left one
near the knee, and the right forward of the
heel. It appears that the plaintllt saw the
train coming before he crossed the track tht.>
first time, and knew what train it was. Ht•
was accustomed to see this train every day.
As he left High street on his route west and
reached the track, he could see west upon
the track several hundred feet distant; and
as he crossed over, the train was some 800
feet distant from the crossing. PlaintUf was
born and brought up In the v111age, and had
lived there nearly all his life, and had been
accustomed to pass along this walk; but he
says he had never noticed Its condition or
this defect. When stopping and turning to
look at the approaching train, be did not notice where he put his foot, but says It must
have been on the rail, and from there slipped
Into this hole. This walk between the rails
had been twice renewed, the last time about
seven years before the accident. The testimony shows that the hole in this plank had
been there from six to nine months, and that
several other persons, prior to plaintiff's Injury, had their feet caught In the same hole.
and some of them had con,;hlPrnble difficulty
In extricating them.
'l'he declaration charges the breach of duty
as follows: "But the defendant, dlsrl'garll·
Ing Its said duty in that behalf, on the lat1t
day aforesaid, and tor a long time, to wit,
three months prior thereto, permitted and
allowed said sidewalk where It crossed th1•
track of said defendant to become decayed.
broken. and out ot repair, and one of the
planks adjoining and next to the south rail
of said trnck to bf><•ome spilt and broken,
so that there wns a space between the s:1ld
rail and said plank large enough to receive a
man's shoe and foot, and Into which a person walking along said walk and across l!aid
track was liable to be thrown down, and the
foot fastened; and which said hole had been
left by defendant to remain and be unrepa.lred and in a dangerous cond1Uon for a space
ot time, to wit, sixty days prior to the 3d of
January, 1891."
It ts' claimed that under the charter of the
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defendant company and the general railroad

laws of the state no duty is cast upon the

defendant company to construct or maintain

a sidewalk across a public street. either in

a township, village, or city. While it is true

that the charter of the defendant company

or the general railroad laws of the state do

not provide in express terms for the build-

mg of a sidewalk, as such, across any pub-

lic street, yet it is provided by the defend-

ant's charter that whenever the company

shall construct its road across a public high-

way it shall restore it “to its former state,

or in a suﬂlcient manner not necessarily to_

impair its usefuiness." In the present case,

however, we need not discuss or. consider

that question. The defendant company, act- ‘

ing under the notiﬁcation of the common

council of the village, did construct the cross- t

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ing there, and for years has assumed the

duty of keeping it in repair. By this act

it invited people to pass over it, and it has

thus become its duty to keep it in a reason-

ably safe condition for public travel. As

was said in Stewart v. Railroad Co., 89 Mich.

315, o0 N. W. 852: .“It was a structure built

upon its own land, and by its nature and

use was a continual invitation to those law- ,

fully having a right to cross from one side

to another at that place to enter upon it and

cross there; and, so long as this invitation

thus impliedly given to such persons contin-

ued, it was the duty of the defendant, inde-

pendently of any contract, to see to it that

it was safe for the purposes implied by the

invitation." This principle is supported by

abundant authority. Nichols' Adm'r v. Rail-

road Co., 83 Va. 99, 5 S. E. 171. The same

principle was involved in the case of Cross

v. Railway Co., 69 Mich. 363, 37 N. W. 361,

and the cases there cited. In Spooner v.

Railroad Co., 115 N. Y. 22, 21 N. E. 696, the

court held the‘ defendant company liable for

the injury upon the ground that it had as-

sumed the duty of maintaining the crossing.

2. It is claimed that there was no such

defect in the planking between the rails as

to make the defendant liable- The action

is not based upon the faulty construction of

the crossing, but in permitting it to become

defective, in that a hole was permitted to

i'cnui..iIt for a long space of time unrepalred.

,In the construction a space was left for the

ﬂange of the car wheels to pass along the

side of the rail. No negligence is claimed

on that ground, but that, -when the plank

became broken and split off sufﬁcient to ad-

mit a person's foot, it was not reasonably

safe. It was admitted on the trial by the

track hands of the defendant company that,

if the plank had been examined, the defect

would readily have been seen.- No claim

was made that any such examination was

made for a long space of time, and, no par-

ticular examination for the last,six years

prior to the injury, except such ascould be

made by the track hands passing over the

crossing on a hand car. Some of defend-

clefendant company and the general railroad ant's witnesses-and especially tho road maslaws of the state no duty Is C8A!t upon the ter-testified that the planking next the rail
1l1•fl•ndant company to construct or maintain would be n£>arly used up by the passing
n sidewalk across a puhllc str~t. either in trains in about six months, and yet no ina township, village, or city. While It ls true spection of the walk ls claimed to ha rn be£>n
that tlle chart('r of the drf1•rnlunt company made, except that above stated by the track
or the general railroad law8 of the state do hands. There was abundant evidence on the
not prO\·lde In express terms for the bulld- trial that the defect existed, and that the
mg of a sidewalk, as such, across any pub- defendant company, by the least care, would
lic street, yet It Is provided by the dPfoncl- have discovered It.
nut's charter that whenever the company
Error ls assigned upon the refusal of the
"hall construct Its road across a public high- court to gh·e se'teral requests to charge.
way tt shall restoi,;e It "to Its former state, The questions so raised are fully disposed
01· In a sufficient manner not necessarily to. of .in what has already been said. The court
Impair Its usefulness." In the present case, submitted the question of defendant's neghowever, we need not discuss or con11lder ligence to the jury as follows: "Before the
that question. The defendant company, act- plalntHf Is entitled to a verdict at your hands
ing under the notltlcatlon of the common here, he must convince you by a prepondercouncil of the village, did construct the cross- : ance ot the evidence-you must be convinced
Ing there, and for years llas assumed the by a preponderance or the evlde11.Ca.. 111... the
duty of ket>plng It In repair. By thls act case-that the company were negligent In peI<it Invited pt>ople to pass over It, and It has
mltting this walk to be in the condition which
thus become Its duty to keep It In a reason- It was in at the time the accident occurred;
nbly safe condition for public travel. As . that that negligence was the direct cause of
was said ln Stewart v. Railroad Co., 89 Mich. ..the Injury wblch the plalntlt'l' claims to have
air., rJO N. W. 852: ."It was a structure built sut'l'ered; and that he,. himself, the plaintlt'f..
upon Its own land, and by its nature and was not negligent In such a way as to co1,1use was a continual Invitation to those law- trlbute himself to the injury which occurrf!\l.
fully having a right to cross from one side I say you must be Slltlsfted, be!c;>re a vei;to 11nother at that place to cnte1· upon It and dlct can be rendered for the plnlntlt'l', of ench
cross there; and, so long as this Invitation and all of these propositions. Your first inUrns lmpl11•dly given to such per,.ons coutln- quiry will naturally be as t.o whether the
11ed. It wa!! the duty of the defendant, lnde- defendant was negligent In permitting this
l)t1n<lently of any contract, to Sl'e to It that walk to be In the condition In which It was;
It was saft~ for the purposes lm11lled by the and upon that question you are lniltructed
invitation." This principle Is 11upported by that the company are bound to exercise that
ahundnnt authority. Nichols' Adm'r v. Rall- degree or care In . the construction and oper1·oncl Co., 83 Ya. 99, 5 S. E. 171. The same a tlon of tbls road as Is common to railway
prlndple Wll'> inYolved ln the case of Cross companies; that degree ot care which, in
v. Railway Co., 69 Mlcb. 3ti3, 37 N. W. :ml, view of the clrcumstmces, . would be req.ul,i;-and the cases there cited. In Spooner v. ed by prudent management. If this def~ct,
Hnllroad Co., 115 N. Y. 22, 21 N. E. 696, tbe which Is cbarged In the plaintiff's declaration,
c~ourt held the· defendant company liable for
-and which Is only that th1~ <'ompany per,tbe injury upon the ground that It had as· mltted this hole to. 'be there next . to the i·all,
sumed the duty of maintaining the crossing. a!! has beeu descrlbecl,;-lt - this defect. werr
2. It Is claimed that there was no such such a one as that ordinary. care .on the .part
defect In the planking between the rails as or tl!e railroad company. would .not discoYer
to make the defendant liable.. The action It, and they bad no knowledge of It. then
ls not based upon the faulty construction of there .would not .be, ln law, negligence- such
the Ci-os!ling, but In permitting it to become as that the defendant woui4)>c lll'ld ' l'61tfl01\·
dt•ft;ctiYe, in that a hole was permitted to sible. .Lo this action,. .on tile. Qther blind.. It
It . was such a defect,. If the defect was the
rt-'lll~in for a long space of time unrepalroo.
In tb'e construction a space was left tor the cause o! the Injury, and .was such a one ail
flange of the car wheels to pass along the that by careful and prudent management on
side of the rail. No negligence ls claimed the part of the company It should have been
on that ground, but that, .when the plank discovered, then. there was ·negligence Jn the
became hroken and spilt oft sufliclent to ad- company In permitting the pince to be there,
mit a pnson's foot, It was not reasonably whether they had actual knowledge OX'. .tlqt~
safe. It was admitted on tho trial by the 'l'he railroad company are not lnsurei·>1; till'
track hands of tbe defendant company that, law do£'8 not require . that they be .lnsur,•rs
If the plank had been examined, the defect against accidents, or against Injuries being
would rc>adlly have been 11een. . No claim received by.persons and Individuals w.b1,> m~y
was mnue that any .such examln~tlon was come upon _thWr property, or 1n the. vicinity
made for a long space of time, and ..nQ par- of It. .There ls danger necessarily Jncldent tQ
tlcula r examination for the la.st . six years , the businell8 of managing and, operatj~. a
prior to the lpjury, except such as. could be railroad ·.company, which all per1mns 1100
made bf the track hands past11lng over the bound to.. fake ~ogn!Zftnc·e of. such · as ar~ witr
crossing on a hand car. Some of defend· ur,1lly Incident to It; but the law · requires
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that. as I have said, the company shall have

in mind the nature of the business which

they are carrying on, and shall take such pre-

cautions as the nature of it and the perils

which are incident to it would seem to re-

quire. The ordinary care and prudence

which railway management and experience

has generally shown are proper. If. then,

the company were not negligent in permitting

this defect to be in this walk, under these in-

structions, they are not responsible. If they

were.—if they failed to perform the duty

which I have stated to you was put upon

them under the law,—and failed to exercise

that degree of care and prudence which is

common in prudent railway management,

thentherc would be negligence." This was

a fair submission of these questions to the ju-

ry under the evidence in the case.
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3. It is claimed that the defendant had no

notice of the defect. The testimony shows

that the defect had existed for several

months; that many persons had noticed it,

and several persons. prior to that time, had.

been caught in the same way at that place,

and in the same hole. This testimony was

all before the jury, and from which they may

well have found that, though the company

had no actual notice of the defect, it was

its duty to have known it, had it exercised

any care. It was competent to show that

others were caught in the same hole prior to

the time of piaintiff's injuries. Lombar v.

Village of East Tawas, 86 Mich. 14, 48' N.

W. 947.

4. It is claimed that the plaintiff was guilty

of contributory negligence in returning to the

crossing in face of the approaching train, and

especially as he testiﬁed that he did not look

where he stepped. Several requests to charge

were submitted to the court upon this claim.

and refused. The court, under the general

charge. left that as a question of fact for the

determination of the jury, and, as we think,

very properly. It appeared that at the time

he stepped upon the track the train was

nearly 600 feet away. He had seen the train

pass there every day for years, and knew the

rate of speed it was going. He would un-

doubtedly have had plenty of time to have

passed over and got his mitten. had it not

been for the defect, for which the defendant

was solely in fault. We cannot say as mat-

ter of law that his conduct was such as to

charge him with negligence. It is not like

the case of one who attempts to cross a rail-

road track with a team in the face of an ap-

proaching train. A very careful and prudent

person might have attempted the same thing.

it was not a peril voluntarily and unneces-

sarily assumed, within the meaning of the

cases cited by counsel, but an act which un-

der the testimony the jury had a right to

pass upon, and determine whether it was

negligent or not. It cannot be said either

that as matter of law the plaintiff was negli-

gent in not looking where he stepped. He

had a right to believe that the crossing was

on
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that, as I have said, the company shall have sate. He had palJ8ed ever It a sreat many
lo mlnd the DB.ture of the business which tlmea ud laad not had bl& attention ca.Deel
they are carrying on, and shall take· eucb pre- t.o this defect. It was a way provided by
cautions as the nature of It and t.he perils the defendant tor him and otben of the pubwhich are Incident to It would seem to re- lic to pa88, and It cannot be said that a
quire. The ordinary care and prudence IM!rson traveling alon1 a way must at all
which raJlway management and experience times looli: where he steps or be charged with
bas generally .shown are pl!oper. If. then, being negligent. It waa a question for the
the company were not negligent In permitting jury.
this detect to be ln this walk, under these ID·
5. It ls claimed further that the JOT'J' Wen!'
structlo11t1, they are not responsible. It tbey lnfiuenced la awarding so large a. verdict by
were,-lf tbey talled to perform tbe duty the langoare of plaintUr's counsel. W!ed In ·
which I have stated to you was put upon the cloaing arlfUJlleDt. Tpe following portion
them under the law,-and falled to exerelse of such argument la selected, and error IUlthat degree of care and pradenee wbleh ls slgned UPon It: "U you tlnd,. gentlemen of
common In prudent raHway menagement, the jury, tbat UU. defendant ought t.o pay
then. there would be negllcenoe." Tbla wa this boy, I hope you will not qnibble- over tbe
a fair submission of tbe11e questiolllt t.o· the ju- amount. Tbe· good Lord knows be cannot
ry under the nldence In the case.
Jaave t.oo much; and yet, gentlemen, as has
3. It 18 claimed that the defendant bad no already been said before you, we do not want
notice of tbe def8'?t. The testJmony allow. you to glive such an amount that It might
that the defect bad existed for aeveral shock the common sense ot the community
moll-tbs; that man,: persona bad· noticed lt, and people generally; but we want enough.
and several penons, prior to tbat time, bad . and It ls for your judgment, and yours only,
been eaugbt In tbe same way at that place, as to bow much lt shall be. Nobody else h&111
and ln the same bole. This testimony was a right to interfere. Ah, gentlemen, nobody
all before the jury, and from wblcb they may else will interfere." When taken In connecwell bave found that, though the compan1 tion with the other portion of tbe argument.
had no actual notice of the defect, lt was which Is set out ln the record, we tblnk counIts duty to have known It. had lt exerclaed sel cannot claim that anything Im~ WS8
any CAre. It was competent to show that said, even lf the portion of whlcb complaint
others were· caugbt kl the same bole prior to ls made can be said to be Improper. Counthe time of platntUr'a lnjmles. Lombar v. sel, continuing hls remarlta to the Jury upVillage ot East Tawaa; 86 Hieb. 14,. 48 N. on that subject, said: "Disabuse younelTes
from sympathp; dJlabwie yourselves from any
w. 941.
4. It ls claimed that the plalntHr wu guilty 1!eellng that 1011 waDt to do for hhn,-whethof contributory negllgence In returnmg to the er It la right or wrong,-lf It la possible that
cr08slng lo face of the· approaching train, and 1ou have any such feellq. Come down to
especlall7 aa he testl4ed that he did not look the law and the facts as the rourt wlll give
where he stepped. Several requests to charge them to you. Let lt strike where lt wlU.
were submitted to tbe court upon this claim, If lt will lea'Ye this paor boy where he ls.
and refused. Tbe court, l!Dder the general under the evidence, then so be lt. But don't
charge. left that as a question of fact for the clve lllm a pittance. Don't give hlm what,
determlnatlon of the Jury, and, as we think. ln proportloa 1Q Uie lnj11ry be bu suffered.
very properly. It appeared that at the time would be no compensation. We want suclt
be stepped upon the track the trsln was an amount •• this brother right bere wm reenearly 60& feet away. He had seen the train ognlze as a fak and just verdict. Give such
pau there every day for years, and knew the a verdict as you believe Clement ll Weaver
be one of you.''
rate of speed It was aolog. lie would un- himself would lfve,
doubtedl7 have had plenty of time to bave It ls not claimed that there was any mlspassed o1'er and got his mitten, bad lt not sta temeat ol fact or law, and certainly the
been for tbe defect, for which tbe defendant language would net bave a tendency to inwaa eolely In fault. We eannot say u mat- flame the minds of the Jurors against the corter of law that his conduct wu such as ro poration. They were told to disabuse their
charge him with neglfgence. It ls not ltke minds from all syllll)ll.thy, and to give such
the case of one who attempts to croa a rall- an amount as would not shock the common
road track with a team ln the face ot an ap- sen.se of men generally; and to this wu addproaching train. A very careful and prudent ed the request to lfve llUt!b a verdict as thl'
person might have attempted the same thing. attorney of the defendant c01npan7 would
It w&1 not a peril voluntarily and unnece• ctve If he were on the jury. It la true thar
sarll7 assumed, wltbln the meanh1g ot the there may hlltv:e been an appearance of frallkcues cited by counsel, but an act wlllcb UD· aeSB and talrue. on the part of counsel, used
der the testimony the jury had a rlgbt to as a cover while he wal!I attempting to arouRt•
pass upon, and determine whether lt was · the sympathy of tlle jury tor the plalntl1r's
negligent or not. It cannot be said either . condition; but we are not prepared to sa;:\·
that as matter ot law the plalntur was negli- that the language was IO tar prejudlcfal &fl
gent ln not looking where be stepped. H e to call for a reversal ot the judgment. Counhad a right to believe that '1le crosalng wu sel muat have some latitude In the argu-
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ment of cases: and. while we have reversed

cases for intemperate language of counsel.

where it plainly appeared that it was used

for the purpose of arousing the passions or

prejudices of the jury, which must neces-

.\‘i\ril)' prejudice the opposite partyJ we see

nothing in these remarks which should call

for any uch rule.

6. We have examined this record. and have

heen unable to ﬁnd any error in the proceed-

ings. We have not felt called upon to dis-

cuss all the assignments of error, but have

t‘X8IIIiDed them with that care which the

large amount involved demands. One other

point demands attention. It is claimed that

the amount of damages is excessive. Not

having found any error in the proceedings, or

anything improper upon the trial tending to

prejudice the defendant's rights or inﬂame

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105421491
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the jury. and thereby prejudice them against

the defendant, we cannot disturb the verdict

on the ground solely that it is greater in

amount than we think should have been

given. Hunn v. Railroad Co., 78 Mich. 529.

44 N. W. 5%; Richmond v. Railway Co..

87 Mich. 392, 49 N. W. 621; Stuyvesant v.

Wilcox (Mich.) 52 N. W. 467. I am not pre-

pared to say, however, that cases might not

arise where, even under our iformer rulings.

we would not be justiﬁed in considering that

question. It the verdict was such as to

shock the common sense and judgment of

mankind, it might call for a different rule.

and the court might be justiﬁed in overturn-

ing it. But that is not so in this case.

The jury have taken into consideration the

pain and suffering this piaintiff.‘ has endured.

and the loss to him for the remainder of his

years of both feet. It may be large, but the

jury alone had the right to determine it. The

judgment must be afﬁrmed, with costs. The

other justices concurred.
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